February 13, 2001
Top Marine Clears Osprey's Design in Crash
By JAMES DAO
WASHINGTON, Feb. 12 — The Marine Corps has conclusively
determined that the Dec. 11 crash of a V-22 Osprey that killed four
marines was a result of hydraulic and computer failures, not the
aircraft's hybrid tilt-rotor design, the commandant of the corps said
today.
The Marines are hoping that the finding, part of a crash report they
expect to send to Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld as early as
this week, will be the first step toward rehabilitating the costly and
troubled V-22 program, which has been plagued by two fatal accidents and
accusations of falsified maintenance reports in the last year alone.
"The thing I would say now is it doesn't appear to be anything that has
to do with tilt-rotor physics," the commandant, Gen. James L. Jones,
said of the December crash in an interview today. More generally, the
commandant said that "there is sometimes out there an idea that an
aircraft that takes off like a helicopter and flies like a plane can't
do either very well," but that "so far the physics of the tilt rotor
doesn't lend itself to that type of criticism."
Some aircraft experts have questioned the inherent safety of the Osprey,
on whose wings are rotors that can tilt up like a helicopter's or
forward like a plane's. Those questions, dealing with the craft's
aerodynamic stability, are being reviewed by an expert panel appointed
late last year by William S. Cohen, then the secretary of defense.
General Jones said he was optimistic that the Marines' final crash
report would include assurances from the Defense Department's inspector
general that the December crash, as well as a fatal crash last April,
were not a result of falsified maintenance records at the Osprey
squadron's headquarters at the New River Marine Corps Air Station in
North Carolina. That case is a subject of a separate inquiry.
"You want to be sure that you can de-link any insinuation that there
might have been a maintenance problem or anything that could have been,
and should have been, caught with either crash," General Jones said.
"I'm reasonably optimistic that we're going to be able to do that."
The Osprey, built by the Boeing Company's helicopter division and
Textron Inc.'s Bell Helicopter unit, has been one of the Pentagon's most
controversial programs for over a decade. The aircraft, still
experimental, will have a price tag of well over $30 billion should full
production proceed, and already had a record of crashes before the one
last April.
In 1989, Dick Cheney, then the defense secretary, tried to cancel the
Osprey to save money. But Congress kept it alive. Then, last April,
safety questions that had already emerged grew all the more serious when
an Osprey crashed in the Arizona desert, killing all 19 marines on
board. Those questions multiplied with the December crash, near the New
River station.
And in January, the Marines opened in investigation of the Osprey
squadron at New River after receiving an anonymous letter accusing the
squadron commander of ordering subordinates to cover up maintenance
problems. In addition to the letter was a tape recording that appeared
to implicate the commander, Lt. Col. Odin F. Leberman. Colonel Leberman
has been relieved of command, and the inquiry has been taken over by the
Pentagon's inspector general, who is investigating whether high-ranking
Marine officers might have pressured the colonel to falsify the records.
General Jones declined today to provide details about the causes of the
hydraulic and computer malfunctions that he said led to the December
crash. But he said investigators had found amid the debris a broken
hydraulic line that, he said, proved their hypothesis that a hydraulic
failure had caused the pilot, considered the best in the V-22 squadron,
to lose control.
The hydraulic system enables the pilot to control the speed and
direction of the aircraft by adjusting its wings, rotors and rotor
engine casings. Pentagon officials in charge of testing the craft had
warned of worn hydraulic lines in existing Ospreys in the weeks before
the crash.
Investigators have also concluded that because of a computer software
malfunction, an emergency backup for the hydraulic system did not work.
One person familiar with elements of the investigation said the software
appeared to have been incorrectly written, creating even greater
problems for the pilot as he struggled to regain control in the seconds
before the crash.
General Jones said today that the Osprey was extremely important to the
Marine Corps, because it can fly much farther and faster than the
Vietnam-era helicopters it is supposed to replace. But he said he would
be the first to support canceling the program if it were proved to be
inherently unsafe. "We should never have preconceived notions that you
can't receive bad news," he said. "And if it's bad news, I'll be the
first to stand up as a moral issue and say, `We ought not to do this.' "
Copyright 2001 The New
York Times Company
Well hello! The controversial high pressure hydraulic system IS part of the
design! Still looks like a "design" problem to me, until they fix the numerous
hydraulic problems.
Ron (Sikorsky fan)
<Sigh...>
Normally I would say that you give Sikorsky a bad name, but Nick
Lappos more than makes up for you.
But please do give the Boeing/anything-not-sikorsky bashing bender a
rest. It's become quite tiresome, and makes reading one of my favorite
newsgroups more tedious than it needs to be.
Thanks,
Dave Blevins (helicopter fan)
: Normally I would say that you give Sikorsky a bad name, but Nick
: Lappos more than makes up for you.
While Ron is a goofball, he can't give Sikorsky a bad name. That's like
saying that a guy who drives a Chevy with a logo that says "Ford
sucks" gives Chevy a bad name.
: But please do give the Boeing/anything-not-sikorsky bashing bender a
: rest. It's become quite tiresome, and makes reading one of my favorite
: newsgroups more tedious than it needs to be.
Admittedly, in this case Ron has a point. It is a bad article. Very
sloppy. There's not really a story here--just the general saying that the
tilt-wing didn't cause the accident. The reporter extrapolated from that
to conclude that there is no design flaw in the aircraft. You cannot make
that conclusion--while the tilt wing might be fine, the transition to
vertical flight might exacerbate design flaws (such as shaking apart
hydraulic connections). There still might be design flaws in the V-22
that we don't know about.
The criticism of the V-22 has swung over to the safety issue. But you
have to admit that it is a complicated subject. There are many reasons
why the V-22 is in trouble. These include the cost issue that has plagued
it for years. And they include other design deficiencies. (For instance,
the aircraft can only carry 18 troops vs. the original 24 that were
planned.)
D
I have to admit, I didn't read the "The V22 ain't broke" article in
detail... I'm just tired of having any negative news item that's not
about a Sikorsky product being carted around the campfire as Ron does
his little war dance and hoop-hoops. Also, any time Brand S wins a
contract or whatever, it's posted like some hot and important news
item.
Like I said, it's tiresome.
But all that said, if the V22 cannot autorotate when at max gross, I
think I'd pass up a ride in it under those conditions, even if they
pointed me at the cyclic and said, "you drive". Nuh-uh.
Pass me another 'Smores,
Camper Dave
helicopter fan
: Like I said, it's tiresome.
I'm new to this group. I figured him out immediately and dumped him in my
killfile. Amazing thing--he doesn't bother me anymore because I don't see
his posts.
: But all that said, if the V22 cannot autorotate when at max gross, I
: think I'd pass up a ride in it under those conditions, even if they
: pointed me at the cyclic and said, "you drive". Nuh-uh.
There was a really good discussion briefly on the V-22 on
sci.military.naval a month or so ago. A poster addressed the issue of the
tilt-rotor in a pretty sophisticated way (even though he's apparently not
a pilot). He noted that pilot workload on the aircraft is high under the
best of circumstances, then questioned what happens when a pilot has to
transition to vertical flight in a hot landing zone. How well can the
pilot handle the aircraft when he's trying to avoid other aircraft and
keeping an eye out for hostile fire? This could make the V-22 a bad
aircraft.
So there's lots of serious questions to be asked about this airplane. I
think the V-22 is neat, but recognize that neat doesn't automatically
translate into a good choice.
D
The workload during the transition is supposed to be pretty high.
: seem convinced. I believe in allowing the involved party make the
: decision.
Which involved party? The contractor? The Marines? The DoD?
You think the USMC is an unbiased party in this? Would that be before or
after it turned out that someone was doctoring the maintenance records.
D
Heck no the USMC is not an "unbiased party" in this. I think they have
a very real need and believe the V22 is the best available answer. Not
a perfect solution, but a carefully considered choice. The Corps
appears to be very conservative aviation wise- they're still flying
Cobras and Hueys (Yes, I know- they have very little resemblance to Viet
Nam era Snakes and Slicks). But the USMC is revolutionary when
something with a perceived advantage appears- AV-8, for instance.
I think the V22 is a very compromised aircraft for combat assault type
missions, but I'm only a pilot. Some staff type has probably worked
through the compromises, weighted them, and mathematically proven a
round peg is better in this square hole. Lies, damned lies and
statistics... but the Corps appears to have made a decision based on
their knowledge of their mission with their resources. I wish them luck
and hope they are correct. It will be an expensive and difficult
project.
Tilt rotors make poor helicopters or airplanes. But in some missions
helicopters are poor answers, and airplanes completely unsuitable. I
don't hear anybody slamming the S76 because it's compromised in lift
missions compared to 212's. Tilt rotors are 2 steps beyond S76's in
that mission from the get go, and the gap will widen with experience.
180 Walt
The USMC should be unbiased because they are the people that end up flying
it in combat. There are people certainly in the five-sided palace that have
a vested interest in the V-22 but the people who test and evaluate the V-22
should have no axe to grind. (SHOULD is the operative word)
"Dwayne Allen Day" <wayn...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu> wrote in message
news:Ey0j6.594$AS6....@grover.nit.gwu.edu...
A lot of their conservatism on this stuff has to do with budgets--they
don't get the big aviation budget that the other services do. The same
applies for ground equipment.
D
Yes, the high pressure hydraulics are part of the _V-22_ design, but one
of the points is they're not part of the _tilt rotor_ design. 3000psi
"AN" is the standard, the V-22 uses 5000psi, but the F-18 has been using
4000psi for twenty years without it causing problems. The other point
is somebody goofed with the leak isolation logic.
Do you know how fast you can lose _all_ the fluid in a 3000psi system
from one leak? Snap your fingers, it can be that quick. One of my
friends had a hydraulic line leak badly enough that the reservoir in
that system completely emptied before the low _pressure_ sensor could
trip and trigger the leak detector/isolator to do its thing. Even
"tried and true" technology doesn't always work as advertised.
>The other point
>is somebody goofed with the leak isolation logic.
Jim, the V22 did as designed, pilot input altered the outcome.
I haven't read the report, this was my interpretation of the article
Walter posted- the principle causes in the Dec 11 crash were a massive
hydraulic leak (which, for a 5,000psi system, might not be much greater
than a pinhole leak), and the automatic leak isolation either working
not as advertised, or working properly but "properly" meant flawed
logic.
Heck, this is still a lot of speculation- I'm not sure I've even seen it
on good authority that the "hydraulic malfunction" was a leak- maybe it
was a hardover...
Dangerpig wrote:
> A
>
> The USMC should be unbiased because they are the people that end up flying
> it in combat. There are people certainly in the five-sided palace that have
> a vested interest in the V-22 but the people who test and evaluate the V-22
> should have no axe to grind. (SHOULD is the operative word)
Fundamentally there are several different kinds of "bias". Bijker calls it the
"technological frame" for the decision. Usually the conflict is some
unprovable assertion which the parties tend to believe is a fact. (e.g. the
value of the SAT in saying who are the best students to take at the
university) Once you accept the contested "fact" as true, all other
decisions appear "unbiased" because they are based on "facts". In the case of
the V-22 I believe the "facts" are the need for the long range high speed
capability and that such capability is vital to the future of the USMC. Once
you accept this as a "given" all other decision about the V-22 can be described
as "unbiased" becasue they are made inreference to that frame.
Vince
Vince wrote...>Fundamentally there are several different kinds of "bias".
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:3A8FC802...@pressroom.com...
Nevertheless, one thing is clear from the Falklands conflict -- anything
which speeds up an amphibious assault and allows the assault convoy to spend
as little time under the enemy land-based air defense "umbrella" is a good
thing.
Think about it.
"Vince Brannigan" <fir...@pressroom.com> wrote in message
news:3A8FC802...@pressroom.com...
>
>
http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23372-2001Feb18.html
By Mary Pat Flaherty and Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, February 19, 2001; Page A01
"To save time and money, the Marine Corps omitted tests of the V-22 Osprey
that would have provided additional data on rapid descents that
contributed to a crash that killed 19 Marines in April, according to a new
report by the General Accounting Office.
The GAO report, which has not been publicly released, also says the
Marines had warnings about troubles in the aircraft's hydraulics
system. Military investigators now believe that a frayed hydraulics line
was a key factor in a second Osprey crash in December in which four more
Marines died.
Overall, the GAO review casts serious doubt on both the safety and
reliability of the troubled Osprey and on the rigor of Marine Corps
testing of the aircraft. The Marine Corps touts the Osprey, which takes
off and lands like a helicopter but can tilt its rotors..."
--