Af/Pak & Other News (3/20/2013)

[dump...@hotmail.com]

Army eyes VHF aircraft radar able to detect hidden IEDs from altitudes
as high as 25,000 feet:

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/03/IED-airborne-radar.html



Afghans Compromise on Special Forces Ban:

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/afghans-compromise-on-special-forces-ban.html



Leupold and Aimpoint combine optics to win Navy ECOS-O combat infantry
rifle sight contract:

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/03/ECOS-O-contract.html



Pakistani Taliban overrun rival faction's headquarters, dozens killed:

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/03/pakistani_taliban_ov.php




Afghanistan's Nuristan province 'at mercy of the Taliban':

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-21035695




Army eyes automated methods of combing through captured sites for
important intelligence:

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/03/Army-automated-SSE.html



Court Hears Lawsuit Over German-Ordered Strike In Afghanistan:

http://www.rferl.org/content/article/24934178.html





India successfully testfires submarine-launched version of BrahMos
missile:

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/sci/2013-03/20/c_132249399.htm





Ex-CIA officer on the strike that could have averted Iraq War:

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57575236/ex-cia-officer-on-the-strike-that-could-have-averted-iraq-war/




Ambassador: No evidence of chemical use in Syria:

http://news.yahoo.com/ambassador-no-evidence-chemical-syria-144508422--politics.html;_ylt=AvC8nIPWX6pXHsERkkdqqLis0NUE;_ylu=X3oDMTNrOWVpbGo1BG1pdANNZWdhdHJvbiBGUARwa2cDN2EyNmM2ODItMTMxNS0zZGQ2LTkwOGYtOTY5YzY5Mjc2YjY0BHBvcwMxBHNlYwNtZWdhdHJvbgR2ZXIDZGIxNjEwZjYtOTE2Zi0xMWUyLWJkZDMtOWQxMTFjZmZiMWMz;_ylg=X3oDMTFpNzk0NjhtBGludGwDdXMEbGFuZwNlbi11cwRwc3RhaWQDBHBzdGNhdANob21lBHB0A3NlY3Rpb25z;_ylv=3



Chemical weapons used in Syria: Israel official:

http://news.msn.com/world/chemical-weapons-used-in-syria-israel-official



U.S., Russia dispute if Syrian rebels used chemical weapons:

http://defensetech.org/2013/03/19/u-s-russia-dispute-if-syrian-rebels-used-chemical-weapons/



Jordanian force cordons off Syrian refugee camp:

http://www.ajc.com/ap/ap/social-issues/jordan-desert-patrol-force-to-cordon-refugee-camp/nWx4Q/



Peace Is Not On The Agenda:

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/israel/articles/20130320.aspx




Managing The Malignancy:

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htterr/articles/20130320.aspx





RAF's first operational F-35 pilot flies first training sortie:

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/rafs-first-operational-f-35-pilot-flies-first-training-sortie-383642/



RAF flew $1 million Euros to Cyprus for British troops:

http://alert5.com/2013/03/20/raf-flew-1-million-euros-to-cyprus-for-british-troops/





S. Korea's army raises alert after hackers attack banks, media:

http://news.msn.com/world/s-koreas-army-raises-alert-after-hackers-attack-banks-media



Comparing Type 056 to LCS:

http://www.informationdissemination.net/2013/03/comparing-type-056-to-lcs.html



North Korea's 'drone attack' drill aims at South:

http://news.msn.com/world/north-koreas-drone-attack-drill-aims-at-south





Video: Robo-Chopper Dives and Grabs Objects Like a Bird of Prey:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/drone-claw/



Despite Problems, SBIRS-High Moves Ahead:

http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/despite-problems-sbirs-high-moves-ahead-with-3rd-satellite-award-05467/



Little Will Change If The Military Takes Over CIA’s Drone Strikes:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/military-drones/



SAIC joins APS in DARPA project to develop deep sonar to detect quiet
hostile submarines:

http://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2013/03/SAIC-DARPA-DSOP.html



After the Aircraft Carrier: 3 Alternatives to the Navy’s Vulnerable
Flattops:

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/replacing-aircraft-carriers/

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 20/03/2013 18:12, dump...@hotmail.com ha scritto:
> After the Aircraft Carrier: 3 Alternatives to the Navy�s Vulnerable
> Flattops:
>
> http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/replacing-aircraft-carriers/

the UK-Italian concept of CVL has already proven (again) their
effectiveness, together with the SSGN conversion in the last Libyan war,
so for me a mix of Americas and (more) SSGN Ohios is the best way in the
current sea environment. and there's the PR factor in reducing the SSBN
number in favour of increasing that of SSGN

the CVE-on-steroid concept draws an huge "meh" from me. WWII experience
shows that CVE's fate is always in the hands of the Divine ("god protect
kids, drunkards and CVEs") Not a thing that can be afforded in the
current Naval & military environment in which casualties and even
operational losses weight *much* more than in past.

but there's a fourth alternative, decisely proven (as capital ship
concept), that is, the dreaded B* word, in the form of the precision
long-range (in the 100+ of kms.) gunfire coupled with spotting/recon UAV
(in confined waters can be really deadly)

a recent news, Italian Navy has just signed a contract for four Scan
Eagle UAV, together with a pair of catapults. meaning, the testing of
the reconnaissance/spotting element is starting. and the R&D work on the
most interesting element is already started: the weather-telemetry
sounding shell (that is, the wet dream of every fire director: having
the precise precise data on everything influences the trajectory
measured along the actual trajectory directly fed real-time into the
ballistic computer..)

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[Andrew Chaplin]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in news:xu%2t.45$XZ4.28
@tornado.fastwebnet.it:

> but there's a fourth alternative, decisely proven (as capital ship
> concept), that is, the dreaded B* word, in the form of the precision
> long-range (in the 100+ of kms.) gunfire coupled with spotting/recon UAV
> (in confined waters can be really deadly)

This looks to be a ballistic riff on the arsenal ship of a decade ago.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[Jim Wilkins]

"Andrew Chaplin" <ab.ch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote in message
news:XnsA18C651C2A079H...@78.46.70.116...

> "dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in news:xu%2t.45$XZ4.28
> @tornado.fastwebnet.it:
>
>> but there's a fourth alternative, decisely proven (as capital ship
>> concept), that is, the dreaded B* word, in the form of the
>> precision
>> long-range (in the 100+ of kms.) gunfire coupled with
>> spotting/recon UAV
>> (in confined waters can be really deadly)
>
> This looks to be a ballistic riff on the arsenal ship of a decade
> ago.
> --
> Andrew Chaplin

Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the subs
or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.

Yamato's death:
http://www.mikekemble.com/ww2/ships/Yamato%20explosion.jpg

A crippling penetration of Bismarck's B turret barbette:
http://www.hmshood.com/hoodtoday/2001expedition/bismarck/bruno1.jpg

jsw

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 23/03/2013 16:59, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:

> Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the subs
> or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
> other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.

and it's what is needed today, if you care to notice...

also, the main advantage of CV's is in the range, whose far offsets the
high "reload time" of carrier's "salvo" (I known that there looms the
vexata quaestio of is better few powerful hits or a rain of smaller
hits...) and the air cover. the latter is the real Raison d' Etre of
carriers.

A global power needs global presence; here lies the core of the actual
USN Issue; they justly don't want to answer to the classical US Prez's
question "Ahem, the CVBG is here... but needs X days at flank speed
prior of reaching the crisis aerea... sorry" so there's a need of at
least "first responders", economical enough to have a sufficient number
to be confident that there's at least one nearby, if not even in, the
crisis aerea, capable to get things in check until the "big sticks"
arrives (aside easing neighbors of the crisis aerea's worries and fears).

so it's not only about size vs. numbers, but covering the Oceans with an
effective & through deployment & strategic movement system (if one think
well, is an issue well-known in Euruope: the First Empire collapses
because of the issue of effectively covering the (really badly
configured) Limes. If a carrier can be PANAMAX the problem is eased)

and, another point is if first-rate carrier is an US exclusive, every
other power is "authorized" to seek the means of zeroing Carrier power
(China and Italy being the main researchers, as seems)

[Jim Wilkins]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message
news:mtn3t.305$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

> Il 23/03/2013 16:59, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:
>
> A global power needs global presence; here lies the core of the
> actual USN Issue; they justly don't want to answer to the classical
> US Prez's question "Ahem, the CVBG is here... but needs X days at
> flank speed prior of reaching the crisis aerea... sorry" so there's
> a need of at least "first responders", economical enough to have a
> sufficient number to be confident that there's at least one nearby,
> if not even in, the crisis aerea, capable to get things in check
> until the "big sticks" arrives (aside easing neighbors of the crisis
> aerea's worries and fears).
>

> Best regards from Italy,
> dott. Piergiorgio.

The Cold War with its risk of escalation is over. Why are we still
expected to police every one else's petty disputes? Are you more inept
than Hillary at diplomacy? Contribute some naval muscle to the UN if
you demand a global police force.

jsw

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 23/03/2013 21:14, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:

> The Cold War with its risk of escalation is over. Why are we still
> expected to police every one else's petty disputes? Are you more inept
> than Hillary at diplomacy? Contribute some naval muscle to the UN if
> you demand a global police force.

Aside that in Italy Cold war is artificially kept alive for very debased
personal interests, I prefer that we don't mix debates about Naval
policy and diplomacy... there (Italy) we have a really grave deep rift
between diplomacy and Navy, whose impact is surely damaging not only to
Italy.

[Bill]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the subs
>or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
>other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.

Well yes.

Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines or
carriers...

[Bill]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 16:14:53 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>The Cold War with its risk of escalation is over. Why are we still
>expected to police every one else's petty disputes?

Because someone has to do it.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...

In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.
jsw

[Daryl]

You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital ships
(not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in the Med
versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at war at the
time). The British got very, very lucky catching those Italian Capital
Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar. It was more luck for
the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History will never know what
would have happened had the Italians broken out and positioned their
Fleet to completely block off the Straits. But they did have the Naval
Arm of the Axis until that battle happened.

Daryl

[Bill]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 20:38:17 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"

<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>"Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...
>> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>>Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the
>>>subs
>>>or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
>>>other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.
>>
>> Well yes.
>>
>> Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines
>> or
>> carriers...
>
>In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.

That's why they didn't start rearming until after that...

The Crusader, Matilda, Hurricane, Spitfire, KGV class, the
Tribals and Towns were all after that date.

So, come to think of it, was British battledress and webbing, the
Bren gun, the '2 pounder' and the WWII period Lee Enfield rifle (The
SMLE No 1 MkV) ...

The British government works on the idea that a credible enemy will
take about five years to emerge.

Most of these programmes began in 1934...

[Bill]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 19:07:13 -0600, Daryl
<dh...@nospamtvmoviesforfree.com> wrote:

>On 3/23/2013 6:38 PM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
>> "Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...
>>> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>>> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the
>>>> subs
>>>> or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
>>>> other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.
>>>
>>> Well yes.
>>>
>>> Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines
>>> or
>>> carriers...
>>
>> In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.
>> jsw
>>
>>
>
>You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital ships
>(not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in the Med
>versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at war at the
>time).

No.

The British had broken their codes.

The Italians were taken utterly by surprise.

The British got very, very lucky catching those Italian Capital
>Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar. It was more luck for
>the Brits and Unluck for the Italians.

If you're talking about the Battle of Cape Matapan, it was nowhere
near Gibraltar.

It was off Crete...

History will never know what
>would have happened had the Italians broken out and positioned their
>Fleet to completely block off the Straits.

That's because they never attempted it.

> But they did have the Naval
>Arm of the Axis until that battle happened.

In reality the major units of the Italian fleet were usually
outclassed.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Daryl" <dh...@nospamtvmoviesforfree.com> wrote in message
news:kiljgd$h7i$1...@dont-email.me...

In 1932 Italy hadn't yet started the war on Ethiopia.

Mussolini considered military intervention to block Germany from
taking over Austria, and in 1935 Britain viewed him as an ally against
Hitler.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hoare%E2%80%93Laval_Pact
"At that moment, both Britain and France were eager to have Italy
rejoin the Stresa Front against Adolf Hitler's ambitions."

It wasn't at all evident in the mid 30's that Germany and Italy would
combine their forces against Britain a few years later. The way WW2
developed wasn't in any grand plan, it began with the failures of
poorly calculated risks, relatively minor aggressions that were
unexpectedly opposed.
jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:sdlsk8p9idg2brr3v...@4ax.com...

>
> In reality the major units of the Italian fleet were usually
> outclassed.
>

But they were very fast and looked snazzy.

[Bill Shatzer]

Daryl wrote:

> You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital ships
> (not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in the Med

Using the traditional definition of "capital ships", Italy had exactly
-six- capital ships in its entire navy - the two Conte di Cavour class
BBs, the two Andrea Doris class BBs and the two Littorio BBs. The two
Littorios were still working up and not yet fully operational when Italy
declared war in 1940.

If you wish to stretch a point and include cruisers, both CAs and CLs,
as "capital ships", Italy had 19 of those.

A long way from 185 in any event.

> versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at war at the
> time). The British got very, very lucky catching those Italian Capital
> Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.

Huh? Save for submarines and frogmen, the Italian Navy never operated as
far west as the Straits of Gibraltar.

> It was more luck for
> the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History will never know what
> would have happened had the Italians broken out and positioned their
> Fleet to completely block off the Straits.

The Italian fleet would likely have been decimated by British air assets
stationed at and staging through Gibraltar. The Regia Aeronautica was
incapable of providing air cover on more than a sporadic and
intermittent basis that far west.

[David E. Powell]

On Mar 23, 9:23 pm, Bill <blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 20:38:17 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>

> <muratla...@gmail.com> wrote:
> >"Bill" <blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote in message

> >news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...
> >> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
> >> <muratla...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> >>>Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the
> >>>subs
> >>>or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
> >>>other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could deliver.
>
> >> Well yes.
>
> >> Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines
> >> or
> >> carriers...
>
> >In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.
>
> That's why they didn't start rearming until after that...

I am thinking 1933-35 really got their attention.

> The Crusader,  Matilda,  Hurricane,  Spitfire,  KGV class,  the
> Tribals and Towns were all after that date.

Yes, and once you have a design it can come down to how many one wants
to build..... and how many one can build..... the British did a heck
of a job on production.

> So,  come to think of it,  was British battledress and webbing,  the
> Bren gun, the '2 pounder' and the WWII period Lee Enfield rifle (The
> SMLE No 1 MkV) ...
>
> The British government works on the idea that a credible enemy will
> take about five years to emerge.
>
> Most of these programmes began in 1934...

Well the Enfield was No. 4 Mk. I, I believe. Maybe some earlier models
were still about in India & the Tropics?

In fairness to the Brits, the Enfield is a very nice rifle and in
1939 everyone had a bolt action main battle rifle, except the US with
the Garand. The Russians and Germans got some made during the war but
the bulk of their rifles were bolt action until the end of the war.
Even the US kept Springfields going in the Marines for a long time,
until around Guadalcanal I believe.

The Bren gun was excellent, I think of it as almost a Czech "Vengeance
Weapon." The Czechs were overrun but they got that design out to
Britain.

[Keith W]

David E. Powell wrote:
>
> The Bren gun was excellent, I think of it as almost a Czech "Vengeance
> Weapon." The Czechs were overrun but they got that design out to
> Britain.

The Czechs made some excellent weapons, the ZB-53 machine gun
was used by both the British (as the Besa) and the Germans as
the Mg37(t) on their armoured vehicles. It was also produced for
the Chinese Nationalists intitially in Brno but later in China itself.
Chinese made models were used by the Red Army in Korea.

The Czech built Pz 35(t) and Pz 38(t) were an important part of
the German army into the first year of operation Barbarossa.

Keith

[Keith W]

Daryl wrote:
> On 3/23/2013 6:38 PM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
>> "Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>> news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...
>>> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>>> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the
>>>> subs
>>>> or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
>>>> other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could
>>>> deliver.
>>>
>>> Well yes.
>>>
>>> Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines
>>> or
>>> carriers...
>>
>> In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.
>> jsw
>>
>>
>
> You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital
> ships (not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in
> the Med versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at
> war at the time).

Only on planet Daryl. Here on earth the Regia Marina had the
following strength available in 1940

6 Capital ships - 4 of which were in refit
19 Cruisers
59 Destroyers
67 Torpedo Boats
116 Submarines

> The British got very, very lucky catching those
> Italian Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.

This must have happened on planet Daryl since it never happened
on planet earth, The large units of the Italian fleet rarely went
far from their home bases and when they did it tended to end
badly. See the the battle of Cape Matapan as an example

> It was more luck for the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History
> will never know what would have happened had the Italians broken out
> and positioned their Fleet to completely block off the Straits.

They would have run out of fuel or been sunk by ships and
aircraft from carriers and Gibraltar. The Italian BB's and cruisers
were built to operate in the Med close to home base and were
lightly armoured and short ranged. Without the techniques and
ships required to refuel at sea they were going nowehere and
without effective radar they were always caught by surprise.

The small units of the Italian fleet were handled by brave men
but the perforamance of the larger units was uninspiring.

> But
> they did have the Naval Arm of the Axis until that battle happened.
>

And when did this great battle in the straits of Gibraltar happen on your
world because it certainly didnt happen on this one.

Keith

[Bill]

On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 21:22:58 -0700 (PDT), "David E. Powell"
<David_Po...@msn.com> wrote:

>On Mar 23, 9:23�pm, Bill <blackuse...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>> So, �come to think of it, �was British battledress and webbing, �the
>> Bren gun, the '2 pounder' and the WWII period Lee Enfield rifle (The
>> SMLE No 1 MkV) ...
>>
>> The British government works on the idea that a credible enemy will
>> take about five years to emerge.
>>
>> Most of these programmes began in 1934...
>
>Well the Enfield was No. 4 Mk. I, I believe. Maybe some earlier models
>were still about in India & the Tropics?

Lee Enfield numbering systems are complicated, often needlessly.

The late 'thirties rifle known as 'SMLE MkV' became the 'Rifle No. 1
Mk V'.

It's the same rifle, it just changed names.

[Daryl]

If I show you a cite that agrees with me will you go away and just shut up?

>
>
>> The British got very, very lucky catching those
>> Italian Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.
>
> This must have happened on planet Daryl since it never happened
> on planet earth, The large units of the Italian fleet rarely went
> far from their home bases and when they did it tended to end
> badly. See the the battle of Cape Matapan as an example

You must think the rest of us are stupid. There has been a consensus
that what I stated was true. Well, maybe not by those born well after
WWII ended but those that were actually there.

>
>
>> It was more luck for the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History
>> will never know what would have happened had the Italians broken out
>> and positioned their Fleet to completely block off the Straits.
>
> They would have run out of fuel or been sunk by ships and
> aircraft from carriers and Gibraltar. The Italian BB's and cruisers
> were built to operate in the Med close to home base and were
> lightly armoured and short ranged. Without the techniques and
> ships required to refuel at sea they were going nowehere and
> without effective radar they were always caught by surprise.

The last time I checked BB stands for Battleship which were very good at
open water and very poor in places like the Straits of Gibraltar.
Destroyers work well in closed spaces as well as Gun Boats. But
Cruisers and BBs are terrible in close quarters. But in the Kieths
World, they can turn on a dime and generate speed quickly.

>
> The small units of the Italian fleet were handled by brave men
> but the perforamance of the larger units was uninspiring.

History says that they didn't have the close quarter fighting with
Capital Ships down pat. When you practice shooting tens of miles, a
thousand yards is really hard to hit anything.

>
>
>> But
>> they did have the Naval Arm of the Axis until that battle happened.
>>
>
> And when did this great battle in the straits of Gibraltar happen on your
> world because it certainly didnt happen on this one.

If I show you will you just Shut Up?

Try Google. It's there along with the fantasies you keep presenting.
It's up to us to weed through the crackpots.

Daryl

[Bill]

On Sun, 24 Mar 2013 06:32:13 -0600, Daryl
<dh...@nospamtvmoviesforfree.com> wrote:

>On 3/24/2013 5:01 AM, Keith W wrote:

>>> The British got very, very lucky catching those
>>> Italian Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.
>>
>> This must have happened on planet Daryl since it never happened
>> on planet earth, The large units of the Italian fleet rarely went
>> far from their home bases and when they did it tended to end
>> badly. See the the battle of Cape Matapan as an example
>
>You must think the rest of us are stupid. There has been a consensus
>that what I stated was true. Well, maybe not by those born well after
>WWII ended but those that were actually there.

You continue to maintain that the Italian navy fought a major
engagement in the Straits of Gibraltar in WWII?

Can I have some of what you're smoking please...

>The last time I checked BB stands for Battleship which were very good at
>open water and very poor in places like the Straits of Gibraltar.
>Destroyers work well in closed spaces as well as Gun Boats. But
>Cruisers and BBs are terrible in close quarters. But in the Kieths
>World, they can turn on a dime and generate speed quickly.

Cruisers are designed for 'close quarters' fighting.

It's why they have those incredibly high rates of fire.

For example HMS Belfast unloads itself at a rate of just over 6 tonnes
of ammunition a minute!

They just mince destroyers in close quarters fighting.

As for battleships in close quarters, well, in the Second Battle of
Narvik the British took a battleship up a teeny tiny restricted fiord
and soundly thrashed all the big nasty 'highly effective in closed
spaces' German destroyers...

You see, if you can't actually dent the big ship with a direct hit
from your biggest gun and they can sink you with a single hit from
secondary armament it doesn't actually matter how maneuverable the
ships are.

Destroyers are shit at fighting battleships.

>> The small units of the Italian fleet were handled by brave men
>> but the perforamance of the larger units was uninspiring.
>
>History says that they didn't have the close quarter fighting with
>Capital Ships down pat. When you practice shooting tens of miles, a
>thousand yards is really hard to hit anything.

Having your turrets trained 'fore and aft' when half the
Mediterranean Fleet opens fire doesn't help much either...

>> And when did this great battle in the straits of Gibraltar happen on your
>> world because it certainly didnt happen on this one.
>
>If I show you will you just Shut Up?

Please do.

[Keith W]

Feel free to try

>>
>>
>>> The British got very, very lucky catching those
>>> Italian Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.
>>
>> This must have happened on planet Daryl since it never happened
>> on planet earth, The large units of the Italian fleet rarely went
>> far from their home bases and when they did it tended to end
>> badly. See the the battle of Cape Matapan as an example
>
> You must think the rest of us are stupid.

No but I think you are ignorant.

> There has been a consensus
> that what I stated was true. Well, maybe not by those born well after
> WWII ended but those that were actually there.
>

Really - so name ONE book about the great battle of the Straits of Gibraltar

>
>>
>>
>>> It was more luck for the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History
>>> will never know what would have happened had the Italians broken out
>>> and positioned their Fleet to completely block off the Straits.
>>
>> They would have run out of fuel or been sunk by ships and
>> aircraft from carriers and Gibraltar. The Italian BB's and cruisers
>> were built to operate in the Med close to home base and were
>> lightly armoured and short ranged. Without the techniques and
>> ships required to refuel at sea they were going nowehere and
>> without effective radar they were always caught by surprise.
>
> The last time I checked BB stands for Battleship which were very good
> at open water and very poor in places like the Straits of Gibraltar.

Indeed especially when overlooked by land batteries emplaced
in caves in the side of a rock

> Destroyers work well in closed spaces as well as Gun Boats.

They do when necessary but also work hard in blue water , see Battle
Of The Atlantic and the USN in the Pacific The naval vessels of choice
in narrow waters were PT Boats, MTB's, MGB's and in the Italian Navy
MAS Boats

The RN of course had destroyers, MTB's and torpedo aircraft
based at Gibraltar as well as a flotilla that typicaally included
at least one carrier battle group and its escorts.

Thye Italians came to understand the importance of Carrier
attacks after the Taranto strike and the Battle of Cape Matapan

> But
> Cruisers and BBs are terrible in close quarters. But in the Kieths
> World, they can turn on a dime and generate speed quickly.
>

Actually Keith made no such claim but there are cases where they
have worked very well at close quarters.

See Battle of Narvik, Battle of Surigao Strait and a whole slew
of actions in the Solomons

>
>>
>> The small units of the Italian fleet were handled by brave men
>> but the perforamance of the larger units was uninspiring.
>
> History says that they didn't have the close quarter fighting with
> Capital Ships down pat. When you practice shooting tens of miles, a
> thousand yards is really hard to hit anything.
>

Actually history tells us the opposite. Italian special forces managed
to sink two British BB's in harbour but their heavy forces at sea
took a beating.

>
>>
>>
>>> But
>>> they did have the Naval Arm of the Axis until that battle happened.
>>>
>>
>> And when did this great battle in the straits of Gibraltar happen on
>> your world because it certainly didnt happen on this one.
>
> If I show you will you just Shut Up?
>

Feel free to try - the world awaits this revelation.

> Try Google. It's there along with the fantasies you keep presenting.

From Google search term 'Battle of Straits of Gibraltar'
Result - hits for naval battles in 1591 and 1621 , nothing during WW2

> It's up to us to weed through the crackpots.
>

That is called projection.

Now just when during WW2 this Great Battle of Gibraltar occur
and what were the results ?

Keith

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
news:kilhpq$b4a$1...@dont-email.me...

You seem remarkably ignorant of Japanese intentions

[Bill]

So was everyone else.

In 1932 the British were still tutoring the Japanese navy in carrier
operations...

[Jim Wilkins]

"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:39D3t.185651$Q01....@fx13.fr7...

>
> Now just when during WW2 this Great Battle of Gibraltar occur
> and what were the results ?
>
> Keith

This is the Italian battleship that attacked Gibraltar:
http://www.sommergibili.com/sciree.htm
"On Sept. 19, 1941, the fourth mission on Gibraltar is finally
successful: three ships, for a total of about 30,000 t, are sunk."

jsw

[peter skelton]

"Bill" wrote in message
news:em0uk8h7arph8u9tt...@4ax.com...

That clearly explains the 1921 decision to build a naval
base at Singapore. Japanese bitterness became very strong
when they felt themselves sold down the river in the naval
treaties. That they were not publically recognized as
credible adversaries does not mean that they were not.

>In 1932 the British were still tutoring the Japanese navy
>in carrier
operations...

That is something of an exageration.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:kimvka$o4p$1...@dont-email.me...

The Royal Navy never committed to defend Manchuko. And the Marco Polo
Bridge incident wasn't until 1937. The Japanese government didn't
understand Japanese intentions since much of the aggression originated
from ambitious field commanders on the Asian continent.
jsw

[Andrew Chaplin]

"Jim Wilkins" <murat...@gmail.com> wrote in news:kilsvu$jif$1@dont-
email.me:

Yes, but...

AIUI, their leadership was politically reliable but operationally unsound,
and they did not have the fleet train or access to bases that would allow
them to operate outside the Med. The danger presented by Italian vessels
seems to have been inversely proportional to their tonnage.

I am sure you know that and were just having fun.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kin0s0$ui7$1...@dont-email.me...

Thank you for proving my point so very completely.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Andrew Chaplin" <ab.ch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote in message

>
> AIUI, their leadership was politically reliable but operationally
> unsound,
> and they did not have the fleet train or access to bases that would
> allow
> them to operate outside the Med. The danger presented by Italian
> vessels
> seems to have been inversely proportional to their tonnage.

Or perhaps the age of their captains.

Some USN and IJN destroyer skippers were daring far beyond the size of
their vessels.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raiz%C5%8D_Tanaka

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar
"Kurita's battleships [including Yamato] were driven away from the
engagement by torpedo attacks from American destroyers; they were
unable to regroup in the chaos, while three cruisers were lost after
attacks from U.S. destroyers and aircraft, with several other cruisers
damaged. Due to the ferocity of the defense, Kurita was convinced that
he was facing a far superior force and withdrew from the battle,
ending the threat to the troop transports and supply ships."
The Japanese didn't believe destroyers would attack their massive
fleet and misidentified them as cruisers.

Of German ships only the tiny S boats dared to operate in the Channel:
http://s-boot.net/sboats-km-channel42.html
jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kin2n2$8k7$1...@dont-email.me...

>>
>> You seem remarkably ignorant of Japanese intentions
>
>>The Royal Navy never committed to defend Manchuko. And the Marco
>>Polo
> Bridge incident wasn't until 1937. The Japanese government didn't
> understand Japanese intentions since much of the aggression
> originated
> from ambitious field commanders on the Asian continent.
>
>
> Thank you for proving my point so very completely.
>

Only in your imagination. Japan tried to conceal its intentions
against the West as long as possible:
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/historicalbackground/JapMilaggro2.html
"...Japan withdrew from the naval limitation treaty in 1937. Japan
then began to expand its navy, with particular emphasis on building
aircraft carriers and huge battleships, such as the Yamato and
Musashi, which were twice the tonnage of the largest British and
American battleships."

"The first major cause of friction occurred in December 1937 when
Japanese aircraft attacked an American oil tanker convoy as it was
being escorted up the Yangtse River by the American gunboat USS Panay.
The Panay was sunk, and the Japanese aircraft then fired on the
survivors. Although the Japanese government apologised for the
incident and the American lives that were lost, relations between the
United States and Japan were correct but never friendly afterwards."
jsw

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kin60c$qfh$1...@dont-email.me...

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:kin2n2$8k7$1...@dont-email.me...
>>
>> You seem remarkably ignorant of Japanese intentions
>
>>The Royal Navy never committed to defend Manchuko. And the
>>Marco Polo
> Bridge incident wasn't until 1937. The Japanese government
> didn't
> understand Japanese intentions since much of the
> aggression originated
> from ambitious field commanders on the Asian continent.
>
>
> Thank you for proving my point so very completely.
>
>Only in your imagination. Japan tried to conceal its
>intentions
against the West as long as possible:
http://www.pacificwar.org.au/historicalbackground/JapMilaggro2.html
"...Japan withdrew from the naval limitation treaty in 1937.
Japan
then began to expand its navy, with particular emphasis on
building
aircraft carriers and huge battleships, such as the Yamato
and
Musashi, which were twice the tonnage of the largest British
and
American battleships."

The decision to build a fleet base at Singapore was taken in
1921. The reasoning behind the decision was that the RN
needed to be able to face the IJN. At the time of the
Washington Treaty, Japan, the US and the UK were involved in
a naval building race.

>"The first major cause of friction occurred in December
>1937 when
Japanese aircraft attacked an American oil tanker convoy as
it was
being escorted up the Yangtse River by the American gunboat
USS Panay.
The Panay was sunk, and the Japanese aircraft then fired on
the
survivors. Although the Japanese government apologised for
the
incident and the American lives that were lost, relations
between the
United States and Japan were correct but never friendly
afterwards."

The war between Russia and Japan was no clue. Roosevelt
intervened in the peace process purely out of the goodness
of his heart. His limitation of the Japanese spoils was
because he loved the Tzar so very deeply. The annexation of
Korea in 1910 meant nothing. The assassination of ZZ in 1928
and the later invasion of Manchuria were no clue. The
Japanese invasion of China was no warning. The only thing
that mattered was a minor skirmish in 1937.

There is a lot of evidence that the expansionist nature of
Japan was recognized long before WW1, and that American
policy in the Pacific recognized that fact and was designed
to contain it before 1907. (I chose 1907 because of the
Great White Fleet and its reception in Australia.)

[Keith W]

As it happens it does. Contemporary records show that the
Admiralty held the opinion that there was no likelihood
of war in the Pacific before 1933 at the earliest but that
it was prudent to build facilities in Singapore sufficient
to support a concentrated fleet if conditions should change.

See
The Washington Conference, 1921-22:
Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl Harbor
Goldstein and Maurer

Keith

[Keith W]

I already referred to the actions of the Italian frogmen

Keith

[Keith W]

Thats not actually true. The Kriegsmarine operated larger steam
torpedo boats such as the Elbing Class in the Channel. These
vessels displaced well over 1200 tons and carried 4x105mm
guns, they were effectively small destroyers and fought
many actions with British coastal forces.

They operated considerable numbers of R-boats escorting
coastal convoys in addition to the Marinef�hrprahm or
as it was known by the allies the F-lighter. This was
actually based on a class of landing craft developed for
the invasion of England that was pressed into service as
a convoy escort. Armed with 20mm, 37mm and 88 mm cannon
its armour plate and shallow draft made it a tough nut for
attacking surface craft. Torpedoes tended to run under it
and it could duke it out with most Motor Gun Boats.

Keith

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kin85u$7br$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kin60c$qfh$1...@dont-email.me...
>
>

> There is a lot of evidence that the expansionist nature of Japan was
> recognized long before WW1, and that American policy in the Pacific
> recognized that fact and was designed to contain it before 1907. (I
> chose 1907 because of the Great White Fleet and its reception in
> Australia.)
>

It was, but we were discussing threats to carriers as an example of
how rapidly an unexpected hostile military situation can develop, and
the western powers had no naval interests worth fighting for in the
northern Chinese mainland areas Japan appeared to covet. The Chinese
themselves had become a major annoyance.
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/boxerreb.htm

At the time of the first war with Russia, Britain and Japan were
allies.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anglo-Japanese_Alliance

The US had plans to retake the Phillippines since the 20's
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_Plan_Orange
but that doesn't mean they seriously expected to. We had plans to
invade France, as unlikely as that was.

jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message

news:etG3t.258107$VO5.2...@fx20.fr7...

> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>>
>> Of German ships only the tiny S boats dared to operate in the
>> Channel:
>> http://s-boot.net/sboats-km-channel42.html
>> jsw
>
> Thats not actually true. The Kriegsmarine operated larger steam
> torpedo boats such as the Elbing Class in the Channel. These
> vessels displaced well over 1200 tons and carried 4x105mm
> guns, they were effectively small destroyers and fought
> many actions with British coastal forces.
>
> They operated considerable numbers of R-boats escorting
> coastal convoys in addition to the Marinef�hrprahm or
> as it was known by the allies the F-lighter. This was
> actually based on a class of landing craft developed for
> the invasion of England that was pressed into service as
> a convoy escort. Armed with 20mm, 37mm and 88 mm cannon
> its armour plate and shallow draft made it a tough nut for
> attacking surface craft. Torpedoes tended to run under it
> and it could duke it out with most Motor Gun Boats.
>
> Keith

I completely missed that bunch.
jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message

news:ObG3t.296756$zx2.1...@fx29.fr7...

> As it happens it does. Contemporary records show that the
> Admiralty held the opinion that there was no likelihood
> of war in the Pacific before 1933 at the earliest but that
> it was prudent to build facilities in Singapore sufficient
> to support a concentrated fleet if conditions should change.
>

> Keith

It was a wise idea since commerce raiders were quick to convert at the
start of a war and might appear anywhere they could do damage.
http://www.bismarck-class.dk/hilfskreuzer/hilfskreuzer_menu.html

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_SMS_Emden.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_auxiliary_cruiser_Kormoran

jsw

[Keith W]

Jim Wilkins wrote:
> "peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
> news:kin85u$7br$1...@dont-email.me...
>> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kin60c$qfh$1...@dont-email.me...
>>
>>
>> There is a lot of evidence that the expansionist nature of Japan was
>> recognized long before WW1, and that American policy in the Pacific
>> recognized that fact and was designed to contain it before 1907. (I
>> chose 1907 because of the Great White Fleet and its reception in
>> Australia.)
>>
>
> It was, but we were discussing threats to carriers as an example of
> how rapidly an unexpected hostile military situation can develop, and
> the western powers had no naval interests worth fighting for in the
> northern Chinese mainland areas Japan appeared to covet. The Chinese
> themselves had become a major annoyance.
> http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/boxerreb.htm
>

Only in the sense of being a territory to be fought over, After the
Xinhai Revolution of 1911 China fragmented and became what
we would today categorize as a 'failed state'. The Japanese
invasion brought a temporary truce between the warring factions
but the nationalists and communists were always at least as
likely to fight each other as the Japanese

Keith

[Keith W]

An excellent book on the fighting in the Channel is
The Battle Of The Narrow Seas by Peter Scott.
The son of Scott of the Antarctic Peter Scott was better
known as a naturalist he commanded a flotilla of
Steam Gun Boats during WW2 and wrote what many
regard as the definitive work on the subject.

On any given night there could be hundreds of vessels from
both sides patrolling the waters. These included minelayers,
minesweepers, armed trawlers escorting coastal convoys,
hunting groups of MTB's , MGB's , R boats as well as
ships carrying commandos on raids.

Keith

[Bill]

On Sun, 24 Mar 2013 14:08:01 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
<murat...@gmail.com> wrote:

>"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message
>news:ObG3t.296756$zx2.1...@fx29.fr7...
>> As it happens it does. Contemporary records show that the
>> Admiralty held the opinion that there was no likelihood
>> of war in the Pacific before 1933 at the earliest but that
>> it was prudent to build facilities in Singapore sufficient
>> to support a concentrated fleet if conditions should change.
>>
>> Keith
>
>It was a wise idea since commerce raiders were quick to convert at the
>start of a war and might appear anywhere they could do damage.

Commerce raiders may be quick to convert but the emergence of the
political will to go to war seems to take about five years or so.

[peter skelton]

"Keith W" wrote in message
news:ObG3t.296756$zx2.1...@fx29.fr7...

What you just said was that ignorance of Japanese intentions
was what caused the decision to build the Singapore base.
Then you go on to say that they correctly decided that Japan
might attack sometime after 1932 but not earlier and that
they also decided it made sense to build a base against the
day. Clearly Japan was recognized as a credible threat by
1921 - there is a difference between not credible and not
imminent.

>See
The Washington Conference, 1921-22:
Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability and the Road to Pearl
Harbor
Goldstein and Maurer

Or any of a large number of standard works on the subject.

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kind5b$5ic$1...@dont-email.me...

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:kin85u$7br$1...@dont-email.me...
> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
> news:kin60c$qfh$1...@dont-email.me...
>
>
> There is a lot of evidence that the expansionist nature of
> Japan was recognized long before WW1, and that American
> policy in the Pacific recognized that fact and was
> designed to contain it before 1907. (I chose 1907 because
> of the Great White Fleet and its reception in Australia.)
>

>It was, but we were discussing threats to carriers as an
>example of
how rapidly an unexpected hostile military situation can
develop, and
the western powers had no naval interests worth fighting for
in the
northern Chinese mainland areas Japan appeared to covet. The
Chinese
themselves had become a major annoyance.
http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/boxerreb.htm

Sure, but Japan as a naval threat was long recognized. The
Pacific war was the culmination of decades of political
manoeuvre. Pretending it wasn't is nonsense.

<one paragraph of obvious and one of irrelevance snipped>

[peter skelton]

"Keith W" wrote in message

news:etG3t.258107$VO5.2...@fx20.fr7...

The allies used destroyers and cruisers, the Germans
full-sized destroyers.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kinmvh$9i$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kind5b$5ic$1...@dont-email.me...
>
>

> Sure, but Japan as a naval threat was long recognized. The Pacific
> war was the culmination of decades of political manoeuvre.
> Pretending it wasn't is nonsense.
>

The 5:5:3 ratio of the Washington Naval Treaty left Japan the master
of East Asian waters but not a threat to the US + Britain, and that
was fine with Adm. Yamamoto when he helped negotiate the London
extensions of it in 1930 and 1934. Of course the German Navy wasn't
in the picture at the time.

The Japanese Army wanted the Navy to stay out of global strategy and
just ferry them to China.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto
"Moreover, it is in question whether the U.S. would have gone to war
at all had Japan only attacked British and Dutch possessions in the
Far East."

FDR had intended to allow enough exemptions to the oil embargo to
allow Japan to survive, but when he was away at the Argentia
conference State and Treasury took the hard line and when FDR returned
he didn't want to unilaterally concede relaxations.
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=22899
"At that time, neither the president nor secretary of state Cordell
Hull meant to implement a complete oil embargo through the freeze
order because they were aware that the oil embargo might provoke Japan
into war."

The Pacific war wasn't quite so inevitable as you seem to believe, nor
am I as ignorant of its history. It would have been very different if
the Army had confined itself to China and not extended into Russian or
French territory..

jsw

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 02:07, Daryl ha scritto:

> You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital ships

I wish we haved.....

anyway, summed all, 10 Jun 1940 there was 2 operational battleship, plus
four in training or final fitting out, 7 heavy cruisers, 12 light
cruiser, and 3 obsolete cruisers, in all 24 ships above 3000 tons plus
four to enter service during the summer and fall 1940. where you get
your 185 capital ships figure ??????????????????????????????

Best regards from ITALY,
dott. Piergorgio.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 02:29, Bill ha scritto:

> The British got very, very lucky catching those Italian Capital

>> Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar. It was more luck for

>> the Brits and Unluck for the Italians.
>

> If you're talking about the Battle of Cape Matapan, it was nowhere
> near Gibraltar.

as already noticed, he is in utter confusion (185 Italian capital ships
???) but he seems to refer to Cap Bon and not Matapan (the key words
being "catching" and "narrows", whose can't be applied to Matapan (open
sea to S and the two forces was converging, not chasing)

> It was off Crete...

>
> History will never know what
>> would have happened had the Italians broken out and positioned their
>> Fleet to completely block off the Straits.
>

> That's because they never attempted it.

Depend on what strait he stutters about, Indeed a choke point was
blocked (the Sicilian Channel/Messina Strait) with rather damaging
consequences to UK. OTOH UK blocked the outside access to the Med, and
Italy indeed never attempted to broke from those two accesses.

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 15:27, Andrew Chaplin ha scritto:

> Yes, but...
>
> AIUI, their leadership was politically reliable but operationally unsound,
> and they did not have the fleet train or access to bases that would allow
> them to operate outside the Med. The danger presented by Italian vessels
> seems to have been inversely proportional to their tonnage.

I'm patiently waiting the results from of the first pair or so of actual
operational service of the Dorias and Bergaminis because there's hints
that the inverse proportion isn't on the tonnage, but on the crew's
size....

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kinrja$r9n$1...@dont-email.me...

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:kinmvh$9i$1...@dont-email.me...
> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
> news:kind5b$5ic$1...@dont-email.me...
>
>
> Sure, but Japan as a naval threat was long recognized. The
> Pacific war was the culmination of decades of political
> manoeuvre. Pretending it wasn't is nonsense.
>

>The 5:5:3 ratio of the Washington Naval Treaty left Japan
>the master
of East Asian waters but not a threat to the US + Britain,
and that
was fine with Adm. Yamamoto when he helped negotiate the
London
extensions of it in 1930 and 1934. Of course the German
Navy wasn't
in the picture at the time.

That the ratio was fine with Yamamoto is not supportable
from the historic record. Whether it was or not is not
relevant here.

>The Japanese Army wanted the Navy to stay out of global
>strategy and
just ferry them to China.

And prevent other navies from interfering. Have you noticed
that you are trying to use evidence of political manoeuvre
to deny its causative effect?

>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku_Yamamoto
"Moreover, it is in question whether the U.S. would have
gone to war
at all had Japan only attacked British and Dutch possessions
in the
Far East."

What took the US to the brink of war was Japanese seizure of
bases in Vietnam. Your quote of Wilmot is used in the Wiki
article's discussion of the possibility that the US might
not have gone to war in the six month period starting in
December 1941. It is valid in that context. You really
should read your references.

>FDR had intended to allow enough exemptions to the oil
>embargo to
allow Japan to survive, but when he was away at the Argentia
conference State and Treasury took the hard line and when
FDR returned
he didn't want to unilaterally concede relaxations.
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=22899
"At that time, neither the president nor secretary of state
Cordell
Hull meant to implement a complete oil embargo through the
freeze
order because they were aware that the oil embargo might
provoke Japan
into war."

And Roosevelt neither understood American politics nor left
instructions. Note the first three words of the quote, it's
about timing.

>The Pacific war wasn't quite so inevitable as you seem to
>believe, nor
am I as ignorant of its history. It would have been very
different if
the Army had confined itself to China and not extended into
Russian or
French territory..

What you are saying is that, if Japan were not expansionist,
there might not have been a war. What I am saying is that
Japan bloody well was expansionist, and that that had been
known for decades. I'm also saying that containing it had
been part of American policy for a long time. What you have
put up as arguments is quibbling about timing. Certainly the
timing could have been different, but the fundamentals are
firm.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 16:14, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:
> "Andrew Chaplin" <ab.ch...@yourfinger.rogers.com> wrote in message
>>
>> AIUI, their leadership was politically reliable but operationally
>> unsound,
>> and they did not have the fleet train or access to bases that would
>> allow
>> them to operate outside the Med. The danger presented by Italian
>> vessels
>> seems to have been inversely proportional to their tonnage.
>
> Or perhaps the age of their captains.

After a pair or so of service life of the Dorias and Bergaminis will be
capable of drawing some conclusions on these specific points.

Italian military psyche occupies an intermediate position between the
Japanese/German mass discipline and the American individualism; and a
hundred or two seems to be the most strong unit Italians can forms (only
Italians ? mh...)

(and I'm wondering on those attempts on draw me in talking about Italian
military psychology.....)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 05:12, Bill Shatzer ha scritto:

> Daryl wrote:
>
>> You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital

>> ships (not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in
>> the Med
>
> Using the traditional definition of "capital ships", Italy had exactly
> -six- capital ships in its entire navy - the two Conte di Cavour class
> BBs, the two Andrea Doris class BBs and the two Littorio BBs. The two
> Littorios were still working up and not yet fully operational when Italy
> declared war in 1940.
>
> If you wish to stretch a point and include cruisers, both CAs and CLs,
> as "capital ships", Italy had 19 of those.

Plus the trio of obsolete cruisers... still we stop at 24 in June 1940,
28 counting the fitting and working out battleships, and counting also
Roma and the three Capitani Romani we reach 32 and stretching a bit and
adding the pier battle between nazis and Giulio Germanico, we can add
her in the list of operational cruisers, absolute maximum count is 33.
let's wait how daryl explain the other 152 or so....

> A long way from 185 in any event.
>
>> versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at war at the
>> time). The British got very, very lucky catching those Italian

>> Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.
>

> Huh? Save for submarines and frogmen, the Italian Navy never operated as
> far west as the Straits of Gibraltar.

Last time I checked, Gib (and Algesiras) is on the Med side of the
Strait, so you can (barely, I reckon) restrict the over-Med activities
on submarines (aside the Red Sea forces, but there's no capital ships
(defined by me as >3000 tons and gun >120mm, so the colonial ship
Eritrea is NOT a capital ship) outside Med during the Axis part of WWII
(there was a pair or trio of Italian cruisers employed in anti-blockade
and anti-raider role in S atlantic during the co-belligerancy)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 12:01, Keith W ha scritto:
> Daryl wrote:

>> On 3/23/2013 6:38 PM, Jim Wilkins wrote:
>>> "Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message
>>> news:1vcsk859gr53n5h40...@4ax.com...
>>>> On Sat, 23 Mar 2013 11:59:21 -0400, "Jim Wilkins"
>>>> <murat...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Battleships were fine for intimidating countries that lacked the
>>>>> subs
>>>>> or air power to fight back. They proved quite vulnerable to each
>>>>> other, and to the barrage of torpedos a carrier force could
>>>>> deliver.
>>>>
>>>> Well yes.
>>>>
>>>> Now name a credible enemy for the USA/NATO with capable submarines
>>>> or
>>>> carriers...
>>>
>>> In 1932 there wasn't a credible enemy for Britain.
>>> jsw
>>>
>>>
>>

>> You forget, when the war was started, the Italians had 185 capital
>> ships (not counting over 100 smaller war ships and about 60 subs) in

>> the Med versus a total of 144 for all the allies (the US wasn't at
>> war at the time).
>
> Only on planet Daryl. Here on earth the Regia Marina had the
> following strength available in 1940
>
> 6 Capital ships - 4 of which were in refit

It's a bit stretching calling the brand-new 41.000 "in refit"...

> 19 Cruisers
> 59 Destroyers
> 67 Torpedo Boats
> 116 Submarines

more or less correct, but there's a huge fantasy considering "capital
ships" the destroyers (italian "torpedo boat" are actually light DD or
WWI DD reclassified to reflect their obsolescence)....


> And when did this great battle in the straits of Gibraltar happen on your
> world because it certainly didnt happen on this one.

I wonder on how and why he fantasized; he's surely NOT drunk (there's
few, if any, typos in his post, and typos is the giveaway sign of an
intoxicated state)

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kinubh$akd$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kinrja$r9n$1...@dont-email.me...
>

It would have been very
> different if
> the Army had confined itself to China and not extended into Russian
> or
> French territory..
>
> What you are saying is that, if Japan were not expansionist, there
> might not have been a war. What I am saying is that Japan bloody
> well was expansionist, and that that had been known for decades. I'm
> also saying that containing it had been part of American policy for
> a long time. What you have put up as arguments is quibbling about
> timing. Certainly the timing could have been different, but the
> fundamentals are firm.

Is your reading comprehension really that bad? If the Japanese Army
had confined its expansionist ambitions to China, which was bigger
than they could realistically handle anyway, they could have avoided a
war with the West. There would not have been an oil embargo and they
could have safely left the East Indies alone or bullied the Dutch into
compliance at little cost. .

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/historicalbackground/JapMilaggro2.html
"A rising naval officer named Isoroku Yamamoto was one of the leaders
of the Japanese Navy's Treaty Faction which supported the 5:5:3 ratio
of naval tonnage for Great Britain, the United States and Japan
respectively established in 1922 by the Washington Naval Conference. "

jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message
news:U7L3t.677$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

>
> Italian military psyche occupies an intermediate position between
> the Japanese/German mass discipline and the American individualism;
> and a hundred or two seems to be the most strong unit Italians can
> forms (only Italians ? mh...)

> Best regards from Italy,
> dott. Piergiorgio.

We can work together well in large units:
http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/nimitz/
"With over 6,000 personnel (crew and aircrew), the carrier has a
displacement of 102,000t, and a flight deck length of 332.9m."

jsw

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 13:32, Daryl ha scritto:

>> 19 Cruisers
>> 59 Destroyers
>> 67 Torpedo Boats
>> 116 Submarines
>

> If I show you a cite that agrees with me will you go away and just shut up?

Sorry, there is no cite whose can agree with you, and I'm from ITALY,
you fool, and neither the ham nor the dwarf can doctor the facts as you
attempted to do in a rather pathetic manner.

>>> The British got very, very lucky catching those
>>> Italian Capital Ships in the narrows of the Straits of Gibraltar.
>>

>> This must have happened on planet Daryl since it never happened
>> on planet earth, The large units of the Italian fleet rarely went
>> far from their home bases and when they did it tended to end
>> badly. See the the battle of Cape Matapan as an example
>
> You must think the rest of us are stupid. There has been a consensus
> that what I stated was true. Well, maybe not by those born well after
> WWII ended but those that were actually there.

?

I can surely exclude that you're the dwarf itself, but you're
unquestionably denying truth and bending facts beyond even italian
standards....

>>> It was more luck for the Brits and Unluck for the Italians. History

>>> will never know what would have happened had the Italians broken out
>>> and positioned their Fleet to completely block off the Straits.
>>

>> They would have run out of fuel or been sunk by ships and
>> aircraft from carriers and Gibraltar. The Italian BB's and cruisers
>> were built to operate in the Med close to home base and were
>> lightly armoured and short ranged. Without the techniques and
>> ships required to refuel at sea they were going nowehere and
>> without effective radar they were always caught by surprise.

I never heard of an Italian ship running out of fuel in the Med... the
most civilized explanation of your nonsense is that either (or both) you
mistook the many episodes of italian ships towed to port, but all those
episodes stems from battle damage, not running out of fuel or you
spectacularly misunderstood the final mission of the Massawa destroyers
in 1940.

> The last time I checked BB stands for Battleship which were very good at
> open water and very poor in places like the Straits of Gibraltar.
> Destroyers work well in closed spaces as well as Gun Boats. But
> Cruisers and BBs are terrible in close quarters. But in the Kieths
> World, they can turn on a dime and generate speed quickly.

you want to explain Med choke points to an Italian ? Indeed the Sicilian
Strait was an hell of ferocious battles between small and insidious
craft, but this don't authorize you to call DD and smaller craft
"capital ships"; an American will never call "capital ship" a tin can,
notwhitstanding the ferocious battles around and up The Slot (whose was,
and still is, a true arena for Naval guerrilla)

as "King Kong" Lee demonstrates, and the Med battles confirmes, the
heavies (the true ones, BBs and CA/large CL) still have a major role in
the wrestling for the control of choke points.

[snip of other drivels]


> Try Google. It's there along with the fantasies you keep presenting.
> It's up to us to weed through the crackpots.

and I'm a communist...

(an Italian will understand the scathing remark on daryl's fantasies above)

best regards from ITALY,
dott. Piergiorgio

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 14:21, Bill ha scritto:


> You continue to maintain that the Italian navy fought a major
> engagement in the Straits of Gibraltar in WWII?
>
> Can I have some of what you're smoking please...

I fully concur and agree (minus the smoke, of course)

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 24/03/2013 14:52, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:

>

> This is the Italian battleship that attacked Gibraltar:
> http://www.sommergibili.com/sciree.htm
> "On Sept. 19, 1941, the fourth mission on Gibraltar is finally
> successful: three ships, for a total of about 30,000 t, are sunk."

I'm at loss of words... it's the first time ever that someone call
"battleship" a submarine and the SLC (Chariots for .en people)....

what are you collectively smoking ??????

[Jim Wilkins]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message

news:vtL3t.680$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

Maybe he confused Matapan with Salamis?

[Jim Wilkins]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message

news:kOL3t.690$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

>
> you want to explain Med choke points to an Italian ? Indeed the
> Sicilian Strait was an hell of ferocious battles between small and
> insidious craft, but this don't authorize you to call DD and smaller
> craft "capital ships"; an American will never call "capital ship" a
> tin can, notwhitstanding the ferocious battles around and up The
> Slot (whose was, and still is, a true arena for Naval guerrilla)

For R.A.M. readers:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111100280_pf.html
"Military historians believe the Melvin is the only destroyer to sink
an enemy battleship in World War II in the maritime equivalent of a
heavyweight boxer being knocked out by a lightweight."

jsw

[Jim Wilkins]

"dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message

news:pTL3t.692$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...

We call that "sarcasm".
jsw ;-)

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kio0p8$m8r$1...@dont-email.me...

Leave off the insults when you can't refute the point. Japan
was that bloody expansionist, couldn't possibly have avoided
trying to grow past the US's tolerance. What you've said is
if that weren't true, there might not have been a war. It
was true and you're spouting nonsense.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

I think that US psyche tend to react collectively in an uniquely
excellent manner during emergencies (cfr. 9/11) but in ordinary
circumstances the work-together is between fair and good; one factor is
that US system is geared towards getting the best from the individualism
(hence my praising, back then, of the ingenuity showed aboard an US
Carrier during the Indonesian tsunami, whose an sailor designed and
produced a makeshift device for a much quicker filling of water cans)

Italian semi-individualism differ in many respects, in the good and bad;
the Italian seems both egoistic and self-centered, but in truth, an
Italian put more value and care towards their peers and their direct
leaders (yes, including their families...) hence the far superior
results achevied by well-led small groups in many fields.

if you try to study fascist regime's innards, you will see how isn't "il
duce" that many italian actually follow, but their fellows and immediate
leaders. it's also why the terror bombing of Italy gets much concrete
results than the bombing of Germany and Japan during WWII.

[dott.Piergiorgio]

Il 25/03/2013 00:47, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:
> "dott.Piergiorgio" <chied...@ask.me> wrote in message
> news:pTL3t.692$XZ4...@tornado.fastwebnet.it...
>> Il 24/03/2013 14:52, Jim Wilkins ha scritto:
>>
>>>
>>> This is the Italian battleship that attacked Gibraltar:
>>> http://www.sommergibili.com/sciree.htm
>>> "On Sept. 19, 1941, the fourth mission on Gibraltar is finally
>>> successful: three ships, for a total of about 30,000 t, are sunk."
>>
>> I'm at loss of words... it's the first time ever that someone call
>> "battleship" a submarine and the SLC (Chariots for .en people)....
>>
>> what are you collectively smoking ??????
>>
>> Best regards from Italy,
>> dott. Piergiorgio.
>
> We call that "sarcasm".
> jsw ;-)

ah, OK

Best regards from Italy,
dott. Piergiorgio.

p.s. there's also the Olterra....

[dott.Piergiorgio]

the only destroyer... wait... perhaps I get where daryl has got his
hopeless mixing up: he in first instance mixes together the two world
wars (where indeed an Italian small ship sank a large battleship) then
somewhat conflates actions from WWI Adriatic with actions from WWII
Med.... and after... mhhh.. perhaps together with a beer and a too quick
reading (and link-hopping) he construed his wrong rendition of WWII Med
conflict.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kio3if$2un$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

> Leave off the insults when you can't refute the point. Japan was
> that bloody expansionist, couldn't possibly have avoided trying to
> grow past the US's tolerance. What you've said is if that weren't
> true, there might not have been a war. It was true and you're
> spouting nonsense.

Some factions were, others less so, and the balance shifted. General
Tojo's lost power over a year before the government surrendered to us.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_T%C5%8Dj%C5%8D
"However, Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme
opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tojo,
who had expressed reservations regarding war with the West, "

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kio553$9sa$1...@dont-email.me...

What happened after several years of having the snot kicked
out of them is hardly relevant to pre-war policy.

[Bill]

Let us all know when someone takes a shot at it.

With enough practice just about anyone can operate a floating
airfield...

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kio5m1$btc$1...@dont-email.me...

The Wiki quote refers to the autumn of 1941.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Bill" <black...@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:ks6vk8hq8vhvmp8ml...@4ax.com...

With enough money and practice anyone can fly to the moon.

[Uncle Steve]

On Sun, Mar 24, 2013 at 08:20:55PM -0400, Jim Wilkins wrote:
> "peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
> news:kio3if$2un$1...@dont-email.me...
> > "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
> > Leave off the insults when you can't refute the point. Japan was
> > that bloody expansionist, couldn't possibly have avoided trying to
> > grow past the US's tolerance. What you've said is if that weren't
> > true, there might not have been a war. It was true and you're
> > spouting nonsense.
>
> Some factions were, others less so, and the balance shifted. General
> Tojo's lost power over a year before the government surrendered to us.

Ah, so the "balance shifted". You folk sure do lean heavily on
euphamisms to explain important historical events.

> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hideki_T%C5%8Dj%C5%8D
> "However, Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme
> opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tojo,
> who had expressed reservations regarding war with the West, "

The Japs were so misunderstood.


Regards,

Uncle Steve

--
Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra and then suddenly it
flips over, pinning you underneath. At night, the ice weasels come.
-- Friedrich Neitzsche

[David E. Powell]

On Sunday, March 24, 2013 2:33:09 PM UTC-4, Keith W wrote:
> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>
> > "peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
>

> > news:kin85u$7br$1...@dont-email.me...
>
> >> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kin60c$qfh$1...@dont-email.me...
>
> >>
>
> >>
>
> >> There is a lot of evidence that the expansionist nature of Japan was
>
> >> recognized long before WW1, and that American policy in the Pacific
>
> >> recognized that fact and was designed to contain it before 1907. (I
>
> >> chose 1907 because of the Great White Fleet and its reception in
>
> >> Australia.)
>
> >>
>
> >
>
> > It was, but we were discussing threats to carriers as an example of
>
> > how rapidly an unexpected hostile military situation can develop, and
>
> > the western powers had no naval interests worth fighting for in the
>
> > northern Chinese mainland areas Japan appeared to covet. The Chinese
>
> > themselves had become a major annoyance.
>
> > http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/battleswars1900s/p/boxerreb.htm
>
> >
>
>
>
> Only in the sense of being a territory to be fought over, After the
>
> Xinhai Revolution of 1911 China fragmented and became what
>
> we would today categorize as a 'failed state'. The Japanese
>
> invasion brought a temporary truce between the warring factions
>
> but the nationalists and communists were always at least as
>
> likely to fight each other as the Japanese

Very true. The Warlords of 1920s-1930s China almost remind one of Somalia in the 1990s.

It was also that "Failed State" nature that led to a clash with Russia as a faction in Northern China got in a fight with the Russians in the 1920s (I recall that Red and White Russians actually teamed up to fight back, almost a precursor to WW2 when the Soviets united against that German-led invasion.)

> Keith

[Keith W]

ISTR that RN Destroyers played a major role in sinking
Scharnhorst first by slowing her down enough for the DOY
to catch her and then finishing her off with no less than
19 torpedoes.

Keith

[Jim Wilkins]

"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message
news:dpU3t.163647$eU7....@fx24.fr7...

> Jim Wilkins wrote:
>>
>> For R.A.M. readers:
>> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/11/AR2005111100280_pf.html
>> "Military historians believe the Melvin is the only destroyer to
>> sink
>> an enemy battleship in World War II in the maritime equivalent of a
>> heavyweight boxer being knocked out by a lightweight."
>>
>> jsw
>
> ISTR that RN Destroyers played a major role in sinking
> Scharnhorst first by slowing her down enough for the DOY
> to catch her and then finishing her off with no less than
> 19 torpedoes.
>
> Keith

Though they didn't score, the destroyers HMS Cossack, Sikh, Maori and
Zulu plus the Polish ORP Piorun very bravely took on the Bismarck
without capital ships to back them or divert return fire.
jsw

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kio6fs$f77$1...@dont-email.me...

Look at your quote above. YOU are talking about 1944.

From your refernce:

Tojo 14 Oct. 1940

For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign
minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations.
Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked... The
heart of the matter is the imposition on us of withdrawal
from Indochina and China... If we yield to America's
demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident.
Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea
undermined.

A paragraph or two down in the same article

He was given one order from the Emperor: To make a policy
review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial
Conferences. Tōjō, who was on the side of the war,
nevertheless accepted this order, and pledged to obey.

That part of the article is a description of the efforts
made to avoid a conflict and how completely futile they were
in view. It also makes it clear that although Tojo had
concerns, he was in favour of war.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kipbe3$s0l$1...@dont-email.me...

> what had been sanctioned by the Imperial Conferences. Tojo, who was

> on the side of the war, nevertheless accepted this order, and
> pledged to obey.
>
> That part of the article is a description of the efforts made to
> avoid a conflict and how completely futile they were in view. It
> also makes it clear that although Tojo had concerns, he was in
> favour of war.
>
> You really should read your references.

I did. They only debated it because they hadn't yet committed to
attacking the US.

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kipeeg$avl$1...@dont-email.me...

So you admit to dishonestly cherry-picking quotes that
disagree with the general thrust of your references to
support your obviously incorrect argument.

Bye Fred.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kipf64$fb5$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kipeeg$avl$1...@dont-email.me...
>

>>I did. They only debated it because they hadn't yet committed to
> attacking the US.
>
> So you admit to dishonestly cherry-picking quotes that disagree with
> the general thrust of your references to support your obviously
> incorrect argument.
>

Stop distorting whatever you don't agree with.

I argued that war with the US was NOT inevitable, but a product of bad
gambles and unfortunate decisions. Here is a concise summary of the
evolution of the political situation and the missed chances for peace:
http://www.wnd.com/2001/12/11975/

"But FDR did not want to cut off oil. As he told his Cabinet on July
18, an embargo meant war, for that would force oil-starved Japan to
seize the oil fields of the Dutch East Indies."

"According to Grew, Konoye was willing to give up Indochina and China,
except a buffer region in the north to protect her from Stalin, in
return for the U.S. brokering a peace with China and opening up the
oil pipeline."

I can't find my copy of Eagles Against the Sun which details the
developments more thoroughly than the references I've found on the
Net.
http://www.amazon.com/Eagle-Against-Sun-American-Japan/dp/0394741013

jsw

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kipts2$571$1...@dont-email.me...

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:kipf64$fb5$1...@dont-email.me...
> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message
> news:kipeeg$avl$1...@dont-email.me...
>
>>I did. They only debated it because they hadn't yet
>>committed to
> attacking the US.
>
> So you admit to dishonestly cherry-picking quotes that
> disagree with the general thrust of your references to
> support your obviously incorrect argument.
>

>Stop distorting whatever you don't agree with.

No distortion, but you've been insulting

You keep trying to argue that stopping the particular
sequence that started the war we got would have removed the
root causes of the conflict. That's nonsense, but you keep
trying. I snipped your umpteenth repeat of that irrelevant
stupidity.

[Jeffrey Hamilton]

You bring the wine then, dott. Piergiorgio.

cheers....Jeff

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kiqck0$4if$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kipts2$571$1...@dont-email.me...
>

> You keep trying to argue that stopping the particular sequence that
> started the war we got would have removed the root causes of the
> conflict. That's nonsense, but you keep trying. I snipped your
> umpteenth repeat of that irrelevant stupidity.

I keep presenting more evidence while you repeat your unsupported
personal opinion. Put up or shut up.
jsw

[peter skelton]

"Jim Wilkins" wrote in message

news:kiqkue$n5t$1...@dont-email.me...

You keep repeating evidence to support something irrelevant
to the question at hand. I long since posted solid evidence
supporting the truth. There is quite a bit in things you've
posted also supporting it, but you've simply ignored it when
it was pointed out to you. Others have posted supporting
material, complete with references. It is very clear by now
that Japan was seen as a credible opponent long before 1937.
It is the point at issue - address some of the copious
evidence that's been posted.

BTW it would help of you were somewhat more truthful.

[Jim Wilkins]

"peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message

news:kiqmjk$vdr$1...@dont-email.me...

> "Jim Wilkins" wrote in message news:kiqkue$n5t$1...@dont-email.me...
>

>>I keep presenting more evidence while you repeat your unsupported
> personal opinion. Put up or shut up.
>
> You keep repeating evidence to support something irrelevant to the
> question at hand. I long since posted solid evidence supporting the
> truth. There is quite a bit in things you've posted also supporting
> it, but you've simply ignored it when it was pointed out to you.
> Others have posted supporting material, complete with references. It
> is very clear by now that Japan was seen as a credible opponent long
> before 1937. It is the point at issue - address some of the copious
> evidence that's been posted.
>
> BTW it would help of you were somewhat more truthful.
>

The possibility of war had been evident since the 20's, but only if
America forcibly opposed Japanese ambitions in Asia.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/70-7_04.htm
"Despite these preparations for war, neither the Army nor the Navy
developed during the decade of the thirties any specific plans for the
use of this formidable military machine against a coalition of western
powers. In the files of the high command were general statements of
policy and annual operations plans, but, except for those that
concerned China, they were defensive in concept and dealt only with
the United States and Soviet Russia. In no case, it was emphasized,
should Japan fight more than one enemy at a time. The plans were, in
the words of one Japanese officer, "outdated writings" and "utterly
nonsensical."

"The sharp American and British reaction [oil embargo] to their move
into Indochina came as a surprise to the Japanese and precipitated an
intensive review of the nation's readiness to wage war. The picture
was not encouraging."

"Though the date 26 November marked the real end of negotiations, the
Japanese were not yet ready to go to war."
They voted on December 1, 1941 to proceed with the attacks they had
been preparing as a contingency.

http://www.wnd.com/2001/12/11975/
"Had FDR met Prince Konoye, there might have been no Pearl Harbor, no
Pacific war, no Hiroshima, no Nagasaki, no Korea, no Vietnam. How many
of our fathers and uncles, brothers and friends, might still be
alive?"

Buchanan was a Presidential speechwriter and thus a major public voice
of US policy. Who are you?

You just baselessly insult me, stubbornly repeat your opinion and
vaguely claim your support is out there somewhere. Prove it.
jsw

[Dean Markley]

Seems to me that you are arguing a "what-if". There's simply no way of showing that history would have followed that path. It is all speculation. Both sides here are using opinion, not fact. And there cannot be any fact unless you have a Wayback machine and you use it to change history.

[Jim Wilkins]

"Dean Markley" <dama...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:00d18cd8-e05a-4b27...@googlegroups.com...

On Tuesday, March 26, 2013 7:24:48 AM UTC-4, Jim Wilkins wrote:
> "peter skelton" <skel...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
>

-Seems to me that you are arguing a "what-if".
-There's simply no way of showing that history would
-have followed that path. It is all speculation.
-Both sides here are using opinion, not fact.
-And there cannot be any fact unless you have a
-Wayback machine and you use it to change history.

As you saw from the Buchanan quote this isn't just my personal
speculation. There have been certain critical events that eliminated a
choice and forced the path of subsequent history in relatively
predictable ways. FDR's missed opportunity with Konoye is one, some
others are American good luck at the Battle of Midway and Hitler's
failed assassination. The Battle of Gettysburg is rich with them.
jsw

[Keith W]

Jim Wilkins wrote:
>
> "Though the date 26 November marked the real end of negotiations, the
> Japanese were not yet ready to go to war."
> They voted on December 1, 1941 to proceed with the attacks they had
> been preparing as a contingency.
>
> http://www.wnd.com/2001/12/11975/
> "Had FDR met Prince Konoye, there might have been no Pearl Harbor, no
> Pacific war, no Hiroshima, no Nagasaki, no Korea, no Vietnam. How many
> of our fathers and uncles, brothers and friends, might still be
> alive?"
>

That does not coincide with Prince Konoye's account of events.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/misc/konoye.html

He attended a conference on July 10th about which he wrote

"However, in spite of my efforts, Foreign Minister MATSUOKA's attitude
became increasingly uncooperative. It became clear that his attitude was
one of opposition to the Japanese-American negotiations."

Eventually it became clear that whatever proposals the Japanese government
then in charge came up with would be rejected by the military and the
government resigned on July 17th.

Instead of the proposed conciliatory Japanese response being issued
to American proposals, the new government decided to act militarily
by intervening in French IndoChina and put forward a set of Japanese
demands

<Quote>
1. Japan has no intention of sending troops further than French Indo-
China and will withdraw them from French Indo-China after the settlement
of the China Incident.

2. Japan will guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines.

3. America will remove her armaments in the Southwest Pacific.

4. America will cooperate in Japan's obtaining resources in the
Netherlands East Indies.

5. America will act as intermediary in the direct negotiations between
Japan and China, and will recognize Japan's special position in French
Indo-China, even After the withdrawal of troops.

</Quote>

The new government went to expressly forbid any meeting between
Konoye and the US Government unless the US accepted the new
Japanese demands. If they did not the alternative was made clear
to Konoye in August.

<Quote>
If, therefore, it is the Prime Minister's
intention to attend such a meeting with determination to firmly
support the basic principles embodied in the Empire's Revised Plan to
the "N"-Plan and to carry out a war against America if the President of
the United States still fails to comprehend the true intentions of the
Empire even after this final effort is made, the army is not necessarily
in disagreement.
</Quote>

In other words he was expected to deliver an ultimatum.


On September 6th an Imperial conference was held at which the
policy was quite clearly set that unless the Americans accepted
Japanese demands then a war with Britain and America should
be followed.

<Quote>
We shall resolve to open hostilities against America (Britain, and
the Netherlands) if, by early October. there is no probability of our
demands in the Japanese-American negotiations being met".
</Quote>


The bottom line was that they were determined that anything other
than craven American submission to all Japanese demands meant war.

Keith

[Jim Wilkins]

"Keith W" <keithnosp...@demon.co.uk> wrote in message

news:krn4t.188647$wa4.1...@fx18.fr7...

Thanks, that's a very good reference, but too long to thoroughly
digest when I need to organize and prepare my taxes.
A speed-reading shows the competing influences of the War and Peace
factions.

Japan's September 3rd proposal:
1. Japan will not send occupational troops further than French Indo-
China.
2. Japan will make an independent interpretation of the Tripartite
Pact.
3. In accordance with a Japanese-Chinese Agreement, Japan will
withdraw
her troops from China.
4. Japan will not restrict American economic activities in China
provided such activities are carried out along just lines.
5. The principle of nondiscrimination in respect to trade will be
established in the Southwest Pacific.
6. The necessary steps will be taken to restore normal trade relations
between Japan and America.

On the embargo:
"There were no means of avoiding this gradual impoverishment of
military
supplies other than to obtain goods through the successful conclusion
of
Japanese-American negotiations, or by increasing domestic production,
at
least to the extent of satisfying the requirements of the military.
This
was one of the main reasons for the extreme interest of the Government
in the Japanese-American negotiations."

By coldly rejecting the more moderate Peace faction proposals as
appeasement America strengthened the position of the War party. I
think we might have handled the situation satisfactorily if the egos
involved and the recent precedent of Czechoslovakia permitted.

Beyond that who can even guess? Maybe they would have started the war
by pushing too hard somewhere else?.
jsw

[Keith W]

Trouble is that Just as this proposal was dispatched the Germans
launched operation Barbarossa and the army read this as freeing
themselves from the ncessity to guard against a possible Soviet
threat. As a resuly they hardened their position and the Army
the Army eneral Staff egan advocating an immediate breaking off
of negotiations and an opening of American-Japanese hostilities.

Keith

[Eunometic]

On Mar 23, 3:17 am, "dott.Piergiorgio" <chiedet...@ask.me> wrote:
> Il 20/03/2013 18:12, dumpst...@hotmail.com ha scritto:
>
> > After the Aircraft Carrier: 3 Alternatives to the Navy s Vulnerable
> > Flattops:
>
> >http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2013/03/replacing-aircraft-carriers/
>
> the UK-Italian concept of CVL has already proven (again) their
> effectiveness, together with the SSGN conversion in the last Libyan war,
> so for me a mix of Americas and (more) SSGN Ohios is the best way in the
> current sea environment. and there's the PR factor in reducing the SSBN
> number in favour of increasing that of SSGN
>
> the CVE-on-steroid concept draws an huge "meh" from me. WWII experience
> shows that CVE's fate is always in the hands of the Divine ("god protect
> kids, drunkards and CVEs") Not a thing that can be afforded in the
> current Naval & military environment in which casualties and even
> operational losses weight *much* more than in past.
>
> but there's a fourth alternative, decisely proven (as capital ship
> concept), that is, the dreaded B* word, in the form of the precision
> long-range (in the 100+ of kms.) gunfire coupled with spotting/recon UAV
> (in confined waters can be really deadly)
>
> a recent news, Italian Navy has just signed a contract for four Scan
> Eagle UAV, together with a pair of catapults. meaning, the testing of
> the reconnaissance/spotting element is starting. and the R&D work on the
> most interesting element is already started: the weather-telemetry
> sounding shell (that is, the wet dream of every fire director: having
> the precise precise data on everything influences the trajectory
> measured along the actual trajectory directly fed real-time into the
> ballistic computer..)

>
> Best regards from Italy,
> dott. Piergiorgio.

Soviet designed anti shipping missiles can attack in a swarm of around
24 missiles at Mach 3 with only one of them porpoising up to use its
radar and sensors and passing that on to the other missile which will
sea skim all the way apart from agressive terminal manoeuvres.

The carrier will turn into the battleship of 1940: a sitting duck for
missiles instead of aircraft. Better get the VSTOL F 35 working, at
least small carriers will be possible

[Bill]

On Thu, 28 Mar 2013 20:49:02 -0700 (PDT), Eunometic
<euno...@yahoo.com.au> wrote:

>Soviet designed anti shipping missiles can attack in a swarm of around
>24 missiles at Mach 3 with only one of them porpoising up to use its
>radar and sensors and passing that on to the other missile which will
>sea skim all the way apart from agressive terminal manoeuvres.

How to they get close enough to launch?

Argentina, when operating with their mainland bases within range of
small carriers, were unable to sink one, or even hit one...