The P-38 record
Ceullers51
in WW2 (plus two so-so units important in the 38 discussion)--
1fg 440 P-38
4fg 550 P-47 P-51
8fg 453 P-39, P-40 P-38
14fg 426 P-38
20fg 211 P-38 P-51
23fg 467 P-40 P-51
35fg 387 P-400 P-39 P-38 P-47 P-51
49fg 664 P-40 P-38 P-47
52fg 425 Spitfire P-51
55fg 303 P-38 P-51
56fg 664 P-47
78fg 326 P-47 P-51
82fg 553 P-38
325 540 P-40 P-47 P-51
347fg 315 P-39 P-38
348fg 349 P-47 P-51
352fg 504 P-47 P-51
353fg 328 P-47 P-51
354fg 637 P-47 P-51
355fg 339 P-47 P-51
357fg 595 P-51
475fg 552 P-38
Of the groups with more than 400 kills that flew only one type of aircraft
thruout their wartime tour, one flew the P-47, one the P-51 and four the P-38.
Three of the P-38 groups were in the MTO and one the Pacific. Of the groups
scoring more than 500 kills while flying only one type of aircraft, one flew
the P-47, one the P-51 and two the P-38. One of the P-38 groups served in the
MTO.
13 P-38 groups were deployed in the combined MTO/ETO theaters. 34 P-47 groups
served in the same theaters. 24 P-51 groups did so. (Note that most groups,
as can be seen from the list above, did not keep one fighter type for the
entire war.) That the aircraft type with the fewest deployed fg has the highest
number of fg in the top ranks in air to air killsis worth noting and doesn't
seem to indicate the 38 lacked the ability to rough up the enemy.
Some comments--
While the ETO fighter jocks got permission to abandon close escort and do free
ranging escort from late winter 44, the MTO jocks never got such permission and
so during the entire war flew only close escort, meaning they gave up the key
advantages of speed and altitude to their foes--yet with that handicap still
performed outstandingly well in air to air.
I threw in the 20 and 55 fg figures because these were the two original ETO 38
groups that seem to be the source of origin of the P-38's poor reputation in
the ETO. But even with the swtich from teh 38, their record for the war is not
outstanding. It was very good, but not top rank.
Compare their records with that of, for example, the 325, which served in the
MTO. It scored 135 kills with the P-40, 153 with the P-47 and 288 with the
P-51, pushing it right to the top ranks of fg. No 325 vet I've ever run into
has badmouthed any of the aircraft they flew, including the P-40, which must
have had been outclassed. A poor workman blames his tools. The reasons they
generally cite for the greater number of kills with the P-51 is that it gave
them the range to go where the action was.
It could be asked why it was that the P-38 groups did so much better than the
P-47 and P-51 groups in the MTO. Why didn't the P-47, for example, shine in the
MTO the way it did in the ETO? A P-47 group topped all the fg in kills and was
based in the ETO, yet no P-47 group did all that well in the MTO--or the PTO
for that matter. Can we conclude from this that the P-47 met easier opposition
in the ETO than in the MTO or PTO? Or would it be wiser to conclude that that
fg was a crackerjack unit, with outstanding leadership, and mission profiles
that offered it plenty of opportunities to score.
A key point about all the high scoring fg--they were at the time and place
where the action was. And they were skilled enough, led well enough and had
mission assignments appropriate enough to allow them to shine.
What's interesting to me is that the US had so many capable fighter types to
choose from. Based on its record, the P-38 delivered the goods.
George
Bejewelled
>FGs
>in WW2 (plus two so-so units important in the 38 discussion)--
Yes, great post. Two things help the 1st and 14th, time in service and (earlier
on ) the Flax missions and Stuka/italian opposition. Still, you can only shoot
down what the other guys send up. Losses would be interesting too (I understand
the 348th at least would show up really well in this regard).
As far as the 20th and 55th (and 364 too), they all showed a big turnaround
when the Mustang came in. This shows it can't just be personnel.
As Carlo says, keep posting George. You're raising the quality of debate. lucky
this isn't a russian subject.
Adrian Camp.
Ceullers51
>
>The leadership argument is a good one, but I am a little uncertain as to
>how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly.
if command noticed a group (wing now) performing below par and they asked me to
check into it, the first thing I would do would be pull the group commander's
jacket and give it a once over. I'd try to recall if I'd served with him and
remember what kind of man he was. If I hadn't served with him, I'd ask around
until I foudn someone who had, and quiz them on what kind of leader he was. If
he checked out ok I'd pull the jackets of the squadron commanders and do the
same drill.
If I had time I'd visit the unit personally, fly some missions with them. Then
I'd call in the group commander and ask him what the deal was. If I didn't
like his answers I'd recommend he be replaced.
At the bottom of the list of things would be to question whether the tyhpe of
aircraft the group was assigned was adequate for the job.
If Hub Zemke, Don Gentile, Don Blakeslee, Sid Woods, Jack Oberhansley, Chelsey
Peterson or Roy Everson had been made commander of the 20fg and told to whip
them into shape, I believe their record would have been substantially better.
Carlo Kopp
>
> Here are the official victory records and aircraft types flown of the USAAF FGs
> in WW2 (plus two so-so units important in the 38 discussion)--
Great post, George, really enjoyed reading it. Pls keep posting.
The interesting question which arises is how the P-38 managed to acquire
such a poor image in the public eye. One of the WW 2 pilots I know, who
flew P-40s in the SWPA for many years, is a great fan of the P-38, and
according to his comment the type was thought of very highly in the
SWPA.
Some sources I have read suggest that the P-38 was systematically bagged
by a small but very vocal group of USAAF officers based in the UK, and
that this was the source of the aircraft's PR problem. These guys wanted
Mustangs, since Mustangs were cheaper to run than P-38s, and thus larger
numbers could be in theory deployed for the same resources.
The leadership argument is a good one, but I am a little uncertain as to
how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly. It would have to be
an unusual coincidence if both wings were not led well, especially if
they were the critical sole long range escort assets in the theatre. One
would assume that such an important asset would get the top people
assigned to it, or so one would hope.
An interesting subject area indeed.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
>
> from Carlo Kopp the comment
> >
> >how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly.
>
> check into it, the first thing I would do would be pull the group commander's
> jacket and give it a once over. I'd try to recall if I'd served with him and
> remember what kind of man he was. If I hadn't served with him, I'd ask around
> until I foudn someone who had, and quiz them on what kind of leader he was. If
> he checked out ok I'd pull the jackets of the squadron commanders and do the
> same drill.
> If I had time I'd visit the unit personally, fly some missions with them. Then
> I'd call in the group commander and ask him what the deal was. If I didn't
> like his answers I'd recommend he be replaced.
> At the bottom of the list of things would be to question whether the tyhpe of
> aircraft the group was assigned was adequate for the job.
> If Hub Zemke, Don Gentile, Don Blakeslee, Sid Woods, Jack Oberhansley, Chelsey
> Peterson or Roy Everson had been made commander of the 20fg and told to whip
> them into shape, I believe their record would have been substantially better.
It would appear that this never happened. I seem to recall reading
somewhere (Bodie ?) that morale was a major problem with the 20/55
groups, so much so that Tony Levier was sent out to fly them demos and
convince them that the P-38 was a decent fighter after all and could
deliver good performance.
This would support your argument that leadership was _the_ core problem
with the 20/55 groups.
If we assume this was the case, then it follows that a suitable
scapegoat for the problems had to be found, ie "the P-38 was no good"
fits the bill extremely well. It did have some genuine difficulties in
the high altitude regime at that time, like the turbos blowing up or
siezing in max boost, compressibility (apparently the transport carrying
dive flaps got shot down by friendly fire), poor cockpit heating,
limited intercooler (leading edge) throughput etc.
Pity that so few vets from that period remain, since it would have to be
fascinating to quiz some of the people involved and get to the bottom of
this sorry tale.
Cheers,
Carlo
C.C. Jordan
>from Carlo Kopp the comment
>>
>>The leadership argument is a good one, but I am a little uncertain as to
>>how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly.
>
>if command noticed a group (wing now) performing below par and they asked me to
>check into it, the first thing I would do would be pull the group commander's
>jacket and give it a once over. I'd try to recall if I'd served with him and
>remember what kind of man he was. If I hadn't served with him, I'd ask around
>until I foudn someone who had, and quiz them on what kind of leader he was. If
>he checked out ok I'd pull the jackets of the squadron commanders and do the
>same drill.
>If I had time I'd visit the unit personally, fly some missions with them. Then
>I'd call in the group commander and ask him what the deal was. If I didn't
>like his answers I'd recommend he be replaced.
>At the bottom of the list of things would be to question whether the tyhpe of
>aircraft the group was assigned was adequate for the job.
>If Hub Zemke, Don Gentile, Don Blakeslee, Sid Woods, Jack Oberhansley, Chelsey
>Peterson or Roy Everson had been made commander of the 20fg and told to whip
>them into shape, I believe their record would have been substantially better.
Excellent point ! The 20th FG was saddled with several commanders who
were "single engine fighter men" and who did not like the P-38. The last
of them was Lt. Col. Mark Hubbard who despised the Lightning. After he
was shot down on March 17, 1944, he was replaced by Col. Hal Rau.
From then on, the 20th FG began to roll. They finally had a commander
who liked the fighter and knew how to use it.
So, you are absolutely correct, the performance of a Fighter Group is
very much a reflection of its leadership. Excellent observation.
My regards,
C.C. Jordan
Now online - Flying Prototypes by Erik Shilling:
The Curtiss YP-37 and the Bell YFM-1.
http://home.att.net/~C.C.Jordan/index.html
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/9485/index.html
The "Planes and Pilots of WWII" website.
An online WWII aviation history magazine.
A member of the WWII Web-ring.
"In reality, there exists only fact and fiction. Opinions result from
the lack of the former and reliance on the latter."
wal...@oneimage.com
Please, are you the George Ceullers from WW2 or a relative?
Walt Bj ftr plt ret
Ceullers51
>a suitable
>scapegoat for the problems had to be found, ie "the P-38 was no good"
I certainly wouldn't discount that. The P-47 had gone thru a bad period, with
mechanical teething troubles, including plenty with the turbo and also
operationally. Thje jug groups just werent getting any kills. That was because
they were being deployed incorrectly. When Frank Hunter was canned and Bill
Kepner took over fighter command at the end of August 43 the jug began to build
its reputation. But the 47 groups did have the spring/summer of 43 to get
their act together for the big show that fall. The 38 group hardly had time to
get squared away before it was thrown to the lions. Its amazing the 55fg
didn't get swallowed whole by the GAF or the weather. The 51 got thrown in
wihtout much fanfare too and the mustang groups had a rough go of it at first,
with lots of mechanical problems. But at least they knew the nature of the job
because the 38 people had gone first and could pass on what they had learned.
There was a lot of pressure on the fgs to hurry up and clear out the GAF before
the D=Day invasion set for May. When a group didn't perform up to par somebodys
head was bound to roll unless an excuse could be found.
George
Ceullers51
What do you know about old George?
George
William H. Shuey
>
> Ceullers51 wrote:
> The interesting question which arises is how the P-38 managed to
> acquire such a poor image in the public eye. One of the WW 2 pilots I
> know, who flew P-40s in the SWPA for many years, is a great fan of the
> P-38, and according to his comment the type was thought of very highly
> in the SWPA.
>
> Some sources I have read suggest that the P-38 was systematically
> bagged by a small but very vocal group of USAAF officers based in the
> UK, and that this was the source of the aircraft's PR problem. These
> guys wanted Mustangs, since Mustangs were cheaper to run than P-38s,
> and thus larger numbers could be in theory deployed for the same
> resources.
>
> The leadership argument is a good one, but I am a little uncertain as
> to how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly. It would have
> to be an unusual coincidence if both wings were not led well,
> especially if they were the critical sole long range escort assets in
> the theatre. One would assume that such an important asset would get
> the top people assigned to it, or so one would hope.
>
> An interesting subject area indeed.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Carlo
Carlo:
There was a serious technical problem with the P-38 in the ETO,
engines would simply explode while climbing to the high escort
altitudes (30,000' +). Lockheed's Tony Levier later said that he thought
the cause was the use of British refined gas in the units based in
England, as opposed to American refined gas used in other theaters.
Something about the chemical makeup of the lead anti-knock agent being
different. 9th Airforce Lightnings weren't suffering as much because
they operated at lower altitudes and weren't flogging their engines as
hard.
Also, there were serious leadership problems in 8th Fighter
command. General "Monk" Hunter simply wasn't doing his job, he didn't
get involved in the problems of his command and the guy who commanded
the fighter pilot replacement center in England was scared of the P-38.
He frankly told all who would listen that he was "A P-40 man". This
isn't the kind of attitude guaranteed to instill confidence in a kid
about to be sent to a P-38 group
There was also a problem with supply of P-38s. The Thunderbolt
and Mustang were being built in two factories, but it was early 1945
before there was a second source opened for P-38 production. General
Kenney wanted them for the 5th A.F., The Mediterranean theater wanted
them, even the 12th A.F. in the Aleutians wanted P-38s( If I was
operating at long distances over Ocean and Arctic weather, I'd want a
twin engined plane too). One factory was not meeting the demand; yet a
big Government owned factory, in Louisiana I believe, was tied up
building some 1700 lousy Vultee Vengeance divebombers that no one needed
thru 1942-43. Our War Production Board did quite a job, by and large,
but they made some big mistakes too.
Reference for much of this - "The Lockheed P-38", by Warren
Bodie, Widewing Publications.
Bill Shuey
Carlo Kopp
The first P-38 groups to arrive in the UK got posted to the Med. In
hindsight, it would have been better to pull the experienced P-38 groups
out of the Med for ETO escort ops, and deploy the "green" groups from
the US into the Med, since by then the theatre air threat had been
largely neutralised.
The ETO P-38 groups were in the unfortunate situation of being firstly
inexperienced, secondly equipped with an untried aircraft, and basically
devoid of any prior tactical experience in that regime of air combat.
Not a healthy combination by any measure.
That they managed an aggregate kill ratio of about 2.5:1 (Bodie) is
astonishing by any measure.
Cheers,
Carlo
Michael Williamson
>
> > While the ETO fighter jocks got permission to abandon close escort and do free
> > ranging escort from late winter 44, the MTO jocks never got such permission and
> > so during the entire war flew only close escort, meaning they gave up the key
> > advantages of speed and altitude to their foes--yet with that handicap still
> > performed outstandingly well in air to air.
> > I threw in the 20 and 55 fg figures because these were the two original ETO 38
> > groups that seem to be the source of origin of the P-38's poor reputation in
> > the ETO. But even with the swtich from teh 38, their record for the war is not
> > outstanding. It was very good, but not top rank.
> > Compare their records with that of, for example, the 325, which served in the
> > MTO. It scored 135 kills with the P-40, 153 with the P-47 and 288 with the
> > P-51, pushing it right to the top ranks of fg. No 325 vet I've ever run into
> > has badmouthed any of the aircraft they flew, including the P-40, which must
> > have had been outclassed. A poor workman blames his tools. The reasons they
> > generally cite for the greater number of kills with the P-51 is that it gave
> > them the range to go where the action was.
The 55th and 20th were not the first 38 groups deployed to England, but the groups
deployed there in 1942 redeployed to cover Operation Torch in November of that year.
Bodie's _The Lockheed P-38 Lightning_ notes that 1FG and 14FG were in England in the
summer of 42. Some 1FG units began combat operations in September with strafing
operations, but had been transferred to XIIth AF, apparently as part of preparations
for Operation Torch. Some sweeps were apparently conducted as well, but no contact
with enemy fighters was reported. This makes sense if they were doing pure fighter
operations, as the Luftwaffe wasn't in the business of going after fighters simply
tooling around the countryside. The bombers were a more lucrative target, and would
carry the war to Germany, challenged or not. It seems that little (or perhaps no)
escort work was done, as the aircraft were already slated for North Africa by the
time their workups were completed.
>
>
> The interesting question which arises is how the P-38 managed to acquire
> such a poor image in the public eye. One of the WW 2 pilots I know, who
> flew P-40s in the SWPA for many years, is a great fan of the P-38, and
> according to his comment the type was thought of very highly in the
> SWPA.
>
> Some sources I have read suggest that the P-38 was systematically bagged
> by a small but very vocal group of USAAF officers based in the UK, and
> that this was the source of the aircraft's PR problem. These guys wanted
> Mustangs, since Mustangs were cheaper to run than P-38s, and thus larger
> numbers could be in theory deployed for the same resources.
>
> The leadership argument is a good one, but I am a little uncertain as to
> how both ETO wings (20/55) managed to do so poorly. It would have to be
> an unusual coincidence if both wings were not led well, especially if
> they were the critical sole long range escort assets in the theatre. One
> would assume that such an important asset would get the top people
> assigned to it, or so one would hope.
The Group leadership may have taken their lead from 8AF brass. BGen. Hunter
(VIIIth Fighter Command?) apparently never flew the 38. Col. Cass Hough, responsible
for much of the combat development of the 38 and 47, stated that he "couldn't get
Hunter into a 38," and that Hunter was very pleased to see all the 38s leave for
North Africa in Nov 42. They were his only long range fighters at the time, leaving
the escort job to Spitfire mkV and P-39F aircraft(!!) This was before the 38's had
their unhappy experience with reliability problems from England, and the groups he
lost were probably the most experienced units in the big fighter. They certainly
performed quite well in North Africa, despite the lack of adequate supply and support
for desert operations (no American aircraft received modifications for desert
operations, unlike the British and Germans, who fitted special filters, etc., to
their aircraft to cope with the dust, sand, etc.).
Most likely Gen Hunter, and other leadership at the high levels of 8th AF, suffered
from "single engine syndrome." The prevailing theory was that a two engine ship
could never compete with a single, and this was reinforced by the German experience
with the Battle of Britain and the 110. That the 110, and virtually all other two
engine fighters of the time, had two crewmembers with all the attendant performance
penalties involved, seems to have been ignored by the conventional theory. Later
pilots arriving in England were generally informed that their aircraft, having two
engines, were unsuitable as fighters, and had the unhappy experience of entering
combat as inexperienced pilots flying what they "knew" from their superiors to be
unsuitable for their role. Morale and subsequent performance likely suffered from
this. Certainly many of the pilots in England were not taught proper cruise
techniques which would have both saved fuel and increased reliability of their
engines on the long flights. Nor did many of them know the single engine operations
characteristics of their aircraft, which would have been very helpful given they
weren't taught how to keep both of them running.
Fortunately, the other theaters apparently had leadership who started out happy
with the 38, and as a result the morale and subsequent performance of the units
involved never caused them to change their minds.
Mike Williamson
Bejewelled
>lost were probably the most experienced units in the big fighter. They
>certainly
>performed quite well in North Africa, despite the lack of adequate supply and
>support
>for desert operation
Yes, but Carlo's right that even after the two groups went out, aircraft and
men were taken from the 20th and 55th to go to Africa. When the 14th(?) was
pulled out of the line, a whole squadron was sent. That's why the 55th,
although it had 8 months in the 38 before its first 8AF mission, wasn't as
experienced as it looked.
The 38s in Africa didn't have a great start, but nor did any US forces coming
into line for the first time. Kasserine and the Slot are examples for other
services. It was a steep learning curve, but the 38 groups were effective by
the end of the African campaign.
A thing that stands out in the P-38 record is the number of bad days that even
the good groups had. For the Med groups it was Ploesti 10 June 44 (date?). Some
9AF groups had bad days too. This doesn't seem to be the case with the other
two fighters, excepting the first missions of a group.
Adrian Camp.
C.C. Jordan
>A thing that stands out in the P-38 record is the number of bad days that even
>the good groups had. For the Med groups it was Ploesti 10 June 44 (date?). Some
>9AF groups had bad days too. This doesn't seem to be the case with the other
>two fighters, excepting the first missions of a group.
There are some important considerations to be weighed before any conclusions
are drawn. A great many fighter groups transitioning to the P-51 had already
logged many missions flying the P-47 and the P-38. They were not novices at
aerial combat as were most of the P-38 squadrons when they arrived.
Additionally, P-38's were the prime long range escort in the MTO, meaning that
they encountered far greater numbers of Luftwaffe fighters.
Even some of the very best outfits had bad days. The 56th FG lost 16 aircraft
on September 18th, 1944. An additional 26 were damaged. All were lost to flak
on a low level sweep.
It must be remembered that the bulk of the P-51 squadrons arrived after the
Luftwaffe had been significantly degraded by the P-47 and P-38 squadrons
that were in combat before them.
There is one very good comparison between the P-38 and the P-47 in the SWPA.
The 49th FG entered combat in March of 1942 with three squadrons. The 7th, 8th
and 9th FS. Initially, all three flew the P-40. The 9th squadron was re-equiped
with the P-38F in November/December 1942. The kill rate soared. In December
1943, the tired, worn out P-38's were replaced by P-47D's. Down went the kill
rate. Those pilots who had "cut their teeth" on the P-38 were not at all happy
with the "Jug". Sure, it was faster than the Lightning, rolled better, and it
could be pushed into a dive at high altitude without the terror of the P-38.
Nonetheless, the pilots of the 9th found it to far less forgiving than the big
Lockheed. It couldn't climb nearly as well. And, what about turn rate? The
"Jug" was not nearly as agile. The pilots complained that they missed the
firehose like concentration of guns in the nose. They found that the P-47
required 3 times the ground run to get airborne, not a calming experience
on their short packed earth runways. The pilots complained that the big
Thunderbolt could not fight worth a damn in the vertical. Whereas the P-38
could be hung on her props at speeds as low as 85 mph, and still have
good control in all axis. In general, the P-47 was considered a step back
from the Lightning. Several pilots requested a transfer to the 7th or 8th FS
where they could fly their old faithful P-40's.
Kills broken down by types:
7th FS
P-40 - 114
P-38 - 66
8th FS
P-40 - 152
P-38 - 55
9th FS
P-40 - 39 (1942)
P-38 - 130 (1942-43)
P-47 - 8 (1943) **Only 8 kills in 19 weeks**
P-38 - 77 (1944-45)
Headquarters pilots
P-40 - 8
P-38 - 19
______________
Total 668
Meanwhile, Gen. Kenny, a strong advocate of the P-38, and a commander
who listened to his fighter pilots, requested and received more Lightnings.
In April of 1944, the 9th once again transitioned to Lightnings, this time,
P-38J's. The entire Group eventually got P-38's by September '44. The kill
rate went right up again.
How good was the 49th Fighter Group? Real good, when you consider they
flew mostly P-40's until late 1944. They scored a confirmed 668 kills in air to
air combat. Compare that to the 354th FG of the 9th AF with 701 (suspected
to be about 65 too high) and the 56th FG with 674. The 357th Fg was the only
other to top 600 air to air kills. In addition to the 49th's 668 kills are 105
probables and 61 damaged. Another 336 are believed destroyed on the
ground. However, unlike the ETO, pilots were *not* given credit for aircraft
destroyed on the ground. That gives the 49th a grand total of 1,004 enemy
aircraft destroyed. The 56th FG, with ground kills, has 1,006.
So, who flew for the 49th? No one special unless you consider the following:
Dick Bong 40
Gerry Johnson 22
Bob DeHaven 14 (perhaps 16)
George Preddy (in P-40's before transfer to the ETO) 26
John Landers 10
Joel Paris 9
Arland Stanton 8
Bob Aschenbrener 10
Grover Fanning 9
Wally Jordan 6
Elliott Dent 6
Ernest Harris 10
Fernley Damstrom 7
Any many more.......
Ask the guys from the 49th or the 475th if they thought the P-38
was inferior to the Mustang or Thunderbolt. You already know
their answer.
My best regards,
C.C. Jordan
Now online - Flying Prototypes by Erik Shilling:
The Curtiss YP-37 and the Bell YFM-1.
http://home.att.net/~C.C.Jordan/index.html
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/9485/index.html
The "Planes and Pilots of WWII" website.
An online WWII aviation history magazine.
A member of the WWII Web-ring.
"In reality, there exists only fact and fiction. Opinions result from
a lack of the former and a reliance on the latter."
Carlo Kopp
> > the groups he
> >lost were probably the most experienced units in the big fighter. They
> >certainly
> >performed quite well in North Africa, despite the lack of adequate supply and
> >support
> >for desert operation
>
> Yes, but Carlo's right that even after the two groups went out, aircraft and
> men were taken from the 20th and 55th to go to Africa. When the 14th(?) was
> pulled out of the line, a whole squadron was sent. That's why the 55th,
> although it had 8 months in the 38 before its first 8AF mission, wasn't as
> experienced as it looked.
> The 38s in Africa didn't have a great start, but nor did any US forces coming
> into line for the first time. Kasserine and the Slot are examples for other
> services. It was a steep learning curve, but the 38 groups were effective by
> the end of the African campaign.
> A thing that stands out in the P-38 record is the number of bad days that even
> the good groups had. For the Med groups it was Ploesti 10 June 44 (date?). Some
> 9AF groups had bad days too. This doesn't seem to be the case with the other
> two fighters, excepting the first missions of a group.
>
> Adrian Camp.
One thing Adrian which is often overlooked in analysis of this period is that it
was characterised by some major spats over strategic and operational level
doctrine. In the ETO, the bomber leadership (or at least many of them) were trying
to prove the viability of Douhet's idea of unescorted heavy bombers defending
themselves by their own guns alone.
The Schweinfurt and Regensburg missions ultimately provided the decisive evidence
that confirmed earlier operational experience: escorts were required to ensure
bomber survivability.
This is an important aspect of the internal political context of the period. Any
proponents of the P-38 or long range escort model in general would at this early
stage of the ETO deployment had to contend with a strong lobby of bomber types
with their own "independent bomber" agenda.
The problem boils down basically to inexperience at the strategic, operational,
tactical and flying levels. A very difficult period for the USAAF, in every
respect.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
> BTW above was not my post :-) But yes you are correct, the initial ETO deployment was
> redirected down to the MTO for Torch.
The crux of the ETO early escort ops is the leadership issue. In another posting today I
made some comments about the bomber leadership and their early commitment to a literal
interpretation of hitherto untried ideas of Douhet.
When you add into the equation reluctance by some of the fighter brass, you end up witth
a fairly unified position in the upper staff ranks.
With all centralised command models, you have to expect the "negative posture" to
trickle down to the operational level of command - who would really want to tell their
leaders that they are collectively wrong, or let alone prove them to be such ?
And what better a scapegoat to pick than an aircraft which cannot defend itself
politically ?
I see the importance of this period in that it provides some tremendous education as to
the difficulties involved in trying to develop, build up and test a completely new
doctrinal model at every level of the system. You have the effects of past doctrine, the
effects of established technological prejudices, and the effects of a relatively
inflexible command model, inherited from the pre-aviation period.
In the simplest of terms, it is called learning the hard way.
BTW the stealth debate in more recent times is another, albeit different, example of a
major paradigm shift and the difficulties which surround it. It could hardly be said
that going to stealth has been a smooth transition. There is always much political
dislocation, and much anguish associated with throwing out everything which is known and
comfortable, and replacing it all with new and "untried" ideas.
My position on the P-38/ETO situation is that it is a very rich piece of history for
doctrinal education, covering many complex issues. I am much impressed with the quality
of much of the debate we have seen on this NG on the topic.
Cheers,
Carlo
wal...@oneimage.com
The P38 had one outstanding advantage as a dogfighter in that it was 'ambidextrous'
It could turn either way equally well at all speeds. Consider that the Me109 lacked
rudder trim. Therefore it will want to turn at high speed due to the rudder being
slightly offset for cruise speeds. The pilot must hold rudder to even shoot straight
at high ie combat speeds. Thsi offset and the limited strength of the pilot's leg will
limit the ability of the aircraft to roll and to turn at diving speeds. Consequently
a P38 pilot was able to dive away froman Me109 and begine a truning pullup the 109 couldn't
follow. A series of dives and turtns and he eventually ends up behind the 109 who was forced
to the outside of every rolling pullup. I forget where I read this but it was from the memoirs
of an experienced P38 combat pilot. Kit Crason's book on the P51 adequately explains the 109's
trim deficiencies.
The p38 had its early problems - Mach tuck, lack of cockpit defog/deice, maintenance, but by
the time the p38J came along most of that was behind it. But the dislike of the 'high brass'
for the twin engine maintenance problems caused it t fall into disfavor in the ETO, as mentioned
above. But its two engines and its long range made it much loved in the Pacific thater. I knew an
instructor in my Basic Training who regularly flew 8 to 10 hours missions in the P38. He had some
stories about that, too! 10 hours in teh cockpit - I did that, once! Once wsa enough!
Walt BJ
>
ArtKramr
>From: Carlo Kopp
>Michael Williamson wrote:
>> The interesting question which arises is how the P-38 managed to acquire
>> > such a poor image in the public eye. One of the WW 2 pilots I know, who
>> > flew P-40s in the SWPA for many years, is a great fan of the P-38, and
>> > according to his comment the type was thought of very highly in the
>> > SWPA.
>> >
>> > Some sources I have read suggest that the P-38 was systematically bagged
>> > by a small but very vocal group of USAAF officers based in the UK, and
>> > that this was the source of the aircraft's PR problem. These guys wanted
>> > Mustangs, since Mustangs were cheaper to run than P-38s, and thus larger
>> > numbers could be in theory deployed for the same resources.
>> >
The P-51 was the ultimate long range escort fighter that solved the Bomber
problem. It was cheaper and faster to build and could be fielded in larger
quantities faster. That adds up to the fact that it had advantages in every
category and was correctly chosen as the fighter of choice to escort bombers.
The P-38 was superb. But the P-51 had advantages that the P-38 couldn't match,
as good as it was. Our problem was that we had a surfeit of riches. And a good
thing too.However, I must admit that I didn't care about just what the fighter
cover was, as long as it was there. (s)
Arthur Kramer
344th Bomb Group,9th Air Force
England France Belgium Holland Germany
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
> >From: Carlo Kopp
>
> >Michael Williamson wrote:
>
> >> The interesting question which arises is how the P-38 managed to acquire
> >> > such a poor image in the public eye. One of the WW 2 pilots I know, who
> >> > flew P-40s in the SWPA for many years, is a great fan of the P-38, and
> >> > according to his comment the type was thought of very highly in the
> >> > SWPA.
> >> >
> >> > Some sources I have read suggest that the P-38 was systematically bagged
> >> > by a small but very vocal group of USAAF officers based in the UK, and
> >> > that this was the source of the aircraft's PR problem. These guys wanted
> >> > Mustangs, since Mustangs were cheaper to run than P-38s, and thus larger
> >> > numbers could be in theory deployed for the same resources.
> >> >
>
> The P-51 was the ultimate long range escort fighter that solved the Bomber
> problem. It was cheaper and faster to build and could be fielded in larger
> quantities faster. That adds up to the fact that it had advantages in every
> category and was correctly chosen as the fighter of choice to escort bombers.
> The P-38 was superb. But the P-51 had advantages that the P-38 couldn't match,
> as good as it was. Our problem was that we had a surfeit of riches. And a good
> thing too.However, I must admit that I didn't care about just what the fighter
> cover was, as long as it was there. (s)
>
May I respectfully disagree with some of your statements here, Art ? And, BTW, we
licence built the P-51D down here post WW2, so I am hardly a biased party here.
For the sake of debate, let us explore the two types (eg P-51D vs P-38J/L):
1.Speed/Climb/Manoeuvre Performance - comparable
2.Cost - P-51 better
3.Combat Radius - P-38 better
4.Payload (strike) - P-38 better
5.Battle damage tolerance - P-38 better
6.Pilot training requirements - P-38 a bit more demanding (twin)
From a strategic perspective, I will argue that the P-38J/L was a better aircraft
for long range escort and also for fighter sweeps and tactical ground attack.
What the P-51 had going for it was that it could be procured in greater numbers,
and was cheaper to operate. A bit like a comparison between the F-16 and F-15.
It would be interesting to speculate what the kill ratios would have been like if
the money spent on P-51s was spent instead in fielding late model P-38J/L wings
:-)
In the final analysis though, this is all speculation, and as you correctly point
out, the presence of any decent escort fighter is what really made the difference.
Cheers,
Carlo
Bejewelled
>1.Speed/Climb/Manoeuvre Performance - comparable
>2.Cost - P-51 better
>3.Combat Radius - P-38 better
>4.Payload (strike) - P-38 better
>5.Battle damage tolerance - P-38 better
1. P-51 faster, slower climb.
3. P-51 flew missions to poland from UK (Gdansk?). Far enough? All Axis targets
were within P-51 range
5. P-38 was easier to hit, and if hit was stuffed full of vulnerable things.
Twice as many radiators and coolant pipes. Actual achieved loss rate was higher
for the 38, for whatever reason.
7. P-38 was easier to see, and had slower overtake when bouncing the
opposition. As this is the scenario where most kills are obtained, this matters
a whole lot, the 38 was exposed to detection when bouncing for what, twice as
long?
Adrian Camp.
ArtKramr
>Date: 11/15/98 0:18 AM PST
>What the P-51 had going for it was that it could be procured in greater
>numbers,
>and was cheaper to operate. A bit like a comparison between the F-16 and
>F-15.
>
But that is no small issue. In fact it is the entire issue. Let me make a point
that starts with the props on a B-26. We carried curtis electrics. They were
dangerous props that had all too great a failure rate. But the superior
Hamiltin standards were simply not avalalble in sufficient quantities to be
used on a B-26 as well as all the other planes that needed them So parts were
critical when you are cranking out thousands of planes at a breakneck speed.
The P-38 required two engines and two props as well as duplication of many
systems. And that is the basis for the Air Corps decison to go wth the P-51.
Both the P-38 and the P-51 could do the job, so performance was not a factor.
But production was everything. Remember men were dying overEurope, and the
plane that was the firstest with the mostest was the right plane.
C.C. Jordan
>>
>>1.Speed/Climb/Manoeuvre Performance - comparable
>>2.Cost - P-51 better
>>3.Combat Radius - P-38 better
>>4.Payload (strike) - P-38 better
>>5.Battle damage tolerance - P-38 better
>
>1. P-51 faster, slower climb.
The P-51 was faster at some altitudes, not all. The P-38, OTOH, climbed
substantially better at all altitudes.
>3. P-51 flew missions to poland from UK (Gdansk?). Far enough? All Axis targets
>were within P-51 range
The P-38 flew missions from Foggia, Italy to Poltava, USSR during FRANTIC.
>5. P-38 was easier to hit, and if hit was stuffed full of vulnerable things.
>Twice as many radiators and coolant pipes. Actual achieved loss rate was higher
>for the 38, for whatever reason.
Loss rates were always based upon losses from all causes. The P-38 had a
higher accident rate, largely due to improper training, especially in the ETO.
Also, early in the war, in North Africa and Italy, the P-38 was the only escort
fighter and usually was badly outnumbered over enemy territory. In addition,
the P-38's flew a great many more combat missions (sorties) in the MTO than
did the fighters of the 8th AF (man for man, plane for plane). It was not
uncommon for 15th AF P-38 pilots to fly 300 combat missions, with many
at low level against ground targets. The 8th AF sent a pilot home after he
logged 200 hours of combat time. In other words, time logged on combat missions.
Not so in the MTO, where pilots averaged 300 to 400 hours of combat
time with some of the North Africa veterans reaching 500 hours. In the SWPA
(5th AF), 500 hours was the minimum for rotation stateside.
Ultimately, the loss rate also increased due to fatigued pilots. The 8th AF was
a country club in comparison to the MTO and the SWPA. The majority of fighter
pilots in North Africa, Italy and the SWPA lived in tents, year round. Very much
unlike those flying from Britain, with warm barracks and the luxury of a rather
comfortable existence. All of the above factors contributed to a higher loss
rate, regardless of what aircraft was flown. Worn out pilots make more mistakes.
>7. P-38 was easier to see, and had slower overtake when bouncing the
>opposition. As this is the scenario where most kills are obtained, this matters
>a whole lot, the 38 was exposed to detection when bouncing for what, twice as
>long?
The P-38 was easier to see in planform. Head-on or tail-on, it was very hard to
see or identify. At least according to the Japanese and Germans who have
written about their P-38 experiences.
My regards
C.C. Jordan
Now online - Tale Of A Tiger by R.T. Smith, Part 3.
Michael Williamson
> Both the P-38 and the P-51 could do the job, so performance was not a factor.
> But production was everything. Remember men were dying overEurope, and the
> plane that was the firstest with the mostest was the right plane.
I hate to say this Art, but the P-51 (B and later, able to act as an escort)
acheived neither. The P-38s were flying combat missions out of England by
September 1942, and the P-47 was fielded in larger numbers. Admittedly, in 1944
there were nearly as many Mustangs as Thunderbots delivered, and the 1943
Thunderbolts were probably shorter-ranged. Sorry, couldn't help myself. The
Mustang was a very good escort, and its economic advantages allowed it to hang
around long enough to put in service in the Korean War as well, mainly as a ground
support type.
The problem with production for the P-38 was largely due to decisions at the
policy level. While the F4F Grumman Wildcat, arguably one of the simplest of US
WWII fighters, had two factories producing it, P-38s were produced at a single
facility until 1945 (the new facility, operated by Vultee, IIRC, delivered a
whopping 113 aircraft by V-J day). But of course, many aircraft suffered from
decisions affecting development or production, so this isn't a unique complaint to
the 38.
BTW, the 38 also used the curtiss propellors. Apparently, they were the most
trouble if corrosion was allowed to develop in the areas of the contacts to the
prop. The K model was to use a hydromatic prop by Hamilton Standard to give
improved high altitude performance, but was cancelled due to delays which would be
caused by changing the design to fit the new props (spinners were larger) as well
as engine availability questions.
Mike Williamson
P.S. The quote on "firstest (I've seen fustest too) and the mostest" was made up.
The Confederate General in question (Forrest?) was quite articulate and said "I try
to get their first with the most men." The editor of the newspaper interviewing
thought a more "homespun" quote would go over better with the readership
Carlo Kopp
> >
> >1.Speed/Climb/Manoeuvre Performance - comparable
> >2.Cost - P-51 better
> >3.Combat Radius - P-38 better
> >4.Payload (strike) - P-38 better
> >5.Battle damage tolerance - P-38 better
>
> 1. P-51 faster, slower climb.
Hardly a decisive difference, Adrian. A good pilot can exploit either to his
advantage.
> 3. P-51 flew missions to poland from UK (Gdansk?). Far enough? All Axis targets
> were within P-51 range
Range alone ? The more gas you carry, the more time you can spend on combat power
settings, ie the more time you can spend in engagements. Persistence on station
always works to your advantage :-)
> 5. P-38 was easier to hit, and if hit was stuffed full of vulnerable things.
> Twice as many radiators and coolant pipes. Actual achieved loss rate was higher
> for the 38, for whatever reason.
Which theatre ? If it was ETO, that might just have something to do with the P-38s
flying all of these low level train busting, Flak suppression, close air support
and other sorties, while the P-51 units spent a bigger proportion of time up high
flying escort.
BTW one of my friends flew Mustangs in Korea. He took a single machine gun hit
into the ventral radiator package, and bye bye Mustang. He was lucky to get pulled
out by a US Navy helicopter the next day having evaded NK patrols through the
night :-)
A single hit, he described to me as sounding like a hammer hitting once, and his
aircraft was lost. If he had a P-38 he would have limped home.
> 7. P-38 was easier to see, and had slower overtake when bouncing the
> opposition. As this is the scenario where most kills are obtained, this matters
> a whole lot, the 38 was exposed to detection when bouncing for what, twice as
> long?
How many engagements statistically involve running down the opposition in a
sustained tailchase ?
If your opponent is any good he will be doing his best to try and put plenty of
holes into your aircraft. Consider a typical escort situation, the fighters will
separate from the bombers and engage an incoming interceptor package, merge and
break into individual turning engagements.
A marginal speed advantage is hardly going to make or break your kill ratios.
As for visibility, if you are trying to deter a fighter section from hitting your
bombers, the sooner they see you the better. In an event, at like altitude the
visual signature of a P-38 vs a P-51 is not that much greater. Look at the head on
cross sections of both aircraft.
So I must respectfully disagree on these points.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
> >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
> >Date: 11/15/98 0:18 AM PST
>
> >What the P-51 had going for it was that it could be procured in greater
> >numbers,
> >and was cheaper to operate. A bit like a comparison between the F-16 and
> >F-15.
> >
>
> But that is no small issue. In fact it is the entire issue. Let me make a point
> that starts with the props on a B-26. We carried curtis electrics. They were
> dangerous props that had all too great a failure rate. But the superior
> Hamiltin standards were simply not avalalble in sufficient quantities to be
> used on a B-26 as well as all the other planes that needed them So parts were
> critical when you are cranking out thousands of planes at a breakneck speed.
> The P-38 required two engines and two props as well as duplication of many
> systems. And that is the basis for the Air Corps decison to go wth the P-51.
> Both the P-38 and the P-51 could do the job, so performance was not a factor.
> But production was everything. Remember men were dying overEurope, and the
> plane that was the firstest with the mostest was the right plane.
>
Art,
This would appear to be the basis of the policy decision, over the longer term, to
use the P-51 over the P-38, note how quickly the P-38 was phased out after the end
of hostilities, once running costs became the top issue.
However, the "mythology" out there is that the P-51 was a vastly better aircraft
than the P-38, and that the P-38 was a failure. Clearly neither of these arguments
hold up to scrutiny once you start seriously digging into the history of the
period, the operational record, or the actual capabilities of the respective
aircraft.
The P-38 could have been available in much larger numbers much earlier, had
priority been given at an early stage to set up multiple sources of production.
This simply did not happen. The USAAF had to literally wait for volume deliveries
of the P-51 in 1944.
The telling statistic is the cumulative production volume, and the total numbers
of Mustangs did not match the total numbers of Lightnings until late 1944/early
1945. By that time the LW and Japanese fighter threat had mostly been attritted.
My main concern in the P-38 vs P-51 issue is that the P-38 is frequently unfairly
labelled as an inferior aircraft and failure in combat. This is simply not true.
The USAAF's top scoring aces flew the P-38 and that ought to speak for itself.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
> <snipped>
>
> >5. P-38 was easier to hit, and if hit was stuffed full of vulnerable things.
> >Twice as many radiators and coolant pipes. Actual achieved loss rate was higher
> >for the 38, for whatever reason.
>
> Loss rates were always based upon losses from all causes. The P-38 had a
> higher accident rate, largely due to improper training, especially in the ETO.
> Also, early in the war, in North Africa and Italy, the P-38 was the only escort
> fighter and usually was badly outnumbered over enemy territory. In addition,
> the P-38's flew a great many more combat missions (sorties) in the MTO than
> did the fighters of the 8th AF (man for man, plane for plane). It was not
> uncommon for 15th AF P-38 pilots to fly 300 combat missions, with many
> at low level against ground targets. The 8th AF sent a pilot home after he
> logged 200 hours of combat time. In other words, time logged on combat missions.
> Not so in the MTO, where pilots averaged 300 to 400 hours of combat
> time with some of the North Africa veterans reaching 500 hours. In the SWPA
> (5th AF), 500 hours was the minimum for rotation stateside.
>
> Ultimately, the loss rate also increased due to fatigued pilots. The 8th AF was
> a country club in comparison to the MTO and the SWPA. The majority of fighter
> pilots in North Africa, Italy and the SWPA lived in tents, year round. Very much
> unlike those flying from Britain, with warm barracks and the luxury of a rather
> comfortable existence. All of the above factors contributed to a higher loss
> rate, regardless of what aircraft was flown. Worn out pilots make more mistakes.
>
CC, some excellent points here. Pity we don't have compiled loss rate specs vs
cause and period of deployment for the P-38 vs the P-51.
What tends to be frequently overlooked is the "fighting outnumbered" issue in
relation to the P-38 flying long range escort. The only stats which seem to be easy
to separate out are the 20/55 FG ETO ops in 943, early 1944, since that was pretty
much all they did.
I once did a numbers count on the available Luftwaffe home defence assets during
that period, ie late 1943, and I ended up with something approaching a 4:1-5:1
ratio in favour of the LW vs the 20/55 FGs. I am sure some LW expert out there can
produce a much more accurate estimate.
What I find most perplexing is how deeply the "P-38 was a failure" mythology is
entrenched out there. I wish more people did more research.
Cheers,
Carlo
ArtKramr
>However, the "mythology" out there is that the P-51 was a vastly better
>aircraft
>than the P-38, and that the P-38 was a failure. Clearly neither of these
>arguments
>hold up to scrutiny once you start seriously digging into the history of the
>period, the operational record, or the actual capabilities of the respective
>aircraft.
In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any word
against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard it
referred to as a failure. Not once. And I never met anyone who called the P-38
a failure. It always inspired the highest respect in every way. Maybe it was
the P-39 that was considered a failure, which it really was and the two got
confused somewhere..
ArtKramr
>Date: 11/15/98 4:45 PM PST
>ArtKramr wrote:
> Both the P-38 and the P-51 could do the job, so performance was not a
>factor.
>> But production was everything. Remember men were dying overEurope, and the
>> plane that was the firstest with the mostest was the right plane.
>
> I hate to say this Art, but the P-51 (B and later, able to act as an
>escort)
>acheived neither.
Acheived neither what? I don't understand.
C.C. Jordan
>7. P-38 was easier to see, and had slower overtake when bouncing the
>opposition. As this is the scenario where most kills are obtained, this matters
>a whole lot, the 38 was exposed to detection when bouncing for what, twice as
>long?
For an easy to look at comparison of the P-38 vs the P-47 vs the P-51
as concerns being easier to see, and the disadvantages and advantages
therein, visit the following URL on the Planes and Pilots of WWII website.
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/9585/Profiles.html
My regards,
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
> >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
> >Date: 11/15/98 2:04 PM PST
>
> >However, the "mythology" out there is that the P-51 was a vastly better
> >aircraft
> >than the P-38, and that the P-38 was a failure. Clearly neither of these
> >arguments
> >hold up to scrutiny once you start seriously digging into the history of the
> >period, the operational record, or the actual capabilities of the respective
> >aircraft.
>
> In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any word
> against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard it
> referred to as a failure. Not once. And I never met anyone who called the P-38
> a failure. It always inspired the highest respect in every way. Maybe it was
> the P-39 that was considered a failure, which it really was and the two got
> confused somewhere..
>
Art, I think the problem developed after the war, as Hollywood and other amatuer
groups got into the business of "popularising" the WW2 air campaigns.
I have certainly seen much oblique and direct commentary published over the years
which labels the P-51 as the escort fighter which achieved all, and disregards
the P-38. One factor I suspect may have been simply the effect (/after effects)
of the Allied propaganda machine, for which a fighter with a British engine and
US airframe was manna from Heaven.
OTOH the guys you would have spoken to would have been operational pilots who
would have known the truth, since they dealt with it on a daily basis. They are
of course not going to accept BS, since they know it to be untrue.
This is BTW one of the reasons why I put much value on the personal accounts of
vets like yourself, Art. You guys were there, you saw it with your own two eyes.
There is no substitute for personal experience !
A number of times I have spoken to vets and been given accounts at odds with the
"common knowledge accepted orthodoxy" - once I started digging into the matter,
every time the veteran's account was proven to be correct, and the "mythology"
simply blind repetition in print of a blunder or unsubstantiated opinion by a
commentator, propagated again and again.
I am really glad we have you on this NG, Art, since you can often illuminate
period issues in a way no second or third hand account can.
Cheers,
Carlo
ArtKramr
> In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any word
>> against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard
>it
>> referred to as a failure. Not once. And I never met anyone who called the
>P-38
>> a failure. It always inspired the highest respect in every way. Maybe it
>was
>> the P-39 that was considered a failure, which it really was and the two got
>> confused somewhere..
>>
Carlo,
Having said that, I remember that almost all recon squadron were equipped with
P-38's with cameras mounted in the nose and the number of MG's reduced. All
said it was the best photo recon aircraft ever. So I guess It had dual
purposes. But the P-51 provided me with more fighter cover than any other
aircraft. We had some Spits and some Hurricanes. And also some P47's, but
P-51's made up the bulk of the escorts. All these planes would sock in around
us. But the P-51's would take a position about 5,000 feet above us and sweep
back and forth. It would take a lot of fuel to do that, but their range was so
great, they could do it with ease. And it meant that they would always have a
great diving advantage over any fighters that attacked us. Gave me a warm and
wooly feeling all they way. (s)
Bejewelled
>to separate out are the 20/55 FG ETO ops in 943, early 1944, since that was
>pretty
>much all they did.
>
>I once did a numbers count on the available Luftwaffe home defence assets
>during
>that period, ie late 1943, and I ended up with something approaching a
>4:1-5:1
>ratio in favour of the LW vs the 20/55 FGs. I am sure some LW expert out
>there can
>produce a much more accurate estimate.
The formations were engaged from coast-in to coast-out. The LW assets were
spread among all the 8AF fighters, mainly P-47. The single-seaters of the LW
tended to engage in the area covered by the short-range escorts, while beyond
P-47 range twins were likely to be encountered. This constitutes a target-rich
environment, as LW fighters were tasked to engage bombers, not escorts.
> "P-38 was a failure" mythology is
>entrenched out there. I wish more people did more research.
On a level playing field with the 47 and the 51B, the lightnings did far worse
in terms of kills achieved, from intro to mid-44. Here's a quote from the 20th
history...
20th FG
In January 1943 the group moved to March Field, California,
where it acquired its P-38 Lightning aircraft.
Despite its advantages of range and speed over its German contemporaries,
the P-38 suffered limitations which resulted in less than a break even rate in
enemy aircraft downed versus 20th aircraft lost. Within a 90-day span,
from 31 December 1943 to 31 March 1944 the operational ledger
disclosed 52 German aircraft destroyed while the 20th's losses amounted to
54 pilots. By the end of the P-38 era in July 1944, the 20th's kill rate
improved slightly. The group logged 84 pilots lost versus 89 German aircraft
destroyed in the air and 31 destroyed on the ground.
unquote...
The 31 March is the command change. The P-38 only did slightly better after it.
Here's the 364th...
By 1 August 1944 the 364th had become a P-51 Group.. The difference between the
P-38 and the P-51 is
shown in the ratio between enemy planes destroyed versus 364th pilots lost. The
P-38 was flown approximately five
months and had a ratio 1.3. The P-51 had 5.
unquote..
That's the research I did, the 55th has a similar record. Of course all three
groups may have been coincidentally staffed with bad pilots. Zemke, who
commanded groups with all three fighters rated them 51, 47, 38. Top P-38 ace in
the west got 12 kills (?) P-51 record in SWPA is too small to sample. The
P-47 record for the 348th is amazing, 300+ against a handful of losses,
although the 47 wasn't really suited to the airfields it was the ultimate
dive/zoom fighter, even though the most famous loss, Kearby, was bounced, BnZ,
by an Oscar. Loss records of the P-38 units in the SWPA would be interesting,
but it's hard to compare them with too many factors involved. P-47/38 and 51 in
the ETO, 1943-4, are directly comparable up to around D-Day.
Adrian Camp.
Bejewelled
>"mythology"
>simply blind repetition in print of a blunder or unsubstantiated opinion by a
>commentator, propagated again and again.
That's fine if you can get vets to agree. All tend to favour their own
aircraft. Witness a JAAF pilot who claims he could take on a Mustang in a
Ki-61. That's his opinion. Also all those LW aces clinging to their 109s. The
F6F/F4U controversy.
Roland Beamont defending the hurricane way past its sell-by date.
Don't get me wrong, I'm all for getting everything you can from people who were
there. The trouble is it doesn't always clear things up, it makes them worse!
Likewise books. You just have to gather all the info and make an informed
guess.
Adrian Camp
Bejewelled
>with
>P-38's with cameras mounted in the nose and the number of MG's reduced. All
>said it was the best photo recon aircraft ever
8AF used a lot of Spits too. They were preferred to early F-4/5s, probably for
the same cold/engine teething trouble the P-38 had. Their base was about 5
miles from where I sit.
>. We had some Spits and some Hurricanes. And also some P47's, but
>P-51's made up the bulk of the escorts. All these planes would sock in around
>us
>. We had some Spits and some Hurricanes. And also some P47's, but
>P-51's made up the bulk of the escorts. All these planes would sock in around
>us
Hurricanes? When? Sure you don't mean Typhoons? This is what I mean by gather
all the data and question it, veteran-sourced or not.
Adrian Camp.
Bejewelled
>>opposition. As this is the scenario where most kills are obtained, this
>matters
>>a whole lot, the 38 was exposed to detection when bouncing for what, twice
>as
>>long?
>
What I meant was,
first, it's easier to see a big plane than a little one. I don't think you can
measure it by size/ara though, it's too bound up in how the pattern recognition
in the eye/brain works. It picks up lines and movement. Maybe the span is the
factor?
Second, if LW fighter cruised at 340 in the combat area, and the 38 dives at
440, it has 100mph overtake. The 47 might dive at 480 and have 140 overtake.
This makes a far bigger difference, in the ETO, than in SWPA where the enemy
might cruise at 240. Engagment time for faster diver is 70% of the 38, whereas
against slower opposition it is 83%. If detection range is less for one or
other (probably not for a 47/38 combo, but maybe for 51/38) there's a tactical
difference. If it's another 70% advantage, we have 49% less likelihood of
detection for small/fast over big/slow. All figures for example only, but P-38
did dive slower, and was bigger and easier to see.
Adrian Camp.
ArtKramr
>>. We had some Spits and some Hurricanes. And also some P47's, but
>>P-51's made up the bulk of the escorts. All these planes would sock in
>around
>>us
>
>Hurricanes? When? Sure you don't mean Typhoons? This is what I mean by
>gather
>all the data and question it, veteran-sourced or not.
>
>Adrian Camp.
>
I think that's a swell idea. Let me know how you make out.
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
> >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
> >Date: 11/15/98 11:48 PM PST
>
> > In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any word
> >> against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard
> >it
> >> referred to as a failure. Not once. And I never met anyone who called the
> >P-38
> >> a failure. It always inspired the highest respect in every way. Maybe it
> >was
> >> the P-39 that was considered a failure, which it really was and the two got
> >> confused somewhere..
> >>
>
> Carlo,
>
> Having said that, I remember that almost all recon squadron were equipped with
> P-38's with cameras mounted in the nose and the number of MG's reduced. All
> said it was the best photo recon aircraft ever. So I guess It had dual
> purposes.
There were also "droop snoot" pathfinders with a bombardier in the nose, and even
a subtype with a bomb/nav radar. There is no doubt that the F-4/5 recce models
were the mainstay of USAF long range photorecce ops in all theatres.
> But the P-51 provided me with more fighter cover than any other
> aircraft. We had some Spits and some Hurricanes. And also some P47's, but
> P-51's made up the bulk of the escorts. All these planes would sock in around
> us. But the P-51's would take a position about 5,000 feet above us and sweep
> back and forth. It would take a lot of fuel to do that, but their range was so
> great, they could do it with ease. And it meant that they would always have a
> great diving advantage over any fighters that attacked us. Gave me a warm and
> wooly feeling all they way. (s)
I understand your fondness for the P-51, Art :-) If I were driving a bomb truck I
am sure that whatever fighter escort would be out there most frequently would be
my _favourite_ fighter as well :-)
By late 44/early 45 the P-38s were mostly occupied in the ETO with ground attack
duties since they did that exceptionally well. They were also used quite
frequently for level bombing in the latter period of the war. A pathfinder would
do the bomb aiming for the whole formation.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
Adrian, the difficulty I see with this comparison is the level and quality of
Luftwaffe opposition in the two periods.
The late 1943 to mid 1944 period was the decisive slice of time during which the
Luftwaffe home defence units got ground down from being formidable in numbers and
experience, to becoming basically nuisance value to the Allies.
The mid 1944 to VE Day period was one during which the Luftwaffe had already lost
the bulk of its experienced pilots, and was down to a small number of "experten"
and a large number of green and "hazard to themselves" pilots.
The only way in which you could make a fair comparison would be to assess/compare
the kill ratios for both periods of a fighter group flying only a single type,
with the caveat that even that is biased since the longer they fly the one type,
the better the pilots become at using it.
This point has been made by myself and others earlier in this thread in relation
to fighting outnumbered, vs fighting with a numbers advantage.
All in all, my position is that you cannot perform a fair and impartial analysis
unless you look at the "big picture" and factor in all of the issues. I am not
convinced that raw statistics can ever tell the whole story, especially in an
environment which is changing dramatically as those stats are gathered.
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
Adrian,
One of the problems you may find with published veteran's accounts, vs first hand
veteran's accounts, is that one or more persons will have edited the published
account before it went to press. Things do tend to mangled in the process, or made
to "sound better" in the interests of improving sales.
Therefore I much prefer to quiz a vet carefully and get him to explain exactly
what he is trying to say. Generally I have found it has worked well for me. I
mostly get data which agrees with better quality historical and multiple published
sources.
Making an informed guess is cutting corners - you really want to identify all of
the evident biases, and sanity check and validate everything.
Occam's Razor - what is left is likely to be the truth.
Cheers,
Carlo
DBSDESIGN
> Pity that so few vets from that period remain, since it would have
> to be fascinating to quiz some of the people involved and get to the
> bottom of this sorry tale.
There are some disparaging remarks from Zemke, via Jeff Ethell.
Hubert Zemke, like many 8th AF pilots wasn't too fond of the P-38.
Zemke was one of a few USAAF pilots to fly all three major types
in combat in the ETO. So he was able to compare the differences of
the P-38, P-47 and P-51, in detail.
To quote Zemke, he said that the P-38 was... "the poorest of the three
USAAF fighters in the ETO. The fact that the extreme cold at altitude
affected its performance hardly endears the machine." He also stated...
"It was enough to regulate the engines and control the aircraft without
entering combat."
As you probably know, Zemke took over the 479th FG with the P-38
in August 1944 and later converted to the P-51 in September. Many
of his pilots didn't like the P-38. Only one pilot from the 479th FG
(Robin Olds) became an ace in the P-38.
Zemke's specific complaints about the P-38 sound familiar...
a) The oil regulator controlling the superchargers had a tendency
to freeze at high altitude. Zemke said that his feet always froze
at altitude in a P-38, due to poor cockpit heating.
b) Due to supercharger problems, the engines would cut out or
overrun RPM limitations. Zemke said that this almost cost
him his life in combat (on at least two occasions).
c) Steep diving restriction on the P-38. Which was estimated
(at that time) to be about 375 mph. Enemy fighters learned
to dive away from the P-38. The Me109 and Fw190 couldn't
do that against a P-47 unless they had a deathwish.
d) Identification factor. The twin booms and contrails could be
spotted by enemy fighters from as far as the eye could see.
e) A P-38 pilot had to do a lot more weaving to look down
over the twin engines.
Zemke did have a few nice things to say about the P-38. Namely
the armament installation, which he thought was the best of the
three planes since the P-38 gun system didn't require calculation
for convergence of gunfire. Zemke felt the P-38 gun system was
extremely lethal and stable. Plus the P-38 had an excellent load
carrying ability that hardly affected cruising performance.
All in all, Zemke felt the Mustang was the best overall US fighter.
However, he also said the Thunderbolt was even better in the thin
air above 25,000 ft, due to paddle-bladed propellers. He stated that
performance of German fighters began to fade significantly above
25,000 ft. Then they fell into the trap of having to dive away to
escape from the P-47s, which in a dive, could easily overtake any
piston-engined aircraft on the planet. Dive and zoom. Then "hit and
recover" again, said Zemke. The Thunderbolt usually had a slow
rate of climb, but it dived like a runaway freight train and zoom
climbed back onto it's perch just as impressively.
I'm not sure if Zemke's quotes from above were taken from an
interview with Ethell, or a copy of wartime remarks he made.
As for the P-38 Lightning, it sounds like the 8th Air Force just
ran out of patience before the bugs were worked out.
Source
FIGHTER COMMAND: American Fighters In Original WW2 Color
by Jeff Ethell and Robert T. Sand, Motorbooks Inc. 1991.
Carlo Kopp
It would seem that Hub made up his mind flying a F/G/H model, and left it
at that. a), b) and c) were fixed by the J/L models.
The ident thing isn't bad if you are flying escort work. It may not be as
convenient in other situations, but the central question with escort work
is what are you trying to achieve ?
The visibility from the cockpit argument cuts both ways, and in a
defensive situation I'd take a P-38 over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
I've sat in a Mustang, CAC Mk.21 (eq D) and while the bubble was nice, you
are still do not have very good aft visibility :-(
Cheers,
Carlo
ArtKramr
>Occam's Razor - what is left is likely to be the truth.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Carlo
>
>
Ah Carlo, you are truly a philospher. (g)
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
> >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
> >Date: 11/16/98 2:11 PM PST
>
> >Occam's Razor - what is left is likely to be the truth.
> >
> >Cheers,
> >
> >Carlo
> >
> >
>
> Ah Carlo, you are truly a philospher. (g)
>
Well thanks, Art. A compliment on RAM is a rare commodity :-)
>
> Arthur Kramer
> 344th Bomb Group,9th Air Force
> England France Belgium Holland Germany
Cheers,
Carlo
Bob Caissie
Olds give a little talk about his flying experiences during WWII.
He mentioned one particular flight in his P-38, and at some point during
this mission he gets jumped by a Me109, and while he is trying to get
away from this 109, he gets his canopy shot away. He said that with the
canopy shot away, it caused turbulent airflow over the airplane and when
he tried to maneuver away from the 109, the airplane stalled causing the
109 to overshoot and when he regained control he was then able to shoot
down the German fighter.
He went on to say that the P-38 was a "lousy airplane" and got a little
chuckle from the crowd.
I was surprised to hear this comment from him. Based on what I've heard
and read about the lightning, it seemed to be a pretty good airplane.
The only other negative comment I've ever heard about the P-38, was the
"castrated lightnings" from the British after receiving their planes
without superchargers. I can understand that.
I'm sure Gen. Olds would have a hard time trying to convince Richard
Bong.
Just my 2 cents,
BC
ArtKramr
I don't care what airplane is under discussion, you can always find experienced
combat pilots who loved it, and an equal number who hated it. As usual, the
truth lies somewhere in the middle of the two arguments.
MakinKid
>They certainly
>performed quite well in North Africa, despite the lack of adequate supply and
>support
>for desert operations (no American aircraft received modifications for desert
>operations, unlike the British and Germans, who fitted special filters, etc.,
>to
>their aircraft to
>their aircraft to cope with the dust, sand, etc.).
This is an interesting point. I've been researching the US war activities
prior to Pearl Harbor (quite extensive, by the way) and one thing that has
surprised me (and is contrary to "received wisdom" about the war) is how
capable US military aircraft actually were in pre-Pearl Harbor operations. The
standard view is, for example, that US military aircraft were shipped off by
Britain's military to fight in the desert in 1941 because they weren't good
enought to fight in Europe.
This doesn't jibe with what I've turned up, nor with the actual war
situation--North Africa was the key battlefront (along with the Atlantic) at
that time. Documents I've turned up continually describe American warplanes as
"colonial" aircraft, that is, suitable for operations in "the colonies"--India,
Africa, the Middle East, as were American motorcycles, cars and trucks. All
were considered to be ruggedly constructed, mechanically reliable, and able to
operate under extreme environmental conditions. The American airplanes are
contrasted with British aircraft, which, apparently had some serious problems
handling heat, dust, high altitude air fields, etc.
One memo comments that a Curtiss field representative had assured RAF people in
North Africa that all they had to do to the hawk fighter plane was "put gas and
oil in it and it would run forever" with the added comment from a British
officer, "This has largely proved true."
I have also found comments praising the Lockheed Hudson: "The Hudson has been
a really good investment, and has proved itself to be a first-class all-around
airplane." This from a Coastal Command evaluation.
The Martin 167 Maryland also received top-notch praise. "They have been very
useful. We are able to sustain a rate of operations far above that we expected
under these conditions." From a Middle East operations evaluation that also
noted the Maryland was involved in the attack on Taranto ("admirable
performance, highest praise from crews").
A report describes the Martin 187 Baltimore as "superior to any comparable
aircraft in service anywhere" and "able to operate freely under the worst
conditions imaginable."
The Doublas DB7, 7A and 7B are praised as being highly versatile, capable of
operating in both the bomber and fighter interceptor rolls.
I've turned up documents indicating extreme interest in Vought-Sikorsky
aircraft, in particular the VS-156 Chesapeake, but don't know the outcome of
the acquisition attempt yet. There seems to be a great deal of interpersonal
relationships going on between the British and the V-S executives, with lots of
comments that the president, Eugene Wilson, is "a plain Scots-American."
The Vultee Vigilant observation plane is described as superior to both the
Focke-Wulf Storch and the Lysander of the British army. It is noted that this
plane was designed by Richard Palmer, who designed the plane with which Howard
Hughes broke the world speed record in in 1935. It is noted that Palmer had
extensive dealings with the German aircraft industry prior to the outbreak of
the war.
Overall, I get the impression that the British who actually used the planes
were somewhat in awe of the American aircraft they were receiving in 1940-41.
That's quite a contrast with the generally accepted view that the American
aircraft were broadly inferior to British types of the same period.
Makin
Doug Hunter
at their best below 20,000 (Yaks, FW-190,
P-47, Tempest) and those that excelled over 20,000 (Me-109, Spitfire,
Mustang). There was never a "best performer" in all categories of
performance. The P-38 belonged to the former group of aircraft. As still
applies today, a "mixed" inventory best "covers all the bases". Escorting
bombers? Mustang rules! For battlefield air-supremacy and low-level attack
(with twin engine redundancy) however, the Lightning was an excellent
choice.
Doug Hunter
DBSDESIGN <dbsd...@aol.com> wrote in article
<19981116190955...@ng38.aol.com>...
Doug Hunter
service. More often they were revered for the qualities previuosly
mentioned. Both countries built their share of "unspectacular" designs, and
in 1941, there was precious little that could deal with enemy fighters on
even terms, in either inventory. There certainly weren't enough Spitfires
for every theatre and the older
P-39, P-40, F4F and Hurricane held the line in their inventories untill
more potent designs came along. In Canada also, various types from both
countries were both manufactured and operated, while B-24s, A-20s,
Dakota's, Corsair's, Catalina's (Canso) and other famous US aircraft
provided stellar British service. The co-operation between the two
industries was unmatched elswhere, and despite a friendly rivalry went on
to produce the P-51 Mustang, arguably the best piston-engined fighter of
the war.
Doug Hunter
MakinKid <maki...@aol.com> wrote in article
<19981117131937...@ng-fd1.aol.com>...
Shaber CJ
> in August 1944 and later converted to the P-51 in September. Many
> of his pilots didn't like the P-38. Only one pilot from the 479th FG
> (Robin Olds) became an ace in the P-38.
They may not have had a sterling record in Europe, but the two top American
aces flew them in the pacific. Bong had 40 kills and Mac had 38 kills.
Bejewelled
>>
>>Cheers,
>>
>>Carlo
Occam's razor, the simplest explanation is likely to be true. So if the group
commanders preferred other aircraft, and the pilots achieved less than with
other aircraft (in the ETO in the time while all three fighters were in the
escort role), the simplest explanation is that the aircraft was not as good as
its rivals. You may prefer other explanations, but they are more complicated.
Incidentally, re carlo's myth/reality thread, no-one here is claiming the P-38
was NO good, just that it wasn't as good, in terms of results, as it's rivals.
In my opinion it was the best US fighter for a period from Aug 42 (it's first
combat) to Feb 43. Then it was second best til April 43, then third best til
August and then fourth til Nov 43. Then it was fifth best, which is just about
where it placed in the Oct 44 Pax river fighter conference where a whole lot of
combat and test pilots voted on best fighter in every category and role. If
anyone wants, I'll laboriously copy the results.
Adrian Camp.
Bejewelled
>> Ah Carlo, you are truly a philospher. (g)
>>
>
>Well thanks, Art. A compliment on RAM is a rare commodity :-)
>
You think that's a compliment?? :)
Adrian Camp.
Bejewelled
>It would seem that Hub made up his mind flying a F/G/H model, and left it
>at that. a), b) and c) were fixed by the J/L models.
The 479th didn't have early models, only J's in this period.>I'd take a P-38
over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
>I'd take a P-38 over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
Glad to see you don't refer to razorback mustang B and C, only the 47 had a
razorback, and many others make that mistake.
Adrian Camp.
Bejewelled
>were somewhat in awe of the American aircraft they were receiving in 1940-41.
>That's quite a contrast with the generally accepted view that the American
>aircraft were broadly inferior to British types of the same period.
>
The Hudson was ordered pre-war, and appreciated. The Maryland was inherited
from the french but did good work, the Baltimore was less popular, I think
because of ground-handling.
Boston/A-20 was appreciated everywhere, even Russia. The P-40 is more
difficult, it went to Africa because it was no good at altitude. which was
considered important in the 40-41 timeframe. It was probably, on balance,
inferior to 109 and spit but better than anything else at that time. It gets a
bad deal from US writers as well, witness Kit Carson's tirade, completely
unfair. Remember the RAF wanted another line of P-40s at NAA, but accepted the
mustang instead.
The Buffalo was not welcomed......
Adrian Camp
Emmanuel Gustin
at
>that time.
Despites its relative importance, the North African front had
to accept whatever that was available. Priority was given to
the home front. For example, it was May 1942 before the
first Spitfires arrived in Egypt! Types that were obsolescent
in Europe, such as Hurricanes and Gladiators, continued to
fight in Africa.
>I have also found comments praising the Lockheed Hudson: "The
>Hudson has been a really good investment, and has proved itself to
>be a first-class all-around airplane."
The Hudson _was_ a first-class aircraft, of course, although a
real handful for an inexperienced pilot. However, Coastal
Command would probably have been grateful for any
replacement at all for the Avro Anson! While "Faithful Annie"
had its advantages, the type was also underpowered, slow,
and short-ranged, and it had ineffective armament.
>Overall, I get the impression that the British who actually used
>the planes were somewhat in awe of the American aircraft they
>were receiving in 1940-41.
I believe that in general, the evaluation was always that the
American aircraft were very well engineered. The first deliveries
were not up to what the British considered a combat-ready
standard, with their lack of armour, self-sealing fuel tanks,
and other desirable equipment. Those issues were dealt with
fairly swiftly.
What the US could not deliver in 1939-1941 was a fighter
performing to the standards of the Bf 109 or Spitfire.
Although the P-40 and even the P-36 were not outclassed,
they could not be called the equals of the best European
fighters. The P-40 was or course handicapped by the absence
of a second supercharger stage for its Allison engine. The
P-39 entered production in early 1941, but was not better.
The P-47, P-38 and Merlin-engined P-51 were much better,
but they appeared in combat-ready form in 1942 and 1943...
And it was mid-1943 before they had been developed to their
full potential.
Emmanuel Gustin
ArtKramr
>From: "Doug Hunter" <dough...@sprint.ca>
>Date: 11/17/98 11:03 AM PST
>Message-id:
>I don't know of any widespread disdain of American aircraft in British
>service. More often they were revered for the qualities previuosly
>mentioned. Both countries built their share of "unspectacular" designs, and
>in 1941, there was precious little that could deal with enemy fighters on
>even terms, in either inventory. There certainly weren't enough Spitfires
>for every theatre and the older
>P-39, P-40, F4F and Hurricane held the line in their inventories
RIght you are. In a war you use what you have and are glad you have it. Only
post war "fans" sneer at what we were glad to have when we needed the stuff.
BTW, we had a lot of Hurricane cover. And good cover it was.
ArtKramr
>DBSDESIGN <dbsd...@aol.com> wrote in article
>> As for the P-38 Lightning, it sounds like the 8th Air Force just
>> ran out of patience before the bugs were worked out.
>>
>> Source
>> FIGHTER COMMAND: American Fighters In Original WW2 Color
>> by Jeff Ethell and Robert T. Sand, Motorbooks Inc. 1991.
>>
>> Regards-DBSDESIGN@aol.
Patince? There was a war on and men were dying. It is a good thing that the
generals ran out of patience when lives were at stake. Their patience. Our
lives.
ArtKramr
>North African front had
>to accept whatever that was available. Priority was given to
>the home front. For example, it was May 1942 before the
>first Spitfires arrived in Egypt! Types that were obsolescent
>in Europe, such as Hurricanes and Gladiators, continued to
>fight in Africa.
>
And glad to have every one of them and all that they could get their hands on.
And the Hurricanes flew top cover for us right to the end of the war. And I
never saw a Hurricane that didn't warm my heart and light up my eyes. But 55
years after the fact, I guess one can get a lot choosier than they could long
ago over Germany.
Paul J. Adam
<dough...@sprint.ca> writes
>I don't know of any widespread disdain of American aircraft in British
>service. More often they were revered for the qualities previuosly
>mentioned.
Coastal Command's Liberators and Catalinas come to mind, since my
professional interest is ASW :)
> Both countries built their share of "unspectacular" designs, and
>in 1941, there was precious little that could deal with enemy fighters on
>even terms, in either inventory. There certainly weren't enough Spitfires
>for every theatre and the older
>P-39, P-40, F4F and Hurricane held the line in their inventories untill
>more potent designs came along.
To stick my head above the parapet - how bad was the P-39? I've heard it
slammed as the "Iron Dog", yet the Russians seemed to like it. Was it
simply a matter of inadequate performance at altitude, prejudice (right
or wrong) against the design novelties like tricycle gear and mid-
engine, or did it have some crippling flaw I'm not yet aware of?
The two really obnoxious flaws I percieve are lack of performance at
altitude, and the 37mm cannon with its limited ammunition supply and
apparent fondness for jamming.
--
There are four kinds of homicide: felonious, excusable, justifiable and
praiseworthy...
Paul J. Adam pa...@jrwlynch.demon.co.uk
Roy Bean
>
> And the Hurricanes flew top cover for us right to the end of the war. And I
> never saw a Hurricane that didn't warm my heart and light up my eyes. But 55
>
> Arthur Kramer
Arthur baby-
It has only been 53 years since the WWII ended for the ETO, but
Bombardiers do have a tendency to inflate figures, don't they?
Carlo Kopp
Adrian,
The mythology in circulation is that the aircraft was not a good performer and not
successful in combat, or often interpreted as the "P-38 being decidely inferior to
the P-47 and P-51".
I do have reservations about the analytical method you have used to reach your
conclusions, ie raw stats. They conceal too much relevant information. Factual
information. This is not a flame, but an observation, and one which I have made to
many other posters on other threads in the past.
Using Occam's razor means cutting away what is speculative, and concentrating on
what is known to be true. This may or may not yield a simpler explanation. You can
have a very simple speculative explanation, but it may not be true.
In the critical period of early USAF ETO escort operations, ie Q3 1943 to mid
1944, the P-38 was _the_ _strategically_ _most_ _important_ _fighter_ in the
USAAF's arsenal. Without the 20/55 FG escort ops, the CBO would have turned out
differently. That is an undeniable fact. That the 20/55 FG did not deliver the
shining results everybody would have hoped for was a result of a number of known
and historically proven issues, many of which have been raised in this debate.
Achievable kill ratios in combat are a function of many variables, not just the
performance of the aircraft in question. They are not therefore the best metric
for assessing the importance or the success of any fighter aircraft. If you had
4-5 P-38 groups in combat rather than the 20/55 stretched very thinly, the kill
ratios for the P-38 would have been vastly better. That is not speculation, but a
logical conclusion from Lanchester's laws of force concentration.
You have BTW impinged on an important issue here, which is what are the metrics
via which a combat aircraft ought to be measured. Kill ratio stats are not a good
metric, since they depend on too many factors which may or may not favour the
outcome.
I am not claiming BTW that you are claiming that the P-38 was no good. I am
speaking about the "mythological" interpretation of the outcome.
You might like to post the Pax stats, I am sure that they will stimulate some
useful debate.
Thanks,
Carlo
ArtKramr
>>It would seem that Hub made up his mind flying a F/G/H model, and left it
>>at that. a), b) and c) were fixed by the J/L models.
>
>The 479th didn't have early models, only J's in this period.>I'd take a P-38
>over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
>
>>I'd take a P-38 over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
>
It doesn't matter what you'd take over what. You flew what you were assigned
to fly and nobody gave a damn about what you thought about it or whether you
liked it or not.
ArtKramr
Why do you count from the day the war ended?. That makes no sense at all. Some
of us were there for some time before the war ended. Had you been there, you
would understand. Right roy baby?
MakinKid
>Despites its relative importance, the North African front had
>to accept whatever that was available.
This is the "received wisdom." But the memoranda, etc. that I am digging
through are revealing a somewhat different picture. For example, the Curtiss
Hawk H81 and H87 fighters were specifically requested by RAF in the Middle East
and North Africa. Reasons were higher in-service rates than the Hurricane and
(later) the Spitfire. The problem seems to have centered on the Rolls-Royce
engine, which performed well in the environment for which it was designed--the
cool, damp northwest of Europe--but had problems in the hot, dusty ME/NA area.
The GM Allison engine in the Curtiss plane proved more reliable and able to
endure that theater. Two problems I've noted being repeatedly commented on:
One) The Rolls-Royce engine used an updraft carburetor that sucked in desert
dust that ruined the engine very quickly. It needed extensive,
performance-robbing air-filtering system to allow it to function adequately.
The Allison engine used a downdraft carburetor that had no such problems.
Two) The Rolls-Royce engine's cooling systems was inadequate, causing the
engine to run hot during routine operations, forcing the cooling shutters to be
wide open almost all the time, thus hampering performance.
Two)a: The Rolls-Royce engine's cooling was supplied 90 percent by the
radiator glycol and 10 percent by the oiling system. The Allison engine's
cooling was supplied only 75 percent by the radiator glycol and 25 percent by
the oiling system. Thus coolant loss was instantly critical for the R-R
engine, causing immediate failure, while the Allison could actually operate for
some little period with no radiator coolant at all--it was being cooled by its
oil.
Two)b: Worse for the R-R engine, because of some clever engineering, which used
water vapor in the cylinder heads to carry away heat, the R-R engine carried
less coolant, so a puncture to the cooling system very quickly caused the loss
of all coolant, while the Allison engine carried more coolant, so took longer
to lose all its coolant. Two)c: Because of the design of the R-R engine, the
loss of as little as three gallons of coolant would cause the remaining coolant
to boil, producing high pressure steam which blocked the flow of further
coolant to the engine, causing catastrophic failure. The Allison, on the other
hand, could suffer the loss of all its coolant and still run for some short
time, often long enough for the British or Commonwealth pilot to make it back
to his home field.
When the US military took up war operations, the demand it had for Curtiss Hawk
fighters meant that British forces began receiving fewer and fewer of them.
The British received 560 H87A-2 and 1,500 H87A-3 and A-4 fighters beginning in
the second half of 1941 thru the first half of 1942. Then only 364 of all
types thru Jan. 1943 and only 458 thru Jan 1944. That's 2,000 planes in about
a year, followed by about 800 in 2.5 years. During that same period,
production of the Spitfire had soared and far more were being built than were
needed in northwestern Europe before the invasion. Some of these were sent to
North Africa to supplement the Hawk 87 and replace the Hurricane. From the
documents I've been studying, the demand was still strong for the Hawk, and it
was preferred in that theater to the Spitfire. Once operations moved to Italy,
the specific advantages of the Hawk 87 were not so important against the
superior flying ability of the Spitfire, and it became preferred. But for
ground attack, the Hawk was still acknowledged to be superior because of the
greater likelihood it would survive battle damage at least long enough to clear
the combat area, if not come all the way home. I would assume that by this
time, the Thunderbolt would be supplanting the Hawk in the ground attack roll.
I find it fascinating that while arguments rattle on about which fighter plane
was better because it was faster or could fly higher or dive faster, at the
time of the war, those criteria took second place to something so overlooked
today as whether a carburetor was of an updraft or downdraft type, or how the
cooling system of an engine was designed.
Makin
DBSDESIGN
> It would seem that Hub made up his mind flying a F/G/H model,
> and left it at that. a), b) and c) were fixed by the J/L models.
Zemke didn't think so. He flew a P-38J in combat. I have a
picture of him standing on top of it.
DBSDESIGN
> Patince? There was a war on and men were dying. It is a good thing
> that the generals ran out of patience when lives were at stake. Their
> patience. Our lives.
You're absolutely correct Art, and that's what I meant. I noticed
some people have been defending the high-altitude, cold-weather
problems with the P-38. As you implied, there wasn't any time
for the 8th AF to wait around for Lockheed to fix them. Nor was
it fair for anyone to expect them to wait any longer.
Carlo Kopp
But was that the model which he based his conclusions upon ? His
complaints as cited here mostly referred to the F/G/H models :-)
Cheers,
Carlo
DBSDESIGN
> Fighters of the war almost seem to divide into two groups, those
> that were at their best below 20,000 (Yaks, FW-190, P-47, Tempest)
Correct (except for the Thunderbolt). According to Zemke, the
performance below 20,000 wasn't especially good. In fact, he
(or someone else) enacted a "no-bounce" rule for P-47s flying
below 15,000 feet. This was criticized by some but it certainly
worked well for "Zemke's Wolfpack". The P-47 worked best at
high-altitude. He says roll-rate and maneuverability improved
dramatically with speed, and the Jugs could basically eat up
the standard Fw190s and Me109s when above 25,000 feet.
DBSDESIGN
> But was that the model which he based his conclusions upon ?
He only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions of the
P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG to
479th FG on August 8, 1944.
> His complaints as cited here mostly referred to the F/G/H models :-)
Not according to Zemke. Apparently the bugs weren't worked out.
They (479th FG) did receive a few new J-25 models right before
converting to Mustangs but I don't know if Zemke ever flew one.
Cynthia Keeney
: >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
: >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
: >Date: 11/15/98 2:04 PM PST
: >However, the "mythology" out there is that the P-51 was a vastly better
: >aircraft
: >than the P-38, and that the P-38 was a failure. Clearly neither of these
: >arguments
: >hold up to scrutiny once you start seriously digging into the history of the
: >period, the operational record, or the actual capabilities of the respective
: >aircraft.
: In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any word
: against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard it
: referred to as a failure. Not once. And I never met anyone who called the P-38
: a failure. It always inspired the highest respect in every way. Maybe it was
: the P-39 that was considered a failure, which it really was and the two got
: confused somewhere..
: Arthur Kramer
: 344th Bomb Group,9th Air Force
: England France Belgium Holland Germany
While *I* am a P-38 lover an old B-17 gunner I worked with hated them.
Claimed they knew they were in for heavy losses when ever they had a
P-38 escort. I never was able to get any kind of mission comparisons out
of him other than the P-38 escort.
Carlo Kopp
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> > But was that the model which he based his conclusions upon ?
>
> He only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions of the
> P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG to
> 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views of
vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
> > His complaints as cited here mostly referred to the F/G/H models :-)
>
> Not according to Zemke. Apparently the bugs weren't worked out.
> They (479th FG) did receive a few new J-25 models right before
> converting to Mustangs but I don't know if Zemke ever flew one.
The turbo and intercooler problems eg were fixed with the transition to
the J model with chin intercoolers instead of the leading edge design.
This all sounds very odd. Never heard of any J models which retained the
old H intercooler/turbo design, but then it has been a long time since I
looked at any of my references :-(
I suppose we could start digging into refs and looking at specifically
what design changes went into which of the J subtypes, and correlate
those against the time Hub flew the type.
Maybe he simply preferred single engined fighters :-) I have met pilots
like that who have a strong dislike for big twins :-) They have a great
repetoire of handling and manoeuvre tricks to fly on smaller single
engined aircraft and don't like big twins since they have to fly them
differently.
Bong and McGuire didn't seem to have any difficulty with the P-38.
Cheers,
Carlo
Emmanuel Gustin
>> Occam's razor, the simplest explanation is likely to be true.
>Using Occam's razor means cutting away what is speculative,
>and concentrating on what is known to be true.
None is a good reproduction of Occam's razor. The original
version is often rendered as "Pluralitas non est ponenda sine
neccesitate", which means as much as "You should not multiply
assumptions if it is not necessary." If there are a number of
possible explanations for something, the one that requires fewer
unproven assumptions is the one to be preferred as a working
hypothesis. That does not mean at all that the simplest explanation
has to be true; just that it is the best starting point. If the simplest
explanation turns out to be untrue, you select the next more
complicated one.
Emmanuel Gustin
Yama
MakinKid wrote:
> operate under extreme environmental conditions. The American airplanes are
> contrasted with British aircraft, which, apparently had some serious problems
> handling heat, dust, high altitude air fields, etc.
This is not uncommon view in Finland either. Hurricanes were almost always
unserviceable (though reason is likely also lack of spares, OTOH Soviets also
criticized Hurricane's serviceability), Gladiators were reportedly pain to
maintain, but Brewster Buffaloes were liked by mechanics, and while P-36's
performance wasn't spectacular, there was no trouble with it's serviceability, same
couldn't be said about MS.406 and Fiat G.50. Trend continued later: Mechanics were
pleased when Vampires and Gnats were phased out, and when they heard that Fouga
Magister was to be replaced with Hawk, they didn't like the idea at all.
> The Vultee Vigilant observation plane is described as superior to both the
> Focke-Wulf Storch and the Lysander of the British army.
You surely mean Fieseler Storch?FAF hated Lysander, it had poor service record and
it was regarded grossly inferior to Fokker C.X in recon and observation roles.
Maybe Lysander was good in shipping agents to occupied France, but as a warplane it
was nothing but easier than average target.
> Overall, I get the impression that the British who actually used the planes
> were somewhat in awe of the American aircraft they were receiving in 1940-41.
> That's quite a contrast with the generally accepted view that the American
> aircraft were broadly inferior to British types of the same period.
It depends what you mean. The truth is that until late 1942, US warplanes were
about a year behind British and Germans performance-wise. They just didn't have the
same overall performance: P-40 was competive in low altitudes but not in high: P-36
and F4F had good handling charasteristics in dive compared to Spitfire and Bf-109
but latters were much faster and climbed much better.
ArtKramr
>Date: 11/17/98 11:52 PM PST
>ArtKramr (artk...@aol.com) wrote:
>: >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
>: >From: Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net>
>: >Date: 11/15/98 2:04 PM PST
>
>: >However, the "mythology" out there is that the P-51 was a vastly better
>: >aircraft
>: >than the P-38, and that the P-38 was a failure. Clearly neither of these
>: >arguments
>: >hold up to scrutiny once you start seriously digging into the history of
>the
>: >period, the operational record, or the actual capabilities of the
>respective
>: >aircraft.
>
>: In all the time I was in the ETO flying missions I never once heard any
>word
>: against the P-38. And although it was compared to the P-51, I never heard
>it
>: referred to as a failure.
>While *I* am a P-38 lover an old B-17 gunner I worked with hated them.
>Claimed they knew they were in for heavy losses when ever they had a
>P-38 escort. I never was able to get any kind of mission comparisons out
>of him other than the P-38 escort.
>
Hmmm. Interesting. I never heard that. But then again I never once had a
mission where we had P-38 cover. Lot's of P-51's, Spits, Hurricanes, P47's, but
neverP-38's.
ArtKramr
>Date: 11/17/98 10:29 PM PST
Right. We used what we had and what we were given. And that was it. No choices.
The B-26 that I flew was far from a perfect plane. It could be a killer at the
least loss of concentration. But no one ever asked us if we liked it or not or
if we would prefer another plane. The B-25 was a far safer plane to fly even
though it was slower and carried a smaller bomb load. But we had no choice
other than the B-26. So we flew it.
141.192
allied fighters, but did not consider P-38 a serious threat at all.
But maybe his views were affected by the fate of Me-110.
Kari Kamunen
MakinKid
>To stick my head above the parapet - how >bad was the P-39?
The British received 248 Airacobra Is (Bell 4). 212 of these were tranferred
to the USSR. The Air Fighting Development Unit at Duxford pitted the Bell
fighter plane against a captured Bf 109E in September 1941 and concluded that
it "cannot compare with the Airacobra in a turn and even if the Me.109 is
behind the Airacobra at the start, the latter should be able to shake him off
and get in a burst before two complete turns have been carried out."
The airplanes delivered to the RAF, however, appear to have had numerous
assembly defects that affected everything from the .30 cal machineguns mounted
in the wings to the cockpit compass.
When these aircraft were transshipped to the Soviet Union, the Russians
complained of numerous electrical defects in them. Also, they arrived without
batteries, someone apparently having pinched them.
Nonetheless, the aircraft seem to have been put into flying condition in time
to play a roll in the 1942 fighting in the East. Their biggest success that
years seems to have been near a Russian town called Voronezh (havent been able
to find it on any map), which was captured by the Germans. A two-day air
battle is reported to have ocurred over this town involving the Airacobra Is as
well as Douglas DB-7 type bombers which are said to have engaged some 150
German warplanes, two-thirds of which were claimed to have been destroyed in
the air and on the ground by the Aircobras and DB-7s.
Airacobras also apparently played an important role in the fighting around
Smolensk. I have found references to a Col. Nedosekin performing with great
heroism at Smolensk while flying an Airacobra.
Bejewelled
>endure that theater.
Maybe, but the rep in the RAF of the C-model allison (H-81) was of
unreliability. Whether justified or not I can't say.> Thus coolant loss was
instantly critical for the R-R
>engine, causing immediate failure, while the Allison could actually operate
>for
>some little period with no radiator coolant at all--it was being cooled by
>its
>oil.
Certainly the merlin made its coolant work harder. OTOH, it had more power than
the V-1710 in the 1941-2 period.
>From the
>documents I've been studying, the demand was still strong for the Hawk, and
>it
>was preferred in that theater to the Spitfire.
Not for air-to-air, where the Spit provided top cover that the P-40 needed,
having a much higher critical height, even with the tropical filter. One of the
RAF's mistakes seems to have been to keep the spits in the UK when they might
have been better used in Africa or Burma. There were 50 squadrons of them at
Dieppe, when only a few had gone overseas.
>the
>greater likelihood it (P-40) would survive battle damage at least long enough
to
>clear
>the combat area
I wonder how much was due to the cooling system all being concentrated round
the engine area. In a Spit (or P-51) there were radiators and pipes all over
the aircraft. A hit anywhere in radiator, pipes, oil cooler or engine water
jacket would lead to engine failure eventually.
Adrian Camp.
Carlo Kopp
Thanks, Emmanuel, I have never seen the Latin original before :-)
In common scientific practice it is taken to mean throwing out the
speculation and concentrating on the stuff you know to be true. Multiplying
assumptions, BTW, is in effect speculation, since you end up stacking ifs.
In the context of the P-38 debate, my concern is that too many people
appear to be using far too simple metrics to argue their case. The problem
is a messy one, and one which is not unique to the interpretation of the
P-38's record.
Cheers,
Carlo
ArtKramr
>In the context of the P-38 debate, my concern is that too many people
>appear to be using far too simple metrics to argue their case. The problem
>is a messy one, and one which is not unique to the interpretation of the
>P-38's record.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Carlo
>
It is important to remember that every pilot and every crewmember always took
pride in what they flew, no matter what the downsides were. It is rare, (but
not unknown) to find many who would trash the plane they flew. Most would
defend it to the death, no matter how flawed it was. That is only natural and
expected of aircrews that were commited to their planes., their units and
their fellow fliers. And of course the books leave all that out.
DBSDESIGN
DBSDESIGN wrote:
>> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
>> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
>> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
> This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
> references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
> of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
Read PETER-THREE-EIGHT by John Stanaway. The troubles with the
superchargers and cockpit heat were not resolved with the P-38Js, according to
8th AF pilots from the 20th, 55th and 479th FG. Some
of the problems were (supposedly) fixed beginning with the J-25
model. Only a handful of these arrived to the 479th in Sept. 1944.
But they were already converting to the Mustang at that time.
> I suppose we could start digging into refs and looking at specifically
> what design changes went into which of the J subtypes, and correlate
> those against the time Hub flew the type.
Zemke's personal ship was a P-38J-15 LO. Buzz code J2-Z.
S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
> Maybe he simply preferred single engined fighters :-)
I think he preferred survival. :-)
> Bong and McGuire didn't seem to have any difficulty with the P-38.
One of the great mysteries of life. Of course, having two engines
had its advantages when flying over the shark-infested waters
of the South Pacific. I would probably learn to like the P-38 under
those circumstances.
Source
ACES AND WINGMEN II by Danny Morris
Aviation Usk Publications, 1984.
Carlo Kopp
Art, my concern is with a tendency on this NG to use kill ratios as the be it
all and end it all measure of the worth of a fighter plane. Applying that metric
to the F-4 in early Vietnam ops you would reach the conclusion that the aircraft
was no good. Yet the truth is quite different.
Insofar as the P-38 goes, it would appear to have become the scapegoat for many
problems in early fighter escort ops in the ETO, be they to do with training,
doctrine, tactics, strategy or internal politics. It wasn't perfect, but then
few combat aircraft are.
As for books, it depends on whether you look at serious technical and historical
references, or even original source material like flight manuals, or the more
popular variety of "commodity" literature. In the latter case I must agree
wholeheartedly, since such texts would appear to be the source of much of the
mythology which so many people wish to so fervently assert :-)
Cheers,
Carlo
Carlo Kopp
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> DBSDESIGN wrote:
> >> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
> >> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
> >> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
>
> > This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
> > references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
> > of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
>
> Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
> know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
You have merely shown that Zemke and Olds did not like the P-38. You could add
Hubbard and various others.
Olds BTW is a big fan of the F-4 which he flew in Nam. The F-4 compares to its
single engined contemporaries much like the P-38 did to its contemporaries.
> Read PETER-THREE-EIGHT by John Stanaway. The troubles with the
> superchargers and cockpit heat were not resolved with the P-38Js, according to
> 8th AF pilots from the 20th, 55th and 479th FG. Some
> of the problems were (supposedly) fixed beginning with the J-25
> model. Only a handful of these arrived to the 479th in Sept. 1944.
> But they were already converting to the Mustang at that time.
It is interesting that the two top scorers of the 20th scored only 8 and 9 kills
respectively. Yet Jenkins is claimed to have scored 16 kills (from early '44?) in
the P-38, and White no less than 22 (Shennan) on the P-38 in the ETO.
> > I suppose we could start digging into refs and looking at specifically
> > what design changes went into which of the J subtypes, and correlate
> > those against the time Hub flew the type.
>
> Zemke's personal ship was a P-38J-15 LO. Buzz code J2-Z.
> S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
A J-15-LO should have had the cockpit heating, dive flaps and F-17 engines with
chin intecoolers.
> > Maybe he simply preferred single engined fighters :-)
>
> I think he preferred survival. :-)
Didn't stop other pilots racking up decent scores on the type, did it ?
> > Bong and McGuire didn't seem to have any difficulty with the P-38.
>
> One of the great mysteries of life. Of course, having two engines
> had its advantages when flying over the shark-infested waters
> of the South Pacific. I would probably learn to like the P-38 under
> those circumstances.
>
> Source
> ACES AND WINGMEN II by Danny Morris
> Aviation Usk Publications, 1984.
>
You will probably find that the prominent pilots who disliked the P-38 all had
single engine fighter backgrounds. As a result their flying technique and
tactical "bag of tricks" will have been learned on singles, and thus often of
marginal utility in a big/fast twin. Thus you could expect them to be a little
frustrated with flying an aircraft where a good chunk of their prior experience
had to be thrown out and relearnt.
It all boils down to having to have your tactics and technique attuned to play
the advantages of your type against the opponent's disadvantages. It would appear
that this may not have been the case with many ETO units/pilots.
Much easier to blame the aircraft, especially if it does/did have some genuine
warts.
Cheers,
Carlo
ArtKramr
>Date: 11/18/98 10:28 PM PST
>Art, my concern is with a tendency on this NG to use kill ratios as the be it
>all and end it all measure of the worth of a fighter plane. Applying that
>metric
>to the F-4 in early Vietnam ops you would reach the conclusion that the
>aircraft
>was no good. Yet the truth is quite different.
>
>Insofar as the P-38 goes, it would appear to have become the scapegoat for
>many
>problems in early fighter escort ops in the ETO, be they to do with training,
>doctrine, tactics, strategy or internal politics. It wasn't perfect, but then
>few combat aircraft are.
>
>As for books, it depends on whether you look at serious technical and
>historical
>references, or even original source material like flight manuals, or the more
>popular variety of "commodity" literature. In the latter case I must agree
>wholeheartedly, since such texts would appear to be the source of much of the
>mythology which so many people wish to so fervently assert :-)
>
>Cheers,
>
>Carlo
You can't blame the NG. They aren't aware of all the variables that statistics
don't take into account: pilot quality, maintainance in any thearte or
squadron, moral, quality of leadership on both sides, how well the aircraft is
suited to a given operational assignment, conditions of weather on operations,
has the aircraft been updated appropriately in a timely manner?... and on and
on ad infinitum. If we look at the stitistics on deaths in training for the
B-26, we would condemn it as a hopeless killer of aircrews. But once the pilot
training problem was solved and only elite crews were assigned to this
dangerous plane, the deaths dropped dramatically. It takes the whole story to
get a clear picture, amd kill ratios are just one part of that, that vary with
all the above conditions. A little knowledge is a dangerous thing. (s)
ArtKramr
>One of the great mysteries of life. Of course, having two engines
>had its advantages when flying over the shark-infested waters
>of the South Pacific. I would probably learn to like the P-38 under
>those circumstances.
>
All single engine aircraft go into automatic rough when out of sight of land.
Carlo Kopp
> >Subject: Re: The P-38 record
Agreed 100% Art. That is one of the best summaries of what is _so_ wrong with
_so_ much of what is posted on this NG, that I have ever seen.
Grab a few tidbits of information completely out of context, generalise that to
be the answer to everything, and then assert it on RAM with great conviction :-)
I would bet that 75% of flame wars, disagreements and disputes on this NG are a
result of this basic attitude on issues :-(
I think you are being very forgiving by accepting such blindness, IMHO with the
abundance of _good_ material published this ought to be as plain as day to any
commonsense observer.
I put it down to intellectual laziness by many posters, ie a willingness to draw
grand conclusions from an incomplete picture. The answer is better research, and
being willing to learn from those who do understand the issues (yet another
deficiency with many posters).
Great post Art !
Cheers,
Carlo
Yama
Paul J. Adam wrote:
> To stick my head above the parapet - how bad was the P-39? I've heard it
> slammed as the "Iron Dog", yet the Russians seemed to like it. Was it
> simply a matter of inadequate performance at altitude, prejudice (right
> or wrong) against the design novelties like tricycle gear and mid-
> engine, or did it have some crippling flaw I'm not yet aware of?
Altitude performance was one of the core issues. In PTO, Japanese flew often
in altitudes P-39 couldn't reach in reasonable amount of time. In Eastern
Front, air warfare was mostly concentrated to supporting ground troops and
sorties were almost always flown low altitudes. Another thing are teething
problems, by the time later series (L,M,N,Q) began to reach USSR, most of the
bugs of the early D/F marks had been worked out.
P-39 was considered fairly dangerous opponent, it wasn't too fast (~580km/h
compared to 620km/h of Bf-109G-6) and didn't climb that well, but it was more
maneuverable and handled better than Gustav, and could take more hits. It was
also better equipped (radios etc) than indigenous Soviet planes, and fairly
well armed. Career of Hans Wind, second-highest scoring Finnish ace (75 kills)
was ended by P-39 (he made it home but was badly wounded). See
http://www.acestory.gdynia.top.pl/wind/wind.htm
Finland got few quite intact P-39's, I find it rather weird none was brought
to flying condition, it would have made very interesting comparison. One P-39
is currently being restored to static display at Tikkakoski.
ArtKramr
>From: Yama
>Altitude performance was one of the core issues. In PTO, Japanese flew often
>in altitudes P-39 couldn't reach in reasonable amount of time. In Eastern
>Front, air warfare was mostly concentrated to supporting ground troops and
>sorties were almost always flown low altitudes. Another thing are teething
>problems, by the time later series (L,M,N,Q) began to reach USSR, most of the
The pilots I spoke to in WW II who flew the P-39's all had the same comment;
dangerous flat spin chracteristics that could kill you and the idea of sittign
in front of the engine was frightening.
DBSDESIGN
DBSDESIGN wrote:
>> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
>> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
>> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
>> Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
>> know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
> You have merely shown that Zemke and Olds did not like the P-38.
> You could add Hubbard and various others.
I have shown that the US 8th Air Force did not like the P-38.
That's why they got rid of it, after flying it for about one year.
> Olds BTW is a big fan of the F-4 which he flew in Nam. The F-4
> compares to its single engined contemporaries much like the
> P-38 did to its contemporaries.
This is an excellent analogy. But not for the reasons you think.
In the hands of an average pilot, with little experience, the F-4
was not very impressive in air-to-air combat against MiG-17s.
But Robin Olds was no ordinary pilot. Many members of Olds group
in Vietnam had experience and training with WW2 and Korean War
era fighter aircraft. Many of the Phantom pilots sent to Vietnam
later were not so lucky, as the record shows.
> It is interesting that the two top scorers of the 20th scored only
> 8 and 9 kills respectively. Yet Jenkins is claimed to have scored
> 16 kills (from early '44?) in the P-38, and White no less than 22
> (Shennan) on the P-38 in the ETO.
Pilots from all air forces grumbled when they could not get
kills confirmed. What else is new?
>> Zemke's personal ship was a P-38J-15 LO. Buzz code J2-Z.
>> S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
> A J-15-LO should have had the cockpit heating, dive flaps and F-17
> engines with chin intecoolers.
Hubert Zemke said he froze in the cockpit of his J-15 LO. Chin
intercoolers, dive flaps and the engines did not help him much.
You seem to be in a state of denial about this.
How much more evidence do you need and from how many more
pilots? Many of them went down in the J-model based on inter-
cooler/supercharger problems. Especially pilots from the 20th
and 55th Fighter Groups. This has been well documented. Read
the sources I listed below.
> Didn't stop other pilots racking up decent scores on the type, did it ?
Not in the 8th Air Force. (Or the 15th AF for that matter).
> You will probably find that the prominent pilots who disliked the
> P-38 all had single engine fighter backgrounds.
This is a blanket statement you're making.
> This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
> references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
> of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
I think part of the reason you're having trouble believing comments
you've read from P-38 pilots, is because you are focusing on the
technical history of the aircraft instead of people who flew them.
That's an incredibly impractical way to judge an airplane. There is
only one way to find out if the machine works as advertised by the
manufacturer. And that is to get feedback from pilots. Preferably
feedback from many different pilots.
You have not only dismissed what Zemke said, but you also seem to
dismiss what German pilots thought of the P-38. Generally, they
didn't think much of the P-38 either when compared to the Mustang
and Thunderbolt. I suggest you read some more commentary from
P-38 pilots and German pilots from the ETO.
The P-38 may have worked better in other places, but it did not
work well for the 8th AF. They couldn't wait to be done with it.
In other words, the 8th AF didn't want to settle for second best.
Not when many people's lives were at stake. They didn't want to
deal with an aircraft featuring a host of mechanical problems
that made the P-38 both a nuisance, and a deathtrap.
Sources
P-38 LIGHTNING AT WAR by Joe Christy and Jeff Ethell.
PETER THREE EIGHT by John Stanaway
THE LOCKHEED P-38 by Warren Bodie
ACES AND WINGMEN by Danny Morris
FIGHTERS OF THE MIGHTY EIGHTH by William Hess
FIGHTER COMMAND by Jeff Ethell and Robert Sand
MESSERSCMITT ACES by Walter Musciano
MakinKid
>>The GM Allison engine in the Curtiss plane proved more reliable and able to
>>endure that theater.
>
>Maybe, but the rep in the RAF of the C-model allison (H-81) was of
>unreliability.
My notes indicate 1,700 C15 Allison engines purchased from General Motors in
1940-1941 by the British. 150 C15 engines from this production run went to the
Hawk 81 fighters used by the famous Flying Tigers in China.
I have found memos stating that the US army horsepower rating for these engines
were being challenged in the field by Curtiss technical representatives who
told the RAF people that the engine was designed to deliver 930 horsepower,
about 150 horsepower lower than the US army said the engine was rated for. If
the British were running the engines at higher rpm and MP than they were
designed for, premature failure should be no surprise. But I am not finding
many such complaints. That could be because, compared to the Rolls-Royce
engines in the Hurricane, which were suffering very severe problems in the
North African environment, the Allison engines' problems appeared smaller.
I have some data from the Soviets indicating crankcase failures in the D model
in the Airacobra fighter.
Incidentally, I have found some references to German Bf 109 fighers found
abandoned on captured airfields in North Africa in which the engines appeared
to have suffered valve train failure. Maintenance dumps contained many broken
connecting rods, burnt and holed pistons, exhaust valves so burnt as to be
scarcely recognizable. I found one document describing an aircraft abandoned
with the engine in the process of being removed. One cylinder bank had
suffered complete separation of the head from the block, apparently on take-off
as the airframe was intact and undamaged. So all sides had reliability
problems.
The F model Allison in the Curtiss Hawk 87 doesn't appear in the collection of
engine complaints I've compiled (not yet complete). I have copies of paperwork
indicating the British purchased about 1800 in 1941-1942.
>Certainly the merlin made its coolant work harder. OTOH, it had more power
>than
>the V-1710 in the 1941-2 period.
The horsepower advantage was negated by excessive failure. This is
demonstrated by the case of the Hawk 87D version, which had the Allison engine
replaced by a Rolls-Royce model 28 engine. While having a higher top speed and
greater operating altitude than the Allison-engined varients, engine failures
were very high and the life of engines so short that these planes were field
converted to Allison engines where at all possible and the last 300 of this
model were converted on the assembly line to the lower-powered but more
reliable (for desert operations) Allison engine.
The Hawk 87D nickname in the RAF was the Kittyhawk II, but memos I have seen
commonly refer to it as the Quittyhawk, in reference to its high
unserviceability rate.
>>was preferred in that theater to the Spitfire.
>Not for air-to-air, where the Spit provided >top cover that the P-40 needed,
In the time frame we are discussing, theSpitfire hadn't been introduced into
North Africa. I am not challenging the reputation of the Spitfire (which
stands on its own) but only addressing the common assumption that the British
intentionally sent second-rate American-made equipment to the Middle East and
North Africa or had no choice but to do so because that was all that was
available. What I am finding is that the British in-theatre specifically
_wanted_ US equipment because it was more reliable under the conditions of that
particular fighting front. It could be run "right out of the packing crate" as
one document states, without modification.
>>greater likelihood it (P-40) would survive battle damage at least long
>enough
>to
>>clear
>>the combat area
>I wonder how much was due to the cooling system all being concentrated round
>the engine area.
This is an interesting point. It suggests again that the usefulness of a type
in a combat environment may have more to do with such commonly overlooked
things as the design and arrangement of the cooling systems, and less with such
things as top speeds and turn radii, which are easier to compare model by
model, but may not have actually been that significant.
There is a tendency to compare aircraft as if they were atheletes--which can
run faster or jump higher. That's easy and fun to do. It's not at all easy or
necessarily fun to compare diasystolic pressures and pulmenary volumetric
efficiency.
Makin
Erik Shilling
(Bejewelled) writes:
> Thus coolant loss was nstantly critical for the R-R
>>engine, causing immediate failure, while the Allison could actually
>>operate for some little period with no radiator coolant at all--it
>>was being cooled by its oil.
While flying a P-37 equipted with a turbo-charged Allison engine, I
lost the coolant on the take-off run. I was able to make it around the
patern and land without the engine stopping, or getting rough, although
it got pretty damn hot.
Erik Shilling
DBSDESIGN
> We used what we had and what we were given. And that was it.
> No choices. <snip> But no one ever asked us if we liked it or not
> or if we would prefer another plane.
That was usually true, but there were exceptions to the rule.
Especially in the 8th Air Force Fighter Command.
Lt. Col. Don Blakeslee lobbied very hard to get Mustangs to replace
the Thunderbolt in 4th FG. Conversely, when all of the Groups were
converting to Mustangs, Lt. Col. David Schilling and other pilots
from the 56th FG lobbied just as hard to keep their Thunderbolts.
Both Fighter Groups got their wish, even though no one asked them
which aircraft they preferred to fly.
And of course, the discontent and complaining in the P-38 groups
led directly to replacement by Mustangs, which proves that the
squeaky wheels did get the grease, on some occasions.
MakinKid
>While flying a P-37 equipted with a turbo-charged Allison engine, I
>lost the coolant on the take-off run. I was able to make it around the
>patern and land without the engine stopping, or getting rough, although
>it got pretty damn hot.
It's one thing to look at yellowed maintenance records from more than half a
century ago and conjecture what they describe meant to those who flew the
aircraft. It's quite another to have that conjecture confirmed by one with
first-hand experience. Thanks!
Makin
C.C. Jordan
The entire story of Erik's fun with the YP-37 is on one of his web pages.
You can read it at:
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/9485/Prototypes.html
Great story!
My regards,
C.C. Jordan
Now online - Tale Of A Tiger by R.T. Smith, Part 3.
http://home.att.net/~C.C.Jordan/index.html
http://www.geocities.com/pentagon/quarters/9485/index.html
The "Planes and Pilots of WWII" website.
An online WWII aviation history magazine.
A member of the WWII Web-ring.
"In reality, there exists only fact and fiction. Opinions result from
a lack of the former and a reliance on the latter."
Gatt
> >In the hands of an average pilot, with little experience, the F-4
> >was not very impressive in air-to-air combat against MiG-17s.
> >But Robin Olds was no ordinary pilot. Many members of Olds group
> >in Vietnam had experience and training with WW2 and Korean War
> >era fighter aircraft. Many of the Phantom pilots sent to Vietnam
> >later were not so lucky, as the record shows.
This reminds me of the argument that Yeager and other fighter pilots made
that the US always seems to forget the necessity for a good dogfighter,
citing the Phantom as an example of a -poor- plane. For those that
haven't heard this argument, it goes that that the US has a cyclical
tendency to get its ass kicked, build a dogfighter, kick ass, figure
afterward that dogfighting is obsolete, add gizmos that don't work, get
its ass kicked, develop a dogfighter...coupled with the lagtime it takes
to train competent, experienced dogfight veterans, it makes for a
piss-poor fighter capablity every other war. (WWII...kicked ass. Early
Korea...ass kicked. Late Korea...kick ass. Vietnam...ask kicked. Gulf
war...kick ass.)
I'd argue that the P-51 was the WWII equivalent of the modern F-16. (Or
maybe F-15) Primarily, a fighter. It happened to be so capable and
airworthy that it could handle other roles, but the bottom line is it was
designed to go up and kill enemy aircraft. Their murderous success
statistics speak form themselves.
The P-38 and the Phantom might be similarly-related. Designed to be
multi-role "interceptors" they were capable of a lot of things but
vulnerable to a lot as well.
And I don't care what you folks say. The Phantom is a damned-beautiful
hunk of aircraft and so is the P-38! :P
Chris Gattman | "The sky is humming,
ga...@europa.com | and my motor thunders...." -Floater
Carlo Kopp
> Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
> DBSDESIGN wrote:
> >> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
> >> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
> >> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
>
> >> Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
> >> know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
>
> > You have merely shown that Zemke and Olds did not like the P-38.
> > You could add Hubbard and various others.
>
> I have shown that the US 8th Air Force did not like the P-38.
> That's why they got rid of it, after flying it for about one year.
Much of the previous debate centred on why the 8th didn't like it. We
already know that :-)
> > Olds BTW is a big fan of the F-4 which he flew in Nam. The F-4
> > compares to its single engined contemporaries much like the
> > P-38 did to its contemporaries.
>
> This is an excellent analogy. But not for the reasons you think.
>
> In the hands of an average pilot, with little experience, the F-4
> was not very impressive in air-to-air combat against MiG-17s.
> But Robin Olds was no ordinary pilot. Many members of Olds group
> in Vietnam had experience and training with WW2 and Korean War
> era fighter aircraft. Many of the Phantom pilots sent to Vietnam
> later were not so lucky, as the record shows.
Are you claiming that in general US kill ratios in Vietnam declined as the
war progressed ? Also you are making assumptions about what I am thinking.
Don't :-)
My point here, and earlier in the debate, was that the P-38 required a
better pilot to extract its full potential. You are correct in noting that
Olds was such a "better pilot".
> > It is interesting that the two top scorers of the 20th scored only
> > 8 and 9 kills respectively. Yet Jenkins is claimed to have scored
> > 16 kills (from early '44?) in the P-38, and White no less than 22
> > (Shennan) on the P-38 in the ETO.
>
> Pilots from all air forces grumbled when they could not get
> kills confirmed. What else is new?
Nothing new, the issue is that some ETO pilots did well in the P-38 and many
did not. Now why would this be ? Might it have something to do with the
skill level of the pilots and their ability to adapt to a slightly more
demanding type ?
> >> Zemke's personal ship was a P-38J-15 LO. Buzz code J2-Z.
> >> S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
>
> > A J-15-LO should have had the cockpit heating, dive flaps and F-17
> > engines with chin intecoolers.
>
> Hubert Zemke said he froze in the cockpit of his J-15 LO. Chin
> intercoolers, dive flaps and the engines did not help him much.
> You seem to be in a state of denial about this.
The revised cockpit heaters were a feature of the J and L series. Why Hub
froze in a J-15 LO is not clear to me :-) Maybe he had a maintenance problem
:-(
> How much more evidence do you need and from how many more
> pilots? Many of them went down in the J-model based on inter-
> cooler/supercharger problems. Especially pilots from the 20th
> and 55th Fighter Groups. This has been well documented. Read
> the sources I listed below.
>
> > Didn't stop other pilots racking up decent scores on the type, did it ?
>
> Not in the 8th Air Force. (Or the 15th AF for that matter).
White and Jenkins were ETO P-38 drivers :-)
> > You will probably find that the prominent pilots who disliked the
> > P-38 all had single engine fighter backgrounds.
>
> This is a blanket statement you're making.
Hub would qualify and I'm sure that if I spent the time on digging through
references I could show pretty quickly that many others did :-)
> > This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
> > references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
> > of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
>
> I think part of the reason you're having trouble believing comments
> you've read from P-38 pilots, is because you are focusing on the
> technical history of the aircraft instead of people who flew them.
> That's an incredibly impractical way to judge an airplane. There is
> only one way to find out if the machine works as advertised by the
> manufacturer. And that is to get feedback from pilots. Preferably
> feedback from many different pilots.
Pilots who became mostly disenchanted with the early F/G/H models and many
of whom could not exploit the J/L models successfully ? If a green pilot is
thrown into combat in an untried machine, as were the 20/55 in 1943, many of
them would have lost confidence in the aircraft. That means they would be
rather reluctant to push any model of the P-38 to the edge of the envelope.
Once bitten, twice shy.
Why don't you read up on LeVier's tour of ETO P-38 units. A very revealing
little episode.
> You have not only dismissed what Zemke said, but you also seem to
> dismiss what German pilots thought of the P-38. Generally, they
> didn't think much of the P-38 either when compared to the Mustang
> and Thunderbolt. I suggest you read some more commentary from
> P-38 pilots and German pilots from the ETO.
The German perspective will be based upon the combination of pilot +
airframe. Given the provenly mediocre track record, and initial
inexperience, of the 20/55 FGs, the German opinion here should come as no
surprise.
> The P-38 may have worked better in other places, but it did not
> work well for the 8th AF. They couldn't wait to be done with it.
> In other words, the 8th AF didn't want to settle for second best.
> Not when many people's lives were at stake. They didn't want to
> deal with an aircraft featuring a host of mechanical problems
> that made the P-38 both a nuisance, and a deathtrap.
You have not introduced anything into this debate which was not known at the
beginning of this debate.
The P-38 in the ETO became a scapegoat for a whole host of problems with
doctrine, tactics, operational deployment and flying technique/training. By
the time the P-38 was replaced with the P-51, LW attrition had passed its
critical point. Therefore it was pretty much irrelevant what they flew for
long range escorts.
Sorry, but I must fundamentally disagree. BTW are you an NP ?
Cheers,
Carlo
Dennis Jensen
dbsd...@aol.com (DBSDESIGN) wrote:
>Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
>DBSDESIGN wrote:
>>> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
>>> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
>>> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
>
>>> Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
>>> know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
>
>> You have merely shown that Zemke and Olds did not like the P-38.
>> You could add Hubbard and various others.
>
>I have shown that the US 8th Air Force did not like the P-38.
>That's why they got rid of it, after flying it for about one year.
>
>> compares to its single engined contemporaries much like the
>> P-38 did to its contemporaries.
>
>This is an excellent analogy. But not for the reasons you think.
>
>In the hands of an average pilot, with little experience, the F-4
>was not very impressive in air-to-air combat against MiG-17s.
>But Robin Olds was no ordinary pilot. Many members of Olds group
>in Vietnam had experience and training with WW2 and Korean War
>era fighter aircraft. Many of the Phantom pilots sent to Vietnam
>later were not so lucky, as the record shows.
>
>> 8 and 9 kills respectively. Yet Jenkins is claimed to have scored
>> 16 kills (from early '44?) in the P-38, and White no less than 22
>> (Shennan) on the P-38 in the ETO.
>
>Pilots from all air forces grumbled when they could not get
>kills confirmed. What else is new?
>
>>> S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
>
>> A J-15-LO should have had the cockpit heating, dive flaps and F-17
>> engines with chin intecoolers.
>
>Hubert Zemke said he froze in the cockpit of his J-15 LO. Chin
>intercoolers, dive flaps and the engines did not help him much.
>You seem to be in a state of denial about this.
>
>pilots? Many of them went down in the J-model based on inter-
>cooler/supercharger problems. Especially pilots from the 20th
>and 55th Fighter Groups. This has been well documented. Read
>the sources I listed below.
>
>> Didn't stop other pilots racking up decent scores on the type, did it ?
>
>Not in the 8th Air Force. (Or the 15th AF for that matter).
>
>> P-38 all had single engine fighter backgrounds.
>
>This is a blanket statement you're making.
>
>> references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
>> of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
>
>I think part of the reason you're having trouble believing comments
>you've read from P-38 pilots, is because you are focusing on the
>technical history of the aircraft instead of people who flew them.
>That's an incredibly impractical way to judge an airplane. There is
>only one way to find out if the machine works as advertised by the
>manufacturer. And that is to get feedback from pilots. Preferably
>feedback from many different pilots.
>
>dismiss what German pilots thought of the P-38. Generally, they
>didn't think much of the P-38 either when compared to the Mustang
>and Thunderbolt. I suggest you read some more commentary from
>P-38 pilots and German pilots from the ETO.
>
WRT the German assessment of the P-38, I think you are forgetting the issue of
pride. For example, the German pilots shot down in the BoB tended to always
have been shot down by the Spit, despite the huge numbers advantage of the
Hurricane. Given the very poor history of the Bf-110, and that the P-38 was
also a twin, and may have been perceived as having similar poor performance,
don't you think that it is possible that the German pilots would never admit
to thinking much of the P-38, as it may reflect poorly on the way other German
pilots perceived their ability.
You are correct in your assertion that human factors should be considered, but
you are neglecting the issue that I mentioned above, as well as the precursor
to the "fighter Mafia's" perception of singles vs twins (as pointed out by
Carlo. The other factor pointed out (correctly) by Carlo is that, with the
huge preponderance of single engined fighters, the correct tactics for the use
of the P-38 were not taught until pretty late in the game. Many of the pilots
had already formed preconceptions of the P-38 at this time.
Dennis
>The P-38 may have worked better in other places, but it did not
>work well for the 8th AF. They couldn't wait to be done with it.
>In other words, the 8th AF didn't want to settle for second best.
>Not when many people's lives were at stake. They didn't want to
>deal with an aircraft featuring a host of mechanical problems
>that made the P-38 both a nuisance, and a deathtrap.
>
ArtKramr
Sounds like the Light Colonels took credit for what was going to happen anyway.
Light Colonels have virtually no influence over anything.
John S. Maddaus
>Here are the official victory records and aircraft types flown of the USAAF FGs
>in WW2 (plus two so-so units important in the 38 discussion)--
>1fg 440 P-38
>4fg 550 P-47 P-51
>8fg 453 P-39, P-40 P-38
>14fg 426 P-38
>20fg 211 P-38 P-51
>23fg 467 P-40 P-51
>35fg 387 P-400 P-39 P-38 P-47 P-51
>49fg 664 P-40 P-38 P-47
>52fg 425 Spitfire P-51
>55fg 303 P-38 P-51
>56fg 664 P-47
>78fg 326 P-47 P-51
>82fg 553 P-38
>325 540 P-40 P-47 P-51
>347fg 315 P-39 P-38
>348fg 349 P-47 P-51
>352fg 504 P-47 P-51
>353fg 328 P-47 P-51
>354fg 637 P-47 P-51
>355fg 339 P-47 P-51
>357fg 595 P-51
>475fg 552 P-38
>
>Of the groups with more than 400 kills that flew only one type of aircraft
>thruout their wartime tour, one flew the P-47, one the P-51 and four the P-38.
>Three of the P-38 groups were in the MTO and one the Pacific. Of the groups
>scoring more than 500 kills while flying only one type of aircraft, one flew
>the P-47, one the P-51 and two the P-38. One of the P-38 groups served in the
>MTO.
>13 P-38 groups were deployed in the combined MTO/ETO theaters. 34 P-47 groups
>served in the same theaters. 24 P-51 groups did so. (Note that most groups,
>as can be seen from the list above, did not keep one fighter type for the
>entire war.) That the aircraft type with the fewest deployed fg has the highest
>number of fg in the top ranks in air to air killsis worth noting and doesn't
>seem to indicate the 38 lacked the ability to rough up the enemy.
>Some comments--
>While the ETO fighter jocks got permission to abandon close escort and do free
>ranging escort from late winter 44, the MTO jocks never got such permission and
>so during the entire war flew only close escort, meaning they gave up the key
>advantages of speed and altitude to their foes--yet with that handicap still
>performed outstandingly well in air to air.
>I threw in the 20 and 55 fg figures because these were the two original ETO 38
>groups that seem to be the source of origin of the P-38's poor reputation in
>the ETO. But even with the swtich from teh 38, their record for the war is not
>outstanding. It was very good, but not top rank.
>Compare their records with that of, for example, the 325, which served in the
>MTO. It scored 135 kills with the P-40, 153 with the P-47 and 288 with the
>P-51, pushing it right to the top ranks of fg. No 325 vet I've ever run into
>has badmouthed any of the aircraft they flew, including the P-40, which must
>have had been outclassed. A poor workman blames his tools. The reasons they
>generally cite for the greater number of kills with the P-51 is that it gave
>them the range to go where the action was.
>It could be asked why it was that the P-38 groups did so much better than the
>P-47 and P-51 groups in the MTO. Why didn't the P-47, for example, shine in the
>MTO the way it did in the ETO? A P-47 group topped all the fg in kills and was
>based in the ETO, yet no P-47 group did all that well in the MTO--or the PTO
>for that matter. Can we conclude from this that the P-47 met easier opposition
>in the ETO than in the MTO or PTO? Or would it be wiser to conclude that that
>fg was a crackerjack unit, with outstanding leadership, and mission profiles
>that offered it plenty of opportunities to score.
>A key point about all the high scoring fg--they were at the time and place
>where the action was. And they were skilled enough, led well enough and had
>mission assignments appropriate enough to allow them to shine.
>What's interesting to me is that the US had so many capable fighter types to
>choose from. Based on its record, the P-38 delivered the goods.
>
>George
GREAT POST. Had the opportunity to spend a cub scout campout with a
former p-38 pilot in the ETO (4 kills) who started with p-40s in
africa. Lot of gripes about the heat problem, but no complaints about
capabiliities.
jmad...@usa.net
John S. Maddaus
>
>It would seem that Hub made up his mind flying a F/G/H model, and left it
>at that. a), b) and c) were fixed by the J/L models.
>
>The ident thing isn't bad if you are flying escort work. It may not be as
>convenient in other situations, but the central question with escort work
>is what are you trying to achieve ?
>
>The visibility from the cockpit argument cuts both ways, and in a
>defensive situation I'd take a P-38 over a Razorback or P-51B/C any day.
>I've sat in a Mustang, CAC Mk.21 (eq D) and while the bubble was nice, you
>are still do not have very good aft visibility :-(
>
>Cheers,
>
>Carlo
>
>
c) wasn't fixed until the J25LO, well into the J production run.
jmad...@usa.net
C.C. Jordan
>Carlo Kopp <Carlo.Ko...@aus.net> wrote:
>
>DBSDESIGN wrote:
>>> He <Zemke> only flew the 'J' model in combat. The earlier versions
>>> of the P-38 were replaced by the time he transferred from 56th FG
>>> to 479th FG on August 8, 1944.
>
>>> Zemke was not alone in his comments about the P-38J. We already
>>> know what Robin Olds thought of it. (And he became an ace in it).
>
>> You have merely shown that Zemke and Olds did not like the P-38.
>> You could add Hubbard and various others.
>
>I have shown that the US 8th Air Force did not like the P-38.
>That's why they got rid of it, after flying it for about one year.
Why is it that because the 8th AF didn't like the P-38, that it was inferior?
They were a small time user. That's very much like saying that the Ford
Taurus is a lousy automobile because four foot tall, one eyed Bulgarian
house painters, on average, don't like it. In May of 1944, there were no
less than 13 active P-38 groups overseas. The 8th had but two. That's
just fifteen percent of the groups and much less than 10% of the aircraft.
Beyond that, many of the 20th and 55th FG actually liked the fighter.
So then, the number of those who disliked the fighter were, indeed, a very
small minority within the USAAF.
>
>> Olds BTW is a big fan of the F-4 which he flew in Nam. The F-4
>> compares to its single engined contemporaries much like the
>> P-38 did to its contemporaries.
>
>This is an excellent analogy. But not for the reasons you think.
>
>In the hands of an average pilot, with little experience, the F-4
>was not very impressive in air-to-air combat against MiG-17s.
>But Robin Olds was no ordinary pilot. Many members of Olds group
>in Vietnam had experience and training with WW2 and Korean War
>era fighter aircraft. Many of the Phantom pilots sent to Vietnam
>later were not so lucky, as the record shows.
>
>> It is interesting that the two top scorers of the 20th scored only
>> 8 and 9 kills respectively. Yet Jenkins is claimed to have scored
>> 16 kills (from early '44?) in the P-38, and White no less than 22
>> (Shennan) on the P-38 in the ETO.
>
>Pilots from all air forces grumbled when they could not get
>kills confirmed. What else is new?
>
>>> Zemke's personal ship was a P-38J-15 LO. Buzz code J2-Z.
>>> S/N 43-28832 and built sometime between Jan-May 1944.
>
>> A J-15-LO should have had the cockpit heating, dive flaps and F-17
>> engines with chin intecoolers.
>
>Hubert Zemke said he froze in the cockpit of his J-15 LO. Chin
>intercoolers, dive flaps and the engines did not help him much.
>You seem to be in a state of denial about this.
So Zemke was cold, so what. Malfunctioning cockpit heaters
were not uncommon. However, the 8th seemed to have many
more problems than the other P-38 users.
>
>How much more evidence do you need and from how many more
>pilots? Many of them went down in the J-model based on inter-
>cooler/supercharger problems. Especially pilots from the 20th
>and 55th Fighter Groups. This has been well documented. Read
>the sources I listed below.
Hold on a minute. There exists no documentation of P-38 losses
due to multiple engine/turbo failures. One reason, is that there were
damn few lost to this cause. I believe that if you dig into it, you will find a
greater amount of losses of P-51's due to engine failures. Am I saying
that the P-51 suffered more engine failures than the P-38? Well, yes
and no. In the 8th, P-38's suffered more engine failures than did the
Mustang. However, the P-38 flew perfectly well, thank you, on one
engine. The Mustang, on the other hand flew very much like a brick when
its Packard quit. Virtually everywhere else where the P-38 flew alongside
the Mustang, the P-51 suffered more engine failures and, as a result,
greater losses to engine failure.
>
>> Didn't stop other pilots racking up decent scores on the type, did it ?
>
>Not in the 8th Air Force. (Or the 15th AF for that matter).
The 15th AF did very well when you consider there weren't many
enemy fighters to shoot down. Perhaps 15 to 20 % of the total
Luftwaffe strength in western Europe? The 31st FS had several
high scorers with Voll and Brown at the top. Voll out-scored all but
seven of the 8th's pilots, and they got the majority of their scores
in mid '43 through March '44 when the targets were very plentiful.
>
>> You will probably find that the prominent pilots who disliked the
>> P-38 all had single engine fighter backgrounds.
>
>This is a blanket statement you're making.
It may be a blanket statement, but it is a correct statement, nonetheless.
Talk to the pilots.
>
>> This is curious insofar as it disagrees with a wide range of technical
>> references on the type. While I put considerable weight on the views
>> of vets, I am a little perplexed with these statements.
>
>I think part of the reason you're having trouble believing comments
>you've read from P-38 pilots, is because you are focusing on the
>technical history of the aircraft instead of people who flew them.
Actually you are guilty of focusing on the opinions of a relatively
small minority of those who flew the plane in combat. Very small.
I have spent many hours talking to pilots from the 49th FG (as well
as the group historian). Most of them came from single engine types,
and virtually all of them preferred the P-38.
>That's an incredibly impractical way to judge an airplane. There is
>only one way to find out if the machine works as advertised by the
>manufacturer. And that is to get feedback from pilots. Preferably
>feedback from many different pilots.
May I respectfully urge you to try your suggestion? Contact the various
fighter squadron and pilot associations. There are plenty of former fighter
pilots who would be happy to talk about their experiences and their
aircraft. Their numbers are quickly dwindling, and now is the time to
record their stories. I'd be happy to send you an e-mail address or two,
privately, of course.
>
>You have not only dismissed what Zemke said, but you also seem to
>dismiss what German pilots thought of the P-38. Generally, they
>didn't think much of the P-38 either when compared to the Mustang
>and Thunderbolt.
I have little regard for the turthfulness of many of the postwar Luftwaffe
apologists. If the P-38 was such an easy kill, perhaps these characters
could explain why, in air to air combat, the P-38 pilots shot down 4, yes,
I said 4, Luftwaffe fighters for every P-38 lost to German fighters? In the
MTO, the ratio was closer to 5 to 1.
>I suggest you read some more commentary from
>P-38 pilots and German pilots from the ETO.
>
>The P-38 may have worked better in other places, but it did not
>work well for the 8th AF. They couldn't wait to be done with it.
This is very true.....
>In other words, the 8th AF didn't want to settle for second best.
Second best at what? Be specific and be prepared to support that
with more the misguided opinions of a minority of those who flew
the fighter. Is it not possible that the 8th AF simply misused the P-38?
Is it not possible that they treated it like a leper from day one?
Is it not possible that the engine problems stemmed largely from
badly formulated fuel and poor multi-engine training. Is it not yet
obvious that the 8th AF was the exception and certainly not the
rule? And, does this not reflect much more on the 8th AF than on
the fighter, which reigned supreme everywhere else it was deployed?
I believe that the answer to every one of those questions is a
resounding, "you bet your ass".
>Not when many people's lives were at stake. They didn't want to
>deal with an aircraft featuring a host of mechanical problems
>that made the P-38 both a nuisance, and a deathtrap.
Whoa there friend. The P-47 and the P-51 had there share of problems.
If the P-38 was a nuisance, it was because it had twice as many engines
and related systems. As for being a deathtrap, that is a rather large inflation
of the facts in evidence, and not up to your usual high standards.
>
>Sources
>P-38 LIGHTNING AT WAR by Joe Christy and Jeff Ethell.
Ethell worshipped the P-38.
>PETER THREE EIGHT by John Stanaway
Stanaway is no less of a fan than Ethell.
>THE LOCKHEED P-38 by Warren Bodie
Bodie is "the" authority on the type.
To cite these fellows as sources means that you have overlooked
the bulk of their work, which clearly strives to show the P-38 as an
equal to the Mustang and Thunderbolt.
I have always seen your posts as far more balanced than these on the
P-38. Why the overt bias, if I may ask?
All the best,