Sprey and Wheeler: The F-22 Controversy, Arguments for Stopping Production
Mike
http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?DocumentID=4527&from_page=../index.cfm
The F-22 Controversy, Part I: Arguments for Stopping Production
There is a burgeoning debate in the Senate over the 13-11 vote in the
Senate Armed Services Committee to buy seven more F-22s for $1.75
billion (an apparently new and improved unit "flyaway" cost of $250
million each, not the Lockheed/U.S. Air Force advertised $143 million
each).
The Levin-McCain amendment to undo the new F-22 acquisition is
refreshingly upright and clear cut. It restores $1.250 billion in
readiness-related spending that Lockheed, Sen. Saxby Chambliss, R-Ga.,
and 12 other SASC senators thought should be raided from the Military
Personnel and Operation and Maintenance accounts to pay for the seven
F-22s. It also undoes a "management savings" of $500 million to pay
for the rest of the F-22 cost - a savings that both Levin and McCain
properly found unjustified; "bogus" would be a better word.
Everyone knows the F-22 is insanely expensive ($65 billion for 187 so
far), but isn't it the super-fighter everyone in the Air Force,
Lockheed and its paid for Capitol Hill offices (more on that later)
describes?
Perhaps not. Please consider the piece below, written by myself and
Pierre M. Sprey, one of the few people alive today who can honestly
say he has participated in the design of effective combat aircraft, as
demonstrated by multiple wars.
The piece was picked up last night by Colin Clark's DoD Buzz as "Stop
the F-22 Now." It is also reproduced below.
Pierre Sprey and I are indebted to Colin for running the piece. But
the exigencies of editing resulted in some points we believe useful to
have hit the cutting room floor. Accordingly, I am including the full
piece as initially written at the end of this message, with the DoD
Buzz version below. It is perhaps prideful, but some readers may find
the additional points to be of interest.
DoD Buzz
July 13, 2009
"Stop the F-22 Now"
by Winslow T. Wheeler and Pierre M. Sprey
The Senate should debate the F-22's fate this week . Sen. John McCain,
ranking member of the Senate Armed Services committee, has pledged to
lead the fight against the F-22, which the committee approved over the
objections of McCain and Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the committee.
Following is an op-ed by Winslow Wheeler and Pierre Sprey calling for
an end to a plane they argue doesn't work nearly as well as claimed
and is far too expensive.
Lawmakers beholden to Lockheed are leading the charge to overturn the
Secretary of Defense's decision to stop producing the F-22. Gates and
President Obama have threatened to veto the 2010 defense spending bill
if it contains a single F-22 over the 187 authorized.
Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have already voted
to overturn Gates' decision. The House wants to make a down payment on
12 more F-22s. The Senate wants to pay up front for seven more in
2010. The House of Representatives passed its version of the bill on
June 25 by a vote of 389 to 22. Clearly, Obama and Gates have a long
way to go to pocket the 145 or so votes they will need in the House to
sustain a veto. The Senate should debate its bill this week. Obama and
Gates will suffer a huge legislative defeat if the F-22 supporters
win.
Instead of being such a close call, further production of F-22s ought
to be laughed out of court. The F-22 is outrageously expensive. The
187 are costing just over $65 billion, about $350 million each.
Not a single F-22 has flown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It
would be foolish to deploy them since there is no enemy air force to
fight against. To send F-22s as a bomber - at three times the
operating cost of F-16s that are already bombing over there - would be
just another drag on the war effort.
Even more important is the question of whether the F-22 is a good
fighter. The truth is that the F-22s weaken US air power. Study after
study show that pilot skill dominates all other factors in winning or
losing air battles. The F-22's maintenance costs have the Air Force to
slash in-air pilot training. In the 1970s, fighter pilots were getting
20 to 30 hours a month of air combat training. Today, F-22 pilots get
10 to 12 hours. High tech theorists claim flying can be replaced by
ground simulators. Experience teaches that simulators can be used for
cockpit procedures training but, by misrepresenting in-air reality,
they reinforce tactics that could get pilots killed in real combat.
The Air Force, Lockheed, and their congressional boosters tout the
F-22 as the silver bullet of air combat. The F-22's so-called stealth
may hurt more than it helps. In truth, against short wavelength
radars, the F-22 is hard to detect only over a very narrow band of
viewing angles. Worse, there are thousands of existing long range,
long wavelength radars that can detect the F-22 from several hundred
miles away at all angles. Believers in stealth's invisibility should
ask the pilots of the two - not one, as commonly believed - stealthy
F-117 bombers taken out of action by old Russian radar-directed
defense systems in the 1999 Kosovo air war. Moreover, a new
whistleblower scandal is presenting evidence that the F-22's stealth
skin has failed to meet its stealth requirements because it has been
badly fabricated and dishonestly tested.
The vaunted invincibility of the F-22 founders on two incurable flaws:
First, the plane's so-called "low probability of intercept" radar may
now be easily detected, thanks to the proliferation of spread spectrum
technology in cell phones and laptops. That creates an environment
where, if the F-22 pilot turns on his radar, he announces his presence
over hundreds of miles. Even better for the enemy, the radar makes an
unmistakable beacon for opposing missiles.
Second, when combat forces F-22 pilots to turn off radars, they'll
find themselves forced into a close-in, maneuvering fight. Compromised
by stealth and heavy radar electronics, the plane's agility, short
range missiles, and guns are nothing special - as one of us observed
at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada when an F-16 "shot down" an F-22 in
exercises.
As for the plane's advertised ability to cruise supersonically the
F-22's low fuel capacity (27% of takeoff weight, only two thirds of
what's needed for combat-useful supersonic endurance in enemy
airspace) reduces this to an air show trick. Why the big fuel
shortfall? To make room for stealth technologies and radar
electronics.
In summary, a vote for continuing F-22 production is a vote to decay
pilots' skills, to deny them a truly great fighter, to shrink the
number of pilots and planes we can field, and to reward Congress'
unending appetite for pork. The new 2010 Defense Authorization bill
should be vetoed if a single F-22 is added.
# # #
Winslow T. Wheeler, a former GOP congressional budget expert, is
director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for
Defense Information in Washington.
Pierre M. Sprey helped bring to fruition the F-16; he also led the
design team for the A-10.
The piece as originally drafted follows:
"Any Pro-Defense Senator Will Vote to Kill the F-22"
by Winslow Wheeler and Pierre Sprey
Democratic and Republican members of Congress beholden to Lockheed are
leading the charge to overturn the Secretary of Defense's laudable
decision to stop producing the F-22 fighter. Gates and President Obama
have threatened to veto Congress' entire 2010 defense spending bill if
it contains a single F-22 over the 187 now authorized. As Gates said
about his original F-22 decision, the vote to sustain the President's
veto of this bill should not be a close call. Sadly, Congress is
making it a very close call. That is why our defenses are in the mess
they are in.
Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees have already voted
to overturn Gates' decision. The House Committee wants to make a 2010
down payment to ensure 12 more F-22s in 2011. The Senate Committee
wants to pay up front for 7 more in 2010 - leaving unsaid how many
more we'll have to pay for in 2011. The House of Representatives
passed their version of the bill on June 25 by a vote of 389 to 22.
Clearly, Obama and Gates have a long way to go to pocket the 145 or so
votes they will need in the House to sustain a veto. The Senate will
debate their version of the bill during the week of July 13. Should
an amendment to support Gates and Obama by removing the seven F-22s
now in the bill receive less than the thirty-four votes needed to
sustain a veto - or if senators supporting the president's position
count noses and decline to move their amendment for fear of losing -
Obama and Gates will have suffered a huge legislative defeat. That
portends a sad future indeed for their efforts to keep pork and other
bad ideas out of the defense budget.
Instead of being such a close call, further production of F-22s ought
to be laughed out of court. Consider the following:
The F-22 is outrageously expensive. The 187 now authorized are costing
the nation just over $65 billion. That's almost $350 million for each
one, counting all development and production costs.
Not a single F-22 has flown in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It
would be foolish to deploy them. There is no enemy air force there. To
send F-22s as yet another bomber - at what DOD data shows to be three
times the operating cost of the F-16s that are already bombing too
much over there - would be just another harmful drag on the real war
effort.
Even more important is the question of whether the F-22 makes a good
fighter, presumably against a competent enemy air force - if we are
ever faced with one. The simple truth is that the F-22s make US air
power weaker, not stronger.
Study after study - to say nothing of war itself - shows conclusively
that pilot skill dominates all other factors in winning or losing air
battles. Because of the F-22, the skill of our pilots has been
seriously degraded. Due to its gigantic maintenance and support burden
- over $3 million per fighter per year, again according to official
DOD figures - the Air Force has slashed our in-air pilot training. In
the 1970s, famously called the "hollow decade" because of low combat
readiness, our fighter pilots were getting 20 to 30 hours a month of
air combat training - half what the Israeli Air Force pilots found
necessary to achieve their lopsided 15 to 1 victory ratio in 1973.
Today, our F-22 pilots get an obviously inadequate 10 to 12 hours.
High tech theorists claim flying training can be replaced by ground
simulators. Experience teaches otherwise: simulators can be used for
cockpit procedures training but, by misrepresenting in-air reality,
they reinforce tactics that could get pilots killed in real combat.
Ignoring the combat-dominating human dimension, the Air Force,
Lockheed, and their congressional boosters tout the F-22 as the magic
silver bullet of air combat, a technological wonder weapon. It's
likely to be the opposite.
The F-22's so-called "stealth" may hurt more than it helps. First of
all, stealth imposes huge aerodynamic, weight and maintenance
penalties, reducing both combat agility and numbers of fighters
available in the air. The invisibility claimed is disingenuous. In
truth, against small (that is, short wavelength) radars, the F-22 is
hard to detect only over a very narrow band of possible viewing
angles. Over the huge remaining span of viewing angles, it is very
detectable. Worse, there are thousands of existing long range, long
wavelength radars, particularly Russian and Chinese ones, that can
detect the F-22 from several hundred miles away at all angles - simply
because all long wavelength radars are immune to any kind of stealth
shapings or coatings. Believers in stealth's cloak of invisibility
should ask the pilots of the two - not one, as commonly believed -
stealthy F-117 bombers taken out of action by antiquated Russian radar-
directed defense systems in the 1999 Kosovo air war. Moreover, a new
unfolding whistleblower scandal is presenting court evidence that the
F-22's stealth skin has failed to meet its stealth requirements -
limited as they are - because it has been badly fabricated and
dishonestly tested.
Worse, the widely advertised 10:1 or even 30:1 kill ratios of the F-22
in Air Force-umpired mock air battles rest entirely on using its radar
(without allowing enemy anti-radar measures) and on assigning
wishfully inflated kill percentages to its radar missiles. Despite the
Air Force's long standing dream, in every real war of the last 45
years, our radar-equipped fighters were simply unable to use beyond-
visual-range radar missile shooting or, at best, fired off a handful
of inconsequential pot-shots. These few actual firings produced kill
rates far less impressive than the percentages the Air Force assigns
in F-22 mock battles.
The vaunted invincibility of the F-22 founders on two incurable flaws:
First, the plane's so-called "low probability of intercept" radar may
now be easily detected by simple, low cost electronics, thanks to the
worldwide proliferation of spread spectrum technology in cell phones
and laptops. That creates an environment where, if the F-22 pilot is
foolish enough to turn on his radar, he announces his presence over
hundreds of miles. Even better for the enemy, the radar makes an
unmistakable beacon for home-on-radar missiles. Both the Russians and
the Chinese specialize in - and sell - just such missiles. Despite
that, our Air Force almost always bans these potentially devastating
missiles and tactics from the F-22's mock battles, for reasons that
are not hard to fathom.
Second, when actual combat forces our F-22 pilots to turn off their
radars and forget the beyond-visual-range dream, they'll find
themselves forced into a close-in, maneuvering fight. Compromised by
the burden of complex stealth and heavy radar electronics in that
dogfight regime, the plane's agility, short range missiles, and guns
are nothing special - as one of us observed at Nellis Air Force Base
in Nevada when an F-16 "shot down" an F-22 in exercises.
As for the plane's advertised ability to cruise supersonically -
indeed a desirable characteristic - unfortunately, the F-22's low fuel
capacity (27 percent of takeoff weight, only two thirds of what's
needed for combat-useful supersonic endurance in enemy airspace)
reduces this to a brief airshow trick. Why the big fuel shortfall?
Once again, to make room for combat-irrelevant tons of stealth
technologies and radar electronics.
It's not as if it's technically hard to design and produce a truly
great air-to-air fighter that can whip any other fighter in the world.
The only hard part is enforcing the discipline needed to: 1) focus
austerely on what has proven inescapably effective in the actual air
combat our pilots have experienced and are likely to experience (as
opposed to the imagined high tech air combat dreamed up by our arm
chair theorists); 2) rigorously excise extraneous niceties and
alluring but untested technologies; 3) build two competing combat-
capable prototypes, then go with the winner of a brutally administered
series of head-to-head dogfights and live weapons firings (even if the
winner fails to evenly spread subcontracts across 40-plus states). The
two most successful planes flying in today's Air Force were built just
that way. There's no reason we can't do that again - and come up with
a new, even better, world-beating fighter.
In summary, a vote for continuing F-22 production is a vote to decay
our pilots' skills, to deny them a truly great fighter, to shrink the
number of pilots and planes we can field, and to reward Congress'
unending appetite for pork. Unquestionably, the new 2010 Defense
Authorization bill should be vetoed if a single F-22 is added. Those
members of Congress who place our nation's defenses first will support
that veto.
# # #
Winslow T. Wheeler is the Director of the Straus Military Reform
Project at the Center for Defense Information in Washington. He worked
on national security issues on Capitol Hill for 31 years for US
senators from both political parties and the Government Accountability
Office.
Pierre M. Sprey, together with Air Force Cols John Boyd and Everest
Riccioni, brought to fruition the F-16; he also led the design team
for the A-10 and helped implement the program. He is one of a very
small number of Pentagon insiders who started the military reform
movement in the late 1960s.
Both Wheeler and Sprey are contributors to the new anthology
"America's Defense Meltdown: Pentagon Reform for President Obama and
the New Congress."
WaltBJ
fatigue problem after that ANG F15 broke in two. Trouble with that
approach is - where do you stop rebuilding? Taking the fuselage apart
to rplace the longerons would be insanely expensive and you end up
with a 30 year old airplane wondering what will fail next. Wing?
Stabilizer, vertical and/or horizontal?
Sprey, Boyd and Riccione if left alone would have produced an
airplane incapable of fighting at night. Boyd's ideas weren't so bad
but I understand Riccione saw no need for a good radar set.
The use of radar in air to air - it won't go away. Track-while-
scan goes a long way to disguising what is happening. As for the
pervading EM from cellphones, TV stations, AM and FM broadcast
stations, apparently these chair experts never heard of SCATER -
Security Control of Electronic Radiation. (It may have a new name by
now.) I have opined for some 15 years now that anyone who emits E/M in
the next big war will be sorry. People who say "you can't do that!"
ie, control emissions, are ignoring 'military necessity'. How do you
turn off the enemy's emissions? Silly question - next.
Stealth - any stealh is better than none. An airplane design
ignoring stealth might as well have a big sign painted on it saying
'shoot me'. Furthermore, do the anti-stealth guys think the war will
stop when the sun goes down?
And if they are so down on radar, where is the push for state-of-the-
art IR systems? I used IRSTS air to air - it worked just fine.
"The F22 hasn't fought - good deal, say I. Why should it? There
is no target worthy of an F22 at present. When will there be one? I
don't know. But with Russia's recent developments in improvements on
legacy SAMs and introduction of a variety of state-of-the-art SAMs
from a snap-shot short range system for pop-up targets to the big 150
mile jobs I sure would like to have a plane more stealth than my F4
did in SEA.- which was zilch.
Face it - the nations with aspirations toward air power are
lookig at Russia's catalog. The SU27 is headache enough, let alone the
follow-on versions. I understand Venezuela is looking at getting some
27s. Not that the small number they can afford is much of a threat,
but that's the way the trend is going.
Again, we can get in a war in several ways - and we have just
about explored all of them in our history. One, kind of overlooked
right now, is if one of our old Allies calls for help. What will we
have to go to war with, in say 5 or 10 years? Resources - a major
source of conflict. The age-old problem here is if a nation can't buy
what it neeeds, it is quite likely to try to take it by force.
Australia worries about this possibility. They have resurces a huge
land area and a population of bout 30 million. Target, anyone? Africa
is another resource target.
The problem with our main fighter force - F15s, F16s, F18s - is
that they are aging. The first (but not the last) F15 has broken up in
flight. That has been the fate of our fighters since WW2 - F86s broke
up, F105s broke up. The DC Guard had a wing spar crack on a Thud
being towed out for an engine-change test hop. Good thing it broke
when it did. Earlier a wing failed on one of their 105s in the
pitchout for landing. The pilot did not make it. Likewise I lost a
friend and his student in an F4 during a combat reversal - the outer
wing panel came off in a slicing dive at 400 knots. Neither man got
out.
We will see more F15s break up. Yes there are fatigue/load
recorders in the airplanes now. But what if during high-G the airplane
crosses another's wake turbulence? I have seen 10+ on a G-meter from
just that cause. When do you decide an airplane is not safe to fly?
And where is its replacement?
DoD and the high brass are all singing the same song - of
course. Very very seldom does anybody get to high rank by disagreeing
with his boss Evem seldomer (nice word) do we see someone with the
guts to resign and say their piece from civilian life. VietNam
recidivus.
I'd sure hate to see our status slip to something resembling
our defense levels in 1940. I'd really hate to see our men going to
war in machines unfit for battle. Thus I have no use for people who
pontificate from theoretical knowledge but lacking any practical
experience.
Walt BJ
Matt Wiser
There are a lot of folks who would call the Center for Defense
Information "The Center for Defense Misinformation." I agree with that
assessment.
Eng.Ineer
> "The F22 hasn't fought - good deal, say I. Why should it? There
> is no target worthy of an F22 at present. When will there be one? I
> don't know.
> Again, we can get in a war in several ways - and we have just
> about explored all of them in our history. One, kind of overlooked
> right now, is if one of our old Allies calls for help. What will we
> have to go to war with, in say 5 or 10 years? Resources - a major
> source of conflict. The age-old problem here is if a nation can't buy
> what it neeeds, it is quite likely to try to take it by force.
> Australia worries about this possibility. They have resurces a huge
> land area and a population of bout 30 million. Target, anyone?
Could you posit a scenario for the invasion of Australia in which the
F22 would be uniquely useful to the defenders?
There may well be such a scenario, but in my total lack of relevant
experience I'm not seeing it.
> The problem with our main fighter force - F15s, F16s, F18s - is
> that they are aging.
For potential "strategic" scale big & lasting wars, what are the
advantage of the F22 compared to building an entirely new fleet of
these designs, with perhaps more modern electronics? It would seem
that you could probably afford to buy 2-3x as many airplanes. And fly
them more for training.
Obviously there are places you do not want to send a pilot in an
F15/16/18, but is the best solution to that sending an (economically +
politically) expensive pilot in an extremely expensive F22, still
exposing a lot of risk of costly loss, or sending an effectively
cheaper UAV and/or cruise missile?
You've got the real world experience, so you obviously have a
perspective that those of us sitting in arm chairs don't, so I'd
appreciate it if you could help explain why the F22 is uniquely useful
compared to a new batch of old designs plus modern robotic toys,
either for the fighting a brush fire without taking losses scenario,
or for the major ally fighting for survival one?