US Navy/Marine Corp Versus Israeli Air Force
Adrian
combining two different excercises.
The article;
Report: IAF whips US pilots in exercise
By ARIEH O'SULLIVAN of "The Jerusalem Post"
URL -http://www.jpost.com/com/Archive/24.Sep.1999/News/Article-3.html
A little over a week ago I came across an article in Janes Information Group
(URL - http://www.janes.com/aerospace/military/news/idr/idr010529_1_n.shtml)
The article was about an air excercise between the USMC F/A-18 from the
Balkans and Israeli F-15s & F-16s. The F/A-18s were equipt with AMRAAMs and
Sidewinder AIM-9Ls while the Israeli aircraft were armed with AMRAAMs, Python
3s & 4s and, helmet mounted display and targeting systems.
The Israeli aircraft ROUTED the F/A-18s 220-20!!! That is an 11:1 kill ratio,
not the 40:1 stated in the paper! Still nothing to celebrate about.
I came across another article about an excercise between the Israeli Air Force
against a "carrier air wing". According to the report, IDF/AF' F-15C's and
F-16C's routed the US Navy's F-14's and F/A-18's, 54-0!! I do not know whether
it was the F-14A's or F-14D's? The IAF did have the "advantage" in close in air
to air missiles and had helmet mounted display and targeting system! I have no
idea what the rules of engagement were??
DOES ANYONE HAVE ANYMORE INFORMATION ABOUT THESE TWO EXCERCISES, WHEN THEY
OCCURRED, WHAT SQUADRONS AND/OR CARRIER AIR WING WERE INVOLVED, ETC.?
Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
training of Navy pilots!
Phil Rhodes
your homework! Do you thing the Israelis could protect the entire world?
Mike Weeks
>Date: 6/26/2001 22:20 Pacific Daylight Time
>Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
>then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
>training of Navy pilots!
I suggest going back into Dejanews and searching in this NG on the various key
words regarding the USN vs. IAF story.
There was plenty of discussion on the subject and w/ input from some who had a
much better understanding of what actually took place.
As a hint, look at the JP piece as PR.
MW
-------------------------------------
"As soon as movement begins, so does the fog of war" - Edward N. Luttwak
Ogden Johnson III
>>From: dev...@ix.netcom.com (Adrian)
>>Date: 6/26/2001 22:20 Pacific Daylight Time
>>Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
>>then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
>>training of Navy pilots!
>I suggest going back into Dejanews and searching in this NG on the various key
>words regarding the USN vs. IAF story.
Deja is gone, r.i.p., but http://groups.google.com/ has taken over the
archive work that deja was doing. After a somewhat rocky start, and
they're still in Beta at doing what deja was doing, I've had success
in finding stuff back to '95 recently.
>There was plenty of discussion on the subject and w/ input from some who had a
>much better understanding of what actually took place.
Indeed, *lots* and *lots* of discussion. ;->
OJ III
Yeff
Ogden Johnson III<oj...@home.com> wrote in
rec.aviation.military.naval:
> Deja is gone, r.i.p., but http://groups.google.com/ has taken over the
> archive work that deja was doing. After a somewhat rocky start, and
> they're still in Beta at doing what deja was doing, I've had success
> in finding stuff back to '95 recently.
FYI, the advanced search is much more useful:
http://groups.google.com/advanced_group_search
-Jeff B.
yeff at erols dot com
Mike Weeks
>Date: 6/27/2001 17:04 Pacific Daylight Time
>mic...@aol.comnojunk (Mike Weeks) wrote:
>
>>>From: dev...@ix.netcom.com (Adrian)
>>>Date: 6/26/2001 22:20 Pacific Daylight Time
>
>>>Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
>>>then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
>>>training of Navy pilots!
>
>>I suggest going back into Dejanews and searching in this NG on the various
>key
>>words regarding the USN vs. IAF story.
>
>Deja is gone, r.i.p., but http://groups.google.com/ has taken over the
>archive work that deja was doing. After a somewhat rocky start, and
>they're still in Beta at doing what deja was doing, I've had success
>in finding stuff back to '95 recently.
My pointer to Deja news & key word connection still works; i.e., it switches
over to Googles, so I've never changed it. You're correct of course on what's
taken place.
Yes, I've now gotten stuff back from the "dark" ages ... <g>
>>There was plenty of discussion on the subject and w/ input from some who had
>a
>>much better understanding of what actually took place.
>
>Indeed, *lots* and *lots* of discussion. ;->
You can say that AGAIN ...
John Keeney
Adrian <dev...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:ce8f5f9c.01062...@posting.google.com...
Pechs1
ratio,
not the 40:1 stated in the paper! Still nothing to celebrate about. >>
F-16C's routed the US Navy's F-14's and F/A-18's, 54-0!! >>
Maybe we oughta let Isreal pay for their own military, and see how they do....
<< Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
training of Navy pilots! >>
Horseshit-the USN guys were probably more concerned about getting aboard than
playing games with the IAD.
When I flew the F-14, against the Egyptians in an 'exercise', they claimed they
kicked our butts also, but we had to fly a LONG way to get there, had no
wartime tanking support and they broke every ROE that we agreed upon
beforehand, just to get gun camera film from the Mig-21s of the F-14.
These exercises mean little....
Isreal, in spite of our paying for thier military, spy on us, are rude to us.
When USN guys went to Isreal to learn how to fly the KFIR, they were treated
like prisoners, not allowed to walk around the base w/o an escort, not allowed
to go anyehere but to fly, eat, sleep. To say the Isrealis are grateful is an
overstatement....
P C Chisholm
CDR, USN(ret)
Old Phart Phantom, Turkey, Viper, Scooter and
Combat Buckeye Phlyer
Doug (Woody) and Erin Beal
You couldn't be more correct. The "results" from these exercises being made so
public by the Israelis is most likely a means to chest thump in front of their
Arab neighbors and the world. If they can defeat the "awesome" U.S. military by
such a wide margin, maybe their neighbors should be more respectful lest they get
squashed.
On the other hand, most fighters suck against Python 4 equipped aircraft.
But largely I have to agree: Every multi-national exercise I've seen, we tie our
hands so as not to give away our true capabilities (during the brief, flight, and
debrief) while the opposing force (i.e. the other guys) take spectacular 9000 ft
gun shots and unbelievable BVR missile shots with all sorts of funny aspects and
missile support profiles calling fairy tale kills all the way to the merge...
--Woody
Mike Weeks
>Date: 6/28/2001 18:28 Pacific Daylight Time
Hey guys ...
Don't forget the actual source that was cited in the published "story" ...
<start>
TEL AVIV (September 24) - A recent joint exercise between the IAF and US Navy
Sixth Fleet pilots apparently resulted in a thorough routing of the US pilots,
according to the latest edition of Air Force Monthly.
The American-based magazine said the exercise in question took place in the
Negev skies and involved engagements between IAF F-16s and US Navy F-14s and
F/A-18s.
<end>
I do think some other aspects just might be at work also - given that there is
a USAF relationship w/ the IAF ...
>Pechs,
>
>You couldn't be more correct. The "results" from these exercises being made
>so
>public by the Israelis is most likely a means to chest thump in front of
>their
>Arab neighbors and the world. If they can defeat the "awesome" U.S. military
>by
>such a wide margin, maybe their neighbors should be more respectful lest they
>get
>squashed.
>
>On the other hand, most fighters suck against Python 4 equipped aircraft.
>
>But largely I have to agree: Every multi-national exercise I've seen, we tie
>our
>hands so as not to give away our true capabilities (during the brief, flight,
>and
>debrief) while the opposing force (i.e. the other guys) take spectacular 9000
>ft
>gun shots and unbelievable BVR missile shots with all sorts of funny aspects
>and
>missile support profiles calling fairy tale kills all the way to the merge...
Pechs1
You couldn't be more correct. The "results" from these exercises being made so
public by the Israelis >>
I have flown 'exercises' with the Italians, The Brits, Egypitians, Greeks,
Koreans, Japanese....all were a waste of time, for publicity only, only
exercised our ability to get there and back w/o getting lost, run outta fuel or
have to land in their airports...
Kinda cool to have a squadron of Mig-21s swarm all over two F-14s, w/i sight
of the Pyramids tho....
Only got in a small amount of hack for the Pyramid fly-by photo shoot(got that
one hanging on my wall....
Didn't know they were a prohibited area.....
Tornado
| I have flown 'exercises' with the Italians, The Brits, Egypitians, Greeks,
| Koreans, Japanese....all were a waste of time, for publicity only, only
| exercised our ability to get there and back w/o getting lost, run outta
fuel or
| have to land in their airports...
What were the waste of time, the exercises or those flying agianst you?
--
Mark - Maddington
Western Australia
"Patience my Arse...I'm gonna kill somthin'"
"You can run...but you'll only die tired"
Ogden Johnson III
>| I have flown 'exercises' with the Italians, The Brits, Egypitians, Greeks,
>| Koreans, Japanese....all were a waste of time, for publicity only, only
>| exercised our ability to get there and back w/o getting lost, run outta
>fuel or
>| have to land in their airports...
>What were the waste of time, the exercises or those flying agianst you?
While I can't speak for Pechs1, IMHO, it was the exercises. These
multinational joint exercises are generally politically driven and
exercise play is carefully scripted to avoid embarrassing any of the
participants. One representative of this breed was one of the annual
fall series of exercises, collectively known as the NATO Reforger
series, that I went on. For this one, in Norway - 1980 IIRC, to the
Norwegians, we [a Marine MEB] were the evil Russkies invading their
country; to ourselves we were the gallant US forces coming to the
rescue of our NATO ally beleaguered by those self-same evil Russkies.
In this sort of thing, we got more training out of the pre-Reforger
workups in the US than we did on the actual exercise itself.
OJ III
[OTOH, opportunities for US Marines to pull liberty in Western Europe
{as opposed to the Med} were few and far between. *That* part of this
exercise was an invaluable experience.]
Pechs1
you? >>
The exercises, they didn't test anything of importance that would be needed
during a conflict. They just turned into touchy-feely things. I even flew a
mission against the Egyptians with a smelly Eqyptian general in my trunk(F-14).
All he said on the ICS was 'yes' and then barfed, quite fun...
Mike Weeks
>Date: 7/1/2001 12:36 Pacific Daylight Time
>The exercises, they didn't test anything of importance that would be needed
>during a conflict. They just turned into touchy-feely things. I even flew a
>mission against the Egyptians with a smelly Eqyptian general in my
>trunk(F-14).
>All he said on the ICS was 'yes' and then barfed, quite fun...
well, perhaps if you hadn't gone inverted ... <g>
Pechs1
This dude was supposedly a MIG-21 Ace from the '73 war....just doin a little
tailchase. maybe because he had so much room back there, instead of a Mig21
cockpit, or maybe he was hung over or sumthin.
Even got a no-grade when I came back aboard, trying to talk to this guy and
listen to his ICS yaking....
After wandering around Alexandria and seeing how they do biz...wonder how they
shot anybody down in former conflicts...
Ralph Savelsberg
> devoe-<< The Israeli aircraft ROUTED the F/A-18s 220-20!!! That is an 11:1 kill
> ratio,
> not the 40:1 stated in the paper! Still nothing to celebrate about. >>
> << IDF/AF' F-15C's and
> F-16C's routed the US Navy's F-14's and F/A-18's, 54-0!! >>
>
> Maybe we oughta let Isreal pay for their own military, and see how they do....
>
> << Now, if the information indicates the US simply got their "buns kicked"
> then, it looks like the budget cuts have takened their toll on the
> training of Navy pilots! >>
>
> Horseshit-the USN guys were probably more concerned about getting aboard than
> playing games with the IAD.
>
> When I flew the F-14, against the Egyptians in an 'exercise', they claimed they
> kicked our butts also, but we had to fly a LONG way to get there, had no
> wartime tanking support and they broke every ROE that we agreed upon
> beforehand, just to get gun camera film from the Mig-21s of the F-14.
I recall reading a picture caption below an image of an F-14 flying on the wing of
Ia French fighter. The F-14 had its tailhook down. According to the caption this
was done to make sure that the French couldn't take gun camera pictures of the
unsuspecting Tomcats after the fight was over and then later pretend they were
taken during the fight. The deployed hook would give that away.
Regards,
Ralph
Christopher Biow
> This dude was supposedly a MIG-21 Ace from the '73 war....just doin a little
>tailchase. maybe because he had so much room back there, instead of a Mig21
>cockpit, or maybe he was hung over or sumthin.
It's not unusual for a pilot to get airsick when someone *else* is doing
the yanking. It's like banging on a drum--only other folks get annoyed. I
managed to get an old F4U pilot sick in a Cristen Eagle by simply holding a
flat, 1.2G turn for about 30 seconds.
Vincent VAGNER
magazine).
Vince
Ralph Savelsberg a écrit :
Ralph Savelsberg
> Right, i've seen such a picture too, with the same kind of caption (it was in a french
> magazine).
>
> Vince
>
It is good to see that a French magazine published that picture too. I don't really
remember in what book or magazine I saw it, but it certainly wasn't a french one, because
unfortunately my French is rather bad. I am able to identify the edible things on a
French menu, but that is about as far as it goes.
Regards,
Ralph Savelsberg
--
Ralph Savelsberg
Fluid Dynamics Laboratory
Eindhoven University of Technology
http://www.fluid.tue.nl/
Jacquelynn DeVoe
the information about these excercises was "leaked" to the Jerusalem
Post just two days before the House Armed Forces Services Committee
was to vote on funds for the F-23!! Geeeee, what a coincidence!!
Again, thank you for your time
Adrian
==========================================================
Pechs1 <pec...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20010628094208...@ng-cc1.aol.com...
Pechs1
doing
the yanking. >>
P C Chisholm
Samuel McCormick
leaked back in the days when the F-23 was still being funded for anything,
then AMRAAMs wouldn't have been used in the exercises because they weren't
operational then ... am I right or wrong?
"Jacquelynn DeVoe" <dev...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:9ht9fq$hdd$1...@slb5.atl.mindspring.net...
Tom Cooper
Well, this was supposedly published in the "Hook" mag, late last or
early this year.
"Admiral:
My apologies for not addressing this issue sooner, but I've been very
busy with the best job in the world (CAG), getting us settled on the
Navy's newest carrier CVN 75, USS Harry S. Truman, and gathering
parts/people for our deployment in Nov. George Michael has hit the
nail on the head, and then some. Although I concur with the article's
assertion that we need more/better adversary support for the Fleet,
the newspaper article (I forget the author's name) was obviously not
well researched, and he should be embarrassed to be a mouthpiece for
the Israeli propaganda mill.
On our last cruise on Enterprise (CVN 65) in 98/99, we participated in
the first officially sanctioned DACT det with the IAF. We sent Tomcats
and Hornets to an Israeli base for a 10 day det, and we did get some
excellent training that we have recommended to other air wings.
However, the unclas version of what really transpired is as follows:
The kill ratio that started with approx. a 5 or 6 to 2 ratio in favor
of the IAF (the claim of 20 to 1 is so absurd it doesn't deserve any
more comment), ended after a steep learning curve to be pretty close
to 1 to 1 at the end of the det. This is impressive when you consider
that:
1. We sent in (with minimal adult supervision) no kidding nuggets, for
the benefit of their training. Unlike their IAF counterparts who had a
complete ACM workup in preparation for the det; our kids, after a
month or two of cruise, were not even ACM current when we arrived
in-country. 2. The scenarios were carefully scripted, in their
backyard. Not only did the IAF get the low blocks (so we could look
down at their brown camouflage against the desert floor), the roles
were pre-briefed to offensive/defensive setups (ala USAF RTU sorties),
with role reversals only allowed in the latter stages of the det.
In addition, suffice it to say we were not allowed by the scenario to
optimize our real world tactics/weapons. On reflection, that is a
probably a good thing since who knows what today's friend will do
tomorrow.
I think the reasoning behind the IAF version is that the Israeli's
believe (rightly so) that a critical factor in their defense is to
preserve the mystique of the "invincible" IAF fighter pilot. While the
IAF is a very professional force and unmatched in dedication and
discipline, one must look at their adversaries and the day/VFR
environment they operate in. We have trained with and/or fought
against every major air force in the Middle East, and should remember
that in every case, the IAF is going up against "Jerry's Kids."
The bottom line is that our SFWTI/Top Gun trained JO's with their
top-notch machines, weapons and superior training have no match
anywhere on this planet! These kids are so good it's scary. I can only
keep up with them after 25 years of Navy flying and 6000 hours in
"pointy nose" airplanes, by cheating at every opportunity. I would put
them up against any air force, any time and be absolutely certain we
will come out on top.
Please feel free to pass this on, and edit if you see fit.
V/R, check 6, Brick."
So much about the 220:20 crap.... albeit, the Israelis certainly
showed more arrogance than they should...
Pechs1
'Brick' Nelson-a CAG???
Holy shit, hide the children.....
Mike Weeks
>Date: 7/8/2001 06:49 Pacific Daylight Time
><< V/R, check 6, Brick." >>
>
>
>'Brick' Nelson-a CAG???
Indeed so; CAG-3 April 1999 - September 2000
>Holy shit, hide the children.....
too late now ...
Guy alcala
Having been told about this by some IAF types before it hit the
papers, it appears that the IAF view is that they spanked us bad. The
persons I talked to freely admitted that U.S. air forces (i.e. all
service) were superior to the IAF in many areas, but that we seemed to
be distinctly lacking in ACM ability, at least judging by this and
another exercise he told they told me about. I've also talked to
people outside our military who were aware of one of the exercises the
Israelis particpated in involving us, who offered some of the same
comments as 'Brick' does above, while agreeing that the IAF types had
done quite well (and that's as specific as he was willing to be).
Not having any personal knowledge one way or another, I offer the
following which was posted on a mailing list I subscribe to some time
back (within the past few years, as will become apparent): I've
removed the names and most other identifying info:
> -----Original Message-----
> From: <snip name> Student
> Sent: <snip date and time>
> To: <snip>
> Subject: Posting to Hackworth web site
>
> Sirs,
> Attached is a diatribe posted to Hackworth's web site by a current ACSC
> student.
> V/R
<snip name>
>
>
> Sir, good morning from Montgomery, Alabama as I stumble through the
USAFs
> Air Command and Staff College (aka Air Command and Golf) - three months
of
> work crammed into a year to appease the local chamber of commerce. I
have
> been a USAF fighter pilot for 14 years with the last 8 years overseas in
> the Pacific and Europe.
>
> As every military member under the current administration, I have
> performed my fair share of goofy political military operations: Boring
> holes in the airspace over Iraq to keep our foot in the door in defense
of
> lower gas prices (we used to call it Provide Comfort until we realized
how
> cynical it was to advertise protection for the same people the Turks
were
> bombing - not much comfort there). Boring holes over Bosnia to appease
> the world that we were serious about ethnic cleansing (we called that
one
> Deny Flight - the pilots thought it was because the Serbs were doing all
> the flying and we were doing all the denying).
>
> In 1995, we finally grew a pair and started bombing in Bosnia - I was
in
> F15E's and we were fragged with some targets that although insignificant
> to the effort - were too hard for the Navy to hit therefore we were
> performing a USAF political airshow while risking the lives of aircrews
to
> look good to congress. While we were wearing out planes, parts and
pilots
> in these contingency operations, those pilots wishing to log the sorties
> as combat time were allowed to - resulting in an Air medal every 20
times
> the landing gear successfully retracted.
>
> Most did, but some of us only logged a combat sortie when we employed
> ordnance or performed a threat reaction to Iraqi fire. The result was
> that the true swordswingers ended up with fewer merit badges but
retained
> their dignity while the careerists (who were scared shitless anyway)
rode
> these fake accomplishments to stardom.
>
> These practices drove the best and the brightest to United Airlines,
and
> after 11 years in the USAF I came close to the same. I then stole a
page
> from your book and cashed in all my blue chips by turning down school,
> aide jobs, joint jobs, etc. and volunteered for a real career killer -
an
> exchange job in Australia flying F/A-18's for the RAAF at their Fighter
> Weapons School - best move I could have made to regain my sanity.
>
> The RAAF has avoided the political correctness wave, the female social
> combat experiment, and has retained a culture that emphasizes war
fighting
> over politics - how refreshing. It was interesting to watch the
convicts
> from down under absolutely pummel visiting US fighter squadrons with
their
> Ivy league commanders, their low morale, poor proficiency from
contigency
> ops and low retention.
>
> I chuckle at the USAFs bloated self press of "the most respected air
and
> space force in the world" - funny, with all these billion dollar
> sattelites, platinum toys and ray guns, these bumpkins from down under
> treat us the same way the North Vietnamese Air Force treated us 35 years
> ago - they are kicking our platinum ass with 20mm gunshots from 2000'
back
> like the Red Baron.
>
> I wrote all this in my last station report which I am sure was lost at
> PACAF somewhere. But nevertheless, after 2.5 years in the tropics, I
had
> purged all the vinegar for political hate from my veins. The Aussies
were
> very appreciative of my efforts to their fighter force and pressed the
> highest levels of the USAF to reinstate my slot at staff college - here
I
> am.
>
> After arriving at ACSC, I began hearing what a cluster the whole Kosovo
> air war had been from my buddies from Europe with targets being selected
> at 1600 Penn Ave, D.C., only after approval from the French only to be
> missed by incompetent aircrews due to all the cuts in training and all
the
> contingency flying. Anyway, none of this could upset my newly found "no
> worries" attitude and I just chalked it up the crazy political times.
>
> Then some of my close fighter brethren relayed to me the medal frenzy -
> it went something like this: If you supported the operation from
Missouri,
> England or Aviano and you're a LtCol - you get a Bronze Star.
>
> If you saw a Surface to Air missile in flight - you apply for a DFC.
If
> you threat reacted - you're a shoe-in. Each wing gets a Silver Star to
> distribute - What, a fucking lottery for a Silver Star? My buds told me
> it became fighter wing versus fighter wing versus bomber wing to see
which
> wing commander could win the most Kosovo Olympic Gold. You either
jumped
> on the team bandwagon or you were considered against it.
>
> It further inbred worse since it was primarily an Air Force show -
> therefore our LtCols with their Bronze Stars could outperform the other
> services when competing for those hallowed joint jobs - You Gotta Be
> Shitting Me! The service with the motto "Integrity in all we do" is
> mortaging its dignity to promote its manufactured self image.
>
> Sorry this litany is so long - I'd love to see an article comparing all
> the sorties of WWII - pilot KIA in WWII - to the DFC ratio of WWII and
> then compared to the Kosovo debacle.
>
> As a closing note, there is an Army Ranger in my ACSC class who lost
his
> kneecap and another chunk of his leg in Somalia - I don't know what
> decorations he received along with his Purple Heart from that event, but
I
> am embarrassed to look him in the eye as we pass in the hallway thinking
> of the medal charade we paraded out of our last demonstration of
impotence
> and the real sacrifice he and his brothers made on the ground.
>
> Thanks for your ears - you should send me a therapy bill for just
having
> an address for me to type to. As dedicated as a whitehouse intern.
Doug (Woody) and Erin Beal
(paraphrasing) "we were fragged against targets that the Navy couldn't hit" is bunk. The bottome line is:
Ever since GHW Bush (about halfway through his term), the defense budget has declined. Clinton threw some
fairly substantial and consistent pay raises in (which kept the voters happy: "See? He's taking care of
the military!), but he was GROSSLY negligent in modernization and recapitalization... plus we've drawn down
our forces in sheer numbers.
From the Naval Aviation side...
- The other guys have been flying with Python IV and Archer for circa a decade. The U.S. flies AIM-9M-8/9
with AIM-9X only on the near horizon... and, even still, not everybody will get it.
- The Navy has been waiting for MIDS (Link 16) since 1994. Shoulda been fielded en masse along time ago.
- Hornets are in a hodge-podge of configurations... i.e. not baselined to the latest/greatest upgrade. It
is a CRIME to think that the Navy actively deploys A-models (Hornet or Tomcat) in this day and age.
- AESA radars won't be retro-fitted on the E/F either so the baselining problem continues.
- Lack of spares, flying dollars, and credible ranges continue to plague.
The U.S. military is tops in deploying our forces and in strike warfare, but because of all of the
nickel-and-diming, we have fallen behind in overall capability.
I believe the reason G.W. Bush only wants to "study" the problem is:
a. He's trying to figure out what the truth really is. I'll bet no O-7 and above wants to admit how
messed up things really are.
b. It's so VERY messed up that he can't physically come up with the funds to fix it. Too far behind the
power curve.
Our military don't suck, but they could be much better with a little more care and feeding.
--Woody
Christopher Biow
>Pechs1 wrote:
>If you look at the tally of air losses on both sides, almost all the israeli air
>losses are due to SAMs and radar-controlled ZSUs, almost none to air-air combat.
>The Egyptian losses, conversely...
Combining accounts from
<http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/hurley.html>,
<http://www.webruler.com/aircombat/>, and
<http://www.idf.il/english/organization/iaf/iaf6.htm>, I get box scores as
follows for Israel v. EAAF. Figures do contradict.
IAF losses
-------------
48 SAM
52 AAA
5 Air-Air entire war
26 Air-Air entire war
2 Air-Air Fratricide
100 planes lost total
EAAF losses
----------------
187+ Air-Air
~450 all Arab, mostly Air-Air, some Air-Ground
13% fratricide, all Arab (of what total number??)
I thought I'd seen a source for about 60 Egypt Arab ground-to-air
fratricides, but I can't find it now.
Cecil Turner
>
snip USN version
> Having been told about this by some IAF types before it hit the
> papers, it appears that the IAF view is that they spanked us bad. The
> persons I talked to freely admitted that U.S. air forces (i.e. all
> service) were superior to the IAF in many areas, but that we seemed to
> be distinctly lacking in ACM ability, at least judging by this and
> another exercise he told they told me about. I've also talked to
> people outside our military who were aware of one of the exercises the
> Israelis particpated in involving us, who offered some of the same
> comments as 'Brick' does above, while agreeing that the IAF types had
> done quite well (and that's as specific as he was willing to be).
Having worked with a couple of IAF guys in exchange situations, I'd say a big
difference is the way they look at exercises. In the US, it's a chance to "put it
all together," often led by the youngsters, and a big learning experience. The IAF
guys treat it like dress rehearsal for war, which affects attitudes, approach, and
lessons learned.
I know nothing about this particular exercise, but would also caution against any
sweeping generalizations based on exercise debriefs. Even if done on a TACTS range,
the imponderables of weapons reliability, fuzing, switchology, etc. have a huge
effect on the outcome and are generally not well replicated. Kill ratios are
extremely subjective, and very dependent on the [artificial] kill criteria. There
are also some famous "exercisisms" that fail to accurately model the real world,
usually as a result of scaling down the scenario, and usually exagerrating the
effectiveness of knife-fighting and benefitting the home team.
> Not having any personal knowledge one way or another, I offer the
> following which was posted on a mailing list I subscribe to some time
> back (within the past few years, as will become apparent): I've
> removed the names and most other identifying info:
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: <snip name> Student
> > Sent: <snip date and time>
> > To: <snip>
> > Subject: Posting to Hackworth web site
> >
> > Sirs,
> > Attached is a diatribe posted to Hackworth's web site by a current ACSC
> > student.
> > V/R
snip diatribe
This was a little scary. If this guy represents what passes for strategic thought
at Maxwell, maybe we should disband it and expand the Naval War College. Maybe he
missed the fact that Bosnia and the Gulf were lopsided wins for the US, and Somalia
was a fiasco? Whether he prefers the ACM training in Australia or the Air Force's
goofy schemes for awarding medals are surely minor issues.
rgds,
KTF
Christopher Biow
>Not having any personal knowledge one way or another, I offer the
>following which was posted on a mailing list I subscribe to some time
>back (within the past few years, as will become apparent): I've
>removed the names and most other identifying info:
Unfortunately, this guy's account is loaded more with political cant than
objective observations.
>> Sirs,
>> Attached is a diatribe posted to Hackworth's web site by a current ACSC
>> student.
>> V/R
><snip name>
>> As every military member under the current administration...
Political basis, natch. It's not as if things have been any less kooky
under prior administrations. See Timberg's Nightingale's_Song for an
account of how foreign policy decision making was so loaded with local
political considerations that advisors learned to avoid sarcastic remarks
during national security sessions, lest Reagan's California politicos (who
were in attendance) pick them up and decide they would "play well"
domestically, making them irrevocable US policy. Or Wilson's
_Supercarrier_, for dissection of the policy and accountability fiascos
that lead to the '82 Lebanon raid.
Awful translations of bad policy into military orders have always been the
rule. If you can't live with that, the military is a poor career choice.
>> ...I have
>> performed my fair share of goofy political military operations: Boring
>> holes in the airspace over Iraq to keep our foot in the door in defense of
>> lower gas prices (we used to call it Provide Comfort until we realized how
>> cynical it was to advertise protection for the same people the Turks were
>> bombing - not much comfort there).
For all the ugliness and complexity of that early period, the result in the
northern no-fly zone has become the "Arab" region's only pluralistic,
democratic government--a true bright spot. Given the politics of Kurdish
self-determination, who knows how long it will last, but those who have
served up there have a true achievement to their credit.
>>Boring holes over Bosnia to appease
>> the world that we were serious about ethnic cleansing...
>> In 1995, we finally grew a pair and started bombing in Bosnia...
There again, however belatedly, we finally took a military stand against
genocide. Finally we came through on a treaty obligation that we've simply
flouted the last half-dozen or so instances. And we succeeded. From those
I've talked to who were there on the ground, they have a strong sense of
accomplishment. Perhaps the view from 35,000 feet is a bit too cynical.
It seems to me this pilot has little hope of success at the staff level,
unless he can learn that as a fundamentally *political* instrument,
military force must be constrained to "the art of the possible." Whatever
ideal he might think he could achieve as the omniscient Grand Dictator of
the Uninety States, he's sworn to support and defend a system that
guarantees military frustration with civilian-imposed restrictions. That
hasn't changed since Mauritius Brabo vented his frustrations with the
Senate's restrictions on the Sinai campaign at the officers' bath at Campus
Martius. And he didn't get *any* air support!
>> I chuckle at the USAFs bloated self press of "the most respected air and
>> space force in the world" - funny, with all these billion dollar
>> sattelites, platinum toys and ray guns, these bumpkins from down under
>> treat us the same way the North Vietnamese Air Force treated us 35 years
>> ago - they are kicking our platinum ass with 20mm gunshots from 2000' back
>> like the Red Baron.
Yes, I think this guy does read too much Gen. Hackworth! IMO, that
thinking, and Gen. Hackworth in particular, is as much to blame for "what's
wrong with civil/military relations today" as is the ignorance one so often
encounters on the civilian side.
>> If you saw a Surface to Air missile in flight - you apply for a DFC.
I will give him that he's right about medal inflation. At this point, we
might as well just return everything but Medals of Honor to the nearest
Cracker Jack box. ADM Johnson's move toward "top ribbon bar only" is at
least a step in the right direction.
Guy Alcala
> g_al...@hotmail.com (Guy alcala) wrote:
>
> >Not having any personal knowledge one way or another, I offer the
> >following which was posted on a mailing list I subscribe to some time
> >back (within the past few years, as will become apparent): I've
> >removed the names and most other identifying info:
>
> Unfortunately, this guy's account is loaded more with political cant than
> objective observations.
I agree that there's a fair amount of that, and Hackworth's not exactly unbiased
either.
> >> Sirs,
> >> Attached is a diatribe posted to Hackworth's web site by a current ACSC
> >> student.
> >> V/R
> ><snip name>
>
> >> As every military member under the current administration...
>
> Political basis, natch. It's not as if things have been any less kooky
> under prior administrations. See Timberg's Nightingale's_Song for an
> account of how foreign policy decision making was so loaded with local
> political considerations that advisors learned to avoid sarcastic remarks
> during national security sessions, lest Reagan's California politicos (who
> were in attendance) pick them up and decide they would "play well"
> domestically, making them irrevocable US policy. Or Wilson's
> _Supercarrier_, for dissection of the policy and accountability fiascos
> that lead to the '82 Lebanon raid.
>
> Awful translations of bad policy into military orders have always been the
> rule. If you can't live with that, the military is a poor career choice.
Agree.
> >> ...I have
> >> performed my fair share of goofy political military operations: Boring
> >> holes in the airspace over Iraq to keep our foot in the door in defense of
> >> lower gas prices (we used to call it Provide Comfort until we realized how
> >> cynical it was to advertise protection for the same people the Turks were
> >> bombing - not much comfort there).
>
> For all the ugliness and complexity of that early period, the result in the
> northern no-fly zone has become the "Arab" region's only pluralistic,
> democratic government--a true bright spot. Given the politics of Kurdish
> self-determination, who knows how long it will last, but those who have
> served up there have a true achievement to their credit.
That may be, but aren't the Turks still bombing? Seems to me they've been pretty
active in the not too distant past, at least before they grabbed that Kurdish
leader (memory fails).
> >>Boring holes over Bosnia to appease
> >> the world that we were serious about ethnic cleansing...
>
> >> In 1995, we finally grew a pair and started bombing in Bosnia...
>
> There again, however belatedly, we finally took a military stand against
> genocide. Finally we came through on a treaty obligation that we've simply
> flouted the last half-dozen or so instances. And we succeeded. From those
> I've talked to who were there on the ground, they have a strong sense of
> accomplishment. Perhaps the view from 35,000 feet is a bit too cynical.
I don't remember it as our failing to come through on a treaty obligation, rather
the U.N.'s unwillingness to back up their words with force (I'm not saying our
leaders were in a big hurry to do so either). My most enduring memory of that
period is the U.N. being the local "Hostages 'R Us," with "peacekeeping" troops
(I use the term figuratively, not literally) being fed by the U.N. forces until
the thugs decided our side was getting a bit too rambunctious and actually might
interfere with their slaughtering whoever happened to be on the menu that day.
So they just rounded up some peacekeepers as hostages ("Allow them to fire their
weapons to defend themselves? Are you mad?!") and handcuffed them to the nearest
lamp post. That there was plenty of blame to go around doesn't excuse any of the
governments/organizations involved, and I share his frustration that we allowed
things like Srebenica to occur, while we postured and "bored holes in the sky."
When we finally stopped making empty threats after what, three years?, and
intervened in such a way that evened up the odds so it was no longer a pushover
for one side, it's amazing how quickly the Serbs were ready to call a halt.
> It seems to me this pilot has little hope of success at the staff level,
> unless he can learn that as a fundamentally *political* instrument,
> military force must be constrained to "the art of the possible." Whatever
> ideal he might think he could achieve as the omniscient Grand Dictator of
> the Uninety States, he's sworn to support and defend a system that
> guarantees military frustration with civilian-imposed restrictions. That
> hasn't changed since Mauritius Brabo vented his frustrations with the
> Senate's restrictions on the Sinai campaign at the officers' bath at Campus
> Martius. And he didn't get *any* air support!
Certainly. OTOH, if you're going to tire people and equipment out on endless
deployments that are serving no purpose other than providing a figleaf for
politicians who are terrified of the risks that go along with taking effective
action, be prepared to see your military volunteers vote with their feet in
droves, and find something more personally rewarding to do. ISTM this officer is
saying that's just what happened, except for the careerists. No one with any
character is willing to be used forever as part of a cynical political ploy, all
form and no substance. Our posturing over the Serbs handing over Milosevic, when
we had Mladic and Karadzic in our zones of control for years and could have taken
them (at some cost in casualties, to be sure), rings pretty hollow. I'd be
willing to bet that, if President Clinton and the other western leaders had asked
for volunteers to get those two and their Croatian/Muslim clones, they'd have
been overwhelmed with offers by military people who otherwise couldn't stand
their guts, and I think the American people would have supported such an action
despite likely losses. Maybe I'm wrong, and we've reached the point where ANY
casualties, no matter in how good a cause, are unacceptable to the citizenry.
But I think not, if we think the reason is important enough.
> >> I chuckle at the USAFs bloated self press of "the most respected air and
> >> space force in the world" - funny, with all these billion dollar
> >> sattelites, platinum toys and ray guns, these bumpkins from down under
> >> treat us the same way the North Vietnamese Air Force treated us 35 years
> >> ago - they are kicking our platinum ass with 20mm gunshots from 2000' back
> >> like the Red Baron.
>
> Yes, I think this guy does read too much Gen. Hackworth! IMO, that
> thinking, and Gen. Hackworth in particular, is as much to blame for "what's
> wrong with civil/military relations today" as is the ignorance one so often
> encounters on the civilian side.
There's certainly no lack of oversimplification and not seeing the big picture
when it comes to Hackworth and others of his ilk, but there are still valid
points to be made.
> >> If you saw a Surface to Air missile in flight - you apply for a DFC.
>
> I will give him that he's right about medal inflation. At this point, we
> might as well just return everything but Medals of Honor to the nearest
> Cracker Jack box. ADM Johnson's move toward "top ribbon bar only" is at
> least a step in the right direction.
I always feel embarrassed when I see our generals with their twelve or fourteen
rows of ribbons (I've counted) extending up to their epaulets, with the average
IDF general with his 3 to 5 campaign ribbons and (maybe) one decoration (and an
open shirt collar with no tie: I particularly appreciate that part;-) ). If we
keep this up, we're going to have to lower the pockets on the uniforms to make
room. Even allowing for the fact that a lot of these are of the "well, we gave
one to the French, so now they have to give us one in return," I think we could
do without all the "You've been a good boy and changed your underwear regularly"
variety.
Not that U.S. medal inflation is anything new; the British soldiers were making
jokes about it in WW2, and it probably goes back well before that. Some of our
own people felt the same way: I remember in James Jones' novel "Whistle," the
troops considered it bad form to wear anything more than their Combat
Infantryman's Badge (and maybe Purple Hearts. I forget); that said everything
that needed to be said, and anything more you got was often just the luck of the
draw. I'll have to ask him, but I wonder if Ed Rasimus over on r.a.m. values his
"North Vietnam 100 Missions F-105" and "River Rats" patches more than his
decorations. I suspect so.
Guy
Guy Alcala
> Guy alcala wrote:
> >
> snip USN version
>
> > Having been told about this by some IAF types before it hit the
> > papers, it appears that the IAF view is that they spanked us bad. The
> > persons I talked to freely admitted that U.S. air forces (i.e. all
> > service) were superior to the IAF in many areas, but that we seemed to
> > be distinctly lacking in ACM ability, at least judging by this and
> > another exercise he told they told me about. I've also talked to
> > people outside our military who were aware of one of the exercises the
> > Israelis particpated in involving us, who offered some of the same
> > comments as 'Brick' does above, while agreeing that the IAF types had
> > done quite well (and that's as specific as he was willing to be).
>
> Having worked with a couple of IAF guys in exchange situations, I'd say a big
> difference is the way they look at exercises. In the US, it's a chance to "put it
> all together," often led by the youngsters, and a big learning experience. The IAF
> guys treat it like dress rehearsal for war, which affects attitudes, approach, and
> lessons learned.
Which would certainly call into question what would happen to us if we had to face
someone good while we were still working up. If we always have months to get ready, as
we did in DS, but Brick's comments about being out of ACM practice after a long
deployment have me wondering. Maybe I misunderstood, and he was referring to a long
time in-transit without flying, but that wasn't the way it read.
> I know nothing about this particular exercise, but would also caution against any
> sweeping generalizations based on exercise debriefs. Even if done on a TACTS range,
> the imponderables of weapons reliability, fuzing, switchology, etc. have a huge
> effect on the outcome and are generally not well replicated. Kill ratios are
> extremely subjective, and very dependent on the [artificial] kill criteria. There
> are also some famous "exercisisms" that fail to accurately model the real world,
> usually as a result of scaling down the scenario, and usually exagerrating the
> effectiveness of knife-fighting and benefitting the home team.
Sure.
> > Not having any personal knowledge one way or another, I offer the
> > following which was posted on a mailing list I subscribe to some time
> > back (within the past few years, as will become apparent): I've
> > removed the names and most other identifying info:
> >
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: <snip name> Student
> > > Sent: <snip date and time>
> > > To: <snip>
> > > Subject: Posting to Hackworth web site
> > >
> > > Sirs,
> > > Attached is a diatribe posted to Hackworth's web site by a current ACSC
> > > student.
> > > V/R
> snip diatribe
>
> This was a little scary. If this guy represents what passes for strategic thought
> at Maxwell, maybe we should disband it and expand the Naval War College. Maybe he
> missed the fact that Bosnia and the Gulf were lopsided wins for the US, and Somalia
> was a fiasco?
Bosnia wasn't, although Kosovo was (eventually). The main fact about Bosnia was that we
let it go on for so long while making threats that the Serbs accurately assessed as
being empty ones. As to the Gulf, our premise was that Provide Comfort would protect
the Kurds from air attacks, and Iraqi attacks in particular. It didn't (the Turks kept
bombing, the Iraqis used helos and ground attacks), and we're still flying there 10
years down the road. Would the Kurds be worse off if we weren't stopping the Iraqis
from using fighters? Sure, but that's well short of the supposed intent. And his
comments about Somalia were clearly in the medal inflation context, not the policy that
put us there.
Don't get me wrong I find that many military types of the Hackworth persuasion often
write as if military operations occur in a vacuum, and I have no sympathy for that
viewpoint. But I can also wish that our policies were more often based on principle
than political expediency, while allowing that political concerns must be considered.
OTOH, considering that a large percentage of the U.S. population probably couldn't point
out where China is on a map, maybe I expect too much.
Guy
Cecil Turner
>snip
> Don't get me wrong I find that many military types of the Hackworth persuasion often
> write as if military operations occur in a vacuum, and I have no sympathy for that
> viewpoint. But I can also wish that our policies were more often based on principle
> than political expediency, while allowing that political concerns must be considered.
> OTOH, considering that a large percentage of the U.S. population probably couldn't point
> out where China is on a map, maybe I expect too much.
>
however, not political policy (though he certainly mixed them up), and chose some pretty
strange examples.
The two are definitely separate issues, and while I agree with the guy (and Hackworth)
that the previous administration seemed to have a lot of difficulty understanding the limits
of military intervention, it's the responsibility of the military to convert national
political goals into reality. And with the notable exception of Somalia, the military has
been pretty darned good at that lately.
rgds,
KTF
Doug (Woody) and Erin Beal
> <SNIP> but Brick's comments about being out of ACM practice after a long
> deployment have me wondering. Maybe I misunderstood, and he was referring to a long
> time in-transit without flying, but that wasn't the way it read.
Brick is referring to a common phenomenon for deployed CVW's. Just prior to deployment,
the air wing has just completed its turnaround training cycle. They're as combat ready as
they will ever be... and the fighter guys are all "ACM current" i.e. 1 tactical sortie in
the last 6 days and 2 in 14 (if I remember the latest currency requirements for active duty
guys correctly) plus 10 hours in the last 30 days and 30 hours in the last 90. (Again, I
think.)
Once the CVW flies on (especially with east coast VFA squadrons outfitted with triple
bubble jets), the degradation starts. ACM currency is the first thing to go because of the
inherent limitations of operating around the CV. Couple that with a lack credible ranges
on the transit or during the deployment, and tactical "proficiency" starts to wane.
Typically to support one of those ACM dets with some foreign country, squadrons will work
up a small number of pilots on one or two first-cycle/short-cycle evolutions starting a
couple of weeks prior, slick the wing-drops off, and send the detachment ashore.
That brings up the issue of currency vs. proficiency. Just because a pilot is ACM current
(i.e. safe per NATOPS), doesn't necessarily mean that pilot is proficient (i.e.
good/comfortable). All of this added to the limitations associated with these exercises
already discussed in this thread help to make these evolutions fairly useless.
--Woody
Christopher Biow
>Ever since GHW Bush (about halfway through his term), the defense
>budget has declined.
Considering that budgets lag administrations by about a year, the
constant-dollar budget increased beginning in Carter's second year, peaked
in the fifth year of Reagan, stayed about flat until the middle of GWH
Bush's and declined since then, flattening the last few years.
<http://inforumweb.umd.edu/WorkPaper/INFORUM/wp95005.pdf> shows most of
this period.
>Clinton threw some
>fairly substantial and consistent pay raises in (which kept the voters happy: "See? He's taking care of
>the military!), but he was GROSSLY negligent in modernization and recapitalization...
That negligence in modernization is real, especially in the Navy, but it
goes way back. My own aircraft, the F-14, is the perfect example. It
received essentially no modernization for its first 25 years and will soon
be retired without any real replacement, the manufacturer's tech base
having degraded to nearly Third World levels. (Tomcat 21 indeed!)
>plus we've drawn down our forces in sheer numbers.
You can't have it both ways! IMO, we didn't do nearly enough draw-down. We
spent too much of the Carter-Reagan buildup money shooting for that
mythical 600-ship Navy, most of which is simply gone now. In the post Cold
War period, if we'd only dropped another 1-2 each of divisions, tactical
fighter wings, and CVBGs, we'd have had the cash to do a decent job of
modernization. Net effect on the Soviet decline and fall would have been
zilch (drawing down mujahadeen would be another matter).
Politicians would simply have had to deal with their lesser ability to
commit US forces. But we bamboozled the Clinton administration with this
arbitrary "two-war" concept--as if wars came in some sort of quanta.
>From the Naval Aviation side...
>- The other guys have been flying with Python IV and Archer for circa a decade.
>The U.S. flies AIM-9M-8/9 with AIM-9X only on the near horizon... and, even
>still, not everybody will get it.
That is indeed absurd. At this rate, my grandchildren will inherit the same
SRAAM airframe that my father-in-law and I flew with. We fonged away ASRAAM
on irreconcilable specs and made AMRAAM later and much less than it should
have been, trying to cram an 8-inch payload into a 7-inch missile. AIM-54
follow-on was never more than a concept.
>- The Navy has been waiting for MIDS (Link 16) since 1994. Shoulda been fielded
>en masse along time ago...
Oh, longer than that! We should have started work (or re-started) a few
years later, with higher goals. The fact that by 1996, FedEx trucks had
better C3 than most of our fighters is rather revealing. ("Okay, we're
going to run a 2-mile spread and pincer against that office building. You
take 15th Street.")
>I believe the reason G.W. Bush only wants to "study" the problem is:
...because Rumsfeld and perhaps Cheney want to "study" the problem. I doubt
that any of this is coming from the top. Not that there is anything new
about that. The last President with a good, personal understanding of
Defense issues was probably Ike. GWH, maybe, but from the wrong angle.
>a. He's trying to figure out what the truth really is. I'll bet no O-7 and
>above wants to admit how messed up things really are.
They are probably at least knowledgeable enough to understand that they
simply won't *get* a significantly higher percentage of GDP. The question
is what you want: force levels, modernization, or missile defense. At this
point, it probably is an exclusive "or".
>b. It's so VERY messed up that he can't physically come up with the funds
>to fix it. Too far behind the power curve.
What power curve??? We've dug a bit of a hole in neglecting modernization
and making simply unsustainable modernization projections. But it's *not* a
"power" curve--given retirement of equipment, it's not even linear. It *is*
a matter of hard choices.
Christopher Biow
[I'm in agreement with you on all the stuff I've deleted]
>Christopher Biow wrote:
>> g_al...@hotmail.com (Guy alcala) wrote:
>> >> In 1995, we finally grew a pair and started bombing in Bosnia...
>> There again, however belatedly, we finally took a military stand against
>> genocide. Finally we came through on a treaty obligation that we've simply
>> flouted the last half-dozen or so instances. And we succeeded. From those
>> I've talked to who were there on the ground, they have a strong sense of
>> accomplishment. Perhaps the view from 35,000 feet is a bit too cynical.
>I don't remember it as our failing to come through on a treaty obligation...
The treaty obligation is to intervene to stop genocide. I guess it's really
as dead and therefore non-binding as the Kellog-Briand Pact, through being
disregarded. It's a perfect example of what treaties should not be signed.
If tomorrow the fashion is to sign a Treaty Against Doing Anything That
Might Annoy Another Country, maybe we'll have the wisdom to ignore it,
rather than sign and then violate it.
Anyway, our response has been to acknowledge genocide only in retrospect,
when it's too late to intervene. No mere piece of paper is going to make
any nation, most particularly a democracy, intervene without a perceived
national interest. A really BIG perceived just cause will not make up for
lack of national interest. Our threshold for such interventions appears to
be about 18 KIA (Mogadishu)--then we give up and go home. Otherwise, it's
Judy Garland's old line: "if they put a bullet through your brain, I'll
complain." Again, this is just The Way It Is; no real point in lamenting
it, unless you want to go on a rant about Humanity's Immaturity or
something.
>... rather the U.N.'s unwillingness to back up their words with force (I'm not saying our
>leaders were in a big hurry to do so either).
One and the same. The force was going to have to be primarily US, or else
not happen at all. Another unfortunate geopolitical reality.
>...When we finally stopped making empty threats after what, three years?, and
>intervened in such a way that evened up the odds so it was no longer a pushover
>for one side, it's amazing how quickly the Serbs were ready to call a halt.
Or even, a few years earlier, how quickly they came to heel once the Croats
procured some decent field artillery.
>> It seems to me this pilot has little hope of success at the staff level,
>> unless he can learn that as a fundamentally *political* instrument,
>> military force must be constrained to "the art of the possible." Whatever
>> ideal he might think he could achieve as the omniscient Grand Dictator of
>> the Uninety States, he's sworn to support and defend a system that
>> guarantees military frustration with civilian-imposed restrictions. That
>> hasn't changed since Mauritius Brabo vented his frustrations with the
>> Senate's restrictions on the Sinai campaign at the officers' bath at Campus
>> Martius. And he didn't get *any* air support!
>Certainly. OTOH, if you're going to tire people and equipment out on endless
>deployments that are serving no purpose other than providing a figleaf for
>politicians who are terrified of the risks that go along with taking effective
>action, be prepared to see your military volunteers vote with their feet in
>droves, and find something more personally rewarding to do.
Granted, though the only time recently that we actually got to that point
was during the Carter administration, particularly those involved in the
extended WAITEX off Iran. I can only hope that those with much gold braid
are in the future able to talk the politicos into proper use of military
assets. A warship in a nearby port or "lost at sea" is quite as proximate a
threat as one on the horizon (in some respects more). If you want to stop a
Silkworm threat in the Gulf or deter hostage-taking, the only effective
means are a reputation for action, or failing that action itself. I'm
reminded of the tanker escort competition in the Straits of Hormuz, where
we escorted with combatants and got toyed with for our trouble, while the
USSR used minesweepers and didn't get touched. Declining empire though they
may have been, the locals expected that the Soviets would follow through on
their threats.
IMO, we should have flag officers resigning in droves if an administration
really does insist on foolishness like stationing a carrier off a coast for
six months, calling a 72-hour strike on 12-hour notice, or posting an AEGIS
cruiser in front of a Silkworm battery. The results of such errors are
predictable.
>ISTM this officer is saying that's just what happened...
It doesn't seem to be happening nearly as much as it was 20 years ago.
>except for the careerists...
There again, I can't say that I've seen any change in the evils of US
Military careerism these last 25 years. GEN Gray is the only flag officer
I've seen who has even taken a poke at it.
>...Maybe I'm wrong, and we've reached the point where ANY
>casualties, no matter in how good a cause, are unacceptable to the citizenry.
>But I think not, if we think the reason is important enough.
Getting that reason to be perceived as "important enough" is the tough
part, and that is a political, not military, function. I will give Clinton
credit for learning the lesson of Mogadishu. His skill at bringing the
American people along on his later interventions was consummate. I'm quite
glad he didn't push it any further, if he wasn't awfully certain that he'd
succeed with the US public. This is *not* a case of "if you never get
thrown out, you're not trying to steal second often enough." We cannot
afford to overextend public opinion; it messed us up for a generation, the
last time we did it in a big way (WW Nam).
>...Even allowing for the fact that a lot of these are of the "well, we gave
>one to the French, so now they have to give us one in return," I think we could
>do without all the "You've been a good boy and changed your underwear regularly"
>variety.
But I *worked* for that "clean underwear commendation medal with combat
brown stain!"
Guy Alcala
> Guy Alcala wrote:
>
> > <SNIP> but Brick's comments about being out of ACM practice after a long
> > deployment have me wondering. Maybe I misunderstood, and he was referring to a long
> > time in-transit without flying, but that wasn't the way it read.
>
> Brick is referring to a common phenomenon for deployed CVW's. <snip explanation>
Thanks for the clarification. I thought he might be referring to something like that, but it
wasn't at all clear.
Guy
Pechs1
received essentially no modernization for its first 25 years >>
This isn't any president's fault but the piss poor people at SYSCOM and the
F-14 desk at NavAir in the early 80's, when $ was everywhere and the gents that
had the power to do something, didn't and took care of their own little rice
bowl....
Guy Alcala
> Christopher Biow wrote:
<snip>
> I get box scores as
> >follows for Israel v. EAAF. Figures do contradict.
>
> >IAF losses
> >-------------
> >48 SAM
> >52 AAA
> >5 Air-Air entire war
> >26 Air-Air entire war
>
> What would be the difference between the above 2 lines?
Wondering about that one myself. I've seen figures from 4 - 20.
> >2 Air-Air Fratricide
> >100 planes lost total
>
> How do you get 100? If I total all your lines above I get 133.
> (not being smart-ass, but trying to understand your definitions)
FWIW, I've seen numbers of 103-106 fixed wing losses, and about 6 or 8 helos. I've
also been told that the fixed wing number was 101.
> >EAAF losses
> >----------------
> >187+ Air-Air
> >~450 all Arab, mostly Air-Air, some Air-Ground
> >13% fratricide, all Arab (of what total number??)
>
> 13 planes or 13% of 450 planes? That would be 58 planes. Seems high.
> >I thought I'd seen a source for about 60 Egypt Arab ground-to-air
> >fratricides, but I can't find it now.
> This seems very high. Both their AAA and their planes' electronics were soviet.
I've also seen numbers around 60 quoted. The problem is that IFF doesn't always
work the way it should, or may not be working at all, or else there's no time
during the engagement to check (especially when there are a lot of low-level a/c
being fired on by Automatic weapons).
Guy
John Carrier
> This isn't any president's fault but the piss poor people at SYSCOM and
the
> F-14 desk at NavAir in the early 80's, when $ was everywhere and the gents
that
> had the power to do something, didn't and took care of their own little
rice
> bowl....
AMEN! Add the F-18 mafia in OpNav, Grumman arrogance, and a community that
was dragged kicking and screaming to the multi-role mission ("Bombs? I
don't carry no stinking bombs!").
R / John (similarly experienced)
Red Rider
"Guy Alcala" <g_al...@postoffice.pacbell.net> wrote in message
news:3B576A58...@postoffice.pacbell.net...
SNIP SNIP SNIP
>The problem is that IFF doesn't always
> work the way it should, or may not be working at all, or else there's no
time
> during the engagement to check (especially when there are a lot of
low-level a/c
> being fired on by Automatic weapons).
>
> Guy
>
There are other things to consider. The pilot actions are influenced by such
things a the threat enviournment, who (if anyone), has air superiority or
air supremacy, how paranoid he is, how paranoid he thinks he should be, what
the mission is, ect.
Many times the pilot will turn off the IFF (this used to be called
"strangling parrot") before entering the threat area. Sometimes, even for
low level missions, (day and night) a really paranoid pilot will turn the
radar altimeter off also. Depending on the sophistication of the air defense
system, both may possibly be used to help locate aircraft.
After all, when someone is trying to kill you, you can never be too careful.
--
Red Rider
I apologize but due to receiving excessive SPAM, I have had to resort to
ANTI-SPAM measures. Either reply by newsgroup or please remove the three
capital letters from the E-Mail address.
Christopher Biow
>Christopher Biow wrote:
>>Combining accounts from
>><http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/hurley.html>,
>><http://www.webruler.com/aircombat/>, and
>><http://www.idf.il/english/organization/iaf/iaf6.htm>, I get box scores as
>>follows for Israel v. EAAF. Figures do contradict.
>>IAF losses
>>-------------
>>48 SAM
>>52 AAA
>>5 Air-Air entire war
>>26 Air-Air entire war
>What would be the difference between the above 2 lines?
IAF claim, vs. the list at <http://www.webruler.com/aircombat/eaf.htm>,
whose sources are listed as _Phoenix Over the Nile_ by Lon Nordeen and
David Nicolle (Smithsonian Press 1996) and "Arab sources." They list two of
the 26 EAAF kills against the IAF as "claim" only. I suspect the Israeli
total losses number is reliable (pilots tend to notice little details like
their aircraft not coming back with them), with dispute being over A/A vs
SAM/AAA. I'm sure many pilots who get blindsided insist "it musta been a
SAM" and the IAF may decide such cases in their favor, to maintain their
myth.
>>2 Air-Air Fratricide
>>100 planes lost total
>How do you get 100? If I total all your lines above I get 133.
"Figures do contradict." Warning: do not taunt Happy Fun Ball.
>(not being smart-ass, but trying to understand your definitions)
Sorry, I should have specified which number came from which source. I'd
thought the 100 total was from one of the above sources, but now I'm not
finding it. I expect it's someone's round number.
>>EAAF losses
>>----------------
>>187+ Air-Air
>>~450 all Arab, mostly Air-Air, some Air-Ground
>>13% fratricide, all Arab (of what total number??)
>13 planes or 13% of 450 planes?
That is exactly my question. The source--I forget which one--is vague.
>That would be 58 planes. Seems high.
>>I thought I'd seen a source for about 60 Egypt Arab ground-to-air
>>fratricides, but I can't find it now.
>This seems very high. Both their AAA and their planes' electronics were soviet.
From having worked in IFF research the last ten years, I wouldn't trust our
own Mk XII systems to avoid such fratricide, much less the older generation
SRO-2 Soviet equipment that the EAAF had. If the decision was made to mix
SAM and CAP areas, that sort of fratricide would be a likely consequence.
For all that it might have been a correct decision by the Egyptian
military, as it would have presented the IAF with a much tougher job over
the battlefield, delivering ordnance while simultaneously trying to dodge
SAMs and EAAF fighters.