Kills with Guns
Schlomo Lipchitz
about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any)
have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns???
John Carrier
"Schlomo Lipchitz" <schlomo...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:46864c29....@nntp.charter.net...
> Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch
> about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any)
> have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns???
On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF
F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the
Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive
through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to
pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun kill
in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a hard-maneuvering
engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be.
An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105,
perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.
R / John
TV
Maybe a Pakistani F-16 gun kill too. And in Venezuela, pilots have also
made guns kills with the F-16. I think all of the US F-14 and -18 kills
have been with Sidewinders.
In Vietnam, the lack of a gun in the F-4 was probably less of a problem than
poor tactical training and ROE/lack of early BVR NCTR. Not to mention poor
missile reliabilities. I say this based on the Crusader's lack of gun
kills. But it's a catchy bitching phrase to talk about the lack of a gun as
a major disadvantage.
TV
"Schlomo Lipchitz" <schlomo...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:46864c29....@nntp.charter.net...
TV
> F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the
> Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive
> through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to
> pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun
> kill in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a
> hard-maneuvering engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be.
According to a recent interview I saw on TV, at least one Israeli pilot got
a guns kill in a F-15 on a Mig-21 solely for the prestige of getting a guns
kill. That blurs the fine line between being bold and being stupid! Hard
to argue with their record though. Funny comment about the Thud kills- it
reminds of G.I. Basel's: "It wasn't a memorable battle. They didn't see me.
I whispered 'Jesus' and filled the sky with 20 mm bullets. It didn't seem
fair, I wanted to honk or something." Perhaps the most humble account of an
a-a kill I've ever heard!
TV
deem...@aol.com
> "Schlomo Lipchitz" <schlomolipch...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
No Crusader gun kills?
>
> R / John
vincent norris
> perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.
John, there ought to be some interesting stories about those kills.
vince norris
TV
If I'm not mistaken, there were only 3-4 kills out of the 19-20 that the
Crusader got in Vietnam. The rest were Sidewinder kills. So like I said
below, this goes against the idea of the gun being critical to a-a success
in Vietnam. Only a fool would argue that it wouldn't have helped to have a
gun on all the F-4s, but it wouldn't have been as revolutionary as some
claim IMO. There were F-4 gun kills too, but again, far fewer than missile
kills (even for the -E). ROE, training, NCTR, and missile reliability were
the more critical factors IMO.
TV
John Carrier
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1183249927.9...@k29g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
The question was about the modern aircraft. For the F-8, if I counted
correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no
ordnance expended ;-).
R / John
deem...@aol.com
> <deemsb...@aol.com> wrote in message
>
> news:1183249927.9...@k29g2000hsd.googlegroups.com...
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Jun 30, 1:54 pm, "John Carrier" <j...@comcast.net> wrote:
> >> "Schlomo Lipchitz" <schlomolipch...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>
> >>news:46864c29....@nntp.charter.net...
>
> >> > Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch
> >> > about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any)
> >> > have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns???
>
> >> On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF
> >> F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the
> >> Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive
> >> through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to
> >> pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun
> >> kill
> >> in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a
> >> hard-maneuvering
> >> engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be.
>
> >> An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105,
> >> perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.
>
> > No Crusader gun kills?
>
> The question was about the modern aircraft.
Hey, you brought up the 105s.....22.5 gun kills? I just figured the
Crusaders had gotten a few because they were the last "gunfighters".
For the F-8, if I counted
> correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no
> ordnance expended ;-).
The old "He's on my tail....eject!" or just flew into the ground
trying to evade?
>
> R / John- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
John Carrier
<deem...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1183297802....@m36g2000hse.googlegroups.com...
Frank Bachman and Jerry Tucker (VF-24 IIRC, Hancock) got a vector in second
half of '72. The Crusader community was quite frustrated by this time
because only the F-4's were getting vectors, let alone getting tally-ho's.
Canopy flash at about 5 NM, started a conversion with a Mig-17 and visually
ID'd the bandit with a bit more than 90 to go. Prior to rolling out in
envelope, the guy ejected. They thought it'd be pretty cool, one Mig kill
shared, no ordnance expended. Ship was given credit for the kill.
No telling what was going on with the Mig driver. Perhaps under training on
his first FAM solo. A mainenance check flight gone bad. Maybe a cripple
just trying to limp home. Allegedly, the Vietnamese transmitted something
akin to "Oh !*&!!", they're F-8's" and then punched. Good sea story
regardless, and like many somewhat improbable and colorful in the community,
true.
R / John
Art Greer
(only weapons were guns and Zunis) or forced it down. As I recall (I was a
SAR contorller on Soputh SAR station) the event took place south of Vihn.
Any one know how the kill was achieved?
Art Greer
"TV" <ja...@ass.net> wrote in message
news:eUwhi.115970$Y_....@read1.cgocable.net...
Larry Cauble
Art Greer;529609 Wrote:
> There was one Navy A-1 Spad MIG kill but I don't recall if he shot it
> down
> (only weapons were guns and Zunis) or forced it down. As I recall (I
> was a
> SAR contorller on Soputh SAR station) the event took place south of
> Vihn.
> Any one know how the kill was achieved?
> Art Greer
>
> from VA-25 on Midway on RESCAP with 20mm and pods with 2.75 FFARs.
> Fairly far North --50 NM NW of Thanh Hoa. Alt 10K. Two MiG-17s
> overshoot and turn in head-on. A-1s Split-S for the deck into a valley
> with ridge lines both sides and karst formations around. Migs decide to
> try turning with the A-1s. Altitude about 500 feet above valley floor.
> One MiG hit in canopy and slams into ridge; other bugs out.
--
Larry Cauble
Art Greer
an accurate air to air weapon. Since the event was in the Thanh Hoa area it
probably was a North Sar/Red Crown controller vice South SAR though we
controlled all the way into Haiphong on occasion..
Art Greer
"Larry Cauble" <Larry.Cau...@aviationbanter.com> wrote in message
news:Larry.Cau...@aviationbanter.com...
dump...@hotmail.com
Dave
@o11g2000prd.googlegroups.com:
> Didn't B-52's score 2 MiG kills with their tail turrets in Vietnam?
And supposedly two F-4 kills, too. My source was a B-52 gunner.
Dave in San Diego
Ed Rasimus
There were quite a few F-4E gun kill in SEA and even several F-4D pod
gun kills. Dee Simmons got two with a podded gun. Saw Big D a couple
of days ago at Robin Olds' memorial service.
Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com
Ed Rasimus
wrote:
First F-105 kill was by my squadron commander, Fred Tracy on June 29,
1966. He was escorting a Wild Weasel on a raid against Yen Bai when a
MiG-17 came by shooting. Fred took a hit in the cockpit that knocked
out half the instrument panel, then hosed the MiG as he overshot.
Karl Richter and Fred Wilson became the first two Lieutenant MiG
killers on the same strike on the same day.
Dave Waldrop, who was at Robin's memorial service, got two MiGs in one
flight. The second one, he came out of a cloud cover inverted and
dropped between Olds and a MiG just in time to shoot. Olds later wrote
him a letter confirming the kill (and not bitching about the
interuption.) Waldrop now is flying the demonstration F-104 that is
regularly seen at airshows.
Ed Rasimus
>Didn't B-52's score 2 MiG kills with their tail turrets in Vietnam?
Got credit for two kills of MiG-21s during Linebacker II. Extremely
doubtful if that really happened, but is was good for their morale.
TV
> gun kills. Dee Simmons got two with a podded gun. Saw Big D a couple
> of days ago at Robin Olds' memorial service.
Olds died and it wasn't even mentioned here!?! Wow. For a long time, based
on interview snippets I heard from him, I thought he was an arrogant git.
But I saw a TV interview of him, that was fairly recent, where a lot of
those comments were shown to be taken out of context. Confident, yes. Git,
not. Great stories in general, and he definitely projected a solid image.
Coincidentally Ed, I'm just reading Palace Cobra now. I might have more
questions when I finish, but for now do you mind if I ask:
1- Relating to this thread, what do you think was most missing from U.S.
A-A? Guns, more reliable missiles, better ROE, Combat Tree (NCTR), or better
communication (like when you guys got robbed of thos Migs- the
"Mig-hoarding" of Udorn reminds me of the 55th in Desert Storm)? Or just
more Migs? ;)
2- Would you have prefered to fly the F-105G or the F-4E for your missions?
For the planes as well as for the separate hunter/killer missions.
3- This relating to Olds. I also recently read Going Downtown. Having read
Thud Ridge a long time ago, it was also pretty decent. Broughton certainly
didn't suffer from lack of confidence either! I know you and the other
River Rats don't feel the warmest feelings towards him, but I was wondering
why when he was on trial (and Yeager was backing him up, so he couldn't have
been a total buffoon), Olds backed away from the trial. Career politics or
something more personal? I certainly don't want to much rake Olds in any
way, I'm curious about the history of the moment. General Ryan certainly
seemed like a jack-ass.
4- Did they really conduct an ORI in the middle of a successful air
campaign?!
Thanks,
TV
vincent norris
Thanks, Ed.
vince norris
Flashnews
collection of data I put out years ago ----
An Air Combat Summary for Western Fighters:
Since 1979, American made fighters have been engaged in air combat at
least 214 times and have downed around 214 aircraft. Air Battles that
have occurred were from the Bekaa Valley and Persian Gulf to around the
world during the coup attempt in Venezuela. Engagements and Kills were
recorded throughout more than 3400 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat
sorties. Western aircraft included the F-4E Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15
Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-5E Tiger II, Mirage F-1, and F-18 Hornet
fighter-bombers. These engagements resulted in (with this data base) 214
confirmed Kills with only the two air-to-air combat losses. No direct
correlation is made with those kills offically sanctioned by the
respective air forces; for instance, Israel and Pakistan will make a
determination of "personal kill" versus "squadron kill" based on the
exact way the pilot performed rulling out louck and chance in the
scoring. There were:
23 x M-61 gun kills
48 x AIM-7 Sparrow kills from F-15, F-18, & F-14's
04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM kills from the F-16 (4) and F-15 (1)
03 x AIM-54 Phoenix Kills
130 x IR missile kills from all types of aircraft utilizing
either AIM-9 Sidewinder, Magic 550, or Python missiles
2 x maneuvering suicides
1 x bail out
3 x from air-to-ground ordnance while airborne
------
214
During this time, only two Western aircraft were downed by Russian built
aircraft. One South African Mirage F-1 by a Cuban flown Angolian MiG-23
with an AA-8 Aphid and a US Navy F/A-18C by an Iraqi flown MiG-25 Foxbat
with an AA-6 Acrid. There were two Saudi F-15C's that downed 2 x
Iranian F-4E's back in the mid 1980's when they were trying to defect.
Also a Navy F-14 downed a USAF RF-4C in an advertent Sidewinder firing
over the Med. There were other statistics where dedicated attack
aircraft were downed by fighters but the details have not been accounted
for here. The First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) there were well over 300
air-to-air encounters with the Iranian scoring around 135 Kills and the
Iraqi's around 85, but the data is still very confused because there
were not engagements just run downs and encounters during strike
missions. Surprisingly the Iraqi's favored the Super 530 IR version on
the F-1 Mirage because of its range. The Iranians were reported to have
made at least three AIM-54 kills which have been recorded because they
would be F-14 kills and it does represent the only combat use of the
AIM-54.
A Summary of the Gulf War and Bosnian Air-to-Air Kills
06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum's
... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills
... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill
... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide's
08 x F-1 Mirages
... 4 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide
04 x MiG-21/F-7 Fishbed's
... 3 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x AIM-7 Kill
08 x MiG-23 Flogger's
... 6 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
03 x MiG-25 Foxbat's
... 2 x AIM-7 Kills
... 1 x AIM-120 Kill
06 x Su-7/17/22
... 3 x AIM-7 Kills
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
... 1 x Mk-83 Bomb
02 x Su-25 Frogfoot
... 2 x AIM-9 Kills
01 x IL-76 Candid transport
... 1 x AIM-7 Kill
01 x PC-9 Trainer
... pilot bailout
07 x Helo's
... 2 x AIM-7 Kills
... 1 x AIM-9 Kills
... 2 x Gun Kills
... 1 x LGB Kill
... 1 x Walleye Kill
04 x Gastreb Light Attack
... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM
Kills
... 3 x AIM-9M Kills
02 x Blackhawk Helicopters (fratricide)
... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill
... 1 x AIM-9M Kill
---------------------------------------
..... 24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for
73%)
..... 04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (6 fired)
..... 16 x AIM-9 KIlls (19 launches for
84%)
..... 02 x 30mm Gun Kills
..... 02 x Maneuvering Suicides
..... 01 x Bailout
..... 03 x Air-to-Ground Ordnance
---------------------------------------
52 x Total Gulf/Bosnia Air-to-Air
Victories
Then Add:
04 x USN Kills on Libyan Su-22's
01 x USN Kill on an RF-4C
01 x RSAF Kills on 2 x F-4E's from Iran
03 x AIM-54 Kills from Iranian F-14's
24 x Israeli Air Force Kills From 1979 to
the Bekaa Valley
89 x Israeli Air Force Kills During the
Bekaa Valley War:
13 x Pakistani Air Force Kills During the
Border War:
03 x Venezuelan Air Force Kills During the
2nd Coup Attempt:
18 x South African Air Force Kills During
the Angolian War:
04 x Gastreb's downed over Bosnia
02 x Iraqi Aircraft downed after Gulf War
-----
214
None of these engagements occurred directly against Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Air Forces although almost all were against Soviet manufactured
machines. Some were fourth generation MiG-29 Fulcrums but no Su-27
Flanker fighters. A couple of Su-25 Frogfoot were downed by Pakistani
F-16's and the one Pakstani F-16 lost to fratricide is counted not as a
combat loss but as a missile kill. Sukhoi Su-27's have since seen combat
in the sporadic air war between Ethiopia and Euritrea, no real numbers
available now.
Enemy fighters have fired 19 to 22 missiles and made five gun passes
with only three hits and two kills. It is interesting to note that over
half of the attacks were considered out-of-envelope attempts due to the
fact that the enemy pilots could not achieve a better position or did
not understand how to. So the pilot-factor in these engagements had a
significant impact on the outcome.
During the dynamics of these engagements the average radar first
contacts were under 20 NM until the Gulf War and then the average
appeared to slip out to 28 NM, even though some individual pilots
acquired contacts as far as 50 NM. This is surprising for many
considering that the F-15 was employed by the Israelis, but the Bekaa
Valley was characterized by very short range radar contacts. The lack of
an average longer range radar contact was primarily due to the complex
and sophisticated nature of the operational environment that required
pilot compensation for formations, terrain, weather, surface-to-air
threats, and the presence of enemy aircraft. The demands for the
positive ID (identification) of targets also effected the nature of the
air battles.
The Soviets employed, by themselves or through numerous surrogate
pilots, tactical "experiments", as Soviet analyst Col Babich would say,
that were not yet addressed in the literature from the Warsaw Pact Air
Forces. Only recently have these more exotic evaluations been identified
in the writings by Soviet tacticians. With a better understanding of the
capabilities of modern Western weapon systems, the Soviets have
attempted to produce tactical geometry's and intercept dynamics that
utilize larger numbers of aircraft with the objective of exceeding the
technical capabilities of the radar such as scan and track rate, search
volume, and overall pilot task loading. Ultimately these factors would
try to reduce "situation awareness" (SA) and "mutual support" (MS)
bringing the friendly formations into "killing zones" or "ambush
points". "Decoy" or "monkey" formations would serve as obvious "bait" in
an attempt to set up the more tactically experienced Western pilots for
an unobserved entry by a MiG element or trapped into one or more of
these "killing zones" for demise by the whole enemy formation. Because
of this, most targets were not "cooperative" and therefore the actual
engagement setups were basically short ranged and radar lock-ups were
discouraged due to the numbers of targets at many different bearings.
There was also a basic "timing" problem, that directly relates to the
skill level of the engaged pilots. In many cases, the Soviet advisory
technicians and their brothers in arms thought that they had properly
"pincered" or "enveloped" the formation of US built fighters. In other
words, they were satisfied from a C3I standpoint that the enemy
formation was properly countered and engaged by their fighters who were
given an entry advantage. Why their pilots never came home was a big
mystery, especially since it looked so good on the GCI radar scopes.
What of course happened was that the US built fighters, through superior
onboard systems, system mechanization, air-to-air weapons, maneuver
performance, pilot skills, and overall realistic training, were able to
correct for a bad start and quickly kill the attackers inside the
resolution cell of their command and control system. Despite the fact
that the Soviets are now saying all of the "right things" when it comes
to appreciating these kinds of air battles, but they are far from
realizing any wide spread benefits from changing the emphasis of their
training.
The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events. The
pilot's ability to keep his eyes and attention outside the aircraft and
still monitor his sensors and weapon system carried the day. During the
approximately 30 Middle East engagements, situation awareness was lost
only three times, according to unofficial pilot debriefs. That means the
pilots and their flight members lost track of events only 1% of the
time. Most of us couldn't do that well driving home from work. To make
that remarkable fact happen took exactly what is called "Western
Technology". The sad thing is, considering all of what we said, that we
can abuse this incredible edge over the Soviets by over-doing it on the
"technology" and system "pet rock" side without a corresponding balance
in requirements. The keep it simple stupid (KISS) principle has never
been more important.
Exchange ratios from the major air conflicts since the Korean War. The
air-to-air exchange ratio is straight forward but the campaign exchange
reflects the simple ratio of aircraft lost to all causes divided by the
number destroyed from all causes. We have a tendency to dwell on the
successes and not examine the failures. The Soviets just look at the
bottom line, aircraft invested versus aircraft expended. In the Korean
War, despite our great air-to-air success rate over the MiG-15 by the
F-86, the Soviets praise the North Koreans for "a draw" with the US
Superpower since in the overall "campaign" the US lost around the same
2000 machines that they did. That is also why they have looked so
seriously at the Middle East Wars, their "campaign" averages were mush
worse.
A best guess determination at what it took to get a missile kill
throughout the conflicts since South East Asia. Together they give a
fairly interesting picture of how the various air wars went and they all
agree on the fact that the Soviet equipment didn't carry the day.
Technology was clearly in the favor of the West, but there was such an
excessive amount of it with little regards to the support side of the
weapons, success was hit or miss and sometimes actually overlooked. The
US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli
Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more
time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on
Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it. Despite
limited F-8 experiences, it was the USAF that became the Vietnam War's
"gun fighters", simply because Navy Phantoms (F-4B/N/J/S) had none by
choice, despite later regrets. Perhaps the best success story has been
that of the Sidewinder "L" (AIM-9L) version that has been so
TV
off with your AMRAAM #s. I believe the totals stand closer to at least 6
rather than 4 (2 F16 Iraq, 2 F16 Bosnia, 2 F15 Bosnia). And I'm not sure
what your general points are.
"The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events"
More to the point, could you simply say they had better A-A training? I
don't understand the difficult to see bit, given that Western fighters are
typically larger. The lesson that experience counts, in combat or anything
else, it hardly new. And it was learned in Linebacker via Top Gun (and FWS
later) if it was forgotten.
"The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and
Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with
more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on
Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it."
I'm not sure where you got these ideas. The USAF had such success with the
Sparrow because a hand-picked unit of F-15 fighters, with the best available
NCTR technology (unavailable to the Navy) were given the cherry-picked
opportunities to pursue A-A BVR engagements. An F-14 pilot is quoted as
commenting that the AIM-7 is a magic bullet once it gets off the rails. How
many BVR engagements has the USN had? One (by a panicky RIO)? And the USAF
was embarrased into adopting the Sidewinder? Professionally, Eagle Drivers
are embarrased to be forced into a dogfight (vs. smacking BVR), but I've
never heard one be embarrased by the AIM-9 unless they were on the receiving
end of one in training!
TV
Tex Houston
> Olds died and it wasn't even mentioned here!?! Wow. For a long time,
> based on interview snippets I heard from him, I thought he was an arrogant
> git. But I saw a TV interview of him, that was fairly recent, where a lot
> of those comments were shown to be taken out of context. Confident, yes.
> Git, not. Great stories in general, and he definitely projected a solid
> image.
Certainly was covered here. Remember though the memorial service was held
on the 30th he died on the 14th.
Tex Houston
Flashnews
may be right in the AMRAAM's but in the beginning the admission of who
or what aircraft was carrying them and even if they were entered into
the Gulf War were very sketchy in details. Fact was the F-15's retained
the AIM-7 longer because of vibration and flow-issues over the wing with
slammer's on the rails and the fact that they had a special Sparrow
tailored to their liking. The F-16 entered the Gulf Zone after the War
but in time to get the first AMRAAM kill (active pit bull as it was) and
then time moved on. The Sparrow was a favorite to the F-15 for a longer
time and especially the Israeli's who wanted the US to embargo it to the
Middle East but that did not last long. Main concerns were fratricide of
course, where the Sparrow could be made dumb but shutting off the radar
or the CW which in one case was documented by the IAF during the Bekaa,
but it was not to avoid a friendly it was to prevent the MiG from being
hit over Syria - an ROE no no. The first years of AMRAAM training
generally saw in the simulators the attrition of friendlies pretty high.
As to preferring the BVR to the WVR shot well I guess that is all good
bar talk but in reality things began to merge as the IR missiles became
stronger in range and ability to "see" a target - hence they were used
more and more in the forward hemisphere - while the Sparrow with its
large motor and warhead continued to run down targets better in the
stern. The Bekaa data would be the latest good sort out of missiles.
The Iraq data with all the US kills shows the trend moving to chasing
down the enemy although there were still a couple of good engagements
more of the classical style. Dorr has a great summary of the F-15 kills
in the Gulf War and I have summarized that and other inputs in the book
done during the events.
Now take all the lessosn from AIM ACE and yopu see as you said that the
air to air environment is getting real deadly to all players and the
ability to launch (F-Pole perhaps) far out makes a difference even over
sorting - so what would an Iranian Air War look like, that will be
interesting. But with MiG-31's, linked MiG-29M's and Su-30's, ground
SA-10 and SA-15's merged into an IADS the whole nice world of the F-15
and F-22 could suddenly pop holes - so I suspect they are working that
real carefully. Then again - the better pilot survives longer - and in
that he generally gets more kills regardless of his mount, but with an
enemy flying stronger machines both sides loose many more. And the
missiles like AMRAAM are slowly taking a back seat to some longer range
beauties - and again the race is on. So I am just offering you what I
had for the groups to ponder - there is no real message and it is my
opinions from about 35 years of being in the middle of a lot of it - so
if you don't like them fine
"TV" <ja...@ass.net> wrote in message
news:7fEii.116492$Y_....@read1.cgocable.net...
Ed Rasimus
>Coincidentally Ed, I'm just reading Palace Cobra now. I might have more
>questions when I finish, but for now do you mind if I ask:
>
>1- Relating to this thread, what do you think was most missing from U.S.
>A-A? Guns, more reliable missiles, better ROE, Combat Tree (NCTR), or better
>communication (like when you guys got robbed of thos Migs- the
>"Mig-hoarding" of Udorn reminds me of the 55th in Desert Storm)? Or just
>more Migs? ;)
Training--realistic, concentrated, dissimilar training.
Tactics--abandonment of welded wing and training in fluid attack/loose
deuce mutual support tactics.
I always had a gun--both F-105 and F-4E. Not a factor. Missile
reliability was. Poor training in AIM-7 applications was an issue.
Only Fighter Weapons School guys in USAF got really concentrated
training in the Sparrow. Frequent carriage of the missiles with
attendant thumps, bumps and stresses caused deterioration and low
reliability.
ROE was definitely a factor. Required VID for most of the war for most
of the players. No airfield strikes until Linebacker was another
issue.
Combat Tree was a late technology advance and would have made a
difference as well.
>
>2- Would you have prefered to fly the F-105G or the F-4E for your missions?
>For the planes as well as for the separate hunter/killer missions.
As the "killer" element, I liked the F-4E. It was compatible with the
F-105G and carried a good load with good systems. When it was
available in the early years, the F-105D (single seat) was a good
killer as well.
>
>3- This relating to Olds. I also recently read Going Downtown. Having read
>Thud Ridge a long time ago, it was also pretty decent. Broughton certainly
>didn't suffer from lack of confidence either! I know you and the other
>River Rats don't feel the warmest feelings towards him, but I was wondering
>why when he was on trial (and Yeager was backing him up, so he couldn't have
>been a total buffoon), Olds backed away from the trial. Career politics or
>something more personal? I certainly don't want to much rake Olds in any
>way, I'm curious about the history of the moment. General Ryan certainly
>seemed like a jack-ass.
Olds was airborne and just a few miles N. of Haiphong during the
Turkestan incident. He actually saw the strafing occur. I spoke with
him about it (actually he spoke and I listened,) a few years ago. He
recalled being astonished that someone was doing that since the ship
and the restrictions were specifically briefed that morning!
He was investigating officer for 13th AF on the incident. He didn't
think too much of Broughton's actions.
>
>4- Did they really conduct an ORI in the middle of a successful air
>campaign?!
The ORI took place in January of '73, right after completion of
Linebacker II, exactly as recounted in Palace Cobra. (I still see Turk
Turley ever year at River Rats reunions.)
Peter Stickney
And another 10 or so which were Sidewinder only.
John, Given the lack of reliability of the F-8's guns,
how much were you really relying on them?
Was doctrine at the time to take advantage of the situation that
since, in order to set yourself up for a gun shot, you'd drive right through
the Sidewinder's best engagement zone and geometry, that you'd push for the
gun shot, but it was mostly a follow-up if the missile didn't work?
--
Pete Stickney
Without data, all you have is an opinion
John Carrier
"Peter Stickney" <p-sti...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:km4tl4...@comcast.net...
The guns weakness was the length of the flexible feeds from the ammo cans
located behind the cockpit (head high) and the guns which were in the lower
forward fuselage. Under G, some flexing would occur, the belted ammo would
catch and break a link. The trick was to avoid firing at anything over 4 G,
and preferably around 2.5 ... not easy against a turning adversary.
As I noted in an earlier post, you usually flew though the Sidewinder
envelope prior to reaching a gun solution. So ... rely on the missile.
Snap (opportunity) shot at high TCA was still available with guns. The WCS
allowed both guns and missiles to be available, missiles on the pickle and
guns on the trigger.
Pushing for the gun shot was generally ill-advised in a multi-plane
engagement. The time expended from sidewinder envelope (1NM and within 40
degrees in the era) to guns (1000') created a predictable path the free
bogey could exploit.
The Thuds got lots of gun kills because most of the time that's what they
had and all they had. With A/A missile armament, the gun is primarily a
weapon of (somewhat unusual) opportunity and often (in the training
environment) ego.
R / John
dump...@hotmail.com
http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2007/0707strafing.asp
includes the following:
"We're using the gun quite a bit in the Iraq and Afghanistan
operations.
The fighters are using lots of 20 mm off F-15Es and F-16s and 30 mm
off A-10s to hit ground targets. Why is that? For individuals, the gun
is
probably one of the most accurate weapons, with the least collateral
damage. That 20 mm will end the bad guy's life, but stray rounds will
just drive into the ground, and that's it.
In Iraq, the adversary uses both road networks and riverine networks.
There have been a number of occasions where boats have been
identified
carrying insurgents on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and we've
used
20 mm and 30 mm guns to destroy those boats. A moving target is hard
to hit with a bomb. With a gun, it's no big deal. In one instance, the
enemy
was getting ready to move people somewhere to do something later that
night, but we removed them from the fight.
The same thing happened in Balad, where we found people going to get
roadside bomb supplies. We have been using the gun against single
persons
who have been planting improvised exposive devices. You'll have an
individual
with a truck, and a couple of other individuals; you'll see them get
out and
move around, trying to dig a hole, and you'll bring in an F-16 or an
F-15E, or
maybe an A-10, and you'll use 20 or 30 mm and go kill them. If you
have troops
in contact, or you have individuals in buildings, you do the same
thing."
Discussions about aircraft guns usually center on air-to-air usage,
but
nowadays, that's a secondary mission. With the primary usage of
aircraft guns being strafing. For how long has this been true?
anyb...@canada.com
Americans should be ashamed to talk about what they did to Vietnam.
>
> vince norris
TV
> on the 30th he died on the 14th.
Huh, I don't have any such thread from the 14th onwards showing up. Darn
newsgroup provider!
TV
Tex Houston
Certainly possible I'm wrong. I received about twenty notices the first
couple of days. By the way, it was a great send off.
Tex Houston
TV
once again, it's clear that the military works like too many other human
endeavours. Who you know matters more than what you know in terms of how
the organization runs. And in a very real way, like other organizations,
skill actually works AGAINST promotion. Good pilots are more likely to take
risks and pay the price, good politicians serve their constituents instead
of their re-election interests, good professors their research instead of
their careers, etc.
As for the book, one more question: What happened to Sopin? If it's in
there, I must have missed how the relationship ended.
Oh, and one more question (I sound like Columbo!): it just struck me that in
almost every fighter book I've read, heavy drinking features prominently.
Was alcoholism (vs. binge drinking) ever a real problem?
TV
John Carrier
<anyb...@canada.com> wrote in message
news:1183600245.0...@z28g2000prd.googlegroups.com...
Certainly the Truman doctrine one step too far.
Is there a nation on the face of the planet that hasn't a skeleton or two in
its closet?
Falcon 109
John
John Carrier
<dump...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:1183592486.2...@a26g2000pre.googlegroups.com...
Strafe can be a worthwhile employment of the gun, evidently done with much
success in the ongoing pair of conflicts. Can be somewhat hazardous in the
daytime if the bad guys have the capability to shoot back (a risk/reward
thing). Pretty functional at night with goggles, etc.
R / John
Ed Rasimus
>Just finished the book Ed. A good read. The most depressing part is that
>once again, it's clear that the military works like too many other human
>endeavours. Who you know matters more than what you know in terms of how
>the organization runs. And in a very real way, like other organizations,
>skill actually works AGAINST promotion. Good pilots are more likely to take
>risks and pay the price, good politicians serve their constituents instead
>of their re-election interests, good professors their research instead of
>their careers, etc.
Strangely enough, in the USAF, the aviator career specialty is the
only profession in which comment in performance reports on your
primary duty was expressly prohibited. While a personnel weenie could
get a glowing write-up about his/her skill at manageing the paperwork,
a fighter pilot got his comments on how he performed his additional
duties. (See comments regarding CTF Officer or Roscoe Control Officer
in Palace Cobra.)
>
>As for the book, one more question: What happened to Sopin? If it's in
>there, I must have missed how the relationship ended.
Left in Thailand. It's often a harsh world. Divorced the wife when I
returned to US and proceeded to several years of assignments in
Europe.
>
>Oh, and one more question (I sound like Columbo!): it just struck me that in
>almost every fighter book I've read, heavy drinking features prominently.
>Was alcoholism (vs. binge drinking) ever a real problem?
Folks deal with their fears in many ways. Some used alcohol to cope.
Fighter pilots tend to live life very strenuously and inevitably some
pay a price.
>
>TV
Flashnews
not made it to the front burner - but now with the USAF SOF looking at
COIN aircraft and people admitting to the vulnerability of the
helicopters and the fact that even the A-10's 30mm has become too big a
weapon for the ROE there is an attitude change. You would think at first
this all should not be interrelated but it has come down to the fact
that the ground forces fighting an insurgency can not get a jump on the
enemy without some help from the third dimension and everything tried
now has been too big weapon wise, too late in getting to where it is
needed, or too clumsy for small unit operations in urban environments.
So now it is realized that when the fighters are up their 20mm guns and
their accurate gunsights can make a difference especially if the ammo is
basic ball.
Visualize a 20/23/25 mm gun with a constantly chambered round
(side-by-side twin for instance) that can get off quicker and a
"spit-burst" of 6 to 10 rounds every trigger pull and combine that with
a laser-sight. If the platform was survivable then you can see from the
grunts poiunt of view it would become a very popular machine. It is not
yet possible as a UAV although it should be put into the go-do locker
for sure, yet a manned platform gives the grunt-air relationship a
chance to exploit the combat situation as it always has and yet has been
denied from this war for too long.
In Vietnam as you talk to the Thud pilots, which still represents an
enormously proud and daring group of can-do people ("there is a way"
right!) and what you see time and time again is their courage and
airmanship being thrown up against incompetence in command and the whole
targeting cycle and perceived purpose of air power in the war. If they
would have been let loose, with people like Olds at the helm, they would
have ripped North Vietnam a new asshole in a few months. If we honor
their courage and dismiss the incompetence that sent them on their
missions that only added to their risk, then we have failed both them
and ourselves. This "gun" strafe issue in Iraq and again in Afghanistan
is the same script being played in a different theater. Incompetence at
the top, apathy at the midsection, and dead heroes at the bottom. Could
or would we ever face off with the retired generals who we praise so
much over and over, like Meyers - nice guy, hard worker but totally
irrelevant to any path in this war to victory. When you read those
words about how important a fighter strafing was to a ground unit, can
you understand for a minute how just about everything else we have been
doing has not added up to a hill of beans.
We as a nation have accomplished this in five years of war - 100 dead a
month / 1500 wounded / $30 billion spent - that's it, it does not get
better then that and the thousands of troops that go out in small units,
patrols, convoys, etc., all rarely get the chance to have real air
assist and protection. In Afghanistan now the UK is concerned because
their casualties are taking four hours to get to hospital, there are no
spare helicopters, and those there are too vulnerable. We are looking at
sling configured ultra-lights now.
All of you in this group have enormous distinction in combat and in the
aviation disciplines - you must not let this incompetence go on and on
when you can see in a micro-seconds solutions that have yet to be even
put on the table in the Pentagon and the commands. Politics aside - we
are doing this to ourselves and we (you and I) are not doing enough to
honor the Thud spirit for one, to get ride of the incompetence and bring
back the warriors placing the network managers aside for a while until
business with the al Qaeda can be finished.
"John Carrier" <jx...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:HaKdnVYDMJBfQBHb...@comcast.com...
David Nicholls
"Flashnews" <ski...@flash.net> wrote in message
news:JdDii.2776$rL1...@newssvr19.news.prodigy.net...
> Joining this late because I have been gone but if it helps here is a
> collection of data I put out years ago ----
>
>
>
> An Air Combat Summary for Western Fighters:
>
>
>
> Since 1979, American made fighters have been engaged in air combat at
> least 214 times and have downed around 214 aircraft. Air Battles that
> have occurred were from the Bekaa Valley and Persian Gulf to around the
> world during the coup attempt in Venezuela. Engagements and Kills were
> recorded throughout more than 3400 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat
> sorties. Western aircraft included the F-4E Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15
> Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-5E Tiger II, Mirage F-1, and F-18 Hornet
> fighter-bombers. These engagements resulted in (with this data base) 214
> confirmed Kills with only the two air-to-air combat losses. No direct
> correlation is made with those kills offically sanctioned by the
> respective air forces; for instance, Israel and Pakistan will make a
> determination of "personal kill" versus "squadron kill" based on the exact
> way the pilot performed rulling out louck and chance in the scoring.
> There were:
>
>
>
most being AIM-9L but IIRC there were several cannon kills - their targets
were all "western" aircraft.
David
dump...@hotmail.com
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htairw/articles/20070707.aspx
has more on the strafing "renaissance".