Naval air and Marine air..Marriage?
Gerry Hamm
Comments gentlemen?
December 2002 Vol. 85, No. 12
The merging of Navy and Marine Corps aviation will have a dramatic
impact on the cultures of both services.
Air Wings Built for Two
By Otto Kreisher
The planned integration of Navy and Marine Corps air elements will
affect future aircraft procurement. The Navy plans to reduce purchases
of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (below left) by 400 airplanes and
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet (above [US Navy photo by PHAN Philip A.
McDaniel]) by about 188. The Marine AV-8B Harrier (below right [US Navy
photo by PHCM Terry Cosgrove]) will eventually be replaced by F-35s.
The Navy and the Marine Corps have embarked on an unprecedented
integration of their fighter squadrons, a move that will affect the size
and the operations of the tactical aviation forces of both services.
It also will force dramatic changes in the cultures of the two services'
air units. Marines face the greatest impact since, historically, they
have considered their air arm an integral part of their ground combat
forces. Half of the Marine Corps' fighter-attack aircraft will be under
direct Navy control as part of carrier air wings, instead of under
Marine command in the traditional air-ground team.
"It's the most ridiculous thing I've ever heard," said Norman Polmar, a
military scholar and author of a history of carrier aviation. "If you
integrate, what's the need for Marine air?"
"The reason for Marine air is to support the grunts [infantry],'' Polmar
said. "If you start to put them together [with the Navy], you lose the
uniqueness of the Marine air."
"It really will change the culture of the Corps," said Col. Scott Doyle,
a veteran Marine pilot.
But Doyle conceded, "To be able to afford the air forces we need, we
have to do it."
Senior Navy and Marine leaders acknowledge that integration is driven
mainly by money, particularly the approaching massive budget "bow wave"
for tactical aircraft.
Adm. Vern E. Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, told a recent Naval
Institute symposium that integrating Navy and Marine Corps tactical air
will produce substantial savings.
Cannot Survive Independently
Marine Lt. Gen. Michael A. Hough, the new deputy commandant for
aviation, told the same gathering that with the looming procurement bow
wave "there is no way for the Navy and the Marine Corps to survive
independently."
Although Marine tactical air pilots qualify in carrier landings during
initial flight training and have flown off carriers regularly since
1931, most of their fighter and attack squadrons fly from land bases.
And when they did operate from the sea during World War II and the
Korean War, it was mainly as Marine air groups on separate carriers.
But that will change under integration.
Budget constraints and force reductions already had forced a partial
tacair integration in 1997, when four Marine F/A-18 Hornet squadrons
started making regular deployments with four of the Navy's 10 carrier
air wings.
That trend will accelerate under a memorandum of understanding signed
Aug. 14 by Navy Secretary Gordon R. England, Clark, and Gen. James L.
Jones, Marine Corps Commandant, directing near total integration of
their tactical aviation.
Many of the details of that integration emerged in an agreement signed
shortly thereafter by Vice Adm. Dennis V. McGinn, deputy chief of naval
operations for warfare requirements and programs, and Marine Gen.
William L. Nyland, then deputy commandant for aviation.
That agreement said integration was a response to Defense Secretary
Donald H. Rumsfeld's mandate in the 2001 Defense Planning Guidance to
seek reductions in future procurement and operating costs.
Encouraged by the findings of a subsequent consultant's study, the
agreement said: "The Navy and the Marine Corps will integrate tactical
aircraft (tacair) forces ... into a seamless naval aviation force at sea
and ashore."
"We are pledged to change both Navy and Marine Corps 'culture' in order
to derive the maximum benefit possible from integration," England and
the two service leaders said in their August memo.
While Marines feel their culture will be affected the most, the Navy
also will have to make some adjustments. For example, Navy aviators are
used to the creature comforts of a carrier or a formal air base. But
Marine expeditionary air units frequently live in tents, work on their
aircraft in the open, and eat packaged combat rations.
Marine aviators long have had to qualify for carrier landings. In 1997,
four Marine Hornet squadrons began making regular deployments with four
of the Navy's carrier wings. An additional four squadrons will do so
after integration. (US Navy photo by PH1 Jim Hampshire)
The Shake Out
Under the agreement, four more Marine F/A-18 squadrons will join Navy
carrier air wings within five years.
In that same period, the Navy will put three Hornet squadrons into
Marine aircraft wings to support the unit deployment program. That
program normally sends squadrons to Japan for six months but also can
handle contingency deployments.
And the Navy will decommission one of its 26 operational F/A-18
squadrons.
The Navy also has 10 F-14 Tomcat squadrons, most of which are being
transitioned into the new Super Hornet models of the F/A-18.
Meanwhile, starting in 2004, the Navy and Marine Hornet squadrons in the
carrier air wings will cut their authorized aircraft from 12 to 10. With
four fighter-attack squadrons per carrier air wing, that would mean a
reduction of eight strike aircraft on the carriers.
The squadrons from both services in the land-based unit deployment cycle
will keep 12 aircraft. And the seven Marine AV-8B Harrier squadrons will
retain 16 of the Vertical/Short Takeoff and Landing Harriers, pending a
future budget review.
In the next step, two more Marine Hornet squadrons will become part of
the final two carrier air wings. They will replace two Navy F/A-18
squadrons that will be disbanded.
With three Navy squadrons and no Marine units being decommissioned, Rear
Adm. Mark P. Fitzgerald, deputy director of air warfare on the Navy
staff, said, "We will give up some capability to the Marines."
But the integration would leave only four Marine Hornet squadrons
outside the Navy's carrier force.
The Navy's venerable F-14 Tomcat has been through many upgrades since it
entered service in 1973. Most of the Navy's 10 Tomcat squadrons are
swapping their beloved F-14s for F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. (US Navy photo
by Capt. Dana Potts)
The timing of those moves is to be determined.
The plan also calls for each service to decommission one of its reserve
Hornet squadrons in 2004. One of the three remaining Marine Reserve
F/A-18 squadrons will join the two surviving Navy units in the reserve
carrier air wing.
In 2006, the reserve squadrons also will drop to 10 aircraft each.
Nothing in the integration plan so far affects the EA-6B electronic
jammer aircraft that both the Navy and Marines fly in support of joint
and combined air strike missions.
According to the agreement, the Navy "will satisfy both Navy and Marine
Corps commitments with Navy or Marine Corps squadrons." It added that
there will be a change of operational control for Navy squadrons tasked
to cover Marine Corps commitments (and vice versa) about six to nine
months prior to a deployment.
As part of the merger, Clark said, a Marine colonel will replace a Navy
captain as a carrier air wing commander in about two years. And Hough
predicted that in the future a Navy captain will command a Marine
expeditionary air group, instead of a Marine colonel.
Not Just Economics
Although integration was inspired primarily by economics, officials
insist it will result in a more effective and lethal tactical aviation
force.
"Not only are we going to save billions of dollars," Clark said, "but
because we are going to integrate across the old stovepipe lines, every
measure in the [consultant's] study--every measure evaluating
warfighting capability--increased under the integration concept."
By removing the traditional barriers between Navy and Marine air, he
said, they will be able to "surge resources" into whatever mission needs
help.
"That's why the net effect of this is increased warfighting capability
at a dramatic reduction in cost," the CNO said.
Vice Adm. Michael G. Mullen, deputy CNO for resources, requirements, and
assessments, said the naval services can have "a significantly more
capable force" with fewer aircraft because of the great increase in
combat capability of the current and next generation of tactical
aircraft when armed with precision munitions.
"Ten years ago, we had to calculate how many sorties per target," Mullen
said. "In Afghanistan, it was how many targets we could hit per sortie."
Hough contrasted the current one-bomb, one-kill strike capability with
his experience flying F-4 Phantoms in Vietnam, "We had to put up 16
airplanes in the hope of hitting the planet."
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will provide even more precision attack
capability, officials said.
The F-35 and the new Super Hornet, which the Navy has begun deploying,
also are expected to be more reliable and easier to maintain, said naval
officials.
"It isn't how many strike aircraft are on a given platform," Mullen
said. "In the end, it is how many sorties a day I can generate out of
that aircraft." If an air wing can turn its aircraft around two or three
a day, he said, "I don't need as many of them."
The Marine Corps had planned to only buy the F-35 STOVL version (shown
here). Tacair integration will force the service to buy enough
carrier-model Joint Strike Fighters to equip 10 squadrons.
Cutting Fighters
Based on those efficiency expectations and the reductions called for in
the integration plan, the Navy Department has decided to cut its planned
procurement of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-35 by more than
one-third.
The Navy plans to reduce its Super Hornet buy from 648 to 460 and
complete the procurement before it starts buying large numbers of F-35s
at the end of the decade.
According to one report, the Marines will cut their F-35 buy from 609 to
350, and the Navy will drop from 480 to 430. That would mean a total cut
of 309. However, England told the Fort Worth Star-Telegram his
department would buy a total of 400 fewer Joint Strike Fighters.
There is little concern at the Pentagon that such a large reduction
would increase unit cost. In fact, Edward C. Aldridge, the
undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics,
said that cuts in the JSF buy should not affect the unit price because
of the large number of F-35s that other nations are expected to
purchase.
Still at issue within the integration plan is just what mix of
F-35s--the carrier version vs. the Short Takeoff and Vertical Landing
model--the two services will buy.
The Marines had wanted to buy only the STOVL aircraft to replace both
their conventional F/A-18 Hornets and their jump jet AV-8B Harriers. The
F-35 STOVL version would have given them a strike aircraft that could
fly either from the large-deck amphibious assault ships, austere
expeditionary bases, or prepared airfields.
The Navy, however, had planned to replace its oldest Hornets by buying
only the carrier-version F-35, which will have greater range than the
STOVL aircraft.
Now it looks as if the Marines will have to get enough of the carrier
model F-35s to equip their 10 squadrons in the Navy air wings. And the
Navy may buy enough STOVL aircraft to supply its three squadrons serving
with the Marine air groups.
"Right now, we are planning to have conventional Navy carrier airplanes
on our [carriers]," England said. "But we will have Marines flying those
airplanes."
Hough said STOVL F-35s will replace the Marine Harriers, but what
replaces the Hornets has yet to be decided.
An AV-8B launches from the flight deck of USS Bataan. Each of the seven
Marine Harrier squadrons will retain 16 Harriers, pending a future
budget review. (US Navy photo by PH3 John Taucher)
The Culture Issue
Despite promises of increased combat effectiveness, there are concerns
about both the emotional and the practical effects of integration on the
Marines.
The Marines' view of their air arm is unique. Although the vital role of
aviation in World War II's Pacific campaigns forced the Navy to
acknowledge the aircraft carrier, instead of the battleship, as its
premier warship, the Marine Corps remains an infantry-centric service.
An aviator has never been Marine Commandant, and the odds of that
changing are slim.
All newly commissioned Marine officers, whether they are to become
pilots, engineers, or grunts, go through The Basic School at Quantico,
Va., where they are trained as infantry leaders. That training can come
in handy later because Marine pilots often serve at the front with
infantry units as forward air controllers and, at times, have had to
fight like a grunt.
Despite their dominant role in the Marine Corps, the ground Marines have
a fondness for their fliers that developed early in the evolution of
military aviation.
Marine aviators in bi-wing airplanes first earned that affection during
the "Banana Wars" in the 1920s and '30s by flying supplies in and
evacuating casualties from isolated infantry units in the jungles of
Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua. In those small but intense
conflicts, Marine fliers also tested the concept of close air support at
treetop levels, which they perfected during the island-hopping campaigns
in World War II.
Navy and Marine Corps Hornet squadrons in carrier air wings will, in
2004, cut their authorized aircraft from 12 to 10. The reduction means
eight fewer strike aircraft per carrier. (US Navy photo by PHAN
Konstandinos Goumenidis)
The Marines also developed a deep skepticism about counting on air
support from other services. That may have started at Guadalcanal in
1942, when the Navy carriers fled the superior Japanese fleet, leaving
outnumbered Marine aircraft ashore at Henderson Field to support the
grunts in desperate battles for survival.
The value of the Marine close air support was proven again in Korea,
when F4U Corsairs helped the grunts defend the Pusan perimeter, go on
the offense at Inchon, and then survive the fighting withdrawal from the
Chosin Reservoir.
Dependable air support is crucial to the Marines because their
amphibious or expeditionary nature means they have much less heavy
artillery than a comparable Army unit. To ground commanders, Marine
tacair is their "flying artillery," and they have learned to depend on
it when things get ugly.
As proof of that dependence, the Marines deploy and fight in
organizations of various sizes called Marine Air-Ground Task Forces.
Each MAGTF combines a ground force, an air arm--which can include
transport and attack helicopters and fixed-wing tactical aircraft--and a
combat support unit, almost always under command of an infantry officer.
Because of the need for the flying artillery, the Marine commander in
Desert Storm, then-Lt. Gen. Walter E. Boomer, pulled most of the Marine
Corps' fighter and attack squadrons out of the Air Force-run strategic
air campaign into Iraq, so they could focus on pounding the enemy
divisions awaiting his ground forces in Kuwait.
Doyle noted that after integration, a MAGTF commander could not do that
because most of the Marine tactical air would be under Navy control.
In Polmar's view, "If you put the Marines under the Navy, there'll be no
one to support the grunts."
But senior Navy and Marine officers reject the idea that integration
will leave the Marine ground forces without air cover.
Gen. Michael W. Hagee, confirmed Oct. 17 to be the new Marine
Commandant, told the Senate Armed Services Committee at his confirmation
hearing that after integration "naval aviation forces will surge to
support Marine and joint ground forces alike."
Hagee added, "This point cannot be emphasized enough--Marine Air-Ground
Task Forces are not losing airpower."
Retired Adm. Leighton W. "Snuffy" Smith Jr., a Navy attack pilot who
flew hundreds of combat missions in Vietnam, said: "If the Marines need
help, the Navy's going to be there."
Smith noted that he led air strikes into North Vietnam that included
Marine F-4s, so "I know you can integrate Navy and Marine air on a
carrier and it will work."
Maj. Gen. James N. Mattis, who led the first Marine Corps force into
Afghanistan, said: "I never doubted that the admiral would have the
airplanes over my head when I needed them," referring to Rear Adm.
Thomas E. Zelibor, who commanded the carrier battle groups at the start
of Operation Enduring Freedom.
"It was the first time in my career I left my artillery behind. ... I
was able to do it because of the trust that the naval air, Marine air,
would be overhead," Mattis said.
And Navy Capt. William Gortney, who led Carrier Air Wing 7 in Enduring
Freedom missions, said his Navy fighters "just spent four-and-a-half
months, 24 hours a day, providing airborne artillery for the troops in
Afghanistan."
A number of the officials noted that precision munitions, which can
provide great accuracy from 15,000 feet, have changed the nature of
close air support.
The old Marine idea of close air support--"some guy down there at 50
feet, shooting at some guy 1,000 feet away--those days are gone," Hough
said. "We do close air support from 30 miles."
To Mullen, who has to balance requirements and budgets, integration
means "I am going to have a more combat-capable force. And I am going to
have one I can actually afford."
Otto Kreisher is a Washington, D.C.-based military affairs reporter for
Copley News Service and a regular contributor to Air Force Magazine. His
most recent article, "Top Chief," appeared in the October 2002 issue.
Copyright Air Force Association. All rights reserved.
Interesting.
Jacek Zemlo
are signed)! Good Heavens! What happens to this world?
To sum up the whole story:
- U.S. Navy will have to switch 3 of their VFA squadrons from USN's
CVW/CV deployment cycle to USMC's Unit Deployment Program,
- the Navy will have to DISESTABLISH further 3 of their operational
VFAs plus 1 reserve squadron,
- U.S. Marine Corps will have to move 6 of their operational VMFAs to
CVW/CV deployment pattern,
- the Corps will have to disestablish 1 reserve squadron as well.
Each Carrier Air Wing will consist of neither 60, nor 50, but as few
as 40 fighter/strike aircraft. It appears CVWR-20 will have only 3,
instead of 4, VFA/VMFA squadrons.
The main victim of these cuts (who fights with a sword [military
budget cuts] dies from a sword) will be F/A-18. Being aware of the
fact the Navy will procure 430 JSFs and 460 Super Hornets, and reduce
the number of aircraft per squadron to 10, we should drop thinking
about 12 F-35C + 38 F/A-18C/E/F in each CVW (and start thinking about
10+30, finally going to 20+20 or so).
Nobody says about any F-14 squadrons "vanishing" before their date of
redesignation to VFA and transition to F/A-18E/F. However, the Author
seemingly made a mistake. Before the F/A-18E/F transition started
within CVWs there were:
12 F-14A/B Tomcat squadrons - not 10,
24 USN F/A-18A/C squadrons - not 26,
4 USMC F/A-18C squadrons.
U.S. Marine Corps dreamed about having "All STOVL force before 2010".
The main obstacles to that were F/A-18A/C in 8+4 VMFAs, EA-6B in 4
VMAQs, and F/A-18D in 6 VMFA(AW)s? Would it be easier now? In my
opinion the idea may have been really great, but is an utopia when we
face the reality.
What's more - Marine F/A-18Ds may operate from carriers for the first
time, side-by-side with Navy C and E/Fs. Incredible!
And here are some of my kind suggestions of further military budget
savings >;-)
1) The U.S., having a fleet of 10 (+ 1 reserve) CVWs and 12 carriers
should consider quickly merging it with French Navy's Charles de
Gaulle. That would significantly reduce the costs and the operational
tempo for U.S. carriers, and the carriers' air groups will be very
similar in kinds and numbers of a/c (Rafale/Super
Etendard/Hawkeye/helos vs. JSF/(Super) Hornet/Hawkeye/helos).
2) When the UK has its future carriers, the U.S. should buy
Invincible-class ships to finally have a quiet little place for AV-8Bs
and JSF's STOVL version where they could not interfere with helicopter
operations (consider also point 1 for the Royal Navy as well).
3) A merge of USN and USMC tactical aviation? - a great thing to do
would be as well finally merging U.S. Air Force and Air National
Guard. The combined Air Force could finally find a mission - that's
true, it is desperately lacking it after the end of Cold War (and the
best cure is to kick other services out of the business).
4) Another successful merge should be that of USAF's Air Mobility
Command and Air Combat Command - anyhow, they cannot live without each
other, especially in the era of AEFs.
5) Finally, we should consider merging USAF and U.S. Army Aviation -
Russia already did it, and seems to be happy with the fact.
6) Getting away with ugly F-22 should make a lot of savings, and help
to collect money for the squadron of B747s armed with laser guns.
And a general conclusion - no matter what place on the world - USA,
Poland, or "Republic of Green Grass and Bushes" - too many politicians
are insane nowadays.
Sorry for bitterness and sorry, if I was too belligerent...
An article of a great importance, Gerry - thank you for providing us
with that!
Jacek Zemlo
USN&USMC aviation enthusiast
Poland