On Tue, 08 May 2012 13:20:50 -0400, Mason Barge wrote:
> On 8 May 2012 09:49:34 +0100, Ken Wesson <
kwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>>On Mon, 07 May 2012 15:02:14 -0400, Mason Barge wrote:
>>
>>> On 7 May 2012 04:36:08 +0100, Ken Wesson <
kwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>On Mon, 30 Apr 2012 08:49:38 -0700, BTR1701 wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> In article <4f9e2247$
1...@news.x-privat.org>,
>>>>> Ken Wesson <
kwe...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>>>> > Not if he signed a contract agreeing to certain behaviors in
>>>>>> > exchange for admission to their university. The contract would be
>>>>>> > legal and its effect wouldn't stop at their property line.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> But it *wouldn't make sense!*
>>>>>
>>>>> Not a requirement under the law.
>>>>
>>>>Perhaps it should be.
>>>
>>> "Should" is a tricky word. You want a governmental entity to intrude
>>> into the relationship between people and insitutions they join or
>>> attend?
>>
>>That ship has long since sailed. In all areas there are laws against
>>various forms of discrimination and sometimes affirmative action quotas
>>(I don't agree with the latter, by the way).
>
> There are no laws against any form of discrimination in admission to a
> private college,
42 USC Section 1981. And then there's likely various private causes of
action that could be brought.
>>You
>>can't contractually sell yourself into slavery and there are a variety
>>of other limitations on contract law, inalienable Xs and
>>non-transferable Ys, etc.
>
> That's true, but it's pretty much a meaningless generality
As support for my statement that the ship of government intervention in
private contractual relationships had already sailed, it is far from
meaningless.
>>Sure it is. Regardless of whether you intend to or not, losing the
>>option is a negative in any sane utility function. I don't plan to watch
>>Glee either, but I'd still consider being *barred* from doing so to be a
>>negative. Hell, what happens if I visit someone and they're watching it?
>>I might not want to watch Glee but I might want to visit that someone
>>and with the hypothetical ban I would not be able to, or would have
>>capricious restrictions on when I could at the very least. That's a
>>negative.
>
> That's a negative for you.
No.
> The whole point is, these people have a right of free choice and don't
> look to your standards or preferences.
No, apparently they look to completely spurious, capricious, and
frivolous ones that make no logical sense whatsoever.
>>One of their ideals is "not watching Glee"? That seems *exceedingly*
>>silly and pointless.
>
> Again, you are making a decision for them based on your own preferences
> and ideas.
Actually, I am basing my thoughts on *logical* preferences and ideas; in
particular, that what A does that has no effect on B is none of B's
business and B has neither the right to know about it nor should be able
to use it in a contract with A on unrelated grounds. For example, if A
contracts with B that B educate A on topic C in exchange for amount of
money D, it's logically irrelevant what television shows A watches away
from B's property and on A's own time as that affects neither B's
property, nor B's ability to perform to its contract with A or with other
students, nor A's ability to perform to his contract with B (i.e., pay
the tuition owed).
Particularly, B should not be imposing contract terms the violation of
which B can only detect through stalking and/or spying on A. I think
there should be a principle that if B, in the normal performance of its
duties per a contract and without going out of its way to look for a
violation of a particular clause, beyond searches of B's own property and
observations of goings-on on B's own property, could not detect a
hypothetical violation that A takes measures to conceal from public view,
then that clause should be deemed unenforceable. (A not paying tuition
would be obvious to B in B's examination of its own property, to wit its
bank balance, for example. A being disruptive in class would also be
obvious to B in observing its own property and in attempting to carry out
its teaching duties in the disrupted class. A watching Glee on the TV in
his own (off-campus) home with the curtains drawn, the sound turned down,
and no visitors could not be detected by B without intentional spying
outside of B's private property. So B is unaffected by whether A watches
Glee or not and B therefore has no logical reason to contract with A that
A cannot do so and there is no public interest justification in such a
clause being enforced. The ability to enforce such clauses does not
enable B to perform a business activity, provide a good or service, or
similarly that B cannot do anyway, or otherwise B could detect violations
automatically as a matter of course and that's clearly not the case here.)