In article
<
MPG.2c0a8cfe...@news.newsguy.com>,
"J. Clarke" <
jclark...@cox.net> wrote:
> In article <
msa1q85nm17ok4id5...@4ax.com>,
>
black...@gmail.com says...
> >
> > On Fri, 24 May 2013 19:43:09 -0700, JRStern <JRS...@foobar.invalid>
> > wrote:
> >
> > >On Thu, 23 May 2013 11:49:17 -0700 (PDT), RichD
> > ><
r_dela...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > >
> > >>You climb into your time machine, go back to Pearl Harbor,
> > >>Dec. 2, 1941. You command a battleship, moored at
> > >>Battleship Row. What do you do?
> > >>
> > >>Suppose you decide to take her out for maneuvers,
> > >>after midnight, Dec. 7. How does that play out?
> > >>
> > >>There's a book here, waiting for a serious writer. Or
> > >>perhaps it's already been done -
> > >
> > >One battleship couldn't stop the planes or make much counterattack.
> > >
> >
> > Probably the best move would be to find the commanding admiral one
> > evening in the officer's club and say:
> >
> > "'The men are rusty on AA drill sir, I think we should have a fleet
> > wide AA drill at dawn one Sunday morning when nobody is expecting it,
> > keep them at it for hours and make it seem real, issue live
> > ammunition and everything, I'll organise it, December 7th sound OK to
> > you?..."
> >
> > Then sit back and await promotion and medals...
>
> Wouldn't really have made much difference. The AA armament on US
> warships at the time was woefully inadequate.
Inadequate for proper defense. But sufficient to put up
a lot of opposition to the Japanese attack. The second
wave attack was much less effective and took more
losses and damage than the first wave - one reason why
Nagumo didn't send a third wave. Where the first wave
came in unopposed, the second wave encountered what
seemed to them like very heavy fire. IIRC, the torpedo
bombers, trying to make low-level runs across the
harbor, got shot up _very_ badly.
What was needed was
> fighter cover. Arrange a practice scramble and gunnery exercise for
> 7:30 AM Sunday and the Japanese might have ended up having a very bad
> day. For that you need to get to General Short, not Admiral Kimmel.
Which is hopeless. Short had no clue about air operations.
One might persuade his air deputy; but the chance of an
Army airman taking suggestions from a battleship captain
is nil.
> Or, Hell, just kick short in the butt hard enough to get him to get his
> B-17s out flying patrols. As a matter of pure bad luck the PBY that was
> supposed to cover the sector in which the Japanese were approaching had
> some kind of mechanical problem and wasn't where it was supposed to be.
AFAIK, there were no PBYs assigned to patrol N of Oahu.
Pac Fleet didn't have enough PBYs for training ops _and_
270-360 degree patrols. The patrols that _were_ sent out
were sent south and east, toward the Japanese-held
Marshall Islands, and over the area where fleet maneuvers
were being held every few days and Japanese subs might
be lurking.
> If Short had been conducting his own patrols there would have been
> double coverage and that wouldn't have happened.
If the Army planes had been used on patrol, they would
have shared duties with the Navy, not run overlapping
patrols. Probably having extra aircraft would have
allowed additional patrols to cover the northern sector.
But I don't think the Army had many B-17s at Oahu; and
I doubt if they were trained for patrol operations.
(A long over-water flight wasn't trivial then; a lot
planes just disappeared on such missions.)
> Now, you really want to ruin the Japanese' day? Contrive to put a
> radar-equipped PBY on the island.
The U.S. had no airborne surface search radar in 1941.
The British had some early forms of it, but not very
good. Effective air-to-surface radar had wait for
for the strapped cavity magnetron to be fully developed
and put in production, which wasn't achieved until 1943.
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