'INDIAN JUDICATURE: AN UNACCOUNTABLE MESS TO BE CLEANED UP' *** Jai Maharaj posts
and/or www.mantra.com/jai
Saturday, December 26, 2009
Indian judicature: an unaccountable mess to be cleaned up -- Noorani,
Krishna Iyer
Lawyers' ways
A.G. Noorani
Frontline
Jan. 17-30, 2009
David Pannick's book entertains even as it instructs and enlightens.
Book facts: I have to move my car: tales of unpersuasive advocates
and injudicious judges by David Pannick, Q.C>, Hart Publishing,
Oxford, pp. 299 L. 10.97
It is not given to lawyers, certainly to Indian lawyers, to carry
their learning lightly. David Pannick does so with remarkable ease. A
Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford, he is the author of Sex
Discrimination Law (1986) and two delightful books Judges (1987) and
Advocates (1992). Witty and erudite, they correct many a false notion
commonly held in India about the legal system in Britain.
Pannick has written for The Guardian. This is a collection of his
fortnightly columns from The Times -- 76 in all. The title is a take-
off from barristers who tell the judge that their closing submissions
to the jury will not take long because they would like to move their
car before 5 o' clock. The columns are carefully sourced.
Chief Judge Bazelon remarked that the comments by the lawyer, who
spoke with such humility, were not "reassuring" as to his
"effectiveness" in a serious criminal trial.
The author has been long at work collecting such cameos. He explains
how he went about it.
"I collect legal curiosities like others collect stamps, air miles,
or Impressionist paintings. My book has no characters other than
idiosyncratic judges and maverick lawyers. It provides no plot other
than the continuing saga of the common law as it follows the route,
as described by Lord Justice Diplock, of 'a maze and not a motorway',
which involves regular detours past all sorts of unexpected sights.
The following chapters serve no purpose other than entertainment,
save to provide reassurance on two matters. It confirms, if there
were otherwise any doubt, that the law is applied by human beings
some of whom suffer from all the prejudices, vanities and
irrationalities common to our species... this book should also
reassure judges and lawyers, as they toil in the dusty volumes of the
law reports or scroll down austere legal pages on the Internet, that
if they persevere they may just find something amusing."
An article aptly entitled "Sweet Dreams" records instances of
judicial somnolence. "What is surprising is not that judges
occasionally fall asleep during trials but that they normally manage
to stay awake.
Courts are often hot and stuffy, the evidence boring and repetitive,
the barristers long-winded and uninspiring. As Virginia Woolf wrote
in 1938, the volume and tedium of the work of lawyers explains why
they are hardly worth sitting next to at dinner -- 'they yawn so.'"
Nehru complained that lawyers' conversations fall into a pattern and
after a time the pattern begins to pall. He was right. Few lawyers
make good conversationalists. Most revel in anecdotes and stale
jokes.
As dinner companions, judges can be insufferable.
Pannick is liberal and tolerant to a fault. At times, excessively so.
Certainly his criticisms of some taboos, however justified in his
country, would be misplaced in India. "Lord Hailsham suggested in
1970 that it has been accepted since the seventeenth century that
judges cannot resume a career at the Bar. Certainly the Bar has
disapproved of any such return as a matter of policy, though it has
not imposed a prohibition. There is, though, no good reason to
prevent such action.
It cannot seriously be suggested that judges will look more
favourably on the submissions of one of their former colleagues." His
criticism of a consultation paper on barristers entertaining
solicitors would be misplaced here. That practice is rampant in many
a place in India. It is interesting to read of Justice McCardie who
tried Sir Sankaran Nair's libel case with utter lack of firmness.
"Lord Justice Scrutton humiliated McCardie when allowing an appeal
from his decision in a claim by a husband against another man for
allegedly enticing away his wife. Scrutton stated, 'If there is to be
a discussion of the relationship of husbands and wives, I think it
would come better from judges who have more than theoretical
knowledge.' Scrutton added, gratuitously, that he was 'a little
surprised that a gentleman who has never been married should, as he
has done in another case, proceed to explain the proper underclothing
that ladies should wear.' McCardie responded by stating in open court
that if any future case of his were to be the subject of an appeal to
a court of which Scrutton was a member, McCardie would not supply a
copy of his notes. The Lord Chancellor negotiated an uneasy truce."
Some of the columns were book reviews that are far from the stodgy
ones lawyers tend to write. Very many teach a lesson one should take
to heart.
Some courageous columns were written to expose a wrong or defend a
wronged person. The book entertains even as it instructs and
enlightens. It is a gift to carry learning so lightly.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2602/stories/20090130260207700.htm
The Indian judicature
There is a strong case to consider constitutional changes in the
judicial appointment process in India if disappointment is not to
visit judicial performance and disinvestment of democracy is not to
vitiate the judicative establishment.
V.R. Krishna Iyer
Frontline
May 25-June 7, 2002
Justice, justices and justicing are the triune facets of the judicial
process. The central figure, the protagonist of the drama of judicial
administration, is, of course, the robed brother on the bench who is
the symbol, the paradigm, the dynamic operator vis-a-vis the whole
dispensation of legal justice. So paramount is the role of the
forensic delivery system that sans judicial presence, jungle law and
demoniac democracy governs society, robbery rules as right, and rule
of law reigns as a bare rope of sand. This critical importance of the
judge is reinforced by our Constitution, which stresses, right in the
forefront, the solemn resolution of the people of India to secure
justice, social, economic and political. This three-dimensional
concept of constitutional justice lifts the court to the highest
level of authority and makes the judicature the foremost power under
the Republic, although it is often referred to as the least dangerous
branch of government, since it has neither the purse nor the sword,
sans which the might of the state is not within its province. Indeed,
human rights have reality only if judges, sensitive to social
concerns, are alertly available to undo violations or promote
enforcement. Justice is the end of government. It is the end of civil
society. In James Madison's words, justice has been and ever will be
pursued until it is obtained or until liberty be lost in the pursuit.
We cannot, however, exaggerate the judicial power or make it arrogate
to itself all the powers of the Republic. Alexander Hamilton's oft
quoted opinion is not irrelevant to the Indian counterpart: Whoever
attentively considers the different departments of power must
perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated from each
other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always
be the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution;
because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them. The
Executive not only dispenses the honours, but holds the sword of the
community. The legislature not only commands the purse, but
prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence
over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active
resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor
will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of
the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.
Nevertheless, it has been observed of the U.S. Supreme Court: The
least dangerous branch of the American government is the most
extraordinarily powerful court of law the world has ever known. The
power which distinguishes the Supreme Court of the United States is
that of constitutional review of actions of the other branches of
government, federal and State.
The Indian judicature, at the apex, deals with infinitely more number
of cases, more myriad issues of wide coverage and more plural
divisions of court than Washington's marble judicial marvel does.
Maybe a Montesquien division of the three branches may apply broadly
to the Indian political scheme, but our Constitution is not a
textbook application of the French jurist's project. Our founding
fathers had a fighting creed -- a democratic polity with an
egalitarian dimension and social justice quintessence, a
parliamentary process with a federal hue and limited sovereignty and
an Executive committed to massive socio-economic transformation and
human rights protection. Central to the vibrancy of this vision is a
unitary judiciary, independent, accessible and activist, functionally
instrumental as a sentinel on the qui vive and geared to a social
justice revolution and rule of law of crimson dynamism and vast
jurisdiction.
This constitutional compact is further reinforced by three great
Articles of empowerment. Article 141 grants the final forum, that is,
the Supreme Court, the ultimate authority to declare what the law is,
and its finality binds every adjudicatory body. Article 144 is a
celebration of this supremacy because it obligates all authorities,
civil and judicial, to act in aid of the Supreme Court. Article 142
is the jurisdictional infinity and remedial glory of the Supreme
Court in doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before
it. Vast, in all conscience, is this large power of considerable
stature, and so, the choice of the trustees of this somewhat
vistaramic functionalism has to be made with great circumspection and
creative attention. It is dangerous to invest unlimited authority in
midgets, delinquents, insolents, indulgents, persons with dubious
commitments.
The social philosophy of the Constitution and judicial convictions of
the Court must concur. The social philosophy of the robed brethren
and the social-economic-political justice projected in the Preamble
must find active concordance. The selecting agency, the selection
criteria and the very selection process need purposeful, paradigmatic
and public operationalism, with a sense of principled pragmatism and
uninhibited transparency. Oligarchic methodology in picking and
choosing judges is incompatible with democratic ideology. Esoteric
ways and iron curtain operations run counter to the democratic system
that judges are expected to uphold. To mystify the mode of
appointment of judges is unfair to the office which is public justice
and unjust to the selectors, leading to suspicion and speculation
about the manner in which the appointees have managed to gain
elevation.
Broadly speaking, David Pannick, a brilliant Q.C., puts the position
of judges in England correctly, with which Indian robed conservatives
cannot quarrel: Because the judiciary has such a central role in the
government of society, we should (in the words of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes) 'wash... with cynical acid' this aspect of public
life. Unless and until we treat judges as fallible human beings whose
official conduct is subject to the same critical analysis as that of
other organs of government, judges will remain members of a
priesthood who have great powers over the rest of the community, but
who are otherwise isolated from them and misunderstood by them, to
their mutual disadvantage.
Democratic methodology must operationalise judicial selection and
regulate their bench behaviour.
There is a strong case to consider constitutional changes in the
appointment process in India if disappointment is not to visit
judicial performance and disinvestment of democracy is not to vitiate
the judicative establishment, leading to court authoritarianism,
arbitrariness and sharp alienation from constitutional justice,
departure from probity and collapse of systemic propriety. The
Constitution, in explicit Anglo-Saxon, specificates a process. The
nine-judge bench, with divided opinions, has rendered a majority
verdict which reversed the intent and text of the Founding Fathers.
Independence of the judiciary has been accorded a paramountcy (of
imperium in imperio) by inventive interpretive genius and impractical
reasoning which is a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma. So
bizarre is the final formula that the grotesque effect of getting a
judge's name through to the President for signature is an arcane
operation which has neither speeded up the course nor improved the
quality of the selection, nor eliminated the potential for any hidden
agenda of particular senior judges. In principle non-transparent, in
selective range narrow, in performance dithering, dilatory and
personalised, the unwisdom and infirmities of the judicial
engineering under the new scheme totally divest the Executive of any
voice, never known in any country. The Venkatachaliah Commission has
made a tepid recommendation for a Judicial Commission.
The English practice is amusing, interesting and instructive. My
source is the delightful and informative David Pannick (Judges). Says
the author:
In 1986 Lord Hailsham attempted 'to dispel any lingering sense of
mystery or obscurity that there may be' about how judges are
appointed by publishing a guide to his policies and procedures.
The guide explains in bland terms the criteria for appointment. The
Lord Chancellor's policy is to appoint to every judicial post the
candidate 'who appears to him to be the best qualified to fill it and
to perform its duties....' It outlines the process of gathering
information and 'broadly based' consultations which precede an
appointment. Lord Hailsham had earlier described how the practice in
all High Court appointments is to hold a meeting between the Lord
Chancellor and the Heads of Division (the Lord Chief Justice, the
Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division, and the
Vice-Chancellor) at which a 'number of names is always discussed.
There is never a vote, but a consensus is usually arrived at....' I
never remember a case in which the decision, when made, was not in
fact a collective one.
Lord Halsbury, who is a legend, was an ugly example of partisanship
in choosing judges for high judicial office. I see no reason to trust
our high judicial echelons to be higher than Halsbury, once given
unaccountable administrative power of appointments. Prof. Griffith,
in his book The Politics of the Judiciary, writes: In a famous essay,
H.J. Laski recorded that between 1832 and 1906 out of 139 judges
appointed, 80 were Members of the House of Commons at the time of
their nomination and 11 others had been candidates for Parliament;
that, of the 80, 63 were appointed by their own party while in office
and 33 of them had been either Attorney-General or Solicitor-General.
Of the thirty judges appointed by Halsbury to the High Court, eight
were MPs at the date of their appointment and of these six were
Conservatives. Five others had been unsuccessful parliamentary
candidates, three of them being Conservatives. One other had been a
Conservative MP nearly twenty years before. So fourteen out of the
thirty appointments were, in those senses, of politicians -- and ten
were Conservatives. Heuston concludes that of Halsbury's 30
appointments to the High Court, four or five were men of real
distinction, eighteen or nineteen were men of competent professional
attainments, leaving no more than seven 'whose appointments seem
dubious'. Four of these seven were Conservative MPs on the date of
their appointment, one had been a Conservative MP, and another had
twice been an unsuccessful Conservative candidate.
In England, the power of appointment is with the politicians, and in
India it has been wrung by judges and will remain so until a
constitutional amendment introduces a well-balanced Commission.
Judges too have frailties and partialities even in judicial affairs.
In administrative matters they can be so without easy detection.
Choosing candidates for the Supreme Court habitually from Chief
Justices of High Courts is doubly dubious and hardly fair to great
puisne judges.
Promotion as Chief Justice is chancy, as I know, and picking from
that lucky lot is another gamble. The process, as at present, is a
casino game and promotes cultivation -- a subtle form of corruption -
- of Supreme Court chiefs.
David Pannick puts on record a British experience: Today, judicial
appointments are not made on a corrupt or politically partisan basis.
But the methods adopted continue to suffer from major defects which
harm the public interest. Judges are appointed by a process that
resembles a pre-1965 Conservative Party leadership contest or a Papa
Conclave rather than the choice of law-makers in a modern democracy.
Judges are chosen without any public discussion of their identity,
let alone of the merits or defects of the candidates.
Their appointments receive little, if any, public comment. The
reasons why one candidate, rather than another, has been recommended
to the Queen remain hidden in the files of the Lord Chancellor's
Department or concealed within the breasts of those senior judges
amongst whom 'soundings' have been taken. All of this serves to deter
public discussion of the criteria of good judges and to perpetuate
gossip (most of it untrue) about the reasons for the rejection of
certain candidates and the success of others.
In the USA the President has the power to appoint Supreme Court
Justices with the consent of the Senate. A Presidential nominee has
to undergo a Senate examination of his record and jurisprudential
beliefs. This serves a valuable function in helping to articulate the
criteria of a good judge, in publicising the beliefs of the nominee,
in rejecting inadequately qualified candidates, and in focussing
public attention on the process of appointment. The Senate has
declined to confirm twenty-seven of the nearly 140 Supreme Court
nominees placed before it since 1789. Other federal U.S. judges are
similarly appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by a
vote of the Senate. The tasks of the President and the Senate are
facilitated by the practice of the American Bar Association of
assessing whether the nominee is qualified to be a judge.
The more open, more critical American procedure of judicial
appointments could be imitated in England to great advantage. At
present we work on the doubtful principle that the Lord Chancellor
and senior judges will know the candidates for judicial office,
professionally or otherwise (p. 66-67). (The American political
abuse, sometimes outrageous, has been missed by dear David.)
What is most instructive is another constructive proposal in Britain.
I quote Pannick again:
In 1972 the Justice Sub-Committee which reported on the judiciary
wisely recommended that the Lord Chancellor should be helped in his
task by an appointments committee. This would allow for interested
bodies to make recommendations, or for interested persons to
apply....
The appointments committee could comprise representatives of the Law
Society, the Bar, academic lawyers, the judiciary, and perhaps some
lay members, for example highly trained and experienced personnel
officers skilled in selection procedures. The committee would not
fetter the decision of the Lord Chancellor on whom to appoint. Nor
would it introduce party politics into the process. It would,
however, add an element of professionalism into what is still an
amateur exercise. When judges are appointed to the Court of Appeal or
the House of Lords, the Committee could usefully publish a report on
the qualifications of the nominee. In this and other ways (such as
the publication of an annual report on judicial appointments) the
committee would introduce a much-needed public eye into what has
hitherto been a private appointment process (p. 67-68).
At this point, an exaggerated myth -- independence of the judiciary -
needs moderation. I quote Prof. Griffith:
What is meant by saying that judges must be impartial and seen to be
so? Judges themselves claim this as their great virtue and only
occasionally as it is seen to be departed from. Lord Haldane was a
practising barrister in 1901 when he recorded: 'I fought my hardest
for the Dutch prisoners before the Privy Council this morning, but
the tribunal was hopelessly divided, and the anti-Boers prevailed
over the pro-Boers. It is bad that so much bias should be shown, but
it is, I suppose, inevitable.'
D.N. Pritt in his autobiography told of his many political cases and
of one which 'came before a judge of great experience and knowledge,
so bitterly opposed to anything left-wing that he could scarcely have
given a fair trial if he had tried'.
Are such phrases applicable today? Every practising barrister knows
before which judges he would prefer not to appear in a political case
because he believes, and his colleagues at the bar believe, that
certain judges are much more likely than other to be biased against
certain groups, like demonstrators or students, or certain kinds of
action like occupations of property by trade unionists or the
homeless. This however is to say little more than that, as we have
already remarked, judges are human with human prejudices. And that
some are more human than others (p. 30-31).
The notable American book The Brethren, which has no counterpart in
India, observes ripping open the functional secrecy of the judiciary:
The United States Supreme Court, the highest court in the land, is
the final forum for appeal in the American judiciary. The Court has
interpreted the Constitution and has decided the country's pre-
eminent legal disputes for nearly two centuries. Virtually every
issue of significance in American society eventually arrives at the
Supreme Court. Its decisions ultimately affect the rights and freedom
of every citizen -- poor, rich, blacks, Indians, pregnant women,
those accused of crime, those on death row, newspaper publishers,
pornographers, environmentalists, businessmen, baseball players,
prisoners and Presidents.
When judges blunder critics thunder, since contempt law inhibition is
alien there (in the U.S.).
Of course, the law of contempt is liberal and free speech, as a
value, enjoys high priority in the U.S., but in India colonial
contempt jurisprudence is still a hangover. We need, I plead, a
Commission to investigate complaints about judges and provide for
punitive consequences for bad behaviour and gross incompetence. Chief
Justice S.P. Bharucha, frank and forthright, has admitted the
existence of corrupt judges, though provably few, impeachably fewer.
But by gossip, judicial delinquency is of proportions sufficient to
warrant a just and accessible but high-powered mechanism to
investigate venial deviancy. Dark room behaviourism is unbecoming of
high judicial office. Absent the system of electing judges, as in
several States in the U.S and in Switzerland, the scope for scrutiny
of candidates and incumbents must be provided by law. Contempt
justice is to defend the court process, not the conduct or reputation
of the judicial personnel - for which the law of the land will
suffice. Special free prosecutional facility, as in the case of
Ministers, may perhaps be made for judges too. The prolix,
promiscuous and in terrorem availability and use of contempt
jurisprudence, where even truth is no justification, exceeds
constitutional bounds and the High Bench, sitting in banc, must
civilise, liberalise, humanise and harmonise Free Speech and Contempt
Justice in a creative comity, tuned to the dialectic and dynamic of
democratic values.
There is no reason why American juristic scholarship should not give
us light. I will furnish a recent example of extraordinary, obnoxious
criticism of the most controversial ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court.
Jamin B. Raskin, Professor of Constitutional Law at American
University's Washington College of Law, wrote an article with a
vehement title ('Bandits in Black Robes') and a sub-title ('Why you
should still be angry about Bush v. Gore'). The article runs as
follows:
Quite demonstrably the worst Supreme Court decision in history, Bush
v. Gore changes everything in American law and politics. The
Rehnquist Court has destroyed any moral prestige still lingering from
the Warren Court's brief but passionate commitment to civil rights in
the middle of the last century. Now the court has returned to its
historic conservative role, rushing to aid the political party of
property and race privilege in a debased partisan way, torturing out
of the Equal Protection Clause new rules to assure the power of one
political faction. Bush v. Gore was no momentary lapse of judgment by
five conservative justices, but the logical culmination of their long
drive to define an extra-constitutional natural law enshrining the
rights of white electoral majorities, like the one that brought
George W. Bush the White House.
Imagine the Arundhati Roy case and compare it with the 'Bandits in
Black Robes' article. The Supreme Court of the U.S. has not
collapsed, nor has Prof. Raskin been incarcerated for gross contempt.
Lord Denning ignored a similar gross contempt case and demonstrated
how the dignity and performance of judges will overpower vituperative
rebuke by critics.
I plead for no serendipitous innovation but insist that the rule of
egalitarian law must run close to the realism of the social order.
The court, more than the 'brethren', must not lose its credibility
and the judges must be as sensitive as Justice Stevens, who in a
recent leading dissent in the notable Bush v. Al Gore wrote: What
must underlie petitioners' entire federal assault on the Florida
election procedures is an unstated lack of confidence in the
impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make the
critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed. Otherwise,
their position is wholly without merit. The endorsement of that
position by the majority of this Court can only lend credence to the
most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land. It
is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial system
that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one day heal
the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by today's
decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may never know
with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year's
Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear.
It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian
of the rule of law.
One of the worst weaknesses of the Indian court system is the
intolerable problem of arrears and delays. Various views have been
expressed plural proposals have been propounded and yet, Docket
Terrorism is still with us creating consternation. Some say that more
judges are necessary in proportion to the population. This would
result in a judicial over-population problem with benches
disagreeing, appeals multiplying and Parkinson's law proving its
validity vis-a-vis the judiciary. The more the judges the more the
work they create to fill the time available for its completion.
Multiply judicial numbers by ten and you will find multiplicity of
admissions, appeals, references, revisions and leisurely hearing with
judgments kept indolently pending, as now, for years. There is
another law known as the Peter Principle which lays down that each
functionary rises to the highest level of his incompetence. This rule
will fill the High Courts with incompetent subordinate judges who may
even ascend to the Supreme Court. Their incompetence is never exposed
because of the existence of contempt law. It is common knowledge that
standards are falling, procrastination is increasing and prompt
disposal, fair and square, is becoming a rarity. Why should this be a
pathology of the judiciary? Should there not be an enforceable code
of ethics which makes judges answerable and pronouncement of
judgments prompt and made with probity? As Chief Justice, M.N.
Venkatachaliah began a move which was taken to a much higher level by
Chief Justice J.S. Verma, but judges violate this ethics code and are
slipshod in the daily business in courts. A constructive
constitutional provision in the shape of a Code and a Commission may
get for us the best from our robed brethren.
The appointment of judges is delayed although the fact that vacancies
are coming up is known in advance. The nine-judge formula has not
accelerated the process of filling of vacancies. Why? Now the judges,
not the executive, must answer.
Fast track courts, part-time judges as in Britain, streamlining the
process in court, using commissions of advocates for many purposes,
appointing ad hoc judges and adopting the full potential of
information technology in the administration of justice may go a long
way in making short shrift of die-hard arrears. The Civil Procedure
Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure can be simplified instantly.
Execution proceedings can be similarly expedited and the law made a
model of fairness and speed.
Currently, even data about judicial arrears and other particulars are
difficult to get, nor are annual judicial reports brought before any
public body. Why not cyber courts that work as virtual courts, as
recently suggested by the member-secretary, Law Commission of India?
Why not utilise final year students and law teachers for smaller
forensic disposals? The legal and judicial professions are
indifferent except exceptionally, and treat the systemic collapse as
an inevitable evil -- more and more inevitable and less and less
evil. The imbroglio, it is a pity, is taken as a fait accompli. Fair
justice once denied, human rights vanish. Therefore, the national
problems of justice, justicing and justices must be regarded as a
people's programme.
V.R. Krishna Iyer is a former Judge of the Supreme Court.
A question of salaries
Mahatma Gandhi told the British Lord Chancellor in the 1930s that the
widest judicial power should be conferred on the apex court. The
question of emoluments was also mentioned by him. Today, forgetting
the penurious lot of the little Indian in large numbers, there is
fashionable demand for huge salaries. I quote Gandhi who told
England:
So far as the salary is concerned, you will laugh, naturally, but the
Congress believes that it is an impossible thing for us who, in terms
of wealth, are a nation of dwarfs, to vie with the British
Government, which represent today giants of wealth. India... can ill
afford to pay the high salaries that are commanded here. I feel that
it is a thing which we will have to unlearn if we are going to have
voluntary rule in India. It is all very well so long as British
bayonet is there to squeeze out of these poor people taxes to pay
these salaries of Rs.10,000 a month, Rs.5,000 a month, and Rs.20,000
a month. I do not consider that my country has sunk so low that it
will not be able to produce sufficient men who will live somewhat in
correspondence with the lives of the millions and still serve India
nobly, truly and well.
I do not believe for one moment that legal talent has to be bought if
it is to remain honest.
The price of justice shall not be beyond the access of the humble.
Today it is, and the wages of justice denied is violence on the
streets. I do not consider that the country is deprived of basic
patriotism so as to drive the people from the courts to the streets.
Do remember, legal aid is now a myth but must be enlivened. Justice
is what justice does. Let us make India:
A land of settled government,
A land of just and old renown,
Where Freedom slowly broadens down
From precedent to precedent.
(Oxford Quotations, p. 544-11)
http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl1911/19111020.htm
End of forwarded message from S. Kalyanaraman
Jai Maharaj, Jyotishi
Om Shanti
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