Fiction and reality (was Re: The Irrelevance of Asimov's Laws)
David Kassover
...
>
>How about:
>
>"The brain is a wonderful organ; it starts working the moment you get
>up in the morning and doesn't stop until you get to work." -- Steven
>Wright
This is an actual quote from somebody? I first heard it in grade school, in
somewhat different form, anonymously:
The human brain is a wonderful thing. It starts working the
moment you get up in the morning, and doesn't stop until you are
called on in class.
Also: The human body is a wonderful thing; it learns to walk
within months of birth and doesn't forget how until it obtains a
driver's license.
--
David Kassover "Proper technique helps protect you against
RPI BSEE '77 MSCSE '81 sharp weapons and dull judges."
kass...@aule-tek.com F. Collins
kass...@ra.crd.ge.com
Jim Kasprzak
|> In article <2ed8r7$o...@usenet.rpi.edu> kas...@rpi.edu writes:
|> >In article <2ed5c7$s...@rhombus.cs.jhu.edu>, call...@rhombus.cs.jhu.edu (Paul Callahan) writes:
|>
|> [deletions]
|> >
|> >|> I grant you that I can't criticize Asimov for failing to see the future,
|> >|> but I do criticize people who read Asimov and think they now know something
|> >|> about the kinds of machines that are likely to be called robots now or in
|> >|> the future.
|> >
|> > Yes, that much we can both agree on -- again, it's a question of telling
|> >the difference between fiction and reality.
|>
|> before we rest assured of this distinction, i would ask you to reconsider it.
|> are we interested in fiction because we *know* with certainty that nothing
|> in it can ever happen? i doubt this.
I won't completely disagree with you on this -- science fiction, and indeed
all fiction, deals with that which is nonexistent but in some way possible.
However, there's the literary interpretation of reality, and then there's the
world you see when you walk down the street in the morning. Paul's point, and
mine, is that you can't take the laws of robotics as presented in Asimov's
stories and use them as guidelines for the sort of robots that we are likely
to encounter in real life.
|> in fact, as is the case when one considers the difference between an
|> "autobiographical" text and a "fictional" novel written in the first
|> person, the difference is largely dependent on a prior *classification*
|> which may be altogether arbitrary.
I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying here. The difference
between history and fiction is far from arbitrary. _Moby-Dick_, for example,
is on one level a quite realisitc tale of life on a 19th-century whaling
ship. And we may even recognize that certain incidents and characters were
taken from ones which Herman Melville encountered in his life. But no one
is saying that _Moby-Dick_ is a literal autobiography of Melville.
Of course, I'll gladly entertain the notion that history itself is a good
part fiction, and even allow for the solipsist notion that everything outside
the realm of our own existence is fiction. But there's a time for
philosophical speculation and a time for sticking your head out the door and
seeing what reality throws at it. If you stand there and try to tell the
cruise missile homing in on you that it's not allowed to blow you up because
that would violate the First Law, then I'll be scraping pieces of you off of
the walls.
|> one very
|> interesting quality about fiction is that it have to be (mis)read with
|> doubt. but the doubt is not only about the facticity of the story, but also
|> about the fictional status of the story. what is interesting about fiction
|> is that it puts the division between "fiction" and "reality" in doubt.
The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
place in dealing with the world.
------------------------------------------------------------------
__ Live from Capitaland, heart of the Empire State...
___/ | Jim Kasprzak, computer operator @ RPI, Troy, NY, USA
/____ *| Support your local microbrewery.
\_| Life is too short to drink cheap beer.
==== e-mail: kas...@rpi.edu or kasp...@mts.rpi.edu
Barclay Blanchard
>kas...@okeeffe.its.rpi.edu (Jim Kasprzak) writes:
>: The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
>: concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
>: concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
>: place in dealing with the world.
>To quote the HitchHikers Guide to the Galaxy (computer game version):
>(Spoiler for the game)
>Intelligence is the ability to believe a thing and its opposite at
>the same time. Thus I am hungry and I am not hungry. Or I have
>Tea and No Tea
How cool! No wonder I loved your books and the game. Paradox is an intrinsic
and beautiful part of my life. I believe that your books helped engender that
in me... thank you.
--
Barclay Elizabeth Blanchard
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Life is too short to date insensitive, ill-read men.|bar...@rail9000.gatech.edu
Support your favorite rabhunk. |BAR...@DALVM3.vnet.ibm.com
marc.colten
>
> How about:
>
> "The brain is a wonderful organ; it starts working the moment you get
> up in the morning and doesn't stop until you get to work." -- Steven
> Wright
>
I saw this one on another newsgroup some time ago - sorry I don't have
who said it:
"If our brains were simple enough to understand, we would
be too simple to understand them."
kevin sawad brooks
>In article <1993Dec11.2...@midway.uchicago.edu>, ksbr...@ellis.uchicago.edu (kevin sawad brooks) writes:
>|> In article <2ed8r7$o...@usenet.rpi.edu> kas...@rpi.edu writes:
>|> >In article <2ed5c7$s...@rhombus.cs.jhu.edu>, call...@rhombus.cs.jhu.edu (Paul Callahan) writes:
>|>
>|> [deletions]
>|> >
>|> >|> I grant you that I can't criticize Asimov for failing to see the future,
>|> >|> but I do criticize people who read Asimov and think they now know something
>|> >|> about the kinds of machines that are likely to be called robots now or in
>|> >|> the future.
>|> >
>|> > Yes, that much we can both agree on -- again, it's a question of telling
>|> >the difference between fiction and reality.
>|>
>|> before we rest assured of this distinction, i would ask you to reconsider it.
>|> are we interested in fiction because we *know* with certainty that nothing
>|> in it can ever happen? i doubt this.
>
> I won't completely disagree with you on this -- science fiction, and indeed
>all fiction, deals with that which is nonexistent but in some way possible.
>However, there's the literary interpretation of reality, and then there's the
>world you see when you walk down the street in the morning. Paul's point, and
take this phrase as an example. it is quite a cliche. in that sense it
is nothing less or more than a "dead metaphor." but what is interesting is
that this dead meataphor arises (as the sun) just as you are trying to
distinguish fiction -- literature -- from the light of day. the point is
that both "real" and "literary" experience are mediated by language. to
the extent that literature is openly more about language than so-called
real-life, then literature is in many senses a more real approach to
understanding our real engagement with the world -- language.
>mine, is that you can't take the laws of robotics as presented in Asimov's
>stories and use them as guidelines for the sort of robots that we are likely
>to encounter in real life.
>
>|> in fact, as is the case when one considers the difference between an
>|> "autobiographical" text and a "fictional" novel written in the first
>|> person, the difference is largely dependent on a prior *classification*
>|> which may be altogether arbitrary.
>
> I'm afraid I don't understand what you're saying here. The difference
>between history and fiction is far from arbitrary. _Moby-Dick_, for example,
>is on one level a quite realisitc tale of life on a 19th-century whaling
>ship. And we may even recognize that certain incidents and characters were
>taken from ones which Herman Melville encountered in his life. But no one
>is saying that _Moby-Dick_ is a literal autobiography of Melville.
>
please see above.
> Of course, I'll gladly entertain the notion that history itself is a good
>part fiction, and even allow for the solipsist notion that everything outside
>the realm of our own existence is fiction. But there's a time for
not my point at all.
>philosophical speculation and a time for sticking your head out the door and
>seeing what reality throws at it. If you stand there and try to tell the
>cruise missile homing in on you that it's not allowed to blow you up because
>that would violate the First Law, then I'll be scraping pieces of you off of
>the walls.
>
>|> one very
>|> interesting quality about fiction is that it have to be (mis)read with
>|> doubt. but the doubt is not only about the facticity of the story, but also
>|> about the fictional status of the story. what is interesting about fiction
>|> is that it puts the division between "fiction" and "reality" in doubt.
>
> The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
>concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
>concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
>place in dealing with the world.
kevin brooks
ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu
--
"This is a signature?"
kevin sawad brooks
>Douglas Adams writes:
>>kas...@okeeffe.its.rpi.edu (Jim Kasprzak) writes:
>>: The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
>>: concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
>>: concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
>>: place in dealing with the world.
>
>>To quote the HitchHikers Guide to the Galaxy (computer game version):
>>(Spoiler for the game)
>>Intelligence is the ability to believe a thing and its opposite at
>>the same time. Thus I am hungry and I am not hungry. Or I have
>>Tea and No Tea
>
>How cool! No wonder I loved your books and the game. Paradox is an intrinsic
>and beautiful part of my life. I believe that your books helped engender that
>in me... thank you.
"i make it a point to believe seven impossible things before breakfast."
-- _alice through the looking glass_
David Zink
>In article <2edk9q$6...@usenet.rpi.edu> kas...@rpi.edu writes:
>>However, there's the literary interpretation of reality, and then there's the
>>world you see when you walk down the street in the morning. Paul's point, and
> ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
>take this phrase as an example. it is quite a cliche. in that sense it
>is nothing less or more than a "dead metaphor." but what is interesting is
>that this dead meataphor arises (as the sun) just as you are trying to
>distinguish fiction -- literature -- from the light of day. the point is
>that both "real" and "literary" experience are mediated by language.
Wrongo. For many people it *is* true, but for far more it is not.
The fact is different people have different methods for digesting
reality into comprehensible chunks. It is unfortunate, but most
people seem to think that everyone processes information the same way
they do. This is especially encouraged because the way one handles
information can have a subtle but profound influence upon the fields
one studies (or becomes interested in) and the sort of employment one
finds. So a lot of the people around you probably *do* think in a
manner similar to yours.
In fact, the entire point of the Taoist (pseudo) pursuit of satori is
to eliminate the mediation of language.
But the existence of non-linguistic thought structures is difficult to
demonstrate in words, because nearly every model of thought processes
(especially as describable on the net) is a verbal model.
The ability to see beyond, around or through the verbal categories is
one of the prime requirements for non-symbolic painting.
-- David
kevin sawad brooks
>
>Wrongo. For many people it *is* true, but for far more it is not.
>The fact is different people have different methods for digesting
>reality into comprehensible chunks. It is unfortunate, but most
>people seem to think that everyone processes information the same way
>they do. This is especially encouraged because the way one handles
>information can have a subtle but profound influence upon the fields
>one studies (or becomes interested in) and the sort of employment one
>finds. So a lot of the people around you probably *do* think in a
>manner similar to yours.
i'm not talking about "methods" for "digesting" "information."
i am talking about the very idea that "reality" as such is
discussed in terms of "methods," "digestion," and "information."
are you getting my drift? the point is that these terms might just
as well apply to written material as they do to "reality."
therefore i am arguing that western european notions (mixed with various
other notions) really have a trouble characterizing reality as
something entirely different than literature.
>
>In fact, the entire point of the Taoist (pseudo) pursuit of satori is
>to eliminate the mediation of language.
>
>But the existence of non-linguistic thought structures is difficult to
>demonstrate in words, because nearly every model of thought processes
^^^^^^^^
exactly.
>(especially as describable on the net) is a verbal model.
>
>The ability to see beyond, around or through the verbal categories is
>one of the prime requirements for non-symbolic painting.
>
> -- David
since i study painting, i wouldn't mind it if you explained several things:
1) your use of the term "non-symbolic"
2) "verbal categories"
3) "non-symbolic painting"
A Adams
:
: The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
: concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
: concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
: place in dealing with the world.
To quote the HitchHikers Guide to the Galaxy (computer game version):
(Spoiler for the game)
Intelligence is the ability to believe a thing and its opposite at
the same time. Thus I am hungry and I am not hungry. Or I have
Tea and No Tea
--
TTFN, Zaphod (Two Heads, No Brain)*E-mail*csc...@gps.leeds.ac.uk****
************************************snail*Flat 18,26 Brudenell Road**
**"If you're not here to kick *******mail*Leeds,LS6 1BD,UK***********
**ass, get out." - jms ***************Tel*UK-0532 789237*************
Marvin Minsky
>kas...@okeeffe.its.rpi.edu (Jim Kasprzak) writes:
>:
>: The human mind is a wonderful thing. It can simultaneously entertain the
>: concept that there is no clear line between fiction and reality, and the
>: concept that there's a distinct difference between the two. Both have their
>: place in dealing with the world.
>
>To quote the HitchHikers Guide to the Galaxy (computer game version):
>(Spoiler for the game)
>Intelligence is the ability to believe a thing and its opposite at
>the same time. Thus I am hungry and I am not hungry. Or I have
>Tea and No Tea
How about:
David Zink
ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>In article <2ejv2v$5...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
>are you getting my drift? the point is that these terms might just
>as well apply to written material as they do to "reality."
>therefore i am arguing that western european notions (mixed with various
>other notions) really have a trouble characterizing reality as
>something entirely different than literature.
Are you saying that because the language used to discuss literature is
a subset of the language used to discuss reality, they are the same?
Or are you saying that because the language *of* literature is of the
same kind as the language used to discuss reality, reality and
literature are the same?
If you are saying that a text of literature may well be
indistinguishable from a text of history, then I agree with you. Or
that the knowledge we have of the world away from our senses can only
be derived from those forms of literature known as `reportage' or
`history'.
But I got the impression that you were going a bit farther than that,
and were essentially confusing the map with the territory.
This is what you wrote:
> The point is that both "real" and "literary" experience are mediated by
> language. to the extent that literature is openly more about language than
> so-called real-life, then literature is in many senses a more real
> approach to understanding our real engagement with the world -- language.
If I knew that you understood that this is `your' real engagement with
the world, and not everybody's, I wouldn't be so bothered. But the
way you are using the language definitely subsumes all of humanity
within that `our', so I have to point out that you are writing a
large segment of the populace out of existence or consideration.
>>But the existence of non-linguistic thought structures is difficult to
>>demonstrate in words, because nearly every model of thought processes
> ^^^^^^^^
>>(especially as describable on the net) is a verbal model.
>
>exactly.
But that doesn't mean that they don't exist. I could hit you with a
stick, and defy you to find the words that would equal that
experience. The experience does exist, and half the people out there
could imagine swinging that stick and what it would feel like. But as
soon as they try to put it into words, it will be changed into
something different (by the limitations of the language). Limiting what you
will accept of your experience to what can be verbally mediated is a
tragic (though not unheard of) error.
>>The ability to see beyond, around or through the verbal categories is
>>one of the prime requirements for non-symbolic painting.
>
>since i study painting, i wouldn't mind it if you explained several things:
>1) your use of the term "non-symbolic"
>2) "verbal categories"
>3) "non-symbolic painting"
A traffic sign is a completely symbolized image. While an unretouched
photograph of a traffic sign may be symbolic in nature or intent, on
at least one level it is non-symbolic: the traffic sign is what it is
and is reflected without interpretation in the image. Normal
paintings fall in the range between these two extremes. One of the
ways in which painters fail to produce their intended effects is
caused by the verbal categories.
Verbal categories are one of the classic traps of Taoism or Zen
Buddhism. Objects in the world are distinguishable, yet many of them
are similar, and part of the power of language is the ability to group
them, for instance separating `chairs' from `tables'. This is a
distinction in our model of the world, but it is a fallacy to think
that reality makes any such distinction; consequently it can also be a
trap. This particular trap makes me think of crotchety elders:
``That's an *earring*, it goes in your *ear*!'' ``Women don't want
jobs like that!'' At best, categorization differentiates objects by
some attribute: At worst, it promotes the fiction that *other*
attributes obey the same category boundaries. And it almost always
does the latter. For instance, most people know that women are
physically weaker than men; I see quotes to that effect in the paper
every couple weeks. And in fact, it has been my general experience
that they are weaker. But that doesn't mean that my sister is weaker
than Stephen Hawking. Also, categories only have a best when the
attribute varies discretely; a continuous attribute, like age, almost
always causes problems. There is no other attribute that a twenty-one
year-minus-a-second old person lacks that a twenty-one-year-plus-a-
second old person has, that isn't (like ability to vote) *directly*
derived from his age. Believing that such a person is necessarily
more mature may not kill you, but it is always false.
If one is trying to paint a street scene containing a red Dodge, one
may get caught in the trap of painting a red Dodge. There has never
been a red Dodge. Objects in the real world are almost never
describable with one color word (though they may be indicated or
distinguished that way). They are composed of thousands of different
shades. `Red' by itself is a potential trap word. I've seen people
told to meet at the green car walk right past it because it was
obviously chartreuse. Also, told to paint a realistic still life,
beginning painters will often distort the perspective to show details
that they know are there, but should not be visible from the
perspective in the painting.
Basically, the trap of verbal categories is the refusal to let things
be what they are.
Iconification is the visual counterpart of verbalization; by
non-symbolic painting I meant those paintings or those aspects of
paintings that were not intentionally verbally mediated or iconified.
-- David
kevin sawad brooks
>In article <1993Dec15.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>
> ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>>In article <2ejv2v$5...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
>>are you getting my drift? the point is that these terms might just
>>as well apply to written material as they do to "reality."
>>therefore i am arguing that western european notions (mixed with various
>>other notions) really have a trouble characterizing reality as
>>something entirely different than literature.
>
>Are you saying that because the language used to discuss literature is
>a subset of the language used to discuss reality, they are the same?
>Or are you saying that because the language *of* literature is of the
>same kind as the language used to discuss reality, reality and
>literature are the same?
the second part of this seems closer to what i said. but i am saying that
whether or not reality differs from literature depends on how these two
are *represented*. by "representation" i don't mean a subject/object
relation, as this relation is itself the product of representation.
i am referring to "representation" as a *differential* system of signs,
in which each sign in the system is determined by its relation to the
other members of that system.
>
>If you are saying that a text of literature may well be
>indistinguishable from a text of history, then I agree with you. Or
>that the knowledge we have of the world away from our senses can only
>be derived from those forms of literature known as `reportage' or
>`history'.
>
>But I got the impression that you were going a bit farther than that,
>and were essentially confusing the map with the territory.
isn't a territory already part of a *system* of territoriality, of what
it means to divide things up and demarcate them, which is then *mapped*
onto *land*, which itself is easily mappable onto many metaphorical
meanings?
>
>This is what you wrote:
>> The point is that both "real" and "literary" experience are mediated by
>> language. to the extent that literature is openly more about language than
>> so-called real-life, then literature is in many senses a more real
>> approach to understanding our real engagement with the world -- language.
>
>If I knew that you understood that this is `your' real engagement with
>the world, and not everybody's, I wouldn't be so bothered. But the
>way you are using the language definitely subsumes all of humanity
>within that `our', so I have to point out that you are writing a
>large segment of the populace out of existence or consideration.
i am as aware as i can be of what i am saying when i don't "subjectivize"
my statement.
>
>>>But the existence of non-linguistic thought structures is difficult to
>>>demonstrate in words, because nearly every model of thought processes
>> ^^^^^^^^
>>>(especially as describable on the net) is a verbal model.
>>
>>exactly.
>
>But that doesn't mean that they don't exist. I could hit you with a
well, it *means* that these exist *for us* as examineable
to the extent that they can be represented. it should also
be noted that different ways of representing something will make
that something different to knowledge.
>stick, and defy you to find the words that would equal that
>experience. The experience does exist, and half the people out there
>could imagine swinging that stick and what it would feel like. But as
this subscribes to an extremely pessimistic theory of language, which
is put in question by your very attempt at representing it. the
question is: how are you representing "this" experience that to
my knowledge did not take place? "this" experience "exists" to the
degree that you are *able* to representing it at all. if we follow
the theory of language you endorse, then you are unable to even figure
the concept of experience at all without distorting it.
then you enter into an infinite regress of distortion to the point that
you you have to wipe out any idea of "idea," "knowledge," and even
"distortion." this leads to hyperbolic doubt. perhaps the only
think you cannot doubt, in this case, is that there is doubt.
i don't agree with such a theory.
>soon as they try to put it into words, it will be changed into
>something different (by the limitations of the language). Limiting what you
>will accept of your experience to what can be verbally mediated is a
>tragic (though not unheard of) error.
[deleted stuff about notions of "non-symbolic" painting]
the deleted stuff was based on some misconceived notion
of "icons" as natural signs that are not mediated by
symbolic language. question: how do you recognize an icon?
>
>Iconification is the visual counterpart of verbalization; by
>non-symbolic painting I meant those paintings or those aspects of
>paintings that were not intentionally verbally mediated or iconified.
>
> -- David
have you ever heard of "verbal icons?"
have you ever heard of the "intentional fallacy?"
David Zink
ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
> In article <2ets7d$a...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
> >In article <1993Dec15.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>
> > ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
> >>In article <2ejv2v$5...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
> i am saying that whether or not reality differs from literature depends on
> how these two are *represented*. by "representation" i don't mean a
> subject/object relation, as this relation is itself the product of
> representation. i am referring to "representation" as a *differential*
> system of signs, in which each sign in the system is determined by its
> relation to the other members of that system.
>>[you] were essentially confusing the map with the territory.
>
>isn't a territory already part of a *system* of territoriality, of what
>it means to divide things up and demarcate them, which is then *mapped*
>onto *land*, which itself is easily mappable onto many metaphorical
>meanings?
Sorry kid, that's territory, not territories: within a territory there
is not necessarily any demarcation. Furthermore, the point here is
that a map has aspects (such as demarcations) that do not exist in the
land, and to speak of the land as having them is to be confused. The
phrase `confusing the map with the territory' is a common way of
saying the same thing as `confusing the menu with the meal' or `trying
to eat the menu'.
>>If I knew that you understood that this is `your' real engagement with
>>the world, and not everybody's, I wouldn't be so bothered. But the
>>way you are using the language definitely subsumes all of humanity
>>within that `our', so I have to point out that you are writing a
>>large segment of the populace out of existence or consideration.
>
>i am as aware as i can be of what i am saying when i don't "subjectivize"
>my statement.
Yes, but this priveleged awareness of yours, does it include
depersoning that large portion of humanity? And, your awareness, does
it only extend to what you are currently saying, or can it extend to
include reconsideration of the meanings implicit in your past utterances?
I mean, you write `i am as aware as i can be' but you don't make clear
what you are aware *of*.
>well, it *means* that these exist *for us* as examineable
>to the extent that they can be represented. it should also
>be noted that different ways of representing something will make
>that something different to knowledge.
Exactly. And the difference between verbal/iconic representations and
non-verbal/non-iconic representations is the difference between
discrete and continuous representations. Since the real world is
essentially a mass of continuous processes, verbal/iconic
representations are necessarily handicapped and need to be used with
extreme care.
>>I could hit you with a stick, and defy you to find the words that would
>>equal that experience. The experience does exist, and half the people
>>out there could imagine swinging that stick and what it would feel like.
>>But as soon as they try to put it into words, it will be changed into
>>something different (by the limitations of the language).
>
>this subscribes to an extremely pessimistic theory of language, which
>is put in question by your very attempt at representing it. the
>question is: how are you representing "this" experience that to
>my knowledge did not take place? "this" experience "exists" to the degree
>that you are *able* to represent it at all.
I am *indicating* the experience, not representing it completely
enough for you to model accurately.
A representation or model of some set of objects can be said to be
Complete or Homeomorphic if every relationship between elements of the
base objects is preserved in the model. Models can be less accurate
than that, however, down to the point of being mere indicators, like
someone's name. If I told you I had lunch with Robert LeGault, this
would be sufficient to convey a large amount of information, *if* you
already had a personal model of the fellow (like Patrick Nielsen-
Hayden does). If you don't know Robert, this indicator `Robert LeGault'
will not convey much at all of the reality of Robert; you couldn't
even be sure such a person exists. Even with an infinite amount of
words, the full experience of Robert could not be conveyed.
>if we follow the theory of language you endorse, then you are unable to
>even figure the concept of experience at all without distorting it.
This is pretty much the basis (or at least one of the bases) of Taoist
and Zen Buddhist philosophy.
And it is quite true. You seem, however, to be quite stubborn about
one point here, so I will repeat it: Language is not the only tool for
manipulating experience to produce behavior; it is just a common and
inadequate one. Your inability to `figure the concept of experience'
(whatever that means: I hope I got the gist of it) is predicated upon
your reliance upon language as a mediative tool. (Is that `to figure'
as the antonym of `to ground' or as `to calculate' or as in
`figurative'?)
>then you enter into an infinite regress of distortion to the point that
>you you have to wipe out any idea of "idea," "knowledge," and even
>"distortion." this leads to hyperbolic doubt. perhaps the only
>think you cannot doubt, in this case, is that there is doubt.
>i don't agree with such a theory.
Hyperbolic doubt is unnecessary, though appropriate if most
conceptualization is done without verification in the external world.
If, on the other hand, you manage your uncertainty, carefully check your
results against reality (for instance, one can commonly find one
person doing something for another because `it will make him happy',
and ignoring the patent evidence that it is not doing so), and
maintain an open mind, than doubt need not be paralyzing.
If you look at what you really wrote, you will see that you are
arguing for certainty, and I have met too many `certain' people to
encourage such an approach. Also, while you may be certain you don't
agree, and have no doubt as to the correctness of your position, it
really has nothing to do with whether the positions *is* correct, a
distinction your discrete, deterministic and doubt-free model may obscure.
It is easily mathematically proven that a finite, discrete model
cannot accurately model a continuous process, just as the number PI
cannot be represented with a finite decimal number. However, there
are two basic ways to alleviate this difficulty. One is to iconize
(such as the symbol for PI) these non-representable aspects. The other
is to understand that the continuous system can be approximated with any
desired degree of accuracy by the discrete system. Both methods involve
a sophisticated understanding of the way discrete modeling can distort
the modeled system.
Also, they are necessarily insufficient. It has been proven that
there exist configurations of the solar system that will remain stable
as long as the sun lasts, and that there are also orbital configurations
that will cause the earth to recede beyond the current orbit of Pluto.
Between every pair of stable configurations there exists an infinite
number of unstable ones, and vice versa (in much the way the rational
numbers are interleaved with the irrational). With precise
measurements of the orbital motions of the planets etc. which type of
configurations is present would be determinable. But precise
measurements are impossible, and with measurements that are only to
any desired degree of accuracy, an infinity of each type of orbit is
possible.
Similarly, while the value of PI expresses the ratio between radius
and circumference of a circle in Euclidean geometry, there is no place
in the real universe where it does so (or at least can be *known* to
do so).
>[deleted stuff about notions of "non-symbolic" painting]
>the deleted stuff was based on some misconceived notion
>of "icons" as natural signs that are not mediated by
>symbolic language. question: how do you recognize an icon?
Actually, you need to be trained to recognize an icon, just like you
need to be trained to recognize a word. And I have no idea where you
got the idea I wrote of "icons" as natural signs. Quite the reverse.
In fact, the quote below is the only place I mentioned iconification.
>>Iconification is the visual counterpart of verbalization;
Do you claim I here wrote that verbalizations were natural signs not
mediated by language?
You can call my notions `misconceived', but it is clear you haven't
read them. What I actually wrote was that the mediation of language
is part of the process that converts `real-world' images into icons,
and additionally warps the proces of seeing so as to cause specific
types of distortions to appear in paintings.
>>Iconification is the visual counterpart of verbalization; by
>>non-symbolic painting I meant those paintings or those aspects of
>>paintings that were not intentionally verbally mediated or iconified.
>
>have you ever heard of "verbal icons?"
THere is no meaningful definition of a ``verbal icon'' that
distinguishes it from a ``word''.
>have you ever heard of the "intentional fallacy?"
Sure. But it is pretty irrelevant here: I am certainly making no
effort to guess the intentions of painters, rather I accept them at
their word. Furthermore, while any discussion of behavior that
attempts to differentiate between `intentional' and `unintentional'
behavior is necessarily inaccurate, it is not necessarily fruitless.
Take for instance the beginning painter who is frustrated by his
inability to accurately or convincingly represent a scene; what I
wrote of is some specific ways in which a reliance on verbal mediation
of experience can create this frustration.
>>Limiting what you will accept of your experience to what can be
>>verbally mediated is a tragic (though not unheard of) error.
Worth repeating.
-- David
Jim Kasprzak
|> In article <2edk9q$6...@usenet.rpi.edu> kas...@rpi.edu writes:
|> >However, there's the literary interpretation of reality, and then there's the
|> >world you see when you walk down the street in the morning.
|>
|> take this phrase as an example. it is quite a cliche. in that sense it
|> is nothing less or more than a "dead metaphor." but what is interesting is
|> that this dead meataphor arises (as the sun) just as you are trying to
|> distinguish fiction -- literature -- from the light of day. the point is
|> that both "real" and "literary" experience are mediated by language. to
|> the extent that literature is openly more about language than so-called
|> real-life, then literature is in many senses a more real approach to
|> understanding our real engagement with the world -- language.
However, I've read the above words several times and, as far as I can tell,
they don't say anything.
kevin sawad brooks
>In article <1993Dec18.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>
> ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>> In article <2ets7d$a...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
>> >In article <1993Dec15.0...@midway.uchicago.edu>
>> > ksbr...@midway.uchicago.edu writes:
>> >>In article <2ejv2v$5...@panix.com> zi...@panix.com (David Zink) writes:
>> i am saying that whether or not reality differs from literature depends on
>> how these two are *represented*. by "representation" i don't mean a
>> subject/object relation, as this relation is itself the product of
>> representation. i am referring to "representation" as a *differential*
>> system of signs, in which each sign in the system is determined by its
>> relation to the other members of that system.
>
>
>>>[you] were essentially confusing the map with the territory.
>>
>>isn't a territory already part of a *system* of territoriality, of what
>>it means to divide things up and demarcate them, which is then *mapped*
>>onto *land*, which itself is easily mappable onto many metaphorical
>>meanings?
>
>Sorry kid, that's territory, not territories: within a territory there
the distinction is irrelevant, kid. as soon as one demarcates --
thinks of, represents, whatever -- a territory, one also sets up
a distinction between inside (the representation, demarcation, whatever)
and outside (...).
>is not necessarily any demarcation.
it is necessarily demarcation, representation, whatever, ...
Furthermore, the point here is
>that a map has aspects (such as demarcations) that do not exist in the
>land, and to speak of the land as having them is to be confused. The
this indicates our basic point of disagreement: you presuppose that
such 'land' is present to knowledge while at the same time outside of
representation. you base your arguments on a "scientific" perceptual
model (subject/object), while my understanding is dialectical.
>phrase `confusing the map with the territory' is a common way of
>saying the same thing as `confusing the menu with the meal' or `trying
>to eat the menu'.
i am aware of your use of the "dead metaphor." i was trying to add
some complexity to the problem.
>
>>>If I knew that you understood that this is `your' real engagement with
>>>the world, and not everybody's, I wouldn't be so bothered. But the
>>>way you are using the language definitely subsumes all of humanity
>>>within that `our', so I have to point out that you are writing a
>>>large segment of the populace out of existence or consideration.
>>
>>i am as aware as i can be of what i am saying when i don't "subjectivize"
>>my statement.
>
>Yes, but this priveleged awareness of yours, does it include
>depersoning that large portion of humanity? And, your awareness, does
^^^^^^^^^^^
word?
>it only extend to what you are currently saying, or can it extend to
>include reconsideration of the meanings implicit in your past utterances?
>
meaning is not implicit in any utterance. past utterances are no longer
the same (past utterance) once one returns to them for reconsideration.
A != A
>I mean, you write `i am as aware as i can be' but you don't make clear
>what you are aware *of*.
read my past utterances.
>
>>well, it *means* that these exist *for us* as examineable
>>to the extent that they can be represented. it should also
>>be noted that different ways of representing something will make
>>that something different to knowledge.
>
>Exactly. And the difference between verbal/iconic representations and
>non-verbal/non-iconic representations is the difference between
>discrete and continuous representations.
i defy you to prove that any representation is "continuous."
Since the real world is
>essentially a mass of continuous processes, verbal/iconic
>representations are necessarily handicapped and need to be used with
>extreme care.
>
>>>I could hit you with a stick, and defy you to find the words that would
>>>equal that experience. The experience does exist, and half the people
>>>out there could imagine swinging that stick and what it would feel like.
>>>But as soon as they try to put it into words, it will be changed into
>>>something different (by the limitations of the language).
>>
>>this subscribes to an extremely pessimistic theory of language, which
>>is put in question by your very attempt at representing it. the
>>question is: how are you representing "this" experience that to
>>my knowledge did not take place? "this" experience "exists" to the degree
>>that you are *able* to represent it at all.
>
>I am *indicating* the experience, not representing it completely
>enough for you to model accurately.
how are you *representing* indication???????
>
>A representation or model of some set of objects can be said to be
>Complete or Homeomorphic if every relationship between elements of the
>base objects is preserved in the model. Models can be less accurate
>than that, however, down to the point of being mere indicators, like
>someone's name. If I told you I had lunch with Robert LeGault, this
>would be sufficient to convey a large amount of information, *if* you
>already had a personal model of the fellow (like Patrick Nielsen-
>Hayden does). If you don't know Robert,
what does it mean to know or not know robert? know is a completely
slippery term. maybe i"know" a robert but i mistakenly think that
it is your robert. your theory is deterministic as hell. it cannot
allow for error as part of the system.
this indicator `Robert LeGault'
>will not convey much at all of the reality of Robert; you couldn't
>even be sure such a person exists. Even with an infinite amount of
>words, the full experience of Robert could not be conveyed.
>
>>if we follow the theory of language you endorse, then you are unable to
>>even figure the concept of experience at all without distorting it.
>
>This is pretty much the basis (or at least one of the bases) of Taoist
>and Zen Buddhist philosophy.
>
>And it is quite true.
nietzsche asks: "what is truth?" he responds: "an army of metaphors,
metonymies, and anthropomorphisms."
You seem, however, to be quite stubborn about
>one point here, so I will repeat it: Language is not the only tool for
>manipulating experience to produce behavior; it is just a common and
>inadequate one. Your inability to `figure the concept of experience'
>(whatever that means: I hope I got the gist of it) is predicated upon
>your reliance upon language as a mediative tool. (Is that `to figure'
>as the antonym of `to ground' or as `to calculate' or as in
>`figurative'?)
it is in fact you that relies on language as a mediating tool:
language, for you, is *only* a mediating tool. this is generated
from your use of a perceptual model.
figurative - to represent with the use of (rhetorical) figures.
>
>>then you enter into an infinite regress of distortion to the point that
>>you you have to wipe out any idea of "idea," "knowledge," and even
>>"distortion." this leads to hyperbolic doubt. perhaps the only
>>think you cannot doubt, in this case, is that there is doubt.
>>i don't agree with such a theory.
>
>Hyperbolic doubt is unnecessary, though appropriate if most
>conceptualization is done without verification in the external world.
ah, the old perceptual model again.
>If, on the other hand, you manage your uncertainty, carefully check your
>results against reality (for instance, one can commonly find one
more perceptual model stuff.
>person doing something for another because `it will make him happy',
>and ignoring the patent evidence that it is not doing so), and
^^^^^^^^
ah, now we have willfull ignorance being advocated -- very nice.
>maintain an open mind, than doubt need not be paralyzing.
>
>If you look at what you really wrote, you will see that you are
>arguing for certainty, and I have met too many `certain' people to
>encourage such an approach. Also, while you may be certain you don't
>agree, and have no doubt as to the correctness of your position, it
>really has nothing to do with whether the positions *is* correct, a
>distinction your discrete, deterministic and doubt-free model may obscure.
>
i am certainly not arguing for certainty! (word play)
>It is easily mathematically proven that a finite, discrete model
>cannot accurately model a continuous process, just as the number PI
>cannot be represented with a finite decimal number. However, there
>are two basic ways to alleviate this difficulty. One is to iconize
>(such as the symbol for PI) these non-representable aspects. The other
>is to understand that the continuous system can be approximated with any
>desired degree of accuracy by the discrete system. Both methods involve
>a sophisticated understanding of the way discrete modeling can distort
>the modeled system.
the question is whether "continuous" forms of representation
exist at all. diff calculus, to the extent that it depends on
writing, is not continuous.
[cut off a bunch of other stuff that i cared less about than the stuff above]
roger m squires
>>...i am arguing that western european notions (mixed with various
>>other notions) really have a trouble characterizing reality as
>>something entirely different than literature.
You might enjoy Nehamas' _Nietzsche: Life As Literature_.
He says "N., I argue, looks at the world in general as if
it were a sort of artwork; in particular, he looks at it
as if it were a literary text. And he arrives at many of
his views of the world and the things within it, including
his views of human beings, by generalizing to them ideas
and principles that apply almost intuitively to the
literary situation..."
rms
David Zink
dsz: is me.
ksb: isn't a territory already part of a *system* of territoriality, of what
ksb: it means to divide things up and demarcate them, which is then *mapped*
ksb: onto *land*, which itself is easily mappable onto many metaphorical
ksb: meanings?
dsz:
dsz: Sorry kid, that's territory, not territories: within a territory there
dsz: is not necessarily any demarcation.
ksb:
ksb: the distinction is irrelevant, kid. as soon as one demarcates --
ksb: thinks of, represents, whatever -- a territory, one also sets up
ksb: a distinction between inside (the representation, demarcation, whatever)
ksb: and outside (...).
The distinction is damn relevant: as long as one was only talking
about the area inside the territory, then there are no demarcations.
The demarcations are only relevant when one tries to look at some area
that crosses the boundary. For instance, if one starts by saying that
there is a prime piece of real-estate known as the solar system, that
does not magically establish the borders of the nations on Earth. And
no mapping to or from Earth will reference that demarcation drawn
around the solar system at all.
dsz: within a territory there is not necessarily any demarcation.
ksb:
ksb: it is necessarily demarcation, representation, whatever, ...
*WITHIN* *WITHIN* *WITHIN* You are *extraordinarily* dense.
dsz: Furthermore, the point here is that a map has aspects (such as
dsz: demarcations) that do not exist in the land, and to speak of the land
dsz: as having them is to be confused.
ksb:
ksb: this indicates our basic point of disagreement: you presuppose that
ksb: such 'land' is present to knowledge while at the same time outside of
ksb: representation. you base your arguments on a "scientific" perceptual
ksb: model (subject/object), while my understanding is dialectical.
Dialectical? Do you have *any* idea what that word means? It's no
big surprise you won't acknowledge the presence of the universe, since
the universe won't argue with you *in words*. But your model fails
anyway, unless you can show that the universe is keeping no secrets
from you.
dsz: The phrase `confusing the map with the territory' is a common way of
dsz: saying the same thing as `confusing the menu with the meal' or `trying
dsz: to eat the menu'.
ksb:
ksb: i am aware of your use of the "dead metaphor." i was trying to add
ksb: some complexity to the problem.
Let's get this straight: your figurative use of `dead' is somehow
priveleged over any attempt to communicate?
Who's been killing the great metaphors of English?
dsz: If I knew that you understood that this is `your' real engagement with
dsz: the world, and not everybody's, I wouldn't be so bothered. But the
dsz: way you are using the language definitely subsumes all of humanity
dsz: within that `our', so I have to point out that you are writing a
dsz: large segment of the populace out of existence or consideration.
ksb:
ksb: i am as aware as i can be of what i am saying when i don't "subjectivize"
ksb: my statement.
dsz:
dsz: Yes, but this priveleged awareness of yours, does it include
dsz: depersoning that large portion of humanity? And, your awareness, does
ksb: ^^^^^^^^^^^
ksb: word?
Reply?
Sentence?
Capitalization?
(And, yes, jargon, but common enough, and, word. Despite the fact you
admit to intentionally misunderstanding things to complicate the
conversation, I'll even define it for you: to make into an unperson.)
ksb: meaning is not implicit in any utterance. past utterances are no longer
ksb: the same (past utterance) once one returns to them for reconsideration.
ksb:
ksb: A != A
ksb:
dsz: I mean, you write `i am as aware as i can be' but you don't make clear
dsz: what you are aware *of*.
ksb:
ksb: read my past utterances.
They were unclear the first time, you pathetic bumbler. I queried
them, and so far you have made no response. Once more I suggest you find
out what `dialectical' *really* means, and try to confine yourself thereto.
ksb: i defy you to prove that any representation is "continuous."
I defy you to prove that the real numbers between 0 and 1 inclusive, a
representation of distances along a line, are not continuous.
As far as that goes, I defy you to prove anything without cribbing, or
even propose a vaguely logical argument. I don't think you understand
the process.
ksb: this subscribes to an extremely pessimistic theory of language, which
ksb: is put in question by your very attempt at representing it. the
ksb: question is: how are you representing "this" experience that to
ksb: my knowledge did not take place? "this" experience "exists" to the degree
ksb: that you are *able* to represent it at all.
dsz:
dsz: I am *indicating* the experience, not representing it completely
dsz: enough for you to model accurately.
ksb:
ksb: how are you *representing* indication???????
With words!!!!!!!
dsz: A representation or model of some set of objects can be said to be
dsz: Complete or Homeomorphic if every relationship between elements of the
dsz: base objects is preserved in the model. Models can be less accurate
dsz: than that, however, down to the point of being mere indicators, like
dsz: someone's name. If I told you I had lunch with Robert LeGault, this
dsz: would be sufficient to convey a large amount of information, *if* you
dsz: already had a personal model of the fellow (like Patrick Nielsen-
dsz: Hayden does). If you don't know Robert,
ksb: what does it mean to know or not know robert? know is a completely
ksb: slippery term. maybe i"know" a robert but i mistakenly think that
ksb: it is your robert. your theory is deterministic as hell. it cannot
ksb: allow for error as part of the system.
Exactly; unfortunately it is not my system, but yours. *You* allow no
representation but with words, and commonly confuse indicators with
complete representations.
dsz: This is pretty much the basis (or at least one of the bases) of Taoist
dsz: and Zen Buddhist philosophy.
dsz:
dsz: And it is quite true.
ksb:
ksb: nietzsche asks: "what is truth?" he responds: "an army of metaphors,
ksb: metonymies, and anthropomorphisms."
Which shows how much Nietzsche knows about truth. He's dead now, but
he probably never caught on that the death that happened to him was
not a metaphor, a metonym, or an anthropomorphism, but just death.
ksb: it is in fact you that relies on language as a mediating tool:
ksb: language, for you, is *only* a mediating tool. this is generated
ksb: from your use of a perceptual model.
ksb:
ksb: figurative - to represent with the use of (rhetorical) figures.
You wrote that I claimed that it was impossible to `figure the
concept of experience without distorting it'.
I still claim that. If you think that you can contruct a metaphor or
simile that does not distort what it represents, then there is really
no point in our continuing to debate: you are out of your gourd.
ksb: then you enter into an infinite regress of distortion to the point that
ksb: you you have to wipe out any idea of "idea," "knowledge," and even
ksb: "distortion." this leads to hyperbolic doubt. perhaps the only
ksb: think you cannot doubt, in this case, is that there is doubt.
ksb: i don't agree with such a theory.
dsz:
dsz: Hyperbolic doubt is unnecessary, though appropriate if most
dsz: conceptualization is done without verification in the external world.
ksb:
ksb: ah, the old perceptual model again.
I thought this style of argument went out with McCarthy.
dsz: If, on the other hand, you manage your uncertainty, carefully check your
dsz: results against reality (for instance, one can commonly find one
dsz: person doing something for another because `it will make him happy',
dsz: and ignoring the patent evidence that it is not doing so), and
ksb: ^^^^^^^^
dsz: maintain an open mind, than doubt need not be paralyzing.
ksb: ah, now we have willfull ignorance being advocated -- very nice.
Advocated? I may be having difficulty with the language, but you
certainly are having difficulty with thought. That was an example of
what *not* to do, and clearly the opposite of the directive.
dsz: If you look at what you really wrote, you will see that you are
dsz: arguing for certainty, and I have met too many `certain' people to
dsz: encourage such an approach. Also, while you may be certain you don't
dsz: agree, and have no doubt as to the correctness of your position, it
dsz: really has nothing to do with whether the positions *is* correct, a
dsz: distinction your discrete, deterministic and doubt-free model may obscure.
dsz:
ksb:
ksb: i am certainly not arguing for certainty! (word play)
Of course you are. Reread your posts. I know that they don't mean
anything to you now, you've written them, you've posted them, and they
are history, no longer meaning what you meant or what you mean, just
sort of semantic objects floating in the Usenet void. But you made
those arguments, you argued against any possibilty of doubt, you
argued that the words you use are not just accurate representations of
reality but so accurate that reality need not even be considered.
ksb: the question is whether "continuous" forms of representation
ksb: exist at all. diff calculus, to the extent that it depends on
ksb: writing, is not continuous.
Which is why they use variables and pass around iconic items like PI,
and why they understand that any concrete answers are inexact.
So far you've responded to a third of the points made and responded
cogently to at most two. Most of your responses are of the form:
``Your understanding is perceptual and mine is dialectical, so I'm
right.'' And additionally you waste a considerable amount of time
purposely misunderstanding things (as in:
ksb: i am aware of your use of the "dead metaphor." i was trying to add
ksb: some complexity to the problem.
) which creates a great deal
of difficulty since you seemingly understand so very little, and it is
impossible to tell whether any failure of yours reflects the
overwhelming of your mental faculties, or merely an attempt by you to
get me to respond at length so that you can feel some sort of power
over others.
You should be able to take the whole (or any part) of what you've
written and hold it up for inspection (note that this is *figurative*
language, you bozo) and say what parts you stand behind, and about
which parts your opinion has changed. Since instead you write:
ksb: meaning is not implicit in any utterance. past utterances are no longer
ksb: the same (past utterance) once one returns to them for reconsideration.
ksb:
ksb: A != A
ksb:
dsz: I mean, you write `i am as aware as i can be' but you don't make clear
dsz: what you are aware *of*.
ksb:
ksb: read my past utterances.
and make it quite clear you cannot handle even the simple syllogism
implied, for what reason is it worth continuing to discuss materrs
with you?
-- David