Re: Late capitalism? - painting by numbers
James Whitehead
news:4401b40d....@news.venturecomm.net...
> On Fri, 24 Feb 2006 20:32:15 GMT, smw <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>
> >
> >
> >Richard Harter wrote:
> [snip]
>
> >Elaborate with regard to the concept "art."
>
> When the sculptor chooses to cut one way rather than another, how does
> she know which way to cut?
>
That is lost to us-
but in conceptual art terms such choices are **irrelevant**-
A German officer visiting Picasso's studio once held up a post card of
guernica-
"Did you do this" - he asked..
Picasso relied -
"No - you did!"
Perhaps thats not clear - but its a nice quote - if art was simply the
application of a set of rules - a process of thought - a representation of
something else - then in principle it is followed it is translatable, and
never unique. Its painting by numbers!
There are clues - "minimal" "untitled" or Newman's "Adam"
>
> Richard Harter, c...@tiac.net
> http://home.tiac.net/~cri, http://www.varinoma.com
> It is not wise to examine apparent coincidences too closely.
> Sometimes they are not coincidences at all.
Immortalist
"James Whitehead" <x...@yyy.co.uk> wrote in message
news:dtsnlf$l9l$1...@newsg4.svr.pol.co.uk...
> Richard Harter" <c...@tiac.net> wrote in message
> news:4401b40d....@news.venturecomm.net...
>> On Fri, 24 Feb 2006 20:32:15 GMT, smw <sm...@ameritech.net> wrote:
>>
>> >
>> >
>> >Richard Harter wrote:
>> [snip]
>>
>> >Elaborate with regard to the concept "art."
>>
>> When the sculptor chooses to cut one way rather than another, how does
>> she know which way to cut?
>>
> That is lost to us-
>
> but in conceptual art terms such choices are **irrelevant**-
>
> A German officer visiting Picasso's studio once held up a post card of
> guernica-
>
> "Did you do this" - he asked..
>
> Picasso relied -
>
> "No - you did!"
>
Do you mean that "this" is the work-of-art-itself or
what-the-work-rerepresents-in-appearance?
Nonetheless the point you make is powerful since in some sense the
representation confronts the creater of what was represented.
in aesthetics, representationalism is the idea that art ought to represent
reality. This view is sometimes and especially popularly called realism, at
least in the visual arts - in literature, realism is something akin to
naturalism.
http://www.swif.uniba.it/lei/foldop/foldoc.cgi?representationalism
With regard to the visual arts, realism is the portrayal of scenes, objects,
and people in ways that are immediately intelligible to the viewer; this is
often called representationalism and is usually contrasted with
abstractionism. With regard to literature, realism is a focus on the
often-gritty reality of life as it is, without the idealization inherent in
romanticism; this usage is sometimes also applied in the visual arts.
http://www.ismbook.com/realism.html
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
http://sharp.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
In the philosophy of perception, that perceptual errors exist is most
frequently regarded as a fundamental fact about perception which must be
integrated into any coherent theory. But the position that the existence of
perceptual errors ought not serve as a premise in an argument about the
nature of perception, since any account of perceptual error presupposes a
particular understanding of the nature of perception. In fact, any theory of
perceptual error presupposes a particular model of consciousness, one in
which there exists a possible correspondence relation between the objects of
direct perception and external objects. In other words, the assumption that
perceptual errors exist depends upon a representational model of
consciousness, which may or may not accurate describe the functions of
consciousness.
Representationalism (or indirect realism) with respect to perception is the
view that "we are never aware of physical objects, [but rather] we are only
indirectly aware of them, in virtue of a direct awareness of an intermediary
[mental] object. (Dancy, 145) Because there are both direct and indirect
objects of awareness in representationalism, a correspondence relation
arises between the mental entities directly perceived and external objects
which those mental entities represent. And thus perceptual error occurs when
the two objects of awareness do not correspond sufficiently well. In
opposition to representationalism, both (direct) realism and idealism agree
that perception is direct and unmediated, despite their disagreements about
what the object of perception is. (Dancy, 145) In any form of direct
perception, no correspondence relationship is possible, since there is only
one object of perception. Thus only representationalism will give rise to
the view that perceptual errors exist and must be part of a theory of
perception. Nevertheless, both idealism and realism must still account for
the facts that are referred to as "perceptual errors" by the
representationalist.
http://www.dianahsieh.com/undergrad/rape.html
Of the ideas that cognitive scientists and the philosophers associated with
them have taken over from Kant, probably the best-known is the doctrine that
representation, much of it at any rate, requires concepts as well as
percepts -- rule-guided acts of cognition as well as deliverances of the
senses. This doctrine has become as orthodox in cognitive science as it was
central to Kant. Its origins in Kant are so well known that it is not
necessary to say anything more about it. As Kant put it, "Concepts without
intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind". In
contemporary jargon, discriminations need information, but we must be able
to discriminate patterns of various kinds in information before it is of any
use to us.
Kant and Cognitive Science
http://www.carleton.ca/~abrook/KNT-CGSC.htm
It is relatively uncontroversial that minds represent the world. That I have
the belief that that the world is warming means that I represent the world
as being a certain way. Accepting this does not commit one to the existence
of states internal to the mind which themselves represent.
Mental Representations
http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/mr.htm
presentation: [Vorstellung, or 'representation'] The manner in which the
mind apprehends something (e.g. my concept of a 'horse' is a presentation of
the general quality of being a horse; my intuition of 'Desert Orchid' is my
immediate presentation of that particular horse). There are some contexts,
however, in which Kant evidently restricts the meaning of 'presentation' to
sensible presentations.
representation: the most general word for an object at any stage in its
deč˛ ermination by the subject, or for the subjective act of forming the
object at that level. The main types of representations are intuitions,
concepts and ideas.
145. REPRESENTATION [A320/B376] "There is no lack of terms suitable for
each kind of representation...Their serial arrangement is as follows. The
genus is representation in general (repreaesentatio). Subordinate to it
stands representation with consciousness (perceptio}. A perception which
relates solely to the subject as the modification of its state is sensation
(sensatio), an objective perception is knowledge (cognitio). This is either
intuition or concept (intuitus vel conceptus)". In addition to concepts,
intuitions, sensations, and perceptions, Kant holds that appearances are
representations. He maintains all judgments, and thus all acts of knowledge,
involve the representations of representations. [Bxl] However, Kant also
suggests that we are not only conscious of different types of
representations; the Preface to B he asserts that "I am conscious of my
existence in time...and this is more than to be conscious merely of my
representation".
--------------------------------
The same function that gives unity to the different representations in a
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations
in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of
understanding. The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the
very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment
into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental
content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the
manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure
concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can
never be accomplished by universal logic. A79, B105
A79, B105: An interpretation of Kant's Metaphysical Deduction of the
Categories
http://www.philosophy.ubc.ca/prolegom/papers/Slaney.htm
-------------------------------------
Kant argues that space and time are both pure forms of intuition and pure
intuitions. They are pure forms of intuition because they must precede and
structure all experience of individual outer objects and inner states; Kant
tries to prove this by arguing that our conceptions of space and time cannot
be derived from experience of objects, because any such experience
presupposes the individuation of objects in space and/or time, and that
although we can represent space or time as devoid of objects, we cannot
represent any objects without representing space and/or time ( A 23-4/B
38-9; A 30-1/B 46).
http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/DB047SECT5
-------------------------------------
...it still remains a scandal to philosophy and to human reason in general
that the existence of things outside us (from which we derive the whole
material of knowledge, even for our inner sense) must be accepted merely on
faith, and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their existence, we are
unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. Since there is some
obscurity in the expressions used in the proof, from the third line to the
sixth line, I beg to alter the passage as follows:
"But this permanent cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of
determination of my existence which are to be met with in me are
representations; and as representations themselves require a permanent
distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and so my existence
in the time wherein they change, may be determined."
To this proof it will probably be objected, that I am immediately conscious
only of that which is in me, that is, of my representation of outer things;
and consequently that it must still remain uncertain whether outside me
there is anything corresponding to it, or not. But through inner experience
I am conscious of my existence in time (consequently also of its
determinability in time), and this is more than to be conscious merely of my
representation.
It is identical with the empirical consciousness of my existence, which is
determinable only through relation to something which, while bound up with
my existence, is outside me. This consciousness of my existence in time is
bound up in the way of identity with the consciousness of a relation to
something outside me, and it is therefore experience not invention, sense
not imagination, which inseparably connects this outside something with my
inner sense.
For outer sense is already in itself a relation of intuition to something
actual outside me, and the reality of outer sense, in its distinction from
imagination, rests simply on that which is here found to take place, namely,
its being inseparably bound up with inner experience, as the condition of
its possibility.
If, with the intellectual consciousness of my existence, in the
representation 'I am', which accompanies all my judgments and acts of
understanding, I could at the same time connect a determination of my
existence through intellectual intuition, the consciousness of a relation to
something outside me would not be required. But though that intellectual
consciousness does indeed come first, the inner intuition, in which my
existence can alone be determined, is sensible and is bound up with the
condition of time. This determination, however, and therefore the inner
experience itself, depends upon something permanent which is not in me, and
consequently can be only in something outside me, to which I must regard
myself as standing in relation.
The reality of outer sense is thus necessarily bound up with inner sense, if
experience in general is to be possible at all; that is, I am just as
certainly conscious that there are things outside me, which are in relation
to my sense, as I am conscious that I myself exist as determined in time. In
order to determine to which given intuitions objects outside me actually
correspond, and which therefore belong to outer sense (to which, and not to
the faculty of imagination, they are to be ascribed), we must in each single
case appeal to the rules according to which experience in general, even
inner experience, is distinguished from imagination
-- the proposition that there is such a thing as outer experience being
always presupposed. This further remark may be added. The representation of
something permanent in existence is not the same as permanent
representation. For though the representation of [something permanent] may
be very transitory and variable like all our other representations, not
excepting those of matter, it yet refers to something permanent. This latter
must therefore be an external thing distinct from all my representations,
and its existence must be included in the determination of my own existence,
constituting with it but a single experience such as would not take place
even inwardly if it were not also at the same time, in part, outer. How this
should be possible we are as little capable of explaining further as we are
of accounting for our being able to think the abiding in time, the
coexistence of which with the changing generates the concept of alteration.
[Bxl/Bxliv] - page 34
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/
http://www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/03intro.htm
> Perhaps thats not clear - but its a nice quote - if art was simply the
> application of a set of rules - a process of thought - a representation of
> something else - then in principle it is followed it is translatable, and
> never unique. Its painting by numbers!
>
> There are clues - "minimal" "untitled" or Newman's "Adam"
>
>
>>
>
>> Richard Harter, c...@tiac.net
>> http://home.tiac.net/~cri, http://www.varinoma.com
>> It is not wise to examine apparent coincidences too closely.
>> Sometimes they are not coincidences at all.
>
http://oncampus.richmond.edu/academics/education/projects/webunits/adaptations/mimicry.html
>
>
Mounard le Fougueux
all this talk seems very religious to me - pretty soon we'll have
Hinayana and Mahayana schools of art and philosophy!
"The blind one found the jewel;
the one without fingers picked it up;
the one with no neck put it on;
and the one with no voice gave it praise."