Kabuki Democracy: Why a Progressive Presidency Is Impossible, for Now
Eric Alterman, The Nation
The Disappearing Intellectual in the Age of Economic Darwinism
The one thing Democrats have going for them is the electorate's enduring wariness of the GOP. The midterms, now predicated on the economy's absence of dramatic improvement, should be trending unmistakably Republican. But it isn't.
The results of Gallup's Daily tracking poll from early July -- titled "Democrats, Republicans Still Tied on 2010 Generic Ballot" -- show that "Republicans maintain their competitive position on the generic congressional ballot, with 46% of U.S. registered voters preferring the Republican candidate in their district and 44% the Democratic candidate." Competitive, but hardly a lock.
What's more, while the Democrats' percentage has dropped a disturbing six points since last summer, the percentage increase for Republicans is statistically insignificant (it was 44).
As true as it is troubling, Gallup further reports that "historical trends suggest that a slight Republican lead on the generic ballot among registered voters ... would translate into sizable Republican seat gains in Congress on Election Day, given their typical advantage in voter turnout." But of course it's also true that history has nearly always favored the out-of-power party in midterms, a kind of punishing, internal correction exercised -- wisely or blindly -- by the electorate every four years between presidential elections.
This year, however, doubts about GOP governance persist among the key voting bloc of independents. The hopeful ambivalence to be noted is that while independents may be wandering away from Democrats, they are decidedly not peddling into the GOP camp.
Why? A twofold answer comes echoing back with resounding clarity: One, the GOP is unforgettably incompetent; and two, the GOP has become inexhaustibly crazy.
The first fact requires no elaboration; we all, all of us, independents included, have just survived (maybe) nearly a decade of immense Republican incompetence -- indeed, an incompetence by design, since bumpy is the road of managing a government one hates -- and even Americans' famous short-term memory hangs tight to the GOP's darkest of bumbling deeds.
The second factor -- that of bughouse unlimited -- has, I think, for most voters been less of a sudden epiphany than a bubbling realization now coming to a boil. Systematically have the whackos, the wingnuts, the crazies and crackpots removed moderate -- these days, one is tempted to even say thoughtful -- Republicans from power, and the latter are beginning to strike back, or at least lash out.
Case in point, soon-to-be former congressman Bob Inglis, of South Carolina, who, as Politico reported, recently "lost his primary in part because he was openly critical of Glenn Beck and told his conservative constituents not to believe everything they hear on Fox.... Pointing a finger at Beck, Sarah Palin and such conservative figures, Inglis told AP:
"There were no death panels in the [healthcare] bill … and to encourage that kind of fear is just the lowest form of political leadership. It’s not leadership. It’s demagoguery."
Yet the equally intriguing part of the Politico story were some of the reader comments that followed -- those, that is, from the very Beck-Palin followers whom Inglis had warned. A sampling:
"Inglis knows that the only way for a Republican to get written up by the Beltway media is to attack other Republicans. Which is why Republicans don't take this article, or Inglis, seriously." Classic denial, mixed with the old "this guy is so beneath comment I must comment on it" routine.
And there was this: "Beck did not pull a lever in the booth nor did Palin. The people did" -- my emphasis, that being Exhibit A in the displayed folly of political activists who mistake their fellow crackpots for a mass "movement."
Or, there was this: "This is only newsworthy to a liberal rag like Politico that traffics in all things negative towards conservatives. Typical." Rather, what's typical is the Agnewesque habit of attacking the reporting source, even when the source omits independent comment, which Politico did.
Now I ask you: Are such delusional, seething "activists" likely to convert many independents?
There also, however, was another conservative comment that I just can't let pass, in that it reflected the essential mainstream of yesteryear's Republicanism. It was literate, though, so perhaps a plant; but in the absence of any contrary evidence let's take it at face value:
"Pretty darn ridiculous. Inglis has a perfect '0' score from organizations like NARAL, and perfect 100 scores from every right to life group. He gets a 90 from the Chamber of Commerce. He gets a 95 from FreedomWorks, a 92 from the American Conservative Union.... So why'd he get tossed? Because he wasn't crazy enough. Because he wasn't calling on people to drink the blood of liberals. I wish you nutjobs would get the hell out of my party. You make a mockery of honest conservatives. You follow your stupid carnival barkers, pied pipers, and snake oil salesmen who sell you non-stop outrage. Conservatism isn't about hating the guts of the other guy -- it's about good policy. You've turned it into a joke. You're ruining my party and you'll ruin America. You contribute nothing but bile and paranoid fantasies. You have nothing positive to offer -- only fevered nightmares. Mark my words -- you're not saving the nation or the Republican party -- you're injecting it with a deadly poison.... Grow up or go away."
Doubtless, they won't be going away anytime soon -- and in the coming midterms they and their "nutjob" brethren will almost certainly deprive the nation of many a Congressional district's marginal sanity. But they do perform an invaluable service: They're also driving thoughtful independents away from the increasingly infantile Republican Party. ++
Restoring a Hallowed VisionBOB HERBERT, NYT
July 9, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/10/opinion/10herbert.html
“We’re going to show that there is a different day in America — that working people are sick and tired of the bosses getting million-dollar bonuses and the workers getting the short end of the stick.”
-- Bob King
In April 1968, the same month that the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. was killed in Memphis, where he had gone to support striking sanitation workers, the president of the powerful auto workers’ union, Walter Reuther, traveled to Memphis to give the strikers critically needed financial support.
The sanitation workers were black. In his biography of Reuther, Nelson Lichtenstein noted that the check he handed over to the strikers was the largest outside contribution that they would receive. Some officials at the United Automobile Workers headquarters in Detroit were taken aback. “But Reuther forged ahead,” Lichtenstein wrote, “offering an impassioned defense of interracial solidarity.”
Three-thousand delegates to the U.A.W. convention later that year heard Reuther say: “We laid $50,000 on the line to demonstrate we meant business. Who helped us back in 1936 and 1937 when we were being beaten up and shot at, when our offices and our cars were being blown up by the gangsters hired by the corporations?
“Who helped us? The coal miners ... the clothing workers ... as long as I am identified with the leadership of this great union, we are going to extend a hand of solidarity to every group of workers who are struggling for justice.”
Reuther believed that solidarity and a commitment to social and economic justice was the very essence of the union movement. If you want to hear a heartfelt restatement of those beliefs for the early 21st century, a period in which the union movement is in great distress and the living standards of working people have seriously declined, listen to the soft-spoken new president of the U.A.W., Bob King.
“My view of the labor movement today,” he said in an interview, “is that we got too focused on our contracts and our own membership and forgot that the only way, ultimately, that we protect our members and workers in general is by fighting for justice for everybody.”
The fundamental issue is that “every human being deserves dignity and a decent standard of living,” he said, “and the whole point of the labor movement is to help make that happen.”
In Mr. King’s view, the fight to organize workers and improve their wages and benefits is important, but it’s part of a much broader effort to improve the lives of individuals and families throughout the country and beyond. He is a believer in cooperative efforts and shared sacrifice, and is unabashedly idealistic as he outlines what can only be described as a new activism on labor’s part.
He promised his members last month that the U.A.W. would be marching and campaigning and organizing — for jobs, for a moratorium on home foreclosures, for civil and human rights and against the mistreatment of immigrants, and for peace.
“The Tea Party has been more vocal than we’ve been,” he said. “There is something wrong with that picture.”
This is not the way that prominent leaders in any segment of our society have spoken for a long time. The pragmatists and cynics, who have gotten a stranglehold on the culture, will scoff. But the pragmatists and cynics, with their hubris and half-baked ideologies, have handed all the wealth of the nation to a favored few and left the rest of the society a ragged mess.
It’s no accident that the great progressive successes of the labor movement, the civil rights movement, a variety of other social justice movements, and the emergence of a vast and thriving middle class all converged in the early post-World War II decades.
But the counterattack from the right, with its assaults on labor, its outlandishly regressive tax policies, its slavish devotion to corporate power and its divide-and-conquer strategies on racial and ethnic issues all combined to halt the remarkable advances of ordinary working people.
All you have to do now is look around at what the right has wrought.
Bob King has a vision that draws upon the lessons of that postwar period, starting with the basic right of workers to organize if they wish without being terrorized by employers. It was the fact that workers were organized in the auto and other manufacturing industries that sparked the creation of a large middle class in America. Those well-paying union jobs allowed working families to buy a home, to put their children through school, to build better lives.
The wages from those jobs fueled the consumer demand that powered America’s economic success.
Even as he looks toward the future, Mr. King is trying to remind us of what went right in the past. ++
Putting the left's Obama "despair" in perspective
The president's supporters expected big things and are feeling short-changed. Stop me if you've heard this before
Steve Kornacki, Salon
Monday, Jul 12, 2010
http://www.salon.com/news/politics/war_room/2010/07/12/obama_base_problems/index.html
Politico ran a piece over the weekend about the left’s "despair" over the direction of the Obama presidency.
The grievances are all familiar at this point: the stimulus wasn’t big enough, healthcare reform took too long and compromised away too much, we shouldn’t be in Afghanistan, and so on. The interesting question, to me at least, is what this all adds up to politically. How serious, in other words, is Obama’s problem with the Democratic Party base?
My sense is that it’s not actually that bad. This isn’t to diminish the disappointment (or even betrayal) that many of Obama’s most ardent 2008 supporters feel, or the legitimacy of their policy gripes. But when you consider other modern presidencies, the frustration that now grips the left is hardly atypical.
Five of Obama’s six immediate predecessors enjoyed at roughly this point in their presidencies what could fairly be described as serious tension with their party’s base. The lone exception was George W. Bush, who was shielded from meaningful intraparty dissent by 9/11, which came not quite eight months into his tenure. It wasn’t until Bush’s second term that the right became outwardly restive. (Although it should be noted that in the months before 9/11, John McCain rarely missed a chance to poke a stick in Bush’s eye.)
For three recent presidents, this tension ended up having a deleterious long-term impact: Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and George H.W. Bush. The good news for Obama is that their examples aren’t particularly analogous to his, because Ford, Carter and Bush all faced skeptical and even hostile bases from the start of their presidencies.
Ford’s story is a little different, of course, since he was never actually elected president (or vice president). He inherited the presidency in 1974 from Richard Nixon, who had rather devilishly finessed what was then a gaping ideological and cultural divide in the GOP, managing to corral both the establishment/Rockefeller wing and the ascendant (heavily Southern) ideological wing. In the ’72 GOP primaries, Nixon was challenged from both the left and the right, by Reps. Pete McCloskey and John Ashbrook. But he wasn’t really vulnerable on either flank and received more than 80 percent of the vote in all but one primary.
Ford, a pragmatic establishment figure, never had a prayer of pulling off this balancing act -- especially after he appointed Nelson Rockefeller, the right-wing’s bête noir, as his V.P. The New Right, its growth spurred by post-Civil Rights defections from Southern Democrats, was hungry to assert itself and lined up behind Ronald Reagan who entered the ’76 primaries against Ford. The lines were sharply drawn and Reagan essentially battled the president to a draw, but establishment forces had just enough juice to push Ford over the top at the convention.
Carter was also at odds with his party’s base from the start of his term. He had managed to win the ’76 Democratic nomination mainly by grasping the significance of that year’s radically expanded primary calendar (there were 30 Democratic contests overall). While Democratic powerbrokers split their loyalties among several candidates (or stood back to wait for the late emergence of Hubert Humphrey or Ted Kennedy), Carter competed in ever primary, notching at least one win on every Tuesday when there was a contest and building so much momentum that late establishment efforts to thwart him were futile.
It may be hard to believe today, given the activist tone of his post-presidency, but Carter governed as a moderate-to-conservative Democrat and never made peace with organized labor or the liberal interest group establishment. Early in Carter’s presidency, Kennedy began making noises about challenging him in 1980. Like Reagan and the New Right in ’76, Kennedy and the left were itching for a fight, eager to reclaim their party. The Kennedy challenge ended up failing. Popular history faults Kennedy’s stammering Roger Mudd interview for this, but the Iran hostage crisis – which temporarily boosted Carter’s standing in late 1979 and early ’80 (just as the primaries were beginning), may have been a bigger factor.
The story went the same for Bush, the old Yankee Republican who’d run as a pro-choice supply side skeptic in the ‘80 Republican primaries. As a gesture to the fading Rockefeller wing, Reagan put Bush on the GOP ticket in the fall. As vice president, he then labored for eight years to recast himself as a Reagan adherent on all of the right’s litmus test issues.
It was enough to win Bush the GOP nod and the White House in ’88, but when he went back on his “Read my lips” pledge and raised taxes in 1990, the right-wing revolted. Their outrage was temporarily muted by the 1991 Gulf War, but as the glow of triumph faded and 1992 approached, Pat Buchanan decided to challenge Bush for the nomination. Buchanan started late and was a very imperfect vessel, but he won nearly 40 percent in New Hampshire primary, a showing that humbled Bush and vividly illustrated that extent of his vulnerability.
As I noted above, the common thread in these examples is that Ford, Carter and Bush were all distrusted by their party’s bases before they came to office. The GOP base with Ford and Bush and the Democratic base with Carter had little to no built-in loyalty.
The story is different with the other two recent presidents to encounter early problems with their base. Both Bill Clinton and Ronald Reagan came to office with more stable relationships with their bases -- Reagan because he was the embodiment of the GOP base and Clinton because of his knack for straddling his party’s fault lines. For different reasons, both of their examples are more analogous to Obama’s.
On paper, Reagan offers the best parallel. Just like Reagan in 1980 (and 1976), Obama in 2008 was fundamentally the candidate of his party’s base, with a passionate (and vast) network of anti-establishment backers propelling him to the nomination.
The Reagan presidency began with great expectations on the right -- expectations that, two years into his tenure, had given way to considerable frustration and angst. Conservative ire with Reagan was similar in nature to today’s liberal frustration with Obama: He compromised too willingly, listened too closely to pragmatic Washington hands (like his chief of staff, Jim Baker), and was intimidated by the political risks of pursuing his base’s wish list.
Sure, he pushed a massive tax cut program through Congress in 1981. But at the time, this was off-set -- in the right’s eyes -- by his the acceleration of a payroll tax hike to preserve Social Security and his acquiescence to a gas tax increase to fund infrastructure. When he irked the Pentagon by scaling back his defense spending request in 1982, hawks openly challenged his commitment to their cause. As budget deficits soared to unprecedented heights, conservatives wondered why their president showed no desire to fight for the elimination of Cabinet departments (like Education and Energy) and the reduction of costly (but politically-popular) social welfare programs. And whatever happened to the moral crusade -- against abortion and pornography and for school prayer -- that candidate Reagan had seemed so eager to lead?
This was hardly the revolutionary presidency that conservatives had dreamed of during the 1980 campaign. And – especially after the G.O.P. was gut-punched in the 1982 midterm elections -- they began to express themselves. In January 1983, three of the architects of the New Right’s rise -- Richard Viguerie, Paul Weyrich and Howard Phillips -- even called for a challenge to Reagan from the right in the 1984 Republican primaries.
"There is no way in which conservatives are going to get elected in 1984 running on a record of the biggest tax increases and the biggest deficits in the history of the country," said Phillips. A conservative challenger, Viguerie argued, would simply run on Reagan’s own 1980 message -- "In other words, reduce taxes, balance the budget, stop busing, bring school prayer back, you name it."
The movement died out by the summer of 1983, for one simple reason: the economy began its comeback. Republicans rallied back to Reagan, independent voters followed, a 49-state landslide ensued, and Reagan went on to assume his exalted status within the G.O.P. What the right called betrayal back in 1982 today looks like fine print.
It’s not hard to see a parallel to Obama, whose first two years are not without their achievements. Today, liberals argue that the stimulus, healthcare, and financial reform packages were all too watered down. But a generation from now?
The Clinton comparison isn’t as neat, since Clinton wasn’t as beloved by the Democratic base when he was elected in 1992. But he was still popular with the base, especially when you consider the centrist credentials he’d built up in preparation for that race. Even as he planted himself in the middle of the political spectrum, Clinton retained an uncanny ability to connect with his party’s core constituency groups -- African-Americans in particular. It also helped that his principal opponent in the ’92 primaries ended up being Paul Tsongas, who promised to run a devotedly pro-Wall Street White House. By necessity, Clinton ran hard to Tsongas’ left, thereby boosting his reputation with the left (before lurching back to the center for the fall campaign).
As president, Clinton’s relationship with the Democratic base was complicated. They appreciated his bottom-line insistence on universal healthcare coverage even as they were appalled by his championing of NAFTA. The party’s wipeout in the 1994 midterms made him vulnerable to a primary challenge in 1996, more because of his overall weakness. But Newt Gingrich’s Republican Congress gave Clinton an opportunity in 1995 to position himself as the defender-in-chief of the social safety net and to rally the base. Thus, he avoided a primary challenge and coasted to the nomination in 1996. (His firm grip on the Democratic nomination made it much easier for Clinton to sign welfare reform in the summer of 1996.)
An Obama-Clinton comparison is inexact, obviously – mainly because the Democratic base expected (and expects) more from Obama than it ever did from Clinton. But like Clinton, Obama could well face a Republican Congress in the second two years of his first term -- a possibility that White House spokesman Robert Gibbs even admitted on Sunday. If this happens, there will be undoubtedly be grumbling on the left that it’s Obama’s fault -- that his timid, compromising style was the cause. But fighting off the GOP Congress could also unite the left behind Obama, as it did for Clinton.
Every president, it seems, is bound to disappoint his party’s base. But when that base is cheering for (and invested in) the president for the start, it’s a lot less likely that the damage will be permanent. ++
"I'm asking you to believe. Not just in my ability to bring about real change in Washington ... I'm asking you to believe in yours."
~ Barack Obama
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