townhall.com
By Austin Bay
Why would five Iranian speedboats bluff an attack on a U.S. Navy
squadron?
Start with a big fact: Under the mullah-led thieves' regime, Iran has
become an explosive political mix of ethnic, economic and ideological
fragments, a mosaic powder keg.
The Ayatollah Khomeini's 1979 Islamic Revolution failed, then
fossilized, leaving a corrupt junta of robed kleptocrats who use the
dictator's classic tools of murder, terror and economic favoritism to
control an impoverished, splintered and increasingly restless
populace.
Moreover, factions within the mullahs' hierarchy spar with one
another. Throwing a risky punch at the United States or Great Britain
serves two distinct purposes. Armed bravado directed at "the Great
Satan" and British imperialists appeals to Iranian nationalists -- at
least, it has in the past. Khomeinist radicals, like Iranian president
Mahmoud Amadinejad, contend that confrontation with the United States
also strengthens them.
The reasoning may appear convoluted, wickedly Byzantine, but if Iran's
domestic malaise continues to get worse, and domestic tensions seed
violent street demonstrations, the most radical Khomeinists apparently
believe dramatic attacks on U.S. forces -- such as the destruction of
a U.S. Navy capital warship -- enhance their political position. Their
willingness to run great risks demonstrates they are "the true
believers." An extended confrontation with the United States also
gives them the opportunity to portray their domestic opponents as
traitors -- and then kill them.
This week's round of Iranian "gunboat diplomacy" by five armed
Revolutionary Guards' speedboats fulfills both political purposes, and
comes as U.S. President George Bush prepares to visit the Middle East.
The incident echoes the March 2007 kidnapping of British sailors and
marines who were patrolling Iraqi waters in small, inflatable boats.
Both incidents fit into a consistent historical pattern, one the
American Enterprise Institute's Michael Ledeen believes the U.S.
government ignores at its own long-term peril. "It is never surprising
when the Iranians attack us," Ledeen told me the day after the
gunboats' display of moxie, "because they have been attacking us for
30 years."
The best long-term U.S. strategy is political and economic --
encouraging an active domestic political opposition to Iran's clever
religious leaders while whittling away at the clerics' graft-crammed
Swiss bank accounts. This incremental strategy, however, takes time
and perseverance.
Could Revolutionary Guard speedboats sink an American warship? A
suicidal zealot in an explosive-packed Boghammer could zig-zag his way
through U.S. defenses, particularly if his boat was one of several in
a "swarm." Drop the analytic resolution from the "macro" strategic
political view to the "micro" tactical military aspects of the
incident, and the Revolutionary Guards' naval action has all of the
elements of a "close-in probe" designed to test U.S. Navy reactions.
However, an American cruiser, destroyer and frigate deployed in a
flotilla are a very dangerous target -- nothing remotely comparable to
vulnerable British sailors in a rubber raft.
The deadly suicide boat attack on the destroyer USS Cole in October
2000, as it lay anchored in the port of Aden, Yemen, made "close in"
defense of U.S. warships a priority. The U.S. Navy began arming its
capital ships with .50 caliber heavy machineguns, assorted light
machineguns and 25 millimeter automatic cannons (like those mounted on
U.S. Army Bradley armored infantry vehicles). Crewmen also
occasionally deploy shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft missiles
(another infantry weapon) as an additional defense against light, low-
flying airplanes (a Cessna on a suicide mission) or drone aircraft
carrying explosives
In June 2005, I spent three days on the cruiser USS Normandy, deployed
near Iraq's Al Basrah offshore oil terminal. The Normandy carries long-
range missiles, a modern naval cannon and electronics capable of
identifying targets hundreds of miles away. However, Iranian dhows
operating beyond the terminal's exclusion zone were the most immediate
threat, and the huge capital ship bristled with light automatic
weapons manned by sailors. After inspecting a 50 caliber mount, I
jokingly called the Normandy the "world's biggest PT boat." World War
II-era U.S. PT boats often fought Japanese barges and small craft up
close, infantry-like combat waged in shallow seas.
Naval mines are the real threat to big ships operating in the Persian
Gulf. A naval mine can break and sink a ship. But mines are material
things, deadly lumps without personality or religion. Sinking an
American destroyer with a mine lacks the brazen testosterone,
theological resolve and sensational media impact of a jihadist-manned
speedboat braving the hail of fire to slam into the arrogant infidel
warship's disintegrating armor.
Austin Bay Austin Bay is author of three novels. His third novel, The
Wrong Side of Brightness, was published by Putnam/Jove in June 2003.
He has also co-authored four non-fiction books, to include A Quick and
Dirty Guide to War: Third Edition (with James Dunnigan, Morrow, 1996).