Why All This Explosive Screening Is A Complete Waste Of Time
Lawrence D'Oliveiro
<http://government.zdnet.com/?p=6728>.
Simon
central.gen.new_zealand> wrote:
> In order to work, it’s got to work 100%, which is simply impossible
> <http://government.zdnet.com/?p=6728>.
So in your opinion, security technologies should only be deployed
where they are 100% reliable?
Katipo
"Lawrence D'Oliveiro" <l...@geek-central.gen.new_zealand> wrote in message
news:hi1enn$98b$1...@lust.ihug.co.nz...
> In order to work, it's got to work 100%, which is simply impossible
> <http://government.zdnet.com/?p=6728>.
I am beginning to think Ohbummer is as braindead as Dubya.
All this forcing countries to introduce those carcinogenic pornography
generating scanners is overkill. Clearly the existing security procedures in
place in Amersterdam (and elsewhere) are doing the job. The only reason that
guy got on the plane was because some dutch fuckwit didn't do his/her job
properly.
hellicopter
Talk of 100% anything is pretty much emblematic of bad advice.
Terrorists will get jobs in security, they will seek out
friendly security officers and seek to find out what gets
through. So the effectiveness will just decline over time.
Security should target those on watchlists. These devices
allow security services to check without alerting potential
targets they are on a watchlist.
I still don't understand why over time the screening can't
filter out areas that are of no interest, so those carry
stuff around their waist still don't need their privates
exposed to all. Computer technology should be able to
zoom in on hidden objects.
Anyway, why would terrorists target the most secure point,
what is it about airplanes that these idiots like?
Its a bottleneck, but its not the only target as
McVeigh proved.
Lawrence D'Oliveiro
> On Jan 6, 8:39 pm, Lawrence D'Oliveiro <l...@geek-central.gen.new_zealand> wrote:
>
>> In order to work, it’s got to work 100%, which is simply impossible
>> <http://government.zdnet.com/?p=6728>.
>
> So in your opinion, security technologies should only be deployed
> where they are 100% reliable?
Just to clarify, for those with comprehension problems: security
technologies which need to be 100% reliable in order to be effective are a
waste of time.
Simon
central.gen.new_zealand> wrote:
> Just to clarify, for those with comprehension problems: security
> technologies which need to be 100% reliable in order to be effective are a
> waste of time.
That is quite a different proposition from the one that you wrote,
Lawrence (as per below).
Heading: "Why All This Explosive Screening Is A Complete Waste Of Time
"
Body: "In order to work, it’s got to work 100%, which is simply
impossible"
The problem is yours.
Simon
> Talk of 100% anything is pretty much emblematic of bad advice.
Exactly. No security technology is 100% effective however, security
measures can and should continue to be deployed in spite of this.
Whether the deployment of full-body imaging scanners (as I have had
the "privilege" of using in Washington DC) should be deployed is
another matter.
Lawrence D'Oliveiro
> On Jan 7, 12:02 pm, Lawrence D'Oliveiro <l...@geek-central.gen.new_zealand> wrote:
>
>> Just to clarify, for those with comprehension problems: security
>> technologies which need to be 100% reliable in order to be effective are
>> a waste of time.
>
> Body: "In order to work, it’s got to work 100%, which is simply
> impossible"
And which part of that didn’t you understand?
Lyndon Watson
> . . . The only reason that
> guy got on the plane was because some dutch fuckwit didn't do his/her job
> properly.
Not Dutch, American apparently, and more than one.
LW
Katipo
"Lyndon Watson" <te...@clear.net.nz> wrote in message
news:a91e2ef9-567f-43db...@j5g2000yqm.googlegroups.com...
> LW
It was a dutch fuckwit that let the guy on the plane without a passport.
Lawrence D'Oliveiro
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/01/airport_securit_12.html>:
Yes, the Amsterdam screeners allowed Abdulmutallab onto the plane with
PETN sewn into his underwear, but that's not a failure either. There is
no security checkpoint, run by any government anywhere in the world,
designed to catch this. It isn't a new threat; it's more than a decade
old. Nor is it unexpected; anyone who says otherwise simply isn't paying
attention. But PETN is hard to explode, as we saw on Christmas Day.
It was the security checkpoints that forced him into using an unreliable
form of explosive. No full-body scanner would pick this up. But in the end,
it was the other passengers who saw what he was up to and stopped him.
In sum, the security system (including the actions taken by the passengers
themselves) worked. It worked as well as it’s ever going to work. Further
attempts to tighten up screening are futile. If you want to put more effort
and money into anything, put it into improving plain-old intelligence
gathering and police work
<http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/01/another_contest.html>.