Sorry for my horrible delay. Reading week is upon me. Ahh, so much to do, so little time... I appreciate your thoughts and would like to delve into the discussion with you. I ask forgiveness beforehand for the absurd length of this e-mail. (Yikes!)
Now onto the puzzle.
If I understand the heart of the puzzle, it is the issue of circularity that is most "puzzling." The tension comes from taking the presupposition that God's Word is the ultimate norm for truth in all areas of life. For, on the surface it seems that if one accepts this presupposition, induction (the scientific method, historical inquiry, etc.) become futile endeavors in foregone conclusions.
I would like to respond from two perspectives. First, from a philosophical perspective I wish to (a) address the issue of Christianity's circularity, (b) make a case for the scientific method in light of Christian circularity, and (c) propose a harder puzzle. Second, (d) from a biblico-theologico perspective I would like to make a case for the scientific method in light of the cultural mandate.
(a) On Christian Circularity
In matters of ultimate standards Christianity is not alone in advocating a circular position: everyone argues in a circle in the sense that (1) everyone must have an ultimate starting point for knowing and (2) an ultimate starting point for knowledge is by definition circular. Thus, at the outset it should be recognized that there is a distinction between arguing circularly on a non-ultimate level and on an ultimate level. The former might look like this: The weather is cold; therefore, the weather is cold. The latter seeks to answer questions like this: On what ultimate basis do you support your claim that science can reveal truth? And its answer might look like this: Science reveals truth as it operates within the God-ordained context of Christian theism, which is that the triune God exists and has revealed himself through cosmos and logos.
The necessity of circularity on ultimate standards is poignant: What higher evidence can one put forth than an ultimate standard? If God is the Creator whose revelation of all things through creation and through Word are infallible and perfect, what higher evidence could possibly be brought to verify His existence? Anything we could muster (arguments from reason, empiricism, or subjectivity) would be mere drops in the bucket of His own creation. God is verified by Himself alone; to allow himself to be verified by any other standard would be an insult to his very nature as almighty God. (To say this is not to say that God cannot be verified rationally, empirically, or subjectively; rather, it is to say that verifications of God must be done on God's own terms, following His rules.)
Atheists argue circularly to suppress God just as much as Christians argue circularly to proclaim God. Some may argue that God does not exist because in their minds they don't need God. So, they adopt autonomy as their ultimate standard, and at the end of the day all of their answers come back to, "I myself decide what is truth." Non-Christian scientists may argue that they "just follow the facts," that induction and the scientific method are the starting points of truth. And thus their answers always come down to "My observations tell me so."
A rationalist (i.e. Descartes) assumes reason as his starting point and then tries to deduce all knowledge from this basis. An empiricist (i.e. Hume or Locke) takes sense experience to be the starting point of knowledge and builds his system of truth upon it. A subjectivist (i.e. Rorty) may take existential satisfaction as the fountain of truth, and attempt to live and think upon that basis. The point is that in all three cases, the ultimate arguments of all three are circular. The bottom line answer of the first is always, "Because reason tells me so." The second, that "Experience tells me so." And the third, that "My heart satisfaction tells me so." Circular argumentation is unavoidable when dealing with ultimate presuppositions.
The bottom line is that on matters of ultimate truth, no one can escape circular argumentation of ultimate standards, not even atheists, scientists, rationalists, irrationalists, skeptics, subjectivists, anybody. John Frame, in his Apologetics to the Glory of God, makes this point saying that "Every philosophy must use its own standards in proving its conclusions; otherwise, it is simply inconsistent. Those who believe that human reason is the ultimate authority (rationalists) must presuppose the authority of reason in their arguments for rationalism. . . . The point is that when one is arguing for an ultimate criterion, whether Scripture, the Koran, human reasons, sensation, or whatever, one must use criteria compatible with that conclusion. IF that is circularity, then everybody is guilty of circularity" (p. 10).
Caveat: Frame further makes the point in class lectures and in his writings that though this type of circular argument may be sound, it is not necessarily persuasive. Thus, he suggests a broadening of this narrow circle to this effect to increase an arguments persuasiveness: Because the whole cosmos reveals God in addition to God's written Word, Christians should welcome using all manner of rational, empirical, or subjective arguments that are in accord with His revelation. Thus, a non-Christian may not like the circularity argument on its own, but he or she may be willing to engage in a theistic proof or evidential argument which should lead them eventually to a faithful acception of the circular implications of God. (However, this idea should be seen in light of my note on the distinction between argument and evidence below.)
(b) On the Scientific Method in Light of Christian Circularity
The fact that God's revelation through Word and creation is the ultimate standard of truth does not in any way diminish the value or importance of science; rather, this fact is what gives value and grounds the purpose of science. The world seen through the eyes of a Christian scientist is a vast playground in which to revel in the wonder of an all-powerful, all-wise, all-loving, and all-present Creator who reveals himself in his creation. At every point in the cosmos the Christian scientists knows that every particle has a God-glorifying meaning within the God-ordered and God-interpreted universe. Those working in new fields where science has never gone before receive the extremely high privilege of walking in the vanguard of discoveries of God's natural revelation. New technologies let us see the vast wonders of creation in ways previous generations did not even dream about. All of this serves to highlight the glory of God, His Creator-Son Christ, and His powerful present Spirit.
Furthermore, the Christian scientist knows that since truth and beauty are revealed by God, it is possible to discover both within God's revelation, a certainty not enjoyed by non-Christians.
Without Christian circularity (that the triune Creator God exists and Has revealed Himself in Word and creation) science would be a dull exercise in purposeless chaos. This leads me into the next point.
(c) A Harder Puzzle
I find it more puzzling to try to conceive of a world in which science would have purpose and meaning apart from the world revealed in Christian theism. Perhaps one could call the entire history of philosophy man's attempt to find truth without the epistemic implications of God (especially the circular ones). Yet, the sum of non-Christian philosophy is always n-1.
(d) A Brief Biblical-Historical Context for Science
A further deepening of the purpose and value of science is seen when science is placed in its proper context within the biblical view of human dignity. In Gen. 1:26ff we learn that man, the royal image of God, was given a royal job to fulfill as God's representatives on earth: he was to fill the earth and subdue it, starting in the Garden and spreading throughout the whole earth. This task of filling and subduing the earth to the glory of God is the proper context for science: only in this setting does humanity taste her God-given dignity and God receives His glory. And from this trajectory science is to be seen as part of the images of God subduing the earth for God's glory.
Even though the images of God rebelled in the Fall and lost dignity, their dignifying job remained the same in spite of added difficulty (curse). So, the scientific endeavor post-Fall must recognize that it has to deal with the effects of the Fall until the glorious day of the Consummation of all things.
God's covenant with Noah provides further direction for understanding the role of science, for in that covenant God promised a stable earth, never again to be destroyed. Obviously, God's promise of a stable earth is highly important to science, which depends heavily on this stability for meaningful progress in its investigations. Without this promise, scientists would have no hope that all of their work would be wasted tomorrow.
God's covenant with Abraham puts God's own existence on the line if He does not fulfill humanity's dignity by causing Abraham's seed to fill the earth and subdue it for God's glory within the Promised Land. Thus, we learn that God Himself is the power we must rely on to accomplish our human dignity, and science (within Abraham's covenantal context) learns that its own dignity comes from relying on God for help to fulfill the great task of humanity.
God's covenant with Moses reveals to science God's moral law which she dare not cross as she pursues humanity's goal of filling and subduing the earth.
(I'm going more quickly than I should . . . trying to be brief.)
God's covenant with David reveals to science that she will be free to flourish to the glory of God when God's King faithfully upholds God's law, leads the people in worship, and protects his people from sin and danger from outsiders.
I think we are operating under different understandings of epistemic circularity. I accept Alston's argument (in "Beyond Justification) that all epistemic models are ultimately circular. For example, arguing for the reliability of sense perception means I must assume that my sense perception is reliable. Our description of this circularity is necessitated by our cognitive limitation. However, why should I include God as one of these epistemic factors that I must assume (like sense perception)? Van Til argues that the deontological requirement of properly functioning agents is submission to God's self-revelation. This, however, pushes the question back one peg.
Van Til relies on a Kantian-style transcendental argument whereby one posits the "ontic necessity" (or precondition) of the intelligibility of a certain experience to establish the existence of certain entities or concepts. For all of its muster, I find this type of argumentation wholly unconvincing. When you make statements about the vastness of God's nature visa-a-vis our cognitive limitation, what perspective are you assuming? Under Van Til's lights, any statement (of ours) about God's nature will suffer from the same limitations that he accuses others of when they utilize an "evidential" perspective. How am I to recognize the property of God's nature that necessitates my submission if my cognitive equipment is not adequate for a contingent assessment of his ontological status? It seems as if Van Til assumes a transcendental perspective in order to argue for cognitive limitation--and then sell it off as an argument for the transcendental necessity of God.
Further, the statement "God verifies himself" seems incoherent. It passes over the principle problem: the onus is on US to recognize the self-attestation of God and submit to his authority. I (as the subject) must have the epistemic capacity to recognize the authority of God's self-revelation as truth (as the object), and then fulfill my deontological requirement. At the very least, transcendental argumentation relies on a (much debated) logical structure for its validity and soundness. Further, the subject must be persuaded by this argument:
1) God is the pre-condition of the intelligibility of experience
2) Experience is intelligible
3) Therefore, God exists.
The efficacy of this argument relies on much more then the nature of the God whose existence it is supposed to support. In my acceptance of this argument, I have undermined the very principle that the argument purports to establish. Namely, I have exercised my autonomy in order to prove that man does not operate autonomously apart for the precondition of experience (God). "God verifies himself" fails because the notion of "self-attesting" authority fails. In order for either concept to be of epistemic interest there must be an agent who recognizes their claims as true. The agent must verify, "God verifies himself" or the semantic content of this statement is unintelligible; how can a proposition be "verified" without a party to whom the proposition is verified? Take for example the logical structure of the above argument. If successful, the argument is supposed to show that God comprises the necessary ontology for logic. However, my acceptance of the argument turns on what I think of the logical structure of the argument. Again, we are stuck in the same rut: I use a certain logical method to "prove" that God is the ontic necessity for the use of logic. This strikes me as viciously circular, if not dishonest.
Let me iterate something important here. If there is such a being as God, his ontological status is certainly not contingent on our musings. There is a stark distinction between the epistemic currency of a concept and the ontological status of the being under question. In my view, the "ultimacy" of God is not demonstrated by the epistemic currency of the transcendental argument for his existence. I believe God has the ontological status that the creeds afford him, but I do not believe it because I must assume him in order to practice intelligible epistemology. I think Van Til errs when he moves from "God's existence is ultimate in matters" of truth to "I must have enough cognitive access to posit him as the precondition of the intelligibility of experience". Importance does not equal access. If Berkley's argument for idealism succeeds, it is no doubt the most important epistemic principle on he market (mental categories are all that exists). However, we do not have immediate access to its truth by virtue of its potential status of ultimate importance.
The proposition "God exists" has important epistemic implications, but why should I assume that I have a perspective that allows me to assume its transcendental necessity?
I have detailed comments ready regarding the rest of your message, but for the sake of space and readability, why don't we hash through this point by point? Kant's transcendental form of argumentation needs to be demonstrated if we are to accept it as ground for Scripture's authority over scientific inquiry.
I hope you did not find my response too truncated. I want you to know that I read through your entire post and I have several thoughts--many of which are at deep odds with your arguments. However, I think it best that we deal with one issue at a time. This approach would save time and wouldn't pigeonhole us into encylopedic entries that no one has the courage to read (except for us, of course).
> I think we are operating under different understandings of epistemic > circularity. I accept Alston's argument (in "Beyond Justification) that > all epistemic models are ultimately circular. For example, arguing for > the reliability of sense perception means I must assume that my sense > perception is reliable. Our description of this circularity is > necessitated by our cognitive limitation. However, why should I include > God as one of these epistemic factors that I must assume (like sense > perception)?
There are a variety of ways to answer the "why" question. The short answer for Christians is that without God as one's epistemic foundation, one is led to irrationality as he tries to understand himself, the universe, and God due to a lack of an ultimate norm. The short answer argument behind this conclusion is the Creator/creature distinction: The implications of God's nature ( i.e. that He is the Lord of All, including the norms for knowing truth) demand that all of his creatures seek truth on God's own terms, which means seeking truth as creatures who are submitting to their Creator's authority.
To unpack this briefly, since we are here talking about circularity on the level of ultimate truth, the "why" answer for Christians is that God's revelation of himself forces us to submit to His ultimate authority as our foundation of truth (and everything). His special (logos) revelation is full of implicit and explicit epistemic norms. Take the implicit epistemic implications of Genesis 1, for example. If Gen. 1 is true, at no point in the universe can I ever claim a more ultimate norm for truth than the Creator who created everything and reveals all truth. (C.f. Van Til's Creator/creature distinction below.) Or take the explicit epistemic norms by which the logos claims specifically that God is the starting point of knowledge and wisdom in Psalm 111:10, Prov. 1:7, 9:10, 15:33, et. al. Thus, the paradigm for rationality in the logos is to search for truth as a dependent, creature-servant of the Lord in submission to the Lord's authority.
Moreover, as Christians, we are not limited to talking about logos revelation to prove our starting point. (Indeed it is impossible to separate logos and cosmos, for no one could know the former without the latter, and vice versa. The two can only be separated for pedagogical purposes.) We could rather start from any perspective ( i.e. rational, empirical, or subjective) within cosmos revelation and be led to see the ultimate authority, control, and presence of the Lord from any of these perspectives as long as we are seeking truth on God's terms (obeying His norms). Thus, the Christian worldview remains perfectly consistent with itself on its own terms. Nothing higher can be asked of an ultimately circular argument.
The implications of such argumentation (for the Christian worldview, or any other worldview) is that such ultimate norms necessarily confront all other supposed ultimate authorities. Therefore, at the end of the day, only one circle is the true circle with ultimate authority. All others will have at least one point of inconsistency and will lead to irrationality at that point. This is seen clearly in the attempt at using any of the cosmos revelation perspectives autonomously. If we use these perspectives (rationalism, empiricism, subjectivism) on our own terms, we are led into irrationality (again, on the ultimate level). (This whole can of worms about perspectives on truth needs to be developed within the context of the interrelation of subject, object, and norm, but I'll save it for another e-mail if you are interested. . . .)
Another way to answer this "why" question is to ask the inverse: Why not must one assume God as the ultimate epistemic starting point? Or in other words, by what standard of truth or by what norm do you seek to hold God to account? Your own? Rationalism? Empiricism? Subjectivism? In my last e-mail, I tried to show that positing such a situation was the harder puzzle, in my opinion. For, to do this one would have to posit a perfectly consistent epistemic system that does not lead to irrationality, skepticism, or subjectivism on the ultimate level--an impossible task from the Christian perspective. Just as no man can step out of his own skin to examine himself autonomously, so no man can step out of the God-created cosmos (including God's authority over epistemology) to examine the cosmos autonomously. As Romans 1 clearly teaches, every part of the universe (including our own selves as images of God) confronts us with the ultimate implications of God's authority.
Van Til argues that the deontological requirement of
> properly functioning agents is submission to God's self-revelation.
If you are speaking of Van Til's Creator/creature distinction, then I'm tracking with you. If not, please correct me....
In other words, on God's terms, the deontological requirement upon creatures is that in every sphere of life creatures must submit to the authority, control, and presence of their Creator. To do otherwise is irrational if indeed the triune Creator God of Scripture exists and has revealed himself authoritatively in cosmos and logos.
This, however, pushes the question back one peg.
So also (I would add as a secondary point here) to question the authority of an ultimate standard puts oneself in the position of needing to account for the ultimate peg upon which one attempts to stand himself.
I respectfully disagree with your interpretation of Van Til on these points:
Van Til relies on a Kantian-style transcendental argument whereby one
> posits the "ontic necessity" (or precondition) of the intelligibility > of a certain experience to establish the existence of certain entities > or concepts.
(I'm no Kant expert, so please tell me if I'm missing your point here. Can you offer some passages of Kant for me to read on Kant's transcendentalism?)
Van Til's creator/creature distinction is not the same as Kant's noumena/phenomena. Van Til's starting point is God's self-revelation in logos and cosmos. Kant's starting point is an autonomous attempt to balance rationalism and empiricism with the god concept thrown in on the back side in order to help with the ethical difficulties of an autonomous system.
Furthermore, (skipping the Kant issue for a moment) would you not agree that the possibility of predication is impossible without the necessary precondition of an ordered, rational cosmos; the existence, order, and purpose of language; etc. How else can you read this e-mail? Or what is left of the world but purposeless chaos and nihilism if all preconditions are shunned, where that even possible? If there were a more compelling alternative to the precondition of God, then what it is?
For all of its muster, I find this type of argumentation
> wholly unconvincing. When you make statements about the vastness of > God's nature visa-a-vis our cognitive limitation, what perspective are > you assuming? Under Van Til's lights, any statement (of ours) about > God's nature will suffer from the same limitations that he accuses > others of when they utilize an "evidential" perspective.
First, from what basis are you judging that you are "wholly unconvinced" . . . by what standard are you wiping God out of the epistemic picture?
Second, in essence, (if I hear your correctly) what you are saying here is that Van Til has no right to claim the necessity of God and the necessity of human cognitive limitation at the same time. For how could an infinite Creator be known by a finite creature? So, it appears we are left with a self-defeating circle: To know the infinite God one must have infinite cognitive ability. Man's cognitive ability is not infinite. Therefore, man cannot know God.
I think such an interpretation of Van Til's Creator/creature distinction is a misunderstanding of creaturely "limitation" in (a) God's transcendence and imminence and (b) the distinction between argument and evidence (explained in my previous e-mail), especially how the noetic effects of sin affect the cognitive ability of creatures.
(a) God solves the infinite/finite problem by revealing himself to the finite.
A non-Christian view of God's transcendence speaks of God's attributes like his infinity, immensity, power, presence, etc. in ways that make Him beyond human knowing. Muslims, for example, often talk of God this way. It is as if God is so far "out there" that words cannot describe him. On the flip side, a non-Christian view of God's imminence speaks of God as if he is one with nature as in, for example, pantheism. A Christian view of God's imminence and transcendence is way different than these two extremes, for it acknowledges both "sides" of the picture.
Important to a Christian view of trans./imm. is that Christians' knowledge of God is not comprehensive. Logos revelation such as Deut. 29:29 (and many other passages) reveal this plainly--finite humans (even Christians) can never comprehend God totally, because God is infinitely beyond total comprehension by any finite creature. He has not revealed everything about himself to man. However, finite humans can apprehend truth about God becauseGod, in his deep grace, has stooped low and revealed Himself to humanity. And every time that God reveals himself to humanity whether through creation or Word, He always speaks perspicuously (in "baby talk"--language that humans can understand). So, because of God's self-revelation it would be wrong to interpret Van Til as purporting the Creator/creature distinction to be the paradoxical reason that humans ought to know the infinite God, but can't due to their own finiteness.
(A related issue, for another e-mail, would be how Scripture's view of the depravity of man affects man's knowledge of God....)
(b) Creature's thoughts of God's revelation is not the same as God's revelation; rather, creature's thoughts are always affected by creaturely finiteness and sin.
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Hope you are doing well and keepin' your head above water. Things are crazy on my side of the state . . . papers, reading, and Hebrew paradigms galore.... But ahh, the weather is so nice!
In my course readings this week I came across an article from John Frame that (I think) helped me understand your Van Til/Kant point more clearly. Let me add this brief (and I really promise to be short this time!) note on what you said, and at your liesure please let me know if I am tracking with your argument more clearly.
> I think we are operating under different understandings of epistemic > circularity. I accept Alston's argument (in "Beyond Justification) that > all epistemic models are ultimately circular. For example, arguing for > the reliability of sense perception means I must assume that my sense > perception is reliable. Our description of this circularity is > necessitated by our cognitive limitation. However, why should I include > God as one of these epistemic factors that I must assume (like sense > perception)? Van Til argues that the deontological requirement of > properly functioning agents is submission to God's self-revelation. > This, however, pushes the question back one peg.
> Van Til relies on a Kantian-style transcendental argument whereby one > posits the "ontic necessity" (or precondition) of the intelligibility > of a certain experience to establish the existence of certain entities > or concepts. For all of its muster, I find this type of argumentation > wholly unconvincing. When you make statements about the vastness of > God's nature visa-a-vis our cognitive limitation, what perspective are > you assuming? Under Van Til's lights, any statement (of ours) about > God's nature will suffer from the same limitations that he accuses > others of when they utilize an "evidential" perspective. How am I to > recognize the property of God's nature that necessitates my submission > if my cognitive equipment is not adequate for a contingent assessment > of his ontological status? It seems as if Van Til assumes a > transcendental perspective in order to argue for cognitive > limitation--and then sell it off as an argument for the transcendental > necessity of God.
... you are basically (a) arguing that Van Til took over Kant's transcendental approach but claimed God as the starting point to replace Kant's starting point, the autonomous mind of man, and then (b) asking how Van Til can claim a purely transcendental theistic starting point for knowledge without dealing with the non-transcendental realm (empiricism, rationalism, and existentialism), for it appears that he would defeat his own starting point if he attempted to use non-transcendental arguments to boulster his transcendental starting point.
If I'm tracking with your question/critique, then I'd say you are making a point that is close to John Frame's assessment of Van Til's "logical leap":
*** Begin Frame quote from http://reformedperspectives.org/hof/ApolFall2006/Transcendental%20Arg... *** But how can we defend the logical move from "intelligible universe" to "theistic universe?" Van Til rarely articulated his reason for that move; he seemed to think it was self-evident. But in effect, he reverted at this point to apologetics of a more traditional type. Apologists have often noted that we could not know the world at all unless it had been designed for knowledge. If the world were nothing but matter, motion, time, and chance, we would have no reason to think that the ideas in our heads told us anything about the real world. Only if a person had designed the world to be known, and the human mind to know it, could knowledge be possible. So Van Til at this point reverted to a traditional teleological argument. He never admitted doing this, and he could not have admitted it, because he thought the traditional teleological (like the other traditional arguments) were autonomous and neutral. *** End Quote***
In this brief piece Frame goes on to argue that God's revelation does indeed make this radical transcendental claim, and no Christian apologetic (and applied to our case, epistemic) argument is complete without the transcendental implications of God's self-revelation. However, in Frame's estimation assuming this transcendental starting point (as Christians ought) does not force Christians to exclude the traditional (non-transcendental) arguments because these arguments bring the Christian theism argument full circle. In other words, the transcendental argument is the goal of the non-transcendental ones, and neither is complete without the others. (Frame's words are much more clear than mine....)
In a word, I'm saying I think I understand better and am more agreeable with your assessment of transcendental argumentation now than I thought I was at first.
That article looks helpful indeed. I need to apologize man....my world the last week has been absolutely insane--on every level. When are you over in Tampa? Perhaps we can get together.
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