It's not vulnerable even if $arg_* is used.
Maxim Dounin
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Well, the $arg_PARAMETER variable is not implemented with hash tables
at all ;) It scans the URI query string at every invocation :)
Regards,
-agentzh
How about the lua and/or the perl modules? It looks as if they are
using the nginx functions?
Sent from my iPhone
The current released versions of ngx_lua does have this vulnerability
in its ngx.req.get_uri_args() and ngx.req.get_post_args() functions.
I've already worked out a patch for these two functions in ngx_lua's
git max-args branch here:
https://github.com/chaoslawful/lua-nginx-module/commit/75876
With this patch, both of these functions will only parse 100 query
args at most. And one can specify a custom maximum number of args
parsed with an optional function argument (default to 100) and
enforcing unlimited parsing by specifying a zero number.
This patch (as well as this branch) will be merged into the master
branch in 3 Jan.
Best,
It would probably be a good idea at that point, to finally make a
release of v0.3.1 of the ngx_lua module as with about 45 "Release
Candidates", it must already hold some record :)
I've also added similar protections to ngx.req.get_headers():
http://wiki.nginx.org/HttpLuaModule#ngx.req.get_headers
All of these changes have been released as ngx_lua 0.3.1rc45:
https://github.com/chaoslawful/lua-nginx-module/tags
and also included in the ngx_openresty bundle's devel version 1.0.10.39:
http://openresty.org/#Download
Feedback welcome!
Thanks.