Penn Central Historical Society
Roger P. Hensley
Historical Society (PCRRHS) has been established to
preserve the history, stories and artifacts of the short
lived Penn Central Railroad. The first issue of its
publication, the PCRRHS Post has just been mailed out.
There is a print, complete and mail membership application
at: http://lib2.clark.cc.oh.us/pc/PCRRHSapp.html
More information may be had on the Penn Central Mailing
List. List information may be found at
http://prozac.cwru.edu/jer/pc/pc.html
Roger
Roger Hensley
rhen...@anderson.cioe.com
== http://madisonrails.railfan.net/ ==
== Railroads of Madison County (Indiana) ==
Pac Man
Roger P. Hensley wrote in message <39AE78F7...@bsu.edu>...
>For those who may be interested, a Penn Central Railroad
>Historical Society (PCRRHS) has been established to
>preserve the history, stories and artifacts of the short
>lived Penn Central Railroad. The first issue of its
>publication, the PCRRHS Post has just been mailed out.
I wish you good luck for your organization, but why would anyone care
about the PC? :-) I will say I'm a bit biased, but c'mon. A "black" mark
(pun intended) on railroading and American business, they certainly did not
"preserve the history, stories and artifacts" of their long lived
predecessors, so why (as railfans) would we want to preserve the PC?
Remember, yes. Preserve, I don't know. The basement of South Station in
Boston (in 1968) was full of records, plans, and drawings dating back to the
turn of the century. Guess where it all went? The dump!
I'd think an interested fan would pick up a copy of "The Wreck of the
Penn Central" for reference (a very good book, BTW), and skip the rest.
After all, those who forget the past, etc., etc.
If anything, PC has served as the bad example of what not to do.
Paul A. Cutler III
lwin
> >Historical Society (PCRRHS) has been established
> I wish you good luck for your organization, but why would anyone care
> about the PC? :-) I will say I'm a bit biased, but c'mon. A "black" mark
> (pun intended) on railroading and American business, they certainly did not
> "preserve the history, stories and artifacts" of their long lived
> predecessors, so why (as railfans) would we want to preserve the PC?
The Penn Central was no different than many other organizations in having
a callous regard to historical preservation. That they failed to do so
has no bearing on preserving records today.
When I first saw this post, I admit I was tempted to make some snide
remark about the post being unreadable or something like that, as
people often did when riding in an elevator in a PC building. (They
ran as well as the trains did.)
But the PC, for better or worse, occupied a very substantial part
of American railroading. More significantly, the situations that
led to its creation and the situations that followed it are
extremely important to the world of railroading. Indeed, it is
frustrating that apparently the NS and CSX didn't bother learning
about it before they took over Conrail.
>Recommend pick up the good book "Wreck of the Penn Central".
The book does contain a lot of information, but IMHO the authors
have a snotty grudge against the PC's management. They make a big
deal out of things that are not important. They blast the railroad
for its outside investments, but those holdings were making money
and keeping the railroad running. PC management was a tragedy of
errors, starting from the hostile proxy fight to take over the
NY Central. PC should definitely not be blamed for the massive
problems of the New Haven which was forced on them.
There were several factors beyond the PC's control. I don't know
if eliminating any one of them would've saved the railroad, but
they hurt it badly:
. Commuter passenger service
. Long haul passenger service
. Inability to raise/lower freight rates to meet market conditiosn
. Inability to abandon unprofitable freight branches on a timely manner.
. onerous property taxes.
Amtrak Jackson
PC was cursed from the start, burdened with endless commuter services,
countless branch lines and secondaries, the New Haven, and archaic work rules.
As I recall from my days with CR, I often heard "We ARE Penn Central - same
folks, same ideas. We're just carrying out the ideas they had."
Speaking of basements, the basement in the Toledo CUT (1995) was the same.
Better save what we can- it had tons of LS&MS paperwork, MCRR, NYC, and PC
stuff...all to the dumpster.
Adam H. Kerman
>Well, umm, hmm...Conrail did exactly what the PC intended to do; unfortunately
>PC was cursed from the start, burdened with endless commuter services,
>countless branch lines and secondaries, the New Haven, and archaic work rules.
Um, Penn Central wasn't especially feather-bedded compared to the rest
of the industry. Among its many problems were deferred maintenance of the
predecessor railroads, which only got worse, refusing to adapt to a changing
business climate in the northeast, failure to follow through on plans for
integration (Selkirk the most notorious example) that would have led to
greater efficiencies, etc.
Perhaps the biggest problem was morale. When the top executives of the two
railroads assumed failure from the start, to the operating crews who had
simply stopped caring, bankruptcy is inevitable. I had a friend who was in
train service for Penn Central who used to tell frightening stories...
Commuter service? Sure, that was a cash drain, but hardly the leading cause
of the bankruptcy. The branch lines? Gotta disagree with you there. Short lines
are thriving today, and would have thrived at the time if run with imagination.
If only more had been sold off rather than abandoned, the local economies and
the industry would have been stronger today.
>As I recall from my days with CR, I often heard "We ARE Penn Central - same
>folks, same ideas. We're just carrying out the ideas they had."
I don't recall that Penn Central had announced plans to eliminate entire mains:
Big Four, Panhandle all gone, Fort Wayne traffic negligible. Of course,
Conrail went further by eliminating the Erie.
Any fans out there for a Conrail historical society?
Adam H. Kerman
>>Recommend pick up the good book "Wreck of the Penn Central".
>The book does contain a lot of information, but IMHO the authors
>have a snotty grudge against the PC's management. They make a big
>deal out of things that are not important. They blast the railroad
>for its outside investments, but those holdings were making money
>and keeping the railroad running.
And many of those holding remain with Penn Central today after it emerged
from bankruptcy.
Pac Man
Amtrak Jackson wrote in message
<20000901025659...@ng-cr1.aol.com>...
>Well, umm, hmm...Conrail did exactly what the PC intended to do;
unfortunately
>PC was cursed from the start, burdened with endless commuter services,
>countless branch lines and secondaries, the New Haven, and archaic work
rules.
Agreed. However, how come the Providence & Worcester could make a go of it,
and the PC couldn't? I don't know much about the early 70's history of the
P&W, but they started with nothing at about the same time, and now are a top
regional in New England. Wha' happened? (I plead ignorance, your honor)
:-)
>As I recall from my days with CR, I often heard "We ARE Penn Central - same
>folks, same ideas. We're just carrying out the ideas they had."
Same folks? Sure, the employees were, but how about the high mucky-mucks?
Were they the same? Also, there were a few more former class 1's thrown
into CR, did that make a differance? BTW, CR was no great shakes either,
IMHO. They could make a profit, but they couldn't grow. They certainly had
the "cut" mentality going, but they refused to expand, it seems to me. For
example, the B&A line traffic was booming in the early to mid 90's (which
had been single tracked in the 70's-80's) and was causing capacity problems.
So, instead of increasing the amount of track, it cut the amount of general
merchandise shipments (read: boxcars) it would take.
> Speaking of basements, the basement in the Toledo CUT (1995) was the same.
>Better save what we can- it had tons of LS&MS paperwork, MCRR, NYC, and PC
>stuff...all to the dumpster.
What's left to save? The PC threw it all away! ^_^
BTW, why did PC or CR ever exist in the first place? Why would the ICC ever
aprove a monopoly like that?
Paul A. Cutler III
Pac Man
>The Penn Central was no different than many other organizations in having
>a callous regard to historical preservation. That they failed to do so
>has no bearing on preserving records today.
Why not? Turnabout's fair play, after all. :-) However, take a look at
the New Haven situation. There was a well established group (the NHRTIA,
todays NHRHTA) involved with the PR dept. of the railroad. The NH promised
to print the NHRTIA's material and some access to records in exchange for
the NHRTIA handling some PR work (dealing with model railroading companies,
for example). (at least, I think that's what happened. I'd have to check)
Why couldn't other companies do more of this?
<snip>
>But the PC, for better or worse, occupied a very substantial part
>of American railroading.
Yeah, all bad. :-) Winners of: Worst Paint Job Award, Worst Internecine
Warfare in Upper Management Award, Biggest Failure in American Business
Award, Worst Merging Preparation Award ("Hey, our computers won't talk to
each other!"), etc. (As compiled by Me, Myself & I Awards, Co., Inc.) LOL
>More significantly, the situations that
>led to its creation and the situations that followed it are
>extremely important to the world of railroading. Indeed, it is
>frustrating that apparently the NS and CSX didn't bother learning
>about it before they took over Conrail.
I agree 100%. The implosion of PC led to the health of railroading as it is
today (for better or worse). And it is important to remember the PC for the
failure it was, but to preserve it's history? I flinch at the thought.
(Just think of ConnDOT repainting the FL-9's in PC watercolor black)
>The book does contain a lot of information, but IMHO the authors
>have a snotty grudge against the PC's management. They make a big
>deal out of things that are not important. They blast the railroad
>for its outside investments, but those holdings were making money
>and keeping the railroad running. PC management was a tragedy of
>errors, starting from the hostile proxy fight to take over the
>NY Central. PC should definitely not be blamed for the massive
>problems of the New Haven which was forced on them.
Yeah, I noticed the bias. What's funny is that it was written in 1970,
so it leaves an incomplete picture. At the time, didn't some of those
outside investments fail to show a profit? I'd have to go back and read the
book again...
About the NH, the gov't should've just taken control of it from the get
go. Because the only way to save the NH was to kill it, as far as the PC
was concerned. (One word: Poughkeepsie)
>There were several factors beyond the PC's control. I don't know
>if eliminating any one of them would've saved the railroad, but
>they hurt it badly:
>. Commuter passenger service
>. Long haul passenger service
>. Inability to raise/lower freight rates to meet market conditiosn
>. Inability to abandon unprofitable freight branches on a timely manner.
>. onerous property taxes.
Absolutely. What's interesting is the number of gov't organizations that
had to be created to handle the traffic. ConnDOT, MBTA, M-N, Amtrak, SEPTA,
etc. If the deregulation of the railroads had happened 10 to 15 years
earlier, maybe PC could have been avoided altogether. 'Course, without the
PC, dereg. would not have happened as soon as it did. <sigh>
Paul A. Cutler III
Adam H. Kerman
>BTW, why did PC or CR ever exist in the first place? Why would the ICC ever
>aprove a monopoly like that?
Penn Central wasn't the first of the big railroad mergers of the era, and the
ICC was not in the business of promoting competition among railroads. Around
the same time, the Chicago Great Western was merged into its important
competitor, Chicago & North Western, and then abandoned.
As an intellectual exercise I guess, the ICC hearing examiner on the UP-CRI&P
merger petition recommended a merger plan affecting all of the western and
grainger railroads that would have likely strengthened the weak carriers and
guaranteed competition in the decades to come. He was overruled, of course.
When years later, the merger was ultimately approved, UP no longer wanted the
Rock due to years of deferred maintenance of its physical plant.
Conrail, of course, was created by Congress then de-nationalized under
Ronald Reagan. Conrail still exists as a railroad in three disparate pieces,
and is jointly owned by NS and CSX.
Roger Hensley
> Any fans out there for a Conrail historical society?
There is one already. The Conrail Technical and
Historical Society.
lwin
> >were other factors involved. First off, many times the new business
> >wasn't enough to offset the costs of maintaining a branch and running
> >a train on it. Remember, back then rates were uniform and not flexible
> >as they are today. That made a big difference.
>
> Various books and articles I read about the '50's and '60's were highly
> critical. If you think there was bias, perhaps. What have you read that
> puts marketing efforts in a positive light?
Well, the NYC and PRR had Flexivan and TrucTrain. They wanted to get
away from local yard work and switching, which were very expensive
and inefficient.
The "Wreck of the Penn Central" describes the problems involved
in branch line operations.
I can't find my book on the PRSL, but its called something like
By Rail to the Boardwalk, and it goes into great detail on
problems of branch line service and marketing efforts.
Let me put it another way. If you open your store longer hours,
you'll do more sales. But if you don't enough sales to pay for
the extra electricity and labor, you're losing money
As to branch line marketing, a boxcar here and there is not the
kind of business that the railroads needed to make a difference.
> I think of the big industrial parks then being opened in the suburbs. The
> developers often located them near a railroad, if not two. Rarely did newly
> opened factories want sidings. The famous Centex industrial park in Elk Grove
> Village included freight spurs throughout so that no customer would have had
> to link to it for more than a few hundred feet, to be served by the C&NW. Over
> the years, it's had negligible use. Jeeze; the developer paid for it and the
> railroad wouldn't make the effort to drum up business.
First, do you even know with certainty the railroads didn't attempt
to drum up business from the park? Second, did the industry include
those suitable for rail shipping? Third, would the traffic generated
pay to run an engine and crew out to get the cars, switch them into
a through train, switch them out at destination (and maybe again en
route), and then run another engine and crew to deliver it? (And
freight agents to write up waybills).
> >Whatever concessions made at that time were no where near what was to
> >follow. What was the crew of a freight train in 1970 vs today?
>
> I suppose two or three in train service and two in the engine weren't
> uncommon. Perhaps some switchers had a fourth man in train service, but
> those guys were doing actual work; can't count that as featherbedding.
I think you'll find that the productivity (ie freight handled by labor)
is far higher than it was in 1970. Longer, faster through trains,
smaller crews, fewer support personnel.
It took the massive retrenchment in workforce size to wake up everybody
to the need for serious re-working of traditional railroad labor rules.
> >Don't forget the Penn Central wasn't the only one affected--the other
> >NE railroads were going bankrupt too.
>
> Depends. The competion, such as the former Nickel Plate, was healthy as
> always. I guess N&W had eliminated the Wabash by that time. Some minor weather
> problem caused the death of the Erie-Lackawana, else it wouldn't have been
> nationalized into Conrail. The New Haven situation wasn't comparable.
Conrail included the Reading, Central of New Jersey, Erie-Lackawanna,
Lehigh Valley, Penn Central, and the LehighHR/NE. The point is that
the problems of the PC weren't isolated.
> True, most of the new equipment was in place by 1964. But, commuter rail wasn't
> anything healthier for the Pennsy 10 years earlier when something could have
> been done. After 1964, there would have been federal subsidies available for
> new equipment anyway! The CB&Q went on the dole, the C&NW didn't till after
> 1975.
In 1958 the PRR invested in six new commuter cars for its Phila area
lines. Very attractive. But the added patronage was insufficient to
justify the capital expenditures. The lines couldn't even meet their
variable operating costs, let alone any surplus for capital costs.
In 1963 in Phila the city subsidized some services and got new
equipment. If you're saying new equipment would have created a
profitable situation, that is incorrect. The service conditions
were just not conducive to profit on commuter service in the east.
The LIRR had been a total disaster since the early 1950s and the
PRR unloaded it on New York State.
> >Lastly, regulators in the east (esp NYC) wouldn't allow fare increases or
> >service cutbacks on obsolete divisions.
>
> Won't dispute bad regulation, although what do you count as obsolete?
The NYC wanted to get rid of the west side line and ferries for years
as well as the Putnam Br but was thwarted. Fares were held unrealistically
low for years.
> You understand the commuter rail situation: it couldn't be abandoned. In that
> case, a healthy investment to turn a big loss into a modest profit made good
> business sense.
That is completely incorrect. First, a massive investment won't turnaround
an inherently bad situation. Phila put on new trains but it didn't
save money nor attract sufficient new patronage to pay for them.
Secondly, the investment must be paid off as well as cost of capital.
All this represents throwing good money after bad.
> >>Did railroad executives of the era see branch lines as anything more than
> >>permanent red ink stains? I doubt it.
>
> >At the time, they were permanent red ink stains.
>
> Nothing's permanent, not regulation nor onerous labor rules nor downturn in
> freight business. I take it you agree with me.
How long did it take from 1970 to reform both regulation and labor?
I'd say 15 years (1985). From the point of view in 1970, that wasn't
gonna happen, indeed in 1970, the forces were very much against it.
Labor had strong backing back then. Despite the losses, railroads were
perceived by the public as 'evil robber barons' and the public was not
sympathetic to their cause.
> The point I was making is that the railroads could have seen the branches as
> profitable under certain circumstances and made the case to the regulators and
> the unions, and then sold them off in lieu of abandoning them.
Regulators and the unions were not interested. The PRSL book I mentioned
proves this clearly.
In 1970, everybody thought the Penn Central's problems were its own fault
and that it should and _could_ clean up its own act. This was simply
a false perception.
Nobody could understand why FW Woolworth closed its 5+10 stores because
they were making a 'modest' profit. People didn't understand that
the company saw those stores has having no future profit potential
given the marketplace. Woolworth is making money on its other retail
operations. For sentimental reasons, I wish Woolworth's was still
around, but I am not a stockholder and it isn't my money being invested.
Businesses close out weak lines all the time. Conditions change.
As I keep emphasizing, railroads wanted point to point unit trains.
Merchandise trains with lots of switching, did not. You seem to
think adding a few boxcars would make the difference, and it wouldn't,
just as keeping a store open longer hours merely to sell a few more candy
bars isn't profitable either.
A local drugstore in my town _closed_ on town fair day, which one would
think would be a big business day. The owner explained his costs and
nuisances in being open far exceeded his sales revenues. (For example,
families would come in wanting to use the bathroom but not buy anything).
He needed a lot of extra help to keep an eye on the kids who came in.
> I agree. And when they don't see themselves as specializing in a specific
> aspect of the transportation business (meeting the needs of smaller customers),
> it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that it becomes unprofitable.
Is it a _future_ prophecy or an _existing_ situation?
Adam H. Kerman
>>I think of the big industrial parks then being opened in the suburbs. The
>>developers often located them near a railroad, if not two. Rarely did newly
>>opened factories want sidings. The famous Centex industrial park in Elk
>>Grove Village included freight spurs throughout so that no customer would
>>have had to link to it for more than a few hundred feet, to be served by
>>the C&NW. Over the years, it's had negligible use. Jeeze; the developer
>>paid for it and the railroad wouldn't make the effort to drum up business.
>First, do you even know with certainty the railroads didn't attempt
>to drum up business from the park?
That's what the developers said.
>Second, did the industry include those suitable for rail shipping?
How does one know he needs something? Marketing tells him.
>Third, would the traffic generated pay to run an engine and crew out
>to get the cars, switch them into a through train, switch them out at
>destination (and maybe again en route), and then run another engine and
>crew to deliver it? (And freight agents to write up waybills).
Good point. If nothing is done to open up a new market, then no one can be
blamed for drumming up unprofitable business.
At the time, industry was moving to the suburbs, just like offices, just like
people. If new business was out there, that's where it would have been.
>>>Whatever concessions made at that time were no where near what was to
>>>follow. What was the crew of a freight train in 1970 vs today?
>>I suppose two or three in train service and two in the engine weren't
>>uncommon. Perhaps some switchers had a fourth man in train service, but
>>those guys were doing actual work; can't count that as featherbedding.
>I think you'll find that the productivity (ie freight handled by labor)
>is far higher than it was in 1970. Longer, faster through trains,
>smaller crews, fewer support personnel.
We've got both, now. Smaller crews and longer trains. Customers have fewer
options. The fast freight is a different matter.
>It took the massive retrenchment in workforce size to wake up everybody
>to the need for serious re-working of traditional railroad labor rules.
Heh. I think the two went hand-in-hand. "You sure there's nobody back there
to throw that brake?"
>Conrail included the Reading, Central of New Jersey, Erie-Lackawanna,
>Lehigh Valley, Penn Central, and the LehighHR/NE. The point is that
>the problems of the PC weren't isolated.
Nationalizing all those railroads together wasn't the most ingenious
solution Congress ever came up with. I wonder how the Rock didn't get shoved
into that big mess.
>>True, most of the new equipment was in place by 1964. But, commuter rail
>>wasn't anything healthier for the Pennsy 10 years earlier when something
>>could have been done. After 1964, there would have been federal subsidies
>>available for new equipment anyway! The CB&Q went on the dole, the C&NW
>>didn't till after 1975.
>In 1958 the PRR invested in six new commuter cars for its Phila area
>lines. Very attractive. But the added patronage was insufficient to
>justify the capital expenditures. The lines couldn't even meet their
>variable operating costs, let alone any surplus for capital costs.
>In 1963 in Phila the city subsidized some services and got new
>equipment. If you're saying new equipment would have created a
>profitable situation, that is incorrect.
I said several times that the plant in Philadelphia was not laid out to take
advantage of suburban sprawl as CB&Q, C&NW, and ICG in Chicago were able to.
Did the new equipment and new patronage reduce the operating deficit?
>The service conditions were just not conducive to profit on commuter
>service in the east. The LIRR had been a total disaster since the early
>1950s and the PRR unloaded it on New York State.
Sorry, that WAS situation to take advantage of suburban sprawl. I don't know
enough about its problems at the time, but there must have been other factors
in play you are not describing. New York PUC, undoubtably.
Others have argued that the Pennsy sold it to the state for far more than it
was worth at the time, but obviously less than it would have cost to replace.
>>>Lastly, regulators in the east (esp NYC) wouldn't allow fare increases or
>>>service cutbacks on obsolete divisions.
>>Won't dispute bad regulation, although what do you count as obsolete?
>The NYC wanted to get rid of the west side line and ferries for years
>as well as the Putnam Br but was thwarted. Fares were held unrealistically
>low for years.
C'mon. How could ferries be obsolete? It had suddenly become cheaper to
bridge the Hudson?
>>You understand the commuter rail situation: it couldn't be abandoned. In that
>>case, a healthy investment to turn a big loss into a modest profit made good
>>business sense.
>That is completely incorrect. First, a massive investment won't turnaround
>an inherently bad situation. Phila put on new trains but it didn't
>save money nor attract sufficient new patronage to pay for them.
>Secondly, the investment must be paid off as well as cost of capital.
>All this represents throwing good money after bad.
Ignoring Philadelphia, you haven't really made the case that conditions in
Chicago were unique allowing three railroads to make significant improvements
to attract riders. In the ICG's case, the investment allowed it to cut costs
substantially. In the other two cases, ridership growth could be handled
without increasing the train crew.
>As I keep emphasizing, railroads wanted point to point unit trains.
>Merchandise trains with lots of switching, did not. You seem to
>think adding a few boxcars would make the difference, and it wouldn't . . .
No, I think adding a few boxcars from a lot of customers makes a difference.
Railroads are in a position to fill the needs of various customers. Good
thing the trucking industry, the parcel shipment industry, and most of the
rest of the transportation business doesn't feel that way, else goods would
never get to market.
>>I agree. And when they don't see themselves as specializing in a specific
>>aspect of the transportation business (meeting the needs of smaller
>>customers), it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that it becomes
>>unprofitable.
>Is it a _future_ prophecy or an _existing_ situation?
Some aspects of the '60's climate were created by the railroads themselves.
Wes Leatherock
On Sun, 3 Sep 2000 06:51:03 GMT Adam H. Kerman <a...@chinet.chinet.com>
wrote:
[ ... text deleted ... ]
> No, I think adding a few boxcars from a lot of customers makes a difference.
> Railroads are in a position to fill the needs of various customers. Good
> thing the trucking industry, the parcel shipment industry, and most of the
> rest of the transportation business doesn't feel that way, else goods would
> never get to market.
With dergulation of the trucking industry, most of the
truck lines declined to handled anything other than truckloads.
Those truck lines which continued to try to provide the
traditional complete service went into bankruptcy and disappeared.
Look at all the abandoned truck terminals around the country.
The few that survived carrying less than truckload freight
raised minimums for such freight to ridiculously high levels--
$35 to $50 or higher even 15 or 20 years ago.
Have you tried to send something of moderate size--
greater than the UPS limits but far, far below a truckload?
Truck lines also discontinued service to all the
smaller places. The equivalent of discontinuing branch
line service.
For really small packages (150 pounds or less), there
are carriers that specialize in this (and nothing else).
UPS is the shining example; the U.S. Postal Service also
carries a considerable amount. And FedEx has added a ground
service for small shipments.
Wes Leatherock
wle...@sandbox.dynip.com
Adam H. Kerman
>On Sun, 3 Sep 2000 06:51:03 GMT Adam H. Kerman <a...@chinet.chinet.com> wrote:
>>No, I think adding a few boxcars from a lot of customers makes a difference.
>>Railroads are in a position to fill the needs of various customers. Good
>>thing the trucking industry, the parcel shipment industry, and most of the
>>rest of the transportation business doesn't feel that way, else goods would
>>never get to market.
> With dergulation of the trucking industry, most of the
>truck lines declined to handled anything other than truckloads.
>Those truck lines which continued to try to provide the
>traditional complete service went into bankruptcy and disappeared.
>Look at all the abandoned truck terminals around the country.
Oh, there are still consolidators out there.
> The few that survived carrying less than truckload freight
>raised minimums for such freight to ridiculously high levels--
>$35 to $50 or higher even 15 or 20 years ago.
> Have you tried to send something of moderate size--
>greater than the UPS limits but far, far below a truckload?
No. However, when I was in the magazine publishing business, the printer jobbed
it out to various truck lines who had specific runs. It was cheaper than UPS.
> Truck lines also discontinued service to all the smaller places. The
>equivalent of discontinuing branch line service.
Yes, but it's possible for smaller guys to provide service to the end user.
I've never had the need to look into shipping something over 150 lbs., so I
don't know how difficult it might be. But someone must still specialize in
that service as it's still needed.
Adam H. Kerman
>>>>Won't dispute bad regulation, although what do you count as obsolete?
>>>The NYC wanted to get rid of the west side line and ferries for years
>>>as well as the Putnam Br but was thwarted. Fares were held unrealistically
>>>low for years.
>>C'mon. How could ferries be obsolete? It had suddenly become cheaper to
>>bridge the Hudson?
>Yes! Especially when the government does it.
Getting a little off subject, but it's not possible to argue that building all
those new highways on either side of the Hudson, needed due to the induced
demand for traffic due to the bridges and tunnels, was cost effective. Not for
passenger use; perhaps for freight.
>The west side line and ferries were in need of replacement, and the NYC
>saw no future return on its investment to do so. Automobiles and buses
>running over bridges (ie Tappan Zee, Geo Washington, and the new bus
>terminals) providing competition the NYC felt it could not meet.
>Ferries were costly to run.
Examining the overall transportation network, ferry service might have been
considered cost effective. Presently, new ferry crossings have been started,
so someone must think they are a good idea.
>>Ignoring Philadelphia, you haven't really made the case that conditions in
>>Chicago were unique allowing three railroads to make significant improvements
>>to attract riders. In the ICG's case, the investment allowed it to cut costs
>>substantially. In the other two cases, ridership growth could be handled
>>without increasing the train crew.
>One problem in the postwar era was that "attracting new riders" created
>a high cost situation. In the prewar era, people worked a 6 day work
>and there was nothing in the suburbs, so the trains were utilized much
>more. The rush hour didn't have as steep a peak to it. But in the
>postwar era, esp in the 1960s, pleasure train riding (ie to downtown
>stores, theatre, etc), declined as suburban facilities were built.
>At the same time, rush hour ridership was increasing. That meant the
>railroads had to have sufficient physical plant (cars, stations,
>terminal space, yard space; plus idle crews) to handle the rush hour
>and that equipment would be idle the rest of the day. Very inefficient
>and unprofitable.
And Chicago was unique unaffected, how? I remind you that the C&NW ADDED
off-peak service on a memory schedule to be able to better market it.
Sprawl increases the need for cars and storage and maintenance facilities, not
for terminal space. When was capacity at a railroad terminal ever exceeded?
Likely, the track capacity existed in outlying areas to serve sprawl.
The maintenance facilities may not have needed to be increased; commuter
equipment replaced intercity equipment during this period. On the ICG, far
fewer Highliners replaced the single-level cars in the early '70's. That
wasn't only due to greater capacity, but a significant drop off in in-city
riding thanks to the opening of the Dan Ryan "L".
The only advantage sprawl has from a railroad's perspective is goofy distance-
based pricing; more revenue to be earned.
lwin
> those new highways on either side of the Hudson, needed due to the induced
> demand for traffic due to the bridges and tunnels, was cost effective. Not for
> passenger use; perhaps for freight.
When the government builds a road, it does not determine whether it
is cost effective or not, but rather to meet a public need (unless
there's politics involved).
In any event, the continued construction of bridges and freeways
took away traffic from the railroad.
In the case of the New York Central, the govt subsidized St. Lawrence
Seaway took away traffic. The govt had to subsidize the construction
and operation of that from the day it opened through today, at a cost
of lost traffic from the railroad.
> Examining the overall transportation network, ferry service might have been
> considered cost effective. Presently, new ferry crossings have been started,
> so someone must think they are a good idea.
The new ferry boats are vastly different than the ones the NYC operated.
Further, there was a time delay of 35-40 years between the end of
railroad ferries and the current service. A business cannot run a
loss operation for 40 years waiting for conditions to improve.
Keep in mind that the abandonment decisions were made in a very
different era than today. People were buying and driving cars
and new roads were being built by the government. In 1960, it
was crystal clear that railroads were obsolete in that context.
When your competitor is the government (or technologically out
matches you), there is no point to stay around. There used to
be frequent steamship crossings of the Atlantic, today there is
but one. By your approach, the steamship companies should have
done something to attract patronage they were losing to the airlines.
By your approach, livery stables and blacksmiths should have found
a way to compete with the automobile and stay in business.
> And Chicago was unique unaffected, how? I remind you that the C&NW ADDED
> off-peak service on a memory schedule to be able to better market it.
Chicago seemed to be able to go at it longer than the east. I don't
know why. But Chicago rail eventually became all govt owned anyway,
just as the east is. And Chicago transit was bought by the govt
long before Phila's was.
> Sprawl increases the need for cars and storage and maintenance facilities, not
> for terminal space. When was capacity at a railroad terminal ever exceeded?
Increased rush hour traffic created problems in many cities. You need
a bigger fleet for the peak demand. If the riders are coming from a
greater distance, you need a still bigger fleet to go out there and
get them.
Pac Man
>You've gotten way off the subject. The point is, many of us loved the
>Penn Central and have decided to form a society after its demise of 26
>years. I can't agree more that it was a failure, but like it or not,
>it's part of our railroad history.
I'm afraid you won't find many members in my neck of the woods (ex-NH
territory), as I know maybe 100 railfans personally, and exactly 2 have loco
models of the PC. But love? Why would anyone love the PC? What did it do
to derserve that much respect in only, what, 8 years? It pillaged the NH
with reckless abandon from which the region is still suffering
(Poughkeepsie, anyone?). I sincerely wish you luck on this enterprise, as I
know how tough it is to keep a non-profit going. However, to me, the PC
represents all the bad things that happened to railroads (and that they did
to themselves) in the 1960's-70's. I'd rather spend my time
remembering/studying times of glory on the railroads, which includes the
present day as well as the distant past (like the early 1950's). :-)
>If you examine the Penn Central more closely, I believe you'll find it
>much more interesting that you might think.
I admit, I only know about what the PC did in New England. And it might be
interesting to learn even more. But, as getting depressed isn't much fun,
it's way down on my priority scale, sorry to say. As an aside, was anything
good happening to the USA in the late 60's early 70's (before my time) at
all? Seems like everyting went downhill from '65-'75. Glad I missed it.
^_^
>As a society what we're trying to do is educate anyone interested in the
>short history of the Penn Central. Not make it something it wasn't.
Again, I wish you well. Really, I mean it. Honest. Cross my heart.
>Yes the Wreck of the Penn Central is a great book for anyone's
>collection, but here are a few more that are highly recommended if
>you're really interested in the Penn Central.
>
>A Sampling of Penn Central (Jerry Taylor)
>Penn Central Bi-Annual (Robert H. Reid)
>Penn Central Power (Yanosey)
>Penn Central Color Guide (Kinkaid)
>Penn central Northeast Rail Scene #6 (Pennisi)
>Wreck of The Penn Central, (Daughen & Binzen)
>No Way To Run A Railroad (Salsbury)
>The Fallen Colossus (Sobel)
>Riding The Pennsy To Ruin (Dow Jones & Co.)
Thanks for the info. I've heard of a book, however, that you didn't mention
(and I have no idea if it's relevant). "To Hell in a Day Coach" Does
anybody remember this one and what's it about?
Paul A. Cutler III (b. 1975)
lwin
that it was written too early (and the authors admitted that, they
wanted to 'hunt down the scent while it was still fresh'.)
Those authors were extremely critical of PC Treasurer David Bevan.
But another book credits Bevan with keeping the company afloat longer
and his getting a bad rap. (I tend to agree with the latter book.)
The saddest part of the PC is that other companies never learned from
it. Lorenzo, after his Continetal airlines system crashed, claimed
(falsely) he had broken new ground with his mergers, as if the PC never
existed. The recent Conrail NS/CSX takeover proved that operational
issues are still a challenge, despite today's far more powerful
real-time computers than the PC had to deal with or make use of.
A book should be written now about the PC. It should be in readable
prose, not a dry congressional style report; but it should be properly
researched with good footnotes. It should be unbiased, and reflect the
operating conditions of the time as the basis for judging decisions made
at that time. But it should also be analytical, noting what changes in
the industry have occured since the PC and how they may have or may have
NOT helped the PC.
One advantage of doing a book long after the fact is that information
may be more accessible. Personal papers and records may be available
from deceased persons. There is no fear of libel when writing about
deceased persons. Older retired people may be more open in interviews
since their careers are over and they need not worry about hurting
themselves (or not care at this point what other people think). [For
example, Defense Secretary McNamera wrote a book admitting many mistakes
in Vietnam policy.]
An added issue of the PC bankruptcy was the transition the NE U.S. was
going through. It was rapidly losing its basic hard industries. At the
time of the PC, the trend was still early (though some once large New
England industries were long gone). In a few years other industries
such as steel, coal, and autos would dry up. I think at the time many
people already saw the NE U.S. as obsolete in favor of other regions and
saw no problem in letting the PC fail. (Others at the time were very
concerned about the impact on national defense resources and the overall
national economy.)
jhay
> Hello Railfans,
>
> You've gotten way off the subject. The point is, many of us loved the
> Penn Central and have decided to form a society after its demise of 26
> years. I can't agree more that it was a failure, but like it or not,
> it's part of our railroad history.
>
> If you examine the Penn Central more closely, I believe you'll find it
> much more interesting that you might think.
>
> As a society what we're trying to do is educate anyone interested in the
> short history of the Penn Central. Not make it something it wasn't.
Good points.
Another good reason for a PCT&HS (or whatever you call it) is that they can
cover PC history, brief as it was, like no other RRHS is able to. The
NYCHS, PRRT&HS and NHRHTA (and societies of other fallen flags) must skip
over most (though not all) post-merger history due to Federal tax law
requirements as applied to nonprofit historical societies.
I can think of some great topics for publication, like the Poughkeepsie
Bridge fire, the new Selkirk Yard, the Metroliners, PC's computer systems,
merger rationalizations and connections, and, inevitably, abandonments and
discontinuances. Good luck in making the most of your new society.
Adam H. Kerman
>Another good reason for a PCT&HS (or whatever you call it) is that they can
>cover PC history, brief as it was, like no other RRHS is able to. The
>NYCHS, PRRT&HS and NHRHTA (and societies of other fallen flags) must skip
>over most (though not all) post-merger history due to Federal tax law
>requirements as applied to nonprofit historical societies.
You say that the IRS would pull 501(c)(3) status if a historical society
for the New York Central published a book on what happened during the Penn
Central years or later? You are insane.
jhay
Quite possibly. Losing 501(c)(3) status is no laughing matter for any
nonprofit, especially when you consider that many nonprofits aren't exactly
swimming in money or personnel (volunteers). That's why they have guidelines
about what they do in their mission statements.
Here are the mission statements from the pre-PC Fallen Flags main
historical societies, cut and pasted from their websites. Emphasis is mine.
First, PRRT&HS:
"The Society's mission is to bring together persons interested in the history
of the Pennsylvania Railroad, its subsidiaries and its predecessor companies.
Our goals are to promote the preservation and recording of all information
regarding the organization, operation, facilities and equipment *of the PRR*."
Next, NYCSHS (actually, it isn't specifically labeled "mission statement", but
it looks like part, if not all, of it):
"The New York Central System Historical Society concentrates its efforts on the
study of the history of the NYC and its subsidiaries as well as motive power
and rolling stock
development *from 1831 to 1968*."
Finally, the NHRHTA:
"The NHRHTA['s] primary purpose is the accumulation, tabulation and
distribution of historical, educational, and technical data *specifically
related to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company and its
predecessors.*"
Do you see the words "and successors" or "after 1968" anywhere in these
statements? Didn't think so. I assure you their omission is no oversight.
I volunteer for a historical society near where I live (Philadelphia), and
belong to others, so I'm well aware of the legal as well as financial
constraints they operate under. The community this society is in was absorbed
by the City of Philadelphia in the great consolidation of 1854, to extend the
City to be conterminous with the County of Philadelphia. IMO, having a NYC HS
publish a purely PC book would be akin to our historical society publishing an
article about the architecture of Philadelphia City Hall (built
1876-1901--that's right, 25 years =:-O ) Just because we're part of
Philadelphia doesn't mean our society can cover the history of the whole city.
If you've ever read the Shoreliner (NHRHTA), or the Keystone or the High
Line (PRRT&HS), you'll notice a dearth of information as to what happened to a
particular line, or whatever the topic is, after 1968. Well, things do get said
like "Floods washed out the line in 1971..." or "Abandoned in 1975, not much is
left today...", and some attempt is usually made to bring the reader up to date
on present statuses. But conspicuous by its absence is mention of PC or CR in
most of these articles. IMO, it might be better if more post-Fallen Flag
history was given, but that just isn't the mission of these historical
societies. Maybe the IRS wouldn't notice such a deviation on their own, but a
commercial, profit-making enterprise might complain loudly, especially one in
potential competition with the society, and the IRS would be forced to
investigate. Sometimes it's best for the underdog not to tempt fate.
JFTR, someone on a New Haven forum said the same thing I just said here,
but in far fewer words (can't remember for sure, but it may have been the
NHRHTA president, Wayne Drummond). I'd point to it with a URL if it were still
there, but it's a very popular forum with many threads, and that particular
thread was inactive for a while, so it probably got pushed off the server.
Whoever said it was right, though--historical societies *must* stay within the
bounds and gray areas ;-) of their mission statement.
JH
Adam H. Kerman
>>>Another good reason for a PCT&HS (or whatever you call it) is that they can
>>>cover PC history, brief as it was, like no other RRHS is able to. The
>>>NYCHS, PRRT&HS and NHRHTA (and societies of other fallen flags) must skip
>>>over most (though not all) post-merger history due to Federal tax law
>>>requirements as applied to nonprofit historical societies.
>>You say that the IRS would pull 501(c)(3) status if a historical society
>>for the New York Central published a book on what happened during the Penn
>>Central years or later?
>Quite possibly. Losing 501(c)(3) status is no laughing matter for any
>nonprofit, especially when you consider that many nonprofits aren't exactly
>swimming in money or personnel (volunteers). That's why they have guidelines
>about what they do in their mission statements.
And a mission statement has what, exactly, to do with carrying out the tax
laws? What precedent, exactly, can you cite for a 501(c)(3) organization losing
its recognition for publishing a book on a subject related to, but not
specifically mentioned, in its purpose (which is distinct from "mission
statement")?
A mission statement is not a legal document nor is it even binding on the
organization. It has whatever weight the board of directors gave it. It's not
the Articles of Incorporation, where the "purpose" would be found.
Under what scenario would the IRS even become aware of this, er, discrepency?
And question it?
> I volunteer for a historical society near where I live (Philadelphia), and
>belong to others, so I'm well aware of the legal as well as financial
>constraints they operate under.
And you are offering legal advice?
For those of you who want decent advice on tax law on Usenet, I would
suggest misc.taxes.moderated. Several very knowledgeable CPAs post there
regularly answering questions. There is a mailing list called Charitylaw
which has the few lawyers on it who specialize in this very narrow field
of law. Of course if you want expert advice, you'd need to pay for it.
Pac Man
>Finally, the NHRHTA:
>"The NHRHTA['s] primary purpose is the accumulation, tabulation and
>distribution of historical, educational, and technical data *specifically
>related to the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company and its
>predecessors.*"
>
>Do you see the words "and successors" or "after 1968" anywhere in these
>statements? Didn't think so. I assure you their omission is no oversight.
It's funny you mention this about the NHRHTA. I looked, and there are over
a dozen articles in the Shoreliner over the years (tho' none in the last 10)
that are titled "On the New Haven Today", which *seems* to contradict your
statements. They featured photos and short articles about modern
railroading on former NH lines. Also, the NHRHTA Newsletters also had *and
have* modern photos and articles dealing with the ex-NH.
<snip>
> JFTR, someone on a New Haven forum said the same thing I just said
here,
>but in far fewer words (can't remember for sure, but it may have been the
>NHRHTA president, Wayne Drummond). I'd point to it with a URL if it were
still
>there, but it's a very popular forum with many threads, and that particular
>thread was inactive for a while, so it probably got pushed off the server.
>Whoever said it was right, though--historical societies *must* stay within
the
>bounds and gray areas ;-) of their mission statement.
I think it's more of a choice than a hard and fast rule (please feel free to
correct me). As mentioned, the NHRHTA does deal occasionally with modern
stuff, but people don't join the NHRHTA to learn about what ConnDOT or
Amtrak is doing today. They join to learn about the past (pre-1969). I
think membership would plummet if they started to emphasize the present,
IMHO.
Paul A. Cutler III
lwin
> > >cover PC history, brief as it was, like no other RRHS is able to. The
> > >NYCHS, PRRT&HS and NHRHTA (and societies of other fallen flags) must skip
> > >over most (though not all) post-merger history due to Federal tax law
> > >requirements as applied to nonprofit historical societies.
> >
> > You say that the IRS would pull 501(c)(3) status if a historical society
> > for the New York Central published a book on what happened during the Penn
> > Central years or later?
>
> Quite possibly. Losing 501(c)(3) status is no laughing matter for any
> nonprofit, especially when you consider that many nonprofits aren't exactly
> swimming in money or personnel (volunteers). That's why they have guidelines
> about what they do in their mission statements.
Having also worked for volunteer societies and as a member, I find it
absurb to suggest that for a "PRR" or "NYC" historical society to
publish something about the Penn Central would beyond its "scope"
so as to cause any legal or tax problem.
First off, the PC is a direct descandant of the PRR and NYC and clearly
related to it. I guess my definition of "scope" in these circumstances
(a volunteer historical organization) is broad enough to include that.
If say they (PRR or NYC HS) wrote something about Six Flags amusement
Park, or the current insurance underwriting business you might have
concern.
Secondly, I doubt very much that a publication of these organizations
would sell that many copies at a high enough price to generate any
kind of significant profit.
> Here are the mission statements from the pre-PC Fallen Flags main
> historical societies, cut and pasted from their websites. Emphasis is mine.
> Do you see the words "and successors" or "after 1968" anywhere in these
> statements? Didn't think so. I assure you their omission is no oversight.
Do you really think the omission of "after 1968" was intentional and
done so for legal/tax reasons? I would be extremely surprised.
(The only thing might be is that the founders hated the Penn Central
so much that they didn't want their group having anything to do with
it. For the group to later write a PC book might upset the founders
or some current members, but I really would be surprised if the IRS
cared. That is a completely separate issue.)
> If you've ever read the Shoreliner (NHRHTA), or the Keystone or the High
> Line (PRRT&HS), you'll notice a dearth of information as to what happened to a
> particular line, or whatever the topic is, after 1968. Well, things do get said
> like "Floods washed out the line in 1971..." or "Abandoned in 1975, not much is
> left today...", and some attempt is usually made to bring the reader up to date
> on present statuses. But conspicuous by its absence is mention of PC or CR in
> most of these articles. IMO, it might be better if more post-Fallen Flag
> history was given, but that just isn't the mission of these historical
> societies.
I would find it very surprising that the writers and editors choose
to avoid the PC simply out of concern for _illegally_ going out of scope.
> Maybe the IRS wouldn't notice such a deviation on their own, but a
> commercial, profit-making enterprise might complain loudly, especially one in
> potential competition with the society, and the IRS would be forced to
> investigate. Sometimes it's best for the underdog not to tempt fate.
Again, I find that very hard to believe. Profits and non profits are
in competition all the time. Every time a boy scout troop or soccer
puts on a car wash, they'll stealing business from commercial car washes.
I think there might be more concern over what a nonprofit did with
its proceeds than what it published. If the organization used its
profits to finance a trip to the Bahamas for its Board, then there
may be a problem.
> Whoever said it was right, though--historical societies *must* stay within the
> bounds and gray areas ;-) of their mission statement.
As far as I'm concerned, a NYC, PRR, or NH historical society can certainly
write and discuss about the Penn Central and still be within their
mission statement.
This is so absurb. There are a lot of local railfan clubs dedicated
to the metropolitan area that they're in. But often these clubs
run shows of out of town systems--sometimes a member took a trip and
is showing his slides, other times it's a guest. Likewise, their
journals often publish what's going on in other cities. By your
strict definition, that's a serious charter violation.
John Albert
<< Why would anyone love the PC? What did it do
to derserve that much respect in only, what, 8 years? >>
Well, for one thing, it gave quite a few guys their "start" in
railroading.
And -- after seeing some of the stuff that Amtrak has done that most
readers of this newsgroup DON'T see -- there are times when one muses,
"Penn Central, please come back!"
I've seen things done now that would make PC look like a "class act"
by comparison (grin)...
Cheers!
- John
Pac Man
>railroading.
Sure. I wonder how many people they did hire overall? Is there any info on
that out there? I probably should just look, I know, but I'm lazy.
> And -- after seeing some of the stuff that Amtrak has done that most
>readers of this newsgroup DON'T see -- there are times when one muses,
>"Penn Central, please come back!"
Oh, yeah. I definitely believe it. A electrician at Southampton St. (since
deceased) told me this one a few years ago. He was told by his Amtrak boss
to have car "X" put on such-and-such track. Couldn't be done (no space to
drill the car), and he went to ask how the boss thought it could be put
there. The boss picked up his car icon from his diagram (apparently, they
have a magnetic board (or something) laying out the facility) and placed it
on the such-and-such track and said "See?" The electrician had to explain
that the real cars don't fly through the air like that. Later, he told me
that the Amtrak boss's entire railroad experience was spelled "T-Y-C-O".
> I've seen things done now that would make PC look like a "class act"
>by comparison (grin)...
I'm sure. :-) However, you have to admit that perhaps the quality of the
management was greater back in the old days (the 1970's), since they almost
all dated to the WWII era when RR's were pushed to the brink of capacity,
and most of the big managers these days are from the 1970's, when RR's were
pushed to the brink of extinction. Besides, when was the last time RR's
were considered a good place to go for a job in management? Most of the
smart business people go into other, more profitable businesses (or at least
the ones without all the capital expense).
I think that it might be summed up this way: 30 years ago, the boss may have
been a jerk, but he knew how to run a railroad. Today, the boss may still
be a jerk, but he has no clue as to how to run a railroad. Does that work
for you? LOL
Paul A. Cutler III
John Albert
<< I think that it might be summed up this way: 30 years ago, the boss
may have been a jerk, but he knew how to run a railroad. Today, the
boss may still be a jerk, but he has no clue as to how to run a
railroad. Does that work for you? >>
Mr. Cutler, I couldn't have said it better. Yes, it works!
Cheers!
- John
Steve Kraus
> It pillaged the NH with reckless abandon from which the
> region is still suffering
PC didn't want the NH; it was forced upon them as it was on the verge of
failure. I don't think you can lay everything at PC's doorstep. Would
you be better off if NH had gone belly up and abandoned?
Adam H. Kerman
The nation would have been better off if the politicians hadn't foisted
New Haven onto Penn Central, yes. Then the three states of Massachusetts,
Rhode Island, and Connecticut would have been forced to confront the issue
of keeping it running. Belly up, yes. Abandoned, no.
Too bad it wasn't the deal breaker.
Pac Man
>>failure. I don't think you can lay everything at PC's doorstep. Would
>>you be better off if NH had gone belly up and abandoned?
>
>The nation would have been better off if the politicians hadn't foisted
>New Haven onto Penn Central, yes. Then the three states of Massachusetts,
>Rhode Island, and Connecticut would have been forced to confront the issue
>of keeping it running. Belly up, yes. Abandoned, no.
The nation? Definetly southern New England, but I don't know about the
whole nation. ;-) But as far as "Would you be better off if NH had gone
belly up and abandoned?" goes, I'd have to say yes. Where is the NH today
or the '70's? The car floats were phased out quickly, the Maybrook was
torched, the S. Boston yards are gone, Cedar Hill is a maintenance base
(plus some traffic), Amtrak, the MBTA, ConnDOT, and M-N run the passenger
jobs, no freight is on the mainline at all to speak of, etc., etc. I don't
think there was much differance between what the PC did, and abandonment.
If the NH had stayed around, it would look a whole lot like the P&W, right
now, IMHO.
>Too bad it wasn't the deal breaker.
I second that! LOL
Paul A. Cutler III