Proof I'm not required to File!
Bob Grenert
the IRS, that my wife and I are *not required to file*. All IRS
Individual Master File records for past years have been changed by the
IRS to reflect our status as being not required to file. Codes have been
entered onto our IMF's that signify we have an acceptable reason for not
filing. There is no debate on this. It is a proven fact that I can show
anyone.
The status we have as "nontaxpayers" (a legal status accepted by the U.S.
Supreme Court) came about when we stopped filing 1040 and State Income
Tax forms and slightly reoganized our lifestyle to eliminate Federal
Government adhesion contracts we had gotten into over the years. Most
people get into these same adhesion contracts in normal life and are
legally required to file and pay taxes. By changing our status and
eliminating all Federal ties, then defending our rights, we were able to
convince the IRS that we were not "taxpayers" or "individuals required to
file". I am not a "person" made "liable", or involved in a "taxable
activity", nor do I earn "taxable income" as defined in the Statutes AND
Regulations (Title 26 USC and CFR 26).
Yes, anyone can do this. But you will need to educate yourself to defend
your Rights. What is important is that for any Right you are standing on
you must be ready, willing and able to defend yourself, or get competent
counsel to help you. Most people don't know enough about the Law to begin
with to do this.
For more information, send an Email request.
Robert Happy Grenert, Sui Juris, Citizen Dei Gratia
(Sovereign by the Grace of God)
Paul Maffia
What absolute idiocy!! Do you believe in the tooth fairy too?
The only place this nonsense is true is in your own uneducated, uninformed
mind.
To paraphrase the US Supreme Court in the Cheek case, anyone who believes
this BS is "irrational."
Paul M.
Paul Ary
Well, I guess you really told him! I am really amazed at how many
people like you will resort to name calling and accusations when you try
to defend your opinion on something with no evidence to back yourself
up. If you are going to cite a case let's have some dates, case
numbers, and some actual quotes in context, not some paraphrased
garbage. You sound a lot like a news reporter or a liberal. You make a
lot of noise without really saying anything. I imagine that most
readers do not know what the "Cheek Case" is. For all they know it
could be a name that you made up. As for being irrational, I would say
that the American people are being irrational for putting up with the
IRS and their UNLAWFUL practices for the last 82 years. Bob Grenert in
his article has given sources for his info. These are the same sources
I have seen given by many other people including researchers, authors,
attorneys, and yes, even the IRS and the supreme court. Bob has made a
very generous offer to email you some info on the subject. Why don't
you take him up on it and see what he has to say before you call him an
idiot to millions of people.
Paul A.
P.S. - By the way, today is April 15th: Have a nice April Fools Day!
Joseph G. Adams
On 15 Apr 1995, Paul Ary wrote:
> In <D736K...@eskimo.com> pau...@eskimo.com (Paul Maffia) writes:
> >bgre...@caprica.com (Bob Grenert) writes:
> >
> >>I have proof, obtained thru a Freedom of Information Act request
> >>made on the IRS, that my wife and I are *not required to file*. All IRS
> >>Individual Master File records for past years have been changed by the
> >>IRS to reflect our status as being not required to file. Codes have
> >>been entered onto our IMF's that signify we have an acceptable reason for
> >>not filing. There is no debate on this. It is a proven fact that I can
> >>show anyone.
> >What absolute idiocy!! Do you believe in the tooth fairy too?
> >The only place this nonsense is true is in your own uneducated,
> >uninformed mind.
> >
> >To paraphrase the US Supreme Court in the Cheek case, anyone who
> >believes this BS is "irrational."
>
> Well, I guess you really told him! I am really amazed at how many
> people like you will resort to name calling and accusations when you try
> to defend your opinion on something with no evidence to back yourself
> up. If you are going to cite a case let's have some dates, case
> numbers, and some actual quotes in context, not some paraphrased
> garbage. You sound a lot like a news reporter or a liberal. You make a
> lot of noise without really saying anything. I imagine that most
> readers do not know what the "Cheek Case" is. For all they know it
> could be a name that you made up. As for being irrational, I would say
> that the American people are being irrational for putting up with the
> IRS and their UNLAWFUL practices for the last 82 years. Bob Grenert in
> his article has given sources for his info. These are the same sources
> I have seen given by many other people including researchers, authors,
> attorneys, and yes, even the IRS and the supreme court. Bob has made a
> very generous offer to email you some info on the subject. Why don't
> you take him up on it and see what he has to say before you call him an
> idiot to millions of people.
For any interested parties, the case in question is _Cheek v. United
States_, 498 U.S 192 (1991). The Supreme Court considered the case of a
man who attended tax seminars and believed that the tax code was
unconstitutional and that they did not apply to him. Obviously, this
didn't hold up in court and he was tried on criminal charges. The Court
held that his good-faith belief in the unconstitutionality of the tax
code did not matter, and the jury was properly instructed to ignore this
claim in determining whether he acted willfully. However, the jury was
entitled to consider the defendant's belief that his wages weren't income
and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the code, in
determining whether he acted willfully.
However, the Court was unanimous in its rejection of the substance of the
defendant's arguments about the constitutionality of the tax code. It
*is* constitutional, and anyone who says otherwise is lying. If you
assert these defenses, they will *not* work, and you *will* have to pay the
taxes and the associated penalties. However, if you can convince a jury
that you were sincere, you may avoid criminal charges and jail. All in all,
you're better off paying your taxes.
As to the substance of what the original poster was claiming, anyone who
takes his advice deserves to get the book thrown at him, imho. The cases
he cites are out of context, not applicable to the issue, or not
controlling. Save yourself lots of time and trouble - ignore these
crackpot theories.
--
Joseph G. Adams | "If the Internet is Michael Fay,
Stanford Law School, 1L | what it needs is a Singapore."
jga...@leland.stanford.edu | - Chip Rowe
Ted Frank
Paul Ary <tz2...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>You make a
>lot of noise without really saying anything. I imagine that most
>readers do not know what the "Cheek Case" is.
Cheek was convicted for tax evasion, won his appeal to the Supreme
Court, was retried, convicted again, and sent to prison.
What's your point? _Cheek_ certainly doesn't authorize the ostrich-tactics
you're proposing. The very fact that you're aware of the _Cheek_ case
indicates that you know your proposals aren't being made in good faith.
--
ted frank "[S]ome of us had the good sense not to peak when we
were 12." -- Daniel Frank
"Mom said she'd fix those butter sticks rolled in Kool-Aid
you like so much." -- Mark O'Donnell
The Pinhead
No. 89-658. Argued October 3, 1990 -- Decided January 8, 1991
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a
federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal Revenue
Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income
taxes in violation of MDRV 7201. Although admitting that he had not filed
his returns, he testified that he had not acted willfully because he
sincerely believed, based on his indoctrination by a group believing that
the federal tax system is unconstitutional and his own study, that the tax
laws were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions were
lawful. In instructing the jury, the court stated that an honest but
unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness, and
that Cheek's beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a
taxpayer within the meaning of the Code were not objectively reasonable.
It also instructed the jury that a person's opinion that the tax laws
violate his constitutional rights does not constitute a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law. Cheek was convicted, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that
one is not violating the law negates willfulness, whether or not the
claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. Statutory
willfulness, which protects the average citizen from prosecution for
innocent mistakes made due to the complexity of the tax laws, United States
v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, is the voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U. S. 10. Thus, if the
jury credited Cheek's assertion that he truly believed that the Code did
not treat wages as income, the Government would not have carried its burden
to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a
belief. Characterizing a belief as objectively unreasonable transforms
what is normally a factual inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a jury
from considering it. And forbidding a jury to consider evidence that might
negate willfulness would raise a serious question under the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial provision, which this interpretation of the statute
avoids. Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's claim, the jury
is free to consider any admissible evidence showing that he had knowledge
of his legal duties. Pp. 6-11.
2. It was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury not to
consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws are unconstitutional, since a
defendant's views about the tax statutes' validity are irrelevant to the
issue of willfulness and should not be heard by a jury. Unlike the claims
in the Murdock-Pomponio line of cases, claims that Code provisions are
unconstitutional do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the Code's
complexity. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue
and a studied conclusion that those provisions are invalid and
unenforceable. Congress could not have contemplated that a taxpayer,
without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore his duties under the
Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms Congress provided to present his
invalidity claims to the courts and to abide by their decisions. Cheek was
free to pay the tax, file for a refund, and, if denied, present his claims
to the courts. Also, without paying the tax, he could have challenged
claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax Court. Pp. 11-14.
882 F. 2d 1263, vacated and remanded.
White, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J.,
and Stevens, O'Connor, and Kennedy, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Blackmun, J., filed a dissenting
opinion, in which Marshall, J., joined. Souter, J., took no part in the
consideration or decision of the case.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in
the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested
to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States,
Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in
order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to
press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 89-658
JOHN L. CHEEK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh
circuit
[January 8, 1991]
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court.
Title 26, MDRV 7201 of the United States Code provides that any person
"who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by
this title or the payment thereof" shall be guilty of a felony. Under 26
U. S. C. MDRV 7203, "[a]ny person required under this title . . . or by
regulations made under authority thereof to make a return . . . who
willfully fails to . . . make such return" shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. This case turns on the meaning of the word "willfully" as
used in 15 7201 and 7203.
I
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot for American Airlines since
1973. He filed federal income tax returns through 1979 but thereafter
ceased to file returns. {1} He also claimed an increasing number of
withholding allowances -- eventually claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980 --
and for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on his W-4 forms that he was
exempt from federal income taxes. In 1983, petitioner unsuccessfully
sought a refund of all tax withheld by his employer in 1982. Petitioner's
income during this period at all times far exceeded the minimum necessary
to trigger the statutory filing requirement.
As a result of his activities, petitioner was indicted for 10
violations of federal law. He was charged with six counts of willfully
failing to file a federal income tax return for the years 1980, 1981, and
1983 through 1986, in violation of 26 U. S. C. MDRV 7203. He was further
charged with three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income taxes
for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 in violation of 26 U. S. C. MDRV 7201.
In those years, American Airlines withheld substantially less than the
amount of tax petitioner owed because of the nu merous allowances and
exempt status he claimed on his W-4 forms. {2} The tax offenses with which
petitioner was charged are specific intent crimes that require the
defendant to have acted willfully.
At trial, the evidence established that between 1982 and 1986,
petitioner was involved in at least four civil cases that challenged
various aspects of the federal income tax system. {3} In all four of those
cases, the plaintiffs were informed by the courts that many of their
arguments, including that they were not taxpayers within the meaning of the
tax laws, that wages are not income, that the Sixteenth Amendment does not
authorize the imposition of an income tax on individuals, and that the
Sixteenth Amendment is unenforceable, were frivolous or had been repeatedly
rejected by the courts. During this time period, petitioner also attended
at least two criminal trials of persons charged with tax offenses. In
addition, there was evidence that in 1980 or 1981 an attorney had advised
Cheek that the courts had rejected as frivolous the claim that wages are
not income. {4}
Cheek represented himself at trial and testified in his defense. He
admitted that he had not filed personal income tax returns during the years
in question. He testified that as early as 1978, he had begun attending
seminars sponsored by, and following the advice of, a group that believes,
among other things, that the federal tax system is unconstitutional. Some
of the speakers at these meetings were lawyers who purported to give
professional opinions about the invalidity of the federal income tax laws.
Cheek produced a letter from an attorney stating that the Sixteenth
Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on gain or
profit. Petitioner's defense was that, based on the indoctrination he
received from this group and from his own study, he sincerely believed that
the tax laws were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions
during the 1980-1986 period were lawful. He therefore argued that he had
acted without the willfulness required for conviction of the various
offenses with which he was charged.
In the course of its instructions, the trial court advised the jury
that to prove "willfulness" the Government must prove the voluntary and
intentional violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could not be
proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence. The court further
advised the jury that an objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding
of the law would negate willfulness but mere disagreement with the law
would not. The court described Cheek's beliefs about the income tax system
{5} and instructed the jury that if it found that Cheek "honestly and
reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income taxes or to file
tax returns," App. 81, a not guilty verdict should be returned.
After several hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note to the judge
that stated in part:
" `We have a basic disagreement between some of us as to if Mr. Cheek
honestly & reasonably believed that he was not required to pay income
taxes.
" `Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] discusses good faith
misunderstanding & disagreement. Is there any additional clarification you
can give us on this point?' " Id., at 85.
The District Judge responded with a supplemental instruction containing
the following statements:
"[A] person's opinion that the tax laws violate his constitutional rights
does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law. Furthermore,
a person's disagreement with the government's tax collection systems and
policies does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law."
Id., at 86.
At the end of the first day of deliberation, the jury sent out another
note saying that it still could not reach a verdict because " `[w]e are
divided on the issue as to if Mr. Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that
he was not required to pay income tax.' " Id., at 87. When the jury
resumed its delib erations, the District Judge gave the jury an additional
instruction. This instruction stated in part that "[a]n honest but
unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness," id.,
at 88, and that "[a]dvice or research re sulting in the conclusion that
wages of a privately employed person are not income or that the tax laws
are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot serve as the
basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense." Ibid. The
court also instructed the jury that "[p]ersistent refusal to acknowledge
the law does not constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law."
Ibid. Approximately two hours later, the jury returned a verdict finding
petitioner guilty on all counts. {6}
Petitioner appealed his convictions, arguing that the District Court
erred by instructing the jury that only an objectively reasonable
misunderstanding of the law negates the statutory willfulness requirement.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected that
contention and affirmed the convictions. 882 F. 2d 1263 (1989). In prior
cases, the Seventh Circuit had made clear that goodfaith misunderstanding
of the law negates willfulness only if the defendant's beliefs are
objectively reasonable; in the Seventh Circuit, even actual ignorance is
not a defense unless the defendant's ignorance was itself objectively
reasonable. See, e. g., United States v. Buckner, 830 F. 2d 102 (1987).
In its opinion in this case, the court noted that several specified
beliefs, including the beliefs that the tax laws are unconstitutional and
that wages are not income, would not be objectively reasonable. {7}
Because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "willfully" as used in
these statutes conflicts with the decisions of several other Courts of
Appeals, see, e. g., United States v. Whiteside, 810 F. 2d 1306, 1310-1311
(CA5 1987); United States v. Phillips, 775 F. 2d 262, 263-264 (CA10 1985);
United States v. Aitken, 755 F. 2d 188, 191-193 (CA1 1985), we granted
certiorari, 493 U. S. --- (1990).
II
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no
defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal
system. See, e. g., United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. 153, 182 (1820)
(Livingston, J., dissenting); Barlow v. United States, 7 Pet. 404, 411
(1833); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 167 (1879);
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57, 68 (1910); Lambert v.
California, 355 U. S. 225, 228 (1957); Liparota v. United States, 471 U. S.
419, 441 (1985) (White, J., dissenting); O. Holmes, The Common Law 47-48
(1881). Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the
common law presumed that every person knew the law. This common-law rule
has been applied by the Court in numerous cases construing criminal
statutes. See, e. g., United States v. International Minerals & Chemical
Corp., 402 U. S. 558 (1971); Hamling v. United States, 418 U. S. 87,
119-124 (1974); Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337
(1952).
The proliferation of statutes and regulations has sometimes made it
difficult for the average citizen to know and comprehend the extent of the
duties and obligations imposed by the tax laws. Congress has accordingly
softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specific intent
to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses.
Thus, the Court almost 60 years ago interpreted the statutory term
"willfully" as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as carving out an
exception to the traditional rule. This special treatment of criminal tax
offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax laws. In United
States v. Mur dock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933), the Court recognized that:
"Congress did not intend that a person, by reason of a bona fide
misunderstanding as to his liability for the tax, as to his duty to make a
return, or as to the adequacy of the records he maintained, should become a
criminal by his mere failure to measure up to the prescribed standard of
conduct." Id., at 396.
The Court held that the defendant was entitled to an instruction with
respect to whether he acted in good faith based on his actual belief. In
Murdock, the Court interpreted the term "willfully" as used in the criminal
tax statutes generally to mean "an act done with a bad purpose," id., at
394, or with "an evil motive." Id., at 395.
Subsequent decisions have refined this proposition. In United States
v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346 (1973), we described the term "willfully" as
connoting "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty," id.,
at 360, and did so with specific reference to the "bad faith or evil
intent" language employed in Murdock. Still later, United States v. Pom
ponio, 429 U. S. 10 (1976) (per curiam), addressed a situ ation in which
several defendants had been charged with willfully filing false tax
returns. The jury was given an instruction on willfulness similar to the
standard set forth in Bishop. In addition, it was instructed that "
`[g]ood motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is a
crime.' " Id., at 11. The defendants were convicted but the Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the latter instruction was improper
because the statute required a finding of bad purpose or evil motive.
Ibid.
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that "the Court of Appeals
incorrectly assumed that the reference to an `evil motive' in United States
v. Bishop, supra, and prior cases," ibid., "requires proof of any motive
other than an intentional violation of a known legal duty." Id., at 12.
As "the other Courts of Appeals that have considered the question have
recognized, willfulness in this context simply means a voluntary,
intentional violation of a known legal duty." Ibid. We concluded that
after instructing the jury on willfulness, "[a]n additional instruction on
good faith was unnecessary." Id., at 13. Taken together, Bishop and
Pomponio conclusively establish that the standard for the statutory
willfulness requirement is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known
legal duty."
III
Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of willfulness, Brief for
Petitioner 5, and n. 4, 13, 36; Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 6-7, 11, 13,
but asserts that the District Court's instructions and the Court of
Appeals' opinion departed from that definition. In particular, he
challenges the ruling that a good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a
good-faith belief that one is not violating the law, if it is to negate
willfulness, must be objectively reasonable. We agree that the Court of
Appeals and the District Court erred in this respect.
A
Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases,
requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the
defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily
and intentionally violated that duty. We deal first with the case where
the issue is whether the defendant knew of the duty purportedly imposed by
the provision of the statute or regulation he is accused of violating, a
case in which there is no claim that the provision at issue is invalid. In
such a case, if the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent
legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge
component of the willfulness requirement. But carrying this burden
requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim
that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a goodfaith belief
that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws. This is
so because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet
be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does not
exist. In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the
Government has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue,
which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and
belief submission, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is
objectively reasonable.
In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly believed that the
Internal Revenue Code did not purport to treat wages as income, and the
jury believed him, the Government would not have carried its burden to
prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court might deem such a belief.
Of course, in deciding whether to credit Cheek's good-faith belief claim,
the jury would be free to consider any admissible evidence from any source
showing that Cheek was aware of his duty to file a return and to treat
wages as income, including evidence showing his awareness of the relevant
provisions of the Code or regulations, of court decisions rejecting his
interpretation of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of the Internal
Revenue Service, or of any contents of the personal income tax return forms
and accompanying instructions that made it plain that wages should be
returned as income. {8}
We thus disagree with the Court of Appeals' requirement that a claimed
good-faith belief must be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered
as possibly negating the Government's evidence purporting to show a
defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue. Knowledge and belief are
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury.
Characterizing a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms
the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from considering
it. It would of course be proper to exclude evidence having no relevance
or probative value with respect to willfulness; but it is not contrary to
common sense, let alone impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant of his
duty based on an irrational belief that he has no duty, and forbidding the
jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise a
serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision. Cf.
Francis v. Franklin, 471 U. S. 307 (1985); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U. S.
510 (1979); Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246 (1952). It is
common ground that this Court, where possible, interprets congressional
enactments so as to avoid raising serious constitutional questions. See,
e. g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and
Construction Trades Council, 485 U. S. 568, 575 (1988); Crowell v. Benson,
285 U. S. 22, 62, and n. 30 (1932); Public Citizen v. United States Dept.
of Justice, 491 U. S. ---, --- (1989) (slip op., at 24-25).
It was therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of
Cheek's understanding that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not
a person required to file a return or to pay income taxes and that wages
are not taxable income, as incredible as such misunderstandings of and
beliefs about the law might be. Of course, the more unreasonable the
asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will
consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has
carried its burden of proving knowledge.
B
Cheek asserted in the trial court that he should be ac quitted because
he believed in good faith that the income tax law is unconstitutional as
applied to him and thus could not legally impose any duty upon him of which
he should have been aware. {9} Such a submission is unsound, not because
Cheek's constitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable or
frivolous, which they surely are, but because the Murdock-Pomponio line of
cases does not support such a position. Those cases construed the
willfulness requirement in the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code to require proof of knowledge of the law. This was because in "our
complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who
earnestly wish to follow the law" and " `[i]t is not the purpose of the law
to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the
exercise of reasonable care.' " United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346,
360-361 (1973), (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 496
(1943)).
Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional
are submissions of a different order. {10} They do not arise from innocent
mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather,
they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied
conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and
unenforceable. Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but
after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded
that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a
tax.
We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer,
without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon
him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms
provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and
to abide by their decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to
year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to require, file for a
refund and, if denied, present his claims of invalidity, constitutional or
otherwise, to the courts. See 26 U. S. C. MDRV 7422. Also, without paying
the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax
Court, 26 U. S. C. MDRV 6213, with the right to appeal to a higher court if
unsuccessful. MDRV 7482(a)(1). Cheek took neither course in some years,
and when he did was unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is
in no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the validity of
the Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness or provides a defense to
criminal prosecution under 15 7201 and 7203. Of course, Cheek was free in
this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them
asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will
consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal
duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the Government has
carried its burden of proving knowledge.
B
Cheek asserted in the trial court that he should be ac quitted because
he believed in good faith that the income tax law is unconstitutional as
applied to him and thus could not legally impose any duty upon him of which
he should have been aware. {9} Such a submission is unsound, not because
Cheek's constitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable or
frivolous, which they surely are, but because the Murdock-Pomponio line of
cases does not support such a position. Those cases construed the
willfulness requirement in the criminal provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code to require proof of knowledge of the law. This was because in "our
complex tax system, uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers who
earnestly wish to follow the law" and " `[i]t is not the purpose of the law
to penalize frank difference of opinion or innocent errors made despite the
exercise of reasonable care.' " United States v. Bishop, 412 U. S. 346,
360-361 (1973), (quoting Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492, 496
(1943)).
Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional
are submissions of a different order. {10} They do not arise from innocent
mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather,
they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied
conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and
unenforceable. Thus in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but
after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded
that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a
tax.
We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer,
without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon
him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms
provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and
to abide by their decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, from year to
year, was free to pay the tax that the law purported to require, file for a
refund and, if denied, present his claims of invalidity, constitutional or
otherwise, to the courts. See 26 U. S. C. MDRV 7422. Also, without paying
the tax, he could have challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the Tax
Court, 26 U. S. C. MDRV 6213, with the right to appeal to a higher court if
unsuccessful. MDRV 7482(a)(1). Cheek took neither course in some years,
and when he did was unwilling to accept the outcome. As we see it, he is
in no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the validity of
the Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness or provides a defense to
criminal prosecution under 15 7201 and 7203. Of course, Cheek was free in
this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them
adjudicated, but like defendants in criminal cases in other contexts, who
"willfully" refuse to comply with the duties placed upon them by the law,
he must take the risk of being wrong.
We thus hold that in a case like this, a defendant's views about the
validity of the tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness,
need not be heard by the jury, and if they are, an instruction to disregard
them would be proper. For this purpose, it makes no difference whether the
claims of invalidity are frivolous or have substance. It was therefore not
error in this case for the District Judge to instruct the jury not to
consider Cheek's claims that the tax laws were unconstitutional. However,
it was error for the court to instruct the jury that petitioner's asserted
beliefs that wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should not be considered by the jury
in determining whether Cheek had acted willfully. {11}
IV
For the reasons set forth in the opinion above, the judgment of the
Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1
Cheek did file what the Court of Appeals described as a frivolous
return in 1982.
2
Because petitioner filed a refund claim for the entire amount withheld
by his employer in 1982, petitioner was also charged under 18 U. S. C. MDRV
287 with one count of presenting a claim to an agency of the United States
knowing the claim to be false and fraudulent.
3
In March 1982, Cheek and another employee of the company sued American
Airlines to challenge the withholding of federal income taxes. In April
1982, Cheek sued the IRS in the United States Tax Court, asserting that he
was not a taxpayer or a person for purposes of the Internal Revenue Code,
that his wages were not income, and making several other related claims.
Cheek and four others also filed an action against the United States and
the CIR in Federal District Court, claiming that withholding taxes from
their wages violated the Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in 1985 Cheek filed
claims with the IRS seeking to have refunded the taxes withheld from his
wages in 1983 and 1984. When these claims were not allowed, he brought
suit in the District Court claiming that the withholding was an
unconstitutional taking of his property and that his wages were not income.
In dismissing this action as frivolous, the District Court imposed costs
and attorneys fees of $1,500 and a sanction under Rule 11 in the amount of
$10,000. The Court of Appeals agreed that Cheek's claims were frivolous,
reduced the District Court sanction to $5,000 and imposed an additional
sanction of $1,500 for bringing a frivolous appeal.
4
The attorney also advised that despite the Fifth Amendment, the filing
of a tax return was required and that a person could challenge the
constitutionality of the system by suing for a refund after the taxes had
been withheld, or by putting himself "at risk of criminal prosecution."
5
"The defendant has testified as to what he states are his
interpretations of the United States Constitution, court opinions, common
law and other materials he has reviewed. . . . He has also introduced
materials which contain references to quotations from the United States
Constitution, court opinions, statutes, and other sources.
"He testified he relied on his interpretations and on these materials
in concluding that he was not a person required to file income tax returns
for the year or years charged, was not required to pay income taxes and
that he could claim exempt status on his W-4 forms, and that he could claim
refunds of all moneys withheld." App. 75-76.
"Among other things, Mr. Cheek contends that his wages from a private
employer, American Airlines, does not constitute income under the Internal
Revenue Service laws." Id., at 81.
6
A note signed by all 12 jurors also informed the judge that although
the jury found petitioner guilty, several jurors wanted to express their
personal opinions of the case and that notes from these individual jurors
to the court were "a complaint against the narrow & hard expression under
the constraints of the law." Id., at 90. At least two notes from
individual jurors expressed the opinion that petitioner sincerely believed
in his cause even though his beliefs might have been unreasonable.
7
The opinion stated, 882 F. 2d 1263, 1268-1269, n. 2 (CA7 1989), as
follows:
"For the record, we note that the following beliefs, which are stock
arguments of the tax protester movement, have not been, nor ever will be,
considered `objectively reasonable' in this circuit:
"(1) the belief that the sixteenth amendment to the constitution was
improperly ratified and therefore never came into being;
"(2) the belief that the sixteenth amendment is unconstitutional
generally;
"(3) the belief that the income tax violates the takings clause of the
fifth amendment;
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are unconstitutional;
"(5) the belief that wages are not income and therefore are not subject
to federal income tax laws;
"(6) the belief that filing a tax return violates the privilege against
selfincrimination; and
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve Notes do not constitute cash or
income.
"Miller v. United States, 868 F. 2d 236, 239-41 (7th Cir. 1989);
Buckner, 830 F. 2d at 102; United States v. Dube, 820 F. 2d 886, 891 (7th
Cir. 1987); Coleman v. Comm'r, 791 F. 2d 68, 70-71 (7th Cir. 1986); Moore,
627 F. 2d at 833. We have no doubt that this list will increase with
time."
8
Cheek recognizes that a "defendant who knows what the law is and who
disagrees with it . . . does not have a bona fide misunderstanding defense"
but asserts that "a defendant who has a bona fide misunderstanding of [the
law] does not `know' his legal duty and lacks willfulness." Brief for
Petitioner 29, and n. 13. The Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 13, states:
"We are in no way suggesting that Cheek or anyone else is immune from
criminal prosecution if he knows what the law is, but believes it should be
otherwise, and therefore violates it." See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 9, 11,
12, 15, 17.
9
In his opening and reply briefs and at oral argument, Cheek asserts
that this case does not present the issue of whether a claim of
unconstitutionality would serve to negate willfulness and that we need not
address the issue. Brief for Petitioner 13; Reply Brief for Petitioner 5,
11, 12; Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 13. Cheek testified at trial, however, that
"[i]t is my belief that the law is being enforced unconstitutionally."
App. 60. He also produced a letter from counsel advising him that "
`Finally you make a valid contention . . . that Congress' power to tax
comes from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the U. S. Constitution, and
not from the Sixteenth Amendment and that the [latter], construed with
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, never authorized a tax on wages and
salaries, but only on gain and profit." Id., at 57. We note also that the
jury asked for "the portion [of the transcript] wherein Mr. Cheek stated he
was attempting to test the constitutionality of the income tax laws," Tr.
1704, and that the trial judge later instructed the jury that an opinion
that the tax laws violate a person's constitutional rights does not
constitute a good faith misunderstanding of the law. We also note that at
oral argument Cheek's counsel observed that "personal belief that a known
statute is unconstitutional smacks of knowledge with existing law, but
disagreement with it." Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. He also opined that:
"If the person believes as a personal belief that known -- law known to
them [sic] is unconstitutional, I submit that that would not be a defense,
because what the person is really saying is I know what the law is, for
constitutional reasons I have made my own determination that it is invalid.
I am not suggesting that that is a defense.
"However, if the person was told by a lawyer or by an accountant
erroneously that the statute is unconstitutional, and it's my professional
advice to you that you don't have to follow it, then you have got a little
different situation. This is not that case." Id., at 6.
Given this posture of the case, we perceive no reason not to address
the significance of Cheek's constitutional claims to the issue of
willfulness.
10
In United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389 (1933), discussed supra, at
7-8, the defendant Murdock was summoned to appear before a revenue agent
for examination. Questions were put to him, which he refused to answer for
fear of self-incrimination under state law. He was indicted for refusing
to give testimony and supply information contrary to the pertinent
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. This Court affirmed the reversal
of Murdock's conviction, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to
give an instruction directing the jury to consider Murdock's asserted claim
of a good-faith, actual belief that because of the Fifth Amendment he was
privileged not to answer the questions put to him. It is thus the case
that Murdock's asserted belief was grounded in the Constitution, but it was
a claim of privilege not to answer, not a claim that any provision of the
tax laws were unconstitutional, and not a claim for which the tax laws
provided procedures to entertain and resolve. Cheek's position at trial,
in contrast, was that the tax laws were unconstitutional as applied to
him.
11
Cheek argues that applying to him the Court of Appeals' standard of
objective reasonableness violates his rights under the First, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments of the Constitution. Since we have invalidated the
challenged standard on statutory grounds, we need not address these
submissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 89-658
JOHN L. CHEEK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh
circuit
[January 8, 1991]
Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment of Court because our cases have consistently
held that the failure to pay a tax in the good-faith belief that it is not
legally owing is not "willful." I do not join the Court's opinion because
I do not agree with the test for willfulness that it directs the Court of
Appeals to apply on remand.
As the Court acknowledges, our opinions from the 1930s to the 1970s
have interpreted the word "willfully" in the criminal tax statutes as
requiring the "bad purpose" or "evil motive" of "intentional[ly]
violat[ing] a known legal duty." See, e. g., United States v. Pomponio,
429 U. S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Murdock, 290 U. S. 389, 394-395
(1933). It seems to me that today's opinion squarely reverses that
longestablished statutory construction when it says that a goodfaith
erroneous belief in the unconstitutionality of a tax law is no defense. It
is quite impossible to say that a statute which one believes
unconstitutional represents a "known legal duty." See Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137, 177-178 (1803).
Although the facts of the present case involve erroneous reliance upon
the Constitution in ignoring the otherwise "known legal duty" imposed by
the tax statutes, the Court's new interpretation applies also to erroneous
reliance upon a tax statute in ignoring the otherwise "known legal duty" of
a regulation, and to erroneous reliance upon a regulation in ignoring the
otherwise "known legal duty" of a tax assessment. These situations as well
meet the opinion's crucial test of "reveal[ing] full knowledge of the
provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those
provisions are invalid and unenforceable," ante, at 13. There is,
moreover, no rational basis for saying that a "willful" violation is
established by full knowledge of a statutory requirement, but is not
established by full knowledge of a requirement explicitly imposed by
regulation or order. Thus, today's opinion works a revolution in past
practice, subjecting to criminal penalties taxpayers who do not comply with
Treasury Regulations that are in their view contrary to the Internal
Revenue Code, Treasury Rulings that are in their view contrary to the
regulations, and even IRS auditor pronouncements that are in their view
contrary to Treasury Rulings. The law already provides considerable
incentive for taxpayers to be careful in ignoring any official assertion of
tax liability, since it contains civil penalties that apply even in the
event of a good-faith mistake, see, e. g., 26 U. S. C. 15 6651, 6653. To
impose in addition criminal penalties for misinterpretation of such a
complex body of law is a startling innovation indeed.
I find it impossible to understand how one can derive from the lonesome
word "willfully" the proposition that belief in the nonexistence of a
textual prohibition excuses liability, but belief in the invalidity (i. e.,
the legal nonexistence) of a textual prohibition does not. One may say, as
the law does in many contexts, that "willfully" refers to consciousness of
the act but not to consciousness that the act is unlawful. See, e. g.,
American Surety Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F. 2d 605, 606 (CA2 1925)
(L. Hand, J.); cf. United States v. International Minerals and Chemical
Co., 402 U. S. 558, 563-565 (1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as we
have said until today with respect to the tax statutes, that "willfully"
refers to consciousness of both the act and its illegality. But it seems
to me impossible to say that the word refers to consciousness that some
legal text exists, without consciousness that that legal text is binding,
i. e., with the good-faith belief that it is not a valid law. Perhaps such
a test for criminal liability would make sense (though in a field as
complicated as federal tax law, I doubt it), but some text other than the
mere word "willfully" would have to be employed to describe it -- and that
text is not ours to write.
Because today's opinion abandons clear and long-standing precedent to
impose criminal liability where taxpayers have had no reason to expect it,
because the new contours of criminal liability have no basis in the
statutory text, and because I strongly suspect that those new contours make
no sense even as a policy matter, I concur only in the judgment of the
Court.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 89-658
JOHN L. CHEEK, PETITIONER v. UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh
circuit
[January 8, 1991]
Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Marshall joins, dissenting.
It seems to me that we are concerned in this case not with "the
complexity of the tax laws," ante, at 7, but with the income tax law in its
most elementary and basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer and are wages
income?
The Court acknowledges that the conclusively established standard for
willfulness under the applicable statutes is the "voluntary, intentional
violation of a known legal duty." Ante, at 8. See United States v.
Bishop, 412 U. S. 346, 360 (1963), and United States v. Pomponio, 429 U. S.
10, 12 (1976). That being so, it is incomprehensible to me how, in this
day, more than 70 years after the institution of our present federal income
tax system with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166, any
taxpayer of competent mentality can assert as his defense to charges of
statutory willfulness the proposition that the wage he receives for his
labor is not income, irrespective of a cult that says otherwise and advises
the gullible to resist income tax collections. One might note in passing
that this particular taxpayer, after all, was a licensed pilot for one of
our major commercial airlines; he presumably was a person of at least
minimum intellectual competence.
The District Court's instruction that an objectively reasonable and
good faith misunderstanding of the law negates willfulness lends further,
rather than less, protection to this defendant, for it added an additional
hurdle for the prosecution to overcome. Petitioner should be grateful for
this further protection, rather than be opposed to it.
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will encourage taxpayers to cling
to frivolous views of the law in the hope of convincing a jury of their
sincerity. If that ensues, I suspect we have gone beyond the limits of
common sense.
While I may not agree with every word the Court of Appeals has
enunciated in its opinion, I would affirm its judgment in this case. I
therefore dissent.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
--
Ronald Cole E-mail: zi...@ecst.csuchico.edu
Senior Software Engineer ron...@optx.com
OTCS Incorporated, a Brian Meyerpeter company ron...@netcom.com
"The Bill Of Rights -- Void Where Prohibited By Law"
Ted Frank
The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
>
>No. 89-658. Argued October 3, 1990 -- Decided January 8, 1991
>
>Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a
>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal Revenue
>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income
>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
It's useful to note that Cheek was convicted again at his retrial,
and the conviction was upheld.
I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
Joseph G. Adams
Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>>Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a
>>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal Revenue
>>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income
>>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
>
>It's useful to note that Cheek was convicted again at his retrial,
>and the conviction was upheld.
>
>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that Cheek asserted
the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly rejected),
when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
(which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing that
Cheek simply presented the wrong theory to the court.
--
Joseph G. Adams |
Stanford Law School, 1L | "I hate stuff that sucks." - Butthead
jga...@leland.stanford.edu |
Mike Goldman
> How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that Cheek asserted
> the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly rejected),
> when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
> (which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
> latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing that
> Cheek simply presented the wrong theory to the court.
How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not required
to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from the
Internal Revenue Service, such request being specified in the Internal
Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such request
being ignored by the Internal Revenue Service. Does not the doctrine of
Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
There are many crackpot theories, as you say, but that does not
necessarily mean that every theory is a crackpot one. As such, a
reasonable person may certainly have good faith reason to believe an
uncontroverted theory.
--
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> -- Finger for PGP Key, or by WWW:
<A HREF="http://www.lm.com/~damon/">My Home Page with PGP Key</A>
PGP Key fingerprint = AC 6B 5B 3E EA 74 30 00 8B 28 06 A7 D5 89 41 47
Or for 1024-bit Key = EF 1F AA 31 74 3C 8B 48 66 04 5D 7C 35 4F F2 2A
The Pinhead
How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not required
to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from the
Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request*
Cite please?
Ted Frank
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not required
>to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from the
>Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such request
>being ignored by the Internal Revenue Service.
Cite please?
>Does not the doctrine of
>Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
>IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
There's no such doctrine. The IRS isn't required to inform taxpayers
that they have to obey the law. If I wrote into the Chief of Police in
Chicago and asked him if I could ignore the laws that say I have to
stop at red lights, and he justifiedly ignores my letter, that doesn't
mean I get to ignore the red lights.
In fact, even if the IRS *mistakenly told you* that you didn't have to
file, there wouldn't be estoppel, though that might be enough to avoid
criminal penalties under the _Cheek_ doctrine. You'd still be liable
for any taxes owed.
Mike Goldman
> How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not required
> to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from the
> Internal Revenue Service, *such request being specified in the Internal
> Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request*
> Cite please?
IRS Policy #P-(11)-23, Internal Revenue Manual.
Mike Goldman
> >Does not the doctrine of
> >Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
> >IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
> There's no such doctrine.
There is no such thing as Estoppel by Acquiescence? Amazing. This is
almost as good as a discussion I had with Irwin Schiff (crackpot tax
protester extraordinaire), who insisted that there was "no such thing as
adhesion contracts."
As to whether or not Estoppel by Acquiescence applies in a particular
instance, I will agree that it is open to some debate. But if you will
argue that no such thing exists, then methinks we are at loggerheads.
> The IRS isn't required to inform taxpayers
> that they have to obey the law. If I wrote into the Chief of Police in
> Chicago and asked him if I could ignore the laws that say I have to
> stop at red lights, and he justifiedly ignores my letter, that doesn't
> mean I get to ignore the red lights.
Different questions altogether. The question asked is not whether a
taxpayer is obligated to file and pay taxes, but rather, a determination
of status as to whether one *is*, in fact, a taxpayer. I.e., the vehicle
code does not bind those not driving or operating a motor vehicle on the
highway. You are of course required to obey all lawful statutes which do
pertain to you.
> In fact, even if the IRS *mistakenly told you* that you didn't have to
> file, there wouldn't be estoppel, though that might be enough to avoid
> criminal penalties under the _Cheek_ doctrine. You'd still be liable
> for any taxes owed.
If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement that,
even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
Ted Frank
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>Ted Frank (th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu) wrote:
>> >Does not the doctrine of
>> >Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
>> >IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
>
>> There's no such doctrine.
>
>instance, I will agree that it is open to some debate. But if you will
>argue that no such thing exists, then methinks we are at loggerheads.
Please, point me to an instance of estoppel by acquiescence outside
of the UCC's "Battle of the Forms". In particular, point me to an
instance of estoppel by acquiescence *by the government*, considering
that the government normally can't even be estopped by affirmative
action.
>> The IRS isn't required to inform taxpayers
>> that they have to obey the law. If I wrote into the Chief of Police in
>> Chicago and asked him if I could ignore the laws that say I have to
>> stop at red lights, and he justifiedly ignores my letter, that doesn't
>> mean I get to ignore the red lights.
>
>Different questions altogether. The question asked is not whether a
>taxpayer is obligated to file and pay taxes, but rather, a determination
>of status as to whether one *is*, in fact, a taxpayer.
Again, irrelevant. You earn income in any of the fifty states? You're
a taxpayer.
>> In fact, even if the IRS *mistakenly told you* that you didn't have to
>> file, there wouldn't be estoppel, though that might be enough to avoid
>> criminal penalties under the _Cheek_ doctrine. You'd still be liable
>> for any taxes owed.
>
>If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement that,
>even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
>status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
Yes, but the method you describe is certainly one for a jury, and
from the cases I've seen, juries are decidedly unfriendly to the
crackpot idea that the failure of the IRS to specifically knock on
your door and tell you that you have to pay income taxes gives you
a good faith basis to believe that you don't have to do so.
--
ted frank "Without state-approved syllabi and standardized testing,
my education can only go so far." -- Lisa Simpson
John Manuola
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3mse18$9...@africa.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>Ted Frank (th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu) wrote:
>>> >Does not the doctrine of
>>> >Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as
the
>>> >IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
>>
>>> There's no such doctrine.
>>
>>As to whether or not Estoppel by Acquiescence applies in a particular
>>instance, I will agree that it is open to some debate. But if you
will
>>argue that no such thing exists, then methinks we are at loggerheads.
>
>Please, point me to an instance of estoppel by acquiescence outside
>of the UCC's "Battle of the Forms". In particular, point me to an
>instance of estoppel by acquiescence *by the government*, considering
>that the government normally can't even be estopped by affirmative
>action.
The Franchise Tax Board of California cannot proceed, legally, with an
action to Levy if the person they are attempting to levy exercises his
rights to administrativve remedy by petitioning the FTB for a
determination as to whether you owe the tax they say you owe. If they
proceed, they would be breaking the law...or at least the agent who
proceeded would be breaking the law.
>
>>> The IRS isn't required to inform taxpayers
>>> that they have to obey the law. If I wrote into the Chief of Police
in
>>> Chicago and asked him if I could ignore the laws that say I have to
>>> stop at red lights, and he justifiedly ignores my letter, that
doesn't
>>> mean I get to ignore the red lights.
>>
>>Different questions altogether. The question asked is not whether a
>>taxpayer is obligated to file and pay taxes, but rather, a
determination
>>of status as to whether one *is*, in fact, a taxpayer.
>
>Again, irrelevant. You earn income in any of the fifty states? You're
>a taxpayer.
oh really, that definition makes you a "taxpayer"? can you quote the
law that says this? or is this just your opinion...? or just some lie
you bought into? or perhaps some lie you are trying to spread?
>
>>> In fact, even if the IRS *mistakenly told you* that you didn't have
to
>>> file, there wouldn't be estoppel, though that might be enough to
avoid
>>> criminal penalties under the _Cheek_ doctrine. You'd still be liable
>>> for any taxes owed.
>>
>>If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement
that,
>>even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
>>status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
>
>Yes, but the method you describe is certainly one for a jury, and
>from the cases I've seen, juries are decidedly unfriendly to the
>crackpot idea that the failure of the IRS to specifically knock on
>your door and tell you that you have to pay income taxes gives you
>a good faith basis to believe that you don't have to do so.
Still haven't read the Lloyd Long case, huh!!
>
Scott Dunn
Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>In article <ZIPPY.95A...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>,
>The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>>
>>No. 89-658. Argued October 3, 1990 -- Decided January 8, 1991
>>
>>Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to file a
>>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal Revenue
>>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income
>>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
>
>and the conviction was upheld.
>
>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
You know, ted, you're right. The 'IRS' had an undisputed record that
showed for years that he was required to file. He should have disputed
the record first. Then he might have had a chance. You know, when the
agency refuses to amend the record, you send in a statement of
disagreement? After all, he did sign a W-4 statement promising to
pay the tax, didn't he? He signed under penalty of perjury that he
had 60(!) exemptions. Wow. Wouldn't you agree that using the proper
administrative procedures that this could have been averted?
>--
>ted frank "[S]ome of us had the good sense not to peak when we
> were 12." -- Daniel Frank
> "Mom said she'd fix those butter sticks rolled in Kool-Aid
> you like so much." -- Mark O'Donnell
Hmm. Interesting taste in food....
--
Scott Dunn : Sui Juris : @netcom.com :
"Since March the 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of
declared national emergency.....A majority of the people of the United
States have lived all their lives under emergency rule." Senate Report
93-549, 1973. We are still in a state of declared emergency. To find
out more, send email.
Scott Dunn
Joseph G. Adams <jga...@leland.Stanford.EDU> wrote:
>
>Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>
>>The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>
>>>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal Revenue
>>>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his income
>>>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
>>
>>and the conviction was upheld.
>>
>>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
>
>the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly rejected),
>when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
>(which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
>latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing that
He did it way too late in the game, too. By the time you find yourself
in court, the 'IRS' has set up and established so many presumptions that
you're basically dead meat. Signing anything under penalty of perjury
and submitting it to the 'IRS' is bad news...unless it's a properly
executed FOIA request asking for the right documents. Then at least you
can get an idea of what they think of you. If you haven't filed for a
few years, you can bet they are salivating at their potential bonus for
putting you in jail. Even if they don't get any money out of you...
>
>--
>Joseph G. Adams |
>Stanford Law School, 1L | "I hate stuff that sucks." - Butthead
>jga...@leland.stanford.edu |
Scott Dunn
>> the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly rejected),
>> when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
>> (which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
>> latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing that
>> Cheek simply presented the wrong theory to the court.
>
>to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from the
>Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such request
>IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
the 'IRS' cannot give legal advice!
>
>There are many crackpot theories, as you say, but that does not
>necessarily mean that every theory is a crackpot one. As such, a
>reasonable person may certainly have good faith reason to believe an
>uncontroverted theory.
There are "unsubstantiated theories" out there too, you know.
>--
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> -- Finger for PGP Key, or by WWW:
><A HREF="http://www.lm.com/~damon/">My Home Page with PGP Key</A>
>PGP Key fingerprint = AC 6B 5B 3E EA 74 30 00 8B 28 06 A7 D5 89 41 47
>Or for 1024-bit Key = EF 1F AA 31 74 3C 8B 48 66 04 5D 7C 35 4F F2 2A
Rich Wales
thousands of Americans are slowly getting out of the
system, legally...but knowing the law. Those who
know what they are doing and do it properly, rarely
even get to trial.
"Rarely even get to trial" is not good enough.
In legal terms, there is a world of difference between "rarely even get
to trial" and "NEVER get convicted".
It would only take ONE case where someone with a legitimate right not to
pay taxes might get (wrongly) convicted of tax evasion, to generate an
appeal which would eventually give the Supreme Court an excuse to set a
controlling precedent striking down the illegitimate "system".
As far as I am aware, not even one such case has happened yet. On the
other hand, there are numerous cases which appear to flatly dismiss any
and all theories that the US federal income tax is invalid and/or that
people may legally "get out of the system".
Until an appellate court issues a ruling that explicitly invalidates the
income tax, and/or declares that an ordinary American is not liable foro
tax despite doing something that would normally be thought of as "earn-
ing income", realists are justified in assuming that the tax law is in
fact valid and broadly applicable.
Rich Wales <ri...@mks.com>
Kitchener, Ontario, Canada (formerly of Los Angeles, CA, USA)
DISCLAIMER: I am not a lawyer or professional tax adviser, and
the above material is not intended to be relied upon as legal or
professional advice in any jurisdiction.
The Pinhead
Different questions altogether. The question asked is not whether a
taxpayer is obligated to file and pay taxes, but rather, a determination
code does not bind those not driving or operating a motor vehicle on the
highway. You are of course required to obey all lawful statutes which do
pertain to you.
The California Vehicle Code contains provisions at least for passengers
not wearing seatbelts and for jay-walkers.
John Manuola
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <ZIPPY.95A...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>,
>The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>>certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh
circuit
>>
>>No. 89-658. Argued October 3, 1990 -- Decided January 8, 1991
>>
>>Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to
file a
>>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal
Revenue
>>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his
income
>>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
>
>It's useful to note that Cheek was convicted again at his retrial,
>and the conviction was upheld.
>
Yeah he was...shall we go on to the Lloyd Long case or the trial of the
Pilot Group in Stockton, CA? Long was found NOT GUILTY...and the Pilot
Group case trial ended in a hung jury (9-3 in favor of acquittal...the 3
who hung it up said they felt the IRS had not presented a good case, but
felt that if their spouses had to file...these people should too [says
something about the mindset of Americans])...Care to know the cite of
teh Long Case...or are sufficiently shit-scared that you don't wanna
know the truth of what is happening?
>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
All that is useful to the Patriot Movement in the Cheek case is that the
Court ruled that he had a right to show the imformation upon which he
made his decision to not file.
>--
John Manuola
writes:
>
>Joseph G. Adams (jga...@leland.Stanford.EDU) wrote:
>
>> How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that Cheek asserted
>> the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly
rejected),
>> when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
>> (which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
>> latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing that
>> Cheek simply presented the wrong theory to the court.
>
>How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not
required
>to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from
the
>Internal Revenue Service, such request being specified in the Internal
>Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such
request
>being ignored by the Internal Revenue Service. Does not the doctrine
of
>Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
>IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
>
>There are many crackpot theories, as you say, but that does not
>necessarily mean that every theory is a crackpot one. As such, a
>reasonable person may certainly have good faith reason to believe an
>uncontroverted theory.
>--
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> -- Finger for PGP Key, or by WWW:
Mike:
The exact trouble with those who know so little about the law...they
only hear the IRS propoganda regarding people they have successfully
convicted, while all that time, thousands of Americans are slowly
getting out of the system, legally...but knowing the law. Those who
know what they are doing and do it properly, rarely even get to trial.
Keepsake
John Manuola
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3ms3d3$b...@telerama.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not
required
>>to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from
the
>>Internal Revenue Service, such request being specified in the Internal
>>Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such
request
>>being ignored by the Internal Revenue Service.
>
>Cite please?
>
>>Does not the doctrine of
>>Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
>>IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
>
>There's no such doctrine. The IRS isn't required to inform taxpayers
>that they have to obey the law. If I wrote into the Chief of Police in
>Chicago and asked him if I could ignore the laws that say I have to
>stop at red lights, and he justifiedly ignores my letter, that doesn't
>mean I get to ignore the red lights.
>
>In fact, even if the IRS *mistakenly told you* that you didn't have to
>file, there wouldn't be estoppel, though that might be enough to avoid
>criminal penalties under the _Cheek_ doctrine. You'd still be liable
>for any taxes owed.
THe first question that comes to mind here is: what makes a person
"liable" for the 'income' tax? Do you know the law there?? WHO is
"liable" for the 'income' tax? What law makes a person "liable"?
keepsake
Mike Goldman
> >As to whether or not Estoppel by Acquiescence applies in a particular
> >instance, I will agree that it is open to some debate. But if you will
> >argue that no such thing exists, then methinks we are at loggerheads.
> Please, point me to an instance of estoppel by acquiescence outside
> of the UCC's "Battle of the Forms". In particular, point me to an
> instance of estoppel by acquiescence *by the government*, considering
> that the government normally can't even be estopped by affirmative
> action.
Are you asking for particular case cites, or just an instance where
estoppel would apply?
> >Different questions altogether. The question asked is not whether a
> >taxpayer is obligated to file and pay taxes, but rather, a determination
> >of status as to whether one *is*, in fact, a taxpayer.
> Again, irrelevant. You earn income in any of the fifty states? You're
> a taxpayer.
I'm glad you are so certain of this. Surely, if it were that simple,
there would no problem for the IRS to send back a simple form letter
saying exactly this, upon a request for determination of status. What if
you're a citizen of France, residing outside the US for more than half
the year, paying taxes to France upon income earned in the US? What if
you're claimed as someone's dependent, your income being taxed to him?
What if you've got less income than the exempt amount? What if you're a
non-federal State Citizen? Lots of possible scenarios, can you be
absolutely sure, absent some determination, which if any of these are
liable for federal income tax? This is precisely why such determination
is required to be provided upon request.
> >If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement that,
> >even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
> >status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
> Yes, but the method you describe is certainly one for a jury, and
> from the cases I've seen, juries are decidedly unfriendly to the
> crackpot idea that the failure of the IRS to specifically knock on
> your door and tell you that you have to pay income taxes gives you
> a good faith basis to believe that you don't have to do so.
There's no point in arguing how a jury might rule, but it seems
irrelevant to our discussion, insofar as you agree that Cheek would cause
an appellate court to reverse any penalty for acting in "bad faith" if
indeed the record indicated that a good faith effort had been made to
obtain some determination of status.
Skepticism is an excellent habit, Mr. Frank, and commendable. But a
skeptic does not connote one with an absolutely closed mind, and even a
very skeptical person may have good cause to believe a given theory of
non-liability to income tax, IF he made an honest and good-faith effort to
establish the facts of the matter, and came to a conclusion which a
reasonable person might arrive at. Your attitude, sir, seems to me one of
dismissal, not skepticism, and I regret that. I am not so sure of myself
that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made no
real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
Is there any point in further discussion at all?
--
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> -- Finger for PGP Key, or by WWW:
Paul Maffia
>Still haven't read the Lloyd Long case, huh!!
It is evident that you have not nor that you understand the actual
holdings and determinations in the case. In fact it is evident you don't
have the foggiest idea of what you are talking about.
Paul M.
John Manuola
writes:
He cannot possibly know that any earned income in any of the 50 states
is taxable income. Because the INCOME is NOT the subject of the tax.
But merely the basis from which to determine the amount of tax owed. The
subject of the tax is the manner in which it was received or who
received it...in other words...the income tax is a tax of certain
revenue taxable activities! Otherwise it would be a direct tax which,
according to Brushaber and Stanton cases must STILL follow the rule of
APPORTIONMENT in Art. 1, Sect. 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution. And if
the activity which generated the income is NOT a taxable event, then no
matter how much income is received from such an activity, there is no
tax!
Ted Frank
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>In article <D75n2...@midway.uchicago.edu> you wrote:
>> >If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement that,
>> >even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
>> >status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
>
>> Yes, but the method you describe is certainly one for a jury, and
>> from the cases I've seen, juries are decidedly unfriendly to the
>> crackpot idea that the failure of the IRS to specifically knock on
>> your door and tell you that you have to pay income taxes gives you
>> a good faith basis to believe that you don't have to do so.
>
>There's no point in arguing how a jury might rule, but it seems
>irrelevant to our discussion, insofar as you agree that Cheek would cause
>an appellate court to reverse any penalty for acting in "bad faith" if
>indeed the record indicated that a good faith effort had been made to
>obtain some determination of status.
Read what I wrote. It's a jury question. Check out _United States v.
Hauert_, where Mr. Hauert wrote the IRS with one of your bogus theories,
didn't get an answer, and decided not to pay his taxes. The jury found
lack of good faith. Behaving like an ostrich is not good faith.
>I am not so sure of myself
>that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made no
>real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
>arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
>"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
There's nothing to challenge - there's no "there" there.
I refer you to _In re Becraft_, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989), which
adequately refuted to bogus state-sovereignty argument. (Yes, that's
Lowell Becraft.)
>Is there any point in further discussion at all?
Not if you're not going to present any legitimate arguments. The best
you've given is plausible ways to weasel out of a criminal conviction,
which is all _Cheek_ stands for. Nothing you propose has any bearing
on one's ability to actually avoid taxes, and all it does is subject
people who follow you like lemmings off a cliff to civil penalties
and possible criminal prosecution.
Dick Adams
Nobody I know has read the Lloyd Long case for two reasons.
(1) It has not been published in a legal forum; and
(2) Nobody who refers to it has made the effort to provide a
copy of it available.
Until I see a verifiable copy of it as far as I am concerned it
is nothing more than a left-handed hammer, a hundred yards of shore
line, or a snipe hunt, i.e., put up or shut up -- and that is as
nice as I can say it.
Dick -- no disclaimer is necessary when replying to nonsense
Tim Smith
>dismissal, not skepticism, and I regret that. I am not so sure of myself
>that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made no
>real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
>arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
>"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
Every single appellate court in the United States that has ever considered
the matter has agreed that they are crackpot theories. No sovereign
state citizen theorist has been able to cite even a single case of
someone getting out of having to pay taxes using these theories (the
best that has been done is citing people who may have escaped *criminal*
liability, but that doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes,
plus interest, plus penalties).
--Tim Smith
Mike Goldman
> >There's no point in arguing how a jury might rule, but it seems
> >irrelevant to our discussion, insofar as you agree that Cheek would cause
> >an appellate court to reverse any penalty for acting in "bad faith" if
> >indeed the record indicated that a good faith effort had been made to
> >obtain some determination of status.
> Read what I wrote. It's a jury question. Check out _United States v.
> Hauert_, where Mr. Hauert wrote the IRS with one of your bogus theories,
> didn't get an answer, and decided not to pay his taxes. The jury found
> lack of good faith. Behaving like an ostrich is not good faith.
Do you have a more precise cite? Though I think you will find that I
have never suggested that anyone "behave like an ostrich." Indeed, I
have suggested that skepticism and careful consideration is vital, and
that asking the IRS for a determination (per their rules) is one such
means by which one may in good faith carefully consider the matter. To
blindly accept *ANY* assertion is foolish, whether that assertion is,
"You are not required to file or pay because of X Y Z," *OR*, "You must
file and pay, stupid."
In my opinion, Mr. Frank, your arguments carry less weight when you reduce
to ad hominem attacks. I have said that I do not say you are wrong, but
merely that you are unconvincing. This is not because my mind is shut to
your arguments, but rather, because you have as yet demonstrated little
thoughtful consideration of the matter. If "the Government is always
right" and there is nothing to be done *LEGALLY*, then we have a more
serious problem than I think you suspect. Because all of these arguments
boil down to hot air on both sides in the end, and if we cannot resolve
our differences in a peaceful and diplomatic fashion, then they will
surely be resolved through other means. And in that scenario, we all
lose.
> >I am not so sure of myself
> >that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made no
> >real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
> >arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
> >"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
> There's nothing to challenge - there's no "there" there.
Yet another example of your incisive talent for dismissal.
> I refer you to _In re Becraft_, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989), which
> adequately refuted to bogus state-sovereignty argument. (Yes, that's
> Lowell Becraft.)
I will indeed look up this cite, sir. My intention was not to bait you
into partisanship of some sort, but to engage in friendly and mutual
dialogue. It seems that you are generally more interested in ranting
than in discussing. Why are you so dedicated to stomping out free
inquiry? Have we not a reasonable right to inquire as to whether there
is some non-violent means of reconciling with a despot?
> >Is there any point in further discussion at all?
> Not if you're not going to present any legitimate arguments. The best
> you've given is plausible ways to weasel out of a criminal conviction,
> which is all _Cheek_ stands for. Nothing you propose has any bearing
> on one's ability to actually avoid taxes, and all it does is subject
> people who follow you like lemmings off a cliff to civil penalties
> and possible criminal prosecution.
For the record, Mr. Frank, throughout the course of this discussion I
have advocated no specific "proposal" at all, merely asked some questions
which I felt were worthy of consideration. Nothing I have said here has
justified your ad hominems and general disrespect. If your position has
merit, then I am open to considering it. But surely following my advice
to engage in deliberate, skeptical inquiry, cannot be akin to leading
"lemmings off a cliff." Tone down your rhetoric, sir, and we may find
this whole matter far less indigesting for all.
Joseph G. Adams
Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>Ted Frank (th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu) wrote:
>>> Read what I wrote. It's a jury question. Check out _United States v.
>>> Hauert_, where Mr. Hauert wrote the IRS with one of your bogus theories,
>>> didn't get an answer, and decided not to pay his taxes. The jury found
>>> lack of good faith. Behaving like an ostrich is not good faith.
>>
>>Do you have a more precise cite?
>
>7th Cir. 1994, Judge Wellford wrote the decision. It would be in the
>last few months of 1994, I only saw the slip op., not the F.3d.
40 F.3d 197 (7th Cir. 1994).
Paul Maffia
>In <D7462...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>Frank) writes:
>>
>Yeah he was...shall we go on to the Lloyd Long case or the trial of the
>Pilot Group in Stockton, CA? Long was found NOT GUILTY...and the Pilot
>Group case trial ended in a hung jury (9-3 in favor of acquittal...the 3
>who hung it up said they felt the IRS had not presented a good case, but
>felt that if their spouses had to file...these people should too [says
>something about the mindset of Americans])...Care to know the cite of
>teh Long Case...or are sufficiently shit-scared that you don't wanna
>know the truth of what is happening?
You obviously are unable to make a distinction between the fact that in a
criminal case of tax evasion, a person can be found not guilty of the
criminal act but still must pay the required taxes, penalties and
interest as were the persons in the cases you cite.
>>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
>All that is useful to the Patriot Movement in the Cheek case is that the
>Court ruled that he had a right to show the imformation upon which he
>made his decision to not file.
>>--
But only to the extent that the court said that a person may properly
argue a silly even irrational but honestly held belief in order to prove
they are not guilty of a criminal violation of the tax law.
The court did not hold, nor is the case of any use to anyone, especially
the idiots in the Patriot Movement, from successfully arguing that they
do not have the file the required tax returns and pay the required taxes,
penalties and interest.
Paul M.
Joseph G. Adams
John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>Unlike some on here, the court did not rule that Cheek's arguments were
>irrational, only that a court cannot reject the defendent's request to
>submit his information to the jury simply because the judge thinks the
>information is irrational. Therefore, Mr Long, for example, was able to
>present his information properly to the jury and was thus acquitted on
>all charges and was NOT required to file or pay on monies received!
The _Cheek_ defense is only relevant to establishing 'willfulness' at
a criminal trial for tax evasion. It says nothing about whether the IRS
may force him to actually pay taxes and associated penalties. While
tax evaders may or may not (most likely, not) avoid prison, they *will*
have to pay taxes.
John Manuola
writes:
>
>In article <D7462...@midway.uchicago.edu>,
>Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>>In article <ZIPPY.95A...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu>,
>>The Pinhead <zi...@hairball.ecst.csuchico.edu> wrote:
>>>certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh
circuit
>>>
>>>No. 89-658. Argued October 3, 1990 -- Decided January 8, 1991
>>>
>>>Petitioner Cheek was charged with six counts of willfully failing to
file a
>>>federal income tax return in violation of MDRV 7203 of the Internal
Revenue
>>>Code (Code) and three counts of willfully attempting to evade his
income
>>>taxes in violation of MDRV 7201.
>>
>>It's useful to note that Cheek was convicted again at his retrial,
>>and the conviction was upheld.
>>
>>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
>
>You know, ted, you're right. The 'IRS' had an undisputed record that
>showed for years that he was required to file. He should have disputed
>the record first. Then he might have had a chance. You know, when the
>agency refuses to amend the record, you send in a statement of
>disagreement? After all, he did sign a W-4 statement promising to
>pay the tax, didn't he? He signed under penalty of perjury that he
>had 60(!) exemptions. Wow. Wouldn't you agree that using the proper
>administrative procedures that this could have been averted?
>
If he files a W-4 form, he has agreed to have "wage taxes" withheld.
Wage taxes are NOT INCOME taxes. Income taxes are in Subchapter A of
the IRC, while Employment taxes (or wage taxes) are in Subchapter C. The
W-4 form, by way of it's OMB Control Number and the corresponding CFR
Table on OMB Numbers, is used in connection with Subchapter C only, not
Subchapter A.
Section 3401 to be specific!
John Manuola
>
>In article <3ms3d3$b...@telerama.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>Joseph G. Adams (jga...@leland.Stanford.EDU) wrote:
>>
>>> How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that Cheek asserted
>>> the fallacious crackpot theory X (which the court correctly
rejected),
>>> when he should have asserted the obviously true crackpot theory Y
>>> (which a lawful court would adopt)? So, a defendant who asserts the
>>> latter theory could make a different claim than Cheek, believing
that
>>> Cheek simply presented the wrong theory to the court.
>>
>>How about if a defendant has a good faith belief that he is not
required
>>to file, but attempts to confirm it by requesting a determination from
the
>>Internal Revenue Service, such request being specified in the Internal
>>Revenue Manual as required to be provided upon request, and such
request
>>being ignored by the Internal Revenue Service. Does not the doctrine
of
>>Estoppel by Acquiescence then prevail, at least until such time as the
>>IRS does respond and inform defendant of error?
>
>the 'IRS' cannot give legal advice!
Who said that requesting a determination letter regarding your status
under the IRC is not something the IRS can and MUST do upon request?
>>
>>There are many crackpot theories, as you say, but that does not
>>necessarily mean that every theory is a crackpot one. As such, a
>>reasonable person may certainly have good faith reason to believe an
>>uncontroverted theory.
>
John Manuola
>
>Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John Manuola) wrote:
>
> thousands of Americans are slowly getting out of the
> system, legally...but knowing the law. Those who
> know what they are doing and do it properly, rarely
> even get to trial.
>
>"Rarely even get to trial" is not good enough.
>
>In legal terms, there is a world of difference between "rarely even get
>to trial" and "NEVER get convicted".
>
>It would only take ONE case where someone with a legitimate right not
to
>pay taxes might get (wrongly) convicted of tax evasion, to generate an
>appeal which would eventually give the Supreme Court an excuse to set a
>controlling precedent striking down the illegitimate "system".
>
>As far as I am aware, not even one such case has happened yet.
Unfortuntely, you have not heard of Lloyd Long or the Pilot Group!
On the
>other hand, there are numerous cases which appear to flatly dismiss any
>and all theories that the US federal income tax is invalid
I have declared the income tax invalid. Merely improperly administered.
and/or that
>people may legally "get out of the system".
One "legally" applies the laws...that is ALL one needs to do. I admit
the IRS doesn't like it. But that's the hassles one must face when one
has buckled under, ignorantly, for so long!
>
>Until an appellate court issues a ruling that explicitly invalidates
the
>income tax, and/or declares that an ordinary American is not liable
foro
How could ANY court do that? The income tax's applicability is
completely relative. Relative to each person's activities. If I sent
you a bill of any amount...what would compel you to pay it?
>tax despite doing something that would normally be thought of as "earn-
>ing income", realists are justified in assuming that the tax law is in
>fact valid and broadly applicable.
How can you possible define the income tax as broadly applicable...? No
law can be "broadly" applicable (at least in the way i am interpreting
your use of that word). All law must be specific or it is invalid for
vagueness or ambiguity!
>
John Manuola
>
>Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John Manuola) writes:
>
>>In <D7462...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>>Frank) writes:
>
>>>
>>Yeah he was...shall we go on to the Lloyd Long case or the trial of
the
>>Pilot Group in Stockton, CA? Long was found NOT GUILTY...and the
Pilot
>>Group case trial ended in a hung jury (9-3 in favor of acquittal...the
3
>>who hung it up said they felt the IRS had not presented a good case,
but
>>felt that if their spouses had to file...these people should too [says
>>something about the mindset of Americans])...Care to know the cite of
>>teh Long Case...or are sufficiently shit-scared that you don't wanna
>>know the truth of what is happening?
>
>You obviously are unable to make a distinction between the fact that in
a
>criminal case of tax evasion, a person can be found not guilty of the
>criminal act but still must pay the required taxes, penalties and
>interest as were the persons in the cases you cite.
>
Then why was Mr. Long not required to file or pay...Read before you make
sweeping judgments. And in the case of the Pilot Group...the leader of
this organization has openly admitted that he has not filed a return in
over 10 years. Yet, the IRS cannot seem to get a jury to make him file.
Hmmm!! why is that?
>>>I don't personally see how anyone who's actually aware of _Cheek_ has
>>>the requisite good faith to use a _Cheek_ defense.
>
>>All that is useful to the Patriot Movement in the Cheek case is that
the
>>Court ruled that he had a right to show the imformation upon which he
>>made his decision to not file.
>>>--
>
>But only to the extent that the court said that a person may properly
>argue a silly even irrational but honestly held belief in order to
prove
>they are not guilty of a criminal violation of the tax law.
>
>The court did not hold, nor is the case of any use to anyone,
especially
>the idiots in the Patriot Movement, from successfully arguing that they
Speaking of 'irrational'...i find it rather illogical and irrational
that you constantly revert to name-calling. It accomplishes very
little...except to make enemies of people...and to make yourself appear
even more idiotic.
>do not have the file the required tax returns and pay the required
taxes,
>penalties and interest.
>
Unlike some on here, the court did not rule that Cheek's arguments were
irrational, only that a court cannot reject the defendent's request to
submit his information to the jury simply because the judge thinks the
information is irrational. Therefore, Mr Long, for example, was able to
present his information properly to the jury and was thus acquitted on
all charges and was NOT required to file or pay on monies received!
Keepsake
>
> Paul M.
>
>
>
>
Ted Frank
Scott Dunn <sco...@netcom.com> wrote:
>Wow. Wouldn't you agree that using the proper
>administrative procedures that this could have been averted?
Yes, if you mean by the "proper administrative procedures" the timely
filing of an income tax return and the timely payment of income taxes.
There's no magic bullet to avoid the law here. Get over it.
Ted Frank
John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>In <3mtlr8$n...@ia.mks.com> ri...@mks.com (Rich Wales) writes:
>>"Rarely even get to trial" is not good enough.
>>
>>In legal terms, there is a world of difference between "rarely even get
>>to trial" and "NEVER get convicted".
>>
>>It would only take ONE case where someone with a legitimate right not
>to
>>pay taxes might get (wrongly) convicted of tax evasion, to generate an
>>appeal which would eventually give the Supreme Court an excuse to set a
>>controlling precedent striking down the illegitimate "system".
>>
>>As far as I am aware, not even one such case has happened yet.
>
>Unfortuntely, you have not heard of Lloyd Long or the Pilot Group!
Unfortunately, you don't know how to read, and are wasting everybody's
time with these nonresponsive non sequiturs.
Neither case that you mention have anything to do with controlling
precedent, or the reversal of a criminal conviction for income tax
evasion.
Ted Frank
John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>You obviously are unable to make a distinction between the fact that in a
>>criminal case of tax evasion, a person can be found not guilty of the
>>criminal act but still must pay the required taxes, penalties and
>>interest as were the persons in the cases you cite.
>>
>Then why was Mr. Long not required to file or pay...
What's your evidence for this?
Has the statute of limitations expired? Or are you still confusing the
difference between a criminal prosecution for *willful* failure to file
and a civil assessment of taxes resulting from actual failure to pay?
>Unlike some on here, the court did not rule that Cheek's arguments were
>irrational, only that a court cannot reject the defendent's request to
>submit his information to the jury simply because the judge thinks the
>information is irrational.
False. _Cheek_ said nothing about evidentiary rulings, only about
jury instructions.
>Therefore, Mr Long, for example, was able to
>present his information properly to the jury and was thus acquitted on
>all charges and was NOT required to file or pay on monies received!
Again, you are confusing a criminal trial with the civil assessment.
That a jury did not find willfulness beyond a reasonable doubt does
not mean that Long isn't going to get hit with civil penalties later.
Ted Frank
John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>If he files a W-4 form, he has agreed to have "wage taxes" withheld.
>Wage taxes are NOT INCOME taxes. Income taxes are in Subchapter A of
>the IRC, while Employment taxes (or wage taxes) are in Subchapter C. The
>W-4 form, by way of it's OMB Control Number and the corresponding CFR
>Table on OMB Numbers, is used in connection with Subchapter C only, not
>Subchapter A.
Wages are income. An argument otherwise is frivolous. _Granado v.
Commissioner_, 792 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986).
Rich Wales
Unfortunately, you have not heard of Lloyd Long or the
Pilot Group!
I haven't heard of the Pilot Group, but I have heard of Lloyd Long.
The Long acquittal proves nothing at all. Long was acquitted on crim-
inal charges of willfully failing to file an income tax return. This
simply means that the jury hearing his case was convinced that there
was reasonable doubt as to whether or not Long genuinely understood he
had a valid legal obligation to file a return.
Simply because Long's tax theories were presented at his trial, and
the jury ended up acquitting him, does =not= automatically mean that
Long's theories were certified as correct by the jury. For all anyone
not actually on the Long jury knows, they may simply have concluded
that no matter how outrageous Long's theories were, he really =did=
believe them, and thus he believed in good faith that he was not
required to file a tax return.
Even if Long's jury =was= 100% convinced that Long was correct in his
views, that would still not constitute any sort of binding ruling that
other courts are required to follow without question. It might pos-
sibly show that juries could be willing to "nullify" the tax laws by
acquitting tax protestors in defiance of clear and convincing evidence,
but that's the most the Long acquittal could possibly mean.
Note, further, that Long's acquittal in his criminal case does =not=
make him immune from civil liability for tax. If the IRS decides to
declare Long liable for back taxes and penalties -- something they can
do at any time, BTW -- Long will =not= be able to cite his acquittal
and have said civil case thrown out of court. This is because any
such civil action will involve =only= the simple question of liability
for tax -- without any regard to whether Long believes he owes the tax.
> Until an appellate court issues a ruling that explicitly
> invalidates the income tax, and/or declares that an
> ordinary American is not liable
How could ANY court do that?
By overturning a criminal conviction of some run-of-the-mill wage earner
who did all the "appropriate" things to get out of the system but who
was hauled into court anyway and (unjustly) found guilty of willful tax
evasion. Or, by overturning a verdict in a civil suit in which such a
person was (unjustly) found liable for taxes and penalties.
Dick Adams
Subject: Re: Proof I'm not required to File!
Organization: University of Baltimore
Dick Adams
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
> .... I am not so sure of myself that I say you are wrong, but you
> are not convincing, as you have made no real effort to challenge
> the premises of the sovereign State citizen arguments, for
> instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as "crackpot" and
> thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
The 14th Amendment created the concept of U.S. citizenship, conferred
that citizenship on the citizens of the individual states, and
authorized Congress to pass legislation to enforce the amendment as
needed. One of the overriding considerations of the 14th Amendment
was to provide a form of federal citizenship which could not be
negated by the States. Whether you like it or not if you were born in
a place where U.S. citizenship was conferred at birth, you are a U.S.
citizen unless and until you renounce it. State citizenship (which
clearly does exist) is not based on birth -- it is based on
contemporaneous domicile in a State which is often construed by mere
physical presence.
In order to gain the standing of a "Sovereign State Citizen" which
would make you a non-resident alien for federal tax purposes, you need
to renounce your U.S. citizenship while retaining your State
citizenship. Unfortunately the Immigration and Naturization Act
stands in your way. Under the INA, a U.S. citizen who wishs to
renounce their U.S. citizenship must do so in a U.S. Consular office
in a foreign country and must relinquish their U.S. passport if they
have one. After being notified of the renunciation, the Secretary of
State issues a CLN, Certificate of Loss of Nationality. Thus, the now
non-U.S. citizen is upon reentry into the United States an alien and
is not eligible for State citizenship.
In Santori v. U.S. (see below), Jose Santori attempted to have the
federal courts rule that he could renounce his U.S. citizenship in a
federal court in Puerto Rico so that he could have standing as a
non-citizen national of the United States while retaining his standing
as a citizen of Puerto Rico. The courts said no. In all federal
court cases where the argument of "Sovereign State Citizenship" has
been considered, the response has consistently been that the argument
is without merit.
Mike Goldman's contention that no real effort has been made "to
challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen arguments" may
be supported by the paralax of his momentary interjection here, but it
is not supported by the facts. We have heard and responded to this
argument in the past -- too many times by my count. Theories and
concepts may be entitled to "worthwhile debate", but settled facts
require only cites. For a list of cites which repudiate the "Sovereign
State Citizen" argument, I suggest you read U.S. v. Lorin G. Sloan.
If you do not have access to a law library, I will e-mail you a copy.
======================================================================
SANTORI v. UNITED STATES
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
June 28, 1994, Decided
OPINION:
Per Curiam. Appellant Jose Santori, a natural born citizen of the
United States, appeals the dismissal by the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico of his request (1) for a
declaratory judgment that he has the right to renounce his United
States citizenship before any federal court and become a non-citizen
national of the United States and a citizen only of Puerto Rico; (2)
that the court set a date on which he can renounce his United States
citizenship; and (3) that, insofar as the Immigration and
Naturalization Act [INA], 8 U.S.C. @ 1101 et seq., prevents any
citizen from renouncing his citizenship and becoming a non-citizen
national, the court declare the INA unconstitutional.
The district court dismissed this case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. The Article III issues involved raise interesting
questions, but we are entitled to affirm the dismissal on the ground
that no substantial question is presented on the merits despite
jurisdictional doubts, see United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 27, 29
(1st Cir. 1993) (citing cases), and choose to do so in this case.
Congress has broad authority over conditions and procedures for
obtaining and renouncing citizenship, see Davis v. District Director,
INS, 481 F. Supp. 1178, 1183-84 n.8 (D.D.C. 1979), and Santori has
provided us with no authority nor any reasoned argument to suggest
that it has exceeded the constitutional limits by refusing to afford
him the option he seeks, namely, to renounce his United States
citizenship while remaining a national of this country.
=====================================================================
Johnboy
writes:
>
>In <3mvipe$n...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com> Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John
>Manuola) writes:
>
>>
>>In <3mul2q$h...@nntp1.u.washington.edu> t...@u.washington.edu (Tim
Smith)
>>writes:
>>
>>>
>>>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>>>dismissal, not skepticism, and I regret that. I am not so sure of
>>myself
>>>>that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have
>made
>>no
>>>>real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
>>>>arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
>>>>"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
>>>
>>>Every single appellate court in the United States that has ever
>>considered
>>>the matter has agreed that they are crackpot theories. No sovereign
>>>state citizen theorist has been able to cite even a single case of
>>>someone getting out of having to pay taxes using these theories (the
>>>best that has been done is citing people who may have escaped
>>*criminal*
>>>liability, but that doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes,
>>>plus interest, plus penalties).
>>>
>>>--Tim Smith
>>>
>>Again,when the argument is wrong, it will lose. When the argument is
>>correct, it will win. And there are a growing number of people who
are
>>getting the IRS out of their lives. So YOUR theory that they will
>still
>>have to pay is just that a theory...no less crackpot then ours.
>>
>>Keepsake
>
>Keepsake:
>
>We understand that you _HAVE_ to say that, since the only way your
>cohorts have avoided conviction on _CRIMINAL_ charges is by presenting
a
>"sincere" belief that the tax laws did not apply to them.
No, there are many other methods as well, such as getting the IRS to
follow legal procedures. THese methods are much too complex to even
pretend to explain in here. But if you had any real desire to know what
these "crackpots" believe, you'd look into them. If not, then I suppose
you are simply satisfied with being an ignoramous, dependent upon
insults to make yourself feel better about the slave state you are in.
Under the
>circumstances, to expect any real discussion of the issue from those
who
>have used this tax evasion method is like expecting OJ's attorneys to
>ask him to confess.
Ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find, knock and the door
shall be opened. Anyone who wants to know what this is REALLY all
about has every opportunity to find out, without putting their precious
tax bill in jeopardy!
>
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3mv3lf$s...@india.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>Ted Frank (th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu) wrote:
>>> Read what I wrote. It's a jury question. Check out _United States v.
>>> Hauert_, where Mr. Hauert wrote the IRS with one of your bogus
theories,
>>> didn't get an answer, and decided not to pay his taxes. The jury
found
>>> lack of good faith. Behaving like an ostrich is not good faith.
>>
>>Do you have a more precise cite?
>
>7th Cir. 1994, Judge Wellford wrote the decision. It would be in the
>last few months of 1994, I only saw the slip op., not the F.3d.
>
>>Though I think you will find that I
>>have never suggested that anyone "behave like an ostrich." Indeed, I
>>have suggested that skepticism and careful consideration is vital, and
>>that asking the IRS for a determination (per their rules) is one such
>>means by which one may in good faith carefully consider the matter.
>
>You suggested that the failure of the IRS to respond to a query, no
>matter how ludicrous the query, exempted one from criminal liability.
>'Tain't so.
>
>>In my opinion, Mr. Frank, your arguments carry less weight when you
reduce
>>to ad hominem attacks.
>
>What was ad hominem about giving a case-cite and a conclusion based on
>that case and the cases it cited?
>
>It's not ad hominem to note that many of the arguments you make are
>considered to be "frivolous", which simply means unsupported by law;
>that's also a direct quote from cases on the subject.
>
>>This is not because my mind is shut to
>>your arguments, but rather, because you have as yet demonstrated
little
>>thoughtful consideration of the matter.
>
>I've read dozens of tax-protestor cases, including briefs in a
half-dozen
>or so appeals. I've explored each and every of the legal arguments made
>by tax protestors. It's not my fault that they're all meritless.
Another silly question...Do you know the IRS definition of a
"tax-protestor"? Or are simply name-calling again?
>
>>If "the Government is always
>>right" and there is nothing to be done *LEGALLY*, then we have a more
>>serious problem than I think you suspect.
>
>The government isn't always right. It loses tax cases all the time. It
>just doesn't lose them when people seeking to challenge the government
>make up arguments for why they don't have to pay taxes based on
illogical
>readings of the statute (literally: one popular tax-protest argument
>involves jumping from "If A then B" in a definitional statute to "If
>not-A then not-B") or active ignorance of case-law.
>
>>Because all of these arguments
>>boil down to hot air on both sides in the end, and if we cannot
resolve
>>our differences in a peaceful and diplomatic fashion, then they will
>>surely be resolved through other means.
>
>The peaceful and diplomatic fashion is the democratic process. The same
>democratic process that produced the statutes that you seem to wish to
>disobey so much.
Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
file a 1040 form? I desire to break NO statute, but to know the law and
to obey it and to compel those who work for the IRS to obey it as well.
>
>>> I refer you to _In re Becraft_, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989), which
>>> adequately refuted to bogus state-sovereignty argument. (Yes, that's
>>> Lowell Becraft.)
>>
>>I will indeed look up this cite, sir. My intention was not to bait
you
>>into partisanship of some sort, but to engage in friendly and mutual
>>dialogue. It seems that you are generally more interested in ranting
>>than in discussing. Why are you so dedicated to stomping out free
>>inquiry?
>
>Grow up. Noting that the position you're taking has absolutely no merit
>is not "stamping out free inquiry" -- it's correcting misimpressions
you're
>leaving among an audience of thousands that could get people in a lot
of
>trouble if they follow your thoughtless advice.
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>In <D77JI...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>Frank) writes:
>>I've read dozens of tax-protestor cases, including briefs in a
>half-dozen
>>or so appeals. I've explored each and every of the legal arguments made
>>by tax protestors. It's not my fault that they're all meritless.
>
>Another silly question...Do you know the IRS definition of a
>"tax-protestor"?
Yes. Next silly question.
>>The peaceful and diplomatic fashion is the democratic process. The same
>>democratic process that produced the statutes that you seem to wish to
>>disobey so much.
>
>Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
>file a 1040 form?
26 U.S.C. $ 7203.
Ted Frank
In article <3n0usq$8...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>If not, then I suppose
>you are simply satisfied with being an ignoramous, dependent upon
>insults to make yourself feel better about the slave state you are in.
If this is a reference to the bogus tax-protestor claim that "sovereign
freeborn state citizens" are not subject to the income tax, I refer you
to U.S. v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1989).
Ted Frank
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>And while you are surely correct that citing people who have escaped
>criminal liability "doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes," it
>also doesn't mean that they DO get nailed for the taxes, either.
But they do. I've cited several cases to you to that effect.
>The question, then, is whether cases exist wherein such sovereigns have
>been convicted criminally of failure to *pay*, as opposed to merely
>failure to file, and conversely, whether such have been acquitted of same.
Failure to pay income tax is felony under $ 7201, while failure to file
is a less serious offense under $ 7203.
The Justice Department, when faced with tax protestors, usually just
brings the less serious charge for first offenders, so there are not
very many $ 7201 tax protest cases.
But I refer you to United States v. Bonneau, 970 F.2d 929 (1st Cir. 1992)
and United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1991).
Tim Smith
>No, there are many other methods as well, such as getting the IRS to
>follow legal procedures. THese methods are much too complex to even
>pretend to explain in here. But if you had any real desire to know what
Cite an appellate court case where someone has won using those methods.
It must be one that you have personally read, rather than one you are
getting from tax protest literature. I add this restriction because I've
read every single such case that anyone on the net has been able to cite,
and they have *all* been misrepresented by the tax protesters. The
misrepresentations range from citing non-existent cases, to quoting out of
context, to outright making up quotes.
--Tim Smith
Harold Clark
(Johnboy) wrote:
> Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
> file a 1040 form? I desire to break NO statute, but to know the law and
> to obey it and to compel those who work for the IRS to obey it as well.
Technically, none. Form 1040 is not mentioned in the US Code. HOWEVER,
26 USC Section 6012 says:
Sec. 6012. Persons required to make returns of income
-STATUTE-
(a) General rule
Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by the
following:
(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which
equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return shall not be
required of an individual -
---
The cite is quite long and can be gotten from the House server
<www.house.gov> if anyone is interested. The exceptions deal with those
exact things covered in the 1040 form; i.e., meeting the
income/exemption/deduction limits for required filing.
In another post, Johnboy or John Manuola or whatever his name is states:
> Why that's strange, i thought that Subchapter C was FICA!!! And it is
> the only place in the COde that refers to withholding at the source,
Totally untrue (I hesitate to use the "lie" word). 26 USC Section 3402 says:
Sec. 3402. Income tax collected at source
-STATUTE-
(a) Requirement of withholding
(1) In general
Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer making
payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax
determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures
prescribed by the Secretary. ...more
-----
> EXCEPT for sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 in Subchapter A. Maybe
> you might wanna read those as well! It would give you a pretty good idea
> from whom taxes should be withheld at source. And just so you know that
> there are no other places where that is referred...read section
> 7701(a)(16).
Which says:
(16) Withholding agent
The term 'withholding agent' means any person required to deduct and
withhold any tax under the provisions of section 1441, 1442, 1443, or
1461.
----
But that doesn't exclude the provisions of Section 3402.
> Therefore, if I have no Social Security number (meaning I am not
> participating in the Social Security system), then there is nothing
> within Subchapter C (FICA) that applies to me and there is nothing in
> Sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 which apply to me, then where is ANY
> company which hires me compelled to withhold ANY taxes from my
> compensation? NOTE: i am not saying that I am not liable for any tax
> (yet), but only that no company which hires me is compelled to withhold
> any tax.
Wrong. See 26 USC 3402. Your company is required to withhold taxes and
you are required to pay them.
Additional reading, 26 CFR 1.1441-5 (the implementing
> regulation for 26 U.S.C. 1441) have fun!!!
26 CFR 1.1441-5 says:
Sec. 1.1441-5 Claiming to be a person not subject to withholding.
(a) Individuals. For purposes of chapter 3 of the Code, an
individual's written statement that he or she is a citizen or
resident of the United States may be relied upon by the payer of
the income as proof that such individual is a citizen or resident
of the United States. This statement shall be furnished to the
withholding agent in duplicate. An alien may claim residence in
the United States by filing Form 1078 with the withholding agent in
duplicate in lieu of the above statement.
----
If you are a US Citizen (and you are if you were born in the United States
and haven't renounced your citizenship), then 26 USC Sections 1441, 1442,
1443 and 1461 don't cover your situation. The futility here is not in
what the tax code says, it is in the claims you are making which are
specious and totally false. Even if you are not a US Citizen, if you earn
money from a US company in the United States, you owe Federal income taxes
(that's Form 1040NR, I believe). Maybe you should read some more.
--
Harold Clark
Opinions are mine alone.
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3mvnnr$p...@epicycle.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>And while you are surely correct that citing people who have escaped
>>criminal liability "doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes,"
it
>>also doesn't mean that they DO get nailed for the taxes, either.
>
>But they do. I've cited several cases to you to that effect.
>
>>The question, then, is whether cases exist wherein such sovereigns
have
>>been convicted criminally of failure to *pay*, as opposed to merely
>>failure to file, and conversely, whether such have been acquitted of
same.
>
>Failure to pay income tax is felony under $ 7201, while failure to file
>is a less serious offense under $ 7203.
That is a very nice try at intimidation. But there is just one
problem....those statutes are PENALTY statutes. What, pray tell, are
the statutes being violated which warrent these penalties? Anyone who
even allows themself to be indicted on these statutes without any
underlying criminal statute, and doesn't challenge the indictment right
away will most definitely be facing a tough trial!
>
>The Justice Department, when faced with tax protestors, usually just
>brings the less serious charge for first offenders, so there are not
>very many $ 7201 tax protest cases.
>
>But I refer you to United States v. Bonneau, 970 F.2d 929 (1st Cir.
1992)
>and United States v. Sloan, 939 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1991).
>--
>ted frank "Without state-approved syllabi and standardized
testing,
> my education can only go so far." -- Lisa Simpson
>
You who refer and refer and refer to case after case after case fail to
realize one thing, the subject of the tax being activities or events
which generated the income and NOT the income itself, makes it virtually
impossible for any court to make any possible ruling that would apply to
anyone other than the person to whom it was set down for. Because no
two people are exactly alike in the manner they conduct their
activities. These cases establish precedent in one particular area or
another, but just as there is no silver bullet to destroying the
activities of the IRS, there is no silver bullet to destroying the
efforts of patriotic americans in cutting away the puppet strings the
government has deceptively attached to them.
keepsake
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3n0vd0$8...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>In <D77JI...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>>Frank) writes:
>>>I've read dozens of tax-protestor cases, including briefs in a
>>half-dozen
>>>or so appeals. I've explored each and every of the legal arguments
made
>>>by tax protestors. It's not my fault that they're all meritless.
>>
>>Another silly question...Do you know the IRS definition of a
>>"tax-protestor"?
>
>Yes. Next silly question.
Please share it with us all...!! Where is it located? and how do each
of these people become "tax-Protestors"? Told ya it was silly, but
humor this old fool!
>
>>>The peaceful and diplomatic fashion is the democratic process. The
same
>>>democratic process that produced the statutes that you seem to wish
to
>>>disobey so much.
>>
>>Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
>>file a 1040 form?
>
>26 U.S.C. $ 7203.
Oh really!!?? Upon reading it it appears to be more of a penalty
statute! Which statute would have to be DISOBEYED (as you assume we do)
in order for this penalty statute to become used? I assume there is one!
Isn't there?!?
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
>
>Please learn how to edit your posts.
>
>In article <3n0usq$8...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>If not, then I suppose
>>you are simply satisfied with being an ignoramous, dependent upon
>>insults to make yourself feel better about the slave state you are in.
>
>If this is a reference to the bogus tax-protestor claim that "sovereign
>freeborn state citizens" are not subject to the income tax, I refer you
>to U.S. v. Dawes, 874 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1989).
>--
No it's not! Next attempt at inviction, please!
Johnboy
writes:
>
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>No, there are many other methods as well, such as getting the IRS to
>>follow legal procedures. THese methods are much too complex to even
>>pretend to explain in here. But if you had any real desire to know
what
>>these "crackpots" believe, you'd look into them. If not, then I
suppose
>
>Cite an appellate court case where someone has won using those methods.
>It must be one that you have personally read, rather than one you are
>getting from tax protest literature. I add this restriction because
I've
>read every single such case that anyone on the net has been able to
cite,
>and they have *all* been misrepresented by the tax protesters. The
>misrepresentations range from citing non-existent cases, to quoting out
of
>context, to outright making up quotes.
>
>--Tim Smith
>
You don't seem to get it, do you?! If the IRS does not pursue a court
case against you, but simply leave you alone...NEVER requiring you to
file again, what case cite is there to give? Yet, the IRS is out of
your life. How can this be happening to so many people? You can't
answer it because you have made one fatal flaw...you have sunk you nose
into case law (an otherwise fine attribute, i might add), but at the
expense of the view of the overall law and how it functions OUTSIDE the
courtroom! There are plenty of organizations who would gladly help you
to understand the methods that work and introduce you to other people
who have successfully rid themselves of the IRS. That's my challenge to
you!
keepsake
Elizabeth C King
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>>Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
>>>file a 1040 form?
>>
>Oh really!!?? Upon reading it it appears to be more of a penalty
>statute! Which statute would have to be DISOBEYED (as you assume we do)
>in order for this penalty statute to become used? I assume there is one!
>Isn't there?!?
I admit that I am a young and very inexperienced lawyer. And, I did miss
quite a few classes in law school. So, could you explain your theories
on the differences between a penalty statute and a statute which compels
a person to do something.
--
---
"I asked him for water, he poured me some wine
He finished the bottle and broke into mine." GD
Elizabeth
ek...@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu
---
Dick Adams
> No, there are many other methods as well, such as getting the IRS to
Forgive me, but if you can't explain those procedures here, you're going
to be in deep .... when you try to explain them in a court of law. But,
let me ask (and not rhetorically) are these complexities an extension of
your contempt for the intelligence of Internet users or just a recognition
of your own inability to assemble a compelling argument??
By the way: if you infer that I am suggesting you are a purveyor of snake
oil, give yourself three points for analytical reading skills.
Dick -- No disclaimers are necessary when responding frivilous arguments
Dick Adams
> Look, you keep claiming there is a way to get out of paying
> the income tax. I assume you are not paying now, correct?
> OK, here's the deal. If you haven't been paying taxes, great.
> You give me your real name, address, and social security number.
> I will call up the IRS and report you as a tax evader.
> Deal?
Steve: It is one of the unfortunate realities of life that very
few of the espousers of tax protester arguments are actually tax
protesters. They are usually trollers is search of suckers who
will buy into their garbage nonsense and create enough of a
backlog for the IRS so that the probabilities of random audits
are significantly decreased. In effect they are the wimps of
society whose concept of productivity is based upon persuasion
of argument instead of validity of position -- and very few have
the ..... to stand up and be counted when push comes to shove.
Dick
Ted Frank
I've read dozens of tax-protestor cases, including briefs in a half-dozen
or so appeals. I've explored each and every of the legal arguments made
by tax protestors. It's not my fault that they're all meritless.
>If "the Government is always
>right" and there is nothing to be done *LEGALLY*, then we have a more
>serious problem than I think you suspect.
The government isn't always right. It loses tax cases all the time. It
just doesn't lose them when people seeking to challenge the government
make up arguments for why they don't have to pay taxes based on illogical
readings of the statute (literally: one popular tax-protest argument
involves jumping from "If A then B" in a definitional statute to "If
not-A then not-B") or active ignorance of case-law.
>Because all of these arguments
>boil down to hot air on both sides in the end, and if we cannot resolve
>our differences in a peaceful and diplomatic fashion, then they will
>surely be resolved through other means.
The peaceful and diplomatic fashion is the democratic process. The same
democratic process that produced the statutes that you seem to wish to
disobey so much.
>> I refer you to _In re Becraft_, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989), which
>> adequately refuted to bogus state-sovereignty argument. (Yes, that's
>> Lowell Becraft.)
>
>I will indeed look up this cite, sir. My intention was not to bait you
>into partisanship of some sort, but to engage in friendly and mutual
>dialogue. It seems that you are generally more interested in ranting
>than in discussing. Why are you so dedicated to stomping out free
>inquiry?
Grow up. Noting that the position you're taking has absolutely no merit
is not "stamping out free inquiry" -- it's correcting misimpressions you're
leaving among an audience of thousands that could get people in a lot of
trouble if they follow your thoughtless advice.
--
John Manuola
writes:
>
>In article <3mttva$g...@epicycle.lm.com>,
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>In article <D75n2...@midway.uchicago.edu> you wrote:
>>> >If any taxes are owed. But I suppose we are at least in agreement
that,
>>> >even under Cheek, if one makes a good faith effort to establish his
>>> >status, he cannot latter be held to have acted in bad faith.
>>
>>> Yes, but the method you describe is certainly one for a jury, and
>>> from the cases I've seen, juries are decidedly unfriendly to the
>>> crackpot idea that the failure of the IRS to specifically knock on
>>> your door and tell you that you have to pay income taxes gives you
>>> a good faith basis to believe that you don't have to do so.
>>
>>There's no point in arguing how a jury might rule, but it seems
>>irrelevant to our discussion, insofar as you agree that Cheek would
cause
>>an appellate court to reverse any penalty for acting in "bad faith" if
>>indeed the record indicated that a good faith effort had been made to
>>obtain some determination of status.
>
>Read what I wrote. It's a jury question. Check out _United States v.
>Hauert_, where Mr. Hauert wrote the IRS with one of your bogus
theories,
>didn't get an answer, and decided not to pay his taxes. The jury found
>lack of good faith. Behaving like an ostrich is not good faith.
>
>>I am not so sure of myself
>>that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made
no
>>real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
>>arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
>>"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
>
>There's nothing to challenge - there's no "there" there.
>
>I refer you to _In re Becraft_, 885 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1989), which
>adequately refuted to bogus state-sovereignty argument. (Yes, that's
>Lowell Becraft.)
>
>>Is there any point in further discussion at all?
>
>Not if you're not going to present any legitimate arguments. The best
>you've given is plausible ways to weasel out of a criminal conviction,
>which is all _Cheek_ stands for. Nothing you propose has any bearing
>on one's ability to actually avoid taxes, and all it does is subject
>people who follow you like lemmings off a cliff to civil penalties
>and possible criminal prosecution.
>
the problem with YOUR argument is that you assume that going to court
is the only way to deal with the IRS. Or is our only way. You fail
to realize that there are tens of thousands of people who have
successfully gotten the IRS out their lives. These court cases are in
fact the only real legal successes of the IRS...and that only because
the defendents failed to approach the case properly in the first place.
Before any case goes to trial there must be an indictment. Correct? Do
you have any idea what the jist of those indictments are?? What do they
usually say?
Keepsake
John Manuola
>
>Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> wrote:
>>dismissal, not skepticism, and I regret that. I am not so sure of
myself
>>that I say you are wrong, but you are not convincing, as you have made
no
>>real effort to challenge the premises of the sovereign State citizen
>>arguments, for instance, rather, you have merely labeled them as
>>"crackpot" and thus dispensed with worthwhile debate.
>
Lynn Davis
Keepsake:
We understand that you _HAVE_ to say that, since the only way your
cohorts have avoided conviction on _CRIMINAL_ charges is by presenting a
"sincere" belief that the tax laws did not apply to them. Under the
Mike Goldman
> Every single appellate court in the United States that has ever considered
> the matter has agreed that they are crackpot theories. No sovereign
> state citizen theorist has been able to cite even a single case of
> someone getting out of having to pay taxes using these theories (the
> best that has been done is citing people who may have escaped *criminal*
> liability, but that doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes,
> plus interest, plus penalties).
Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Smith, but if the only charges brought are
criminal in nature, is it not necessarily true that the only ruling which
the court can make for the defendant is that he/she is not guilty of said
criminal charge? It is beyond the court's jurisdiction to specify that
civil liability does not exist, if said civil liability is not being heard.
And while you are surely correct that citing people who have escaped
criminal liability "doesn't mean they don't get nailed for the taxes," it
also doesn't mean that they DO get nailed for the taxes, either. So it
is merely irrelevant.
The question, then, is whether cases exist wherein such sovereigns have
been convicted criminally of failure to *pay*, as opposed to merely
failure to file, and conversely, whether such have been acquitted of same.
--
Mike Goldman <da...@telerama.lm.com> -- Finger for PGP Key, or by WWW:
<A HREF="http://www.lm.com/~damon/">My Home Page with PGP Key</A>
PGP Key fingerprint = AC 6B 5B 3E EA 74 30 00 8B 28 06 A7 D5 89 41 47
Or for 1024-bit Key = EF 1F AA 31 74 3C 8B 48 66 04 5D 7C 35 4F F2 2A
Mike Goldman
> >have never suggested that anyone "behave like an ostrich." Indeed, I
> >have suggested that skepticism and careful consideration is vital, and
> >that asking the IRS for a determination (per their rules) is one such
> >means by which one may in good faith carefully consider the matter.
> You suggested that the failure of the IRS to respond to a query, no
> matter how ludicrous the query, exempted one from criminal liability.
> 'Tain't so.
I asked a question, Mr. Frank, namely, whether an unanswered request for
determination letter constitutes estoppel by acquiescence, at least until
such time as some determination is made. Rather than answering this
question, or suggesting case cites where such was not found to be the
case, you responded merely that there was no such thing as estoppel by
acquiescence, a most incredible statement.
> >In my opinion, Mr. Frank, your arguments carry less weight when you reduce
> >to ad hominem attacks.
> What was ad hominem about giving a case-cite and a conclusion based on
> that case and the cases it cited?
Nothing, and were that all you said, I would not have accused you of ad
hominems. But when you refer to me as "weaseling" and my simple
questions as "leading lemmings off the cliff" and subject every request
for information to labeling as "crackpot" or "stupid" or "bogus", you
insult everyone's intelligence.
I will look up your case cites, as I said, though I won't be able to get
to the law library tomorrow. Perhaps we should continue then.
> The peaceful and diplomatic fashion is the democratic process. The same
> democratic process that produced the statutes that you seem to wish to
> disobey so much.
Fortunately we are a Democratic Republic, and not a mere Democracy.
> leaving among an audience of thousands that could get people in a lot of
> trouble if they follow your thoughtless advice.
Again, my only advice was that people engage in careful, skeptical
inquiry. Your words above are just yet another ad hominem against me.
Sundial Services
I don't buy it, but boy, do I love reading it. ;-)
Dusting off my copy of the Constitution of the United States, it says:
Amendment XVI [1913]:
"The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
States, and without regard to any census or enumeration."
Now, I think everyone knows what "income" is (it's the opposite of "out-go"),
and "from whatever source derived" is pretty all-inclusive, and... and we all
live here, and we all generally abide by the Constitution -- today, regardless
of what happened during the Civil War 120 years ago.
So -- ya gotta pay your taxes. And if YOU have no better things to do than to
argue in court that YOU should not have to pay taxes (or if you're the lawyer
that the poor schmuck's paying to argue the case for him...hey, it's a job) --
then go ahead.
>> But if *I* sit on your jury, then I'm gonna vote for conviction as quickly
as possible, so that *I* can get the hell back to work and earn more, taxable,
income! :-)
29% of it might belong to the guvvmint, but 71% of it's still mine.
{ "So there!," he shouted at the lawyers, strapping on his asbestos
bunny-suit... }
-Mike Robinson
Paul Maffia
>>>>
>>>Yeah he was...shall we go on to the Lloyd Long case or the trial of
>the
>>>Pilot Group in Stockton, CA? Long was found NOT GUILTY...and the
>Pilot
>>>Group case trial ended in a hung jury (9-3 in favor of acquittal...the
>3
>>>who hung it up said they felt the IRS had not presented a good case,
>but
>>>felt that if their spouses had to file...these people should too [says
>>>something about the mindset of Americans])...Care to know the cite of
>>>teh Long Case...or are sufficiently shit-scared that you don't wanna
>>>know the truth of what is happening?
But Long and the Pilot group were still required to pay the taxes,
penalties and interest due. Sorry that you are unwilling to accept the
facts as they exist rather the inanities you want to believe.
>>
>Then why was Mr. Long not required to file or pay...Read before you make
>sweeping judgments. And in the case of the Pilot Group...the leader of
>this organization has openly admitted that he has not filed a return in
>over 10 years. Yet, the IRS cannot seem to get a jury to make him file.
> Hmmm!! why is that?
But Long was required to pay. You characters may as well be on dope. Your
minds are just as scrambled as if you were on this subject.
>Speaking of 'irrational'...i find it rather illogical and irrational
>that you constantly revert to name-calling. It accomplishes very
>little...except to make enemies of people...and to make yourself appear
>even more idiotic.
Sorry, but that is what the court said anyone who believed any of this
protest crap was.
>>
>Unlike some on here, the court did not rule that Cheek's arguments were
>irrational, only that a court cannot reject the defendent's request to
>submit his information to the jury simply because the judge thinks the
>information is irrational. Therefore, Mr Long, for example, was able to
>present his information properly to the jury and was thus acquitted on
>all charges and was NOT required to file or pay on monies received!
But that is, in fact, exactly what the court said in the Cheek case.
Specifically it said that it was irrational for anyone to believe they
did not have to pay tax on their income, no matter what its form.
No matter how hard you try, to continue to argue in the manner you and
your cohorts do on the subject, is too ignore reality and that, by
definition, is irrational. And anyone who acts and believes irrationally
is nuts, pure and simple.
Not a single protest nut has yet posted any argument or theory here that the
court has not at some time or another specifically addressed and
dismissed as without merit and labeled as bizarre and other very
uncourtly terms.
The adhesion contract theory you seem to favor being one of the most
ridiculous.
Paul M.
Johnboy
>
>Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John Manuola) wrote:
>
> Unfortunately, you have not heard of Lloyd Long or the
> Pilot Group!
>
>I haven't heard of the Pilot Group, but I have heard of Lloyd Long.
>
>The Long acquittal proves nothing at all. Long was acquitted on crim-
>inal charges of willfully failing to file an income tax return. This
>simply means that the jury hearing his case was convinced that there
>was reasonable doubt as to whether or not Long genuinely understood he
>had a valid legal obligation to file a return.
>
>Simply because Long's tax theories were presented at his trial, and
>the jury ended up acquitting him, does =not= automatically mean that
>Long's theories were certified as correct by the jury. For all anyone
>not actually on the Long jury knows, they may simply have concluded
>that no matter how outrageous Long's theories were, he really =did=
>believe them, and thus he believed in good faith that he was not
>required to file a tax return.
>
I never said that the jury said he didn't have to pay, but knowing more
of the post-trial activity than you, i am aware that he has not been
compelled to file or to pay!! So what's your point? That you're still
scared of the IRS?
>Even if Long's jury =was= 100% convinced that Long was correct in his
>views, that would still not constitute any sort of binding ruling that
>other courts are required to follow without question. It might pos-
>sibly show that juries could be willing to "nullify" the tax laws by
>acquitting tax protestors in defiance of clear and convincing evidence,
>but that's the most the Long acquittal could possibly mean.
>
>Note, further, that Long's acquittal in his criminal case does =not=
>make him immune from civil liability for tax. If the IRS decides to
>declare Long liable for back taxes and penalties -- something they can
>do at any time,
no they cannot do thise at anytime, there are laws that prohibit them
from doing this at anytime! They have a time frame they must work
within if they wish to attempt to get Mr. Long to pay!
Johnboy
writes:
>
>In article <3mvifa$n...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>In <D773B...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>>Frank) writes:
>>>Wages are income. An argument otherwise is frivolous. _Granado v.
>>>Commissioner_, 792 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986).
>>
>>That's not what I said. I am making the distinction between Income
>>Taxes as found in Subchapter A of the IRC and Employment Taxes as
>>found in Subcahpater C of the IRC.
>>
>>Do tell us the difference is between them. And if you believe there
>>is no difference, then do explain there are two different Subchapters
>>which clearly distinguish them.
>
>You are confused. There is nothing in Subchapters A and C that make
>them mutually exclusive. Indeed, Subchapter C refers to income taxes
>in sections 3401 ff.
>
>But to answer your question more specifically, Subchapter C applies,
>in general, to employers. Subchapter A applies to essentially
everybody.
Why that's strange, i thought that Subchapter C was FICA!!! And it is
the only place in the COde that refers to withholding at the source,
EXCEPT for sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 in Subchapter A. Maybe
you might wanna read those as well! It would give you a pretty good idea
from whom taxes should be withheld at source. And just so you know that
there are no other places where that is referred...read section
7701(a)(16).
Therefore, if I have no Social Security number (meaning I am not
participating in the Social Security system), then there is nothing
within Subchapter C (FICA) that applies to me and there is nothing in
Sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 which apply to me, then where is ANY
company which hires me compelled to withhold ANY taxes from my
compensation? NOTE: i am not saying that I am not liable for any tax
(yet), but only that no company which hires me is compelled to withhold
any tax. Additional reading, 26 CFR 1.1441-5 (the implementing
regulation for 26 U.S.C. 1441) have fun!!!
>--
Johnboy
>
>In article <3mvi5k$n...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>In <D76z...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
Frank)
>>writes:
>>>Yes, if you mean by the "proper administrative procedures" the timely
>>>filing of an income tax return and the timely payment of income
taxes.
>>>
>>>There's no magic bullet to avoid the law here. Get over it.
>>
>>You're right there is no silver bullit theory to defeating the IRS.
>>But there are proven attack plans.
>
>They're so "proven" that not one successful example of them can be
>cited.
>
>Give me one example of the IRS losing a civil assessment and being
>prevented from levying on the property of someone using one of these
>"proven attack plans". Cite to the Tax Court decision involved.
>--
One question: if the IRS has not created a lien (which as an aside
question: how are liens created>) nor pursued any litigation to obtain
the funds, what possible court case could there be? I have already said
that what I am referring to are thousands of people who have
successfully gottent he IRS to LEAVE THEM ALONE!!! And trust me, not
only is there no possible way I could explain what happened on such a
limited forum, but i have very little desire to waste that much time
beating my head against the wall you call a brain!
keepsake
Jim Moody
Keep...@ix.netcom.com "John Manuola" writes:
> [...]
> You're right there is no silver bullit theory to defeating the IRS.
> But there are proven attack plans. But you isolate yourself from these
> at the expense of your intelligence.
Those who have enough wealth can always find ways of protecting
it, of course. UK residents can salt away funds in off-shore low
tax havens without a great deal of difficulty. It need not even
be very far from mainland Britain: the Isle of Man, between
Britain and Ireland, or the Channel Islands, between Britain and
France. All these islands are British (like the Caribbean Cayman
Islands, another tax haven), but not part of the UK, having
different (i.e. lower) taxes.
Similar arrangements must surely be available to the rich in the
USA.
--
Jim Moody
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>>>Wages are income. An argument otherwise is frivolous. _Granado v.
>>>>Commissioner_, 792 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986).
>>>
>>>That's not what I said. I am making the distinction between Income
>>>Taxes as found in Subchapter A of the IRC and Employment Taxes as
>>>found in Subcahpater C of the IRC.
>>>
>>>Do tell us the difference is between them. And if you believe there
>>>is no difference, then do explain there are two different Subchapters
>>>which clearly distinguish them.
>>
>>You are confused. There is nothing in Subchapters A and C that make
>>them mutually exclusive. Indeed, Subchapter C refers to income taxes
>>in sections 3401 ff.
>
>the only place in the COde that refers to withholding at the source,
Learn how to read. Specifically, read sections 3401 ff., which explicitly
refer to income taxes.
--
Sundial Services
>From: j...@duntone.demon.co.uk (Jim Moody)
>Subject: Re: Proof I'm not required to File!
>Date: Tue, 18 Apr 1995 07:50:27 +0000
Or the not-so-rich, for that matter. However, I was once acquainted with a
somewhat-wealthy, but very-nice gentleman who ran into the other side of that
coin: the fact that these areas are not subject to U.S. law, and are not
necessarily going to give *back* what you invested there. :-/ These areas
have their own judicial system, and their own tax law, and their own
(sometimes kangaroo) courts.
/mr/
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
No, sir, i think it is you who need to read...only this time with your
eyes open...!! take off the blinders!!
>
Johnboy
Moody) writes:
>
>In article <3mvi5k$n...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>
> Keep...@ix.netcom.com "John Manuola" writes:
>
>> [...]
>> You're right there is no silver bullit theory to defeating the IRS.
>> But there are proven attack plans. But you isolate yourself from
these
>> at the expense of your intelligence.
>
>Those who have enough wealth can always find ways of protecting
>it, of course. UK residents can salt away funds in off-shore low
>tax havens without a great deal of difficulty. It need not even
>be very far from mainland Britain: the Isle of Man, between
>Britain and Ireland, or the Channel Islands, between Britain and
>France. All these islands are British (like the Caribbean Cayman
>Islands, another tax haven), but not part of the UK, having
>different (i.e. lower) taxes.
>
>Similar arrangements must surely be available to the rich in the
>USA.
>--
>Jim Moody
>
Question, how does someone who has no social security number pay taxes?
BornToAdd
leave some bandwidth for other issues/questions.
John Manuola
writes:
>
>In article <scotdunD...@netcom.com>,
>Scott Dunn <sco...@netcom.com> wrote:
>>Wow. Wouldn't you agree that using the proper
>>administrative procedures that this could have been averted?
>
>Yes, if you mean by the "proper administrative procedures" the timely
>filing of an income tax return and the timely payment of income taxes.
>
>There's no magic bullet to avoid the law here. Get over it.
You're right there is no silver bullit theory to defeating the IRS.
But there are proven attack plans. But you isolate yourself from these
at the expense of your intelligence.
Keepsake
John Manuola
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3mub8k$5...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>If he files a W-4 form, he has agreed to have "wage taxes" withheld.
>>Wage taxes are NOT INCOME taxes. Income taxes are in Subchapter A of
>>the IRC, while Employment taxes (or wage taxes) are in Subchapter C.
The
>>W-4 form, by way of it's OMB Control Number and the corresponding CFR
>>Table on OMB Numbers, is used in connection with Subchapter C only,
not
>>Subchapter A.
>
>Wages are income. An argument otherwise is frivolous. _Granado v.
>Commissioner_, 792 F.2d 91 (7th Cir. 1986).
That's not what I said. I am making the distinction between Income
Taxes as found in Subchapter A of the IRC and Employment Taxes as
found in Subcahpater C of the IRC.
Do tell us the difference is between them. And if you believe there
is no difference, then do explain there are two different Subchapters
which clearly distinguish them.
John Manuola
(Joseph G. Adams) writes:
>
>
>John Manuola <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>>Unlike some on here, the court did not rule that Cheek's arguments
were
>>irrational, only that a court cannot reject the defendent's request to
>>submit his information to the jury simply because the judge thinks the
>>information is irrational. Therefore, Mr Long, for example, was able
to
>>present his information properly to the jury and was thus acquitted on
>>all charges and was NOT required to file or pay on monies received!
>
>The _Cheek_ defense is only relevant to establishing 'willfulness' at
>a criminal trial for tax evasion. It says nothing about whether the
IRS
Exactly what I am saying...!! And as of yet, in the case of Lloyd Long,
for example, he has not been forced to pay!
>may force him to actually pay taxes and associated penalties. While
>tax evaders may or may not (most likely, not) avoid prison, they *will*
>have to pay taxes.
>
You are expressing a concerned opinion, but an opinion none the less!
One that is proving to be more and more incorrect!
Keepsake
>--
>Joseph G. Adams |
>Stanford Law School, 1L | "I hate stuff that sucks." - Butthead
>jga...@leland.stanford.edu |
>
Johnboy
King) writes:
In this case, all 7203 talks about is what would be the penalty for
anyone who is required to file and pay and doesn't so so. It doesn't
say WHO is required to file and pay! And that's the challenge!!
Keepsake
Johnboy
Frank) writes:
>
>In article <3n1l5n$h...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>So who is the taxpayer? This is vital!! BEcause the biggest mistake
>>people make is to assume that the INCOME is the subject of the
>>tax...when it is not so!!
>
>That's not what section 61 says.
>
>>The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page 2580 says:
>
>I'm sorry, did both houses vote on the March 27, 1943 Congressional
Record?
>Did the President sign the resulting bill?
>
>If not, I think I'll go with what the statute actually says rather than
>what some congresscritter may or may not have said on the floor of the
>House 52 years and several tax law permutations ago.
>
So you are claiming that the subject of the 'income tax' is income???
>>And besides our courts have already ruled "the right
>>to labor...is a constitutionalas well as common-law right" not a
>>privilege (Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 102, 112 N.E. 853).
>
>The Massachusetts Supreme Court, even assuming that they said that
>and that you haven't taken it out of context, doesn't overrule the
>United States Supreme Court.
And I suppose YOU are going to tell me that the US Supreme COurt has
ruled otherwise!!
"The property which every man has is his own labor, as it is
the original foundation of all other property so it is the most
sacred and inviolable."
Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. 111 U.S. 746
Is that a little better for ya??
>>In addition, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, it
was
>>ruled that "legislature cannot prohibit any person or class of persons
>>from engaging in a lawful business which is not injurious to others."
>
>So? Taxation isn't prohibiting of businesses.
>
Oh really...!! How kind of you to declare it so!! But what the courts
say would contradict that!!
The power to tax is the power to destroy!!
>>Also, in 58 Am. Jur. Section 1, Occupations
>
>I don't particularly care what the West Publishing Company says.
>Sometimes they get the law right, sometimes they don't, but they
>certainly don't tell the judges how to decide.
ah, and when is your nomination to the Supreme COurt going to occur??!!
You must be the nation's most eminent attorney!!
>>But only if I file a W-4 form with them asking them to withhold from
my
>>paycheck. If I do not file a W-4, then they are not required to
>>withhold.
>
>False.
says who...? you!!! hahaha!!
>
>>And a careful reading of 3402(f)(2)(a) reveals that the W-4
>>shall be filed when the employee is CLAIMING exemptions. If said
>>employee is not making a claim of any kind (not a claim of zero or
>>exempt, for that would be a claim)then he need not file said W-4.
>
>All that means is that the employer is required to withhold the
>maximum amount without any exemptions.
Not if i am not a participant of the Social Security system...3402
relates to SOCIAL SECURITY tax...!! get it right!!
>
>>And
>>this says nothing for the situation where someone has no Social
Security
>>number.
>
>The two are unrelated. The income tax predates social security numbers
>by well over a dozen years.
And they haven't made ANY changes in the law to adjust for this. Unless
of course, Subchapter C IS the social security tax....oh my!!! You
mistakenly believe that Subchapter C tax is the same tax as Subchapter
A...and have NO proof of this...except your bloated ego!!
>
>>Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
>>determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
>>it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
>>argument!
>
>Not at all. Wages are listed as taxable in Section 61(a)(1).
but the wages are NOT the subject of the tax...!!! They are part of the
basis from which the tax is calculated, but the activity of receiving
compensation for labor is not the subject of the tax! And if I am not
engaged in any revenue taxable activity, then it doesn't matter how much
compensation is generated...there is no tax liability.
>--
Johnboy
writes:
>
>In article <3n1gs1$f...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>In <D78uM...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>>Frank) writes:
>>>>Another silly question...Do you know the IRS definition of a
>>>>"tax-protestor"?
>>>
>>>Yes. Next silly question.
>>
>>Please share it with us all...!! Where is it located?
>
>In the regulations. The definition has no legal import, it's just used
>by the IRS so they know where to devote internal resources; a tax-
>protestor tax-evasion trial looks a lot different than the run-of-the-
>mill white-collar-hiding-income tax-evasion trial, so they have
>internal procedures to tell which is which.
>
>I posted the cite a few months back, but I don't seem to have saved
>it. Tim? Dick? Joseph? Any of you pull the post off the net?
>
>>and how do each
>>of these people become "tax-Protestors"?
>
>By making tax protest arguments,
such as?
filing frivolous declarations of state sovereignty,
false!!
sending in 1040's filled with zeroes,
correct!
ALL ARE FOUND IN IRM 5431.4
>
>[Astonishing assertion that a statute that penalizes you for not
>doing something does not compel you to do something deleted.]
WHat does the penalty statute of 7203 compel anyone to do except to find
out if they are required to file or pay and if so, then comply and if
not, then don't! But without the statute that requires one to file or
pay, 7203 is essentially useless!! It is like saying that the penalty
for murder is death...but not establishing a statute which defines what
murder is.
Johnboy
writes:
>
>In article <3n0vd0$8...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>, Keep...@ix.netcom.com
>(Johnboy) wrote:
>
>> Again, I ask, probably in futility, what STATUTE compels a person to
>> file a 1040 form? I desire to break NO statute, but to know the law
and
>> to obey it and to compel those who work for the IRS to obey it as
well.
>
>Technically, none. Form 1040 is not mentioned in the US Code.
HOWEVER,
>26 USC Section 6012 says:
>
>Sec. 6012. Persons required to make returns of income
>
>-STATUTE-
>
>(a) General rule
>
>Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by
the
>following:
>(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which
>equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return shall not
be
>required of an individual -
Bear with my trek through the code, i appreciate your willingness to
observe it.
Follow me if you would, it would easily be assumed that this is
referring to everyone, until one reads section 441(b) of the code to
determine the definition of the phrase "taxable year". it reads:
For the purposes of this subtitle, the term "taxable year'means:
(1) the TAXPAYER's annual accounting period...
So who is the taxpayer? This is vital!! BEcause the biggest mistake
people make is to assume that the INCOME is the subject of the
tax...when it is not so!! The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page
2580 says:
THe income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It
is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and
privileges which is measured by referring to the income which
they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax: it is
the basis for determining the amount of tax.
If it is NOT the income which determines whether or not you owe a tax,
but only how much you owe, then WHAT IS it which dtermines whether or
not you owe a tax? Which activities and privileges are they referring
to? Certainly not labor...because for something to be a privilege it
w=must, by legal definition, be something that not everyone has the
privilege of doing. And besides our courts have already ruled "the right
to labor...is a constitutionalas well as common-law right" not a
privilege (Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 102, 112 N.E. 853).
In addition, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, it was
ruled that "legislature cannot prohibit any person or class of persons
from engaging in a lawful business which is not injurious to others."
Also, in 58 Am. Jur. Section 1, Occupations it states, in referring to
Billings Associated Plumbing, Heating and Cooling Contractors v. State
Bd. of Plumbers, 602 P2d 597, that "the right to carry on a lawful
business is a PROPERTY right."
A tax on property is a DIRECT tax...! An indirect tax is a tax on
privileges or granted rights, which is what COngress stated our 'income'
tax is.
So which privileges are being taxed???
>---
>The cite is quite long and can be gotten from the House server
><www.house.gov> if anyone is interested. The exceptions deal with
those
>exact things covered in the 1040 form; i.e., meeting the
>income/exemption/deduction limits for required filing.
The BIG question here is: how do you know you are required to file a
1040 form, and not one of the hundreds of other IRS forms available?
>
>In another post, Johnboy or John Manuola or whatever his name is
states:
>
>> Why that's strange, i thought that Subchapter C was FICA!!! And it
is
>> the only place in the COde that refers to withholding at the source,
>
>Totally untrue (I hesitate to use the "lie" word). 26 USC Section 3402
says:
>
>Sec. 3402. Income tax collected at source
>
>-STATUTE-
>
>(a) Requirement of withholding
>
>(1) In general
>
>Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer making
>payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax
>determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures
>prescribed by the Secretary. ...more
>
>-----
>> EXCEPT for sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 in Subchapter A. Maybe
>> you might wanna read those as well! It would give you a pretty good
idea
>> from whom taxes should be withheld at source. And just so you know
that
>> there are no other places where that is referred...read section
>> 7701(a)(16).
>
>Which says:
>
>(16) Withholding agent
>The term 'withholding agent' means any person required to deduct and
>withhold any tax under the provisions of section 1441, 1442, 1443, or
>1461.
>----
>But that doesn't exclude the provisions of Section 3402.
>
>> Therefore, if I have no Social Security number (meaning I am not
>> participating in the Social Security system), then there is nothing
>> within Subchapter C (FICA) that applies to me and there is nothing in
>> Sections 1441, 1442, 1443 and 1461 which apply to me, then where is
ANY
>> company which hires me compelled to withhold ANY taxes from my
>> compensation? NOTE: i am not saying that I am not liable for any tax
>> (yet), but only that no company which hires me is compelled to
withhold
>> any tax.
>
>Wrong. See 26 USC 3402. Your company is required to withhold taxes
and
>you are required to pay them.
But only if I file a W-4 form with them asking them to withhold from my
paycheck. If I do not file a W-4, then they are not required to
withhold. And a careful reading of 3402(f)(2)(a) reveals that the W-4
shall be filed when the employee is CLAIMING exemptions. If said
employee is not making a claim of any kind (not a claim of zero or
exempt, for that would be a claim)then he need not file said W-4. And
this says nothing for the situation where someone has no Social Security
number. Or are you going to tell me that there is a law which requires
a citizen of the United States to apply for and obtain a Social Security
number?
Besides, Subchapter C relates to FICA...read the title of the
Chapter..21, i believe it is!! It has NOTHING to do with the 'income'
tax...! Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
argument!
>
> Additional reading, 26 CFR 1.1441-5 (the implementing
>> regulation for 26 U.S.C. 1441) have fun!!!
>
>26 CFR 1.1441-5 says:
> Sec. 1.1441-5 Claiming to be a person not subject to withholding.
>
> (a) Individuals. For purposes of chapter 3 of the Code, an
> individual's written statement that he or she is a citizen or
> resident of the United States may be relied upon by the payer of
> the income as proof that such individual is a citizen or resident
> of the United States. This statement shall be furnished to the
> withholding agent in duplicate. An alien may claim residence in
> the United States by filing Form 1078 with the withholding agent in
> duplicate in lieu of the above statement.
>----
>If you are a US Citizen (and you are if you were born in the United
States
>and haven't renounced your citizenship), then 26 USC Sections 1441,
1442,
>1443 and 1461 don't cover your situation.
You're right, it doesn't cover me...and there are no other sections in
Subchapter A which require taxes be withheld on an American Citizen. And
as I continue to point out, Subchapter C relates to the FICAS tax whose
basis for determining the amount of the tax is the income earned. But
this tax is QUITE different from the 'income' tax in Subchapter A.
Therefore, if I have not applied to participate in the Social Security
system...and am not covered by the withholding provisions of Subchapter
A...then there is NOT statute which requires my employer to withhold
taxes from my paycheck! Taxes of ANY nature!! I am personally familiar
with many people who have gotten their employers to stop all
withholding.
The futility here is not in
Actually the futility is in getting people to actually read the
law...like you are...because until they do, they simply spout insults
and derrogatory comments. I appreciate you taking the time to actually
dialog with me on the laws themself!
>what the tax code says, it is in the claims you are making which are
>specious and totally false. Even if you are not a US Citizen, if you
earn
>money from a US company in the United States, you owe Federal income
taxes
>(that's Form 1040NR, I believe). Maybe you should read some more.
>
>Hey...you said something I agree with here..!!--
>Harold Clark
>Opinions are mine alone.
>
The Pinhead
So who is the taxpayer? This is vital!! BEcause the biggest mistake
people make is to assume that the INCOME is the subject of the
tax...when it is not so!! The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page
2580 says:
THe income tax is, therefore, not a tax on income as such. It
is an excise tax with respect to certain activities and
privileges which is measured by referring to the income which
they produce. The income is not the subject of the tax: it is
the basis for determining the amount of tax.
That the income tax is an excise tax was Lloyd Long's defense.
A careful reading of Brushaber will give the same conclusion.
(Cite as: 240 U.S. 1, 36 S.Ct. 236)
FRANK R. BRUSHABER, Appt.,
v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY.
No. 140.
Argued October 14 and 15, 1915.
Decided January 24, 1916.
APPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Southern
District of New York to review a decree dismissing the bill in a suit
by a stockholder to restrain the corporation from voluntarily
complying with the Federal income tax. Affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Julien T. Davies, Brainard Tolles, Garrard Glenn, and Martin
A. Schenck for appellant.
Mr. Henry W. Clark for appellee.
Solicitor General Davis, Assistant Attorney General Wallace, and
Attorney General Gregory for the United States.
Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:
As a stockholder of the Union Pacific Railroad Company, the appellant
filed his bill to enjoin the corporation from complying with the
income tax provisions of the tariff act of October 3, 1913 (s II., chap.
16, 38 Stat. at L. 166). Because of constitutional questions duly
arising the case is here on direct appeal from a decree sustaining a
motion to dismiss because no ground for relief was stated.
The right to prevent the corporation from returning and paying the
tax was based upon many averments as to the repugnancy of the
statute to the Constitution of the United States, of the peculiar
relation of the corporation to the stockholders, and their particular
interests resulting from many of the administrative provisions of the
assailed act, of the confusion, wrong, and multiplicity of suits and the
absence of all means of redress which would result if the corporation
paid the tax and complied with the act in other respects without
protest, as it was alleged it was its intention to do. To put out of the
way a question of jurisdiction we at once say that in view of these
averments and the ruling in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U.
S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, sustaining the right of a
stockholder to sue to restrain a corporation under proper averments
from voluntarily paying a tax charged to be unconstitutional on the
ground that to permit such a suit did not violate the prohibitions of s
3224, Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 1913, s 5947), against enjoining
the enforcement of taxes, we are of opinion that the contention here
made that there was no jurisdiction of the cause, since to entertain it
would violate the provisions of the Revised Statutes referred to, is
without merit. Before coming to dispose of the case on the merits,
however, we observe that the defendant corporation having called
the attention of the government to the pendency of the cause and the
nature of the controversy and its unwillingness to voluntarily refuse
to comply with the act assailed, the United States, as amicus curiae,
has at bar been heard both orally and by brief for the purpose of
sustaining the decree.
Aside from averments as to citizenship and residence, recitals as to
the provisions of the statute, and statements as to the business of the
corporation, contained in the first ten paragraphs of the bill,
advanced to sustain jurisdiction, the bill alleged twenty-one
constitutional objections specified in that number of paragraphs or
subdivisions. As all the grounds assert a violation of the Constitution,
it follows that, in a wide sense, they all charge a repugnancy of the
statute to the 16th Amendment, under the more immediate sanction
of which the statute was adopted.
The various propositions are so intermingled as to cause it to be
difficult to classify them. We are of opinion, however, that the
confusion is not inherent, but rather arises from the conclusion that
the 16th Amendment provides for a hitherto unknown power of
taxation; that is, a power to levy an income tax which, although
direct, should not be subject to the regulation of apportionment
applicable to all other direct taxes. And the far-reaching effect of this
erroneous assumption will be made clear by generalizing the many
contentions advanced in argument to support it, as follows: (a) The
Amendment authorizes only a particular character of direct tax
without apportionment, and therefore if a tax is levied under its
assumed authority which does not partake of the characteristics
exacted by the Amendment, it is outside of the Amendment, and is
void as a direct tax in the general constitutional sense because not
apportioned. (b) As the Amendment authorizes a tax only upon
incomes 'from whatever source derived,' the exclusion from taxation
of some income of designated persons and classes is not authorized,
and hence the constitutionality of the law must be tested by the
general provisions of the Constitution as to taxation, and thus again
the tax is void for want of apportionment. (c) As the right to tax
'incomes from whatever source derived' for which the Amendment
provides must be considered as exacting intrinsic uniformity,
therefore no tax comes under the authority of the Amendment not
conforming to such standard, and hence all the provisions of the
assailed statute must once more be tested solely under the general
and pre-existing provisions of the Constitution, causing the statute
again to be void in the absence of apportionment. (d) As the power
conferred by the Amendment is new and prospective, the attempt in
the statute to make its provisions retroactively apply is void because,
so far as the retroactive period is concerned, it is governed by the
pre-existing constitutional requirement as to apportionment.
But it clearly results that the proposition and the contentions under
it, if acceded to, would cause one provision of the Constitution to
destroy another; that is, they would result in bringing the provisions
of the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct
taxes be apportioned. Moreover, the tax authorized by the
Amendment, being direct, would not come under the rule of
uniformity applicable under the Constitution to other than direct
taxes, and thus it would come to pass that the result of the
Amendment would be to authorize a particular direct tax not subject
either to apportionment or to the rule of geographical uniformity,
thus giving power to impose a different tax in one state or states
than was levied in another state or states. This result, instead of
simplifying the situation and making clear the limitations on the
taxing power, which obviously the Amendment must have been
intended to accomplish, would create radical and destructive changes
in our constitutional system and multiply confusion.
But let us by a demonstration of the error of the fundamental
proposition as to the significance of the Amendment dispel the
confusion necessarily arising from the arguments deduced from it.
Before coming, however, to the text of the Amendment, to the end
that its significance may be determined in the light of the previous
legislative and judicial history of the subject with which the
Amendment is concerned, and with a knowledge of the conditions
which presumptively led up to its adoption, and hence of the purpose
it was intended to accomplish, we make a brief statement on those
subjects.
That the authority conferred upon Congress by s 8 of article 1 'to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises' is exhaustive and
embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been
questioned, or, if it has, has been so often authoritatively declared as
to render it necessary only to state the doctrine. And it has also
never been questioned from the foundation, without stopping
presently to determine under which of the separate headings the
power was properly to be classed, that there was authority given, as
the part was included in the whole, to lay and collect income taxes.
Again, it has never moreover been questioned that the conceded
complete and all- embracing taxing power was subject, so far as they
were respectively applicable, to limitations resulting from the
requirements of art. 1, s 8, cl. 1, that 'all duties, imposts and excises
shall be uniform throughout the United States,' and to the limitations
of art I., s 2, cl. 3, that 'direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several states,' and of art 1, s 9, cl. 4, that 'no capitation, or other
direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or
enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.' In fact, the two
great subdivisions embracing the complete and perfect delegation of
the power to tax and the two correlated limitations as to such power
were thus aptly stated by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. supra, at page 557: 'In the matter of
taxation, the Constitution recognizes the two great classes of direct
and indirect taxes, and lays down two rules by which their
imposition must be governed, namely: The rule of apportionment as
to direct taxes, and the rule of uniformity as to duties, imposts, and
excises.' It is to be observed, however, as long ago pointed out in
Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 541, 19 L. ed. 482, 485, that the
requirements of apportionment as to one of the great classes and of
uniformity as to the other class were not so much a limitation upon
the complete and all- embracing authority to tax, but in their essence
were simply regulations concerning the mode in which the plenary
power was to be exerted. In the whole history of the government
down to the time of the adoption of the 16th Amendment, leaving
aside some conjectures expressed of the possibility of a tax lying
intermediate between the two great classes and embraced by
neither, no question has been anywhere made as to the correctness
of these propositions. At the very beginning, however, there arose
differences of opinion concerning the criteria to be applied in
determining in which of the two great subdivisions a tax would fall.
Without pausing to state at length the basis of these differences and
the consequences which arose from them, as the whole subject was
elaborately reviewed in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S.
429, 39 L. ed. 759, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. ed. 1108,
15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 912, we make a condensed statement which is in
substance taken from what was said in that case. Early the
differences were manifested in pressing on the one hand and
opposing on the other, the passage of an act levying a tax without
apportionment on carriages 'for the conveyance of persons,' and
when such a tax was enacted the question of its repugnancy to the
Constitution soon came to this court for determination. Hylton v.
United States, 3 Dall. 171, 1 L. ed. 556. It was held that the tax came
within the class of excises, duties, and imposts, and therefore did not
require apportionment, and while this conclusion was agreed to by
all the members of the court who took part in the decision of the
case, there was not an exact coincidence in the reasoning by which
the conclusion was sustained. Without stating the minor differences,
it may be said with substantial accuracy that the divergent reasoning
was this: On the one hand, that the tax was not in the class of direct
taxes requiring apportionment, because it was not levied directly on
property because of its ownership, but rather on its use, and was
therefore an excise, duty, or impost; and on the other, that in any
event the class of direct taxes included only taxes directly levied on
real estate because of its ownership. Putting out of view the
difference of reasoning which led to the concurrent conclusion in the
Hylton Case, it is undoubted that it came to pass in legislative
practice that the line of demarcation between the two great classes of
direct taxes on the one hand and excises, duties, and imposts on the
other, which was exemplified by the ruling in that case, was accepted
and acted upon. In the first place this is shown by the fact that
wherever (and there were a number of cases of that kind) a tax was
levied directly on real estate or slaves because of ownership, it was
treated as coming within the direct class and apportionment was
provided for, while no instance of apportionment as to any other
kind of tax is afforded. Again the situation is aptly illustrated by the
various acts taxing incomes derived from property of every kind and
nature which were enacted beginning in 1861, and lasting during
what may be termed the Civil War period. It is not disputable that
these latter taxing laws were classed under the head of excises,
duties, and imposts because it was assumed that they were of that
character inasmuch as, although putting a tax burden on income of
every kind, including that derived from property real or personal,
they were not taxes directly on property because of its ownership.
And this practical construction came in theory to be the accepted
one, since it was adopted without dissent by the most eminent of the
text writers. 1 Kent, Com. 254, 256; 1 Story, Const. s 955; Cooley,
Const. Lim. 5th ed. ; Miller, Constitution, 237; Pom. Const. Law, s 281;
1 Hare, Const. Law, 249, 250; Burroughs, Taxn. 502; Ordronaux,
Constitutional Legislation, 225.
Upon the lapsing of a considerable period after the repeal of the
income tax laws referred to, in 1894 [28 Stat. at L. 509, chap. 349],
an act was passed laying a tax on incomes from all classes of
property and other sources of revenue which was not apportioned,
and which therefore was of course assumed to come within the
classification of excises, duties, and imposts which were subject to
the rule of uniformity, but not to the rule of apportionment. The
constitutional validity of this law was challenged on the ground that
it did not fall within the class of excises, duties, and imposts, but was
direct in the constitutional sense, and was therefore void for want of
apportionment, and that question came to this court and was passed
upon in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & T. Co. 157 U. S. 429, 39 L. ed. 759,
15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, 158 U. S. 601, 39 L. ed. 1108, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep.
912. The court, fully recognizing in the passage which we have
previously quoted the allembracing character of the two great
classifications, including, on the one hand, direct taxes subject to
apportionment, and on the other, excises, duties, and imposts subject
to uniformity, held the law to be unconstitutional in substance for
these reasons: Concluding that the classification of direct was adopted
for the purpose of rendering it impossible to burden by taxation
accumulations of property, real or personal, except subject to the
regulation of apportionment, it was held that the duty existed to fix
what was a direct tax in the constitutional sense so as to accomplish
this purpose contemplated by the Constitution. (157 U. S. 581.)
Coming to consider the validity of the tax from this point of view,
while not questioning at all that in common understanding it was
direct merely on income and only indirect on property, it was held
that, considering the substance of things, it was direct on property in
a constitutional sense, since to burden an income by a tax was, from
the point of substance, to burden the property from which the
income was derived, and thus accomplish the very thing which the
provision as to apportionment of direct taxes was adopted to
prevent. As this conclusion but enforced a regulation as to the mode
of exercising power under particular circumstances, it did not in any
way dispute the all-embracing taxing authority possessed by
Congress, including necessarily therein the power to impose income
taxes if only they conformed to the constitutional regulations which
were applicable to them. Moreover, in addition, the conclusion
reached in the Pollock Case did not in any degree involve holding
that income taxes generically and necessarily came within the class
of direct taxes on property, but, on the contrary, recognized the fact
that taxation on income was in its nature an excise entitled to be
enforced as such unless and until it was concluded that to enforce it
would amount to accomplishing the result which the requirement as
to apportionment of direct taxation was adopted to prevent, in which
case the duty would arise to disregard form and consider substance
alone, and hence subject the tax to the regulation as to
apportionment which otherwise as an excise would not apply to it.
Nothing could serve to make this clearer than to recall that in the
Pollock Case, in so far as the law taxed incomes from other classes of
property than real estate and invested personal property, that is,
income from 'professions, trades, employments, or vocations' (158 U.
S. 637), its validity was recognized; indeed, it was expressly declared
that no dispute was made upon that subject, and attention was called
to the fact that taxes on such income had been sustained as excise
taxes in the past. Id. p. 635. The whole law was, however, declared
unconstitutional on the ground that to permit it to thus operate
would relieve real estate and invested personal property from
taxation and 'would leave the burden of the tax to be borne by
professions, trades, employments, or vacations; and in that way what
was intended as a tax on capital would remain, in substance, a tax on
occupations and labor' (id. p. 637),--a result which, it was held, could
not have been contemplated by Congress.
This is the text of the Amendment:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.'
It is clear on the face of this text that it does not purport to confer
power to levy income taxes in a generic sense,--an authority already
possessed and never questioned, --or to limit and distinguish
between one kind of income taxes and another, but that the whole
purpose of the Amendment was to relieve all income taxes when
imposed from apportionment from a consideration of the source
whence the income was derived. Indeed, in the light of the history
which we have given and of the decision in the Pollock Case, and the
ground upon which the ruling in that case was based, there is no
escape from the conclusion that the Amendment was drawn for the
purpose of doing away for the future with the principle upon which
the Pollock Case was decided; that is, of determining whether a tax
on income was direct not by a consideration of the burden placed on
the taxed income upon which it directly operated, but by taking into
view the burden which resulted on the property from which the
income was derived, since in express terms the Amendment provides
that income taxes, from whatever source the income may be derived,
shall not be subject to the regulation of apportionment. From this in
substance it indisputably arises, first, that all the contentions which
we have previously noticed concerning the assumed limitations to be
implied from the language of the Amendment as to the nature and
character of the income taxes which it authorizes find no support in
the text and are in irreconcilable conflict with the very purpose
which the Amendment was adopted to accomplish. Second, that the
contention that the Amendment treats a tax on income as a direct tax
although it is relieved from apportionment and is necessarily
therefore not subject to the rule of uniformity as such rule only
applies to taxes which are not direct, thus destroying the two great
classifications which have been recognized and enforced from the
beginning, is also wholly without foundation since the command of
the Amendment that all income taxes shall not be subject to
apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the
taxed income may be derived forbids the application to such taxes of
the rule applied in the Pollock Case by which alone such taxes were
removed from the great class of excises, duties, and imposts subject
to the rule of uniformity, and were placed under the other or direct
class. This must be unless it can be said that although the
Constitution, as a result of the Amendment, in express terms
excludes the criterion of source of income, that criterion yet remains
for the purpose of destroying the classifications of the Constitution
by taking an excise out of the class to which it belongs and
transferring it to a class in which it cannot be placed consistently
with the requirements of the Constitution. Indeed, from another
point of view, the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose
was intended, and on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the
object of maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and
harmonizing their operation. We say this because it is to be observed
that although from the date of the Hylton Case, because of statements
made in the opinions in that case, it had come to be accepted that
direct taxes in the constitutional sense were confined to taxes levied
directly on real estate because of its ownership, the Amendment
contains nothing repudiation or challenging the ruling in the Pollock
Case that the word 'direct' had a broader significance, since it
embraced also taxes levied directly on personal property because of
its ownership, and therefore the Amendment at least impliedly
makes such wider significance a part of the Constitution,--a condition
which clearly demonstrates that the purpose was not to change the
existing interpretation except to the extent necessary to accomplish
the result intended; that is, the prevention of the resort to the
sources from which a taxed income was derived in order to cause a
direct tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source itself, and
thereby to take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties, and
imposts, and place it in the class of direct taxes.
We come, then, to ascertain the merits of the many contentions
made in the light of the Constitution as it now stands; that is to say,
including within its terms the provisions of the 16th Amendment as
correctly interpreted. We first dispose of two propositions assailing
the validity of the statute on the one hand because of its repugnancy
to the Constitution in other respects, and especially because its
enactment was not authorized by the 16th Amendment.
The statute was enacted October 3, 1913, and provided for a general
yearly income tax from December to December of each year.
Exceptionally, however, it fixed a first period embracing only the
time from March 1, to December 31, 1913, and this limited
retroactivity is assailed as repugnant to the due process clause of the
5th Amendment, and as inconsistent with the 16th Amendment
itself. But the date of the retroactivity did not extend beyond the
time when the Amendment was operative, and there can be no
dispute that there was power by virtue of the Amendment during
that period to levy the tax, without apportionment, and so far as the
limitations of the Constitution in other respects are concerned, the
contention is not open, since in Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 20 Wall.
323, 331, 22 L. ed. 348, 351, in sustaining a provision in a prior
income tax law which was assailed because of its retroactive
character, it was said:
'The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new statute,
although the measure of it was governed by the income of the past
year, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted that it could
impose such a tax on the income of the current year, though part of
that year had elapsed when the statute was passed. The joint
resolution of July 4th, 1864 [13 Stat. at L. 417], imposed a tax of 5
per cent upon all income of the previous year, although one tax on it
had already been paid, and no one doubted the validity of the tax or
attempted to resist it.'
The statute provides that the tax should not apply to enumerated
organizations or corporations, such as labor, agricultural or
horticultural organizations, mutual savings banks, etc., and the
argument is that as the Amendment authorized a tax on incomes
'from whatever source derived,' by implication it excluded the power
to make these exemptions. But this is only a form of expressing the
erroneous contention as to the meaning of the Amendment, which we
have already disposed of. And so far as this alleged illegality is based
on other provisions of the Constitution, the contention is also not
open, since it was expressly considered and disposed of in Flint v.
Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 108, 173, 55 L. ed. 389, 422, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.
342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312.
Without expressly stating all the other contentions, we summarize
them to a degree adequate to enable us to typify and dispose of all of
them.
1. The statute levies one tax called a normal tax on all incomes of
individuals up to $20,000, and from that amount up, by gradations, a
progressively increasing tax, called an additional tax, is imposed. No
tax, however, is levied upon incomes of unmarried individuals
amounting to $3,000 or less, nor upon incomes of married persons
amounting to $4,000 or less. The progressive tax and the exempted
amounts, it is said, are based on wealth alone, and the tax is
therefore repugnant to the due process clause of the 5th
Amendment.
2. The act provides for collecting the tax at the source; that is, makes
it the duty of corporations, etc., to retain and pay the sum of the tax
on interest due on bonds and mortgages, unless the owner to whom
the interest is payable gives a notice that he claims an exemption.
This duty cast upon corporations, because of the cost to which they
are subjected, is asserted to be repugnant to due process of law as a
taking of their property without compensation, and we recapitulate
various contentions as to discrimination against corporations and
against individuals, predicated on provisions of the act dealing with
the subject.
(a) Corporations indebted upon coupon and registered bonds are
discriminated against, since corporations not so indebted are relieved
of any labor or expense involved in deducting and paying the taxes
of individuals on the income derived from bonds.
(b) Of the class of corporations indebted as above stated, the law
further discriminates against those which have assumed the
payment of taxes on their bonds, since although some or all of their
bondholders may be exempt from taxation, the corporations have no
means of ascertaining such fact, and it would therefore result that
taxes would often be paid by such corporations when no taxes were
owing by the individuals to the government.
(c) The law discriminates against owners of corporate bonds in favor
of individuals none of whose income is derived from such property,
since bondholders are, during the interval between the deducting
and the paying of the tax on their bonds, deprived of the use of the
money so withheld.
(d) Again, corporate bondholders are discriminated against because
the law does not release them from payment of taxes on their bonds
even after the taxes have been deducted by the corporation, and
therefore if, after deduction, the corporation should fail, the
bondholders would be compelled to pay the tax a second time.
(e) Owners of bonds the taxes on which have been assumed by the
corporation are discriminated against because the payment of the
taxes by the corporation does not relieve the bondholders of their
duty to include the income from such bonds in making a return of all
income, the result being a double payment of the taxes, labor and
expense in applying for a refund, and a deprivation of the use of the
sum of the taxes during the interval which elapses before they are
refunded.
3. The provision limiting the amount of interest paid which may be
deducted from gross income of corporations for the purpose of fixing
the taxable income to interest on indebtedness not exceeding one
half the sum of bonded indebtedness and paidup capital stock is also
charged to be wanting in due process because discriminating
between different classes of corporations and individuals.
4. It is urged that want of due process results from the provision
allowing individuals to deduct from their gross income dividends
paid them by corporations whose incomes are taxed, and not giving
such right of deduction to corporations.
5. Want of due process is also asserted to result from the fact that
the act allows a deduction of $3,000 or $4,000 to those who pay the
normal tax, that is, whose incomes are $20,000 or less, and does not
allow the deduction to those whose incomes are greater than
$20,000; that is, such persons are not allowed, for the purpose of the
additional or progressive tax, a second right to deduct the $3,000 or
$4,000 which they have already enjoyed. And a further violation of
due process is based on the fact that for the purpose of the additional
tax no second right to deduct dividends received from corporations is
permitted.
6. In various forms of statement, want of due process, it is moreover
insisted, arises from the provisions of the act allowing a deduction
for the purpose of ascertaining the taxable income of stated amounts,
on the ground that the provisions discriminate between married and
single people, and discriminate between husbands and wives who
are living together and those who are not.
7. Discrimination and want of due process result, it is said, from the
fact that the owners of houses in which they live are not compelled
to estimate the rental value in making up their incomes, while those
who are living in rented houses and pay rent are not allowed, in
making up their taxable income, to deduct rent which they have
paid, and that want of due process also results from the fact that
although family expenses are not, as a rule, permitted to be deducted
from gross, to arrive at taxable, income, farmers are permitted to
omit from their income return certain products of the farm which are
susceptible of use by them for sustaining their families during the
year.
So far as these numerous and minute, not to say in many respects
hypercritical, contentions are based upon an assumed violation of the
uniformity clause, their want of legal merit is at once apparent, since
it is settled that that clause exacts only a geographical uniformity,
and there is not a semblance of ground in any of the propositions for
assuming that a violation of such uniformity is complained of.
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747;
Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 622, 46 L. ed. 713, 720, 22 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 493; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 158, 55 L. ed. 389,
416, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Billings v. United
States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 58 L. ed. 596, 605, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421.
So far as the due process clause of the 5th Amendment is relied
upon, it suffices to say that there is no basis for such reliance, since it
is equally well settled that such clause is not a limitation upon the
taxing power conferred upon Congress by the Constitution; in other
words, that the Constitution does not conflict with itself by
conferring, upon the one hand, a taxing power, and taking the same
power away, on the other, by the limitations of the due process
clause. Treat v. White, 181 U. S. 264, 45 L. ed. 853, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep.
611; Patton v. Brady, 184 U. S. 608, 46 L. ed. 713, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep.
493; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 61, 49 L. ed. 78, 97, 24
Sup. Ct. Rep. 769, 1 Ann. Cas. 561; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S.
107, 158, 55 L. ed. 389, 416, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B,
1312; Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 58 L. ed. 596, 605,
34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 421. And no change in the situation here would arise
even if it be conceded, as we think it must be, that this doctrine
would have no application in a case where, although there was a
seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act complained of was so
arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the exertion
of taxation, but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the
same in violation of the 5th Amendment; or, what is equivalent
thereto, was so wanting in basis for classification as to produce such
a gross and patent inequality as to inevitably lead to the same
conclusion. We say this because none of the propositions relied upon
in the remotest degree present such questions. It is true that it is
elaborately insisted that although there be no express constitutional
provision prohibiting it, the progressive feature of the tax causes it to
transcend the conception of all taxation and to be a mere arbitrary
abuse of power which must be treated as wanting in due process. But
the proposition disregards the fact that in the very early history of
the government a progressive tax was imposed by Congress, and that
such authority was exerted in some, if not all, of the various income
taxes enacted prior to 1894 to which we have previously adverted.
And over and above all this the contention but disregards the further
fact that its absolute want of foundation in reason was plainly
pointed out in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 747, and the right to urge it was necessarily foreclosed by
the ruling in that case made. In this situation it is, of course,
superfluous to say that arguments as to the expediency of levying
such taxes, or of the economic mistake or wrong involved in their
imposition, are beyond judicial cognizance. Besides this
demonstration of the want of merit in the contention based upon the
progressive feature of the tax, the error in the others is equally well
established either by prior decisions or by the adequate bases for
classification which are apparent on the face of the assailed
provisions; that is, the distinction between individuals and
corporations, the difference between various kinds of corporations,
etc., etc. Ibid.; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. S. 107, 158, 55 L. ed.
389, 416, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1312; Billings v.
United States, 232 U. S. 261, 282, 58 L. ed. 596, 605, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep.
421; First Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 9 Wall. 353, 19 L. ed. 701; National
Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 70, 58 L. ed. 504, 510, 34 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 209. In fact, comprehensively surveying all the contentions
relied upon, aside from the erroneous construction of the
Amendment which we have previously disposed of, we cannot
escape the conclusion that they all rest upon the mistaken theory
that although there be differences between the subjects taxed, to
differently tax them transcends the limit of taxation and amounts to
a want of due process, and that where a tax levied is believed by one
who resists its enforcement to be wanting in wisdom and to operate
injustice, from that fact in the nature of things there arises a want of
due process of law and a resulting authority in the judiciary to
exceed its powers and correct what is assumed to be mistaken or
unwise exertions by the legislative authority of its lawful powers,
even although there be no semblance of warrant in the Constitution
for so doing.
We have not referred to a contention that because certain
administrative powers to enforce the act were conferred by the
statute upon the Secretary of the Treasury, therefore it was void as
unwarrantedly delegating legislative authority, because we think to
state the proposition is to answer it. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143
U. S. 649, 36 L. ed. 294, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; Buttfield v. Stranahan,
192 U. S. 470, 496, 48 L. ed. 525, 535, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 349; Oceanic
Steam Nav. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 53 L. ed. 1013, 29 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 671.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice McReynolds took no part in the consideration and decision
of this case.
--
Ronald Cole E-mail: zi...@ecst.csuchico.edu
Senior Software Engineer ron...@optx.com
OTCS Incorporated, a Brian Meyerpeter company ron...@netcom.com
"The Bill Of Rights -- Void Where Prohibited By Law"
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>In <D78uM...@midway.uchicago.edu> th...@kimbark.uchicago.edu (Ted
>Frank) writes:
>>>Another silly question...Do you know the IRS definition of a
>>>"tax-protestor"?
>>
>>Yes. Next silly question.
>
>Please share it with us all...!! Where is it located?
In the regulations. The definition has no legal import, it's just used
by the IRS so they know where to devote internal resources; a tax-
protestor tax-evasion trial looks a lot different than the run-of-the-
mill white-collar-hiding-income tax-evasion trial, so they have
internal procedures to tell which is which.
I posted the cite a few months back, but I don't seem to have saved
it. Tim? Dick? Joseph? Any of you pull the post off the net?
>and how do each
>of these people become "tax-Protestors"?
By making tax protest arguments, filing frivolous declarations of
state sovereignty, sending in 1040's filled with zeroes, that sort
of thing.
[Astonishing assertion that a statute that penalizes you for not
doing something does not compel you to do something deleted.]
Ted Frank
>people make is to assume that the INCOME is the subject of the
>tax...when it is not so!!
That's not what section 61 says.
>The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page 2580 says:
I'm sorry, did both houses vote on the March 27, 1943 Congressional Record?
Did the President sign the resulting bill?
If not, I think I'll go with what the statute actually says rather than
what some congresscritter may or may not have said on the floor of the
House 52 years and several tax law permutations ago.
>And besides our courts have already ruled "the right
>to labor...is a constitutionalas well as common-law right" not a
>privilege (Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 102, 112 N.E. 853).
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, even assuming that they said that
and that you haven't taken it out of context, doesn't overrule the
United States Supreme Court.
>In addition, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, it was
>ruled that "legislature cannot prohibit any person or class of persons
>from engaging in a lawful business which is not injurious to others."
So? Taxation isn't prohibiting of businesses.
>Also, in 58 Am. Jur. Section 1, Occupations
I don't particularly care what the West Publishing Company says.
Sometimes they get the law right, sometimes they don't, but they
certainly don't tell the judges how to decide.
>But only if I file a W-4 form with them asking them to withhold from my
>paycheck. If I do not file a W-4, then they are not required to
>withhold.
False.
>And a careful reading of 3402(f)(2)(a) reveals that the W-4
>shall be filed when the employee is CLAIMING exemptions. If said
>employee is not making a claim of any kind (not a claim of zero or
>exempt, for that would be a claim)then he need not file said W-4.
All that means is that the employer is required to withhold the
maximum amount without any exemptions.
>And
>this says nothing for the situation where someone has no Social Security
>number.
The two are unrelated. The income tax predates social security numbers
by well over a dozen years.
>Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
>determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
>it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
>argument!
Not at all. Wages are listed as taxable in Section 61(a)(1).
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>You don't seem to get it, do you?! If the IRS does not pursue a court
>case against you, but simply leave you alone...NEVER requiring you to
>file again, what case cite is there to give?
You mean the IRS *never* makes a mistake and brings a criminal prosecution
or civil assessment against someone who is never required to file again?
Of all the agencies that could possibly have a 100% track record, I
really wouldn't think the IRS is one of them.
If you're so confident, why do you post essentially anonymously?
>Yet, the IRS is out of
>your life. How can this be happening to so many people?
I've seen no evidence that it's happening to anyone. I've seen plenty
of evidence of people who think precisely what you think who find themselves
in prison for tax evasion or failure to file.
The Pinhead
I admit that I am a young and very inexperienced lawyer. And, I did miss
quite a few classes in law school. So, could you explain your theories
a person to do something.
Probably pretty much the same thing as with the California Legislature.
You see, we got a law that says that the budget gotta be done by a
certain date. But because there isn't a penalty statute for this law,
the legislators almost never have it ready in time and they never get
in trouble when it's late. Heck they even emit bills of credit*
(IOUs) from the time the budget is due until its actually submitted.
*Doesn't appear to be any penalty statute for this law, either.
Tim Smith
>sweeping judgments. And in the case of the Pilot Group...the leader of
>this organization has openly admitted that he has not filed a return in
>over 10 years. Yet, the IRS cannot seem to get a jury to make him file.
Think about this for a few minutes.
--Tim Smith
BornToAdd
tax protestors and scientologists, etc... makes
television look intellectually appealing.
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>Question, how does someone who has no social security number pay taxes?
The Amish manage just fine.
kevin derita
>
>
>Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John Manuola) writes:
>> Still haven't read the Lloyd Long case, huh!!
>
>Nobody I know has read the Lloyd Long case for two reasons.
> (1) It has not been published in a legal forum; and
> (2) Nobody who refers to it has made the effort to provide a
> copy of it available.
>
>Until I see a verifiable copy of it as far as I am concerned it
>is nothing more than a left-handed hammer, a hundred yards of shore
>line, or a snipe hunt, i.e., put up or shut up -- and that is as
>nice as I can say it.
>
>Dick -- no disclaimer is necessary when replying to nonsense
I have all the motions and briefs, as well as the complete transcript for this case.
If you would like a copy please notify me.
Kevin DeRita
a...@iadfw.net
kevin derita
rda...@ubmail.ubalt.edu says...
>
>
>Keep...@ix.netcom.com (John Manuola) writes:
>> Still haven't read the Lloyd Long case, huh!!
>
>Nobody I know has read the Lloyd Long case for two reasons.
> (1) It has not been published in a legal forum; and
> (2) Nobody who refers to it has made the effort to provide a
> copy of it available.
>
>Until I see a verifiable copy of it as far as I am concerned it
>is nothing more than a left-handed hammer, a hundred yards of shore
>line, or a snipe hunt, i.e., put up or shut up -- and that is as
>nice as I can say it.
>
>Dick -- no disclaimer is necessary when replying to nonsense
I have all the motions and briefs for this case, as well as the complete
transcript.
If you would like a copy notify me.
Kevin DeRita
a...@iadfw.net
kevin derita
>In another post, Johnboy or John Manuola or whatever his name is states:
>
>> Why that's strange, i thought that Subchapter C was FICA!!! And it is
>> the only place in the COde that refers to withholding at the source,
>
>Totally untrue (I hesitate to use the "lie" word). 26 USC Section 3402 says:
>
>Sec. 3402. Income tax collected at source
>
>-STATUTE-
>
>(a) Requirement of withholding
>
>(1) In general
>
>Except as otherwise provided in this section, every employer making
>payment of wages shall deduct and withhold upon such wages a tax
>determined in accordance with tables or computational procedures
>prescribed by the Secretary. ...more
>Wrong. See 26 USC 3402. Your company is required to withhold taxes and
>you are required to pay them.
>Harold Clark
>Opinions are mine alone.
Mr. Clark please read the following:
[Sec. 3401(d)]
(d) EMPLOYER.-For purposes of this chapter, the term "employer" means the perons for
whom an individual performs any service, of whatever nature, as the emplyee of such person,
except that-
(exceptions noted)
Therefore we are forced to look at the term employee:
[Sec. 3401(c)]
(c) EMPLOYEE.- For purposes of htis chapter, the term "employee" includes and officer,
employee, or elected official of the United States, a State, or political subdivision therof, or
the District of Columbia, or any agency or instrumentality of any one or more of the foregoing.
The term "employee" also includes an officer of a corporation.
I contend that I am none of those people.
Robert Gonzalez
: In article <3n1l5n$h...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
: Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
: >So who is the taxpayer? This is vital!! BEcause the biggest mistake
: >tax...when it is not so!!
: That's not what section 61 says.
: >The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page 2580 says:
: I'm sorry, did both houses vote on the March 27, 1943 Congressional Record?
: Did the President sign the resulting bill?
: If not, I think I'll go with what the statute actually says rather than
: what some congresscritter may or may not have said on the floor of the
: House 52 years and several tax law permutations ago.
: >And besides our courts have already ruled "the right
: >to labor...is a constitutionalas well as common-law right" not a
: >privilege (Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass. 102, 112 N.E. 853).
: The Massachusetts Supreme Court, even assuming that they said that
: and that you haven't taken it out of context, doesn't overrule the
: United States Supreme Court.
: >In addition, in Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, it was
: >ruled that "legislature cannot prohibit any person or class of persons
: >from engaging in a lawful business which is not injurious to others."
: So? Taxation isn't prohibiting of businesses.
The associated paperwork and regulations has a recognisable prohibitive
effect on the lawful business of average people.
: >Also, in 58 Am. Jur. Section 1, Occupations
: I don't particularly care what the West Publishing Company says.
: Sometimes they get the law right, sometimes they don't, but they
: certainly don't tell the judges how to decide.
: >But only if I file a W-4 form with them asking them to withhold from my
: >paycheck. If I do not file a W-4, then they are not required to
: >withhold.
: False.
: >And a careful reading of 3402(f)(2)(a) reveals that the W-4
: >shall be filed when the employee is CLAIMING exemptions. If said
: >employee is not making a claim of any kind (not a claim of zero or
: >exempt, for that would be a claim)then he need not file said W-4.
: All that means is that the employer is required to withhold the
: maximum amount without any exemptions.
: >And
: >this says nothing for the situation where someone has no Social Security
: >number.
: The two are unrelated. The income tax predates social security numbers
: by well over a dozen years.
This is a red herring. Withholding didn't begin until the 40's. Up to
that point, individual wage earners didn't pay.
: >Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
: >determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
: >it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
: >argument!
: Not at all. Wages are listed as taxable in Section 61(a)(1).
: --
Scott Dunn
Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>In article <3n1hd7$f...@ixnews3.ix.netcom.com>,
>Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>You don't seem to get it, do you?! If the IRS does not pursue a court
>>case against you, but simply leave you alone...NEVER requiring you to
>>file again, what case cite is there to give?
>
>You mean the IRS *never* makes a mistake and brings a criminal prosecution
>or civil assessment against someone who is never required to file again?
>
>Of all the agencies that could possibly have a 100% track record, I
>really wouldn't think the IRS is one of them.
>
>If you're so confident, why do you post essentially anonymously?
>
>>Yet, the IRS is out of
>>your life. How can this be happening to so many people?
>
>I've seen no evidence that it's happening to anyone. I've seen plenty
>of evidence of people who think precisely what you think who find themselves
>in prison for tax evasion or failure to file.
The primary reason for this is that they don't have a clue about
administrative law. They think that if they sign 2 documents, A
Revocation of Power of Attorney and Declaration of Citizenship, Notarize
them, file with the County recorder...and then send them to every single
government agency under the sun, that everthing is hunky dory.
I'm sorry. That's not the way it works. Think about it. Do you know
who is responsible for handling your letters? Ever thought of maybe
asking how they responded to it, even if they didn't write you? In my
situation, the Social Security Administration has been very consistent.
Even after the letters I sent, they still insist that my number is valid.
The reason why people who "fail to file" wind up in prison is because by
the time they get to court, the 'IRS' has built this humongous record
that says your required to file. You can write to them all you want and
ask questions, but they are forbidden to give legal advice. On the other
hand, you can ask for DOCUMENTS using 4 USC 552 (FOIA, tax records exempt
from 552a, Privacy Act), and you might get somewhere. Better yet, you
might know whether or not they are planning an action against you.
>--
>ted frank "Without state-approved syllabi and standardized testing,
> my education can only go so far." -- Lisa Simpson
--
Scott Dunn : Sui Juris : @netcom.com :
"Since March the 9th, 1933, the United States has been in a state of
declared national emergency.....A majority of the people of the United
States have lived all their lives under emergency rule." Senate Report
93-549, 1973. We are still in a state of declared emergency. To find
out more, send email.
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>In this case, all 7203 talks about is what would be the penalty for
>anyone who is required to file and pay and doesn't so so. It doesn't
>say WHO is required to file and pay! And that's the challenge!!
Fine. Look at $ 6012.
Note also that a federal appeals court looked at your claim that $ 6012
doesn't say who is required to file and pay and found it to be frivolous.
Newman v. Schiff (8th Cir.).
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>In the regulations. The definition has no legal import, it's just used
>>by the IRS so they know where to devote internal resources; a tax-
>>protestor tax-evasion trial looks a lot different than the run-of-the-
>>mill white-collar-hiding-income tax-evasion trial, so they have
>>internal procedures to tell which is which.
>>
>>I posted the cite a few months back, but I don't seem to have saved
>>it. Tim? Dick? Joseph? Any of you pull the post off the net?
>>
>>>and how do each
>>>of these people become "tax-Protestors"?
>>
>>By making tax protest arguments,
>
>
>> filing frivolous declarations of state sovereignty,
>
Not false. Check your own citation. Have you read the IRM? Or are you
just parroting some numbers that a tax-protestor organization gave you?
>ALL ARE FOUND IN IRM 5431.4
Ted Frank
Johnboy <Keep...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>If not, I think I'll go with what the statute actually says rather than
>>what some congresscritter may or may not have said on the floor of the
>>House 52 years and several tax law permutations ago.
>>
>So you are claiming that the subject of the 'income tax' is income???
Indeed. And no court thinks that _Brushaber_ says anything differently.
>>The Massachusetts Supreme Court, even assuming that they said that
>>and that you haven't taken it out of context, doesn't overrule the
>>United States Supreme Court.
>
>And I suppose YOU are going to tell me that the US Supreme COurt has
>ruled otherwise!!
Yes. _Brushaber_. An out-of-context quote from a case that predates
_Brushaber_ and had nothing to do with the income tax doesn't change
this fact.
>>So? Taxation isn't prohibiting of businesses.
>>
>Oh really...!! How kind of you to declare it so!! But what the courts
>say would contradict that!!
>
>The power to tax is the power to destroy!!
Again, taking a quote out of context from a case dealing with federalism
has nothing to do with what the courts say about the income tax.
>>>Also, in 58 Am. Jur. Section 1, Occupations
>>
>>I don't particularly care what the West Publishing Company says.
>>Sometimes they get the law right, sometimes they don't, but they
>>certainly don't tell the judges how to decide.
>
>ah, and when is your nomination to the Supreme COurt going to occur??!!
Your point is?
>>>But only if I file a W-4 form with them asking them to withhold from my
>>>paycheck. If I do not file a W-4, then they are not required to
>>>withhold.
>>
>>False.
>
>says who...?
Says $ 3402.
>>>And a careful reading of 3402(f)(2)(a) reveals that the W-4
>>>shall be filed when the employee is CLAIMING exemptions. If said
>>>employee is not making a claim of any kind (not a claim of zero or
>>>exempt, for that would be a claim)then he need not file said W-4.
>>
>>All that means is that the employer is required to withhold the
>>maximum amount without any exemptions.
>
>Not if i am not a participant of the Social Security system...3402
>relates to SOCIAL SECURITY tax...!!
Learn how to read, bozo. $ 3402 specifically refers to the income tax
and provisions in Subtitle A.
If $ 3402 is only for social security taxes, please tell me why
subsection (n) is in the statute?
>>>And
>>>this says nothing for the situation where someone has no Social
>>>Security number.
>>
>>The two are unrelated. The income tax predates social security numbers
>>by well over a dozen years.
>
>And they haven't made ANY changes in the law to adjust for this. Unless
>of course, Subchapter C IS the social security tax....oh my!!! You
>mistakenly believe that Subchapter C tax is the same tax as Subchapter
>A...and have NO proof of this...except your bloated ego!!
I've said no such thing. I've said that Subchapter C contains laws
with respect to many different taxes, including the income tax.
Whether something is in one particular subchapter or another has no
legal import.
>>>Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
>>>determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
>>>it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
>>>argument!
>>
>>Not at all. Wages are listed as taxable in Section 61(a)(1).
>
>but the wages are NOT the subject of the tax...!!! They are part of the
>basis from which the tax is calculated, but the activity of receiving
>compensation for labor is not the subject of the tax!
That's not what section 61(a)(1) says. Nor do you have a single court
case interpreting section 61(a)(1) that says otherwise.
Ted Frank
>Ted Frank <th...@midway.uchicago.edu> wrote:
>>I've seen no evidence that it's happening to anyone. I've seen plenty
>>of evidence of people who think precisely what you think who find themselves
>>in prison for tax evasion or failure to file.
>
>The primary reason for this is that they don't have a clue about
>administrative law. They think that if they sign 2 documents, A
>Revocation of Power of Attorney and Declaration of Citizenship, Notarize
>them, file with the County recorder...and then send them to every single
>government agency under the sun, that everthing is hunky dory.
>
>I'm sorry. That's not the way it works.
Of course not. One can't declare sovereign citizenship. It's a nonsensical
non-existent legal state of being.
Harold Clark
(Johnboy) wrote:
<stuff snipped for some brevity>
> >Technically, none. Form 1040 is not mentioned in the US Code.
> HOWEVER,
> >26 USC Section 6012 says:
> >
> >Sec. 6012. Persons required to make returns of income
> >
> >-STATUTE-
> >
> >(a) General rule
> >
> >Returns with respect to income taxes under subtitle A shall be made by
> the
> >following:
> >(1)(A) Every individual having for the taxable year gross income which
> >equals or exceeds the exemption amount, except that a return shall not
> be
> >required of an individual -
>
> Bear with my trek through the code, i appreciate your willingness to
> observe it.
>
> Follow me if you would, it would easily be assumed that this is
> referring to everyone, until one reads section 441(b) of the code to
> determine the definition of the phrase "taxable year". it reads:
>
> For the purposes of this subtitle, the term "taxable year'means:
> (1) the TAXPAYER's annual accounting period...
>
> So who is the taxpayer? This is vital!! BEcause the biggest mistake
> people make is to assume that the INCOME is the subject of the
> tax...when it is not so!! The House COngressional Record, 3/27/43, page
> 2580 says:
<lots of irrelevent non-federal case cites snipped>
26 USC 7701 says (and you are fond of quoting these definitions):
(14) Taxpayer
The term 'taxpayer' means any person subject to any internal revenue tax.
> The BIG question here is: how do you know you are required to file a
> 1040 form, and not one of the hundreds of other IRS forms available?
UH DUH, you read the instructions? Depending on your circumstances, you
might file a 1040, a 1040A, a 1040EZ, a 1040NR, etc.
Having a Social Security number is irrelevent. Read 26 USC Sec. 6109
Sec. 6109. Identifying numbers
-STATUTE-
(a) Supplying of identifying numbers
When required by regulations prescribed by the Secretary:
(1) Inclusion in returns
Any person required under the authority of this title to make a return,
statement, or other document shall include in such return, statement, or
other document such identifying number as may be prescribed for securing
proper identification of such person.
and;
(c) Requirement of information
For purposes of this section, the Secretary is authorized to require such
information as may be necessary to assign an identifying number to any
person.
-----
NOTE THAT NEITHER OF THESE PARAGRAPHS SAY IT HAS TO BE A SOCIAL SECURITY
NUMBER. The Secretary of the Treasury will assign you a number if you
don't have a taxpayer identification number.
and last;
(d) Use of social security account number
The social security account number issued to an individual for purposes of
section 205(c)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act shall, except as shall
otherwise be specified under regulations of the Secretary, be used as the
identifying number for such individual for purposes of this title.
-------
So the use of the SSN is a convenience, but not a necessity. The
Government will assign you a TIN for your use if you don't have a SSN.
> Besides, Subchapter C relates to FICA...read the title of the
> Chapter..21, i believe it is!! It has NOTHING to do with the 'income'
> tax...! Though, in technical terms, since the INCOME is the basis for
> determining the tax, it can technically be called an INCOME tax...but
> it is not the same tax in Subchapter A!! THis is a fatal flaw in your
> argument!
No it isn't. Read the title of 26 USC 3402.
INCOME TAX COLLECTED AT SOURCE
and the following additional section from 3402:
(2) Amount of wages
For purposes of applying tables or procedures prescribed under paragraph
(1), the term 'the amount of wages' means the amount by which the wages
exceed the number of withholding exemptions claimed multiplied by the
amount of one such exemption. The amount of each withholding exemption
shall be equal to the amount of one personal exemption provided in section
151(b), prorated to the payroll period. The maximum number of withholding
exemptions permitted shall be calculated in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary under this section, taking into account any
reduction in withholding to which an employee is entitled under this
section.
-----
Since FICA taxes do not have any exemption provisions, it is obvious that
3402 is speaking to the withholding of INCOME taxes. You even quoted 3402
in your prior response regarding the submission of W-4 forms. You don't
submit W-4 forms for FICA taxes, they are for INCOME tax withholding.
Seems odd that you use it to justify a position regarding income tax
withholding (W-4 forms) and then claim it doesn't apply to income tax
withholding. At least be consistent in your silly claims.
<stuff snipped>
> Actually the futility is in getting people to actually read the
> law...like you are...because until they do, they simply spout insults
> and derrogatory comments. I appreciate you taking the time to actually
> dialog with me on the laws themself!
So a quick summary is in order. The tax code identifies the following:
Who is to file a return (26 USC 6012)
Withholding requirements (26 USC 3402)
Taxpayer Identification Numbers (26 USC 6109) Having or not having a
Social Security number is irrelevent.
All of which are at odds to your claims.
The futility is even entering into these kind of discussions. Too bad you
lack enough comprehension of the English language to understand the laws
as written.