It can't get more clearer than this
Wolf
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit cases re: jurisdiction, taxes,
income, and labor
SUPREME COURT CASES
1818: U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S.336. Establishes two separate
jurisdictions within the United States Of America:
1. The "federal zone" and 2. "the 50 States". The I.R.C. only has
jurisdiction within the "federal zone". "The exclusive jurisdiction
which the United States have in forts and dock-yards ceded to them,
is derived from the express assent of the states by whom the cessions
are made. It could be derived in no other manner; because without it,
the authority of the state would be supreme and exclusive therein,"
3 Wheat., at 350, 351.
1883: Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746. Defines
labor as property, and the most sacred kind of property. "Among
these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of
Independence is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which
is meant, the right any lawful business or vocation, in any manner
not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase
their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give them their
highest enjoyment...It has been well said that, THE PROPERTY WHICH
EVERY MAN HAS IS HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION
OF ALL OTHER PROPERTY SO IT IS THE MOST SACRED AND INVIOLABLE..."
1894: Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211. Restricts jurisdiction
of the federal government inside the states. "The law of Congress in
respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits
of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
national government."
1895: Pollack v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429,
158 U.S. 601. Prohibits direct taxes on the income of individuals.
1900: Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41. Defines the meaning of
"direct taxes". "Direct taxes bear immediately upon persons, upon
the possession and enjoyment of rights; indirect taxes are levied
upon the happening of an event as an exchange."
1901: Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244. Establishes that
constitutional limits on the Congress do not apply within the
"federal zone" and described where they do apply.
"CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AND LIMITATIONS [Bill of Rights]
WERE NOT APPLICABLE to the areas of lands, enclaves, territories,
and possessions over which Congress had EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION"
1906: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43. Defined the distinction between
natural persons and corporations as it pertains to 5th Amendment
protections within the U.S. Constitution.
"...we are of the opinion that there is a clear distinction in this
particular between an individual and a corporation, and that the
latter has no right to refuse to submit its books and papers for an
examination at the suit of the state. The individual may stand upon
his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry
on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is
unlimited. He owes no duty to the state or to his neighbors to
divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation,
so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the
state, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection
of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law
of the land long antecedent to the organization of the state, and
can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance
with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate
himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest
or seizure except under a warrant of the law. He owes nothing to
the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights.
Upon the other hand, the corporation is a creature of the state. It
is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It
receives certain special privileges and franchises, and holds
them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its
charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not
authorized by its charter. Its rights to [201 U.S. 43, 75] act as a
corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws
of its creation. There is a reserved right in the legislature to
investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its
powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having
chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not,
in the exercise of its sovereignty, inquire how these franchises
had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and demand the
production of the corporate books and papers for that purpose. The
defense amounts to this: That an officer of a corporation which
is charged with a criminal violation of the statute, may plead the
criminality of such corporation as a refusal to produce its books. To
state this proposition is to answer it. While an individual may
lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected
by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation,
vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show
its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges. "
1911: Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107. Defined excise
taxes as taxes laid on corporations and corporate privileges,
not in natural persons.
"Excises are taxes laid upon the manufacture, sale or consumption
of commodities within the country, upon licenses to pursue certain
occupations and upon corporate privileges...the requirement
to pay such taxes involves the exercise of [220 U.S. 107, 152]
privileges, and the element of absolute and unavoidable demand
is lacking...Conceding the power of Congress to tax the business
activities of private corporations.. the tax must be measured by some
standard...It is therefore well settled by the decisions of this
court that when the sovereign authority has exercised the right to
tax a legitimate subject of taxation as an exercise of a franchise
or privilege, it is no objection that the measure of taxation is
found in the income produced in part from property which of itself
considered is nontaxable."
1914: Weeks v. U.S., 232 U.S. 383. Established that illegally
obtained evidence may not be used by the court or admitted into
evidence. This case is very useful in refuting the use by the IRS
of income tax returns that were submitted involuntarily (note that
these returns must say "submitted under compulsion in violation of
5th Amendment rights" or some such thing at the bottom.
"The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts [232 U.S. 383,
392] of the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise
of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as
to the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure
the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all
unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise of law. This
protection reaches all alike, whether accused of crime or not,
and the duty of giving to it force and effect is obligatory upon
all intrusted under our Federal system with the enforcement of
the laws. The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of
the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures and
enforced confessions, the latter often obtained after subjecting
accused persons to unwarranted practices destructive of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution, should find no sanction in the
judgments of the courts, which are charged at all times with the
support of the Constitution, and to which people of all conditions
have a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental
rights.
The case in the aspect in which we are dealing with it involves
the right of the court in a criminal prosecution to retain for the
purposes of evidence the letters and correspondence of the accused,
seized in his house in his absence and without his authority, by a
United States marshal holding no warrant for his arrest and none for
the search of his premises. The accused, without awaiting his trial,
made timely application to the court for an order for the return
of these letters, as well or other property. This application
was denied, the letters retained and put in evidence, after a
further application at the beginning of the trial, both applications
asserting the rights of the accused under the 4th and 5th Amendments
to the Constitution. If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right
to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be
stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they
are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles
established be years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted
in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. The United
States marshal could only have invaded the house of the accused when
armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution, upon
sworn information, and describing with reasonable particularity the
thing for which the search was to be made. Instead, he acted without
sanction of law, doubtless prompted by the desire to bring further
proof to the aid of the government, and under color of his office
undertook to make a seizure of private papers in direct violation
of the constitutional prohibition against such action. Under such
circumstances, without sworn information and particular description,
not even an order of court would [232 U.S. 383, 394] have justified
such procedure; much less was it within the authority of the United
States marshal to thus invade the house and privacy of the accused.
In Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 , 48 L. ed. 575, 24
Sup. Ct. Rep. 372, this court said that the 4th Amendment was
intended to secure the citizen in person and property against
unlawful invasion of the sanctity of his home by officers of the law,
acting under legislative or judicial sanction. This protection is
equally extended to the action of the government and officers of
the law acting under it.
Boyd Case, 116 U.S. 616 , 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 524. To
sanction such proceedings would be to affirm by judicial decision
a manifest neglect, if not an open defiance, of the prohibitions of
the Constitution, intended for the protection of the people against
such unauthorized action.
1916: Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1. Established
that the 16th Amendment had no affect on the constitution, and
that income taxes could only be sustained as excise taxes and not
as direct taxes.
"...the proposition and the contentions under [the 16th
Amendment]...would cause one provision of the Constitution to
destroy another;
That is, they would result in bringing the provisions of
the Amendment exempting a direct tax from apportionment into
irreconcilable conflict with the general requirement that all direct
taxes be apportioned;
This result, instead of simplifying the situation and making
clear the limitations of the taxing power, which obviously the
Amendment must have intended to accomplish, would create radical
and destructive changes in our constitutional system and multiply
confusion.
Moreover in addition the Conclusion reached in the Pollock Case did
not in any degree involve holding that income taxes generically and
necessarily came within the class of direct taxes on property, but on
the contrary recognized the fact that taxation on income was in its
nature an excise entitled to be enforced as such unless and until
it was concluded that to enforce it would amount to accomplishing
the result which the requirement as to apportionment of direct
taxation was adopted to prevent, in which case the duty would arise
to disregard form and consider substance alone and hence subject
the tax to the regulation as to apportionment which otherwise as
an excise would not apply to it.
....the Amendment demonstrates that no such purpose was intended
and on the contrary shows that it was drawn with the object of
maintaining the limitations of the Constitution and harmonizing
their operation."
....the [16th] Amendment contains nothing repudiating or challenging
the ruling in the Pollock Case that the word direct had a broader
significance since it embraced also taxes levied directly on
personal property because of its ownership, and therefore the
Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part
of the Constitution -- a condition which clearly demonstrates that
the purpose was not to change the existing interpretation except
to the extent necessary to accomplish the result intended, that
is, the prevention of the resort to the sources from which a taxed
income was derived in order to cause a direct tax on the income to
be a direct tax on the source itself and thereby to take an income
tax out of the class of excises, duties and imposts and place it
in the class of direct taxes...
Indeed in the light of the history which we have given and of the
decision in the Pollock Case and the ground upon which the ruling
in that case was based, there is no escape from the Conclusion
that the Amendment was drawn for the purpose of doing away for the
future with the principle upon which the Pollock Case was decided,
that is, of determining whether a tax on income was direct not
by a consideration of the burden placed on the taxed income upon
which it directly operated, but by taking into view the burden
which resulted on the property from which the income was derived,
since in express terms the Amendment provides that income taxes,
from whatever source the income may be derived, shall not be subject
to the regulation of apportionment.
1916: Stanton v. Baltic Mining, 240 U.S. 103. Declared that
the 16th Amendment conferred no new powers of taxation to the
U.S. government, but simply prevented income taxes from being
taken out of the category of indirect (excise) taxes to which they
inherently belonged.
"..by the previous ruling it was settled that the provisions of
the Sixteenth Amendment conferred no new power of taxation but
simply prohibited the previous complete and plenary power of income
taxation possessed by Congress from the beginning from being taken
out of the category of indirect taxation to which it inherently
belonged and being placed in the category of direct taxation subject
to apportionment by a consideration of the sources from which the
income was derived, that is by testing the tax not by what it was --
a tax on income, but by a mistaken theory deduced from the origin
or source of the income taxed. "
1918: Peck v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165. Stated that the 16th Amendment
does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects, but
removed the need to apportion direct taxes on income. The plaintiff
is a domestic corporation chiefly engaged in buying goods in the
several states, shipping them to foreign countries and there selling
them. In 1914 its net income from this business was
$30,173.66, and from other sources $12,436.24. An income tax for that
year, computed on the aggregate of these sums, was assessed against
it and paid under compulsion. It is conceded that so much of the
tax as was based on the income from other sources was valid, and the
controversy is over so much of it as was attributable to the income
from shipping goods to foreign countries and there selling them.
The tax was levied under the Act of October 3, 1913, c. 16, 11,
38 Stat. 166, 172, which provided for annually subjecting every
domestic corporation to the payment of a tax of a specified per
centum of its 'entire net income arising or accruing from all
sources during the preceding calendar year.' Certain fraternal and
other corporations, as also income from certain enumerated sources,
were specifically excepted, but none of the exceptions included
the plaintiff or any part of its income. So, tested merely by the
terms of the act, the tax collected from the plaintiff was rightly
computed on its total net income. But as the act obviously could not
impose a tax forbidden by the Constitution, we proceed to consider
whether the tax, or rather the part in question, was forbidden by
the constitutional provision on which the plaintiff relies.
The Sixteenth Amendment, although referred to in argument, has no
real bearing and may be put out of view. As pointed out in recent
decisions, it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted
subjects, but merely removes all occasion, which otherwise might
exist, for an apportionment among the states of taxes [247 U.S. 165,
173] laid on income, whether it be derived from one source or
another. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 17-19,
36 Sup. Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D,
414; Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112-113, 36
Sup. Ct. 278.
1920: Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245. Overturned by O'Malley
v. Woodrough (307 U.S. 277). Court ruled that income taxes on
federal judges were unconstitutional.
"After further consideration, we adhere to that view and accordingly
hold that the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize or support the
tax in question. " [A direct tax on salary income of a federal judge]
1920: Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189. Defined income within
the meaning of the 16th Amendment as "profit". Prohibited direct,
unapportioned taxation of income of a stockholder. The Sixteenth
Amendment must be construed in connection with the taxing clauses of
the original Constitution and the effect attributed to them before
the amendment was adopted.
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 , 15
Sup. Ct. 912, under the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 509, 553,
c. 349, 27), it was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real
estate and upon returns from investments of personal property were in
effect direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose,
imposed by reason of ownership; and that Congress could not impose
such taxes without apportioning them among the states according
to population, as required by article 1, 2, cl. 3, and section 9,
cl. 4, of the original Constitution.
Afterwards, and evidently in recognition of the limitation upon the
taxing power of Congress thus determined, the Sixteenth Amendment was
adopted, in words lucidly expressing the object to be accomplished:
'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among [252
U.S. 189, 206] the several states, and without regard to any
census or
enumeration.'
As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new
subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might
exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on
income. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 , 17-19,
36 Sup. Ct. 236, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 713, L. R. A. 1917D, 414; Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 , 112 et seq., 36 Sup. Ct. 278;
Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 172 , 173 S., 38 Sup. Ct. 432.
A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language,
requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose
construction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income,
those provisions of the Constitution that require an apportionment
according to population for direct taxes upon property, real and
personal. This limitation still has an appropriate and important
function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded
by the courts.
[.]
After examining dictionaries in common use (Bouv. L. D.; Standard
Dict.; Webster's Internat. Dict.; Century Dict.), we find little to
add to the succinct definition adopted in two cases arising under
the Corporation Tax Act of 1909 (Stratton's Independence v. Howbert,
231 U.S. 399, 415 , 34 S. Sup. Ct. 136, 140 [58 L. Ed. 285]; Doyle
v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467,
469 [62 L. Ed. 1054]), 'Income may be defined as the gain derived
from capital, from labor, or from both combined,' provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conversion
of capital assets, to which it was applied in the Doyle Case,
247 U.S. 183, 185 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 467, 469 (62 L. Ed. 1054).
Brief as it is, it indicates the characteristic and distinguishing
attribute of income essential for a correct solution of the
present controversy. The government, although basing its
argument upon the definition as quoted, placed chief emphasis
upon the word 'gain,' which was extended to include a variety
of meanings; while the significance of the next three words was
either overlooked or misconceived. 'Derived-from- capital'; 'the
gain-derived-from-capital,' etc. Here we have the essential matter:
not a gain accruing to capital; not a growth or increment of value
in the investment; but a gain, a profit, something of exchangeable
value, proceeding from the property, severed from the capital,
however invested or employed, and coming in, being 'derived'-that
is, received or drawn by the recipient (the taxpayer) for his
separate use, benefit and disposal- that is income derived from
property. Nothing else answers the description.
[.]
Thus, from every point of view we are brought irresistibly to the
conclusion that neither under the Sixteenth Amendment nor otherwise
has Congress power to tax without apportionment a true stock dividend
made lawfully and in good faith, or the accumulated profits behind
it, as income of the stockholder. The Revenue Act of 1916, in so far
as it imposes a tax upon the stockholder because of such dividend,
contravenes the provisions of article 1, 2, cl. 3, and article 1,
9, cl. 4, of the Constitution, and to this extent is invalid,
notwithstanding the Sixteenth Amendment. 1922: Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20.
Prohibited Congress from legislating or controlling benefits
that employers provide to their employees. A major blow against
socialism in America! "Out of a proper respect for the acts of a
co-ordinate branch of the government, this court has gone far to
sustain taxing acts as such, even though there has been ground
for suspecting, from the weight of the tax, it was intended to
destroy its subject. But in the act before [259 U.S. 20, 38] us
the presumption of validity cannot prevail, because the proof of
the contrary is found on the very face of its provisions. Grant
the validity of this law, and all that Congress would need to do,
hereafter, in seeking to take over to its control any one of the
great number of subjects of public interest, jurisdiction of which
the states have never parted with, and which are reserved to them
by the Tenth Amendment, would be to enact a detailed measure of
complete regulation of the subject and enforce it by a socalled
tax upon departures from it. To give such magic to the word 'tax'
would be to break down all constitutional limitation of the powers
of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the states. "
1924: Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47. The Supreme Court ruled that
Congress has the power to tax the income received by a native citizen
of the United States domiciled abroad from property situated abroad
and that the constitutional prohibition of unapportioned direct taxes
within the states of the union does not apply in foreign countries.
1930: Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111. The Supreme Court ruled that
wages and compensation for personal services were not to be taxed in
their entirety, but instead, the gain or profit derived indirectly
from them.
1935: Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Company, 295
U.S. 330. The Supreme Court ruled that Congress that it has no
constitutional authority whatsoever to legislate for the social
welfare of the worker. The result was that when Social Security
was instituted, it had to be treated as strictly voluntary.
"The catalog of means and actions which might be imposed upon an
employer in any business, tending to the comfort and satisfaction
of his employees, seems endless.
Provisions for free medical attendance and nursing, for clothing,
for food, for housing, for the education of children, and a hundred
other matters might with equal propriety be proposed as tending to
relieve the employee of mental strain and worry.
Can it fairly be said that the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce extends to the prescription of any or all of
these things?
Is it not apparent that they are really and essentially related
solely to social welfare of the worker, and therefore remote from
any regulation of commerce as such? We think the answer is plain.
These matters obviously lie outside the orbit of Congressional
power."
1938: Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303. Ruled that disputes over
uncertainties in the tax code should be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer. "In view of other settled rules of statutory construction,
which teach that... if doubt exists as to the construction of
a taxing statute, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
taxpayer..."
1939: O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277. Overturned portions
of Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, but not the part about the 16th
Amendment.
"However, the meaning which Evans v. Gore, supra, imputed to the
history which explains Article III, 1 was contrary to the way in
which it was read by other English-speaking courts.[1] The decision
met wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and
professional opinion. Evans v. Gore, supra, itself was rejected by
most of the courts before whom the matter came after that decision
[2]"
1945: Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 US 652. Ruled that there are
three distinct and separate definitions for the term "United States".
The income tax only applies to one of the three definitions!
"The term 'United States' may be used in any one of several
senses. It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the
position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of
nations. It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty
of the United States ex- [324 U.S. 652, 672] tends, or it may be
the collective name of the states which are united by and under
the Constitution."
1959: Flora v. United, 362 US 145. Ruled that our tax system is based
on voluntary assessment and payment, not on force or coercion. "Our
system of taxation is based upon voluntary assessment and payment,
not upon distraint."
1961: James v. United States, 366 US 213, p. 213, 6L Ed 2d
246. Income that is taxed under the 16th Amendment must derive
from a "source". Also established that embezzled money is taxable
as income. "...the Sixteenth Amendment, which grants Congress
the power "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 US 331, 334; Douglas
v. Willcuts, 296 US 1,9. It has long been settled that Congress'
broad statutory definitions of taxable income were intended "to
use the full measure of taxing power." The Sixteenth Amendment is
to be taken as written and is not to be extended beyond the meaning
clearly indicated by the language used." Edwards v. Cuba R. Co. 268
US 628, 631 [From separate opinion by Whittaker, Black, and Douglas,
JJ.] (Emphasis added)
1970: Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 at 748. Supreme Court ruled that:
"Waivers of Constitutional Rights not only must be voluntary, they
must be knowingly intelligent acts, done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and consequences."
1975: Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648. Supreme Court ruled
that income taxes constitute the compelled testimony of a witness:
"The information revealed in the preparation and filing of an income
tax return is, for the purposes of Fifth Amendment analysis, the
testimony of a witness."
"Government compels the filing of a return much as it compels,
for example, the appearance of a `witness' before a grand jury."
1978: Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 21. Established that wages and income are NOT equivalent as
far as taxes on income are concerned.
"Decided cases have made the distinction between wages and
income and have refused to equate the two in withholding or
similar controversies. Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. United States,
179 Ct. Cl. 318, 332, 373 F.2d 924, 932 (1967); Humble Pipe Line
Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 944, 950, 442 F.2d 1353, 1356
(1971);
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 920, 442
F.2d 1362
(1971);
Stubbs, Overbeck & Associates v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142 (CA5
1971); Royster Co. v. United States, 479 F.2d, at 390; Acacia Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 188 (Md. 1967)."
1985: U.S. v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605. The production of evidence or
subpoenaed tax documents cannot be compelled. "We conclude that
the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the contents of the
subpoenaed documents were privileged under the Fifth Amendment. The
act of producing the documents at issue in this case is privileged
and cannot be compelled without a statutory grant of use immunity
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 6002 and 6003."
1991: Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192. Held that if the
defendant has a subjective good faith belief no matter how
unreasonable, that he or she was not required to file a tax return,
the government cannot establish that the defendant acted willfully in
not filing an income tax return. In other words, that the defendant
shirked a legal duty that he knew existed.
1992: United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 119 L Ed 2d 34, 112
S Ct. 1867. Court held that income that is taxed under the 16th
Amendment must come from a "source". Congress's intent through '
61 of the Internal Revenue Code [26 USCS ' 61(a)]--which provides
that gross income means all income from whatever source derived,
subject to only the exclusions specifically enumerated elsewhere
in the Code...and ' 61(a)'s statutory precursors..."
1995: U.S. v. Lopez, 000 U.S. U10287. Establishes strict limits
on the constitutional power and jurisdiction of the federal
government inside the 50 States. "We start with first principles. The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See
U.S. Const., Art. I, 8. As James Madison wrote, "[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments
are numerous and indefinite." The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-293
(C. Rossiter ed. 1961). This constitutionally mandated division of
authority "was adopted by the Framers to ensure protection of our
fundamental liberties." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Just as the separation and
independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serves to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one
branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from
either front." Ibid.
The Constitution delegates to Congress the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes." U.S. Const., Art. I, 8, cl. 3. The Court,
through Chief Justice Marshall, first defined the nature of Congress'
commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 189-190 (1824):
"Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:
it is intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated
by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse."
The commerce power "is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the constitution." Id., at 196. The Gibbons Court,
however, acknowledged that limitations on the commerce power are
inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause.
"It is not intended to say that these words comprehend that commerce,
which is completely internal, which is carried on between man and
man in a State, or between different parts of the same State, and
which does not extend to or affect other States. Such a power would
be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary.
"Comprehensive as the word `among' is, it may very properly
be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one. . . . The enumeration presupposes something not enumerated;
and that something, if we regard the language or the subject of the
sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State." Id.,
at 194-195.
For nearly a century thereafter, the Court's Commerce Clause
decisions dealt but rarely with the extent of Congress' power,
and almost entirely with the Commerce Clause as a limit on state
legislation that discriminated against interstate commerce. See,
e.g., Veazie v. Moor, 14 How. 568, 573-575 (1853) (upholding a
state-created steamboat monopoly because it involved regulation
of wholly internal commerce); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 17,
20-22 (1888) (upholding a state prohibition on the manufacture
of intoxicating liquor because the commerce power "does not
comprehend the purely domestic commerce of a State which is carried
on between man and man within a State or between different parts
of the same State"); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional
Law 306 (2d ed. 1988). Under this line of precedent, the Court
held that certain categories of activity such as "production,"
"manufacturing," and "mining" were within the province of state
governments, and thus were beyond the power of Congress under the
Commerce Clause. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121 (1942)
(describing development of Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
[.]
Consistent with this structure, we have identified three broad
categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power. Perez v. United States, supra, at 150; see also
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., supra, at
276-277. First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce. See, e.g., Darby, 312 U.S., at 114 ; Heart
of Atlanta Motel, supra, at 256. "`[T]he authority of Congress
to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and
injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open
to question.'" [quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491 (1917)]. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities. See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234
U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911)
(upholding amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles
used in intrastate commerce); Perez, supra, at 150 ("[F]or example,
the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. 32), or . . . thefts from
interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. 659)"). Finally, Congress' commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, Jones & Laughlin Steel,
301 U.S., at 37 , i.e., those activities that substantially affect
interstate commerce. Wirtz, supra, at 196, n. 27.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT CASES:
U.S. v. Tweel, 550 F.2d 297, 299-300 (1977) "Silence can only
be equated with fraud when there is a legal or moral duty to
speak, or when an inquiry left unanswered would be intentionally
misleading... We cannot condone this shocking conduct...If that
is the case we hope our message is clear. This sort of deception
will not be tolerated and if this is routine it should be corrected
immediately"
Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2nd 1378, 9th Cir., (1981) "Persons dealing
with government are charged with knowing government statutes and
regulations, and they assume the risk that government agents may
exceed their authority and provide misinformation"
Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 650 F.2d 1093,
9th Cir., (1981) "All persons in the United States are chargeable
with knowledge of the Statutes-at-Large.. It is well established
that anyone who deals with the government assumes the risk that the
agent acting in the government's behalf has exceeded the bounds of
his authority"
Economy Plumbing and Heating v. U.S., 470 F.2d 585 (Ct. Cl. 1972)
"Persons who are not taxpayers are not within the system and
can obtain no benefit by following the procedures prescribed for
taxpayers, such as the filing of claims for refunds."
Long v. Rasmussen, 281 F. 236, at 238 "The revenue laws are a code
or a system in regulation of tax assessment and collection. They
relate to taxpayers, and not to non-taxpayers. The latter are
without their scope. No procedures are prescribed for non-taxpayers,
and no attempt is made to annul any of their rights and remedies
in due course of law. With them Congress does not assume to deal,
and they are neither the subject nor the object of the revenue laws."
Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 135 Or. 180, 294 P.461, 73 A.L.R. 721
(1931) "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for
the mere privilege of existing. The corporation is an artificial
entity which owes its existence and charter powers to the state;
but the individuals' rights to live and own property are natural
rights for the enjoyment of which an excise cannot be imposed."
U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F2d 400, cert denied, 429 U.S. 918, 50 L.Ed.2d
283, 97 S.Ct. 310 (1976) "income" is not defined in the Internal
Revenue Code
----------------------------------------------------------------------
[1] The opinion is set forth in a footnote at page 160 et seq.,
of 3 Cranch.
[2] Printed in 157 U.S. at page 701.
"Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and people who mean to
be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives." James Madison
"Government is like a fire, useful in the fireplace, but if it
gets out of its place, it will consume everything you own" George
Washington
=============================================
No law compels a work eligible man or woman to submit a form W-4 or W-9(or
their equivalent) nor disclose an SSN as a condition of being hired or
keeping one's job. With the exception of an order from a court of competent
jurisdiction issued by a duly qualified judge, no amounts can be lawfully
taken from one's pay (for taxes, fees or other charges) without the worker's
explicit, knowing, voluntary, written consent.
http://www.preferredservices.org/NonconsensualTaking.html
cpt banjo
> It can't get more clearer than this
Yes it can, especially when you don't post lies. Here's just a
partial correction of your pathetic misrepresentations:
> 1818: U.S. v. Bevans, 16 U.S.336. Establishes two separate
> jurisdictions within the United States Of America:
> 1. The "federal zone" and 2. "the 50 States". The I.R.C. only has
> jurisdiction within the "federal zone".
Not when it comes to taxes:
"The 8th section of the 1st article gives to Congress the "power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises," for the purposes
thereinafter mentioned. This grant is general, without limitation as
to place. It, consequently, extends to all places over which the
government extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by
the subsequent words which modify the grant. These words are, "but all
duties, imposts, and excises, shall be uniform throughout the United
States." It will not be contended, that the modification of the power
extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power
then to lay and collect duties, imposts, and excises, may be
exercised, and must be exercised throughout the United States. Does
this term designate the whole, or any particular portion of the
American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer.
It is the name given to our great republic, which is composed of
States and territories."
Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. 317 (1820)
> 1883: Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U.S. 746. Defines
> labor as property, and the most sacred kind of property. "Among
> these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration of
> Independence is the right of men to pursue their happiness, by which
> is meant, the right any lawful business or vocation, in any manner
> not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, which may increase
> their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to give them their
> highest enjoyment...It has been well said that, THE PROPERTY WHICH
> EVERY MAN HAS IS HIS OWN LABOR, AS IT IS THE ORIGINAL FOUNDATION
> OF ALL OTHER PROPERTY SO IT IS THE MOST SACRED AND INVIOLABLE..."
This doesn't prevent the taxation of income earned from laboring. See
Springer v. U.S., 102 U.S. 586 (1881), upholding the constitutionality
of the Civil War income tax.
> 1894: Caha v. United States, 152 U.S. 211. Restricts jurisdiction
> of the federal government inside the states. "The law of Congress in
> respect to those matters do not extend into the territorial limits
> of the states, but have force only in the District of Columbia,
> and other places that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
> national government."
Not a tax case, therefore irrelevant.
>
> 1895: Pollack v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429,
> 158 U.S. 601. Prohibits direct taxes on the income of individuals.
A lie. Pollock said only that a tax on investment income had to be
apportioned; in passing, the Court noted that an unapportioned tax on
personal earnings is constitutional, which it had previously held to
be the case in Springer.
> 1906: Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43. Defined the distinction between
> natural persons and corporations as it pertains to 5th Amendment
> protections within the U.S. Constitution.
Not a tax case, hence irrelevant.
> 1911: Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107. Defined excise
> taxes as taxes laid on corporations and corporate privileges,
> not in natural persons.
Excises aren't limited to taxes on corporate privileges, as
exemplified by the Knowlton case ten years earlier which upheld the
estate tax. In fact, the last definition of an excise given by the
Supreme Court is much broader:
"Whatever may be the precise line which sets off direct taxes from
others, we need not now determine. While taxes levied upon or
collected from persons because of their general ownership of property
may be taken to be direct, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157
U.S. 429 , 15 S. Ct. 673; Id., 158 U.S. 601 , 15 S. Ct. 912, this
court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the
government, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or
the exercise of a single power over property incidental to ownership,
is an excise which neet not be apportioned..." Bromley v. McCaughn,
280 U.S. 124 (1929), upholding the federal gift tax.
The receipt of income is the exercise of a power over property and is
therefore properly the subject of an excise.
> 1916: Brushaber vs. Union Pacific Railroad, 240 U.S. 1. Established
> that the 16th Amendment had no affect on the constitution, and
> that income taxes could only be sustained as excise taxes and not
> as direct taxes.
Big deal. The income tax is an excise -- upon the receipt of income.
> 1920: Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245. Overturned by O'Malley
> v. Woodrough (307 U.S. 277). Court ruled that income taxes on
> federal judges were unconstitutional.
>
> "After further consideration, we adhere to that view and accordingly
> hold that the Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize or support the
> tax in question. " [A direct tax on salary income of a federal judge]
Another misrepresentation. The basis for striking down the tax was
Artlcle III, Section 1, not the 16th Amendment.
> 1920: Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189. Defined income within
> the meaning of the 16th Amendment as "profit". Prohibited direct,
> unapportioned taxation of income of a stockholder.
Another lie. The decision dealt solely with whether a stock dividend
was income. The Court did not say a stockholder could never be
subject to an unapportioned tax.
> 1930: Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111. The Supreme Court ruled that
> wages and compensation for personal services were not to be taxed in
> their entirety, but instead, the gain or profit derived indirectly
> from them.
Another lie. The Court held that Mr. Lucas was fully taxable on his
personal earnings:
"The Revenue Act of 1918 approved February 24, 1919, c. 18, 210, 211,
212(a), 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1064, 1065, imposes a tax upon
the net income of every individual including 'income derived from
salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service ... of whatever
kind and in whatever form paid,' 213(a). The provisions of the Revenue
Act of 1921, c. 136, 42 Stat. 227, 233, 237, 238, in sections bearing
the same numbers are similar to those of the above. A very forcible
argument is presented to the effect that the statute seeks to tax only
income beneficially received, and that taking the question more
technically the salary and fees became the joint property of Earl and
his wife on the very first instant on which they were received. We
well might hesitate upon the latter proposition, because however the
matter might stand between husband and wife he was the only party to
the contracts by which the salary and fees were earned, and it is
somewhat hard to say that the last step in the performance of those
contracts could be taken by anyone but himself alone. But this case is
not to be decided by attenuated subtleties. It turns on the import and
reasonable construction of the taxing act. There is no doubt that the
statute could tax salaries to those who earned them and provide that
the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skilfully devised to prevent the salary when paid
from vesting even for a second in the man who earned it."
> 1939: O'Malley v. Woodrough, 307 U.S. 277. Overturned portions
> of Evens v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, but not the part about the 16th
> Amendment.
Another lie. In overturning Evans, the Court stated:
"Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position
that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not,
when applied to the income of a federal judge, a diminution of his
salary within the prohibition of Article III, 1 of the Constitution.
To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who
took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common
duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the
cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great
historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of
Article III, 1.9 To subject them to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular
function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with
their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose
Constitution and laws they are charged with administering."
> 1978: Central Illinois Public Service Co. v. United States, 435
> U.S. 21. Established that wages and income are NOT equivalent as
> far as taxes on income are concerned.
Another lie. The issue was whether certain meal reimbursements, which
were obviously income to the recipient, were subject to withholding as
wages:
"We are confronted here, instead, with the question whether the lunch
reimbursements, even though now they may be held to constitute taxable
income to the employees who are reimbursed, are or are not "wages"
subject to withholding, within the meaning and requirements of
3401-3403 of the Code..."
In other words, all wages are income within the meaning of Section 61,
but not all income is wages subject to withholding.
> 1991: Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192. Held that if the
> defendant has a subjective good faith belief no matter how
> unreasonable, that he or she was not required to file a tax return,
> the government cannot establish that the defendant acted willfully in
> not filing an income tax return. In other words, that the defendant
> shirked a legal duty that he knew existed.
Cheek also rejected the defendant's imbecilic arguments that his wages
weren't subject to taxation:
"Cheek asserted in the trial court that he should be acquitted because
he believed in good faith that the income tax law is unconstitutional
as applied to him, and thus could not legally impose any duty upon him
of which he should have been aware. Such a submission is unsound, not
because Cheek's constitutional arguments are not objectively
reasonable or frivolous, which they surely are, but because the
Murdock-Pomponio line of cases does not support such a position."
> 1995: U.S. v. Lopez, 000 U.S. U10287. Establishes strict limits
> on the constitutional power and jurisdiction of the federal
> government inside the 50 States.
Not a tax case, hence irrelevant.
> Redfield v. Fisher, 292 P. 813, 135 Or. 180, 294 P.461, 73 A.L.R. 721
> (1931) "The individual, unlike the corporation, cannot be taxed for
> the mere privilege of existing.
The case didn't deal with federal taxes, hence irrelevant.
By posting outright lies, you have demonstrated that your posts are a
total waste of bandwidth.
Paul Thomas
"Wolf" <is a scammer of course> wrote
> The I.R.C. only has jurisdiction within the "federal zone".
There's no standing court case that holds that position.
> Among these unalienable rights, as proclaimed in the Declaration
> of Independence is the right of men to pursue their happiness,
Neither labor or happiness are taxed in the US.
Please. Go out and labor all you like and be happy about it too. You'll
owe no taxes based on the amount of labor you perform or the happiness you
get from that labor.
Jackney Sneeb
> Please. Go out and labor all you like and be happy
> about it too. And when you have to file your tax return,
> see me and I'll help you pay far more than the
> IRS demands.
>
>Paul Thomas, Erstwhile CPA