Schlund v. Bush [High-Tech Torture] Lawsuit Update
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8520 North 54th Drive
Glendale, Arizona 85302
Phone 602-670-2017
Plaintiff In Pro Per
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Charles August Schlund, III, an individual
Plaintiff,
v.
George W. Bush, President of The United States of America, a Sovereign
Nation; et al.,
Defendants
Case No: CV-03-1590 PHX VAMOPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT BUSH'S MOTION TO
DISMISS.
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Charles August Schlund, III ("Plaintiff Schlund") submits his
Opposition to President Bush's ("Defendant Bush") Motion to Dismiss.
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Defendant Bush, through his undersigned counsel, as usual, sets forth
his unsupported and unqualified attorney impressions, opinions, and
conclusions, which are not evidence or under oath or truthful which can
be considered by this Court in his Motion to Dismiss. President Bush,
through his undersigned counsel, Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard G.
Patrick ("Attorney Patrick") does not possess the competency of any
noted expertise in the field related to what is commonly referred to in
the medical field as "neuroprosthesis," "nano prosthetic implants,"
"nano implants," "brain implants," "brain chips," neurotechnology
implants," telepathic communicating devices," "surveillance implants,"
and other intelligence or other identifier names related to the
manipulation of the body or brain for military, surveillance, torture,
medical purposes and other purposes. In fact, it is doubtful Attorney
Patrick has ever set foot in a scientific research clinic which
specializes in implant research and the related fields, including
transcranial magnetic stimulation, electromagnetic radiation or
stimulation, stimulation by sound, electricity and the like. These
areas are of particular interest to the military and the medical fields
because of the resurgence for the need for controlled body and brain
stimulation and control.
The United States Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is the
well-known primary and major funder of brain implant research and has
been using various types of implants, including brain implants and
brain chips in research for soldiers to boost their cognitive
capacities, control pain, and the transmission and receipt of wireless
telecommunications in the field under combat conditions, and other
implants for tracking and location verification similar to that used by
Global Position Satellite Networks. On the medical side, which
auto-connects to the military side, are some of the disclosed (while
many advancements are intentionally not disclosed or copyrighted or
patented, for obvious reasons), which include but are not limited to:
nano implants transferred through laser technology connected to the
optic and Vagus nerve for treating disorders such as depression,
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder, panic attacks, chronic attack, and
nano-nerve which relate to light transfers and light sensitive chips
that mimic the eye signal processing ability and stimulate the optic
nerve or the visual cortex, helping the blind. It is undisputed that
monkeys can control computers and robotic arms "merely by thinking,"
not telekinetically but via implanted electrodes picking up neuro
signals from nano implants, empowering the paralyzed and controlling
muscle spasms thanks to the new release of battery powered electrodes
that are implanted in the subject's brain and surgeries that repaired
the subject's twisted muscles and lengthened the tendons, allowing the
subjects to walk after being crippled most of their life.
There are chips and nano-brain chips that have success in restoring the
memory of those afflicted with Alzheimer's Disease and other disorders,
proved successful in treating spinal chord injuries, strokes, and the
millions who are legally blind. See Scientific American, Oct. 2005
edition, "The Forgotten Era of Brain-Control Chips." In fact, the pros
and cons of "brain chips" which function off of wireless telemetry as
an integrated technology with computers and the advancements in
computations, electrodes, micro-electronics, neurotechnology, brain
scanning technologies, and brain implant technology and research is at
the forefront of importance due to the potential adverse consequences
of such technology being abused by authoritarian governments to gain
more power or by terrorists to wreck destruction and control people of
importance in their network. It is absolutely asinine and ludicrous to
consider the ridiculous statements of Attorney Patrick who works for
the well-known primary financial backer and research of brain
technology, especially nano brain implants, who have openly admitted
the necessity or research and field use of implanting brain chips in
soldiers, as aforesaid. Moreover, President Bush's White House Council
on Bioethics have been ordered by the President not to pursue anyone
involved in brain implant research, despite the ethical controversies
due to its military or, as in the case before the bench, quasi-military
purposes.
It is not the reasonable and highly beneficial uses of implant
technology but the destructive and abusive use and the technology for
"physical control" over the subject target which is not static but
"dynamic." Id. Scientific America, Vol. 293, No. 4. Here, Plaintiff
Schlund, in his First Amended Verified Complaint For Deprivation of
Civil Rights Through Racketeering Activities ("Amended Complaint"),
filed September 15, 2005, incorporated by this reference as though set
forth verbatim, states the acts and conduct of Defendants in subjecting
him to harassment, persecution, and torture of him as a political
witness and/or whistle blower in an effort to obstruct justice and give
the false impression that said Defendants are not monitoring,
harassing, torturing, invading his privacy, or attempting to influence
or control him through wireless technology implanted electrical devices
in the cover up of murder, treason, drug running and the fixing of the
elections of the United States of America as Plaintiff Schlund had
briefed the FBI before the government injected Plaintiff with the
implants to cover up the crimes. Further, that said Defendants
systematically use wireless technology and other types of implants and
associated electronic product(s) used against him to invade his privacy
and track his communications, telecommunications, and physical
whereabouts on a daily basis and will never arrest Plaintiff to allow
him a trial to prove his innocents.
There is no chance of an arrest of Plaintiff for the crimes Plaintiff
is under investigation for because the government knows plaintiff can
prove how the government framed him to cover up murder and treason and
the fixing of the presidential elections of the United States under the
protection of Defendant's. In fact Plaintiff whishes to be arrested so
he can prove his innocents in trial, the government monitoring and
torturing Plaintiff is only to deny Plaintiff his rights under the
American Constitution and to stop Plaintiff from writing books and
articles for publication to cover up the truth, The Assistant US
Attorney motion to dismiss if also to cover up the truth and to stop
Plaintiff from proving the case in trail.
In America the government does not burn books it injects those that
could write embarrassing books and then tortures them with implants in
an investigation to stop them from writing the books. Still further,
Plaintiff has alleged the systematic use by Defendants to utilize the
judicial system (including outright lying to this Court), as well as
use of Doran v. McGinness, 158 F.R.D. 383 (1994) in attempts to
systematically invalidate valid civil rights cases against these
Defendants and such cases filed against other departments/agencies of
the United States Federal Government and others, implanting in the
subject target and using wireless technology in implants in an illegal
manner, constituting acts and conduct of racketeering and intentional
deprivation of civil rights through such racketeering activities to
witness tamper, obstruct justice, and thwart any lawsuits to continue
to conceal the illegal use of the wireless technology, the methods used
to install or implant the wireless implant(s) for the purposes set
forth in the Complaint. These illegal acts are done by corrupt judges
and corrupt agents under the protection of higher corruption in the
government so their crimes appear to be legal while using perjury,
planted evidence and torture to justify their evil corrupt acts.
Plaintiff Schlund has never made any claim or statement of telepathic
brain implants in him and no such claim has been made in any lawsuit or
motions or anywhere else. Plaintiff Schlund does not believe telepathic
communications to or from him are possible. Plaintiff Schlund does not
believe he has any brain implants. Plaintiff Schlund was injected with
implants that are well know to the courts and are used in pets and
people every day causing extreme pain and suffering to large numbers of
American citizens and Plaintiff Schlund has thousands of witnesses to
this form of torture that can be called upon to testify to the
governments crime committed under the color and cover of authority. The
court knows about the implants Plaintiff Schlund is referring to and
knows that they are used in great numbers in investigations of American
citizens and Plaintiff Schlund can prove that these implants are also
used for torture and murder in the removal of political and economic
threats to those in positions of power.
Plaintiff Schlund can call to the witness stand or before the court
people who killed their children after being injected with these
devices as a result of the torture of them from the implants and
Plaintiff Schlund can call to the witness stand people that killed
toddlers because of the torture of them driving them mad and insane
after being injected with these devices. These crimes would have never
happened if the government had not corruptly used implants and other
electronic devices for the use of torture to remove witnesses and
dissidents and for economic and political gain and to cover up
corruption within the government. For the court to believe that the
government requires at least four implants in the neck and ears of
Plaintiff to only monitor him would be only a Paranoid Delusion.
Plaintiff can demonstrate that one small microphone can monitor a
whisper at 35 feet through the air and the Human body is mostly water
that sounds travels through extremely well compared to air. Plaintiff
can install four such microphones in a gallon of milk to simulate a
human head and neck and each microphone can hear everything as well as
the other.
The only time the government installs implants in the manner used
against Plaintiff Schlund is for the use of torture. This can easily be
proven in trial or in a demonstration for the court. The court fully
knows that pets are injected with electronic implants all the time and
they do not require four implants to monitor the people around them.
The implants in Plaintiff also contain filters that are designed to
filter out background noise. No monitoring device designed for
investigations that has a filter in it is really designed for
monitoring. Only someone delusional could believe that the monitoring
device was designed to filter out some of the sounds being monitored.
In real monitoring devices the filters are always in the receiving
equipment not in the monitoring equipment. The filters are really
designed to filter out the use of torture by sound or speech. Plaintiff
Schlund has read all the CIA, DEA, NSA and other files on the
designing, testing, manufacturing and use of these devices in the Don
Bolles files in 1977. Every detail of the devices and how they were
designed for torture was in the government files. By authorizing the
use of implants and other devices in contact or close proximity to the
body authorizes the use of torture because torture modes can be
incorporated into the devices to control and torture political and or
economic, witnesses, dissidents and threats such as Plaintiff Schlund.
Specifically, the methods used to transfer, install, and implant the
implants into Plaintiff Schlund involves critical levels of secrecy to
the Defendants and others, involving joint operations. Plaintiff
Schlund placed in writing to various government agencies, including the
Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA"),
FBI and others, what could be expected of activity conducted by
Defendants individually and to accomplish fixing the presidential
elections and what their agenda would be including plundering the
United States Treasury after being placed in office by covert
operations of the CIA and others, strategic placing of various members
on the United States Supreme Court for this purpose into the future.
It materialized exactly as Plaintiff Schlund said it would years
earlier, along with Defendant Bush individually and as finally
appointed by the United States Supreme Court into the position of
President of the United States and the CIA (Joint Operation of the DEA)
and others controlling the states of Florida, Texas, and Arizona, which
were and continue to be strategic states for operations of a covert
nature and the running of drugs and other international and domestic
associated joint operations involving the aforesaid. These states were
specifically earmarked in writing as important in order to control the
other states in order to protect the incoming drug shipments that the
CIA ran into the United States, which involved various types of gangs
and joint government and private illegal racketeering activities.
Texas and Florida would be the key states in the fixing of the
presidential elections as Plaintiff briefed the FBI in 1992. The gang
members are the witnesses the government is using to justify Plaintiffs
injection with implants and the torture of Plaintiff that is used with
planted evidence and false conversations taken under torture from
Plaintiff by the government and as Plaintiff agreed with the FBI to
make the conversations to prove who the corrupt agents involved were in
the overthrow of the United States by the Bush family, CIA, DEA and
others.
The illegal drugs were the common denominator that held the gangs
together. These gangs furnished the children, girls, and boys for sex
for the different corrupt judges and politicians in said states
(especially Arizona), and the strategic and systematic use of the drugs
(and allegations of a subject being a drug manufacturer) used to
authorize many of the investigations against political witnesses
(Plaintiff Schlund) and those associated to him and other dissidents.
These investigations and torture have continued to this day even after
Plaintiff proved in trial that the government framed him and that the
government had even threatened to murder the children of his first
witness if he dared to testify. This resulted in Plaintiff Schlund's
acquittal after the government refused to release records that their
informant was really a drug manufacturer and drug dealer. The
government's informant was really Carl Altz Special agent of the DEA
who had committed perjury before a grand jury and in trial which
outraged the judge. The drugs are and continue to be the catalyst that
holds everything together for Defendant and his agents, and the
proceeds from the drugs helped to finance many of the covert
operations, resulting in the building of a large expanse of churches,
the funding of the religious channels on T.V., and many other illegal
covert CIA, DEA, and other quasi-military operations that were and
continue to be part of the systematic overthrow of the United States of
America by the CIA, DEA and select individuals.
The Defendants' racketeering activities were used specifically to
deprive select individuals of their United States' constitutional
rights, usurp the federal and constitutional laws protecting
individuals and those associated with select target subjects for the
purpose in part to authorize investigations and trials which would then
be used to establish new case law (such as case law like Dorn v.
McGinness, 158 F.R.D. 383-388 E.D. Mich. 1994) ["[c]ourts need not
entertain claims founded upon beliefs of alleged implantation in his
brain of a telepathic mind control device which is so obviously bizarre
and hallucinary"] which hopefully have the effect of discrediting the
individual making claims based on reality and the ability to prove the
reality of the implants and their effects, and the reality of proving
the type of implant product(s) and the method or procedure used to
insert or install such implant into the subject target for wireless
telemetry influence and psychological and physiological manipulation
and torture by the select individual(s) cleared for these types of
aforesaid unique investigation technique used by Defendant and his
agents. The court never denied Doran had implants, the court only
ruled that the implants were not brain implants used for telepathic
communications. Doran did not know how he heard voices and was tortured
or where the implants were in his body and Doran had no chance of
proving his case because he was in prison under the total control of
the government.
DEFENDANT'S CASES ARE DISTINGUISHED ON THE FACTS AND NOT APPLICABLE.
Defendant cites Skolnick v. Hallett,350 F.2d 861 (7th Cir. 1965): This
was a per curiam decision out of the 7th Circuit United States Court of
Appeals in 1965. The Plaintiff/Appellant Skolnick filed a lawsuit for
(1) intimidation, (2) defamation by slander, and claimed the District
Court was a "kangaroo court." In his In Pro Se Complaint which was
gutted with scurrilous, offensive, and objectionable allegation
principally leveled at the Northern District of Illinois judge,
Honorable Joseph Samuel Perry, and the attorney for the defendant,
Harry G. Fins, a long-time member of the Illinois Bar with offices in
Chicago, Illinois, the justification for the dismissal and striking of
Plaintiff's Complaint. Notably, the case was actually against the
state court Judge Hallett and Attorney Fin. Moreover, the case did not
denote specifically what scurrilous, offensive, or objectionable
allegations were actually leveled at the judge in the decision.
In short, Plaintiff Schlund has leveled the detailed facts of
Defendant's individual (pre-appointment as President by the U.S.
Supreme Court) racketeering acts and conduct resulting in the
deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights, required to be pled,
and the United States Constitutional and federal laws supporting his
claims. See Complaint, pgs. 1-26 incorporated hereat. The nature,
degree, and type of Defendant's acts and conduct alleged by Plaintiff
Schlund are of his own personal knowledge and personal involvement with
said Defendants and their agents and the gangs they ran and controlled,
which have been continuous and ongoing. He has reported the details of
such acts and conduct, and the nature and extent of his injuries and
damages as the result of such conduct in his Verified Complaint. He
has also expressed in a general manner the methodology of wireless
telemetry product(s) used in an integrated manner to invade his
privacy, trespass on his property and other rights, harass him,
persecute him and torture him, his family, and witness tamper in the
aforesaid regards, in detail. In fact, his specific allegations of the
acts and conduct of said Defendants and the result of the injury and
damage to him from such conduct is required to be pled under F.R.C.P.
Rule 8.
See also, Shaveriat v. Williams Pipeline Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1430 (7th
Cir. 1993) [noting increasing trend toward greater specificity in
complaints], supported by Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506,
512, 122 S.Ct. 992, 998, 152 L.Ed. 2d 1 (2002). F.R.C.P. Rule 9(b)
requires detailed pleading on claims involving Defendant's acts and
conduct, a product of malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions
of mind of a person, and F.R.C.P. Rule 9(f) and (g) of time and place
which are material and "shall" be considered like all other averments
of material matter connected to time and place as set forth in the
Complaint. Plaintiff Schlund is a witness whose declaration under oath
is direct evidence which supports the Complaint, also construed as an
affidavit under penalty of perjury to support his claim under F.R.C.P.
Rule 43(a). As an aside, Defendant squawks about Plaintiff not naming
the specific surnames of the individuals involved with Defendants
acting in joint effort to harass, persecute, torture, and invade his
privacy, claiming the case should be dismissed on those grounds, which
is frivolous. The unknown "agents" are not necessary to be named
specifically for the claims to be valid. See, Central Intelligence
Agency v. John Kerry Sims and Sydney M. Wolfe, 471 U.S. 159 (1965).
Moreover, Plaintiff Schlund is being egregiously and intentionally
harassed, persecuted, and tortured by the most unethical, immoral, and
criminal individuals, violating the law and his Constitutional Rights
in a vile and evil manner, as set forth in the Complaint, which is and
of itself indecent, abusive, coarse, vulgar, and demonstrates a gross
conscious and reckless disregard for Plaintiff as a human being and the
protections afforded against such conduct under the United States
Constitution. See Plaintiff's Complaint. The 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals itself held that "official torture constitutes a causable
violation of the law of nations and described the prohibition against
official torture as 'universal, obligatory, and definable.' The same
9th Circuit Court of Appeals also defined such torture as: 'To subject
a person to such horrors is to commit one of the most egregious
violations of the personal security and dignity of a human being.'"
Further, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, which controls on the
decisions of the District Court of Arizona, states that all relevant
material averments constitutes evidence admissible on the issue of
Plaintiff Schlund's physical and mental pain and suffering, supporting
his special damages claim. Defendant's specific acts and conduct
averred to by Plaintiff Schlund and the resulting injury and damages is
required to be pled under F.R.C.P. Rule 9(f) and 9(g). Browning v.
Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 245-46 D.C. Cir. (2002) and Marseilles Hydro
Power, LLC v. Marseilles Land & Water Co., 2003 W.L. 259142, at *6(ND
Ill. 2003). In fact, F.R.C.P. Rule 9(g) absolutely requires the
specificity of pleading the acts and conduct causing the violation of
Constitutional Rights and the physical and emotional harm to Plaintiff
Schlund or the justification for punitive damages and the "causal
connection" between the aforesaid. And, the manner of the specificity
of connecting the two has not been "reducable to formula." Marseilles
Hydro supra.
Furthermore, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in Siderman De Blak v.
Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992) specifically noted
that technology, as it advances, is used for intrusion, causing injury
and damages through the use of wireless integrated telemetry to conduct
illegal surveillance and torture by the government. Appellant Court
loudly echoed in its judicial decision, after solidly recognizing the
realities of torture through use of such technology, specifically
surveillance and the government's pattern of always denying such
activity, despicable in design and nature as the most egregious
inhumane crimes against an individual (humanity), domestic and
internationally, such as that pled by Plaintiff Schlund. Moreover, the
9th Circuit Court of Appeals analysis dealt specifically with the
atrocities, injuries, pain, and suffering a person experiences during
the various acts and conduct it noted as "torture" by the government;
and, especially noted that all governments "that engage in torture,
denying it, and no state claims a sovereign right to torture its own
citizens," and the factual causal connection is pled in Plaintiff
Schlund's Complaint. See Complaint and Tel-Oren v. Libian Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion of Edwards J.),
cert. denied 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed. 2d 377 (1985).
Even the 9th Circuit judges note in the Siderman case, "Judge Kaufman's
survey of the universal condemnation of torture provides much support
for the view that torture violates jus kogens." In Judge Kaufman's
words, "[a]mong the rights universally proclaimed by all nations
(including the USA), as we have noted, is the right to be free of
physical torture" (630 F.2d at 890).
Supporting this case law, which also recognizes the prohibition against
official torture as one of only a few jus kogens norms. Restatement
702 Comment n, also identifying jus kogens norms "prohibiting genocide,
slavery, murder, or causing disappearance of individuals, prolonged
arbitrary detention, and systematic racial discrimination."
The 9th Circuit confirms that the prohibition against official torture
on any level has achieved the status of jus kogens norm (Id.)
(citations omitted in the interest of judicial economy). Plaintiff's
Complaint is not mere speculation, conjecture, or scurrilous statements
made against Defendants but are of his personal knowledge of nearly 30
years. In that nearly 30 years, his personal knowledge includes
personal contact and exposure to inappropriate and illegal acts of high
ranking officials, including the Honorable Judge Broomfield, with all
due respect. Judge Broomfield was promoted to the Surveillance Court
to protect him and because Judge Broomfield got ride of the threat
against the Bush family by stopping Plaintiff's lawsuit which would
have gone all the way to the Bush family. Judge Broomfield failed to
rule on the motion for relief from torture and the 9th Circuit failed
to rule on the motion for relief from torture and the Supreme Court
ruled that they did not have to rule on the motion for relief from
torture because it was not filed in the lower court. It was properly
filed in the lower courts and was properly before the courts through
the entire legal process.
Thus, because Attorney Patrick has no individual personal knowledge of
the facts set forth in this case, his impressions, opinions, and
conclusions are worthless and to be given no evidentiary weight, State
v. Bridges, 134 Ariz. 59 (1982). Likewise, the Skolnick v. Hallett, is
void of any factual content supporting Attorney Patrick misplaced
conclusions and must be disregarded.
Defendants cite Chew Wing Luk v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir.
1959) is factually distinguishable and not controllable.
In the Chew Wing Luk v. Dulles case, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals dealt
with Plaintiff Chew Luk, who filed with the American Consul General
("A.C.G.") in Hong Kong an application for a passport to come into the
United States. Chew lied in the affidavit supporting the application
for the passport, claiming to be a citizen of the U.S. through Chew Tai
Cam, a native-born citizen of the United States, who he claimed was his
father. The A.C.G. required Plaintiff/ Appellant to produce a
Certificate of Identity allowing him to come to the United States for
the purpose of prosecuting his lawsuit pursuant to Section 503 of the
Nationality Act of 1940 (8 U.S.C. Sec. 903). After producing the
Certificate of Identity, his application was granted, and Petitioner
based the jurisdiction of the District Court for his lawsuit under
Section 503 of the Act.
The lawsuit was then filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. It was then transferred to the United
States Court for the Southern District of California, Central Division,
whereupon Chew filed an Amended Complaint for declaratory judgment,
alleging that he was an American citizen, as the "illegitimate son" of
Chew Fong Shew (formerly claimed by Appellant to be his aunt, a
native-born citizen of the United States at the time of Plaintiff's
birth).
Trial was had before the District Court solely on the issue of
jurisdiction, and the District Court dismissed the amended complaint on
the grounds that the court did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action; and for that reason Plaintiff had not been denied
a right or privilege as a national of the U.S. when the A.C.G. denied
his application for a passport on facts different from the allegations
set forth in the Amended Complaint. In fact, the Court never reach any
issues of the alleged fraud on the part of Plaintiff/Appellant in
filing the Amended Complaint, despite Dulles/Appellee set forth in its
Answer to the Amended Complaint as a separate defense alleging the
fraud on the part of Plaintiff that the filing constituted an affront
to and imposition upon the dignity of the Court. Thus, the 9th Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the District Court and ordered the case be
remanded to the District Court "for trial," asserting the District
Court may conclude from the evidence before it that the Amended
Complaint was filed in bad faith and that the allegations contained
therein are false and constitute a fraud and willful imposition on the
dignity of the Court. (Id. at 827).
Therefore, because Plaintiff Schlund has not asserted any verified
allegations to this Court that are false and constitute a fraud, there
is no willful imposition on the dignity of the Court that would justify
dismissal of his claim. In fact, this Court cannot find, as a matter
of law, that the factual averments set forth by Plaintiff are false,
and Defendants' claim through Attorney Patrick are merely speculative
and conjectural, and if not, are subject to a trial by this Court on
the relevant and material issues of fact now before it. Plaintiff has
demanded a trial by jury filed with his First Amended Complaint under
F.R.C.P. Rule 38 and 39. Certainly, if Defendant is taking the
position that Plaintiff Schlund's claims are false and he is
perpetuating a fraud and willful imposition upon the dignity of the
Court under the holding of Chew Wing Luk v. Dulles, he would be
entitled to a trial by jury, as the Ninth Circuit required therein.
(Id. at p. 827, col. 1, par(s) 4 and 5).
DEFENDANTS' STATUE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE DOES NOT CONTROL AGAINST A
CONTINUING WRONG BY DEFENDANTS
Plaintiff has clearly alleged Defendant Bush's acts as an individual
continued after he was appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court to President
of the United States. And that these acts are carried out and continue
to systematically carried out to satisfy Defendant's individual or
under color of authority plan, scheme, and design of deprivation of
Plaintiff Schlund's civil rights through racketeering activities of
using electronic wireless telemetry and associate product(s) to invade
his privacy, harass, persecute, and torture him due to his status as a
"political witness" or/and whistleblower against Defendant individually
and in his capacity as President.
Including but not limited to these continuous acts is Defendant's
systematic establishing and use of Dorn v. McGinness, 158 F.R.D. 383
(1994) (Complaint, p. 17, par. 40) to attempt to systematically use to
invalidate valid civil rights cases filed against Defendant for his
individual (or, now under color of authority) use of wireless
technology and associated product technology which includes wireless
telemetry and electronic implants used by Defendant and his agents for
different purposes to violate Plaintiff Schlund's rights, which is
continuous and ongoing due to his status as a political witness or
whistleblower against Defendant and his agents (Complaint, pgs. 1-19).
The systematic use of wireless telemetry to violate Plaintiff Schlund's
rights to privacy and the guarantee under the Constitution that he be
secure in his person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures "shall not be violated" is continuously being
violated by said Defendant through the electronic means as aforesaid.
See, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) and Bevins v. Six Unknown
Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) [Petitioner sued to
recover damages from the agents was dismissed by the District Court on
the grounds (1) it failed to state a federal cause of action, and (2)
that the agents were immune from suit by virtue of their official
position. United Supreme Court Justice Brennan delivered the opinion
of the court, reversing the District Court and Court of Appeals due to
the existence of triable issues of fact based on the verified complaint
and its allegations of injuries and damages, based on Defendants'
unconstitutional conduct and/or governmental capacity in the violation
of Plaintiff's right to privacy, etc.
The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected, reversed, and
remanded the District Court/Appellate Court's decisions the Defendant
and its agents were immune from liability by virtue of their official
capacity (Id. 275 F.Supp. at 15) on allegations of Defendants' wrongful
conduct was done unreasonably and contrary to law. Plaintiff Schlund
has certainly alleged the Defendants' unlawful conduct and the nature,
type, degree, and its effect of injuring and damaging him, which is
continuing and ongoing, is a violation of his civil rights and a
deprivation of his civil rights through wrongful racketeering
activity(ies) is sufficient to overcome Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
which admits these claims.
Defendant's Attorney Patrick's opinions, impressions, and conclusions
are statements that are both irrelevant and prejudicial as to the truth
of Plaintiff's claim and must not be given any weight by the Court,
infra. Plaintiff Schlund objects, which shall constitute a continuing
objection to each and all of Attorney Patrick's impressions, opinions,
and conclusions concerning Plaintiff's claims and moves to strike all
of the aforesaid as set forth in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. An
example on point, Nike Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enterprises, 33 U.S.P.Q.
2d 1472 (1994); and Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531
(1977) [continued electronic trespass through use of wireless
electronic telemetry and associated product(s) shackling individual FBI
agents with liability, resulting in "blacklisting" or "black balling"
based on Plaintiff's status. The FBI's violation of his rights
constituted a deprivation of civil rights of a continuous nature,
constituting an electronic trespass, violating his rights to privacy
and racketeering activity] a continuing activity. No immunity was
available for them. See, Taylor v. Merricks , 712 F.2d 1112 (7th
Cir.1983).
Thus, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss must be denied.
DEFENDANT, IN HIS STATUS AS PRESIDENT, IS LIABLE UNDER THE LAW
Plaintiff Schlund has alleged in his Verified Complaint the specific
conduct of Defendant Bush as an individual, which continues after he
was appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court as President. The deprivation
of Plaintiff's civil rights does not shield Defendant as the President
from personal liability from injury and damages to Plaintiff Schlund in
his status as a "political witness" or/and "whistleblower," or just
simply as an individual who has been specifically targeted by Defendant
in either capacity. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). Clinton
did not have Jones injected with implants and tortured to remove Jones
as a witness against Clinton such as the corrupt agents and judges
working for the Bush family have done in this case after Plaintiff
briefed the FBI on the detailed plans to fix the presidential elections
of the United States. Plaintiff Schlund has not alleged any cause of
action whereby the President, acting as an individual or/and in his
capacity or status as the President of the United States, with his
"agents," forces liability upon the President through respondent
superior principles.
Plaintiff Schlund has clearly and directly alleged a viable cause of
action against Defendant Bush as an individual based on acts and
conduct of a wrongful nature which have continued after he acquired the
status as President of the United States, for which he is individually
liable, irrespective of whether they have continued to be done under
color of authority or office by him. Plaintiff Schlund is not suing
Defendant Bush individually or/and Bush in his capacity as President
due to the wrongful acts and conduct of any asserted "agent," as set
forth in the Complaint. Plaintiff Schlund is only suing Defendant Bush
as an individual for his wrongful acts and conduct in that capacity.
Plaintiff Schlund is suing Defendant Bush for his continuous wrongful
acts and conduct violating Plaintiff's rights, as an individual now
with the status as President of the United States, and not any
individual agent under his authority or chain of command.
Therefore, Defendant's respondent superior principle and its Motion to
Dismiss is irrelevant and off point.
DEFENDANTS' CLAIM PLAINTIFF SCHLUND HAS NOT PLED A PROPER RICO CLAIM IS
MISPLACED. IT'S NOT PLEAD AT ALL.
In short, Plaintiff Schlund has simply, concisely, and directly pled a
cause of action for deprivation of civil rights based on
wrongful/illegal acts and conduct of the electronic and other
harassment, persecution, and torture of Plaintiff through use of
wireless telemetry and associated product(s) which can be proved are in
existence and used in that manner for that purpose, in violation of
Plaintiff Schlund's rights. In fact, the conduct, individually and
collectively of Defendant as an individual, and continued on after he
acquired the status and capacity of President of the United States does
not negate the nature, decree, and caliber of such acts and conduct of
a racketeering nature. Plaintiff Schlund has fully complied with
R.F.C.P. Rule 9(b), (f), and (g). See argument supra. See Argument
supra. Defendant first admits there is too much verified specific
facts asserted by Plaintiff Schlund supporting his causes of action
against Defendant, demanding a little more generalized and
conclusionary framed Complaint to place them on "notice" so that an
answer can be filed to the Complaint. In reverse, Plaintiff Schlund
files his First Amended Complaint, and now Defendants cry to the Court
that it purportedly contains "only general and conclusionary
allegations," wrongfully representing to the Court it is strictly a
RICO claim, requiring more specificity of pleading or it should be
dismissed. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at p. 3.
Therefore, because Plaintiff Schlund has not pled a racketeering cause
of action, the argument is irrelevant, moot, and misplaced as a matter
of law. Plaintiff Schlund's Complaint alleges "planning level" and/or
"operational" level activities in the use of wireless telemetry and
associated products to invade his privacy through illegal surveillance
used for torture, subjecting Defendant individually to liability, or as
an individual conducting same under color of authority or office,
shackled with the same liability. Brown v. U.S., 193 F.Supp. 692
(1961); United States v. Newstadt, 281 F.2d 597, 602 (1964); Fitch v.
United States, 513 F.2d 103 (1975); and Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681
(1997).
Defendants' assertion Plaintiff Schlund fails to plead in his First
Amended Complaint Defendants' violation of his right to vote and
religious freedoms is misplaced.
The construction of the specific averments in Plaintiff Schlund's
Complaint state that his United States' constitutional right to vote
and right to express his religious activities are being interfered with
by Defendant through Defendants' illegal and wrongful use of
electronic, wireless telemetry and associated electronic product(s),
causing injury and damage to him, which is continuous and ongoing.
Complaint p. 11 and 13-17. The Court is to look at the substance of
the Complaint, not the form, and uphold Plaintiff Schlund's right of
action. Plaintiff Schlund has alleged that Defendants' use of the
wireless technology to intrude and violate his rights or privacy
persecute, harass, and torture him and spills over to interfering with
his rights to vote and expressions of his religious freedoms under the
United States Constitution.
Plaintiff has pointed to the laws and rules of general applicability
under the United States Constitution (First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment), in violation of
those rights, irrespective of the supplemental allegations of the
violation of those rights connected to statutory and federal law, as
set forth in the Complaint. See First Amended Complaint to be read and
considered in its entirety, not specifically. Fed. R. of Civ. Proc.
Rule 8 and 9. See ive of the supplemental allegations of the violation
of those rights connected to statutory and federal law, as set forth in
the Complaint. See First Amended Complaint to be read and considered
in its entirety, not specifically. Fed. R. of Civ. Proc. Rule 8 and 9.
See Yamaguchi v. United States Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1481
(9th Cir. 1997) [Federal courts must liberally construe a pleading, and
the pleading rules only require that a complaint sufficiently establish
some basis for a judgment against the Defendant].
Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
[Complaint need not establish all that Plaintiff must eventually prove,
cross-over allegations of a general and specific nature do not negate
themselves in order to be read in a manner considering the Complaint
sufficiently establishes a basis for a judgment against a Defendant].
As to Defendants' other misplaced contentions, if the Court was to
accept Defendant as an individual or/and in his official status as
President, he would be entitled to qualified immunity for the
intentional deprivation of Plaintiff Schlund's civil rights through the
use of electronic wireless telemetry and associated electronic
product(s) used for torture and the illegal surveillance of a perpetual
ongoing nature and would place the Defendant above the law.
This is contrary to the United States Supreme Court's holding to render
all individuals liable (irrespective of their status) for wrongful
deprivation of another's civil rights, and especially when it involves
electronic intrusions of invasion of privacy, harassment, persecution,
and electronic torture of the person through such mediums previously
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court.
DEFENDANT ADMITS AND CONCEDES PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL AVERMENTS OF
HARASSMENT, PERSECUTION, AND TORTURE OF PLAINTIFF THROUGH ELECTRONIC
MEANS.
Defendant admits beyond the Motion to Dismiss he electronically
trespasses, harasses, persecutes, and tortures Plaintiff Schlund but
attempts to justify it. See, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at p. 5,
15: "Defendant acts pursuant to the laws of the United States." But
Defendant does not cite (nor can he) any law that allows him to use
electronic wireless telemetry and associated electronic product(s) to
deprive Plaintiff Schlund of his rights to privacy and torture him.
Nor justify Defendant's interference with Plaintiff Schlund's
expression of free speech, religion, or right to vote unfettered by
Defendant's electronic intrusive influence electronically. In re Agent
Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F.Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005),
[holding the individual potentially liable for the manufacturing of the
chemical and the government for negligently using it.
As an aside, Plaintiff Schlund has not expressed a generalized beef
with the U.S. Government (Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1109
9the Cir. 1995) as Defendant improperly contends. Motion to Dismiss,
p. 6.
Plaintiff Schlund has pursued a legitimate claim against a select
individual - George W. Bush, Jr., an individual who became President
through illegal activities of fixing the presidential election
Plaintiff Schlund forecasted the plans to fix the elections and
accurately stated how and where and the details. It is now again a
factual reality based on undisputed evidence that Defendant Bush, an
individual, is engaged in a joint operation, scheme, and plan to effect
control in the precise manner set forth in Plaintiff Schlund's
Complaint and violating Plaintiff Schlund's "rights as a political
witness. Complaint pgs. 1-29. Defendant is and can be held liable by
an honest, fair, and objective judge on the evidence at trial.
Plaintiff adds that the torture of Plaintiff has greatly changed due to
the paranoia of George W. Bush and his agents and the torture of
Plaintiff while on jobs has dramatically changed but remains heavy
while Plaintiff is out of site of a camera.
Plaintiff assumes this reduced torture is a result of the paranoia of
the corrupt agents over their belief that Judge Mathis may rule fairly
as an honest judge. If Judge Mathis rules for the government many
people will die from the use of this kind of torture by implants and
the use of this kind of torture in the United States will become common
place resulting in the fixing of trials and the protecting of drugs and
corruption. Plaintiff will be forced to go to other countries to write
books that can not be wrote in the United States because of the use of
torture by the government to stop them. Treaties are in force with many
countries on the use of these implants and other similar devices in
clothing and other things. Plaintiff can only go to countries that
would welcome books on the subjects Plaintiff has information on.
Plaintiff would be forced under torture and under the threat of death
to go to these countries to get the implants removed so Plaintiff can
write books with his returned freedom of speech denied in America as
the lawsuit is appealed. Plaintiff Schlund can prove in court that the
drug investigations against him are false and Plaintiff Schlund has ten
years of hair on his head that can be tested in court to prove that
Plaintiff Schlund has done no drugs and made no drugs and has not been
in contact with any drugs. Judge Mathis can call Plaintiff Schlund
before her at a time of her choosing for such test to be performed in
court. Mummies that were four thousand years old have been tested for
drugs and have tested positive. Surly Plaintiff Schlund can be tested
in court to prove his innocents.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS CLAIM HEARD BEFORE A JURY NO MATTER
HOW "BIZARRE" IT MAY SOUND TO THE DEFENDANT OR THE COURT
Plaintiff Schlund has the United States Constitutional "right" to have
his lawsuit heard by a jury of his peers "no matter how bizarre it may
sound" to the Defendant or specially, this Court. See, case on point,
State v. Fayle,143 Ariz. 565,658 P.2d 218 (Ariz. App. 1982)
CONCLUSION
Based upon the above said, position Plaintiff Schlund has set forth
sufficient allegations to place Defendant(s) on notice of the violation
of Plaintiff's rights. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be denied
and Defendant ordered to answer the Complaint.
BY:__________________________
Charles August Schlund, III
8520 North 54 Drive
Glendale Arizona 85302
Plaintiff in Pro Per
ORIGINAL hand-delivered this ___ day of October, 2005 to:
Clerk of the Court
U.S. District Court of Arizona
401 W. Washington Street
Phoenix, AZ 85009
and
COPIES of the foregoing mailed to:
Mr. Richard G. Patrick
Assistant U.S. Attorney
United States Attorney's Office District of Arizona
Two Renaissance Square
40 North Central Avenue, Suite 1200
Phoenix Arizona 85004-4408
Fax: (602) 514-7760
Office: (602) 514-7500
Richard...@usdoj.gov
The Honorable Virginia A. Mathis
United States District Court
Sandra Day O'Connor
United States Courthouse, Ste. 130
401 W. Washington St., S.P.C. 1
Phoenix, AZ 85003-2118
By ____________________________.
leoj_...@yahoo.com
> his lawsuit heard by a jury of his peers "no matter how bizarre it may
> sound" to the Defendant or specially, this Court. See, case on point,
> State v. Fayle,143 Ariz. 565,658 P.2d 218 (Ariz. App. 1982)
plaintiff should learn how to draft a proper complaint for a proper
civil suit. my advice ... get yourself a copy of the rules for civil
procedure. stay up late. many nights reading. come to love it!
[no offense, mr. schlund, but it's true. you don't want to use language
like, "as usual." as usual? relative to what? who? just trying to help]