Assumed Name-Is It Legal?

[Green]

If I wanted to use an assumed name like, for instance, T-Bone (ala
George Costanza of Seinfeld fame) in all my business affairs, is it
legal? I know using an assumed name to commit fraud would be
illegal. But suppose I just started using a pseudonym in all my legal
affairs.

For instance, suppose I land a job where I originally applied as T-
Bone. When hired I give my real social security number, and don't
plan nefarious activities. So it's not fraud, but is it a crime?

Suppose T-Bone uses the pay stubs from work as proof of a job in order
to buy a car. Or suppose I am able to register the car to T-Bone.

I move to a new city where everyone knows me as T-Bone.

Suppose I witness a crime and give my name as T-Bone. When I'm called
as a witness I swear my name is T-Bone.
Suppose I register as T-Bone to vote?

I just want to conduct my life under the name of T-Bone, but without
the 'formality' of having my name legally changed.

Sure, it's unusual, it's improper, but is it lawful?

If it's not a crime, does this improper use invalidate the actions
I've taken under that name? For instance, do I still own the car? Is
my testimony in the trial still valid? Suppose I go in one day to
vote and somehow the discrepancy is discovered. Can T-Bone still
vote, or will he be turned away?

I'd like to find authoritative Federal citations that indicate whether
it is lawful to conduct your general affairs under a false name.

[deadrat]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> If I wanted to use an assumed name like, for instance, T-Bone (ala
> George Costanza of Seinfeld fame) in all my business affairs, is it
> legal?

Yes.

> I know using an assumed name to commit fraud would be illegal.

Or using it for unfair competitive advantage. You can't call yourself
McDonald and open a hamburger stand. States may require you to register
an assumed name for doing business or getting professional licenses.

> But suppose I just started using a pseudonym in all my legal
> affairs.
>
> For instance, suppose I land a job where I originally applied as T-
> Bone. When hired I give my real social security number, and don't
> plan nefarious activities. So it's not fraud, but is it a crime?

Not a crime.

> Suppose T-Bone uses the pay stubs from work as proof of a job in order
> to buy a car. Or suppose I am able to register the car to T-Bone.

Fine. The DMV isn't interested in making moral judgments; they just want
their money.

> I move to a new city where everyone knows me as T-Bone.
>
> Suppose I witness a crime and give my name as T-Bone. When I'm called
> as a witness I swear my name is T-Bone.

Unless they ask for your given name or your legal name.

> Suppose I register as T-Bone to vote?

Do you have ID under the name T-Bone? How did you get it?

> I just want to conduct my life under the name of T-Bone, but without
> the 'formality' of having my name legally changed.
>
> Sure, it's unusual, it's improper, but is it lawful?

It's not unusual, improper, or unlawful.

> If it's not a crime, does this improper use invalidate the actions
> I've taken under that name?

No. You can even get married as T-Bone. Assuming you can find someone
who wants to married to someone called T-Bone.

> For instance, do I still own the car?

Of course. And you still owe any debts you incur under the name T-Bone.

> Is my testimony in the trial still valid?

Of course.

> Suppose I go in one day to
> vote and somehow the discrepancy is discovered. Can T-Bone still
> vote, or will he be turned away?

Procedures vary by state. If you're challenged, you may have to identify
yourself. How are you going to do that? Getting a state ID or passport
requires a birth certificate.

> I'd like to find authoritative Federal citations that indicate whether
> it is lawful to conduct your general affairs under a false name.

There is no such thing. Name usage is a state matter, and what you're
contemplating is called "the common law right to change a name by open
use." You'll need to check 51 jurisdictions for the specifics.

Note that you could be inviting trouble down the road. Who knows what
the Social Security Administration will do with two names under one SSN?
And sometimes your true name will be required, e.g., if you sue someone
in federal court. But all that's different from breaking the law.

*** I am not a lawyer, so this can't be legal advice. ***

[Bill Graham]

Authors, actors, and generally famous professionals do it all the time, so
it must be legal. You can pick any "nickname" you want to be known by, and
as long as you don't use it to defraud, it is perfectly legal.

[Greegor]

The most common reasons people try this crap
are to try to skip out on bills, criminal warrants,
mortgages etc.

Claims to the contrary are usually lies.

Welcome to usenet.

[Green]

On Feb 19, 1:48 pm, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:

> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > If I wanted to use an assumed name like, for instance, T-Bone (ala
> > George Costanza of Seinfeld fame) in all my business affairs, is it
> > legal?
>

> > I'd like to find authoritative Federal citations that indicate whether
> > it is lawful to conduct your general affairs under a false name.
>
> There is no such thing.  Name usage is a state matter, and what you're
> contemplating is called "the common law right to change a name by open
> use."  You'll need to check 51 jurisdictions for the specifics.
>

Suppose a government entity, say the City of New York, wished to do
the same thing. For instance, suppose Mayor Bloomberg had everyone
start referring to the city as "Big Apple," even in public documents,
correspondence, parking tickets, you know, everything.

Is there similarly a common law right for a municipality to change a
name by open use?

How and where would I find authoritative citations about this? What
topic would information be found under.

[Dave M.]

Green

Suppose a government entity, say the City of New York, wished to do
the same thing. For instance, suppose Mayor Bloomberg had everyone
start referring to the city as "Big Apple," even in public documents,
correspondence, parking tickets, you know, everything.

Is there similarly a common law right for a municipality to change a
name by open use?

Towns do change their names. Londinium is now called London. Over time
lots of words change in meaning, spelling, pronunciation et c. That sort of
change may be "open use". I have heard of towns voting to change their
names.

Dave M.

[Green]

On Feb 20, 12:08 pm, "Dave M." <marte...@frontier.com> wrote:
> Green

>
> Is there similarly a common law right for a municipality to change a
> name by open use?
>
>    Towns do change their names. Londinium is now called London. Over time
> lots of words change in meaning, spelling, pronunciation et c. That sort of
> change may be "open use". I have heard of towns voting to change their
> names.
>
> Dave M.

I have more in mind an informal name change, without the vote, without
a filing with the state, without a registered DBA. No formality in
changing the name whatsoever.

Suppose the Mayor ordered that parking tickets be printed with the
name "Big Apple" instead of "City of New York". Then the Mayor
announced to the press that the City was going to start using these
tickets.

Suppose I got such a parking ticket in New York. I know it is a
legitimate ticket because I heard on the news that New York was going
to start using that name on tickets. It's also a legitimate ticket
because I was in fact double-parked, and because I happen to know the
officer who issued the citation and saw the citation being issued.

If challenged in court, under what legal theory should I be able to
prevail and beat the ticket? Or otherwise, under what legal theory
should the City prevail?

[c...@ocd.org]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Is there ... a common law right for a municipality to change a
> name by open use?

A city is a fictively created entity whose existence,
name, and other attributes are governed by the jurisdiction's
applicable constitutional, legislative, and duly enacted regulatory
provisions.
There accordingly are important differences between,
on the one hand, common law principles which as a matter of substance
may be informative and perhaps even sometimes apply to a determination
of a city's obligations, prerogatives, and rights and, on the other
hand, procedural issues such as whether and when and, if so, how a
city, as such, may and may not effectively commence and prosecute some
sort of civil or administrative or criminal proceeding or to delegate
or not be permitted to delegate such authority when it otherwise
exists to some other person or agency to do so on the city's behalf.
The considerations summarized below in any event make
this a different question from your query quoted below.

>I have more in mind an informal name change, without the vote, without
>a filing with the state, without a registered DBA. No formality in
>changing the name whatsoever.
>Suppose the Mayor ordered that parking tickets be printed with the
>name "Big Apple" instead of "City of New York". Then the Mayor
>announced to the press that the City was going to start using these
>tickets.
>Suppose I got such a parking ticket in New York. I know it is a
>legitimate ticket because I heard on the news that New York was going
>to start using that name on tickets. It's also a legitimate ticket
>because I was in fact double-parked, and because I happen to know the
>officer who issued the citation and saw the citation being issued.
>If challenged in court, under what legal theory should I be able to
>prevail and beat the ticket? Or otherwise, under what legal theory
>should the City prevail?

Referring to N.Y. City in particular, these questions
rest in substantial part on misassumptions of practicality compounded
by the key fact you hypothesize, namely, that you know that a ticket
is a legitimate one because the relevant facts also known to you are
to the effect that, for the purposes of that ticket, Big Apple refers
to a kind of d/b/a designation for the City of N.Y.
More basically, they rest on a fallacious assumption.
That is that whether or not it contains a Big Apple logo and words or
a City of N.Y. logo and words, the traffic summons, which is a state
law permitted form, is not issued in by the city itself and, instead,
by whoever is the accusing law enforcement officer or other officer
authorized by law to issue the summons.
And for non criminal traffic offenses and summonses,
which are relegated by applicable law to the city's Traffic Violations
Bureau for disposition including adjudication when contested, it would
be worse than ridiculous except in the rare case of glaringly
offensive official conduct to assume that the largely deterrent and,
above all, municipal and state revenue generating purposes of that
Bureau under color of enforcing the state's vehicle and traffic laws
would be frustrated by the sort of hyper technical claim you wonder
about especially when as you say, the affected driver or other
respondent knows what you say you would know in addition to what else
is stated and attested to on the summons.

[Green]

On Feb 21, 12:08 pm, c...@ocd.org wrote:

> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > Is there ... a common law right for a municipality to change a
> > name by open use?
>

>                 And for non criminal traffic offenses and summonses,
> which are relegated by applicable law to the city's Traffic Violations
> Bureau for disposition including adjudication when contested, it would
> be worse than ridiculous except in the rare case of glaringly
> offensive official conduct to assume that the largely deterrent and,
> above all, municipal and state revenue generating purposes of that
> Bureau under color of enforcing the state's vehicle and traffic laws
> would be frustrated by the sort of hyper technical claim you wonder
> about especially when as you say, the affected driver or other
> respondent knows what you say you would know in addition to what else
> is stated and attested to on the summons.

It's not hyper technical to me. I am challenging the legality of a
municipal ordinance wherein the city's proper name was not used.

I can appreciate the difficulty in battling the city over such a
matter, but I'm really more interested in the legality that the
practicality.

If we extend your scenario above, I plead not guilty and go to trial,
I'll argue that the City as no authority either to cite me or
prosecute me using the alias "Big Apple."

I can understand the judge not caring one whit about my argument that
I am not guilty for the 'technical' reason that the city has no
authority to cite me using the moniker "Big Apple."

But the judge might have a thing or two to say about the City filing
papers in his court under the pseudonym "Big Apple."

Let's suppose the court turns a blind eye toward my prosecution, rules
against my argument, and finds me guilty. I appeal the decision all
the way up to the highest level (the US Supreme Court?). What are the
legal reasons the higher court might or might not find that the City
of New York has, without any formal name change or formal authority,
may issue citations for such non-criminal acts?

[Green]

Oops, mean to say:

What are the legal reasons a higher court might or might not find that
the City of New York, without any formal name change or approval from
a higher authority, has the power to issue citations for non-criminal
acts using the alias "Big Apple"?

[c...@ocd.org]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 08:10:50 -0800 (PST), Green <Gree...@yahoo.com>
wrote:

{ familiarity with thread's earlier postings is assumed }

>> { <snip> - part of an earlier response not relevant to
>> the legal argument the poster says he wants to make
>> but which questioned of practicality of him relying
>> on the sort of claim he contemplates making }

>It's not hyper technical to me. I am challenging the legality of a
>municipal ordinance wherein the city's proper name was not used.

> ....
>If ... I plead not guilty and go to trial,

>I'll argue that the City as no authority either to cite me or
>prosecute me using the alias "Big Apple."

Your problem here is not that you do not sufficiently
appreciate hyper technicality. It is that you ignore a core defect
with your attempt so far to begin to construct an argument along the
lines you indicate even though you were alerted to the presence of
this defect earlier. And one more time it is this:

> .... the judge might have a thing or two to say about the City filing

>papers in his court under the pseudonym "Big Apple."

No matter whether the city is referred to on the
city's version of the state's so-called Uniform Traffic Summons or
not, and no matter whether this is done in the city's formal name
("the City of New York") or by some colloquial reference (for
instance, "Big Apple" which, not incidentally, you said earlier you
"know" is a designation for N.Y. City), or both (and you also did not
say that both appellations do not appear on the summons in question),
it is not "the City" (or the "Big Apple") that is prosecuting you. It
is instead the traffic officer or police officer who issued and signed
and served you with then filed the summons who is the complainant.
And by the way, your reference to a judge may be
misplaced since you have not said that you are charged with an offense
triable by a judge instead of a hearing officer (who, in that
capacity, acts with the same authority as would a judge).
But no matter whether your case is tried before a
judge or hearing officer, what it is most likely that person might say
are these two things: "What is the nature of your defense?" and, after
giving you a reasonable time to respond and listening to you,
"Guilty". And however unlikely, if that person was to say more than
that in the nature of explanation, it might be something along the
lines above or - perhaps especially since you said earlier that you
would acknowledge that you "know" that you were served with a
"legitimate" ticket or summons which you contend was issued and served
and filed on behalf of the city - that you are relying on a trivial
irregularity which, as such, should and will be disregarded.

>Let's suppose the court turns a blind eye toward my prosecution,
>rules against my argument, and finds me guilty.

I am guessing that you mean attempted "defense" and
not "prosecution".

> I appeal the decision all
>the way up to the highest level (the US Supreme Court?).

One can think abstractly of a possibly at most
borderline plausible if not more likely wrongfully frivolous way
verbally to frame your contemplated attempted defense as if one in
constitutional terms, but you have not yet done so. There accordingly
would not even in a stretching of the limits of reason manner be any
way ethically to try to appeal a conviction to the US supreme court.
But unless and until you have posted facts about the
summons that indicate otherwise, presumably it would be reasonable to
suppose that you would have a right to appeal to some extent pursuant
to sects. 227 and 228 of the state's Vehicle and Traffic Law as
conceivably subject to judicial review via a N.Y. CPLR Art. 78
proceeding if you have seen to it that there is an adequate record and
have done the other things needed to preserve the availability for you
of these alternatives.

> What are the
>legal reasons the higher court might or might not find that the City
>of New York has, without any formal name change or formal authority,
>may issue citations for such non-criminal acts?

This has been explained to you earlier and again
above. This is so especially if, as you have not said is not the
case, you refer to a low level alleged civil traffic offense and not
to an allegation and prosecution for any of the penal provisions of
the state's Vehicle and Traffic Law or related ones of the state's
Penal Law or of the N.Y.C. Administrative Code.

[Green]

Must've picked a bad example to help illustrate the question, as the
discussion is concentrating on the minutia of the example rather than
the essence of the question.

I'm most interested in Pennsylvania law. If people generally have the
common law right to change a name by open use, is there anything
similar that might apply to local municipalities using an alias,
particularly in enacting ordinances? What would it be referred to, or
what topics should I look at in the law library?

[c...@ocd.org]

On Wed, 22 Feb 2012 23:10:34 -0800 (PST), Green <Gree...@yahoo.com>
wrote:

>Must've picked a bad example to help illustrate the question, as the
>discussion is concentrating on the minutia of the example rather than
>the essence of the question.

What you now label as 'minutia' are facts that YOU
chose to post as the ones you said were relevant to your own
assumptions about the significance or not of the use by a municipality
for the particular purposes you asked about AND, while what you now
say were a bad examples of what you were wondering about, it also was
you who focused exclusively on N.Y. and N.Y. City in particular so
that you did not even mention and certainly were very far from clear
that you have been most interested in behaviors governed by
Pennsylvania law.

>I'm most interested in Pennsylvania law. If people generally have the
>common law right to change a name by open use, is there anything
>similar that might apply to local municipalities using an alias,
>particularly in enacting ordinances? What would it be referred to, or
>what topics should I look at in the law library?

These questions posed this way reintroduce a fallacy
that was present in your earlier postings but which was unnecessary to
discuss because it was overshadowed by other actually glaring
fallacies you made necessary to consider by your introduction of what
you now term minutia, and it is this:
You seem to assume - and, if you do, incorrectly -
that there is going to be a onesizefitsall! answer which in turn will
enable some sort of discretely focused library research when you pose
your underlying query as open endedly as you now seem to want to do.
Especially puzzling in this connection is that one
aspect of this sort of misassumption by you is something to which you
maybe even consciously give lip service via your introduction of an
'anything like' fudge factor but which you then go on to ignore,
namely, and as you do note, that municipalities are fictive corporate
bodies which, even if in some instances originally established in
pre-statutory times, are for the most part now largely the creatures
of and in any event subject to applicable municipal regulating
legislation, which are different from so-called 'natural persons' who,
as a matter of common law right, are permitted for some purposes to
chose their own names.
In addition and as ought be noted to help establish
context for municipal name related purposes, do not overlook that what
you refer to as an individual's common law right to adopt and use
almost any non fraudulent name that does not otherwise impair existing
proprietary rights of others has, more or less, been such a right BUT
that it is a right that increasingly has become impaired in recent
times in light of social, technological, political, and law regulated
developments associated with increasing nationalization in general,
computerization, increasing local and state and federal governmental
and corporate power, intrusively 'common law' eroding or outright
eliminating federal statutes (eg., the P.A.T.R.I.O.T. Act and
amendments over time to the Immigration Act), etc.
In other words, your decision to frame your queries in
terms of an analogy you presuppose to be an accurate one, comparing
individual's names and rights associated therewith with the naming
obligations and prerogatives of municipal corporations or comparable
governmental entities, is inherently suspect from the get go.
There in any event is not and therefore you will not
find any one answer to what is and is not 'legal' for a municipality
to do in connection with its name that will apply to all
circumstances. And while one will find SOME instances of SOME kinds
of behaviors by or on behalf of or as against a municipality that, to
be valid, must be done 'in the name of' the municipality, even then
one often will find legislative or judicially decided authority to the
effect that any number of occasional variances between a legislatively
or regulatorily prescribed 'in the name of' requirement will be
legislatively or, as the case may be, administratively or judicially
overlooked and so disregarded. Depending on all the relevant facts.
THEREFORE, what you now belatedly label as 'minutia
(or, to be more accurately probably ought refer to as 'minutiae
because there rarely is only one factual detail that will be
determinative in contested situations) is(are) essential to take into
account to be able intelligently and productively to undertake
relevant analysis and legal research and, more importantly, to arrive
at a probably effective real world answer about how to approach a
disputed or likely to be contested claim in connection with which the
name of a municipality is likely to be a significant issue.
If, however, you refocus your interest on Pennsylvania
but still only in the context of what you said earlier that you now
label as 'minitua' - an alleged violation of law by you while driving
a motor vehicle in connection with which you question the name related
formalities of a summons - you will find that Pennsylvania law
throughout the state essentially parallels what was discussed earlier
in this thread about N.Y. traffic violations and related adjudicatory
proceedings including who/what is and is not the law signficant
complainant.
In any event, what sort of research and analysis will
and will not be productive will begin with, that is above all will
depend on, a fair statement of the relevant facts of the controversy
as, realistically estimated, each party would contend those facts to
be.


,

[c...@ocd.org]

{ for more see earlier postings in thread if interested }

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote in part:

> (I)s there anything similar (to individuals' common law
> name change rights) that might apply to local municipalities

> using an alias, particularly in enacting ordinances?

In the nature of a 'P.S.' my earlier response to you
which inadvertently omitted these questions but which you might find
it helpful to answer for yourself if not for others are:
Can you provide any example of a municipality in
Penna. or anywhere else in the U.S. which, using an alias to identify
itself, enacted enacted an ordinance?
What if any local municipalities using an alias did
this and, if so, when and in what manner in connection with what
particular subject matter?

[Green]

On Feb 23, 3:18 pm, c...@ocd.org wrote:
>  { for more see earlier postings in thread if interested }
>

> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote in part:

In adopting an ordinance, a municipality used an informal appellation
(e.g., New York City) rather than the proper legal name (e.g., City of
New York). I've not yet been able to find any statute or case law on
point. I've only found the following generalized empowerment clauses.

17. A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in express
words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express powers,
essential to its purposes and that are not simply convenient but are
indispensable in carrying out its municipal duties. Warner Cable
Communications Inc. v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, 784 F. Supp. 203
(E.D. Pa. 1992); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment of Tredyffrin Tp., 414
Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
18. As a nonsovereign, a third-class city has only those powers
expressly given it by the legislature. City of Washington v. Police
Dept. Of City of Washington, 259 A.2d 437, 436 Pa. 168, Sup.1969.
19. Since municipalities are not sovereign, they have no original or
inherent powers, and exclusively derive their power from enabling
statutory legislation. In re Acquisition of Water System 327 Pa 424,
93 A2d 437 (1953).
20. If a party files a preliminary objection in the nature of a
demurrer, and the pleadings in question provide a cause of action
under any theory of law, as for example under alternative theories,
the preliminary objection will be overruled. Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa.
590, 716 A.2d 1231 (1998); Willet v. Pennsylvania Medical Catastrophe
Loss Fund, 549 Pa. 613, 702 A.2d 850 (1997); Packler v. State
Employe's Retirement Bd., 470 Pa. 368, 368 A.2d 673 (1997); Morgan
Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Hydraroll, Ltd., 2000 PA Super 228, 759 A.2d 926
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2000), reconsideration and reargument denied, (Oct.
12, 2000).
21. The novelty of a claim or theory does not compel the affirmance of
a demurrer. Denton v. Silver Stream Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr.,
739 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. Super. 1999).

I'm considering arguing that, even if use of the alias was an
inadvertent mistake, the municipality has no power to use said alias,
and that the harm is that such use might frustrate the public notice
requirements for enactment of ordinances.

Thoughts?

[Green]

On Feb 24, 1:27 am, Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> I'm considering arguing that, even if use of the alias was an
> inadvertent mistake, the municipality has no power to use said alias,
> and that the harm is that such use might frustrate the public notice
> requirements for enactment of ordinances.
>
> Thoughts?

I should add that it is an ordinance requiring property owners to use
the city-provided trash collection service, with mandatory payment of
fees and penalties for non-compliance.

[deadrat]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> On Feb 23, 3:18 pm, c...@ocd.org wrote:

<snip/>

> In adopting an ordinance, a municipality used an informal appellation
> (e.g., New York City) rather than the proper legal name (e.g., City of
> New York).

Please quote the part of the ordinance that uses the nickname.

<snip/>

> I'm considering arguing that, even if use of the alias was an
> inadvertent mistake, the municipality has no power to use said alias,
> and that the harm is that such use might frustrate the public notice
> requirements for enactment of ordinances.

What are you doing? Trying to get the law enjoined on the grounds that
its language makes it invalid? Arguing that you, yourself shouldn't have
to pay the penalty for violating the law because it used a confusing
nickname?

> Thoughts?

I'll reserve comment until I understand better what you're doing.

[deadrat]

So you've got an ordinance that says something like "All owners of
property in New York City must pay the fees set by the New York City
Department of Sanitation regardless of whether they use its services."
And you'd like to know whether you have to obey the ordinance because it
should read "property in the City of New York" and fees set by the
Department of Sanitation of the City of New York"?

Generally speaking, vague laws are unconstitutional. Someone of average
intelligence must be able to determine whether he's subject to the law;
if so, what behavior the law mandates or prohibits; and what penalties
accrue for noncompliance.

Here's what I expect to happen when you make your motion:

Judge: What are you? Stupid?

You: No, your honor.

Judge: Are you sure?

You: Yes, your honor.

Judge: Against all available evidence, I will accept your word. Any
person who's not stupid understands that New York City refers to the City
of New York. Did you pay the fees required?

I may be using stereotypes of New Yorkers here.

[Green]

On Feb 24, 11:27 am, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:
> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>

> > I'm considering arguing that, even if use of the alias was an
> > inadvertent mistake, the municipality has no power to use said alias,
> > and that the harm is that such use might frustrate the public notice
> > requirements for enactment of ordinances.
>
> What are you doing?  Trying to get the law enjoined on the grounds that
> its language makes it invalid?  Arguing that you, yourself shouldn't have
> to pay the penalty for violating the law because it used a confusing
> nickname?
>

I'm asking the Court to declare the ordinance invalid on the basis
that the municipality may only do as specifically authorized by the
Commonwealth, and the municipality has no such authorization. In
addition, there is potential harm in that using an informal name in
enacting legislation may obscure the sunshine of public scrutiny.

I am not asking that I be exempt from payment of fees, nor that the
law does not apply to me. In fact, I believe that the law does apply
to me because laws are generally presumed to be valid unless and until
declared otherwise.

I'm asking the court to declare the ordinance void. Then if the
municipality is so inclined, it may go back and redo the ordinance
using the proper name.

What legal theory would a judge use to decide that the ordinance
stands despite the fact that the name of the municipality does not
appear in said ordinance, particularly since the defect is curable?
(I think this is the correct way to pose the question.)

Wouldn't such a decision mean that, as interpreted by the court, a
municipality has the express grant of power from the Commonwealth to
use a pseudonym?

[deadrat]

The municipality has the express grant of power to implement ordinances in
the areas designated by the state constitution and the state legislature.
These ordinances are things. A judge is going to determine whether a
reasonable person would understand that the nickname and the official name
refer to the same city. Nicknames and official names are labels. The law
does not confuse things and labels. You shouldn't either.

I wouldn't be surprised if somewhere in the municipal ordinances there's a
section that talks about references: "All occurrences of New York City
must be construed to refer to the City of New York." Have you looked?

[c...@ocd.org]

On Thu, 23 Feb 2012 22:27:33 -0800 (PST), Green <Gree...@yahoo.com>
wrote:

>In adopting an ordinance, a municipality used an informal appellation
>(e.g., New York City) rather than the proper legal name (e.g., City of
>New York). I've not yet been able to find any statute or case law on
>point. I've only found the following generalized empowerment clauses.

Now that you indicate that you pose your questions and
conclusions in this thread (they are not actually "arguments" despite
your use of that word ) as the guy who posted earlier that he has been
operating a trash hauling business in a Penna. city which, acting with
state conferred local law authority, enacted an ordinance to the
effect that it is shifting to a single city contracted trash hauler so
that existing such businesses no longer will be permitted to operate
in the city after their existing mostly monthly customer agreements
have expired and that you and other haulers are suing to try to
invalidate that ordinance, I suppose the reader ought simply defer to
deadrat's entirely cogent, persuasive, and almost certainly correct
responses to you.
But a few additional and maybe even later to become
significant comments about what you seem to presume to be your
analysis are appropriate anyway:

>17. A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in express
>words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express powers,
>essential to its purposes and that are not simply convenient but are
>indispensable in carrying out its municipal duties. Warner Cable
>Communications Inc. v. Borough of Schuylkill Haven, 784 F. Supp. 203
>(E.D. Pa. 1992); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment of Tredyffrin Tp., 414
>Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).

If I am right to infer from the numbering and style of
expression in light of what I think I recall you posted earlier that
you cut and pasted this and your other statements quoted below from
your response to the city defendant's preliminary objections to your
declaratory judgment complaint, it might be noted that your no. 17
statement suggests that you do not know what "implied" means - that
is, what is "fairly implied" as an "incident" of expressly conferred
authority - and, despite what you might presuppose in lay terms is
meant by the "indispensable" qualifier, how flexible Penna. courts
have been in construing/applying how "in carrying out municipal
duties" generally is understood.
Nor do you seem to be aware that the decisions you
cite here or in connection with your no. 18 do not concern themselves
with obviously trivial and incidental procedural matters such as a
Penna. equivalent of a Penna. city referring to itself as "New York
City" instead of "The City of New York" for some purpose and, instead,
concern cases in which a municipality _substantively_ exceeded its
authority in legislating about _subject_ _matters_ which applicable
state or federal law did not authorize the city to legislate about
(e.g., in cases of state or federal pre-emption).

>18. As a nonsovereign, a third-class city has only those powers
>expressly given it by the legislature. City of Washington v. Police
>Dept. Of City of Washington, 259 A.2d 437, 436 Pa. 168, Sup.1969.
>19. Since municipalities are not sovereign, they have no original or
>inherent powers, and exclusively derive their power from enabling
>statutory legislation. In re Acquisition of Water System 327 Pa 424,
>93 A2d 437 (1953).

Correct. But for the purposes to which you refer,
this obviously is little more than rhetorical make-weight (or
"boilerplate").

>20. If a party files a preliminary objection in the nature of a
>demurrer, and the pleadings in question provide a cause of action
>under any theory of law, as for example under alternative theories,

>the preliminary objection will be overruled. [ citations omitted ]

Correct.

>21. The novelty of a claim or theory does not compel the affirmance of
>a demurrer. Denton v. Silver Stream Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr.,
>739 A.2d 571, 575 (Pa. Super. 1999).

Correct, except that you omitted the word "alone" --
in other words, that merely because an alleged claim is novel is not a
reason, without more, to sustain a demurrer. Worse, you apparently
are all too willing but without any stated justification or even
explanation to excuse yourself from abiding by an obvious corollary to
this dictum, namely by you not answering,

What if anything _in_ _addition_ to its being
novel makes your misnomer related contentions
worthy of the grant of any relief to you and not
relief to the city, if the court in the exercise
of its deems this appropriate and desirable, to
disregard whatever is the disparity between what
you would contend is the city's "legal name" and
whatever is the identification for which the city
opted in the ordinance in question?

You in other words ignore that that a claim is novel
does not alone warrant the grant of relief to the asserter of that
claim on the basis only of its novelty.

>I'm considering arguing that, even if use of the alias was an
>inadvertent mistake, the municipality has no power to use said alias,
>and that the harm is that such use might frustrate the public notice
>requirements for enactment of ordinances.

As I said, this is not an argument and instead merely
a conclusion, an empty fiat.
It is further puzzling because you acknowledge that
you have not found any legislative or statutory authority in support
of what you term an "argument" in this connection.
And arguably even more troubling is that what you said
earlier makes the concluding part of this statement apparently one of
actual bad faith, that is, that you acknowledge that you did not have
any lack of notice by reason of how the city identified itself in the
ordinance during its pre-enactment stage since, to the contrary, you
did not then have any doubt whatever, and you still do not doubt, that
the ordinance was being enacted by the city in question to apply to
that city.
As deadrat reminded you in effect, if how the Penna.
city identified itself is parallel to the "New York City" instead of
"The City of New York" example you gave earlier, you have not even
referred what actually would be a misnomer let alone to an "alias" or
other fictional name situation.

>Thoughts?
Not that this matters anymore, but as an example of
your sloppiness of thought, you might want to recall that you began
this thread with what you assumed might be an analogy between city
names and individual person's names and what you said was a "common
law right" for people to adopt whatever names they wish subject only
to the sorts of caveats discussed earlier. However, not that you have
made clear that Penna. is the jurisdiction of most interest to you,
you might want to note that it is a state which legislatively has
substantially qualified what you imagined to be a "common law right".
If considered in isolation this is as I say only an
incidental point, but it appears to be of a piece with your preference
for substituting conclusions based on mere assumption for legal
argument.

[Green]

Just for clarification, there are several issues in the complaint, of
which the lack of use of a proper name is the weakest. But I’d still
like to use said issue if I can support it.

Bear with me; let me see if I can even begin to construct a proper
legal argument (if anyone is so inclined, please feel free to help).

-------------------------------
begin

Conclusion: The Court should declare the ordinance invalid because the
city used only a nickname, and never used its proper legal name, when
referring to itself in the ordinance.

Statement of the rule: When enacting an ordinance, the use of other
than the municipality’s proper legal name in the text of the
ordinance: is contrary to the intent of the policy of sufficient
public notice (sunshine) of legislative action; is a procedural step
not authorized by the Commonwealth; is a procedural step subject to
strict construction.

Rule 1: The purpose of statutory procedures used in enacting a
municipal ordinance are to provide sufficient notice of governmental
action to the public. (This one is a guess, I’ll have to do some
research on, say, Sunshine Laws)
Rule 2: The statutory procedures used in enacting said ordinance are
mandatory and are strictly applied; if the municipality fails to
comply with such requirements, the courts may declare the ordinance
invalid. (This one is an actual rule)
Rule 3: Said ordinance is subject to a strict construction because it
is penal in nature. (Actual)
Rule 4: A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in

express words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express

powers. (Actual -- as cited above)

While there appear to be no statutes or opinions exactly on point, as
a case of first impression, this Court should rule that the failure to
use the proper legal name in an ordinance a City is enacting is
contrary to the public interest.

end
---------------------------------------------------

That’s all I’ve go so far. Any criticism or help is welcome!

[Green]

On Feb 24, 4:43 pm, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:


> These ordinances are things.  A judge is going to determine whether a
> reasonable person would understand that the nickname and the official name
> refer to the same city.  Nicknames and official names are labels.  The law
> does not confuse things and labels.  You shouldn't either.
>

The point I was trying to make is more along the lines of 'how does a
reasonable person come to know that the municipality_is_enacting the
ordinance?' For instance, an electronic search using the name "City
of New York" would turn up nothing on a proposed ordinance that
contained only the name "New York City.'

Use of a nickname unnecessarily obscures from public view the
enactment process. Without an express grant to use the nickname, why
would a reasonable person even think to conduct a nickname search?

[c...@ocd.org]

On Sat, 25 Feb 2012 13:26:55 -0800 (PST), Green <Gree...@yahoo.com>
wrote:

>Just for clarification, there are several issues in the complaint, of
>which the lack of use of a proper name is the weakest. But I’d still
>like to use said issue if I can support it.

You do not appear to have considered whether your
introduction of and reliance on what you acknowledge to be the weakest
of your contemplated contentions may be substantially credibility
undermining. However, this may be especially so if, as you also say
although you have not specifically identified and supported so saying
either, you have actually substantial arguments for which you have
good support as a basis for the court to grant you the relief in your
lawsuit to invalidate the law of which you complain. Notions of
intelligent rhetorical focus and of deflection and dilution apparently
have no meaning for you.
Another unanswered question raised in effect but which
you have not answered in _any_ of your postings in this thread
remains: What do you mean by 'Assumed Name' as applied to the city and
ordinance in question?

> ............................

>
> The Court should declare the ordinance invalid because the
>city used only a nickname, and never used its proper legal name, when
>referring to itself in the ordinance.

Except by way of what you first indicated you thought
was an analogy to another state and another city which, however, you
later said you considered to be 'minutia that you now believe does not
actually apply to you and your lawsuit in any event, you have not said
here or anywhere else in this thread what is the name of the city in
question that is not a nickname and an Assumed Name as you use these
words in the subject you selected for this thread and or how you would
claim to know that that name is not a nickname or Assumed Name.

>Statement of the rule: When enacting an ordinance, the use of
>other than the municipality’s proper legal name in the text of the
>ordinance: is contrary to the intent of the policy of sufficient
>public notice (sunshine) of legislative action; is a procedural step
>not authorized by the Commonwealth; is a procedural step subject to
>strict construction.

Here again and still equally if not more important
than the above considerations in this connection, you do not provide
any actual information about ANY of the following:
>> what you believe and would contend is the city's true or,
as you might prefer to put it, 'legal' name;
>> how you know on the basis of what state statute or
regulation or applicable administrative ruling or local ordinance or
decision of any court at judicial level that proscribes the use of the
name by which the city identified itself in the notice of proposed
enactment of the subject ordinance and in the ordinance itself;
>> how if at all any such actually supportable principle of
law also requires a court judicially to declare the law invalid or
which even suggests explicitly that a name variance of whatever is the
particular nature you have in mind ought even be considered by a court
as an influential factor in deciding whether judicially to invalidate
the law to which you refer.
This last omission is not one susceptible of mere
reliance as you apparently propose to do on the sorts of only
generalized principles you state since, _even_ _if_ there is some sort
of purportedly required form of naming, one would have to analyze how
_if_ at all substantially, in particular, the name used by the city
did not comply with such a prescription. This is especially so
where, as you seem to have suggested, the others similarly situated to
you would acknowledge as you already have acknowledged that you and
they have known at all material times that the city in question, as
such, proposed to enact that law that would be and now is applicable
to the city, as such (by whatever name the city is known), and made
its proposed text available for inspection and copying at some
reasonable time before its adoption and enactment.
And while you also have suggested even if you never
specified in your news group postings that you have a basis to
complain about other omissions or errors by the city in connection
with the ordinance's enactment that provide a basis for your lawsuit
other than and so in addition to, the name variance if there is such,
but you have not you said how or even that these other alleged defects
are relevant to your contentions about the city's name usage. And,
again, the 'if there is such' qualifier remains important not to
overlook because you are aware that you have not provided any of the
information referred to above while you acknowledge that that
information is significant for the subject of this thread.

>Rule 1: The purpose of statutory procedures used in enacting a
>municipal ordinance are to provide sufficient notice of governmental
>action to the public. (This one is a guess, I’ll have to do some
>research on, say, Sunshine Laws)
>Rule 2: The statutory procedures used in enacting said ordinance are
>mandatory and are strictly applied; if the municipality fails to
>comply with such requirements, the courts may declare the ordinance
>invalid. (This one is an actual rule)

You do not need to guess. These are basically correct
statements, as far as it goes.
BUT the core question apart from timing and where the
notice shall be published or otherwise given that you continue to beg
in this connection is: What _sort_ of notice _if_ any in addition to
the following? -
>> that the city's governing body proposes to enact whatever
is the ordinance on behalf of the city as identified with its proposed
relevant statutory number or other comparable mode of citation;
>> the text of the proposed law or, absent that, a brief
statement of its purpose and substance stated in reasonable detail and
also a statement identifying where at a fairly convenient time and
place a member of the public may read a complete copy;
>> that a hearing will be held at an also reasonable time and
place on whatever is the stated date and time at which directly
affected members of the public and also anyone else claiming to have
something relevant to say will be permitted to express their complete
or only partial support or complete or partial opposition and their
reasons therefor.

>Rule 3: Said ordinance is subject to a strict construction because
>it is penal in nature. (Actual)

You have not made clear that the ordinance of which
you complain 'is penal in nature' and you seem instead to have
suggested that it is regulatory in its basic nature, but this is a
fair statement if it is penal in nature and maybe even if it is not.

>Rule 4: A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in

>express words, necessary or implied in or [incident] to its express

>powers. (Actual -- as cited above)

These also are reasonably correct statements.
_However_, surely you must see, do you not?, that you do not mention
here or elsewhere in connection with your reference to pre enactment
notice on behalf of the city that is required to be given _how_ the
governmental body in question shall and may and may not be identified
in the notice or in the proposed ordinance +or about what effect shall
be given the ordinance if there is some variation between any such
prescribed mode of identification (name used) and the identification
(name used) in the notice and ordinance.
In other words, your ENTIRE summary remains a mere
(though partly correct in 'boilerplate' terms) conclusion not
connected to the question you pose in your chosen subject of this
thread.

>While there appear to be no statutes or opinions exactly on point, as
>a case of first impression, this Court should rule that the failure to
>use the proper legal name in an ordinance a City is enacting is
>contrary to the public interest.

Beyond you not having quoted or even cited any
statutes or judicial opinions exactly on point, you have not cited
provided an argument or support in law for _any_ aspect of your
contention _including_ as demonstrated that you have not even shown
that what you term a 'nickname' or 'Assumed Name' is that.

[deadrat]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> Just for clarification, there are several issues in the complaint, of
> which the lack of use of a proper name is the weakest. But I’d still
> like to use said issue if I can support it.
>
> Bear with me; let me see if I can even begin to construct a proper
> legal argument (if anyone is so inclined, please feel free to help).
>
> -------------------------------
> begin
>
> Conclusion: The Court should declare the ordinance invalid because the
> city used only a nickname, and never used its proper legal name, when
> referring to itself in the ordinance.
>
> Statement of the rule: When enacting an ordinance, the use of other
> than the municipality’s proper legal name in the text of the
> ordinance: is contrary to the intent of the policy of sufficient
> public notice (sunshine) of legislative action;

You don't tell us the jurisdiction, so it's impossible to give much help that
can be of use, but let's assume that the ordinance itself followed required
public notice procedures for wherever yo are. A court is going to ask whether
any reasonable person would fail to understand that the nickname referred to the
city. Do you suppose that a federal court decision is invalid because the
opinion used "United States" or "US" or "U.S." instead of "The United States of
America"?

> is a procedural step not authorized by the Commonwealth;

Ah, "Commonwealth." So you're in PA or MA?

> is a procedural step

It's not a procedural step. That would be something like taking a vote with a
quorum present. It's a textual issue.

> subject to strict construction.

Where do you find the legal definition of "strict construction" in the statutes
of the Commonwealth?

> Rule 1: The purpose of statutory procedures used in enacting a
> municipal ordinance are to provide sufficient notice of governmental
> action to the public. (This one is a guess, I’ll have to do some
> research on, say, Sunshine Laws)

In Illinois, you can go here:

http://illinoispress.org/public-notice-illinois-government-245.html

Perhaps your jurisdiction has a similar resource.

> Rule 2: The statutory procedures used in enacting said ordinance are
> mandatory and are strictly applied; if the municipality fails to
> comply with such requirements, the courts may declare the ordinance
> invalid. (This one is an actual rule)

This is likely true, but the nickname isn't a procedural issue.

> Rule 3: Said ordinance is subject to a strict construction because it
> is penal in nature. (Actual)

Actual where? And I'm guessing that not paying fees isn't penal. You just get
slapped with a fine for noncompliance.

> Rule 4: A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in
> express words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express
> powers. (Actual -- as cited above)

But the municipality is (presumably) exercising a power granted to it. The
municipality just hasn't phrased something to your liking.

> While there appear to be no statutes or opinions exactly on point, as
> a case of first impression, this Court should rule that the failure to
> use the proper legal name in an ordinance a City is enacting is
> contrary to the public interest.

Only if the name is misleading. Is it?

[deadrat]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> On Feb 24, 4:43 pm, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:
>
>
>> These ordinances are things.  A judge is going to determine whether a
>> reasonable person would understand that the nickname and the official nam
e
>> refer to the same city.  Nicknames and official names are labels.  Th
e law
>> does not confuse things and labels.  You shouldn't either.
>>
>
> The point I was trying to make is more along the lines of 'how does a
> reasonable person come to know that the municipality_is_enacting the
> ordinance?'

This is set out in state law. In Illinois, public notice means publication
in one or more newspapers.

> For instance, an electronic search using the name "City
> of New York" would turn up nothing on a proposed ordinance that
> contained only the name "New York City.'

You don't get to determine what form public notice takes. The law tells
you.

> Use of a nickname unnecessarily obscures from public view the
> enactment process.

It might obscure the entity performing the process, but not the process
itself.

> Without an express grant to use the nickname, why
> would a reasonable person even think to conduct a nickname search?

The law doesn't require that you be able to do a name search. It usually
requires a form of publication.

[Green]

On Feb 25, 8:42 pm, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:
> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>

> You don't tell us the jurisdiction, so it's impossible to give much help that
> can be of use, but let's assume that the ordinance itself followed required
> public notice procedures for wherever yo are.

It's in a non-home-rule municipality in Pennsylvania

 A court is going to ask whether
> any reasonable person would fail to understand that the nickname referred to the
> city.  Do you suppose that a federal court decision is invalid because the
> opinion used "United States" or "US" or "U.S." instead of "The United States of
> America"?
>

I take your point here. Are there laws or decisions on point in this
matter.

One response I can think of is that the notification process in the
filing of a court document and the enactment of an ordinance are
fundamentally different. Notification for court cases is by service
of process, while notification for local legislative action is by
considerably less direct methods, with just as potentially serious
consequences for the citizen who does not receive actual notice.

>
> Where do you find the legal definition of "strict construction" in the statutes
> of the Commonwealth?
>

Not PA specific.

>
> > Rule 3:  Said ordinance is subject to a strict construction because it
> > is penal in nature. (Actual)
>
> Actual where?

Ordinances that are penal in nature are subject to a strict
construction. Beacon Warehouse, Inc v City of Pittsburgh, 16 Pa.
Commw. 16, 328 A2d. 585 (1974).

 And I'm guessing that not paying fees isn't penal.  You just get
> slapped with a fine for noncompliance.
>

Fine of up to $600 and imprisonment up to 6 months.

> > Rule 4: A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in
> > express words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express
> > powers.  (Actual -- as cited above)
>
> But the municipality is (presumably) exercising a power granted to it.  The
> municipality just hasn't phrased something to your liking.
>

I don't dispute that the municipality has the power to enact a similar
ordinance -- one which contains the proper legal name of the
municipality.

> > While there appear to be no statutes or opinions exactly on point, as
> > a case of first impression, this Court should rule that the failure to
> > use the proper legal name in an ordinance a City is enacting is
> > contrary to the public interest.
>
> Only if the name is misleading.  Is it?
>

The name is not misleading, only obscuring. What is the basis for the
position that, if the nickname is not misleading, it is not contrary
to the public interest?

[Green]

On Feb 25, 8:18 pm, c...@ocd.org wrote:
> On Sat, 25 Feb 2012 13:26:55 -0800 (PST), Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com>

> wrote:
>
> >Just for clarification, there are several issues in the complaint, of
> >which the lack of use of a proper name is the weakest.  But I’d still
> >like to use said issue if I can support it.
>
>                 You do not appear to have considered whether your
> introduction of and reliance on what you acknowledge to be the weakest
> of your contemplated contentions may be substantially credibility
> undermining.  However, this may be especially so if, as you also say
> although you have not specifically identified and supported so saying
> either, you have actually substantial arguments for which you have
> good support as a basis for the court to grant you the relief in your
> lawsuit to invalidate the law of which you complain.  Notions of
> intelligent rhetorical focus and of deflection and dilution apparently
> have no meaning for you.

Yes, I am quite certain I've not considered these finer points, but
now that you mention them, along with the difficulty in convincing
anyone here that this position has merit, perhaps I should seriously
consider these points.

>                 Another unanswered question raised in effect but which
> you have not answered in _any_ of your postings in this thread
> remains: What do you mean by 'Assumed Name' as applied to the city and
> ordinance in question?
>

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "as applied to," but I'll
try this:

It is the same as the difference between "City of Anytown", and
"Anytown City." Checking with the Department of State the name
"Anytown City" is a county orphan, while the name "City of Anytown" is
a business corporation (I'm assuming this means municipal
corporation).

In the ordinance, the name "Anytown City" is used every time one might
expect the name "City of Anytown" to appear.

>
>         >> how you know on the basis of what state statute or
> regulation or applicable administrative ruling or local ordinance or
> decision of any court at judicial level that proscribes the use of the
> name by which the city identified itself in the notice of proposed
> enactment of the subject ordinance and in the ordinance itself;

I don't know that it is proscribed. I suspect by my inability, so
far, to find any citations on point, that this issue probably has not
been considered at the appellate level.

>         >> how if at all any such actually supportable principle of
> law also requires a court judicially to declare the law invalid or
> which even suggests explicitly that a name variance of whatever is the
> particular nature you have in mind ought even be considered by a court
> as an influential factor in deciding whether judicially to invalidate
> the law to which you refer.

I originally planned to ask the judge to do decide.

>
>                 These also are reasonably correct statements.
> _However_, surely you must see, do you not?, that you do not mention
> here or elsewhere in connection with your reference to pre enactment
> notice on behalf of the city that is required to be given _how_ the
> governmental body in question shall and may and may not be identified
> in the notice or in the proposed ordinance +or about what effect shall
> be given the ordinance if there is some variation between any such
> prescribed mode of identification (name used) and the identification
> (name used) in the notice and ordinance.
>                 In other words, your ENTIRE summary remains a mere
> (though partly correct in 'boilerplate' terms) conclusion not
> connected to the question you pose in your chosen subject of this
> thread.

I do not understand your point.

>
>                 Beyond you not having quoted or even cited any
> statutes or judicial opinions exactly on point, you have not cited
> provided an argument or support in law for _any_ aspect of your
> contention _including_ as demonstrated that you have not even shown
> that what you term a 'nickname' or 'Assumed Name' is that.
>

Help me out, what exactly is an 'argument,' and could you explain to
me how to structure one on this point?

I suspect there are no statutes or decisions on point, or if there
are, they are too obscure for me to have discovered.

But my question is: have I stated my position sufficiently clearly;
have I stated my position as strongly as possible; what am I missing
that I could add to the position that the ordinance is invalid because
it not not contain the name of the municipality?

[deadrat]

Green <Gree...@yahoo.com> wrote:

> On Feb 25, 8:42 pm, deadrat <a...@b.com> wrote:
>> Green <GreenR...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>> You don't tell us the jurisdiction, so it's impossible to give much help
>> that can be of use, but let's assume that the ordinance itself followed
>> required public notice procedures for wherever yo are.
>
> It's in a non-home-rule municipality in Pennsylvania
>
>> A court is going to ask whether any reasonable person would
>> fail to understand that the nickname referred to the
>> city.  Do you suppose that a federal court decision is invalid because
>> the opinion used "United States" or "US" or "U.S." instead of "The United
>> States of America"?

> I take your point here. Are there laws or decisions on point in this
> matter.

This article may be of some use to you:

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3243/is_1_64/ai_n28803039/?
tag=content;col1

> One response I can think of is that the notification process in the
> filing of a court document and the enactment of an ordinance are
> fundamentally different. Notification for court cases is by service
> of process, while notification for local legislative action is by
> considerably less direct methods, with just as potentially serious
> consequences for the citizen who does not receive actual notice.

Notice is effected by the methods outlined in the law. It's almost always
publication in local newspapers. If it's so published, you've received legal
notice, whether you read the notices or not.

>> Where do you find the legal definition of "strict construction" in the
>> statutes of the Commonwealth?

> Not PA specific.

Spot on. I'll try below to give my take on the article listed above.

>> > Rule 3:  Said ordinance is subject to a strict construction because
>> > it is penal in nature. (Actual)
>>
>> Actual where?
>
> Ordinances that are penal in nature are subject to a strict
> construction. Beacon Warehouse, Inc v City of Pittsburgh, 16 Pa.
> Commw. 16, 328 A2d. 585 (1974).

OK. See below. You've misunderstood what it means for a penal ordinance to be
subject to strict construction.

>>  And I'm guessing that not paying fees isn't penal.  You just get
>> slapped with a fine for noncompliance.

> Fine of up to $600 and imprisonment up to 6 months.

I guessed wrong.

>> > Rule 4: A municipality can exercise only those powers granted in
>> > express words, necessary or implied in or instant to its express
>> > powers.  (Actual -- as cited above)
>>
>> But the municipality is (presumably) exercising a power granted to it.
>> The municipality just hasn't phrased something to your liking.
>
> I don't dispute that the municipality has the power to enact a similar
> ordinance -- one which contains the proper legal name of the
> municipality.

Then you have no complaints against procedure.

>> > While there appear to be no statutes or opinions exactly on point, as
>> > a case of first impression, this Court should rule that the failure to
>> > use the proper legal name in an ordinance a City is enacting is
>> > contrary to the public interest.
>>
>> Only if the name is misleading.  Is it?

> The name is not misleading, only obscuring. What is the basis for the
> position that, if the nickname is not misleading, it is not contrary
> to the public interest?

You've raised a new issue, public interest. I don't think you'll find much joy
there. The law has a concept of public policy, which applies to some actions,
notably making wills and entering into contracts. So, a court may refuse to
enforce a non-compete agreement in an otherwise valid employment contract
because such an agreement is against public policy. But if a law was properly
enacted and doesn't conflict with a higher law, the it is by definition public
policy.

Here's the promised help. It may be worth what you're paying for it.

There are two issues at work in applying strict construction to statutes. The
first is textual and concerns what implications a court is allowed to draw from
the language of the statute. Under strict construction, courts must restrict
themselves to necessary implications, i.e., those which admit of no other
reasonable interpretation or those which if not made, defeat the intent of the
legislature or the purpose of the legislation. (Applying liberal construction
to the definition of "legislature" and "legislation.") It is important to note
that strict construction is not literal construction, and I think it's the
latter that you want (but can't have). So transposing to New York, a court will
ask whether there is any municipality that the New York City Council could
possibly mean other than the City of New York when it uses the name "New York
City" in one of its ordinances. Next a court will ask whether the Council
intended to pass an ordinance for the City of New York, the purpose of which was
to regulate some activity in the City of New York. To do this, the court may
examine the legislative history of the ordinance in question or the Council's
nomenclature in other ordinances. Strict construction will not demand voiding
the ordinance on the basis of the nickname. To do that would require that the
court believe that the New York City Council intended to waste its time passing
regulations for a city outside its jurisdiction, one that may indeed even be
fictional.

(Note that I can construct a non-frivolous example. Suppose the New York City
Council left off the word "City," and just mentioned "New York." A court would
take the immediate implication that "New York" couldn't refer to the entire
state since the Council's powers don't reach that far. But did the Council mean
the City of New York or the County of New York?)

The second issue is the meaning of strict construction in a procedural sense.
In this instance, strict construction means resolving doubts in favor of a
particular party. For penal statutes this is always the defendant. Suppose the
ordinance fines a violator who's a resident of the municipality. There are many
ways to determine residence -- property ownership, property occupation, taking
local benefits like a drivers license, the place of voting, a declaration in a
tax filing, and so on. Under strict construction, if there's any doubt as to
whether an alleged violator is a resident of the municipality, that doubt must
be resolved in favor or the alleged violator.

(In my New York example, a resident of Richmond County who's run afoul of the
ordinance would be able to claim that there is some doubt as to whether the
ordinance applies to all five boroughs. Since the language might restrict the
ordinance to New York County and thus apply only to Manhattanites, there's some
doubt as to its application to Staten Islanders like him. He should skate.)