This is loosely based on an incident in high school many years ago. What I wondering is if anybody committed a crime, or even if no crime, is there any civil liability? The two students involved are a Hall Monitor (HM) and a "regular" student (ST).
ST is in the hall about 5 minutes after the period started (reason is legit, but he has no hall pass or note from the faculty or staff with whom he was meeting). HM stops him and asks for a pass; ST tells HM he doesn't have one, that he was coming from a meeting with whoever, and is going directly to his next class. HM tells ST that he's going to take him to the office. ST tells HM he's just going to continue to his class, and at some point HM initiates physical contact. There is an altercation and ST is injured. When both stories are put together, what's agreed to is that ST ignored HM, HM initiated physical contact to force ST's compliance, ST attempted to break the hold, and HM escalated his level of force in response to ST's resistance until ST was injured. ST's parents inform the principal that they're going to sue HM, HM's parents, and the school, as well as press criminal charges against HM.
Now comes the monkey wrench (and this actually occurred in the incident this scenario is based on). It turns out that the HM faculty advisor (aka the football coach) has told the HM's (aka the football team; they serve as HM's during the time that would otherwise be in their PE class) that they may use physical force to gain compliance. Given this additional info-
1. Will HM probably be acquitted on the assault and battery charge if it goes to trial? 2. Has the faculty advisor committed a crime by pre-approving this HM's use of force? 3. Does this relieve HM of liability for ST's injuries (medical costs and pain_and_suffering)? 4. Does this add to the liability of the school because their employee authorized the assault? 5. Would this typically result in punitive damages against the school?
On May 4, 8:41 pm, Stan K <stanle...@hotmail.com> wrote:
[Hall Monitor stopped Student from walking away and ignoring HM, using physical force that injured Student]
> the HM faculty > advisor (aka the football coach) has told the HM's (aka the football > team; they serve as HM's during the time that would otherwise be in > their PE class) that they may use physical force to gain compliance.
The hall monitors are not duly deputized law enforcement officers. Therefore, they had no such right. The State has a monopoly on the use of force, and does so only through properly authorized and trained LEOs. Even they can be liable if they use _excessive_ force. These hall monitors probably had no training whatsoever in what degree of force was appropriate in certain situations, how to apply force without unnecessary injury, and so on, as LEOs are trained to do.
> 1. Will HM probably be acquitted on the assault and battery charge if > it goes to trial?
Probably not, if the evidence shows he intentionally struck Student. He did not have any legal authorization to do so, and ignorance of the law (the belief that he _did_ have such authorization, from "coach") is no excuse. He exceeded his actual authority, and even an actual cop who does that (and who also may well believe he is acting properly in restraining a perp) can be charged and convicted of assault.
> 2. Has the faculty advisor committed a crime by pre-approving this > HM's use of force?
What crime? It's not up to us to guess what he might be charged with, unless you ask us to play the role of prosecutor. Being an idiot is not a crime. I can't think of any specific criminal charge I would bring against the coach, but faculty discipline (or firing) is a far more likely remedy.
> 3. Does this relieve HM of liability for ST's injuries (medical costs > and pain_and_suffering)?
How? A civil suit for damages has nothing to do with whether criminal charges are viable or not. The tort of battery exists whenever a person touches the person of another, without the other's consent, in a harmful or offensive manner. It is an "intentional" tort, meaning, all that is necessary to prove liability is that the touching occurred, that it was harmful or offensive, and that the defendant _intended_ to do it. "Intent" does not only refer to purpose or motive, but includes consciously taking some action (such as swinging one's fist in a certain direction, frex) _knowing_ that it will, or likely will, have certain consequences (coming into contact with the victim's nose, frex).
> 4. Does this add to the liability of the school because their > employee authorized the assault?
Probably yes. The employment and/or agency relationship may make the school vicariously liable both for what the coach did, and for what the hall monitors did (the HMs were "agents" of the school even if they were not "employees"). Alternatively, it may make the school, and the coach, liable on a theory of negligence (in that they knew or should have known not to tell the hall monitors to "swing away" to stop a student).
> 5. Would this typically result in punitive damages against the school?
If the school is found vicariously liable for the hall monitor's battery tort, quite likely so. Not likely, if the school is found liable merely for negligence in instructing the hall monitors as to their rights and duties.
-- This posting is for discussion purposes, not professional advice. Anything you post on this Newsgroup is public information. I am not your lawyer, and you are not my client in any specific legal matter. For confidential professional advice, consult your own lawyer in a private communication.
Mike Jacobs LAW OFFICE OF W. MICHAEL JACOBS 10440 Little Patuxent Pkwy #300 Columbia, MD 21044 (tel) 410-740-5685 (fax) 410-740-4300
Stan K <stanle...@hotmail.com> wrote: [Hall Monitor(HM) sees student (ST) in the hall during class. HM uses physical force to detain ST, and ST is injured.]
>Now comes the monkey wrench (and this actually occurred in the >incident this scenario is based on). It turns out that the HM faculty >advisor (aka the football coach) has told the HM's (aka the football >team; they serve as HM's during the time that would otherwise be in >their PE class) that they may use physical force to gain compliance. >Given this additional info-
>1. Will HM probably be acquitted on the assault and battery charge if >it goes to trial?
Probably not(*). HM used physical force on ST, probably without legal justification. Of course, there's no telling what a jury will do -- you could get a pro-police jury that isn't going to convict on a situation like that no matter what.
>2. Has the faculty advisor committed a crime by pre-approving this >HM's use of force?
Maybe, maybe not. It depends on the circumstances. THe faculty advisor probably has "plausible deniability": he can claim that the approval to use physical force was intended only to apply to situations where HM did in fact have a right to detain ST (which probably isn't this one).
>3. Does this relieve HM of liability for ST's injuries (medical costs >and pain_and_suffering)?
No. "I vas only followink orders" is not an excuse.(*)
>4. Does this add to the liability of the school because their >employee authorized the assault?
Maybe. I think that HM was already acting as an agent of the school, so the school would be liable if HM was.(*)
>5. Would this typically result in punitive damages against the school?
It would if I were on the jury.(*)
(*) The courts have been creating more and more exceptions for schools and Peace Officers to use physical force. It's gotten so hard to win even a civil case against them that the exclusionary rule is about the only protection we have left. So it's possible that a judge might create some sort of "right" for the HM to use physical force on behalf of the school, as a sort of junior Peace Officer or something. If so, all the above reasoning doesn't apply.
This is for discussion purposes only, and is not legal advice. I'm not a lawyer. If you want legal advice, hire a lawyer.
BG> (*) The courts have been creating more and more exceptions for schools BG> and Peace Officers to use physical force. It's gotten so hard to win BG> even a civil case against them that the exclusionary rule is about the BG> only protection we have left.
Barry, how would you explain this trend? These days, almost daily there's another article on another blog about another police brutality, followed by some hundreds of comments, about 90% condemning the police; yet, in the courtroom it's the other way around, like the judges and jury are totally different crowd, and like attorneys for the defense are totally helpless. Even assuming that the prosecution picks the jury, doesn't the defense do the same? and you are saying that it's getting harder. Why?
In article <o8GIn.5971$yx.5...@newsfe13.iad>, bat <b...@bats.com> wrote: > BG> (*) The courts have been creating more and more exceptions for schools > BG> and Peace Officers to use physical force. It's gotten so hard to win > BG> even a civil case against them that the exclusionary rule is about the > BG> only protection we have left.
>Barry, how would you explain this trend? These days, almost daily there's >another article on another blog about another police brutality, followed by >some hundreds of comments, about 90% condemning the police; yet, in the >courtroom it's the other way around, like the judges and jury are totally >different crowd, and like attorneys for the defense are totally helpless. >Even assuming that the prosecution picks the jury, doesn't the defense do >the same? and you are saying that it's getting harder. Why?
Because the higher courts (esp. SCOtus) have ruled that, even if you win a jury verdict, it will be overturned if the officer had a "good faith" belief that he was doing the right thing, or in some cases simply that there wasn't an _existing_ court decision saying he couldn't do that.
You can almost always find some detail in which (the current case) differs from (previously decided case), so the lawyers for the cop (and the PD and city or State) will claim that the cop wasn't "on notice" that his misbehavior was wrong.
Note that this is a major departure from, e.g., the 1960s. Back then, the higher courts were likely to find in favor of those who had been maltreated by cops, and send an unfavorable verdict back to lower court based on some error by the trial judge. Now, it's the other way around: you can win in lower court and have the whole thing thrown out at the appellate level. -- Barry Gold, webmaster for: Conchord: http://www.conchord.org Los Angeles Science Fantasy Society: http://www.lasfsinc.org My blog: http://goldslaw.livejournal.com/
> Because the higher courts (esp. SCOtus) have ruled that, even if you > win a jury verdict, it will be overturned if the officer had a "good > faith" belief that he was doing the right thing, or in some cases > simply that there wasn't an _existing_ court decision saying he > couldn't do that.
Question: How do you get out of the Catch-22 issue where "LEO does X. There was no existing court decision saying X was wrong, even though it is very obvious that it's wrong (maybe no-one has actually done X before and there's no law that quite covers X but yet we can clearly see that X is just absolutely unspeakable in polite society. Strip and cavity-searching a 5yo girl by a male principal might fit under this.) So we can't say LEO is guilty since there was no prior case saying he couldn't do that"?
Can a court say "X is wrong. We won't find this particular defendant guilty/liable due to lack of precedence. However, be on notice that if anyone else does it, we will hold them accountable"? I.e. can the court have a finding that "X is wrong" and yet also hold that "Y is not guilty of/liable for X" in the same case?
On May 19, 4:36 pm, bg...@nyx.net (Barry Gold) wrote:
> In article <o8GIn.5971$yx.5...@newsfe13.iad>, bat <b...@bats.com> wrote: > >you are saying that it's getting harder. Why?
> Because the higher courts (esp. SCOtus) have ruled that, even if you > win a jury verdict, it will be overturned if the officer had a "good > faith" belief that he was doing the right thing, or in some cases > simply that there wasn't an _existing_ court decision saying he > couldn't do that.
That's the concept of "qualified immunity" as most recently enlarged and extended to shield crooked cops.
> You can almost always find some detail in which (the current case) > differs from (previously decided case), so the lawyers for the cop > (and the PD and city or State) will claim that the cop wasn't "on > notice" that his misbehavior was wrong.
Which, of course, simply encourages the sadistic or power-hungry cop to find creative _new_ ways to beat people up.
> Note that this is a major departure from, e.g., the 1960s. Back then, > the higher courts were likely to find in favor of those who had been > maltreated by cops, and send an unfavorable verdict back to lower > court based on some error by the trial judge. Now, it's the other way > around: you can win in lower court and have the whole thing thrown out > at the appellate level.
Barry's right, and let me add that in addition to a much tougher qualified-immunity attitude toward police-brutality claims now in the highly conservative US Supreme Court (and many of the circuits, esp. the extremely conservative 4th Cir whose bailliwick includes Maryland, Virginia, and the other Piedmont/tobacco states of the Southeastern Seaboard), SCOTUS has also thrown a monkey wrench into such cases (and _many_other_ types of claims) with the recent _Iqbal_ and _Twombly_ decisions (look 'em up - they're easy to find) in terms of the degree of specificity of pleading which a plaintiff must meet, or risk being thrown out before he even puts on (or gathers in discovery) a lick of evidence. In other words, if the facts showing culpability of the defendant are known only to the defendant, there is now almost no way for the planitiff to overcome that hurdle and successfully sue. Talk about your incentives for potential defendants to sabotage the ideal of transparency in government, sunshine laws, and open records laws. The better corrupt or bigoted officials are at hiding their crimes, the more likely they are to get away with them. -- This posting is for discussion purposes, not professional advice. Anything you post on this Newsgroup is public information. I am not your lawyer, and you are not my client in any specific legal matter. For confidential professional advice, consult your own lawyer in a private communication. Mike Jacobs LAW OFFICE OF W. MICHAEL JACOBS 10440 Little Patuxent Pkwy #300 Columbia, MD 21044 (tel) 410-740-5685 (fax) 410-740-4300
In article <ht602j$cp...@news.eternal-september.org>,
Mike <prabb...@shamrocksgf.com> wrote: >Question: How do you get out of the Catch-22 issue where "LEO does X. >There was no existing court decision saying X was wrong, even though it >is very obvious that it's wrong (maybe no-one has actually done X before >and there's no law that quite covers X but yet we can clearly see that X >is just absolutely unspeakable in polite society. Strip and >cavity-searching a 5yo girl by a male principal might fit under this.) >So we can't say LEO is guilty since there was no prior case saying he >couldn't do that"?
Generally, a lower court says "LEO is guilty" and a higher court says "Because that specific issue has not been litigated before, LEO might not have known it wasn't allowed, so that particular LEO gets off this time."
>Can a court say "X is wrong. We won't find this particular defendant >guilty/liable due to lack of precedence. However, be on notice that if >anyone else does it, we will hold them accountable"?
I don't know if a single court can do that, but I'd think it could. (However, it would still be better for it to happen as above, if nothing else because the appeals court is likely to have a larger area where it is determinative.)
se...@panix.com (Seth) wrote: >>Question: How do you get out of the Catch-22 issue where "LEO does X. >>There was no existing court decision saying X was wrong, even though it >>is very obvious that it's wrong (maybe no-one has actually done X before >>and there's no law that quite covers X but yet we can clearly see that X >>is just absolutely unspeakable in polite society. Strip and >>cavity-searching a 5yo girl by a male principal might fit under this.) >>So we can't say LEO is guilty since there was no prior case saying he >>couldn't do that"? > Generally, a lower court says "LEO is guilty" and a higher court says > "Because that specific issue has not been litigated before, LEO might > not have known it wasn't allowed, so that particular LEO gets off this > time."
Generally, a lower court does NOT find LEO is guilty. The doctrine of qualified immunity means the officer does not have to stand trial at all unless the immunity hurdle is met. For the purposes of deciding such a motion (and for no other purpose), the plaintiff's claims are assumed to be true. This might not be true after Twombly and Iqbal, but they're true enough for the moment. The court isn't required to accept pure speculations, allegations of conspiracy or fraud, or outright absurdities as true.
However, given the claim of the plaintiff, if the conduct alleged is *not* a violation of "clearly established law," the case is dismissed. Period. On top of that, if the officer loses, the officer may *immediately* take the issue to the appeals court. This is unlike most failures at a motion to dismiss, where only after the trial (or after the judge changes her mind) do you get another bite at the apple.
The doctrine of immunity means the case is simply beyond the court's jurisdiction and must be dismissed.
This means that a case doesn't get to violate "clearly established law" unless it already does, and if it hasn't, this won't be found until a court rules on it. So how does a court rule on it if it has to throw the case out if it isn't already?
Sometimes, an appeals court will uphold a dismissal on the "not clearly established law" grounds, but then go on to find that the behavior was a violation of a constitutional right. Since this doesn't affect either of the parties to the suit, this ruling is superfluous to the actual case and some argue that it's a purely advisory opinion, which is not allowed.
But since there would otherwise be no way to "clearly establish" law, the courts tolerate this irrationality. What they should do is simply do away with this doctrine in its current form, since it's a cumbersome, stupid way to do things and leads to great injustice: after all, what is the moral difference between someone who has had their rights violated if the one cop who did it was just lucky enough to have done it one day before some Circuit Court of Appeals decides it's now "clearly established," and the plaintiff in *that* case has his case thrown out anyway.
One plaintiff may win big, and the other gets the shaft. Meanwhile, the one who gets the shaft is the one who actually "clearly established" that this behavior is illegal, and he (or his lawyer) is the one who laid out all the legal capital to accomplish this. It's just not fair. It also discourages such litigants from even trying. A cynical person would suggest this is exactly *why* the conservative Justices have crafted this ridiculous Rube Goldberg operation.
The two leading cases on this issue are Saucier v. Katz and Hope v. Pelzer (on how the violation doesn't have to be *exactly* like a previous violation to be "clearly established"). Also there's a lot of argument as to whether "clearly establishing" things like this is advisory opinion, much of it in law journals.