First The Beast Nation Needs Permanent Military Bases In The Middle East, Southeast Europe, Latin America & Southeast Asia, Then We Rule The World MuWhaHaHaHaJahBuLon
My Name
Bookman is the deputy editorial page editor of The Atlanta
Journal- Constitution
The official story on Iraq has never made sense. The
connection that the Bush administration has tried to draw
between Iraq and al-Qaida has always seemed contrived and
artificial. In fact, it was hard to believe that smart
people in the Bush administration would start a major war
based on such flimsy evidence.
Related
Donald Kagan: Comparing America to ancient empires is 'ludicrous'
Read President Bush's National Security Strategy
"Rebuilding America's Defenses," a 2000 report by the
Project for the New American Century, listed 27 people as
having attended meetings or contributed papers in
preparation of the report. Among them are six who have since
assumed key defense and foreign policy positions in the Bush
administration. And the report seems to have become a
blueprint for Bush's foreign and defense policy.
Paul Wolfowitz
Political science doctorate from University of Chicago and
dean of the international relations program at Johns Hopkins
University during the 1990s. Served in the Reagan State
Department, moved to the Pentagon during the first Bush
administration as undersecretary of defense for policy.
Sworn in as deputy defense secretary in March 2001.
John Bolton
Yale Law grad who worked in the Reagan administration as an
assistant attorney general. Switched to the State Department
in the first Bush administration as assistant secretary for
international organization affairs. Sworn in as
undersecretary of state for arms control and international
security, May 2001.
Eliot Cohen
Harvard doctorate in government who taught at Harvard and at
the Naval War College. Now directs strategic studies at
Johns Hopkins and is the author of several books on military
strategy. Was on the Defense Department's policy planning
staff in the first Bush administration and is now on Donald
Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board.
I. Lewis Libby
Law degree from Columbia (Yale undergrad). Held advisory
positions in the Reagan State Department. Was a partner in a
Washington law firm in the late '80s before becoming deputy
undersecretary of defense for policy in the first Bush
administration (under Dick Cheney). Now is the vice
president's chief of staff.
Dov Zakheim
Doctorate in economics and politics from Oxford University.
Worked on policy issues in the Reagan Defense Department and
went into private defense consulting during the 1990s. Was
foreign policy adviser to the 2000 Bush campaign. Sworn in
as undersecretary of defense (comptroller) and chief
financial officer for the Pentagon, May 2001.
Stephen Cambone
Political science doctorate from Claremont Graduate School.
Was in charge of strategic defense policy at the Defense
Department in the first Bush administration. Now heads the
Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation at the Defense
Department.
The pieces just didn't fit. Something else had to be going
on; something was missing.
In recent days, those missing pieces have finally begun to
fall into place. As it turns out, this is not really about
Iraq. It is not about weapons of mass destruction, or
terrorism, or Saddam, or U.N. resolutions.
This war, should it come, is intended to mark the official
emergence of the United States as a full-fledged global
empire, seizing sole responsibility and authority as
planetary policeman. It would be the culmination of a plan
10 years or more in the making, carried out by those who
believe the United States must seize the opportunity for
global domination, even if it means becoming the "American
imperialists" that our enemies always claimed we were.
Once that is understood, other mysteries solve themselves.
For example, why does the administration seem unconcerned
about an exit strategy from Iraq once Saddam is toppled?
Because we won't be leaving. Having conquered Iraq, the
United States will create permanent military bases in that
country from which to dominate the Middle East, including
neighboring Iran.
In an interview Friday, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
brushed aside that suggestion, noting that the United States
does not covet other nations' territory. That may be true,
but 57 years after World War II ended, we still have major
bases in Germany and Japan. We will do the same in Iraq.
And why has the administration dismissed the option of
containing and deterring Iraq, as we had the Soviet Union
for 45 years? Because even if it worked, containment and
deterrence would not allow the expansion of American power.
Besides, they are beneath us as an empire. Rome did not
stoop to containment; it conquered. And so should we.
Among the architects of this would-be American Empire are a
group of brilliant and powerful people who now hold key
positions in the Bush administration: They envision the
creation and enforcement of what they call a worldwide "Pax
Americana," or American peace. But so far, the American
people have not appreciated the true extent of that
ambition.
Part of it's laid out in the National Security Strategy, a
document in which each administration outlines its approach
to defending the country. The Bush administration plan,
released Sept. 20, marks a significant departure from
previous approaches, a change that it attributes largely to
the attacks of Sept. 11.
To address the terrorism threat, the president's report lays
out a newly aggressive military and foreign policy,
embracing pre-emptive attack against perceived enemies. It
speaks in blunt terms of what it calls "American
internationalism," of ignoring international opinion if that
suits U.S. interests. "The best defense is a good offense,"
the document asserts.
It dismisses deterrence as a Cold War relic and instead
talks of "convincing or compelling states to accept their
sovereign responsibilities."
In essence, it lays out a plan for permanent U.S. military
and economic domination of every region on the globe,
unfettered by international treaty or concern. And to make
that plan a reality, it envisions a stark expansion of our
global military presence.
"The United States will require bases and stations within
and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia," the document
warns, "as well as temporary access arrangements for the
long-distance deployment of U.S. troops."
The report's repeated references to terrorism are
misleading, however, because the approach of the new
National Security Strategy was clearly not inspired by the
events of Sept. 11. They can be found in much the same
language in a report issued in September 2000 by the Project
for the New American Century, a group of conservative
interventionists outraged by the thought that the United
States might be forfeiting its chance at a global empire.
"At no time in history has the international security order
been as conducive to American interests and ideals," the
report said. stated two years ago. "The challenge of this
coming century is to preserve and enhance this 'American
peace.' "
Familiar themes
Overall, that 2000 report reads like a blueprint for current
Bush defense policy. Most of what it advocates, the Bush
administration has tried to accomplish. For example, the
project report urged the repudiation of the anti-ballistic
missile treaty and a commitment to a global missile defense
system. The administration has taken that course.
It recommended that to project sufficient power worldwide to
enforce Pax Americana, the United States would have to
increase defense spending from 3 percent of gross domestic
product to as much as 3.8 percent. For next year, the Bush
administration has requested a defense budget of $379
billion, almost exactly 3.8 percent of GDP.
It advocates the "transformation" of the U.S. military to
meet its expanded obligations, including the cancellation of
such outmoded defense programs as the Crusader artillery
system. That's exactly the message being preached by
Rumsfeld and others.
It urges the development of small nuclear warheads "required
in targeting the very deep, underground hardened bunkers
that are being built by many of our potential adversaries."
This year the GOP-led U.S. House gave the Pentagon the green
light to develop such a weapon, called the Robust Nuclear
Earth Penetrator, while the Senate has so far balked.
That close tracking of recommendation with current policy is
hardly surprising, given the current positions of the people
who contributed to the 2000 report.
Paul Wolfowitz is now deputy defense secretary. John Bolton
is undersecretary of state. Stephen Cambone is head of the
Pentagon's Office of Program, Analysis and Evaluation. Eliot
Cohen and Devon Cross are members of the Defense Policy
Board, which advises Rumsfeld. I. Lewis Libby is chief of
staff to Vice President Dick Cheney. Dov Zakheim is
comptroller for the Defense Department.
'Constabulary duties'
Because they were still just private citizens in 2000, the
authors of the project report could be more frank and less
diplomatic than they were in drafting the National Security
Strategy. Back in 2000, they clearly identified Iran, Iraq
and North Korea as primary short-term targets, well before
President Bush tagged them as the Axis of Evil. In their
report, they criticize the fact that in war planning against
North Korea and Iraq, "past Pentagon wargames have given
little or no consideration to the force requirements
necessary not only to defeat an attack but to remove these
regimes from power."
To preserve the Pax Americana, the report says U.S. forces
will be required to perform "constabulary duties" -- the
United States acting as policeman of the world -- and says
that such actions "demand American political leadership
rather than that of the United Nations."
To meet those responsibilities, and to ensure that no
country dares to challenge the United States, the report
advocates a much larger military presence spread over more
of the globe, in addition to the roughly 130 nations in
which U.S. troops are already deployed.
More specifically, they argue that we need permanent
military bases in the Middle East, in Southeast Europe, in
Latin America and in Southeast Asia, where no such bases now
exist. That helps to explain another of the mysteries of our
post-Sept. 11 reaction, in which the Bush administration
rushed to install U.S. troops in Georgia and the
Philippines, as well as our eagerness to send military
advisers to assist in the civil war in Colombia.
The 2000 report directly acknowledges its debt to a still
earlier document, drafted in 1992 by the Defense Department.
That document had also envisioned the United States as a
colossus astride the world, imposing its will and keeping
world peace through military and economic power. When leaked
in final draft form, however, the proposal drew so much
criticism that it was hastily withdrawn and repudiated by
the first President Bush.
Effect on allies
The defense secretary in 1992 was Richard Cheney; the
document was drafted by Wolfowitz, who at the time was
defense undersecretary for policy.
The potential implications of a Pax Americana are immense.
One is the effect on our allies. Once we assert the
unilateral right to act as the world's policeman, our allies
will quickly recede into the background. Eventually, we will
be forced to spend American wealth and American blood
protecting the peace while other nations redirect their
wealth to such things as health care for their citizenry.
Donald Kagan, a professor of classical Greek history at Yale
and an influential advocate of a more aggressive foreign
policy -- he served as co-chairman of the 2000 New Century
project -- acknowledges that likelihood.
"If [our allies] want a free ride, and they probably will,
we can't stop that," he says. But he also argues that the
United States, given its unique position, has no choice but
to act anyway.
"You saw the movie 'High Noon'? he asks. "We're Gary
Cooper."
Accepting the Cooper role would be an historic change in who
we are as a nation, and in how we operate in the
international arena. Candidate Bush certainly did not
campaign on such a change. It is not something that he or
others have dared to discuss honestly with the American
people. To the contrary, in his foreign policy debate with
Al Gore, Bush pointedly advocated a more humble foreign
policy, a position calculated to appeal to voters leery of
military intervention.
For the same reason, Kagan and others shy away from terms
such as empire, understanding its connotations. But they
also argue that it would be naive and dangerous to reject
the role that history has thrust upon us. Kagan, for
example, willingly embraces the idea that the United States
would establish permanent military bases in a post-war Iraq.
"I think that's highly possible," he says. "We will probably
need a major concentration of forces in the Middle East over
a long period of time. That will come at a price, but think
of the price of not having it. When we have economic
problems, it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply.
If we have a force in Iraq, there will be no disruption in
oil supplies."
Costly global commitment
Rumsfeld and Kagan believe that a successful war against
Iraq will produce other benefits, such as serving an object
lesson for nations such as Iran and Syria. Rumsfeld, as
befits his sensitive position, puts it rather gently. If a
regime change were to take place in Iraq, other nations
pursuing weapons of mass destruction "would get the message
that having them . . . is attracting attention that is not
favorable and is not helpful," he says.
Kagan is more blunt.
"People worry a lot about how the Arab street is going to
react," he notes. "Well, I see that the Arab street has
gotten very, very quiet since we started blowing things up."
The cost of such a global commitment would be enormous. In
2000, we spent $281 billion on our military, which was more
than the next 11 nations combined. By 2003, our expenditures
will have risen to $378 billion. In other words, the
increase in our defense budget from 1999-2003 will be more
than the total amount spent annually by China, our next
largest competitor.
The lure of empire is ancient and powerful, and over the
millennia it has driven men to commit terrible crimes on its
behalf. But with the end of the Cold War and the
disappearance of the Soviet Union, a global empire was
essentially laid at the feet of the United States. To the
chagrin of some, we did not seize it at the time, in large
part because the American people have never been comfortable
with themselves as a New Rome.
Now, more than a decade later, the events of Sept. 11 have
given those advocates of empire a new opportunity to press
their case with a new president. So in debating whether to
invade Iraq, we are really debating the role that the United
States will play in the years and decades to come.
Are peace and security best achieved by seeking strong
alliances and international consensus, led by the United
States? Or is it necessary to take a more unilateral
approach, accepting and enhancing the global dominance that,
according to some, history has thrust upon us?
If we do decide to seize empire, we should make that
decision knowingly, as a democracy. The price of maintaining
an empire is always high. Kagan and others argue that the
price of rejecting it would be higher still.
That's what this is about.
http://galen-frysinger.org/american_power.htm
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But all things that are reproved are made manifest by the light:
for whatsoever doth make manifest is light. The light shineth in darkness;
and the darkness comprehended it not. The light of the body is the eye:
if therefore thine eye be single, thy whole body shall be full of light.
But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness.
If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!
Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead,
and Christ shall give thee light. For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light.