The War as We Saw It - A Classic
tsim...@theworld.com
The New York Times
August 19, 2007
Op-Ed Contributors
The War as We Saw It
By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD
SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY
Baghdad
VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political
debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by
definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the
control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an
occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over
a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is
far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with
the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of
recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable
and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest
we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not
be seen as official within our chain of command.)
The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq
is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework.
Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures
elsewhere. What soldiers call the battle space remains the same, with
changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit
neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite
militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more
complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi
police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States
taxpayers expense.
A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American
soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal
armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint
and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators
that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped
plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had
they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi
Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their
families.
As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a
majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be
considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion
commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the
thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command,
who are really loyal only to their militias.
Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed
forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit
support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against
Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own
armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.
However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a
counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center
that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective
surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie
in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross
purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that
Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.
In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and
questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains
entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became
all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and
reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a time-sensitive
target acquisition mission on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is
being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have
the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively
hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always
refuse namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.
Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an
American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to
safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding
indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local
citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view,
we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view
us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four
years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each
warring side.
Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet
political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in
the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no
semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at
a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a
lasting political solution will not be possible while the military
situation remains in constant flux.
The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the
Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members.
The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its
people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against
the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they
believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The
qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the
invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us
something useful for the moment.
Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe
is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to
consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks
losing it all. Washingtons insistence that the Iraqis correct the three
gravest mistakes we made de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi
Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government places
us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.
Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or
in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the
reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere.
There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we
expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is
to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the
conflict as we do now will only ensure we are hated by all in the long
run.
At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency,
improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we
have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in
bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced
and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone
services and sanitation. Lucky Iraqis live in gated communities
barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of
communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would
consider normal.
In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in
the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our
occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted
Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal
violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how
they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care
packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation,
We need security, not free food.
In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released
Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of
their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain
dignity is to call us what we are an army of occupation and force our
withdrawal.
Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis
take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in
which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their
differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist,
but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd
ends without recognizing the incongruities.
We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this
mission through.
Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant.
Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is
a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff
sergeant.