[NYTr] The failure of an all-volunteer military
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Boston Globe via International HeraldTribune - Jan 26, 2007
http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=4356129
The failure of an all-volunteer military
by Andrew J. Bacevich
The Boston Globe
'War is the great auditor of institutions," the British historian
Corelli Barnett has observed. In Iraq, the United States has undergone
such an audit and been found wanting. The defects of basic U.S.
national security institutions stand exposed. Failure to correct those
defects will only invite more Iraqs -- unnecessary wars that once begun
prove unwinnable.
The essential guarantor of U.S. national security is the all-volunteer
force. In its hey day -- the 1990s -- the all-volunteer force underwrote
America's claim to global pre-eminence. Its invincibility taken for
granted, the volunteer force seemed a great bargain to boot.
Maintaining the world's most powerful military establishment imposed a
negligible burden on the average citizen. No wonder Americans viewed
the volunteer military as the most successful federal-reform program of
the postwar era. What was there not to like?
In fact, questions of efficacy or economy did not figure significantly
in the decision to create the all- volunteer force. Back in the early
1970s, the object of the exercise had been quite simple: to terminate
an increasingly illegitimate reliance on conscription. During the
Vietnam War, thanks in no small part to the draft, the armed services
had become estranged from American society. The all-volunteer force
creation severed relations altogether.
This divorce had large implications. After Vietnam, citizenship no
longer included an obligation to contribute to the nation's defense.
Military service became a matter of personal preference, devoid of
political or moral significance. Although providing for the common
defense remained a primary function of government, federal officials no
longer possessed the authority to command citizens to bear arms.
Henceforth, they could only encourage young Americans to enlist,
offering inducements to sweeten the invitation.
Historically, Americans had viewed a "standing army" with suspicion.
After Vietnam they embraced the idea. By 1991 they were celebrating it.
After Operation Desert Storm -- with its illusion of a cheap, easy
victory -- soldiers like General Colin Powell persuaded themselves that
"the people fell in love with us again."
If love, it was a peculiar version, neither possessive nor signifying a
desire to be one with the beloved. For the vast majority of Americans,
Desert Storm affirmed the wisdom of contracting out national security.
Cheering the troops on did not imply any interest in joining their
ranks. Especially among the affluent and well educated, the notion took
hold that national defense was something "they" did, just as "they"
bused tables, collected trash, and mowed lawns. The stalemated war in
Iraq has revealed two problems with this arrangement.
The first is that "we" have forfeited any say in where "they" get sent
to fight. When it came to invading Iraq, President George W. Bush paid
little attention to what voters of the First District of Massachusetts
or the 50th District of California thought. The people had long since
forfeited any ownership of the army. Even today, although a clear
majority of Americans want the Iraq war shut down, their opposition
counts for next to nothing: the will of the commander-in-chief prevails.
The second problem stems from the first. If "they" -- the soldiers we
contract to defend us -- get in trouble, "we" feel little or no
obligation to bail them out. All Americans support the troops, yet
support does not imply sacrifice. Yellow-ribbon decals displayed on the
back of gas guzzlers will suffice, thank you.
Stipulate for the sake of argument that Bush is correct in saying that
failure in Iraq is not an option. Then why limit the "surge" to a
measly 21,500 additional troops? Why not 50,000? With the population of
the United States having now surpassed 300 million, why not send
100,000 reinforcements to Iraq?
The question answers itself: There are not an additional 100,000
Americans willing to commit their lives to the cause. Even offering up
21,500 finds the Pentagon scraping the bottom of the barrel, extending
the tours of soldiers already in the combat zone while accelerating the
deployment of those heading back for a second or third tour of duty.
After the Cold War, Americans came to see war as something other than a
human enterprise; the secret of military superiority ostensibly lay in
the microchip. The truth is that the sinews of military power lie among
the people, who legitimate war and sustain it.
For the United States to remain a great military power will require a
genuine reconciliation of the military and American society. But this
implies the people exercising a greater say in deciding when and where
American soldiers fight. And it also implies reviving the tradition of
the citizen-soldier so that all share in the burden of national
defense.
B) 2007 The International Herald Tribune
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