[NYTr] Venez: The 47-Hour Coup That Changed Everything

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Venezuelanalysis - Apr 13, 2007
http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/articles.php?artno=2018

The 47-Hour Coup That Changed Everything

An Account of April 11-13, 2002, in Venezuela

By Gregory Wilpert

The April 2002 coup attempt against President Chavez represented the
perhaps most important turning point of the Chavez Presidency. First, it
showed just how far the opposition was willing to go to get rid of the
countrys democratically elected president. Up until that point the
opposition could claim that it was merely fighting Chavez with the
political tools provided by liberal democracy. Afterwards, the mask was
gone and Chavez and his supporters felt that their revolution was facing
greater threats than they had previously imagined. A corollary of this
first consequence was thus that the coup woke up Chavezs supporters to
the need to actively defend their government.

Second, the coup showed just popular Chavez really was and how determined
his supporters were to prevent his overthrow. They went onto the streets,
at great personal risk (over 60 people were killed and hundreds were
wounded by the police in the demonstrations that inspired the military to
bring Chavez back to power), to demand their presidents return to office.

Third, the coup woke up progressives around the world to what was
happening in Venezuela. It forced them to examine why a supposedly
unpopular and authoritarian government would be brought back to power
with the support of the countys poor. As such, the coup shone a spotlight
on what was happening in Venezuela and eventually rallied progressives
around the world to support the Bolivarian (and now socialist) project.

Fourth, and perhaps most importantly for the future evolution of the
Venezuelan conflict, the coup was the third nail in the political coffin
of the countrys old elite. The first such nail was Chavezs election in
1998, which brought an explicitly anti-establishment figure into
Venezuelas presidency for the first time in forty years. The second nail
was the passage of the 1999 constitution and Chavezs confirmation as
President, in 2000, which democratically swept the countrys old elite
almost completely out of political power, such as the governorships, the
Supreme Court, and the National Assembly. With the third nail, the
failure of the 2002 coup, the opposition lost a base of power in the
military and a significant amount of good will in the international
community. The next three nails, the failed 2002-2003 oil industry
shutdown, the August 2004 recall referendum, and the December 2006
presidential election, only further solidified the old elites demise as a
political force in Venezuela.

Each of these victories against the opposition heightened consciousness
in Venezuela about the need to take the Bolivarian revolution further and
thus also allowed Chavez to further radicalize his political program. The
coup attempt represented a crucial moment in this process because it was
the most dramatic expression of the Venezuelan conflict between a
charismatic President and a mobilized poor population on the one hand and
the countrys old elite and their supporters on the other.

Preconditions for a Coup

With Chavezs popularity rating apparently sinking in late 2001 and early
2002,[1] especially among the middle class, and the general inability of
the countrys old governing elite to accept Chavez as the legitimately
elected President of Venezuela, it became just a matter of time for this
old elite to form an alliance with dissident military officers and to
organize a coup. The events in 2001 that led up to the coup can be
summarized as the following:

* The departure of key former supporters from Chavezs coalition (half
of the MAS Movement towards Socialism party, Caracas Mayor Alfredo
Peqa, and MVR Chavezs party Movement for a Fifth Republic co-founder
and Minister of the Interior Luis Miquilena).

* The business sectors uproar over 49 law-decrees passed in November
2001 that revamped the countrys banking, agriculture, oil industry,
and fishing industries, among other things.

* The union federations (CTV) anger over the governments push for union
elections in October 2001.

* Chavezs opposition to the Bush administrations war on terrorism.

* The mass medias active participation in the political conflict,
largely taking the place of the discredited centrist and conservative
parties.

* A developing recession, due to a rapid decline in world oil prices
following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S.

Many of these development were a consequence of Chavez refusing to play
along in the politics as usual game of accommodating the established
powers in society, whether the old union leadership, the church, the
business class, the private mass media, or the government of the United
States. In his first three years in office (1999-2001) Chavez thus proved
himself to be a political leader of a completely different sort than the
kinds the countrys old elite and the middle class had expected. Until
2000, following the mega-elections, it still looked like Chavez could
perhaps be the kind of leader who talked tough, but who acted like a
moderate. However, with the 49 law-decrees, especially the land reform
and the new hydro-carbons law, Chavez proved that he was a different kind
of leader.

Preparing for a Coup

Therefore, the radical sectors of the opposition, which could not accept
Chavez as the legitimately elected president, began plans for a coup,
which it put into motion in early 2002. One of the first elements in this
plan was to demonstrate to the public that there supposedly was
widespread discontent within the military. The first to launch this wave
of disapproval was Colonel Pedro Soto, a former assistant to President
Carlos Andris Perez, who announced in a public event on human rights, on
February 7, 2001, that the president should resign because Venezuela had
become a dictatorship. Soto declared himself to be in rebellion, basing
himself on article 350 of the constitution, which says that citizens have
a right to civil disobedience, should the government violate
constitutional norms. Immediately, the mass media were all over Soto in a
frenzy. It seemed as if they were desperate for a new face that would
take the lead. Soto, however, was quickly arrested for insubordination
and would eventually flee to Miami.

Chavez put the incident off by saying, He was a traitor together with a
group companions Then he did not get promoted to general, filed a
complaint for not being promoted, with the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Court ruled his claim without merit Shortly thereafter, another officer,
Captain Pedro Flores Rivero, of the National Guard, joined Colonel Soto
in demanding the presidents resignation. Both Soto and Flores gave
speeches against the in the Plaza Altamira, in one of Caracas most
upscale neighborhoods, where they accused the government of being a
totalitarian dictatorship.

Eleven days after Sotos first denunciation, on February 18, another
military officer, Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo, made similar statements,
saying that Chavez had violated the right to freedom of the press,
eliminated the separation of powers, and was attempting to set up a
regime similar to the one in Cuba. Each officer, in addition to their
charges against the government, also claimed that there was much
discontent within the military. The series of military officers
pronouncements thus began to appear planned to coincide with the
oppositions gathering momentum, to create an increasing impression that
Chavez no longer had the backing of the countrys military.

PDVSA Management Take the Lead

All along during the time of increasing tensions, ever since the passing
of the 49 law-decrees, managers from the countrys state owned oil
company, PDVSA, complained about the law that was supposed to reform the
oil industry. However, the conflict with the management had been on a
relatively low burner until Chavez decided to name a new board of
directors for PDVSA. Since the Venezuelan state is the only owner of
PDVSA, the president has the authority to unilaterally name its board of
directors. Chavez had repeatedly complained to the public about his
frustrations about getting direct answers from PDVSA as to its finances.
He referred to PDVSA as a state within a state and as being a black box
that he was determined to open. He took his first real step in doing so
when he named a new board of directors on February 21. By that time PDVSA
already had three presidents in three years, all of whom seemed to be
closer to the companys upper management than to the president.

The last PDVSA president, General Guaicaipuro Lameda, was someone Chavez
thought he could trust, but who did not seem particularly eager to help
Chavez in figuring out PDVSAs finances.[2] Chavez thus named Gaston
Parra, a fairly well-known leftist engineer who specialized in the oil
industry, to the post of PDVSA president. At first the oil industry
executives did not say much about the new board. Gradually, though,
protests against the new board were voiced, especially from the
management. At one point even, a group of PDVSA workers complained that
managers were trying to push them into supporting protests against the
new board of directors.[3] Talk of a possible general strike began to
develop, both amongst the PDVSA management and among the CTV leadership.
In early March, the CTV began to speak publicly about the possibility of
organizing a general strike for March 18th. A little later it was decided
to set the general strike date for April 18th. Meanwhile, the government
warned that should the management walk out on their job, in a general
strike, everyone who did so would immediately be fired.

The oil managements rallying cry became Respect the meritocracy! in
reference to their claim that the new board of directors did not have the
necessary experience or background in the oil industry. While it was true
that most of them came from outside PDVSA, all of them did have extensive
backgrounds as oil industry analysts. The hypocrisy of the managements
claim that inexperienced people were put into place becomes all the
clearer when one looks at past boards of directors, named under Chavezs
predecessors, some of whom indeed had nothing at all to do with the oil
industry and the management at the time did not utter any complaint.

The overall opposition discourse had begun to revolve primarily around
PDVSA, with the oppositions argument being that PDVSA belongs to the
people, not to the government. The opposition tried to create the notion
that as long as the meritocracy runs PDVSA, it would be non-ideological
and would be run in the interests of all Venezuelans. However, if the new
board of directors were allowed to stay, PDVSA would become an
ideologically leftist organization, run in the interests of a political
party. Exactly why the meritocrats, who were closely identified with
former PDVSA president Luis Giusti, someone who followed the precepts of
privatization and of neo-liberalism, would be less ideological than
Chavezs board nominees was never explained.

In a series of employee meetings, the companys management and
administrative employees decided to engage in work slow-downs, to
pressure the government into appointing a new board of directors; one
that would be chosen more in accordance with past practices of naming
board members as a kind of promotion from within the company. Meanwhile,
the largest oil workers union, Fedepetrol, which Carlos Ortega of the CTV
was the leader only a year earlier, said that it would support an oil
industry strike, should the management call for one. However, the other
four oil worker unions[4] sided with Chavez in the dispute.

A few days later, though, Fedepetrol reversed its decision and announced
that it would not support the strike after all. Actually, the unions
leadership was divided, with the unions president, Rafael Rosales, saying
about the PDVSA crisis, The management has its conflicts and we have
ours. If someone has reason to protest, it is us, who have been
disrespected by this management, since all of our problems are their
fault, since they are our bosses.[5] The unions general secretary, Felix
Jimenez, though, said that Fedepetrol should support the managements
strike.

On the 4th of April, 2002, PDVSA management employees began their strike.
Large sections of PDVSA were shut down, such as several gasoline
distribution centers, practically all administrative offices, and the El
Palito refinery. The stoppage of the refinery later turned out to be
extremely costly to PDVSA because the crude oil in its mile-long pipes
turned into asphalt and large sections of the refinery ended up being
permanently damaged, requiring wholesale replacement of parts of the
refinery. The Minister of Labor, Maria Cristina Iglesias announced on
television that all those who failed to show up from work would be fired,
for abandoning their workplace. She reiterated that this was not a legal
strike. Venezuelas Attorney General, Isaias Rodriguez, also appeared on
television, to say that the oil company strike is completely illegal
because it is not being called by any of the recognized unions of the oil
company, nor does it involve a labor conflict.

Two days into the PDVSA management strike, the CTV pledged it would join
the strike/lockout by calling for a national general strike on April 9.
The decision represented a moving up of the original general strike date,
which had been set for April 18. Ortega said that the strike would at
first be set for 24 hours, but could be extended for 48 hours or turned
into an indefinite strike, depending on how the situation evolved and how
the government reacted. So as to make the strike sound legal, Ortega
said, We want to dismiss that the CTV supposedly has the intention of
weakening the government. What we are asking of the government is to
comply with the collective bargaining agreements and that no one
mistreats us.

Ortega also warned, The government can decree ten thousand states of
exception, the strike will take place, in clear reference to the rumors
that Chavez might decree a state of emergency. Defense Minister Josi
Vicente Rangel, though, repeatedly denied that rumors of a state of
exception had any basis and said that the rumors of a state of exception
are aimed at creating distress and unrest among the population.[6]

With the media joining in the conflict and with an increasingly virulent
opposition rhetoric on its political talk shows, the government tried to
counter these with its cadenas[7]the Venezuelan governments legal
prerogative to force all broadcast media (TV and radio) to simultaneously
broadcast a special government announcement. In the days leading up to
the strike, the government made frequent use of this, broadcasting ten
minute messages of the vice-president, Diosdado Cabello, explaining how
the government would not give in to blackmail over the PDVSA conflict.
Cabello said that last December 10, during the general strike, we made
some mistakes that we will not make this time. For example, December 10
we let ourselves be squashed mediatically If we have to respond every ten
minutes with a cadena so that the information would be true and
transmitted to all Venezuelans, then we will do it.

Finally, on Sunday, April 7th, Chavez stated unequivocally that he had
had enough. During his weekly television program Als Presidente Chavez
announced that the top seven managers of PDVSA would be summarily fired.
He read each of their names off a piece of paper and declared loudly and
full of gratification, as if he were a baseball umpire, Youre out! Twelve
other managers would receive early retirement. Chavez also said, I have
given clear instructions to the president of PDVSA so that anyone who
calls for a strike would be fired immediately, without any discussion.

The other big announcement Chavez made during his television program was
that the minimum wage would be raised 20%, starting May 1st. This was in
response to the CTVs demand that Chavez should fulfill an old campaign
promise of raising the minimum wage. The announcement was broadcast on
all television and radio networks, interrupting an announcement that
Carlos Ortega was about to make.

After the broadcast, Ortega made his announcement, saying that
Fedecamaras and numerous other organizations had decided to support the
general strike that was being convoked for April 9. Representatives from
all groups he mentioned were present. Even Venezuelas Catholic Bishops
Conference joined, represented by the Jesuit priest Mikel de Viana, who
said, If what is happening in PDVSA is going to be the form in which
union demands will be met, this is not how the working class should be
treated. The only system in which the principle of authority is invoked
is in a dictatorship.[8] Also present were directors of various media
outlets, such as Miguel Henrique Otero of the opposition newspaper El
Nacional, saying, We are all in this struggle, in defense of the right to
inform.

The General Strike

That Tuesday, April 9th, 2002, no newspapers appeared, the television
channels all broadcast practically the same thingeither voluntarily the
statements of the opposition or involuntarily the official government
cadenas, public busses and the subway were running, banks were open, but
all fast food franchises and many restaurants were closed, as were most
schools, practically all privately operated offices were closed, but
government offices were open, and, perhaps most importantly, PDVSAs
administrative buildings, located mostly in Caracas, were shut down. The
streets tended to be like on a Sunday in the middle class neighborhoods,
while in the poor neighborhoods things were quite normal. Throughout the
day Venezuelans were presented with completely opposite images of what
was going on in Venezuela. While the private media presented only nearly
empty streets and closed storefronts (recorded in middle class
neighborhoods), the state media and the cadenas presented busy streets
and open shops and street vendors (in the poor neighborhoods). For
someone who was not familiar with Venezuela, the contrasts could hardly
have been more confusing.

Fedecamaras and the CTV, which had taken on the leadership of the
opposition, announced that evening that the strike was a success, with
80% of workplaces closed down, and that since the government did not
concede to any of the oppositions demands, such as the removal of the new
PDVSA board members, it would extend the general strike another 24 hours.
Carlos Ortega explained the reason for continuing by saying, Our reasons
have to do with the aggressive and intolerant conduct of the government,
as its response to the demands of the workers. That night, in the
opposition strongholds, a noisy cacerolazothe banging of pots and pans in
protesttook place throughout the country.

The next day it became clear that the strike was already losing force.
While most streets in the middle class neighborhoods were still much
calmer than usual and most stores were still closed, there was noticeably
more activity than the day before. Perhaps to animate the opposition, as
a strategic ploy to prepare the ground for the coup, General Nestor
Gonzalez Gonzalez announced his non-recognition of President Chavez as
Commander in Chief. He said that he was doing this because Chavez was
disrespecting the Armed Forces due to his supposed support of Colombian
guerilla forces. General Gonzalez had been one of the officers accused of
corruption in the management of Plan Bolivar 2000.[9]

In a warning of what was to come, one of the leaders of the opposition,
the former PDVSA president General Guaicaipuro Lameda, said to the
newspaper El Universal, when asked what would happen when Chavez leaves
office, The armed forces will play a fundamental role, recognizing that
we have a government outside of the rule of law[10]

Also that day, the opposition announced that it had formed an umbrella
organization, called Coordinator for Democracy and Liberty, to which all
oppositional NGOs (40, according to spokespersons), oppositional parties
(about 10), and the CTV and Fedecamaras belong. Their first action would
be to organize a demonstration that would gather at Caracas Parque del
Este and march on the freeway a mere two kilometers, to the one of PDVSAs
main buildings in the middle class neighborhood of Chuao. One of the
spokespersons for the umbrella group, which would later come to be known
as the Democratic Coordinator, said, We are in a context in which we are
applying articles 333 and 350 of the Constitution[11]

Coup dItat

The publics perspective

Friday, April 11, 2002, the opposition marched to the corporate offices
of PDVSA-Chuao, which had become one of the key rallying centers. It was
estimated that anywhere between 300,000 and 500,000 Venezuelans
participated, making it one of the largest demonstrations in Venezuelan
history and certainly the largest demonstration of the opposition to
Chavez.

Once at the rallying point, one speaker after the other suggested that
the demonstration should continue marching towards the Miraflores
presidential palace, to demand the presidents resignation. Carlos Ortega,
the last speaker said, You have wasted the resources of the state and now
this human river will go towards Miraflores to demand your resignation!
Although demonstration did not have a permit to continue past
PDVSA-Chuao, the demonstrators headed towards the presidential palace,
which was another eleven kilometers to the west. At Miraflores, however,
a crowd of perhaps one thousand Chavez supporters had already gathered a
few days earlier, in a more or less constant vigil in front of the
palace.

When it became known, around 11 am that day, that the opposition
demonstration would head to Miraflores, various pro-Chavez political
leaders, such as Caracas Mayor Freddy Bernal and National Assembly Deputy
Juan Barreto, appeared on state television urging Chavistas to come to
the presidential palace to defend it against the opposition. Also,
members of the group Asamblea Popular Revolucionaria (Popular
Revolutionary Assembly APR, which later turned into the website
Aporrea.org) distributed fliers in the surrounding barrios, urging people
to come to Miraflores.[12] Within very little time the demonstration in
front of Miraflores grew to several thousand, assembling mainly on the
Avenida Urdaneta, which passes in front of the north entrance of
Miraflores.

Shortly before the opposition demonstration arrived near Miraflores, the
government had positioned National Guard troops, which are responsible
for maintaining public order, around the palace. At about 1:30 to 2:00 pm
the opposition demonstrators began trickling in to the neighborhood of
the presidential palace. The demonstrators at the front of the opposition
march were clearly out for a fight. Several witnesses reported that they
belonged to the Bandera Roja (Red Flag) party, which is very well known
in Venezuela for its willingness to commit acts of violence in pursuit of
its goals.[13] Two lines of security forces tried to separate the
opposition demonstrators from the presidential palace. The first was a
line of metropolitan police, which were under the control of Greater
Caracas opposition mayor Alfredo Peqa, who did not offer any resistance
to the demonstrators as they marched up the western side of the palace
compound. The second line of security forces were National Guard troops,
armed with shotguns that shoot plastic shrapnel (perdigones) and tear
gas.

While the opposition demonstration was trying to get near the
presidential palace, at about 1:45 pm, General Lucas Rincon, the countrys
highest ranking general read a statement on television that was broadcast
on all networks. Behind him was the military high command. In his
statement, Rincon denied rumors that President Chavez had been arrested
and reaffirmed that the military was solidly in support of its commander
in chief.

By 2:30 pm, opposition demonstrators and National Guard troops were
engaged in a pitched battle, with rocks and tear gas flying between the
National Guard and the demonstrators. The troops managed, though, to
prevent the demonstrators from approaching the presidential palaces north
entrance from the west. Photographs and video footage later showed how at
one point in the confrontation former PDVSA president General Guaicaipuro
Lameda urged opposition demonstrators to take a different route of
approach to the palace, on the east side of the compound, up the Avenida
Baralt. The metropolitan police led the charge up the street. With a
water cannon vehicle and an armored personnel carrier the police forged
its way up the street, towards an overpass known as the Puente Llaguno
(Llaguno Bridge), which is one block from the presidential palace. As the
police headed up the street, around 3:30 pm, they encountered no
resistance from any National Guard troops and, according to Chavista
accounts, opened fire on the Chavista demonstrators who were gathered
both on the Avenida Baralt and on the bridge. Also around this time,
Chavista demonstrators heard shots being fired at them from buildings
surrounding their demonstration. A group of perhaps five or six Chavistas
was armed and at around 5 pm began returning fire from the police, while
taking cover behind the buildings that border the overpass. The shooters
on the overpass would later recount that they were also trying to shoot
at the people shooting at them from the buildings.

As more and more people were hit and even killed by the gunfire, the
Chavista dead and wounded were taken to a first aid tent located across
the street from Miraflores, within a government compound known as the
White Palace. This small first aid tent had been set up three days
earlier, in anticipation of any violence that might occur as a result of
the pro-Chavez vigil clashing with anti-Chavez demonstrators. TV
commentators, upon seeing footage of the tent, immediately raised
questions about it, suggesting that such a tent had never before been
placed there and that it was there now precisely because Chavez or his
supporters had intended to ambush the opposition demonstration from the
Llaguno Bridge. Numerous witnesses would later report, though, that first
aid tents had been positioned in this location previously, whenever
Chavez used the area in front of Miraflores as a rallying point.[14]

While Chavistas were being shot at from both the metropolitan police and
from unidentified shooters in buildings (or sharpshooters, many said),
opposition demonstrators were being shot at too. However, it was unclear
exactly who was firing at the opposition demonstrators. According to most
accounts, the opposition demonstrators never came closer to the Llaguno
Bridgewhere the Chavista demonstrators werethan about 400-500 meters,
which means that the small arms that the Chavistas were shooting with
were out of range to hit any opposition demonstrators. It is generally
assumed that pistols have an effective range of only about 250-300
meters. Nonetheless, at least seven opposition demonstrators were killed
and many more wounded that day. According to most eye-witness accounts,
the opposition demonstrators were shot at from the buildings near the
opposition demonstration. Autopsies also confirmed that the vast majority
of the dead received shots from above, many of them to their heads, most
likely from nearby buildings.

According to the final report of the office of the Defensoria del Pueblo
(Defender of the People, the human rights defender), there were 19
fatalities that day. Seven of the dead had participated in the pro-Chavez
demonstration, seven in the anti-Chavez demonstration, and five were
non-partisan bystanders. Also, there were a total of 69 wounded that day.
38 in the pro-Chavez demonstration, 17 in the opposition demonstration,
and 14 were reporters or unaffiliated passers-by.[15]

A different kind of battle was taking place in the media while all of the
shooting was going on near the presidential palace. That is, all of the
private TV stations were broadcasting the battle scenes on the street
from the perspective of the opposition demonstration. Shortly after the
first demonstrators were being killed by shooters from nearby buildings
and by the metropolitan police, at 3:45pm, Chavez took over the airwaves
in a national broadcast and made an address to the nation, asking for
people to remain calm and severely criticizing the opposition. Repeatedly
during Chavezs speech, he was handed a slip of paper, presumably about
what was happening outside the presidential palace, which he would glance
at and then continued his address. A few minutes into the broadcast,
however, the TV stations, in an apparently coordinated plan, split their
screens and showed Chavez on one half and the street battles in the other
half. Chavez, upon being informed of what the TV stations were doing,
issued an order at about 4:25 pm, to take all private TV stations off the
air. Chavezs broadcast continued for another hour, until 5:15 pm.

The private TV stations managed to get back onto the air during Chavezs
broadcast, via cable and satellite, although not over the regular
airwaves. In addition to broadcasting the fight between opposition and
National Guard, the TV stations began showing images of Chavistas
shooting from the bridge onto the street below, which was off screen.
News commentators then claimed, without showing any actual footage, that
the Chavistas who were shooting were firing at unarmed opposition
demonstrators. This claim was repeated over and over again on all of the
media. Later this claim would prove to be one of the key elements in
providing the justification for the coup.

While the private TV stations were broadcasting one opposition politician
or commentator after the other, as well as the Chavista gunmen shooting
from the bridge in the direction of the opposition demonstration, the
state television station broadcast interviews with pro-Chavez
politicians. Both opposition supporters and Chavistas said that they were
ambushed and each argued that their side had suffered most of the
casualties in the confrontation that day.

Then, at 7 pm, Chavistas began to realize that a coup was indeed in
progress because at that time the first of several military
pronouncements was made. Vice-Admiral Hector Ramirez, reading a prepared
statement from an undisclosed location, with nine other military officers
behind him, read a statement that said, We direct ourselves to the people
to no longer recognize the current government, the authority of President
Chavez, and of the military high command. Ramirez went on to say that
given the deaths of several people in the confrontation in the city
center, the constitution obliges us to avoid more bloodshed and this
obligation implies the peaceful departure of the president and the
substitution of the high command.

Next, the entire National Guard leadership, with General Carlos Alfonso
Martinez speaking, followed by the vice-Minister for citizen Security,
General Luis Alberto Camacho Kairuz, and then by the leadership of the
DISIPthe political police (similar to the FBI in the U.S.)all declared
their disobedience to the President on television. Camacho Kairuzs
statement gave the first foreshadowing of what was to come. In his
televised comments after calling for Chavezs resignation, he suggested
that a provisional junta should be installed to govern the country, which
would initiate procedures for modifying the constitution to return us to
what we have always been: the Republic of Venezuela;[16] that is, to
remove the word Bolivarian from Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. General
Camacho Kairuz also announced the defection of various regiments
throughout the country.

The final blow to Chavezs presidency came at 8 pm when the head of the
army, General Efrain Vasquez Velasco appeared on television to renounce
Chavezs leadership, saying until today I was loyal to you, Mr. President.
Perhaps the greatest surprise was that one of the generals considered to
be closest to Chavez, the head of the military high command, General
Manuel Rosendo, also declared his disobedience.

The general public that was following the events on television that
evening was presented with very contradictory images. On the four major
private television channels, which had been off the air temporarily, but
which could be received by those with cable or satellite access, the
images were of Chavistas shooting at off-screen targets and commentators
claiming that they were firing at unarmed opposition demonstrators. The
constant repetition of this footage was intermingled with the
pronouncements of various opposition politicians and of military officers
declaring their disobedience. Meanwhile, on state TV (channel 8), the
broadcast was live from the Miraflores presidential palace, where several
ministers and pro-Chavez National Assembly deputies were being
interviewed about the days events. Key to the Chavista understanding of
what had happened, the deputies flatly contradicted the private TV
stations claim that it was opposition demonstrators who had been shot at.
Instead, they said that it was Chavistas who were killed, many of whom
were lying dead in the presidential palace itself. Deputy Juan Barreto
said during these broadcasts that it was the oppositional party Bandera
Roja that was the main culprit in the deaths that day; that they placed
snipers in the neighboring buildings to shoot at Chavistas.

Between 9 pm and 10 pm, the state television channel (VTV) explained to
its viewers that Chavez was meeting with both his ministers and the
military high command, to decide how to deal with the crisis. Then,
suddenly, at about 10 pm, VTV went off the air. More or less around the
same time the private TV channels could be received over the regular
airwaves, via antenna, again.

Rumors began to spread that Chavez had resigned and that he had asked to
be taken to Cuba. Supporters of the opposition became ecstatic at the
news of this possibility and congregated at the Caracas city airport, La
Carlota, in the hopes of seeing Chavezs departure. An airplane there
appeared to be getting ready to leave. However, it was then announced, at
about 10:30 pm, that the plane was for Chavezs wife, Marisabel Rodriguez
de Chavez, who was flying with her daughter to her hometown of
Barquisimeto, in western Venezuela.

The mystery of what was happening in Miraflores continued until 1:30 am,
when General Efrain Vasquez Velasco confirmed that Chavez was negotiating
with military officers the conditions of his resignation. The
negotiations continued with little news until 3:30 am, when General Lucas
Rincon Romero took to the airwaves to announce in a brief statement that
the President of the Republic was asked to resign, which he accepted.
Rincon added that the military high command would be at the service of
the new authorities. About half an hour later, television viewers were
able to barely make out images of Chavez, as he was being escorted into
the military compound of Fuerte Tiuna (Fort Tiuna). To Chavistas it
seemed that Chavez had been toppled via a classic coup, while to
anti-Chavistas it seemed that a ruthless dictator was finally removed
from office.

The authors perspective

By April 11, I had been living in Venezuela for about one and a half
years. I considered myself to be an interested bystander, in that I
thought the Chavez governments policies were interesting and worth
supporting, but I had reservations about Chavez because I thought that
too often he seemed to do himself more harm than good because of the way
he pursued his policies. It was not until the days leading up to the
April 9th general strike, though, that I involved myself in a deeper
analysis of political events in Venezuela. By the time the CTV and
Fedecamaras called for an unlimited general strike, it had become obvious
to me that something big was about to happen. The rhetoric was so extreme
on both sides that it seemed nearly impossible for any kind of resolution
of the conflict without a major confrontation of some sort.

So, on April 10th, I suspected that what some members of the opposition
were aiming for was a coup, as this seemed to be the only solution for
the opposition.[17] That is, the opposition was arguing that it wanted
Chavezs resignation, but given that Chavez had declared unequivocally
that he would never resign, a confrontation in the form of a coup seemed
the only option for the opposition. A referendum, as many in the
opposition had suggested, also seemed unviable, since that option was
flat-out rejected and a recall referendum would, according to the
constitution only be possible once half of Chavezs term in office had
passed, on August 19, 2003. More likely seemed to me was that the
opposition was hoping Chavez would declare martial law and that the
opposition would use such an occasion as an excuse for a coup.

The day of the opposition demonstration to Chuao and then to Miraflores,
my wife and I were at home, watching the protest on television. In the
early afternoon, shortly after the demonstration headed for the
presidential palace, my wife received phone calls urging her to join the
pro-Chavez demonstration at Miraflores. We both decided to go, but we
first had to find a babysitter for our daughter. Around 3 pm we decided
that she would go ahead and I would join her later, once the babysitter
arrived.

I was finally able to head towards Miraflores at about 4 pm. Taking the
subway, I got off one stop beyond the closest one for the Miraflores
presidential palace because the Miraflores stop had been closed. Walking
back, I had to cross El Calvario, a city park where opposition
demonstrators had gathered who did not want to fight the National Guard.
Since the park is much higher than the surrounding area, one could
clearly see the battles between opposition demonstrators and the National
Guard from there. Tear gas was everywhere and the demonstrators were
breaking down a schoolyard wall, to use its rocks against the Guard. I
phoned my wife and told her where I was and that I had to circle around
the entire area, since soldiers were blocking my way to get to the
pro-Chavez demonstration. As I crossed the now infamous Avenida Baralt, I
saw some motorcycles and then a police van zoom past me. Hardly any
opposition demonstrators were to be seen on the street. I did see someone
lying on the street who looked like he might be dead. I took a picture of
him and just as I was about to get closer, I heard shots being fired.
Just like most people, my first thought was that it could be fireworks,
which were quite common, but then I realized that the man lying on the
street might have been shot. Suddenly I could hear rapid bursts of
gunfire and I and some other people who were milling around the area ran
for cover behind the columns of a building (at Plaza Caracas). Once the
shooting stopped, I continued towards the National Assembly, figuring
that somewhere there must be a gap in the National Security line, so I
could get to the Chavista demonstration.

I found a gap at the National Assembly and finally made it to the
pro-Chavez demonstration, on Avenida Urdaneta. However, as I approached
the overpass over the Avenida Baralt (Puente Llaguno), the crowd got
extremely dense and I could not advance anymore. I asked someone what was
going on and he exclaimed to me, They are shooting at us! I struggled to
figure out where the shots where coming from, which I could hear and then
noticed that people had completely cleared away from the overpass.
Everyone seemed to be trying to hide behind the buildings that kept them
protected them from shots coming from the street below. At the two ends
of the bridge I saw several men returning fire towards the street below,
just as was later shown on television.

At one point many in the crowd pointed at one of the buildings nearby.
When I looked, I could see a soldier on the roof. At first I thought that
perhaps this was one of the snipers that I heard people mention. But then
I realized that he seemed to be searching the rooftop and people were
shouting at him to go to one of the lower floors, where they seemed to
have seen someone shooting.

Finally, at around 6 pm, the shooting stopped and I could cross the
bridge. I joined up with my wife, just as the rally in front of the
presidential palace was ending. We decided to go back home. Once home, we
turned on the TV and I saw the scene that I had witnessed of the
Chavistas shooting from the bridge. To my amazement, though, the
announcer was claiming that the Chavistas were firing at the unarmed
opposition demonstration. I could not believe my ears because I had
seenwith my own eyes, from the bridgethat no opposition demonstrators
were visible on the street below. Then, later in the evening, when I
heard the pronouncements of the military claiming that Chavez was
responsible for the deaths and shootings, I was convinced that a coup was
in progress. I immediately decided to tell my side of the story and began
writing about it.[18]

What Happened Behind the Scenes

To this day much controversy and speculation remains about what really
happened on April 11, behind the scenes of the coup. Large sectors of
Venezuelas opposition still claim that what happened was not a coup, but
the resignation of a president, who decided to do so after realizing that
he no longer had the support of the military. On the other hand, many
Chavez supporters argue that what happened was a classic coup that was
largely organized and financed by the CIA. It seems that while the former
story has no basis in reality, aspects of the latter story are possible,
even though little evidence for it has emerged so far. The truth of what
happened behind the scenes will probably never be fully known, but a more
sophisticated analysis of the complicated events is possible.

Much of the behind the scenes account presented here is based on research
conducted by Sandra La Fuente and Alfredo Meza, who try to present one of
the more balanced and thoroughly investigated accounts, even if they have
blinders of their own as regards to the possible existence of a larger
conspiracy that brought the coup about. This is actually precisely the
unresolved issue that exists to this day: was the coup a planned
conspiracy that was carried out according to plan (in its earlier
stages), but which ultimately failed due to the conspirators hubris and
the Chavistas superior strategy? Or, was it a confluence of unforeseen
events that first favored the opposition by removing Chavez from power
and then favored Chavez by putting him back into power? Some, such as the
Venezuela blogger Francisco Toro,[19] argue that it was a little bit of
both, while investigators such as La Fuente and Meza seem to argue that
it was mostly unplanned. Chavista analysts, such as Guillermo Garcia
Ponce and Rodolfo Sanz, argue that it was all planned to the last detail
and carried out according to plan.[20] It seems obvious to me, that there
was indeed a carefully planned conspiracy where elements of luck aided
the conspirators at first, but failed them later on. At heart, though, it
seems that whether the entire coup in its early successful stage was a
plot depends on whether two key players were in on it from the beginning:
Generals Efrain Vasquez Velasquez, the head of the Army, and Manuel
Rosendo, the head of the military high command (comparable to the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the U.S.).

According to the accounts of several key opposition players in the coup,
such as by Admiral Carlos Molina Tamayo and Colonel Julio Rodriguez, work
on the plot to overthrow Chavez had begun at least nine months prior to
April 11th.[21] Also, there are several circumstantial indications that a
plot to overthrow Chavez was in the works well before April 11, such as
Pedro Carmona supposedly having ordered a presidential sash while he was
in Spain a few weeks earlier and General Medina Gomez, who some say was
the mastermind behind the plot, requested to be Venezuelas military
attachi to the U.S. and returned from Washington DC one day prior to the
coup. All this strongly suggests that there was a carefully laid out plan
for a coup.

Perhaps the first conspiratorial element to come into play on April 11
was the decision to redirect the opposition march towards Miraflores.
During an April 10 planning meeting for the protest, it was already
decided to re-route the march to Miraflores and to present this as a
spontaneous suggestion. The idea was to spread it as a rumor, as a chant
towards Miraflores!, and then as a suggestion to be made by one rally
speaker after the other. The reason it had to appear spontaneous was
that, first, the opposition had no permit to march to Miraflores and,
second, announcing the plan in advance, would surely have meant an early
confrontation with state security forces, long before they got near the
presidential palace.

However, apparently the DISP and also pro-Chavez activists had
infiltrated the oppositions planning meeting and knew of the plan to
re-direct the demonstration to Miraflores. Pro-Chavez forces were thus
more or less prepared for the march and had extra time to get ready for
it. They were convinced that the reason for the re-directing of the march
was to try and take the presidential palace by force. The objective of
the plan was to surround and assault the seat of government in order to
consummate the coup against the president and the constitution, says
Guillermo Garcia Ponce, who belongs to the presidents inner circle of
advisors.[22]

The government knew it could not trust the metropolitan police, under
control of the vehemently oppositional mayor Alfredo Peqa, to stop the
demonstration before it got to the presidential palace. It thus had to
rely on the National Guard, which was equipped and trained to deal with
crowd control. A plan was in place already to post National Guard troops
on the Avenida Bolivar, in order to keep the opposition demonstration at
least one kilometer away from the presidential palace. However, the order
to position the National Guard troops had been countermanded by someone.
National Guard General Carlos Alfonso Martinez, who was one of the first
generals to renounce the government that day, explained the situation as
follows during the National Assembly hearings that investigated the coup:

In the organizers speeches in front of the masses, they began to
insist that the march should not end here [at PDVSA Chuao] and that it
should continue to the Miraflores Presidential Palace to solicit the
resignation of the president. In practice, scenario 1 had ended and
began to transform itself into scenario 2.

Scenario 2 was realized with the aggravating factor that the National
Guard deployment that was planned for the Avenida Bolivar had not been
executed.[23]

The government thus could not control the crowd as it had planned to. As
a result, Chavez decided to activate a notorious military plan known as
Plan Avila. Plan Avila, named after the mountain range that borders
Caracas to the north, is a plan to mobilize the countrys armed forces in
case of a national emergency. The first time it was activated, in
February 1989, it was meant to control the riots and raiding that gripped
Caracas and other cities as a reaction to a package of neo-liberal
economic reforms. Between 300 and over 1,000 people were killed as
soldiers and police fired on rioters and looters at will.

Chavez, when he first noticed that the National Guard troops could not be
controlled, tried to activate Plan Avila by calling General Manuel
Rosendo, the highest ranking officer of the military. However, he could
not reach Rosendo and, suspecting that Rosendo might have switched sides
and might be hiding, he called one of his most trusted generals, Jorge
Garcia Carneiro. Using a two-way radio and a pre-established military
code, Chavez told Carneiro to activate the plan by sending a deployment
of tanks to the presidential palace. The tanks, though, had a difficult
time leaving the military installations at Fuerte Tiuna because the
rebelling officers had already begun to block some of the citys main
arteries, precisely to prevent troop movements and the mobilization of
Chavezs supporters. Also, as of 2 pm, several generals, in a coordinated
effort, blocked the entrances to Fuerte Tiuna. This was well before any
deaths had occurred in the city center, thus invalidating the common
argument that the military rebellion was in protest against Chavezs
responsibility for deaths.

One of the main controversies over what happened during the coup is over
the nature of Plan Avila. Generals Rosendo and Vasquez both used the
activation of this plan as the main reason for declaring disobedience to
their commander in chief. According to the opposition, this was exactly
the same plan that was applied in 1989 and would thus have meant a
massacre of civilians, had the plan actually been implemented. A ruling
of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission, in August 2002, found that
the Venezuelan government must change this plan, in order to comply with
human rights standards. The human rights organization COFAVIC says that
the Chavez government has only partially applied the ruling, mostly as
concerns reparations for affected families of the events of February
1989, but not with respect to the training of soldiers in human rights or
crowd control.[24]

Even though the plan is meant to be secret, General Jorge Garcia
Carneiro, Chavezs one-time defense minister, testified during the
National Assembly Hearings that the plan is primarily meant to secure
important installations during a national disaster, such as food
distribution, communication, and government centers. It is not meant to
control crowds, which was not Chavezs intention, according to Garcia
Carneiro. Rather, Chavez called on it to secure the presidential palace,
which some of the tanks he mobilized that day then proceeded to do by the
evening.

While Chavez was struggling with getting his troops under control, the
rebellious generals and other high-ranking officers were planning their
pronouncements to the public. One of the stories, that of how
Vice-Admiral Hector Ramirez made his public announcement, caught much
attention and controversy because it potentially provides strong evidence
that the coup was planned down to the last murderous detail.

Also unbeknownst to the general public at the time, while the opposition
was marching towards Miraflores, the five newly appointed PDVSA board
members turned in their resignation, seeing that the country was heading
for a head-on collision between opposition and government over their
appointment. The news about their resignation never got out to the
public, though, other than in the form of a rumor.

The Neustaldt Testimony

The evening of April 10, the day before the opposition demonstration and
coup, CNN correspondent Otto Neustaldt received a phone call from a close
friend of his who was actively involved in the opposition.[25] According
to Neustaldt, this friend told him, Otto, tomorrow the 11th there will be
a video of Chavez, the demonstration will go towards Miraflores, and
there will be deaths and 20 high ranking officers will pronounce
themselves against the government and will demand Chavezs resignation.

The next morning, at 11am, Neustaldts friend called again to say, We no
longer know if there will be 20 officers who will rise up, but it will
still be a significant or at least representative number, who will ask
for Chavezs resignation. Everything else will remain as planned. There
will be a video, several deaths, and then the officers will come out and
talk. It was going to be Neustaldts task to video tape the pronouncement
and to then pass it on to the media.

Once at the location where the pronouncement was going to be made,
Neustaldt and the officers, led by Vice-Admiral Hector Ramirez Perez,
were ready, but the microwave equipment to make a live broadcast had not
arrived yet. Neustaldt thus suggested to the officers that perhaps they
should do a trial run of their pronouncement, which he could record. They
agreed and recorded the pronouncement. To Neustaldts surprise, the
Vice-Admiral, with ten other high-ranking officers behind him, said that
there have been several deaths in the city, when, at the time the
pronouncement was being read, around 2pm, not a single death had happened
yet.

Finally, when the microwave equipment arrived to make the live broadcast,
around 3:45pm, Chavez began his nationally televised broadcast, making it
impossible for the officers to broadcast their pronouncement live.
According to Neustaldt, he then offered the officers to take the test
recording to the international media, so that they could at least get
their message out this way. The officers agreed and Neustaldt took a
motorcycle, leaving his equipment behind, to Reuters and to other
broadcasters.

When Neustaldts version of this first recording became public, five
months after the coup, it caused an uproar. If what he said was true,
that the officers predicted the murders well beforehand and made a
recording where the deaths are mentioned, then clearly there was a
conspiracy to which the officers belonged. However, right after Chavez
and the state television channel went public with Neustaldts video taped
testimony, Neustaldt held a press conference, in which he denied that he
said what he seemed to be saying at the conference. According to him, his
statements were taken out of context and edited in a way to make it sound
like he was saying things he did not say. Ironically, at Neustaldts press
conference, sitting next to him, was the same lawyer, Carlos Bastidas,
who was also the lawyer defending Vice-Admiral Ramirez. A few days later,
Venezuelas state TV decided to show the entire conference video and it
was obvious that nothing Neustaldt said was taken out of context.

At least two other witnesses to these events, Neustaldts journalist
friend[26] and Vice-Admiral Ramirez say that Neustaldt was lying at the
conference and that actually the officers pronouncement was made after
the death of the journalist Jorge Tortoza, which happened at 4:20pm. Coup
investigators La Fuente and Meza recount how witnesses remember Tortozas
name being called out as one of the dead, before the recording was made.
However, in an interview made on April 12th by the journalist Ibeyese
Pacheco, Vice-Admiral Ramirez clearly says that his recorded
pronouncement of the 11th was made before any deaths had occurred.

There are several interesting things to note about this dispute about
Neustaldts statement at the university conference. First, who is more
likely to be lying? Would a professional journalist lie who was not
involved in the coup and who would not have anything to gain by
implicating high ranking officers who, if what he says is true, do not
hesitate to kill innocent bystanders? Perhaps he was simply wrong about
the timing of events and the recording was made after the first deaths
had happened, which was around 3:30pm. In that case it would have been
made during the presidents national broadcast. But then why would Ramirez
himself say that the recording was made beforehand? Did he too get the
timing wrong?

The second interesting issue is that clearly there are powerful interests
at stake in covering up what really happened April 11. Why, for example,
would Neustaldt come up with a convoluted and patently false claim that
he did not say what he said? One can only speculate at this point, but
given the presence of Ramirezs lawyer at Neustaldts press conference, it
would not be too far-fetched to assume that Neustaldt was acting under
pressure from Ramirez, probably under a death threat.

Finally, the most thorough accounting of the coup, La Fuente and Mezas
book, El Acertijo de Abril (The April Puzzle), makes no mention of
Neustaldts version of events, even though the book goes into great detail
about how this first pronouncement came about. Also, the testimony is not
mentioned even though the book came out one and a half years after the
testimony and even though it was one of the most controversial post-coup
incidents. If true, Neustaldt provides the most damning testimony that
the rebellious officers deliberately organized the assassination of pro-
and anti-Chavez civilians in cold blood, in order to blame Chavez for the
deaths and to provide a justification for their rebellion. Given the
seriousness of the charge, it seems as if the La Fuente and Meza book
deliberately attempts to cover-up the involvement of some of the main
masterminds behind the coup.

Chavezs Dilemma

Towards the evening of April 11, once it was clear that the military was
no longer fully under his control and with almost 20 civilian
demonstrators killed and over 100 wounded near the presidential palace,
for which the press blamed the president, Chavez had to decide what to
do, but could not make up his mind right away. It appeared that the coup
was successful and so Chavez had to decide whether to give himself up
peacefully to the rebelling generals or whether to put up a fight.

In the late evening, Chavez met with the military high command in his
office. Except for Josi Vicente Rangel, his cabinet was not in the
meeting and everyone was wondering what was going on. Finally Josi
Vicente Rangel emerged to say that the generals were rebelling and that
most of them were demanding Chavezs resignation. Others were demanding
that Chavez be arrested and tried.

It was around 8pm and the state television channel had been taken off the
air, so there was no way now for Chavez to get a message out to the
citizens or his followers. Shortly thereafter, cell phones no longer
worked either, according to Guillermo Garcia Ponces account of the
events. The executive had been almost completely cut off from the outside
world. Nonetheless, the president of the National Assembly, William Lara,
was able to reach CNN and Telemundo by telephone and made some statements
to an international audience.

Several witnesses of those late night hours say that Chavez appeared
depressed. Apparently he was stunned by the number of defections and
betrayals that had occurred that day. Just a few weeks earlier, Chavez
had said that the Armed Forces would never betray him and that he knew
the military better than the back of my hand. Late that night, in a
meeting with his cabinet, Chavez said, I have considered that I should
resign. There is a problem of governability here. What do you think I
should do? Defense Minister Josi Vicente Rangel responded, President, we
should resist until we are out of ammunition.[27]

The cabinet discussed the situation and considered several alternatives.
One was to move the executive to the main military barracks that was
still supporting Chavez, in Maracay, where General Raul Baduel was in
command of Venezuelas best trained and equipped forces. Baduel had been
part of Chavezs original MBR-200 and was still loyal to Chavez. The
second alternative was to resist in the presidential palace. And the
third possibility Chavez and his cabinet considered was to surrender.

The first option, of going to Maracay, was discarded early on because
doing so would only have been possible if there had been a safe way to
get there. Originally Chavez thought he could do so with the tanks that
he had ordered to come to Miraflores. However, the coup generals managed
to convince the tank battalion to return to Fort Tiuna, so this option
was no longer viable.

The second option, of resisting in Miraflores, with the help of the
presidential honor guard, which remained loyal to Chavez, would have
almost definitely meant a battle and bloodshed. According to Chavez
himself and to most witnesses who were present, Chavez said he rejected
that option for that reason.

Finally, after long discussions with both his cabinet and with the
rebelling generals, the generals got impatient and phoned Chavez to tell
him that if he did not resign in the next fifteen minutes, they would
order a military attack on the presidential palace.[28] So, at about 3
am, Chavez decided that he would resign, but only if four conditions were
met. First, if the physical safety of everyone in his government is
guaranteed. Second, if the constitution is respected, which meant that
the resignation would have to be presented to the National Assembly.
Third, that Chavez could address the country live. Fourth, that his
closest advisors and family could leave the country together with him.
General Manuel Rosendo and General Hurtado Sucre, who were acting as
go-betweens between Chavez and the main rebel generals, took the message
to Fort Tiuna, where the rebel generals were ensconced. Rosendo and
Hurtado returned shortly thereafter and told Chavez that his conditions
had been accepted. Chavez thereupon authorized Lucas Rincon Romero, the
highest ranking officer in the Venezuelan military, to tell the country
that he had agreed to resign. Rincon, in a brief address to the nation,
then read his famous statement that Chavez had resigned.

Most Venezuelans had waited until 3:20am to finally hear Rincons
statement to the country. Opposition sympathizers were ecstatic with the
news, while Chavez supporters became very depressed. However, many people
could not be absolutely certain that Rincon was telling the truth. Given
the large number of defections from the Chavez camp in the military, it
seemed all too possible that Rincon might have lied to the nation because
he too had decided to switch sides. The opposition, though, had no doubts
that this was the end of Chavez as president.

However, as it turned out, despite Rincons seemingly last word on Chavez
as president, the ordeal was far from over. Shortly after Rincon read the
statement, according to Chavezs version of events,[29] he heard from the
rebel generals that they would not accept his conditions after all.
Chavez thus decided that he would not resign, but instead let himself be
arrested and was then taken to Fort Tiuna, where he was seen one more
time on television, around 4am, as he entered the fort.

Once in Fort Tiuna, General Vasquez Velasquez asked Chavez to sign the
resignation. Chavez responded, I will not sign anything. From this moment
on I am in your hands and you do what you believe to be right. To which
Vasquez said, I inform you that from this moment on you will be in the
custody of the Armed Forces.

The debate that followed among the coup generals was about whether to let
Chavez go to Cuba or whether to keep him in Venezuela and try him for
crimes against humanity. Another option, which some chroniclers claim was
considered, was to turn Chavez over to U.S. authorities, where he might
be tried for a crime, along the lines of the capture of General Manuel
Noriega or Panama. Later, after his release, Chavez would argue that
supporting evidence for this hypothesis was a U.S. plane on the island
where he was held captive for part of the time. In the end, on the
insistence of Daniel Romero, a lawyer and assistant to former President
Carlos Andris Perez, the generals decided to keep Chavez in custody and
to let the transition government decide his fate.

The Coup within the Coup

In the early morning hours of April 12th, the Generals, with Efrain
Vasquez Velasco as one of the most important ones, decided to hand the
presidency to Fedecamaras president Pedro Carmona. Later it would be
argued that with Chavezs resignation and the apparent disappearance of
the countrys vice-president, Diosdado Cabello, the military had the duty
to fill this vacuum of power, as it would be called. In actuality,
though, Pedro Carmonas designation as interim president had been long in
the making.

Discussions about who should succeed Chavez had begun practically ever
since Chavez first assumed the presidency in 1999. Towards the end of
2001 it appeared that the main candidate as successor to Chavez would be
CTV president Carlos Ortega. However, powerful economic sectors in
Venezuela and the military seemed to prefer Pedro Carmona. By late March
2002, the proposal had been floated that rather than one president, there
should be junta, consisting of Pedro Carmona, Carlos Ortega, and an
officereither Vice-Admiral Hector Ramirez Perez or General Vasquez
Velasco.

The final decision was, though, that Carmona would be the transition
president. Carmona appeared on television, at 4:51am, to make the
announcement. At that time, a list of candidates for the rest of the
transition cabinet had already been made, as well as a draft of the
infamous decree that would abolish all state institutions.

The next day was a very busy one for the coup leaders. Everyone who was
anyone in the opposition gathered at the presidential palace, to
celebrate, to congratulate, and to lobby for positions in the transition
government. The private mass media was celebrating too, with tremendous
headlines that cheered, Its Over! (El Universal), Chavez Resigned (El
Universal), The Assassin Has Fallen (Asi es la Noticia), Good-bye Hugo
(Tal Cual). Napolesn Bravos morning talk show (24 Horas) opened program
with, Good morning, we have a new president, and then Bravo proceeded to
read the resignation letter Chavez supposedly signed, but actually did
not sign. The state media, though, was still off the air.

Already early in the morning the first signs became visible that the coup
was drifting to the far right of the political spectrum. According to
Miguel Manrique, an advisor to CTV president Carlos Ortega, Ortega had
become very upset when he heard that the military named Carmona as
president without consulting with him.[30] In the morning of the 12th
Ortega met with Carmona in the presidential palace to urge larger
civilian participation in the transition government. He then left the
capital, to go to his home town of Coro, about 300 kilometers west of
Caracas and was not heard from again during the coup regime.

While the coup organizers were working out the details of a decree that
would name Carmona as president, among other things, Isaias Rodriguez,
the countrys Attorney General, managed to convince the private broadcast
media to let him onto live television with the argument that he wanted to
publicly announce his resignation. Once on live television, at 2:04 pm,
he said, This is a coup ditat. There is no doubt about it. The
Inter-American Democratic Charter and the Washington protocol have been
violated here. He went on to say that Chavez did not resign and that even
if he had, it would not be effective unless he did so to the National
Assembly and that next in line of succession is the vice-president and
then the president of the National Assembly. A few minutes into his
announcement, as soon as they noticed that Rodriguez was not announcing
his resignation, the private television stations cut him off
mid-sentence. Already word had spread, by word of mouth and via the
community media, that Chavez had not resigned and that he was being held
against his will on a military island somewhere. Isaias Rodriguezs
announcement thus confirmed what many had already suspected.

Also that afternoon, various police forces, opposition leaders, and
mayors decided to start a witch hunt for pro-Chavez officials. The first
whose home was raided was that of the Interior Minister Ramon Rodriguez
Chacin. As he was being illegally arrested by the police, neighbors who
sympathized with the opposition hit him and launched insults at him. The
next to receive similar treatment was Tarek William Saab, a member of
Chavezs party in the National Assembly. Tal Cual editor Teodoro Petkoff
was among the very few in the opposition who publicly protested against
this type of illegal witch hunt. Also arrested illegally and beat-up by
enraged opposition followers was the governor of Tachira state, Ronald
Blanco la Cruz. Numerous raids were also conducted in community media
offices, where equipment was confiscated, and of homes of members of
Bolivarian Circles. In the case of the Bolivarian Circles, which had been
accused of being behind the shots fired from the Llaguno bridge, the
justification for the raids was that officials were looking for arms
caches. None were found, though.

Suspecting that Vice-President Diosdado Cabello was hiding in the Cuban
embassy, a mob surrounded the embassy and cut off all of its water,
electricity, and phone lines. They trashed the cars parked outside,
assuming that these belonged to employees of the embassy, and threw rocks
into the windows. Television cameras broadcast these activities live,
while the police stood by and watched. Eventually the major of the city
district in which the embassy is located, Enrique Capriles Radonski, came
and climbed the wall of the embassy compound in order to talk to the
ambassador. Once inside, he asked the ambassador if he could search the
premises, to make sure that no Chavez government officials were hiding
there, saying that if he did this, the crowd would leave the embassy
alone. The ambassador refused.[31]

Finally, by 5 pm, the coup organizers had their decree and the names of
the transition cabinet ready. Prior to that, a debate had been raging
around a proposal various opposition legislators had made, to convoke the
National Assembly to ratify Carmona as president. The idea was to vote
out of office National Assembly president William Lara and to replace him
with an opposition deputy. Apparently a few deputies from the Chavez
camped had decided to switch sides, so that the opposition could turn the
slight Chavez majority into a majority for itself, with 90 out of the
National Assemblys 165 votes. Following this, Carmona would be named
president by the National Assembly. However, upon consulting with
Cardinal Ignacio Velasco, who had been deeply involved in the coup
organizing from the start, and Vice-Admiral Ramirez Perez and General
Rodriguez Salas, they convinced Carmona that convoking the National
Assembly would be a bad idea. Instead, they supported the decree that had
been prepared by Daniel Romero and others.

So, at 5:30 pm, in an assembly hall in Miraflores, the lawyer Daniel
Romero read the coup decree to a hall full of opposition dignitaries.
With obvious glee Romero read each of the eleven decree articles that
specified:

1. The designation of Pedro Carmona as president of the Republic of
Venezuela.

2. The removal of Bolivarian from Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.

3. The dissolution of the National Assembly and the convocation of
legislative elections for December 2002. The new legislature would
have powers to reform the constitution of 1999.

4. The creation of a Consultative Council to consult the president. It
would consist of 35 representatives from diverse sectors of
Venezuelan society.

5. The president will coordinate policies of democratic transition.

6. National elections will be held within one year. Carmona would not be
eligible for reelection at that time.

7. The president would have the power to remove and name new officials
to any national, state, or local post in order to guarantee
governability.

8. The dismissal of all Supreme Court judges, of the Attorney General,
of the Comptroller General, of the human rights defender (Defensor
del Pueblo), and of the members of the National Electoral Council.
The president can name new individuals to these posts.

9. The 48 law-decrees that were passed with the enabling law in November
2001 would be suspended.

10. The countrys juridical order would be maintained, but only insofar as
it does not contradict the decree.

11. The democratic transition and national unity government would give up
its powers in accordance with this decree.

Following the reading of each point the crowd gathered in the hall
cheered wildly. 27 representatives of different groups were then asked to
come forward to sign the decree, to give it legitimacy. One of the first
to sign was the Cardinal. Most of the rest of the signers either came
from the old AD/Copei elite or were former leaders of leftist parties,
such as Pablo Medina and Amirico Martin.

Then, Pedro Carmona swore himself in as President of Venezuela, swearing
to reestablish the validity of the 1999 constitution. Normally the
president of the National Assembly swears in the president, but in this
case, following the dismissal of all high-level state officials, no one
could have sworn in Carmona. Then, the new ministers were announced. All
of them came from either the military or Venezuelas political right-wing,
making a mockery of the claim that this was a broad-based national unity
government.

The Counter-Coup

While the coup organizers were busy preparing their decree and divvying
up state power, Chavezs inner circle began working on getting the word
out that Chavez did not resign and that he was being held prisoner.
Already people living in the barrios near Fort Tiuna began mobilizing to
the Fort, to demand their presidents release. Also, there were three
military centers that were clearly unwilling to accept the transition
regime: the paratrooper regiment of the air force base at Maracay, one
hour from Caracas, the presidential honor guard in Miraflores, and
battalions within Fort Tiuna. The resistance that would happen in Maracay
and in Miraflores would prove to be crucial in restoring Chavez to power.

The next morning, April 13th, as the spontaneous demonstrations in
support of Chavez grew increasingly larger, the Greater Caracas city
police (Policia Metropolitana), began repressing these demonstrations.
Also, rioting and looting broke out in many poor neighborhoods, as Chavez
supporters vented their anger on their surrounding infrastructure. The
metropolitan police ended up shooting and killing between 50 and 60
people in the confrontations with demonstrators.[32] Many of these deaths
happened in front of Fort Tiuna, where the Metropolitan police repeatedly
and unsuccessfully attempted to disperse the crowd with live ammunition.
Also, demonstrations were taking place throughout the country, with
people demanding the immediate return of their president.

None of this was viewable on television, however. The previous day, on
the 12th of April, all four main private TV channels were broadcasting
interviews with gloating opposition leaders and the resume of Pedro
Carmona. On the 13th, however, a complete news blackout had taken over.
The private broadcasters were showing nothing but cartoons and old
Hollywood movies. Channel 8, the state television channel was off the air
for all of the 12th and most of the 13th. The lack of information was
bizarre. At first one had the impression that there was no news simply
because nothing was happening, because everything was back to normal, now
that Chavez was out of office. Anyone who could receive cable television
or who was in some way connected to the network of Chavez supporters,
knew, via CNN or via word of mouth (or directly, if they lived in or near
a barrio) that nothing was normal at all. Later, the owners of the media
outlets would claim that the reason they did not broadcast any news was
because it was too dangerous to send reporters onto the street. This
argument, though, is hardly credible, especially because they could at
least have reported on their fear of going onto the street. Also, it was
later learned that in the afternoon of the 12th, Carmona had gathered the
heads of the main media outlets and asked them to make sure that their
broadcasts do not contribute to any instability in the country.

In Fort Tiuna, General Garcia Carneiro was relatively isolated because
his sympathies for Chavez were well known. No action was taken against
Garcia Carneiro, though, partly because he pretended to support the coup
generals. The generals, in turn, assumed that Garcia Carneiro was simply
someone who would go with however was in charge and so did not pay much
attention to him. When he left Fort Tiuna, in the evening of the 12th, he
went straight to the main entrance where Chavistas had gathered, to
encourage them and to tell them that Chavez had not resigned.

As word gradually spread about the demonstrations, the rioting, and the
repression, General Raul Baduel, who is well known in Venezuela for being
a practicing Taoist, drafted a manifesto in Maracay, under the heading,
Operation Rescue National Dignity. The four main points of the manifesto
were:[33]

1. To end the terror being exercised by the metropolitan police in the
barrios of Caracas.

2. To immediately reinstate the constitutional order.

3. To avoid a military confrontation.

4. To seek the immediate resignation of the usurping government.

The news of the manifesto and of the paratroopers unwillingness to accede
to the coup regime spread very quickly, especially with the help of the
Bolivarian Circles. At 1:34 pm, Gen. Baduel made a public announcement of
the paratroopers resistance to the coup regime. Shortly thereafter, more
and more battalions throughout the country made similar statements, which
were broadcast mostly by the international media or community media.

By the afternoon of the 13th, General Vasquez Velasco, without whom the
coup would probably never have gotten as far as it had, felt that Carmona
had gone too far. First, he was upset that Carmona had named Vice-Admiral
Hector Ramirez Perez as Defense Minister. Ramirez Perez was of a lower
rank than he was and it was because of him, not Ramirez Perez, that
Chavez had fallen. Also, he was upset with Carmonas decree, which had
abolished practically all state institutions a move that went much
further than he thought Carmona and his supporters would go. Vasquez
Velasquez decided to summon all of the rebelling generals to discuss the
situation.

Meanwhile, at the Miraflores presidential palace, the presidential Honor
Guard began to implement its plan to retake the palace. Already a day
earlier it had begun working on what to do. The Honor Guard was
practically hand-picked by Chavez and so constituted among the most loyal
troops in the country. That the coup organizers failed to replace these
constituted perhaps one of the greatest errors of the short-lived coup
regime.

While the honor guard was conspiring and pretending to go along with
Carmona coup, Carmona and the other coup leaders were receiving the news
of General Baduels refusal to recognize the coup regime and doubts
Vasquez Velasquez was having. Carmona began to realize that the coup was
in trouble. He sent someone to find Carlos Ortega, who was in his
hometown of Punto Fijo, and offered to name CTV Vice-President Manuel
Cova as Vice-President of Venezuela.

However, just as the coup leaders gathered in Miraflores were getting
ready to swear-in the cabinet, an officer of the Honor Guard tipped-off
the gathered dignitaries, warning them to leave as fast as possible. The
Honor Guard had planned to arrest all of the cabinet and Pedro Carmona
just as they were being sworn in. Most managed to escape in time, but
many ended up being captured. TV crews that were in Miraflores at the
time recorded how many of the gathered Venezuelan elite ran for their
cars, as they tried to escape.

The coup leadership, including Transition President Pedro Carmona, fled
to Fort Tiuna, believing that they would be safer there, since this is
where most of the rebel generals were. Throughout the day Carmona had
been receiving reports about the demonstrations and riots that were
happening everywhere.

A fax arrived to the offices of the Honor Guard that afternoon,
surreptitiously sent by a soldier loyal to Chavez who was supposed to be
guarding the president. The fax, written in Chavezs handwriting and
signed by him, said,

To the Venezuelan People: I, Hugo Rafael Chavez Frias, Venezuelan,
President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, declare: I have not
resigned the legitimate power that the people have given me.

The Honor Guard rapidly photocopied the fax and distributed it among the
demonstrating crowd of Chavez supporters outside the presidential palace.

Back in Fort Tiuna, in the meeting General Vasquez Velasco had with the
generals, many of them pleaded with him not to make a pronouncement, but
finally he decided to go ahead and drafted a statement that he then read
to the press at 4:37 pm. Gen. Vasquez Velasco explained that errors had
been committed in the transition and went on to demand the compliance
with twelve norms. The statement, which, according to the general, were
supported by the officers of the Army and of the troops in Fort Tiuna,
specified, first, that the transition had to follow the norms set forth
in the constitution of 1999. It also demanded the elimination of the
Carmona decree and the reinstatement of the National Assembly. It went on
to demand respect for the states institutions. Finally, the statement
demanded that Chavez be taken to a country of his choice and that he be
allowed to appear live on television, just as Chavez had originally
demanded as a condition for his resignation.

However, by that time it was too late to save the coup. General Baduel
had already launched the plan to bring back Chavez to Miraflores, the
presidents Honor Guard had already taken back Miraflores, and in Fort
Tiuna Colonel Josi Montilla and several other officers were in the
process of arresting the coup generals. Also that afternoon, around 4:40
pm, on CNN, Chavezs wife, Marisabel Rodriguez de Chavez, said that she
spoke to her husband via telephone and confirmed once again what most
Chavistas had already heard through the grapevine, that Chavez had not
resigned and that he is being held prisoner in a military installation on
the Island of Orchila, 300 kilometers off the Venezuelan coast.

In a last-ditch effort to save the coup from its collapse, Pedro Carmona
decided, at 5:11 pm, from his hideout in Fort Tiuna, to announce on
television that he would reinstate the National assembly. By this time,
though, Carmona was practically completely surrounded by troops loyal to
Chavez. Still, in an interview with CNN around that time, he claimed that
his transition government is in complete control and that the situation
in the rest of the country is completely normal.

Also around this time, Chavez supporters decided to stage demonstration
in front of the private television broadcasters, as well as at the
newspaper offices of El Nacional and El Universal. In the case of the TV
stations, the demonstrators threw rocks at the buildings, braking windows
and causing the stations to interrupt their cartoons and Hollywood movies
and to focus on the angry demonstrators outside of their studios.
Eventually some of the demonstrators managed to storm the studios of RCTV
(channel 2), took it over, and held several television journalists
captive. They then proceeded to interview them about their role in the
coup, broadcasting the interviews live on TV.

A little after 8 pm various leaders of Chavezs movement, supporters, and
journalists re-took Channel 8, the state television station. At first the
broadcasts were washed out and difficult to see because inexperienced
people were using the equipment, but gradually the picture improved, as
Chavez supporters talked about their experiences during the past two
days. Also, an hour later they were able to confirm that Chavez would
return to the presidential palace soon.

Chavezs Imprisonment and Return to Power

After spending the night of April 11th in custody in Fort Tiuna, Chavez
was taken the next morning to the naval base Turiamo, in accordance with
orders from Vice-Admiral Ramirez Perez. The base is located a few short
hours outside of Caracas, in the state of Aragua. In the helicopter to
Turiamo Chavez was certain that they would kill him once he arrived.
Before he had left, a waiter who was serving both Chavez and Carmona in
Fort Tiuna told Chavez that he had overheard how Carmona and others were
talking about the option of killing him.[34]

Once at Turiamo, two women soldiers asked Chavez to sign a statement
confirming that he was in good health. He confirmed this, but added that
he also did not resign, which the soldiers included in their report. They
later sent the fax to the Attorney General, who then went on the air to
say that Chavez had not resigned. Also at Turiamo, Chavez wrote the note
that said he had not resigned, dropped it into the trash, where another
soldier picked it up and faxed it to Miraflores.

Chavez was then, in the afternoon of the 13th, flown to the island
military base of La Orchila. While there he exercised a bit and spoke to
the soldiers who were guarding him there. In the late afternoon, once the
coup was already falling apart, Cardinal Ignacio Velasco and one of the
coup generals flew to the island to meet with Chavez. Chavez, did not
know what was happening in the country, as his captors kept him without
access to information ever since he had left Fort Tiuna. He knew, though,
that if the coup organizers were sending two such high level
representatives to speak to him, that it must be important.

Cardinal Velasco tried to convince Chavez to sign a resignation letter,
arguing that his doing so would be best for the country. The cardinal
also told Chavez that a plane would take him to any country he wanted to
go to. Chavez responded that he would not sign a resignation letter as
long as his original conditions of safe passage, television address, and
proper resignation in front of the National Assembly had not been met. He
said he would, though, agree to sign a statement saying that he had
abandoned the presidency. After some resistance, the general and the
cardinal finally agreed to Chavezs proposal. As the statement was being
typed up, one of the soldiers who was guarding him whispered to him that
he should not sign anything. That, combined with the obvious nervousness
of the other soldiers and the rush that the cardinal and general appeared
to be in, convinced Chavez that something was going on that he did not
know about. So when the document was ready, Chavez said, Look, I
definitely wont sign anything. Thanks very much for your visit.[35] The
cardinal and the general suddenly agreed and quickly left. A few minutes
later they were back again and Chavez found out that the plane they had
come with had left without them and instead a paratrooper squadron was
arriving on the island to take Chavez back to Miraflores. At 2 am he was
on his way.

Chavez landed in Miraflores, amid tremendous cheers from the crowd of 30
to 40,000 supporters who were gathered outside of the presidential palace
compound. The people who were waiting for Chavez had heard several hours
earlier, since perhaps around 10 pm, that Chavez would return soon. While
they were waiting, various ministers and leaders of Chavezs movement gave
speeches to the crowd from the top of an improvised stage, which was the
top of a van. Finally, when Chavez arrived at 4 am, many people were
crying with joy, to see their president return.

Chavez went straight to the Salon in Miraflores where his cabinet and
television cameras were waiting for him. His address to the nation was
broadcast on all stations live at 4:35 am. I send a message from the
depth of my heart to Venezuela and the world that this palace is of the
Venezuelan people. the people have retaken this palace and they will not
be removed! said Chavez. Also, acknowledging that he too had committed
errors said, we must make decisions and adjust many things We must
respect dignity, without retaliations, no witch hunts We should not
tolerate disrespect for liberties we have won.[36]

A Coup Conspiracy, a Vacuum of Power, or Something Else?

In the days following the coup opposition leaders were emphatic in
stressing that what had happened April 11-13 was not a coup, but a vacuum
of power. According to this version of events, Chavez had resigned, and
his vice-president and the president of the National Assembly had
disappeared. It thus fell upon civil society (the oppositions term for
itself) and the military to find a new president.

Another version of events, claimed mostly by the most radical opposition
groups, was that Chavez had planned all of the events of those days
himself, in order to trap the opposition and to stage a self-coup
(autogolpe). Chavezs ultimate goal supposedly was to purge the military
and to use the incident as an excuse to persecute the opposition. Aside
from the fact that there is no evidence for this version of events, if a
self-coup was the true goal, it would seem that the plan ended in
failure, as practically no one was persecuted afterwards, even though
many oppositional military officers were removed from command.

The question of whether what happened was a coup or a vacuum of power is
not really a serious question, in that practically everyone except the
most die-hard anti-Chavistas agree that what happened was indeed a coup.
However, there is the interesting question of what exactly made the coup
possible. What were the coups most immediate causes and what were the
causes of its ultimate failure?

The Coups Causes and Plot

Ultimately, the coup had its causes in the polarization of Venezuelan
society, which is not something that Chavez brought about, but which is
something that he made visible and accentuated. This is not to say that
the coup was merely a reflection of the rich versus poor or light versus
dark skinned Venezuelans, as many pro-Chavez commentators argue. Rather,
Chavez made visible the existing extreme polarization of Venezuelan
society in a way that no other Venezuelan president has before him. At
the same time, his particular style of governing alienated some who might
under different circumstances be natural allies, such as some of the more
moderate leftist parties and their political leaders.

Part of his style, which certainly contributed to the crisis, has been
his relative unwillingness to compromise with political opponents. This
is an aspect which caused another group of former allies to switch sides
(such as Luis Miquilena and his supporters in the National Assembly).
This unwillingness to compromise also contributed to the radicalization
of the positions of various opponents, who, under other circumstances,
might never have supported a coup.

Another key contributing factor to the development of a coup dynamic in
Venezuela was the unwillingness of the countrys old elite to accept
Chavez as the countrys democratically elected president. This sector, to
which one must probably count the former governing parties AD and COPEI,
the CTV leadership, Fedecamaras, the Church hierarchy, right-wing
officers in the military, and much of the private mass media (especially
El Universal, RCTV, and Globovisisn), had always argued that Chavez was
dangerous and that his election and initial popularity were merely a
fluke that was caused by the implosion of the Punto Fijo system. These
groups could never tolerate Chavez as president and sought to find ways
to oust him from office ever since he was first elected and still do to
this day.

These were the broader societal dynamics that contributed to the coup.
However, the details of the events of April 11 appear to have been
largely planned by a small clique, which knew that they could count on
the tacit support of practically the entire opposition. The core of this
clique probably consisted of General Enrique Medina Gomez, who was
Venezuelas military attachi in Washington, Vice-Admiral Hector Ramirez
Perez of the navy, Isaac Perez Recao, a wealthy and very young
businessman and arms dealer, Pedro Carmona, the president of Fedecamaras
and former manager in one of Perez Recaos businesses, and Daniel Romero,
a friend of Perez Recaos and assistant to former president Carlos Andres
Perez. What follows is largely speculation on my part, but it seems that
there is sufficient evidence to make some educated guesses.

The plot to overthrow Chavez was probably very simple. At its heart it
aimed to create a situation of maximum political tension, in which it
could later be said that Chavez had lost legitimacy and could either be
forced or convinced to resign. The combination of the loss of legitimacy
and the resignation would then be sufficient to convince Venezuelans and
the rest of the world that this was not a coup, but a legitimate transfer
of power.

The very first step thus had to be to create a situation of maximum
tension. This was done by exploiting the conflict between PDVSA and the
president, where the private media helped tremendously in raising the
pitch and the stakes (with Chavezs help). Next, once people were
mobilized, a situation was created in which Chavez and/or his supporters
appear to act in ways that de-legitimate the government. The coup
plotters did this by placing armed men in the buildings surrounding both
demonstrations and having them shoot at these, causing Chavistas to
return fire and causing general confusion and mayhem, for which Chavez
could be blamed. Since key Chavez advisors, such as the vice-minister for
citizen security, General Camacho Kairuz, was in on the coup plans and
knew of Chavezs probable reaction to the demonstration heading for
Miraflores, the coup plotters knew that any attempt to stop the march,
especially with the use of Plan Avila troops, could be used as an
additional argument to justify a military uprising against Chavez.

The next element was to have military officers in place who would
denounce the president for the supposed human rights violations of the
day. Apparently there were far more high ranking officers who were
willing to do this than Chavez had realized. These officers, who later
proved to be quite right wing, such as General Carlos Alfonso Martinez,
General Enrique Medina, and many others, would then be used to pressure
Chavez to resign on the basis that he no longer controlled the military
and, if that was not enough, that there would be a threat of violent
confrontation in the presidential palace.

Once Chavez was gone from the presidency, the coup organizers were
probably certain, due to their previous discussions with U.S. government
officials, that the Bush administration would endorse the coup. They
would endorse it, provided, of course, that it did not look like a coup.

With Chavez facing the terrible alternative between resigning or fighting
it out in a situation where his legitimacy was in question, the coup
planners had Chavez in a lose-lose position. Chavez managed to beat the
coup plotters, though, when he got out of the alternative by neither
resigning nor fighting. At first, Chavez believed that resignation or
fighting were indeed his only alternatives. However, the false
announcement that Chavez had resigned meant that the opposition could no
longer threaten with bombing, so Chavez no longer felt pressure to
resign. He was free to let himself be arrested, thus robbing the
opposition of one of the main ingredients it needed for the coup to
succeed.

The Reasons for the Coups Failure

All of the foregoing, if that was indeed the plan, happened according to
plan. Things only started to go wrong when, first, Chavezs resignation
was announced when, in reality, he had not resigned. This created the
impression among the opposition that they had succeeded and made some of
them careless in the next phases of their effort to replace Chavez. Among
Chavez supporters this created the demand to see the resignation letter
and to see Chavez, which the opposition could not allow. Once rumors
started circulating that Chavez had not resigned, there was nothing the
opposition could do, since they could not prove that he had resigned.
This then increased peoples willingness to go onto the street and to
demand Chavezs return.

The next factor that contributed to the coups failure was that the coup
was taken over by the countrys most right-wing elements. More moderate
supporters of the coup, such as General Vasquez Velasco, did not realize
that they were actually instruments of a very radical faction of the
opposition. The naming of Pedro Carmona as president, the national unity
decree, and the exclusion of any moderate factions of Venezuelan society
from the Carmona government took large sectors of the opposition by
surprise. The coup government thus ended up being stillborn, as sooner or
later many initial supporters would have turned against it. This
weakness, however, might not have been necessary for the coup to fail. It
is quite probable that the lack of a signed resignation and the large
support base for Chavez, both in the population and in the military,
would have been enough to doom the coup.

That is, the larger than expected popular support for Chavez was perhaps
one of the more important elements in the coups demise. Opposition
supporters generally minimize the importance of this factor, downplaying
the number of people went to the streets and the impact this had on
Chavezs return. However, it is unlikely that the military officers that
were loyal to Chavez would have reacted as quickly and as decisively as
they did if they had not seen the spontaneous demonstrations in support
of Chavez. General Jorge Garcia Carneiro, who played an important role in
securing Fort Tiuna, described the impression the demonstration made on
him as follows:

The morning of the 12th I believed that things were lost. I was truly
submerged in a world of confusion, even though there was a little bit of
hope because the day before the people had presented signs of rebellion.
Once I saw the people, this multitude, ferociously demanding the presence
of Chavez, of course this gives one more strength.[37]

In effect, the opposition never seemed to consider it a possibility that
Chavez supporters would reject the coup or that they would believe it was
a coup. Given that opposition leaders and supporters receive most of
their information from the private mass media and that this media was
actively involved in creating the impression that Chavez had lost
practically all popular support, it was no surprise that the opposition
ended up believing its own propaganda machine. When the people did take
to the streets, the generals could hardly have called out the troops to
repress the demonstration, since this was precisely their claim to
legitimacy: their refusal to repress a civilian demonstration.[38]

In effect, the opposition made the error of believing its own propaganda,
that Chavez was a highly unpopular president. Although apparently
scientific polls appeared to confirm this impression to the opposition,
the pollsters had not yet become accustomed to a Venezuela in which the
countrys poor had political preferences. That is, prior to Chavez, the
main citizens who counted, because they voted, were from the middle
class. However, three years into Chavezs presidency, the countrys poor
had awakened politically and had become a previously unrecognized
political force. Pollsters and the media, thinking that their class was
the only class that counted, failed to see that Chavez was still
immensely popular among the poor, who would go to great risks in making
sure that he would be returned to power.

Another important error on the part of the coup planners, which
contributed to their failure, was that they did not exchange the
Presidential Honor Guard. The honor guard was thus free to plot the
re-taking of the presidential palace, which, for its tremendous symbolic
value, represented a nearly fatal blow to the coup. Similarly, the coup
organizers did not seem to have any contingency plans in place for how to
react to General Raul Baduels efforts to bring Chavez back. The Maracay
paratrooper regiment is one of the countrys best armed and trained forces
and would have intimidated any other regiment if it had come to a real
confrontation. The coup organizers seemed to believe that Baduel would
not react if sufficient generals had already renounced Chavez as
commander in chief.

Unresolved Questions 1: Who were the snipers?

There seem to be four main unresolved questions, which, if they remain
unresolved, will continue to shroud the coup in controversy. The first of
these is the question of who shot the pro- and anti-Chavez demonstrators
on April 11th. It seems obvious that the only ones who could possibly
have had an interest in causing a confrontation and in causing deaths
that day were the masterminds behind the coup and therefore it is
reasonable to believe that it was they who made sure those shots were
fired.[39] However, other than the testimony provided by Otto Neustaldt
and by various coup organizers who bragged about having planned the coup,
solid proof still has not yet surfaced.

Seven people were arrested on April 11th, in the hotel Ausonia, which is
across the street from where several people were killed. When the DISIP
(a national police force) arrested them, several weapons and drugs were
found on them. Five of them had false identification papers and several
were apparently Colombians. On the 13th the suspects were presented to a
judge, but the hearing ended up being postponed, apparently due to the
confusion the country was in. Finally, when they had their hearing on the
16th, the judge ruled that there was insufficient evidence to hold them
any longer and let them go. According to Attorney General Isaias
Rodriguez, the suspects have all fled the country.[40] One of the most
promising leads on identifying the assassins was thus lost amidst the
confusion of the coup days.

Unresolved Questions 2: What is Plan Avila?

A second unresolved question is whether the Plan Avila that Chavez
invoked, in order to prevent a confrontation between pro- and anti-Chavez
demonstrators and to prevent an assault on Miraflores, represented a
potential violation of human rights and thus warranted the military
disobedience of Generals Vasquez Velasco and Manuel Rosendo and of other
officers. It would seem, though, that as long as there was no order to
attack demonstrators, the plan would merely have protected governmental
installations with lethal force. That is, as long as no one tried to
physically attack governmental buildings, such as the presidential
palace, no one would have been injured. As such, the plan is clearly not
a plan to attack. National Guard General Francisco Belisario Landis, who
was in charge of the National Guard on April 11th, explains that, The
Plan Avila was the one that was applied when the Pope visited Venezuela
It is implemented when the police force has been overcome and there is a
situation in which the public order has been significantly altered or
there is a latent, visible, and notorious threat to it.[41] If the plan
has been applied to control crowds before, such as during the Popes
visit, it makes little sense to say that Generals Vasquez and Rosendo
were justified in disobeying Chavez on April 11th, on the basis that this
is a lethal plan (in which they were no doubt at least partly responsible
for drafting).

Unresolved Questions 3: Were Rosendo and Vasquez part of the plan?

This leads to the third unresolved question of whether Vasquez and
Rosendo were part of the coup plan in the first place. The fact that Gen.
Vasquez was considered for the post of Defense Minister back in March
suggests very strongly that the coup organizers could count on his
support for their project. More than that, Tejera Paris, a former foreign
minister of Venezuela who was also being considered for the transition
presidency, reports that meetings were held at his home to discuss the
coup. According to La Fuente and Meza, Paris recounts how, Various
officials came here [to his home] and one of them, a major, told me that
he would arrange a meeting with [Gen.] Vasquez Velasco. He came to my
home one morning in March dressed as a civilian. He made a great
impression on me, of a decent and concerned man, reluctant to change the
government. I think he knew that Chavez presented a problem, but he did
not want to topple him. But we talked about how the coup should
unfold.[42]

Vasquez Velasco later confirmed that he indeed met with Tejera Paris, but
always denied that he was part of any plan to topple Chavez. This claim,
however, does not sound particularly credible, given the key position he
had in the success of the coup. If it had not been for the rebellion of
Vasquez Velasco (and of General Manuel Rosendo), the coup would in all
likelihood have failed. The coup organizers must have known how he was
going to react to the events of the day, which Vasquez knew of well in
advance.

Unresolved Questions 4: How involved was the U.S. government?

Finally, one of the biggest unresolved questions is what role the Bush
administration played in the coup. There are numerous instances of
circumstantial evidence that suggest that the Bush administration was
involved in one way or another. In late 2003, though, several documents
have surfaced, as a result of a series of Freedom of Information Act
requests made by the lawyers Jeremy Bigwood and Eva Golinger, that the
CIA did know that a coup was being planned. The documents that show that
the Bush administration was aware of the coup plans are the five Senior
Executive Intelligence Briefs, issued between March 5 and April 8,
2002.[43] This brief is distributed to the 200 highest level
decision-makers in the U.S. government.

The April 1 brief states:

President Chavez is facing continued strong opposition from the private
sector, the media, the Catholic Church, and opposition political parties
angered by a host of laws he decreed in December. Reporting suggests that
disgruntled officers within the military are still planning a coup,
possibly early this month.

The next brief, of April 6, states, under the headline, Conditions
Ripening for Coup Attempt:

Dissident military factions, including some disgruntled senior officers
and a group of radical junior officers, are stepping up efforts to
organize a coup against President Chavez, possibly as early as this
month. [deleted section] The level of detail in the reported plans
[deleted]targets Chavez and 10 other senior officials for arrestlends
credence to the information, but military and civilian contacts note that
appears ready to lead a successful coup and may bungle the attempt by
moving too quickly.

The brief goes on to note that the coup will be unsuccessful as long as
it is not supported by a broader political base. It then continues,

To provoke military action, the plotters may try to exploit unrest
stemming from opposition demonstrations slated for later this month or
ongoing strikes at the state-owned oil company PDVSA

Considering that this is exactly how the coup unfolded, it would seem
that the CIA was indeed quite well informed about the plans.

The April 8 brief makes it very clear that the CIA knew that a coup was
in the works:

Disgruntled military officers are planning a coup, although the military
and the opposition as a whole appear to prefer that Chavez be removed by
constitutional means.

When these documents became public, in November 2004, the Venezuelan
government demanded an explanation from the Bush administration. At first
a Bush administration spokesperson said that the administration did not
send a warning to Chavez, since this would have constituted interference
in Venezuelas internal affairs. Later, another spokesperson backtracked,
saying that the administration had indeed warned Chavez. Chavez, though,
denied ever having received such a warning.

More importantly, though, these briefs reveal that the Bush
administration was at the very least contributing to the coup, when it
claimed, contrary to its own intelligence findings, that the events of
April 11th were Chavezs own fault. White House spokesperson Ari Fleisher
said on April 12th,

We know that the action encouraged by the Chavez government provoked this
crisis. According to the best information available, the Chavez
government suppressed peaceful demonstrations. Government supporters, on
orders from the Chavez government, fired on unarmed, peaceful protestors,
resulting in 10 killed and 100 wounded. The Venezuelan military and the
police refused to fire on the peaceful demonstrators and refused to
support the government's role in such human rights violations. () The
results of these events are now that President Chavez has resigned the
presidency. Before resigning, he dismissed the vice president and the
cabinet, and a transitional civilian government has been installed. This
government has promised early elections.[44]

By endorsing the coup, with its confirmation of the oppositions version
of events as the only valid version, the U.S. government essentially
became an accomplice to the coup, regardless of whether the U.S.
government also had a larger hand in the coup behind the scenes. More
than that, since it is now proven that the Bush administration knew of
the coup plans well in advance, its endorsement of the oppositions
version of events constitutes active participation in the cover-up of the
actual events in order to support the coup plotters version of what
happened.

The question of whether the U.S. government was clandestinely involved in
the coup remains unresolved though. While the security briefs leave the
impression that the U.S. was merely observing events and not
participating in them, it is important to note that the security briefs
are prepared by the intelligence section of the CIA, not its operational
arm. That is, the CIA covert operations arm could have had a hand in the
coup, even though the security brief presents events in Venezuela from an
observers and not a participants perspective.

However, there are numerous other bits and pieces of evidence that point
to U.S. government complicity and perhaps even leadership in the coup. It
will probably take twenty years, as was the case with the uncovering of
U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Chiles Salvador Allende, before the
full story of U.S. involvement in the Venezuelan coup is revealed.

One of the pieces of evidence comes from Chavez himself, who has on
several occasions told of the story of a formal farewell reception, held
April 8th, 2002, for the Chinese military attachi, which was attended by
a large cross-section of Venezuelas national and foreign military
representatives. At that reception, a U.S. marine officer by the name of
David Cazares asked to speak to General Gonzalez of the Venezuelan
military. Not knowing that there were at least two General Gonzalezes in
Venezuelas military, he was directed to the wrong one. Cazares wanted to
speak to General Nestor Gonzalez Gonzalez, the General who was actively
plotting the coup with the opposition, but was instead directed to
General Roberto Gonzalez Cardenas, a Chavez loyalist. Since the name tag
on the uniform only says the first last name, he could not have known
that he was approaching the wrong Gonzalez. According to Chavez, he said
to Gen. Roberto Gonzalez, Why havent you contacted the ships that we have
on the coast and the submarine we have submerged in La Guaira?[45] What
has happened? Why has no one contacted me? What are you waiting for?
Puzzled about the question, the wrong Gonzalez merely responded, Ill find
out. Thereupon Cazares gave the general his business card, so that he
might contact him. Chavez says that Roberto Gonzalez gave him the card as
proof.[46]

A second piece of the puzzle, which fits well with the story above, was
provided by Wayne Madsen, a former officer of the National Security
Administration (NSA) the militarys spy and electronic eavesdropping arm.
According to Madsen, Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX) training exercises
in the Caribbean the US Navy provided signals intelligence and
communications jamming support to the Venezuelan military, [47] during
the coup. Furthermore, The National Security Agency (NSA) supported the
coup using personnel attached to the US Southern Command's Joint
Interagency Task Force East (JIATF-E) in Key West, Florida. NSA's
Spanish-language linguists and signals interception operators in Key
West; Sabana Seca on Puerto Rico and the Regional Security Operating
Centre (RSOC) in Medina, Texas also assisted in providing communications
intelligence to US military and national command authorities on the
progress of the coup djtat.

An intelligence report by Venezuelas Air Force, which was submitted to
coup president Pedro Carmona and found in the Presidential palace after
it was re-taken by Chavez confirms that U.S. ships entered Venezuelan
territorial waters. According to the report, These ships were identified
as NC1 3300, NC22027, and NC# 2132; they entered territorial waters at
9:00am on April 12, 2002, without due authorization. After 4:00pm they
headed towards the high seas.[48]

Colonel Rodgers, along with Colonel Ronald McCammon signed their names
upon entering Fort Tiuna, the Caracas military headquarters, on April 11
and were seen there by several witnesses.[49] The U.S. State Department
later denied the existence of these officers or that any officers were in
Fort Tiuna at that time. Wayne Madsen elaborated on this information in
an interview with the British newspaper The Guardian. "I first heard of
Lieutenant Colonel James Rogers [the assistant military attachi now based
at the US embassy in Caracas] going down there last June [2001] to set
the ground, said Madsen to The Guardian.[50]

Finally, Chavez and other witnesses say they saw a U.S.-registered
airplane on the island that Chavez was being held captive on, La Orchila.
The island is a military base and thus normally would not have any U.S.
planes on it. According to one account, the plane belonged to a
Paraguayan banker named Victor Gil of Total Bank and that the planes
purpose was to take Chavez to Puerto Rico.[51]

What these bits and pieces of evidence point to is a suggestive picture
of direct U.S. government support for the coup. The exact extent and
nature of this support will probably remain an issue of controversy for
quite some time. It seems that the support was minimally in the form of
supportive statements and advice on what the coup would have to look like
in order for the U.S. to accept it. It seems more plausible, though, that
the support was much more substantial than that and included extensive
coordination between Venezuelan and U.S. coup planners, logistical
military support as described by Madsen, and a plan for secretly flying
Chavez to the U.S. or some other country, as happened to both President
Bertrand Aristide of Haiti in 2005 and to General Manuel Noriega in 1990,
when they were deposed with U.S. help.

Bibliography

Elizade, Rosa Miriam and Luis Baez (2004), Chavez Nuestro, La Habana:
Casa Editorial Abril

Garcia Ponce, Guillermo (2002) El Golpe de Estado del 11 de Abril.
Caracas: Comando Polmtica de la Revolucisn

Golinger, Eva (2005), The Chavez Code: Cracking U.S. Intervention in
Venezuela, Havana: Editorial Josi Martm (also published in 2006 at: Olive
Branch Press)

Harnecker, Marta (2003), Hugo Chavez Frmas: Un Hombre, Un Pueblo.
Caracas: Asociacisn Civil Universitario por la Equidad (Published in 2005
in English as: Understanding the Venezuelan Revolution, New York: Monthly
Review Press)

La Fuente, Sandra and Alfredo Mesa (2004) El Acertijo de Abril. Caracas:
Random House Mondadori

Rosas, Alexis (2005) La Noche de los Generales. Self-published
Sanz, Rodolfo (2003) Dialectica de una Victoria. Los Teques: Nuevo
Pensamiento Critico

End Notes:

[1] According to opposition polls, Chavezs approval rating dropped from
around 60% in early 2001 to 35% in early 2002.

[2] Later General Guaicaipuro would go on to become one of the main
protagonists in the April coup against Chavez and would be treated as a
potential presidential candidate of the opposition.

[3] El Universal, March 13, 2002, Denuncian Presiones a Petroleros

[4] Fetrahidrocarburos, Sintrap, Sindicato Nacional Unitario de
Trabajadores Petroleros, and Sindicato Marino de PDV-Marina.

[5] El Universal, April 6, 2002, Fedepetrol se divide por crisis de PDVSA

[6] Vheadline.com: http://www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=2621

[7] The Word cadena means chain," which is a reference to the connecting
of all broadcast outlets to one government signal.

[8] El Universal, April 8, 2002, La CTV permanecera en la calle

[9] Chavez would later accuse General Gonzalez Gonzalez of being one of
the coup plotters main liaisons to the U.S. embassy.

[10] El Universal, April 11, 2002, Conflicto bajo la lupa

[11] Article 333 says that all citizens have the duty to make sure that
the constitution is upheld, should it be violated. Article 350 states
that Venezuelans will not recognize any government or authority that
violates the constitution.

[12] See: http://www.aporrea.org/quienes_somos.php

[13] Personal testimony to the autor.

[14] La Fuente and Mesa (2004), p.110, fn.66

[15] www.defensoria.gov.ve

[16] El Universal, April 12, 2002, Altos oficiales desconocen autoridad
del presidente Chavez

[17] At that time I wrote an article for ZNet, called, An Imminent Coup
in Venezuela? (http://www.zmag.org/content/LatinAmerica/wilpertvenez.cfm)

[18] The result was a series of articles that were published in a wide
variety of places, but mainly on the ZNet website. See, for example: Coup
in Venezuela: An Eyewitness Account, April 12, 2002
(http://www.zmag.org/content/LatinAmerica/wilpertcoup.cfm) and Venezuela:
Not a Banana-Oil Republic after All April 15, 2002
(http://www.zmag.org/content/LatinAmerica/wilpertcounter.cfm)

[19] http://caracaschronicles.blogspot.com

[20] Garcia Ponce (2002) and Sanz (2003)

[21] Admiral Carlos Molina admitted to this on the 12th of April on the
television program 24 Horas: the fall of president Chavez has been in the
planning since a year ago and in some sectors even further back than
that. Nonetheless, all of the ideas and currents for getting rid of this
doomed government converged, just as it turned out. Colonel Julio
Rodriguez, in an interview with the journalist Ibeyise Pacheco, late in
the evening of April 11th, said in response to being asked what was
behind the events of the day, Twelve months ago a firm movement began to
be organized in all seriousness, that fortunately was realized on this
day.

[22] Garcia Ponce (2002), p.9

[23] Asamblea Nacional, Informe de la comisisn parlamentaria especial
para investigar los sucesos de abril de 2002, Chapter 3.

[24] www.cofavic.org.ve

[25] This account is based on Otto Neustaldts own testimony during a
conference at the Universidad Bicentenaria Maracay, on July 16, 2002. His
testimony was filmed and two months later broadcast on the state
television program VTV. A summary of the account can be found at:
www.asovic.org/reb150902.htm

[26] The friend was the journalist Lourdes Ubieta, who Neustaldt
describes as a close friend of Isaac Perez Recao, someone who was deeply
implicated in the coup plotting by several participants.

[27] La Fuente and Meza (2004), p.49

[28] La Fuente and Meza do not mention this in their account. However,
several pro-Chavez witnesses support this version of events, such as
Aristobulo Isturiz (in the documentary Chronica de un golpe) and
Guillermo Garcia Ponce (in his book, El Golpe de Estado del 11 de Abril).

[29] Marta Harnecker (2003), Hugo Chavez Frmas: Un Hombre, Un Pueblo

[30] Phil Gunson and David Adams, St. Petersburg Times, April 22, 2002,
The Unmaking of a Coup

[31] Two years later, Capriles Radonski would be arrested for his role at
the Cuban embassy during the coup. He was imprisoned for several months,
but eventually the case was first dismissed and then re-opened again.

[32] The official number, according to the Attorney Generals office was
56.

[33] Taken from Gracia Ponce (2002), p.58

[34] Harnecker (2003), p.220

[35] Ibid., p.226

[36] www.vheadline.com/readnews.asp?id=3006

[37] Harnecker (2003b), p.51

[38] Although, over 60 people were killed by the Caracas police,
controlled by opposition Mayor Alfredo Peqa, for rioting and
demonstrating in support of Chavez during April 12 and 13, 2002.

[39] While this explanation seems reasonable to most people, there still
are many in the opposition who argue that actually Chavez had an interest
in placing snipers in the buildings. That is, Chavez wanted the coup to
happen because it was not actually a coup, but a self-coup, a staged coup
which Chavez used to identify his enemies within the government and so
that he could use the event as a means for repressing the opposition.
There is no evidence, though, to give this interpretation any credence.
Also, after the coup Chavez became more much softer on the opposition
than he was beforehand.

[40] La Fuente and Meza (2004), p.152-153

[41] Interview with Ernesto Villegas Poljak, in Quinto Dia, July 26,
2002, La GN jamas recibis la orden de activar el Plan Avila

[42] La Fuente and Meza, p.136

[43] The documents are posted at:
www.venezuelafoia.info/CIA/CIA-index.htm

[44] www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/04/20020412-1.html

[45] La Guaira is Venezuelas main port, just north of the capital
Caracas.

[46] Chavez recounted this story during a luncheon with international
journalists in September 2003.

[47] His report was available online shortly after the coup, but is no
longer posted, except at: http://www.uvm.edu/~wmiller/venezuelancoup.htm

[48] Cited in: Golinger, Eva (2005), The Chavez Code: Cracking U.S.
Intervention in Venezuela, Havana: Editorial Josi Martm, p.15

[49] General Garcia Carneiro, who was instrumental in re-taking Fort
Tiuna during the counter-coup, told of seeing the two colonels in the
Fort on April 11th in his testimony to the National Assembly.

[50] American navy 'helped Venezuelan coup,' by Duncan Campbell in The
Guardian, Monday April 29, 2002

[51] Elizade, Rosa Miriam and Luis Baez (2004), Chavez Nuestro, La
Habana: Casa Editorial Abril, p.288

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