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Z: Erecting a New Wall in Europe

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Rich Winkel

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Apr 7, 1994, 6:33:12 PM4/7/94
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/** headlines: 351.0 **/
** Topic: Z: Erecting the New Wall **
** Written 1:24 pm Apr 4, 1994 by newsdesk in cdp:headlines **
From: George Gundrey - IGC News Desk <newsdesk>

/* Written 3:16 pm Mar 29, 1994 by news...@igc.apc.org in igc:zmagazine */
/* ---------- "Z: Erecting the New Wall" ---------- */
From the March, 1994 issue of Z Magazine

Title: Erecting the New Wall:
Geopolitics and the restructuring of Europe

By Zoltan Grossman

It was in a noisy nursing home in Chicago that my 79-year-old
grandmother put the Bosnian war in context. I was holding her
hand, talking with her in Hungarian about relatives we had
scattered around villages in southwestern Hungary. She mentioned
that we also had a few distant relatives in Yugoslavia. "But
Grandma," I said, "there is no more Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has
broken up." "Really?" she asked. "Yes Grandma, there are four new
countries, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia."

"Bosnia?," she shot back. "Yes Grandma," I said, "Bosnia."
"Bosnia?," she asked again. "Yes Grandma" I said again, "Bosnia.
And there's a terrible war there now," She then smiled and, out
of nowhere, recited:

"Stop, stop Serbian dogs You'll never get Bosnia The Hungarians
won't let you We'll fight to the last drop of blood Serbian dogs"

Pretty crude, but it rhymes in Hungarian. What Grandma had
remembered was a song she learned as a little girl, as the
Austro-Hungarian Empire was fighting Serbia, having lost an
Austrian archduke to a Serb assassin in Sarajevo. She didn't know
that Serb artillery was pounding Sarajevo that week, but could
easily remember a nursery rhyme from World War I. The fact that
the two conflicts are so similar speaks volumes about the history
of Europe.

What Is Europe?

Europe has always been a political and cultural definition.
Geographically, Europe does not exist, since it is only a
peninsula on the vast Eurasian continent. Before the l9th
century, geographers generally referred to it as "Christendom."
When colonialism began to spread Western culture and religion to
all corners of the globe, some British and German geographers
began to delineate the eastern boundaries of a European
continent. What they were actually doing was trying to draw the
eastern limits of "Western civilization" and the white race.
(While Russia extended far into Siberia, only a thin strip was
actually populated by ethnic Russians.)

Since they had to give some geophysical explanation for carving
off Europe, the geographers offered a variety of natural
boundaries. Today, the boundary of Europe is generally agreed to
go through the straits of the Dardanelles and Bosporus (next to
the Turkish city of Istanbul), the Black Sea, Caucasus Mountains,
then up the Caspian Sea, Ural River, and Ural Mountains to
Russia's Arctic shores. The trouble with this line is that it
includes a number of non-Christian peoples in Europe - from
Bosnian Muslims to Kalmyk Buddhists - as well as nations outside
the mainstream of Western Christianity.

Throughout history, Western European powers have tried to unify
Europe, usually by force. The Roman Empire conquered the
Mediterranean coasts of Europe, Asia and Africa. After
Christianity took hold in the Empire, the Church split into two
halves. The Western Roman Empire adopted a Western form of
Christianity, which evolved into Roman Catholicism. The Eastern
Roman (or Byzantine) Empire adopted Eastern Orthodox
Christianity. The Legacy of this Great Schism of 1054 can be seen
today on European street signs, with Western countries using the
Roman alphabet, and Eastern Orthodox countries usually using the
Greek derived Cyrillic alphabet.

Both the Western and Eastern branches of Christianity battled
with Islam throughout the Middle Ages. Crusaders temporarily
seized the Holy Land in the 1200s, and Christian armies drove the
Muslims out of Spain by 1492. The Muslim Turks of the Ottoman
Empire counter-attacked, conquering most of the Balkans in
southeastern Europe. The modern nations of Bosnia, Yugoslavia,
Albania, Bulgaria, Moldova, and most of Romania were still under
Ottoman rule in the late 19th century, when industrialization
began in Western Europe. Since they did not make that crucial
early jump to industrialism, the Balkan countries still lack what
Westerners call a "capitalist ethic." Yet they also preserved
their Eastern Orthodox and Muslim traditions.

To the north, the Austrian Empire consolidated control over what
is now Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia,
Croatia, and parts of Poland, Ukraine, and Romania. It solidified
a capitalist ethic and Catholic belief system throughout this
region. After Martin Luther founded Protestantism, Swedish and
German empires spread it along the Baltic coastal region.

A clear "fault line" began to emerge down the face of Central
Europe. To the west of that line, Catholic and Protestant
Christianity prevailed. To the east, Eastern Orthodox
Christianity and Sunni Islam still held sway. The conflicts
between these regions reflected not so much differences in
religious doctrine, but different levels of development and
global power.

Crossing the "fault line" has proved fatal to those European
conquerors who tried to build a continental empire. Napoleon
Bonaparte was turned back on the outskirts of Moscow in 1812, as
much by Russia's resolve as by its winter. Adolf Hitler was
similarly defeated at Stalingrad in 1943 as he sought lebensraum
(living space) for his German-controlled Mitteleuropa (Central
Europe). His adversary, Josef Stalin, took control over the
Baltic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East
Germany - all Western-oriented countries that would later begin
the unraveling of his empire. Even in the 20th century, the Great
Schism has proven impossible to bridge.

Western European Integration

In the 1990s, Europe is on its way to becoming one of the world's
superpowers. It needn't be in the form of a federal United States
of Europe, without national boundaries appearing on the map. What
is forming is a transnational European Union - a regional
alliance of Western and Central European states around economic,
political, and military issues. Europe doesn't have to become one
nation, though it could end up that way. The Union is growing out
of existing economic alliances, in fits and starts. But despite
setbacks in the process of integration, the march toward Union is
probably unstoppable.

All of the continent's nations - East and West - are members of
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),
which is not an alliance but a forum for discussing mutual
concerns. The real nucleus of the new Europe is in the European
Union (EU). The postwar common cause of Western Europe led to the
birth of the European Community (EC) - the EU's initial form - in
the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Starting with France, West Germany,
Italy, and the Benelux nations (Belgium, Netherlands, and
Luxembourg), it grew to incorporate the UK, Denmark, and the
poorer countries of Ireland, Greece, Spain, and Portugal. Some
smaller but wealthy nations - Austria, Switzerland, Norway,
Sweden, Finland, and Iceland - formed the parallel alliance
called the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

Economic union. In a series of decisions in 1988, the EC
decided to eliminate most trade and tariff barriers between
member states as of January 1, 1993. This economic integration
process brought predictions of a European "super-market" and
eventual political-economic union. In December 1991, EC nations
signed the Treaty on European Union in the Dutch city of
Maastricht, creating a new European Union of all EC members. The
treaty laid out a roadmap to reach these goals. Despite some
close calls in Denmark, the UK, and France the treaty took effect
in November 1993.

The first priority of integrating Western Europe is economic and
monetary union. This includes the establishment of a European
Monetary System (EMS), a European Currency Unit (ECU) by 1999,
and a European Monetary Institute (EMI), whose new Frankfurt
headquarters is the nucleus of a European central bank.

The obstacles to economic union have been formidable. French
farmers launched blockades of Paris to protest lifting protective
tariffs. Italy and the UK dropped out of the European Rate
Mechanism (ERM) to protest Germany's strengthening of the
Deutschmark at their expense. Finally, many Europeans remain
resentful of the faceless EU bureaucrats (or "Eurocrats") in the
EU headquarters city of Brussels, proposing policies through an
undemocratic process. Nevertheless, the lure of a united European
economy is proving just barely stronger than the instinct to
guard national sovereignty.

At the same time, EFTA nations are lining up to join the EU, now
that joining would not violate some EFTA members' political
neutrality. Austria and Sweden may join soon. In 1991, the EC and
EFTA jointly agreed to the establishment of a European Economic
Area (EEA), with a total market of 380 million people. By 2000,
the EFTA will probably no longer exist.

Political union. The second priority of European integration is
political union. The European Parliament is located in the French
Alsace city of Strasbourg, rather than in Brussels. Parliament
elections have slowly turned from purely symbolic affairs to real
hard-fought campaigns, which at times have served as early-
warning systems for trends in national elections. In the early
1990s, EU voters turned increasingly toward previously marginal
parties - such as regional advocates, extreme-right groups, and
environmentalist Greens - rather than the traditional
conservative and social democratic alliances. The Maastricht
Treaty increased the parliament's powers, as well as the rights
of citizens to petition it.

The internal politics of EU states is being shaped like never
before by the "European question." The resignation of anti-union
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in November 1990 removed a major
obstacle to fuller UK involvement. Italy, France, and other
countries are shedding traditional political parties in favor of
newer but more tumultuous alliances. Their move not only is an
effort to stem extreme corruption and alienation from government,
but to abandon the party-centered political system imposed on
them after World War II. Leaders such as French President
Francois Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl see the
European Union as a guarantee of future political stability.

Military union. A similar process is taking place in Europe's
military integration. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) has linked the U.S., Canada, and most of Western Europe
against the Soviet Union. With the Soviet collapse, the impetus
for NATO has diminished. Since 1955, EU nations have participated
in the Western European Union (WEU) military alliance, which in
the Cold War years was indistinguishable from NATO. In 1992,
however, a Franco-German corps was founded as a nucleus for a
future European army. Also, French and British troops have
operated somewhat independently in Bosnia, despite U.S.
insistence that any intervention be under the NATO umbrella. Both
issues set off alarm bells in Washington, always wary to what
Henry Kissinger once called the "decoupling" of Europe from the
U.S. The Maastricht Treaty called for increased "joint actions"
by European Union states.

Some nations have proposed that NATO expand to the east, starting
with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. These countries
would have to upgrade their militaries to NATO levels, and their
domestic and foreign problems would then become NATO's problems.
NATO membership is also no guarantor of democracy, given past
dictatorships in member states Portugal, Greece, and Turkey. In
the meantime, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)
provides a loose forum on military affairs for all NATO, ex-
Warsaw Pact, and ex-Soviet states.

But a European military will be slow in coming. WEU nations have
not arrived at a common position on the largest European military
conflict since the 1940s - the war in Bosnia. The UN-sponsored
naval blockade of Yugoslavia in 1993 was a joint operation of
European warships under the WEU and U.S. warships under NATO.
Interestingly, despite the extremely high level of militarization
in Europe since the 1940s, the Adriatic Sea blockade was the
first real military operation ever by either alliance. NATO may
be on its way out, but it will not be as sudden a change as the
unraveling of the Warsaw Pact. As Europe grows stronger, it will
not only want to defend itself, but U.S. taxpayers will insist
that it does so.

The break-ups inside the union. As Europe grows larger and more
powerful, its components are ironically growing smaller. The
growing integration of nation-states can give more breathing room
to regions within each country. As multiethnic countries in
Eastern Europe break up, the multiethnic and multiregional
countries of Western Europe are breaking up too. Before European
integration, Scots would be out in the cold if they had seceded
from the United Kingdom. Now, an independent Scotland would not
only be economically tied to the UK, but to other EU countries as
well. Just as the USSR splintered into 15 countries, the UK could
break into four countries. (Besides England, Scotland, and Wales,
Northern Ireland could become an independent state, or join the
Republic of Ireland - perhaps with an autonomous Protestant
region.) The united Europe will be a union not so much of
countries, but of the historic regions that predated and formed
the countries in the first place. The Maastricht Treaty created a
committee of regions (or "subnational governments") to consult on
legislation - perhaps a precursor to a more powerful
parliamentary "house of regions."

Nation-states such as Italy and Germany only formed in the late
l9th century. Now, Italian northern regions are voting the right-
wing autonomist Northern League into power, and eastern Germans
are strongly resenting arbitrary rule by western Germans. Spain's
ethnic minority regions of Catalunya and Euzkadi (formerly
Catalonia and the Basque Country) could become independent
members of the EU, not to mention the traditional Spanish regions
of Andalusia, Galicia, Castile-Leon, and others. The relatively
well-off northern regions of both Spain and Italy want to be seen
as part of Europe's industrial heartland, not its less developed
south.

Other long-standing ethnic conflicts could splinter nation-states
within a united Europe. Belgium could split into French speaking
Walloonia and Dutch-speaking Flanders. The island of Corsica and
the Celtic peninsula of Breizh (Britanny) have long sought real
autonomy from France. Even in peaceful Switzerland, French-
speaking voters have been more amenable to joining the EU than
the German-speaking Swiss majority, who are historically
mistrustful of Germany.

However, European integration will hardly be a godsend for the
smaller cultures of the continent. Already, the market for
Finnish books in Finland is being overwhelmed by books in English
and German. A multilingual society builds a basis for cultural
understanding, but also contains the dangers of cultural
homogenization, American style. While minority peoples may break
free from nation-states, they may grow even more dependent on
their economies and media. A European superstate would crush any
genuine movements for cultural change.

The new European Union challenges the basic rationale behind the
nation-state. The U.S. State Department Office of the Geographer
recognized as much in its quarterly Geographic and Global
Issues: (Spring 1993): "Changing concepts of territorial
sovereignty and even of the state are bringing more variation in
the functions of international boundaries and a tendency for
decline in the number or level of functions a boundary may
perform. A single international boundary symbol no longer will
suffice for the world political map. Examples of this variation
are the boundaries proposed for a new, united Western Europe
which will become less of a barrier than they were. An
international boundary on land traditionally controlled the flow
of both people and trade. Increasingly, modern economic
communities or bilateral trade agreements have retained control
over the movement of people but have reduced or dispensed with
many of the controls over trade. The European Community has begun
the process of dismantling Western Europe's borders. As the EC
evolves in the decade ahead, it plans gradually to eliminate all
intra-EC barriers to the flow of people, goods, services, and
capital."

Central European Expansion

Mikhail Gorbachev's vision of a "common European home from the
Atlantic to the Urals" echoed writers from Victor Hugo to E.P.
Thompson. But will all of Europe be united in the EU? Who else
will be admitted into the New Europe? Who will be left out or
kicked out?

As long as Warsaw Pact nations remained in the Moscow-led Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), there was no question
of a Western European alliance expanding to the east. As long as
Europe was split, there was no question of building a true
continental union. But with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989,
both questions were reopened.

The "fault line" between Western and Eastern Christianity is fast
becoming the frontier of the new European superpower. From
Murmansk on the Barents Sea, to Dubrovnik on the Adriatic, a New
Wall is being built across the continent. The wall is not "new"
at all, since it dates back to the Great Schism and the Crusades.
What is new is the recognition that it never really went away.

In the west, mainly Catholic and Protestant countries of Western
and Central Europe will be part of this new economic giant. To
the east, Eastern Orthodox and Muslim nations will be left out,
seen as a reserve of cheap labor, cheap resources, and debt
repayment. The most likely candidates for full EU membership are
thus Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic
states, Slovenia, and Croatia.

The appeal of joining a European economic superpower-in-the-
making was extremely tempting to citizens of Communist Party-
ruled countries, as they stood in line for basic consumer goods.
It was especially tempting to those ethnic groups who did not
share a cultural-religious heritage with Russia. It is no
accident that the period between 1988 (the EC decision for a
single market) and 1993 (the target date for EU economic
integration) saw the upheavals in Eastern Europe. The Western-
oriented nations in Central Europe (or at least their elites)
were not only rebelling against Communist rule, but for being in
a position to join the new Europe. The uprisings had as much to
do with the West as with the East.

The reunification of Germany in October 1990 pushed the frontiers
of the EC toward the east, as East German voters dissolved their
country. While some voters looked toward a glorious future for
Germany alone, most favored a united state within the context of
an integrated Europe. European leaders such as French President
Francois Mitterrand see a stronger EU as the best check on any
future German resurgence, and a stronger EU means an expanded EU
that encircles Germany.

Poland and Hungary. Poland and Hungary were always the Warsaw
Pact states most oriented toward the West. The military
repression of popular workers' movements in Hungary in 1956, and
in Poland in 1981, turned many Hungarians and Poles away from
state socialism. In both countries, the Communist leadership
cracked down on dissent, but at the same time instituted
capitalist managerial practices. The anti-labor policies of the
Communists became indistinguishable from the policies of
capitalist countries that at least had more press freedom and
consumer goods. In 1989, Poland elected a Solidarity-led
government, and Hungary opened its borders - the two events that
sparked the collapse of Soviet Communism. Both countries are
first in line for EU membership (a status not changed by the
resurgent strength of ex-Communist parties), and have formed the
Central European Free Trade Alliance (CEFTA) together with the
Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 1968 Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia similarly embittered Czechs and Slovaks toward
Socialist government. After they ousted the Communist Party in
1989, they elected liberal playwright Vaclav Havel as president.
But their choices of prime minister were more revealing - the
capitalist technocrat Vaclav Havel in the Czech capital of
Prague, and the ex-Party official and right-wing nationalist
Vladimir Meciar in the Slovak capital of Bratislava. The two
men - without majority support - broke the country in two by
1993. Klaus felt that without Slovakia, the more prosperous Czech
Republic could succeed at quicker capitalist "shock therapy" and
EU membership. Meciar wanted to keep intact Slovakia's central
economy, military industry, economic ties to Russia, and
domination of its Hungarian minority. All these will stand in the
way of Slovakia's EU membership, but its integration with Prague
is still so strong that Bratislava will eventually be carried
along.

The Baltics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had been
independent of Moscow in 1940, only to be forcibly reincorporated
into the Soviet Union. They were the first to secede from Mikhail
Gorbachev's Soviet Union in 1990-91. While Estonia has cultural-
religious ties to Finland, Latvia and largely Catholic Lithuania
have a long history of trade ties with Western nations on the
Baltic Sea. With the most recent memories of independence of any
Soviet republics, the Baltic states were the most repulsed by
Russian rule. With their Catholic and Protestant heritage as
their entry card, they were also the most attracted to the new
integrated Europe.

Slovenia and Croatia. The ex-Yugoslav states of Slovenia and
Croatia were traditionally part of the Austrian sphere of
influence. As such, they were Catholic and more developed than
the Orthodox and Muslim parts of Yugoslavia. Their other
traditional ally, Germany, pushed hard in 1991 for EC recognition
of both states. However, Western European states did not
intervene in the ensuing Serb secession from Croatia, nor in the
Bosnian war that began the following year. To spill Western
European blood in either region would imply that Eastern Orthodox
or Muslims are welcome to join the new Europe. This is at the
time when Muslim immigrants are being attacked throughout Europe.
In the eyes of British or French politicians, strong intervention
in ex-Yugoslavia would also create a precedent for intervention
further in the ex-USSR. They would rather admit Slovenia and
eventually Croatia, preferably without its Serb minority.

The Balkans. An oversimplification of the Balkan crisis might
go as follows. The Orthodox elites of the Balkan heartland
(Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians) are reasserting their power
against the more prosperous Catholic north (Croats, Slovenes,
Hungarians), and the less prosperous Muslim south (Bosnians,
Albanians, Sanjak Muslims, Turks). This three-way struggle - as
well as the economic stagnancy of the southern Balkans -
naturally discourages European powers from admitting any Balkan
nation to the EU. Romania and Bulgaria are receiving associate
status in the EU, and Turkey is trying to, but almost certainly
none of them will receive full membership. Much as Bosnian
Foreign Minister Haris Silajdzic said about Europe's attitude
toward Muslims in 1993, "We are a nuisance to the West. They just
wish we would go away. We embarrass them. They would like to
forget us."

Greece. The scenario of the New Wall has one major hitch.
Greece is already a member of the EU, as its sole Orthodox member
and has even assumed the rotating EU presidency. Yet Greek-EU
relations have recently (and not surprisingly) been strained.
Greece has always had differences with the West, over Middle
Eastern politics, Soviet relations, and an alleged NATO tilt
toward its arch rival Turkey. But the Yugoslav war - in which
Greece has tilted toward Serbia - has especially caused a stir.
Athens objects to the name of newly independent Macedonia, since
the adjacent region of northern Greece is also called Macedonia.
Greek fears that the new Slavic state would renew an old claim on
its territory were not calmed by the compromise admission to the
United Nations of the "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia."
All other EU members favor recognition of Macedonia, and the U.S.
has put "tripwire" troops on its border with Serbia. Greece was
originally admitted to the EU to encourage its transition from
military rule to multiparty democracy. But its continued
membership tacitly opens the door to other eastern nations.
Whether or not Greece remains a member will be a major litmus
test of EU intentions toward all other nations east of the New
Wall.

Trouble Along the New Wall

One can almost project future conflicts along the New Wall, by
identifying the religious minorities stuck on the wrong side of
the continent's division. New wars along this line are merely
part of the shaking out of who will and won't be part of a united
Europe.

Croatian Serbs. The Eastern Orthodox minorities stuck on the
western side of the wall include the Serbs in Croatia, who have
already revolted to maintain their ties to Serbia. They were
originally brought in as mercenaries by the Austrian Empire to
guard the frontier against Ottoman expansion. Today, though
Western European countries such as Germany back Croatia, they
would just as soon admit a Croatia without its Serb minority.

Baltic Russians. The only other major group is the Baltic
Russians, including the minority populations in Lithuania (9
percent), Estonia (30 percent), and Latvia (34 percent). While
the Russians are mostly concentrated in the capital cities (many
are families of retired Soviet military officers), they also make
up a majority around the Estonian city of Narva, adjacent to the
Russian border. All the Baltic states are requiring Russians to
learn the national language as a prerequisite for full
citizenship, or at least those Russians who settled since
Stalin's 1940 annexation. In addition, the Baltic enclave of
Kaliningrad is part of Russia, but is cut off from the rest of
the country. Part of German East Prussia before 1945, Kaliningrad
is a strategic port populated by Russians. Pentagon planners
claim to worry that a Slavic nationalist alliance may one day
invade the Baltic states - both to "protect" ethnic Russians and
to secure a corridor to Kaliningrad.

Bosnian Croats. A potentially greater problem exists with the
Catholic and Protestant minorities stuck on the eastern side of
the wall. The Catholic Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina have already
launched a war against the Muslim-led government, in order to
link their secessionist state of "Herceg-Bosna" with Croatia. All
of Bosnia-Hercegovina was part of the Nazi puppet state of
Croatia in World War II. After the latest war started in 1992,
Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic complained that Croatian
President Franjo Tudjman was pressuring him to unite all of
Bosnia into a confederation with Croatia. Soon after Izetbegovic
refused, Bosnian Croat forces began to turn against their Muslim
"allies" on the battlefield.

Hungarian minorities. Another potential flashpoint are the
Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Ukraine, which
have been a source of friction with the Hungarian government. In
the northern Serbian province of Vojvodina, ethnic Hungarians
have protested Serbian harassment and forced recruitment into the
Yugoslav army. In the Romanian region of Transylvania - once part
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire - Hungarians and Romanian
nationalists have openly been at odds since the 1989 revolution.
The conflict has included attacks on the large Hungarian
population, which has increased its influence in Romanian
national politics. In the Transcarpathian region of western
Ukraine, Hungarians are included in a mixture of Ukrainians,
Slovaks, Romanians, and others. At various times part of Hungary
and Czechoslovakia, the region is now a relatively calm example
of ethnic tolerance. But all it would take is a worse economic
crisis for a nationalist government in Budapest to more openly
call for "liberating oppressed Hungarians" in all three regions.
Recent jet fighter purchases have made Hungary's neighbors even
more nervous.

Uniates. A lesser known religious minority is the Ukrainian
Catholics, or Uniates, who live in western Ukraine. Soviet rulers
mistrusted the Uniates as a possible fifth column for the
Vatican. Moscow encouraged allied Orthodox clergy to take over
Uniate assets, and convert the population. Yet with the advent of
perestroika in the 1980s, the Uniates reemerged, having practiced
their faith underground. The Ukrainian independence movement was
strongest in the Uniate region, yet some Orthodox clergy still
resented the sudden growth of a rival church. Though independent
Ukraine is one of the most peaceful of the ex-Soviet states,
there has always been the underlying threat of ethnic strife
between ethnic Ukrainians and Russians in the eastern region. But
as the Uniate faith grows, the possibility also exists of
Orthodox-Catholic strife between Ukrainians in the west.

Poles and Lithuanians. The western regions of Ukraine and
Belarus are also home to small pockets of ethnic Poles. The area
was part of Poland in 1919-39. When Moscow annexed eastern Poland
(in return for Poland receiving much of eastern Germany), these
Poles became Soviet citizens. While Warsaw is not demanding the
return of these lost territories, it does still carry on an
ancient political rivalry with Ukraine. (In addition, Lithuania
and Belarus claim parts of each other's territory, and some
Latvians and Estonians can be found in Russia.)

Karelian Finns. The final region of contention is Karelia, an
ethnic Finnish autonomous republic in northwestern Russia.
Finland was part of the Russian Empire until freed after the
Bolshevik Revolution. Most of it then gained independence, but
lost more territory to Moscow in the 1939-40 Russo-Finnish War.
Some Finnish nationalists favor the independence or annexation of
Karelia, and Karelians claim some Russian lands outside their
republic. Russia, however, would strongly resist any territorial
losses in an area so near the strategic Murmansk and St.
Petersburg naval bases.

The New Pecking Order

The European New Wall is not the moving of the concrete-and-steel
Iron Curtain further east. Its presence will be felt more like
the barbed wire fences along the Rio Grande. The new Eastern
Europe will be to the new Western Europe what Latin America is to
the United States. More "reliable" Eastern European guest workers
will replace the Africans and Asians from the ex-colonies. But
even this immigration will be limited within Europe's terms.

The attacks on Turks, Arabs, and Africans in Western Europe, like
the attacks on Vietnamese, Mozambicans, Gypsies, and others in
Central Europe, are only one aspect of the immigration crisis.
Even socialist politicians (such as the French ex-premier Edith
Cresson) are jumping on the bandwagon of anti-immigrant hysteria,
which now even extends to native-born children of immigrants or
guest workers. It used to be that Hungary had watchtowers looking
over its border with Austria, preventing Hungarians from leaving.
Now it is Austria that has erected towers, to keep out refugees
and economic migrants from Romania, ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey, and
points further east.

Economically, Europe will grow more integrated. Politically, it
will be united as a continent, but each national component will
split into smaller regions. Culturally, it will be both more
homogeneous and more isolated from its former colonial domains of
the Third World.

Europe will not be a single union, but a series of concentric
rings. At its core will be German-dominated Central Europe,
consisting of Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Croatia, the Czech
Republic, and perhaps Hungary. Around it will be the other
prosperous industrial countries, including the northern parts of
Italy and Spain. Around that will be the poorer regions of
Ireland, the Baltics, Poland, Slovakia, Portugal, and southern
Spain and Italy. At the outer fringe will be a zone of
exploitation, where cheap labor, cheap resources, and a dumping
ground market will prevail. North Africa and Turkey are already
on this outer fringe, but they may be slowly joined by the
Balkans, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. As the strong vote for
Russian nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky has already
shown, this arrangement can only lead to decades of resentment
and reaction.

Zoltan Grossman is a cartographer in Madison, Wisconsin. He
writes extensively on geo-politics and national minorities and is
active in Native American support groups.

** End of text from cdp:headlines **

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