On 02/21/2009 04:16 AM, Andreas Metzler wrote:

I believe gnutls-cli (appropriately) sets
GNUTLS_VERIFY_ALLOW_X509_V1_CA_CRT, because the semantics of its
invocation indicate that the certificates passed to the trusted store
are explicitly limited to CA certificates, and cannot possibly be
end-entity certificates.

Your invocation told gnutls-cli that the certificate *was* a CA, so it
didn't have to guess whether you'd intended to use the attached
certificate as an end-entity certificate or not.

Hope this helps de-mystify somewhat.  Frankly, the V1 vs. V3 business
seems to me to be as much a problem with the GnuTLS API as it does with
the crusty old X.509v1 specification.  If GnuTLS certificate validation
were to use two different user-provided lists of certificates: one of
explicit CAs and one of potential peers (End Entities), this whole
discussion would be moot.

But of course, that's not what it does: applications provide the
verification code with a single list of pre-verified "trusted"
certificates, and GnuTLS distinguishes between End Entities and CAs
based on attributes *within* each cert in the list (and apparently V1
certs have no such distinguishing attributes).  In practice, i suspect
that many software authors who use GnuTLS haven't been aware of this
subtle distinction.

hth,

        --dkg

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