----------------------------------
By
Trevor Watkins
I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
Consent Axiom:
NO ACTION WITHOUT
CONSENT
This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”. Like most 4 word sentences, some
further elaboration is required for better understanding.
PRINCIPLE
=========
This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
It does not proscribe how you will behave. It is not changed by
circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
you may take no action against another human being without their full
and informed consent. Period.
ACTION
======
Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
other, then that action must be immediate in time and space, must
have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
reality.
1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
or time.
2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
terms of the consent axiom.
3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
would require their consent.
CONSENT
========
Consent must be
1. Freely given
2. Full and informed
3. Specific
4. Clearly and accurately communicated
5. Applicable only to the individual in question
6. Preferably witnessed
Consent, once given,
1. cannot be changed or revoked
2. Is contractually binding
3. Is limited in time and scope
EXCEPTIONS
==========
The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
as property, either of individuals, or unowned.
Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned. If
ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
taken by a duly appointed jury. If an individual is considered
unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
charity and intervention of their peers.
Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for society that
their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
justified. This argument should be rejected.
In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.
In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
consequences of the action precipitating the accident.
Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
axiom and its implications. As described below under disputes, both
victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
must follow.
AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
==================
Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
=========================
Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
for the unintended consequences of your actions? Well, if not you,
then who? God? Fate? Both are difficult to sue. I believe you must
take responsibility for the immediate but unintended consequences of
any deliberate action, even when lawful in terms of the consent
axiom. . However, these consequences must be immediate both in time
and place.
SOCIETY
=======
A consenting society is that group of people who acknowledge and
respect the consent axiom as the basis of their social interactions.
Members of such a society will understand their mutual obligation to
resist and punish consent violations, and to provide jury members for
dispute resolutions.
DISPUTES
========
As with all human endeavours, disputes will arise. I believe that the
resolution of these disputes is a task for a jury of your peers when
other avenues such as compensation and apology have failed.
The size and composition of the jury must be consented to by both
parties to the dispute. If agreement on a jury cannot be reached in a
reasonable time (7 days, for example), both sides select six jurors,
and a foreman with a casting vote is chosen by random lottery of the
jury members. Jury decisions are made by a simple majority vote. Any
jury decision may be appealed to another jury until one side or the
other has 3 identical decisions in its favour. Thereafter the jury
decision becomes binding upon both parties to the dispute, and is
added to the set of legal precedents for that society which defines
the common law.
THE JURY
========
The members of the jury alone determine the rules for the hearing.
They may be guided by well-established rules of legal procedure and
evidence, but they are not bound by it. They may appoint a judge or
judges to guide them, they may invite or allow lawyers to represent
the parties, they may call witnesses, conduct investigations, seek
the opinion of experts, or do whatever is required to reach a
decision. They will be funded equally by the parties to the dispute
during the hearing, but may finally decide on any allocation of costs
they see fit.
Because it is a matter of chance as to which side obtains the casting
vote on the jury, it will be important for both sides to select jurors
committed to acting on the merits of the case, rather than jurors
blindly supporting the side which appointed them. I believe that a
class of professional, impartial jurors will arise whose primary asset
will be their reputation for fair decisions. This class of jurors will
provide the pool from which most parties to a dispute will make their
jury selection.
CONSENT VIOLATIONS
==================
If someone does take action without consent, then that action is
unlawful and should be punished. Who will punish such a violation?
In the first instance, the victim of the violation, if capable, is the
most obvious candidate for exacting judgement and punishment. The
punishment may vary from an apology, or compensation, through to
capture and removal from the consenting society. Failing this, in the
second instance, members of the victim’s social network, such as
family, friends and colleagues will assist in exacting judgement and
punishment against a consent violator. If this second group is not
capable, then in the final instance, the unrelated members of the
consenting society must take responsibility for the consent violation,
as a cost and obligation that they bear by virtue of their membership
of that society. It is likely that formal structures, such as police
forces and judiciaries, would be setup by most societies to fulfil
this obligation, funded by consenting members of that society.
I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just ask "Did all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?" If yes, I'm for it.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Trevor Watkins" <bas...@gmail.com>
To: "LibertarianSA" <libsa@googlegroups.com>
Cc: <jmhar...@acenet.co.za>
Sent: Saturday, August 01, 2009 3:22 PM
Subject: [Libsa] The Consent Axiom
THE CONSENT
AXIOM
----------------------------------
By
Trevor Watkins
I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
Consent Axiom:
NO ACTION WITHOUT
CONSENT
This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”. Like most 4 word sentences, some
further elaboration is required for better understanding.
PRINCIPLE
=========
This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
It does not proscribe how you will behave. It is not changed by
circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
you may take no action against another human being without their full
and informed consent. Period.
ACTION
======
Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
other, then that action must be immediate in time and space, must
have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
reality.
1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
or time.
2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
terms of the consent axiom.
3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
would require their consent.
CONSENT
========
Consent must be
1. Freely given
2. Full and informed
3. Specific
4. Clearly and accurately communicated
5. Applicable only to the individual in question
6. Preferably witnessed
Consent, once given,
1. cannot be changed or revoked
2. Is contractually binding
3. Is limited in time and scope
EXCEPTIONS
==========
The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
as property, either of individuals, or unowned.
Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned. If
ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
taken by a duly appointed jury. If an individual is considered
unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
charity and intervention of their peers.
Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for society that
their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
justified. This argument should be rejected.
In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.
In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
consequences of the action precipitating the accident.
Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
axiom and its implications. As described below under disputes, both
victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
must follow.
AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
==================
Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
=========================
Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
for the unintended consequences of your actions? Well, if not you,
then who? God? Fate? Both are difficult to sue. I believe you must
take responsibility for the immediate but unintended consequences of
any deliberate action, even when lawful in terms of the consent
axiom. . However, these consequences must be immediate both in time
and place.
SOCIETY
=======
A consenting society is that group of people who acknowledge and
respect the consent axiom as the basis of their social interactions.
Members of such a society will understand their mutual obligation to
resist and punish consent violations, and to provide jury members for
dispute resolutions.
DISPUTES
========
As with all human endeavours, disputes will arise. I believe that the
resolution of these disputes is a task for a jury of your peers when
other avenues such as compensation and apology have failed.
The size and composition of the jury must be consented to by both
parties to the dispute. If agreement on a jury cannot be reached in a
reasonable time (7 days, for example), both sides select six jurors,
and a foreman with a casting vote is chosen by random lottery of the
jury members. Jury decisions are made by a simple majority vote. Any
jury decision may be appealed to another jury until one side or the
other has 3 identical decisions in its favour. Thereafter the jury
decision becomes binding upon both parties to the dispute, and is
added to the set of legal precedents for that society which defines
the common law.
THE JURY
========
The members of the jury alone determine the rules for the hearing.
They may be guided by well-established rules of legal procedure and
evidence, but they are not bound by it. They may appoint a judge or
judges to guide them, they may invite or allow lawyers to represent
the parties, they may call witnesses, conduct investigations, seek
the opinion of experts, or do whatever is required to reach a
decision. They will be funded equally by the parties to the dispute
during the hearing, but may finally decide on any allocation of costs
they see fit.
Because it is a matter of chance as to which side obtains the casting
vote on the jury, it will be important for both sides to select jurors
committed to acting on the merits of the case, rather than jurors
blindly supporting the side which appointed them. I believe that a
class of professional, impartial jurors will arise whose primary asset
will be their reputation for fair decisions. This class of jurors will
provide the pool from which most parties to a dispute will make their
jury selection.
CONSENT VIOLATIONS
==================
If someone does take action without consent, then that action is
unlawful and should be punished. Who will punish such a violation?
In the first instance, the victim of the violation, if capable, is the
most obvious candidate for exacting judgement and punishment. The
punishment may vary from an apology, or compensation, through to
capture and removal from the consenting society. Failing this, in the
second instance, members of the victim’s social network, such as
family, friends and colleagues will assist in exacting judgement and
punishment against a consent violator. If this second group is not
capable, then in the final
> I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just > ask "Did > all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?" > If yes, > I'm for it.
Leon: To say, "If yes, I'm for it" implies approval of the action. The consent axiom doesn't imply approval or disapproval. It is neutral in that sense. It merely says that if agree it is no one else's business.
Come on Jim. this is pedantic semantics at it's worst. Most people have difficulty understanding what's being said; you're battling not to understand.
I am for whatever people consent to.
I'd hoped it unnecessary to delve into what I mean by each word in a Popperian infinite regress. By "I" I mean ... . By "am" I mean ... . And so on. Through "for" by which I mean being for the right to undertake the action, by which I mean against coercive 3rd party interference and ... . By "right" I mean ... . By "coercive" I mean ... . By "consent", I mean ... having mens rea, not being under undue influence, being informed etc. By "Informed" I mean being conscious with reasonable accuracy of the import of the consent concerned .... . By "Import" I mean ... .
And so on through the entire English lexicon, and some Latin, French, German et al where English is lacking.
----- Original Message ----- From: "Jim Peron" <JPe...@lfb.org>
To: <libsa@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 5:23 AM
Subject: Re: [SPAM] [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
> On Aug 1, 2009, at 7:15 PM, Leon Louw wrote:
>> I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just
>> ask "Did
>> all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?" >> If yes,
>> I'm for it.
> Leon:
> To say, "If yes, I'm for it" implies approval of the action. The
> consent axiom doesn't imply approval or disapproval. It is neutral in
> that sense. It merely says that if agree it is no one else's business.
In the US the term, "I'm for it" implies a rather enthusiastic
endorsement of something. If it does not mean that in South Africa
then I was unaware of the difference, for that I'm sorry. And in the
US people would "understand" it that way with very little difficulty.
Again, that may not be the case in South Africa.
Either way the response was unduly and uncharacteristically harsh (or
perhaps sarcastic, it is hard to tell without the verbal nuances of
the spoken word.)
> Come on Jim. this is pedantic semantics at it's worst. Most people
> have difficulty understanding what's being said; you're battling not
> to understand.
> I am for whatever people consent to.
> I'd hoped it unnecessary to delve into what I mean by each word in a
> Popperian infinite regress. By "I" I mean ... . By "am" I
> mean ... . And so on. Through "for" by which I mean being for the
> right to undertake the action, by which I mean against coercive 3rd
> party interference and ... . By "right" I mean ... . By "coercive"
> I mean ... . By "consent", I mean ... having mens rea, not being
> under undue influence, being informed etc. By "Informed" I mean
> being conscious with reasonable accuracy of the import of the
> consent concerned .... . By "Import" I mean ... .
> And so on through the entire English lexicon, and some Latin,
> French, German et al where English is lacking.
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Jim Peron" <JPe...@lfb.org>
> To: <libsa@googlegroups.com>
> Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 5:23 AM
> Subject: Re: [SPAM] [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
> > On Aug 1, 2009, at 7:15 PM, Leon Louw wrote:
> >> I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just
> >> ask "Did
> >> all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?"
> >> If yes,
> >> I'm for it.
> > Leon:
> > To say, "If yes, I'm for it" implies approval of the action. The
> > consent axiom doesn't imply approval or disapproval. It is neutral
> in
> > that sense. It merely says that if agree it is no one else's
> business.
Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.
"Choice," here when it involves an "absolute" value, can surely only mean to
choose to either conform to this value or not to conform. "Absolute" in my
understanding, means inviolate such as in the law of gravity. Therefore, it
cannot mean, under the constraint of an "absolute' moral value, that people
can choose their own moral values which may well differ from other's choices
(which is Jim Harris' philosophy).
Second, by "Absolute" value do you mean that this is universal and that
every cognisant human being has a basic understanding of what is right and
wrong - even the most heinous of criminals?
Hitler might have believed he was right in his attempt to wipe out non-arian
races justifying this on his belief that the all white arian race was
superior and entitled to wipe out all those considered beneath them. The
acid test of absolute morality is the question - would he have consented to
have been tortured to death in a gas chamber himself? The answer is clear
and it fits the golden rule of "Do unto others as you would have done unto
yourself".
I agree there is an "absolute" moral law. I also hold that for every law
there is a law-giver. So, Trevor where, in your mind, does the "absolute"
value come from - why should it be there at all? Why aren't we like Jim
Harris who chooses to make his own moral laws which are, I believe he would
say, not absolute. (Jim, if you are reading this, please correct me if I
have misinterpreted you).
The Consent Axiom can only work if there is adherence to the biblical golden
rule which I would go to say is exactly the same as your Consent Axiom. It
has been in existence for nearly 2000 years and yet mankind has not followed
it. What chance is there of your modern precis of the same rule being
followed?
By the way the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly did not
usher in 70 years of peace. Count the number of wars and deaths ensuing as a
consequence in the world in that same period since that event!!!
Just as another aside, did you know that when the iconic portrait of
Einstein was captured, it was at a moment just after he had reflected to the
photographer on how saddened he was that his E=mc2 formula resulted in that
same nuclear event. The silent poignancy of that reflective moment is what
the photographer captured.
On Sat, Aug 1, 2009 at 3:22 PM, Trevor Watkins <bas...@gmail.com> wrote:
> THE CONSENT
> AXIOM
> ----------------------------------
> By
> Trevor Watkins
> I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
> reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
> Consent Axiom:
> NO ACTION WITHOUT
> CONSENT
> This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
> commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”. Like most 4 word sentences, some
> further elaboration is required for better understanding.
> PRINCIPLE
> =========
> This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
> It does not proscribe how you will behave. It is not changed by
> circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
> does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
> you may take no action against another human being without their full
> and informed consent. Period.
> ACTION
> ======
> Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
> carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
> other, then that action must be immediate in time and space, must
> have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
> reality.
> 1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
> the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
> time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
> ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
> imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
> from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
> or time.
> 2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
> daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
> for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
> are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
> However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
> action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
> may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
> are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
> unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
> terms of the consent axiom.
> 3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
> actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
> someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
> them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
> would require their consent.
> CONSENT
> ========
> Consent must be
> 1. Freely given
> 2. Full and informed
> 3. Specific
> 4. Clearly and accurately communicated
> 5. Applicable only to the individual in question
> 6. Preferably witnessed
> Consent, once given,
> 1. cannot be changed or revoked
> 2. Is contractually binding
> 3. Is limited in time and scope
> EXCEPTIONS
> ==========
> The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
> Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
> as property, either of individuals, or unowned.
> Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
> unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
> considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned. If
> ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
> taken by a duly appointed jury. If an individual is considered
> unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
> charity and intervention of their peers.
> Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for society that
> their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
> vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
> apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
> slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
> justified. This argument should be rejected.
> In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
> binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
> consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.
> In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
> victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
> accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
> consequences of the action precipitating the accident.
> Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
> axiom and its implications. As described below under disputes, both
> victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
> axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
> the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
> must follow.
> AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
> ==================
> Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
> oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
> straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
> wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
> acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
> at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
> take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
> YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
> sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
> the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
> be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
> tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
> harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
> yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.
> Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
> have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
> for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
> result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
> deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
> for the unintended consequences of your actions? Well, if not you,
> then who? God? Fate? Both are difficult to sue. I believe you must
> take responsibility for the immediate but unintended consequences of
> any deliberate action, even when lawful in terms of the consent
> axiom. . However, these consequences must be immediate both in time
> and place.
> SOCIETY
> =======
> A consenting society is that group of people who acknowledge and
> respect the consent axiom as the basis of their social interactions.
> Members of such a society will understand their mutual obligation to
> resist and punish consent
Sorry for seeming harsh and/or sarcastic. Mostly I participate in these exchanges for fun. I like Humor as a means of communicating views. The problem is, of course, that it doesn't always work when such deep philosophy as Popper's essentialism is under consideration.
So here's a simply rewording. I know that it too could be subjected to harsh linguistic scrutiny, but anyway:
"I'm for that to which people consent being lawful."
There does seem to be a shade of difference between US and SA English here, of which I'll be mindful henceforth.
Having said that, you have me wondering if I am against anything consensual (in the US sense). Nothing comes immediately to mind.
Were you to ask me whether I'd prefer X and Y not to have done so-and-so, I can think of very few so-and-sos I'd prefer not to have happened, and they're mostly very personal, like preferring my daughter not to tattoo purple marijuana leaves all over her body and face, and my wife not to have an affair with the village idiot.
On a larger scale, it's much harder to think of examples. I suppose I'd rather people tell fewer lies and listen to more tonal than atonal music, but such preferences are really very marginal and hard to think of. I'm not even sure why I have these inclinations. Part of me says the spontaneous non-coercive order of people doing things I "disapprove" of may be better than the alternatives. I have great difficulty caring about what other people do in the absence of coercion.
----- Original Message ----- From: Jim Peron To: libsa@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 1:25 PM
Subject: Re: [SPAM] Re: [SPAM] [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
Leon:
In the US the term, "I'm for it" implies a rather enthusiastic endorsement of something. If it does not mean that in South Africa then I was unaware of the difference, for that I'm sorry. And in the US people would "understand" it that way with very little difficulty. Again, that may not be the case in South Africa.
Either way the response was unduly and uncharacteristically harsh (or perhaps sarcastic, it is hard to tell without the verbal nuances of the spoken word.)
On Aug 2, 2009, at 3:38 AM, Leon Louw wrote:
Come on Jim. this is pedantic semantics at it's worst. Most people have difficulty understanding what's being said; you're battling not to understand.
I am for whatever people consent to.
I'd hoped it unnecessary to delve into what I mean by each word in a Popperian infinite regress. By "I" I mean ... . By "am" I mean ... . And so on. Through "for" by which I mean being for the right to undertake the action, by which I mean against coercive 3rd party interference and ... . By "right" I mean ... . By "coercive" I mean ... . By "consent", I mean ... having mens rea, not being under undue influence, being informed etc. By "Informed" I mean being conscious with reasonable accuracy of the import of the consent concerned .... . By "import" I mean ... .
And so on through the entire English lexicon, and some Latin, French, German et al where English is lacking.
----- Original Message -----
From: "Jim Peron" <JPe...@lfb.org>
To: <libsa@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 5:23 AM
Subject: Re: [SPAM] [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
> On Aug 1, 2009, at 7:15 PM, Leon Louw wrote:
>> I sometimes say anyone can tell in my absence where I stand, just
>> ask "Did
>> all concerned consent to what was done to them / their property?" >> If yes,
>> I'm for it.
> Leon:
> To say, "If yes, I'm for it" implies approval of the action. The
> consent axiom doesn't imply approval or disapproval. It is neutral in
> that sense. It merely says that if agree it is no one else's business.
----- Original Message ----- From: Bryan Lever To: libsa@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2009 1:38 PM
Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
Hi Trevor You wrote:
Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are
discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would
optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its
adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans,
microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom
represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.
"Choice," here when it involves an "absolute" value, can surely only mean to choose to either conform to this value or not to conform. "Absolute" in my understanding, means inviolate such as in the law of gravity. Therefore, it cannot mean, under the constraint of an "absolute' moral value, that people can choose their own moral values which may well differ from other's choices (which is Jim Harris' philosophy).
Second, by "Absolute" value do you mean that this is universal and that every cognisant human being has a basic understanding of what is right and wrong - even the most heinous of criminals?
Hitler might have believed he was right in his attempt to wipe out non-arian races justifying this on his belief that the all white arian race was superior and entitled to wipe out all those considered beneath them. The acid test of absolute morality is the question - would he have consented to have been tortured to death in a gas chamber himself? The answer is clear and it fits the golden rule of "Do unto others as you would have done unto yourself".
I agree there is an "absolute" moral law. I also hold that for every law there is a law-giver. So, Trevor where, in your mind, does the "absolute" value come from - why should it be there at all? Why aren't we like Jim Harris who chooses to make his own moral laws which are, I believe he would say, not absolute. (Jim, if you are reading this, please correct me if I have misinterpreted you).
The Consent Axiom can only work if there is adherence to the biblical golden rule which I would go to say is exactly the same as your Consent Axiom. It has been in existence for nearly 2000 years and yet mankind has not followed it. What chance is there of your modern precis of the same rule being followed?
By the way the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly did not usher in 70 years of peace. Count the number of wars and deaths ensuing as a consequence in the world in that same period since that event!!!
Just as another aside, did you know that when the iconic portrait of Einstein was captured, it was at a moment just after he had reflected to the photographer on how saddened he was that his E=mc2 formula resulted in that same nuclear event. The silent poignancy of that reflective moment is what the photographer captured.
Bryan
On Sat, Aug 1, 2009 at 3:22 PM, Trevor Watkins <bas...@gmail.com> wrote:
THE CONSENT
AXIOM
----------------------------------
By
Trevor Watkins
I believe that the basis for successful human coexistence can be
reduced to a single statement, a single concept. This statement is the
Consent Axiom:
NO ACTION WITHOUT
CONSENT
This statement is as brief and uncompromising as the biblical 5th
commandment, “Thou shalt not kill”. Like most 4 word sentences, some
further elaboration is required for better understanding.
PRINCIPLE
=========
This statement is a principle. It describes how you ought to behave.
It does not proscribe how you will behave. It is not changed by
circumstances. It does not vary relative to prevailing conditions. It
does not take utility or the greatest good into account. It says that
you may take no action against another human being without their full
and informed consent. Period.
ACTION
======
Like Newton, we must define the meaning of the term “action” quite
carefully. For an action against another to require the consent of the
other, then that action must be immediate in time and space, must
have significant consequences for the other, and must have physical
reality.
1. IMMEDIATE IN TIME AND SPACE:
the request for consent and the action must be within a reasonable
time and distance of each other. Consent given now does not imply
ongoing consent into the future. Consent given in one place does not
imply consent in all places. Consent for an action is not required
from people far removed from the consequences of that action, in space
or time.
2. SIGNIFICANT CONSEQUENCES:
daily life involves many actions which have insignificant consequences
for those around us, and do not require their consent. These actions
are largely covered by the ordinary rules of civility and manners.
However, both the action and the predictable consequences of that
action must be considered. While a gentle shove at the top of a cliff
may not be considered murder, the consequences at the bottom certainly
are. I believe you must take responsibility for the immediate but
unintended consequences of any deliberate action, even when lawful in
terms of the consent axiom.
3. PHYSICAL REALITY:
actions requiring consent must have a physical reality. Looking at
someone, talking about or to someone, thinking evil thoughts about
them, these actions do not require consent. Screaming in their ear
would require their consent.
CONSENT
========
Consent must be
1. Freely given
2. Full and informed
3. Specific
4. Clearly and accurately communicated
5. Applicable only to the individual in question
6. Preferably witnessed
Consent, once given,
1. cannot be changed or revoked
2. Is contractually binding
3. Is limited in time and scope
EXCEPTIONS
==========
The consent axiom only addresses relationships between human beings.
Everything else, including animals and the environment are considered
as property, either of individuals, or unowned.
Some human beings, such as very young children or the insane or
unconscious, are incapable of informed consent. In that case they are
considered as the property of a consenting individual, or unowned. If
ownership is challenged (by anyone), the decision on ownership must be
taken by a duly appointed jury. If an individual is considered
unowned, by themselves or by anyone else, then they must rely on the
charity and intervention of their peers.
Some actions are considered so overwhelmingly good for society that
their performance overrides any individual objections (for example,
vaccination, environmental preservation (eg global warming), terrorist
apprehension). This argument is inevitably the top of a slippery
slope, on which all manner of further consent violations are
justified. This argument should be rejected.
In a democracy, the decisions taken by a majority are considered
binding on the minority, with or without there consent. In a
consenting society this silly concept simply would not apply.
In some cases, such as an accident, a request for consent from the
victim has no meaning. In such cases, the person responsible for the
accident, even if unintentional, must take responsibility for the
consequences of the action precipitating the accident.
Some members of a society may not consent to be bound by the consent
axiom and its implications. As described below under disputes, both
victim and violator have rights to a trial by jury under the consent
axiom. If a non-consenting consent violator gives up that right, then
the violator’s guilt must be automatically presumed, and punishment
must follow.
AN EXTREME EXAMPLE
==================
Imagine you have spotted a young girl in an Iraqi market wearing an
oddly bulging outfit under which you have clearly seen wires and
straps. The consent law says you OUGHT to ask her consent, or at least
wait until she makes some unambiguous threatening action, before
acting. Since the consequences of her threatening action may be coming
at you at several thousand feet per second, you may well decide to
take pre-emptive action and shoot her first. However, if you do this,
YOU must now bear the consequences of your unlawful act (and for the
sake of order in society, this must always remain an unlawful act). If
the 12 year old girl you shot with little or no warning turns out to
be a spina bifida sufferer, with wires and straps up and down her poor
tortured body, then you can expect a jury of your peers to be quite
harsh. If there was more semtex than child under the robe, you might
yet get a medal. Its not fair, its just how it is.
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES
=========================
Every action has unpredictable and unintended consequences. Who would
have thought the invention of the atomic bomb would ensure world peace
for 70 years? Who would have thought a message of love and peace would
result in the crusades and the inquisition? Who knows how many
deserving microbes you kill every time you breath? Are you responsible
for the unintended
Trevor I haven't read all of this yet but I promise I will. I couldn't however resist offerig some immediate thoughts.
Point 1
Right at the start you say, or imply, that the consent axiom is the only basis for successful human coexistance. I imagine that behind that claim is the view that consent handles disagreements in the way the market handles exchanges where there is no agreement on exchange values, i.e. no deal. That is logically consistent, efficient and seemingly no-one loses. Other ways require someone to lose and that appears by definition to be an unsuccessful coexistance - at least to the loser.
But what if some people think what you consent to is not enough i.e. that a moral person would always consent to some things or that successful human coexistance requires everyone to consent to a list of things they may not want to? For example what if a large fraction of the population believes that randomness, or accident, is a major factor in who ends up with what, and that it isn't just a matter of free individual choices and application? They may then reasonably say that a certain level of redistribution from the lucky to the unlucky is fair because part of what you have is undeserved (and may involve accidental transfer from the unlucky to the lucky). They may say that successful cooperative human existance is impossible so long as some of the lucky can refuse to go along with it.
What if it can be shown that the radical no-deal principle leads to so little actually being done that all sides do face a net loss over time? I have in mind some game theory examples like the prisoner's dillemma where the rational individual solutions lead to a less than the optimum available result. It has been argued that some enforced cooperation at market and political levels results in a bigger overall cake than trying to rely on strict bottom up concent would do. I don't say that these claims are correct (although I think them plausable) but that what if they were.
You would not have a basis of successful coexistance if some were allowed to deny action on these beliefs. What I am trying to argue is that successful coexistance requires a large majority buy in to the basis principles and that there is reason to believe that consent to your radical formulation of the consent axiom will be rather small.
I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority) will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that this will require some additional axioms.
Point 2
The radical consent axiom is incoherent when you have a real dispute. Eventually there will be a dispute that will have to be settled in violation of the consent of one or both parties. In other words the radical consent axiom requires fantasy levels of agreement if you are to avoid violating somewhere.
> Trevor I haven't read all of this yet but I promise I will. I couldn't
> however resist offerig some immediate thoughts.
> Point 1
> Right at the start you say, or imply, that the consent axiom is the only
> <Trevor - Not the ONLY basis, but a sufficient> basis for successful human
> coexistance. I imagine that behind that claim is the view that
> consent handles disagreements in the way the market handles exchanges where
> there is no agreement on exchange values, i.e. no deal. That is logically
> consistent, efficient and seemingly no-one loses. Other ways require
> someone to lose and that appears by definition to be an unsuccessful
> coexistance - at least to the loser.
> But what if some people think what you consent to is not enough i.e. that a
> moral person would always consent to some things or that successful human
> coexistance requires everyone to consent to a list of things they may not
> want to? For example what if a large fraction of the population believes
> that randomness, or accident, is a major factor in who ends up with what,
> and that it isn't just a matter of free individual choices and application?
> They may then reasonably say that a certain level of redistribution from the
> lucky to the unlucky is fair because part of what you have is undeserved
> (and may involve accidental transfer from the unlucky to the lucky). They
> may say that successful cooperative human existance is impossible so long as
> some of the lucky can refuse to go along with it.
<Trevor - everyone is richer than someone else, and poorer. There is no
limit to the redistribution required for perfect equality. It is simply not
a viable target for society. Its one reason why socialism fails.>
> What if it can be shown that the radical no-deal principle leads to so
> little actually being done that all sides do face a net loss over time? I
> have in mind some game theory examples like the prisoner's dillemma where
> the rational individual solutions lead to a less than the optimum
> available result. It has been argued that some enforced cooperation at
> market and political levels results in a bigger overall cake than trying to
> rely on strict bottom up concent would do. I don't say that these claims
> are correct (although I think them plausable) but that what if they were.
<Trevor - if it became clear that withholding consent leads to a net loss,
we can expect rational people to start giving consent, even in situations of
imperfect knowledge. Perfect rationality leads to impasse in game theory -
some randomness is required for optimum results.>
> You would not have a basis of successful coexistance if some were allowed
> to deny action on these beliefs. What I am trying to argue is that
> successful coexistance requires a large majority buy in to the basis
> principles and that there is reason to believe that consent to your radical
> formulation of the consent axiom will be rather small.
<Trevor - size isn't everything. I define a consenting society, I
don't speculate on its size. However, if a consenting society is more
successful than others, I confidently expect the society to grow.>
> I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't
> believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority)
> will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that
> this will require some additional axioms.
<Trevor - I take your point - I haven't given much thought to how a
consenting society would cope if embedded within a non-consenting society.
Removal from and isolation from nonconsenting societies would probably be
the best bet. >
> Point 2
> The radical consent axiom is incoherent when you have a real
> dispute. Eventually there will be a dispute that will have to be settled in
> violation of the consent of one or both parties. In other words the radical
> consent axiom requires fantasy levels of agreement if you are to avoid
> violating somewhere.
<Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course, in
a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will suffer
an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process before
that event occurs.>
> <Trevor - everyone is richer than someone else, and poorer. There is no > limit to the redistribution required for perfect equality. It is simply not > a viable target for society. Its one reason why socialism fails.>
Garth: There is no reason why redistribution needs to aim for equality. No one thinks outcomes are totally random so most societies aim for no more than progressive tax.
>> <Trevor - if it became clear that withholding consent leads to a net >> loss, we can expect rational people to start giving consent, even in >> situations of imperfect knowledge.
Garth: That's a good point.
> Perfect rationality leads to impasse in game theory - some randomness is >> required for optimum results.>
Garth: My view is that its a narrow view of rationality that leads to impasses.
>> I believe the problem of successful coexistence with those who don't >> believe in the radical concent axiom (which I think are the vast majority) >> will require allowing some limited violations of the consent axiom, and that >> this will require some additional axioms.
> <Trevor - I take your point - I haven't given much thought to how a > consenting society would cope if embedded within a non-consenting society. > Removal from and isolation from nonconsenting societies would probably be > the best bet. >
Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages. Isolation won't help. Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.
> <Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course, in > a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will suffer > an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process before > that event occurs.>
Garth: I have no problem with due process. My point is that *any* dispute resolution process necessarily involves some other principle that isn't consent. In other words you need at least one other axiom for a successful coexistence. I should make it clear I do think the consent axiom should be one of the axioms.
> Morality arises from choice, not coercion. I believe there are > discoverable "absolute" moral values. Such an absolute value would > optimise the success (survival, comfort, wealth, happiness) of its > adherents in the majority of environments, whether they be humans, > microbes or aliens from Alpha Centauri. I believe the consent axiom > represents such an absolute moral value or proposition.
> "Choice," here when it involves an "absolute" value, can surely only mean > to choose to either conform to this value or not to conform.
<Trevor - by "absolute" I mean objective, unconditional, complete in itself, not relative, independent. However, it does not mean "one of a kind", or "the only one". The consent axiom is not the only basis for successful coexistence, it just happens to be a good one.>
"Absolute" in my understanding, means inviolate such as in the law of
> gravity. Therefore, it cannot mean, under the constraint of an "absolute' > moral value, that people can choose their own moral values which may well > differ from other's choices (which is Jim Harris' philosophy).
> Second, by "Absolute" value do you mean that this is universal and that > every cognisant human being has a basic understanding of what is right and > wrong - even the most heinous of criminals?
<Trevor - Yes, an absolute moral value would be like a universal constant (such as the speed of light) in that it would be true (lead to success, as defined) for all species in all places at all times. It may be provable theoretically, like game theory's tit for tat, but is more likely to be empirically observed. I do not say anything about whether a particular human being understands this concept.
> Hitler might have believed he was right in his attempt to wipe out > non-arian races justifying this on his belief that the all white arian race > was superior and entitled to wipe out all those considered beneath them. The > acid test of absolute morality is the question - would he have consented to > have been tortured to death in a gas chamber himself? The answer is clear > and it fits the golden rule of "Do unto others as you would have done unto > yourself".
<Trevor - Your "golden rule" is flawed, in that it imposes my desires and expectations on not necessarily willing others. I like people to fire leather balls at me at speed (playing volleyball), but not everyone does.>
> I agree there is an "absolute" moral law. I also hold that for every law > there is a law-giver. So, Trevor where, in your mind, does the "absolute" > value come from - why should it be there at all? Why aren't we like Jim > Harris who chooses to make his own moral laws which are, I believe he would > say, not absolute. (Jim, if you are reading this, please correct me if I > have misinterpreted you).
> The Consent Axiom can only work if there is adherence to the biblical > golden rule which I would go to say is exactly the same as your Consent > Axiom. It has been in existence for nearly 2000 years and yet mankind has > not followed it. What chance is there of your modern precis of the same rule > being followed?
<Trevor - Well, a much better chance if it is clearly and unequivocally stated, then debated and improved, then disseminated. Humanity does appear to improve over time, but not continuously. I cannot say that the world's religions have contributed significantly to this improvement.>
> By the way the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki certainly did not > usher in 70 years of peace. Count the number of wars and deaths ensuing as a > consequence in the world in that same period since that event!!!
<Trevor - the world had 2 devastating wars involving 5 of the 7 continents in a space of 30 years. Then no continental war for 70 years, following the abrupt end to the 2nd world war using nuclear weapons. After Nagasaki, no human being has been killed by the deliberate deployment of nuclear weapons. You do the math.>
> Just as another aside, did you know that when the iconic portrait of > Einstein was captured, it was at a moment just after he had reflected to the > photographer on how saddened he was that his E=mc2 formula resulted in that > same nuclear event. The silent poignancy of that reflective moment is what > the photographer captured.
<Trevor - I didn't know that - interesting piece of info about one of my favourite people. Of course, even Einstein did not appreciate the full import of what he had discovered (eg he never fully accepted quantum theory which arose from general relativity.>
> Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages. Isolation won't help.
> Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.
<Trevor - Consent from kids is not required while they are considered
property, up to about the age of 4 when informed consent becomes possible.
Prior to this, their parents or guardian's consent is required. However, any
action (including those against a child) can be challenged (by anyone) and
subjected to the dispute mechanism. Most children adapt to the ethical
environment in which they find themselves, challenging it as they enter
puberty. A consenting societies rite of passage for young adults would
probably involve their formal acceptance of the consent axiom, or their
departure to seek another system. A consenting society would require
adherence to the consent axiom, or constant dispute resolution followed by
appropriate sanction. >
>> <Trevor - the issue of disputes is dealt with at some length. Of course,
>> in a dispute, it is highly likely that one or other of the parties will
>> suffer an action to which they do not consent. I try to define a due process
>> before that event occurs.>
> Garth: I have no problem with due process. My point is that *any* dispute
> resolution process necessarily involves some other principle that isn't
> consent. In other words you need at least one other axiom for a successful
> coexistence. I should make it clear I do think the consent axiom should be
> one of the axioms.
<Trevor - I take your point - perhaps the Jury approach to dispute
resolution should be considered a second axiom.>
On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 10:05 AM, Trevor Watkins <bas...@gmail.com> wrote: > Replies in <Trevor - > below. > Trevor Watkins
>> Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages. Isolation won't help. >> Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.
> <Trevor - Consent from kids is not required while they are considered > property, up to about the age of 4 when informed consent becomes possible. > Prior to this, their parents or guardian's consent is required. However, any > action (including those against a child) can be challenged (by anyone) and > subjected to the dispute mechanism. Most children adapt to the ethical > environment in which they find themselves, challenging it as they enter > puberty. A consenting societies rite of passage for young adults would > probably involve their formal acceptance of the consent axiom, or their > departure to seek another system. A consenting society would require > adherence to the consent axiom, or constant dispute resolution followed by > appropriate sanction. >
Garth: I meant when they have grown up and may wish to stay where they grew up. On the other hand I categorically reject the idea that kids are property. That notion makes abuse permissible. That's another long standing argument with Jim. I also reject the idea of totally informed consent as an either or concept. Information is always incomplete, and if you say that kids can't know what's good for them because they don't have the cognitive and emotional development or experience with which to make reasonable judgements about their own preferences (which is probably right), then you must also admit that the same holds for adults - some more than others.
On another point I don't believe there are such things as objective morals. There are perhaps ought type rules which when followed with produce desired outcomes but this is squarely a utilitarian argument. It says nothing about why you should persue that outcome in the first place. If you mean objective in the sense that something is right or wrong in itself (apart from consequences) as in religious rules or Kant's categorical imperitive or Rand's objectivism then I think you are mistaken.
Garth I'm mainly with Trevor here, and think you're confusing concepts. You're not distinguishing between principles and application.
I assume you agree with the anti-rape principle. Whether or not there's a rape is another matter, a complex jurisprudential problem entailing sophisticated time-honoured aspects of due process, evidence, forensics, psychology and more. What should be done if the is rape is an additional complex problem, entailing the above and more, such as social norms, culture, prison conditions, assessment of damages, psychological assessments etc.
The sole purpose of the first set is concerned with a single simple principle: was there consent?
For libertarians, as opposed to people of all other persuasions, this should always be decisive.
But libertarianism per se has no view on how to establish the truth and what to do about it (other than that the complex processes should preferably not themselves violate the consent principle.)
----- Original Message ----- From: Garth Zietsman To: libsa@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 04, 2009 11:07 AM
Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
On Tue, Aug 4, 2009 at 10:05 AM, Trevor Watkins <bas...@gmail.com> wrote:
Replies in <Trevor - > below.
Trevor Watkins
Garth: I've argued this point with Jim for ages. Isolation won't help. Nonconsenters will arise within your group - probably your kids.
<Trevor - Consent from kids is not required while they are considered property, up to about the age of 4 when informed consent becomes possible. Prior to this, their parents or guardian's consent is required. However, any action (including those against a child) can be challenged (by anyone) and subjected to the dispute mechanism. Most children adapt to the ethical environment in which they find themselves, challenging it as they enter puberty. A consenting societies rite of passage for young adults would probably involve their formal acceptance of the consent axiom, or their departure to seek another system. A consenting society would require adherence to the consent axiom, or constant dispute resolution followed by appropriate sanction. >
Garth: I meant when they have grown up and may wish to stay where they grew up. On the other hand I categorically reject the idea that kids are property. That notion makes abuse permissible. That's another long standing argument with Jim. I also reject the idea of totally informed consent as an either or concept. Information is always incomplete, and if you say that kids can't know what's good for them because they don't have the cognitive and emotional development or experience with which to make reasonable judgements about their own preferences (which is probably right), then you must also admit that the same holds for adults - some more than others.
On another point I don't believe there are such things as objective morals. There are perhaps ought type rules which when followed with produce desired outcomes but this is squarely a utilitarian argument. It says nothing about why you should persue that outcome in the first place. If you mean objective in the sense that something is right or wrong in itself (apart from consequences) as in religious rules or Kant's categorical imperitive or Rand's objectivism then I think you are mistaken.
Leon I take your point. I do understand this distinction and maybe I should have marked where I changed from principle to application. However it isn't true that jurisprudential concerns haven't been an issue among Libertarians. It was a serious bone of contention between Jim and me whether I had the right to come over his fence if I thought he was abusing his kids. I said if his kids asked me to intervene I had every right - under the assumption that they hadn't consented to the abuse and had consented to my intervention. Jim believed his kids were property and had no capacity to deny or extend consent. I'm sure he thought I was a statist and I believed I was as being as consistently Libertarian as he - except that we differed on children being property (where he has complete rights of use and disposal) or people with at least some capacity and 'right' to consent. He thought they were HIS kids not mine, and I thought they were their own people.
Since the central Libertarian principle is consent, surely they should put more weight on reliable methods for checking for consent than those who don't hold that principle? I'm saying Libertarains should be as obsessed with the detection of consent as they are with promoting it as a standard. [I am not sure of that point at all but it seemed worth thinking about.]
Also the matter of the capacity for consent isn't just a jurisprudential issue about judging whether there was consent in a particular case or not. The fuzziness isn't just in an outsider being unsure whether there was consent or not. The capacity for consent is itself variable and fuzzy in principle. It is essentially zero at birth and increases to some unknown extent as we get older. Perhaps it shrinks when we get very old. It probably never reaches the same peak in everyone. The difference is that the child has say 10% capacity and the adult say 80-90%, and the jurisprudential issue is to ask whether whatever capacity they had was fully exercised.
If peak capacity for consent in adults is in principle unequal then that has implications - for principle. At the very least it means we need at least one more central principle. You may not agree that capacity for consent is unequal in adults in their normal state, but what if it is? Do we ever intervene? What principle(s) ought to guide intervention when we think capacity for consent is limited?
All good points to consider, Garth.*Children as property.* We routinely
describe children as belonging to their parents, implying ownership. If full
dependants are not property, then what are they? They are not independent
entities, their choices are constrained by their dependency, they live at
the pleasure of someone else. My criterion for application of the consent
axiom is that the consentee is capable of forming an intelligible and
unambiguous declaration of intention, which appears to occur between the
ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to this, interpretation of intention
must be made by the dependant's parents, guardian, minder, owner - call it
what you will. As I state in my document, ANY action by anyone can be
disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.
*Capacity for consent. * Having satisfied the criterion above for consent, I
do not believe this remains an issue. All the consentee needs to do is
communicate their intention - they do not need to justify it. Even if their
choice is irrational, harmful to themselves, blatantly stupid, it must be
respected, or consequences will flow. The consentee needs to be just
intelligent enough to communicate his/her intention based on his/her
available information.
> Leon I take your point. I do understand this distinction and maybe I
> should have marked where I changed from principle to application. However
> it isn't true that jurisprudential concerns haven't been an issue among
> Libertarians. It was a serious bone of contention between Jim and me
> whether I had the right to come over his fence if I thought he was abusing
> his kids. I said if his kids asked me to intervene I had every right -
> under the assumption that they hadn't consented to the abuse and had
> consented to my intervention. Jim believed his kids were property and had
> no capacity to deny or extend consent. I'm sure he thought I was a statist
> and I believed I was as being as consistently Libertarian as he - except
> that we differed on children being property (where he has complete rights of
> use and disposal) or people with at least some capacity and 'right' to
> consent. He thought they were HIS kids not mine, and I thought they were
> their own people.
> Since the central Libertarian principle is consent, surely they should put
> more weight on reliable methods for checking for consent than those who
> don't hold that principle? I'm saying Libertarains should be as obsessed
> with the detection of consent as they are with promoting it as a standard.
> [I am not sure of that point at all but it seemed worth thinking about.]
> Also the matter of the capacity for consent isn't just a jurisprudential
> issue about judging whether there was consent in a particular case or not.
> The fuzziness isn't just in an outsider being unsure whether there was
> consent or not. The capacity for consent is itself variable and fuzzy in
> principle. It is essentially zero at birth and increases to some unknown
> extent as we get older. Perhaps it shrinks when we get very old. It
> probably never reaches the same peak in everyone. The difference is that
> the child has say 10% capacity and the adult say 80-90%, and the
> jurisprudential issue is to ask whether whatever capacity they had was fully
> exercised.
> If peak capacity for consent in adults is in principle unequal then that
> has implications - for principle. At the very least it means we need at
> least one more central principle. You may not agree that capacity for
> consent is unequal in adults in their normal state, but what if it is? Do
> we ever intervene? What principle(s) ought to guide intervention when we
> think capacity for consent is limited?
> *Children as property.* We routinely describe children as belonging to > their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not property, then > what are they? They are not independent entities, their choices are > constrained by their dependency, they live at the pleasure of someone else.
Garth: They are people who someone has agreed to support. They are not slaves. I don't think you are entitled to abuse them - even if consent doesn't apply and you think you have full property rights over them. I don't think the non-applicability of consent plus ownership outlaws abuse at all. You need an additional principle or axiom.
> My criterion for application of the consent axiom is that the consentee is > capable of forming an intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, > which appears to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to > this, interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, > guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my document, > ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.
Garth: This is completely reasonable in my opinion. I would assume though that as soon as our 2-4 year old can declare their intention or preference unambiguously - e.g. I don't wish to be hit daddy, I want someone else to look after me, etc - the consent axiom believing parent is then bound to listen? Do the property rights immediately fall away?
> *Capacity for consent. * Having satisfied the criterion above for > consent, I do not believe this remains an issue. All the consentee needs to > do is communicate their intention - they do not need to justify it. Even if > their choice is irrational, harmful to themselves, blatantly stupid, it must > be respected, or consequences will flow. The consentee needs to be just > intelligent enough to communicate his/her intention based on his/her > available information.
Garth: I am talking about 'the ability to form and unambiguously declare their intention or preference' - not the rationality or whatever of the intention/preference itself. I mean do all adults have an equal capacity to unambiguously know and/or communicate their own intentions/preferences? It may seem that the answer must be yes but if you admit that new born kids have vastly less than full capacity for this then it is in principle possible that development of this capacity may not be equally complete in all adults.
What is your view of the drunk friend who wants to drive? According to your view he has full capacity to form and unambiguously declare his intention. Do you intervene? If so on what grounds? Is it because he temporarily isn't himself? Is it because his intentions must be overriden even if he is fully himself?
If you argue that his more inclusive intentions i.e. taking into account what he would intend if sober, would ask you to stop him, then I will argue that people differ quite substantially in their ability to know and communicate their more inclusive/representative intentions, because the capacity to grasp that has an element of reasoning ability to it.
If you argue that you must not intervene, then I suspect you will often have great difficulty in accepting the outcome of the principle. I personally accept that you must allow people to be themselves and actualise their intentions even if they are stupid - but I also think there is a limit to just how much stupidity they should suffer before I think it time to act against them for their own good. I say that apart from my wish to personally not suffer from their stupidity. I guess I have an additional axiom that good sense is to be valued more than bad sense, and a principle that one should have compassion.
You can therefore declare me a non-libertarian if you wish but I know my sympathies are profoundly libertarian. I am fairly Randian in my trying to balance reason and consent but since I don't believe in objectivism I am not not a Randian. Anyway this discussion has just given me a better explicit understanding of myself and my political views and for that I thank you.
> Children as property. We routinely describe children as belonging to > their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not > property, then what are they? They are not independent entities, > their choices are constrained by their dependency, they live at the > pleasure of someone else. My criterion for application of the > consent axiom is that the consentee is capable of forming an > intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, which appears > to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to this, > interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, > guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my > document, ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a > decision by a jury.
Guardianship does not imply ownership. If children are property, one of the most abhorrent positions I've heard in a long time, then they may be treated like property. They may be roasted for lunch, raped as a pasttime, etc. Property does not have rights. Nor can property develop rights. I can't think of a statement more likely to convince people that all libertarians are insane than to promote the idea that children are property.
On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 2:01 PM, Jim Peron <JPe...@lfb.org> wrote:
> On Aug 6, 2009, at 1:38 AM, Trevor Watkins wrote:
> *Children as property.* We routinely describe children as belonging to > their parents, implying ownership. If full dependants are not property, then > what are they? They are not independent entities, their choices are > constrained by their dependency, they live at the pleasure of someone else. > My criterion for application of the consent axiom is that the consentee is > capable of forming an intelligible and unambiguous declaration of intention, > which appears to occur between the ages of 2 and 4 for most humans. Prior to > this, interpretation of intention must be made by the dependant's parents, > guardian, minder, owner - call it what you will. As I state in my document, > ANY action by anyone can be disputed, leading to a decision by a jury.
> Guardianship does not imply ownership. If children are property, one of the > most abhorrent positions I've heard in a long time, then they may be treated > like property. They may be roasted for lunch, raped as a pasttime, etc. > Property does not have rights. Nor can property develop rights. I can't > think of a statement more likely to convince people that all libertarians > are insane than to promote the idea that children are property.
Garth: Exactly my position - only much better put.
What's your take on the consent axiom Jim? Is it sufficient in your view?
On kid's rights, as in all matters, I'm keen on universally applicable principles and minimal room for discretion and arbitrary criteria. Accordingly, I don't like distinctive laws/rules applying to children. I see children as indistinguishable from incapacitated adults. Identical constraints arise for adults in a host of circumstances eg -
a.. an unconscious person in an operating theater where a surgeon finds a condition which, unless fixed without consent, will kill the patient
b.. a drunk or drugged person
c.. retards
d.. people having fits
e.. primitive people in advanced conditions
f.. someone who unknowingly risks their lives - the stepping in front of a bus idea
g.. You see a flame about to ignite your absent neighbour's house (so trespass to save it)
h.. You see the flame about to cross your boundary into your explosives factory (so trespass to stop it)
i.. etc
My view is that no special law/rule is necessary. The basic consent axiom suffices for all these situations.
The implications of regarding children are bizarre even if the raison d'etre is clear. If one owns one's children, is there a cut-off date/age. Consistent non-arbitrary non-discretionary principles say no, which means a 90 yr old owns their 70 yr old child and can beat the hell out of them, or sell them into slavery.
I prefer the view that people never own children, not even pre-birth, and can no more abuse them than they can any of the adults above. Not only am I for the law permitting me to defend Jim's kids from his abuse, but I'd do it regardless of the law. As an aside, Jim is ambiguous about such concepts as "law". I is, as I've pointed out for law, and just doesn't call what he's for "law", just as communist anarchists are for property, but just don't call their kind of appropriation "ownership".
No, Garth, I don't think there can or should be such a thing as "libertarian" jurisprudence. I don't think the consent axiom - that's libertarianism consists of - suggests eg a preference for juries, the right to cross-examine or a presumption of innocence. It is for the rule of law by default in that the rule of law is for universal application.
I see libertarianism as literally one word: consent. (When my shock at Walter Block asserted this subsided, I decided he's right).
All the law needs to say is that doing things to people requires their consent. It's then up to other domains to decide how that applies in practice.
And yes. people do have unequal "capacity", by which I assume you mean something like knowledge, rationality or IQ. That's not a problem, it's a fact, by which I mean it's not something for which we need a solution, just as we don't seek a solution to some being taller or shorter, or to the fact the some have a sharper sense of taste.
Fortuitously, spontaneous orders of free societies rescue "inferior" folk from being losers; actually turns them into winners - they get to enjoy mass production, language, advanced technology, cheap excellent music, fantastic health care, easily accessible food, staggeringly cheap and diverse clothing etc etc. Their greatest disadvantage is when the market (ie the consent axiom) is curtailed.
----- Original Message ----- From: Garth Zietsman To: libsa@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 05, 2009 10:59 AM
Subject: [Libsa] Re: The Consent Axiom
Leon I take your point. I do understand this distinction and maybe I should have marked where I changed from principle to application. However it isn't true that jurisprudential concerns haven't been an issue among Libertarians. It was a serious bone of contention between Jim and me whether I had the right to come over his fence if I thought he was abusing his kids. I said if his kids asked me to intervene I had every right - under the assumption that they hadn't consented to the abuse and had consented to my intervention. Jim believed his kids were property and had no capacity to deny or extend consent. I'm sure he thought I was a statist and I believed I was as being as consistently Libertarian as he - except that we differed on children being property (where he has complete rights of use and disposal) or people with at least some capacity and 'right' to consent. He thought they were HIS kids not mine, and I thought they were their own people.
Since the central Libertarian principle is consent, surely they should put more weight on reliable methods for checking for consent than those who don't hold that principle? I'm saying Libertarains should be as obsessed with the detection of consent as they are with promoting it as a standard. [I am not sure of that point at all but it seemed worth thinking about.]
Also the matter of the capacity for consent isn't just a jurisprudential issue about judging whether there was consent in a particular case or not. The fuzziness isn't just in an outsider being unsure whether there was consent or not. The capacity for consent is itself variable and fuzzy in principle. It is essentially zero at birth and increases to some unknown extent as we get older. Perhaps it shrinks when we get very old. It probably never reaches the same peak in everyone. The difference is that the child has say 10% capacity and the adult say 80-90%, and the jurisprudential issue is to ask whether whatever capacity they had was fully exercised.
If peak capacity for consent in adults is in principle unequal then that has implications - for principle. At the very least it means we need at least one more central principle. You may not agree that capacity for consent is unequal in adults in their normal state, but what if it is? Do we ever intervene? What principle(s) ought to guide intervention when we think capacity for consent is limited?
> Guardianship does not imply ownership. If children are property, one > of the most abhorrent positions I've heard in a long time, then they > may be treated like property. They may be roasted for lunch, raped > as a pasttime, etc. Property does not have rights. Nor can property > develop rights. I can't think of a statement more likely to convince > people that all libertarians are insane than to promote the idea > that children are property.
I wanted to say a bit more on this, mainly because the idea is atrocious. I also wanted to say more last night but had to go to bed.
The idea that children are property because they are dependent is certainly not one I would expect from a libertarian. Alas, over the years I have found Trevor taking positions that I never associated with libertarian thinking per se.
The premise seems to be that they are property because they are dependent, at least dependency was the factor mentioned. Also dependent are people in comas (temporary or long-term), people who are handicapped in particular ways (such as those paralyzed, those severely retarded, those with severe autism, those who are "insane", etc.), and many elderly people. Are all these classes of people "property"?
Property is normally considered a class of objects that are owned by individuals, can be traded among individuals, and devoid of all rights. Most is inanimate objects, the exception is animals which are considered not to possess rights per se. Other than Trevor's odd example of children, no property can acquire rights. The rights reside with the property owner. I have the right to drive the car, the car doesn't have any rights per se.
When we realize that dependency can come and go, under Trevor's theory a piece of property can gain rights (and cease to be property) but lose rights and return to the status of property. In his theory, a child is property, grows up and ceases to be property. Same child can have a fever and go into a coma, at which point he returns to the status of property due to dependency. He gets better, comes out of the coma, and ceases to be property. He now grows up, happily owns property (who he stupidly calls children instead of property). He gets old, very old, and becomes dependent on his children, at which point he becomes the property of his children. (Apparently a good time for them to get even, I guess.)
Humans are not property. I know of no libertarian theorist of any stature who would say so. (I exclude Trevor from this category). To be property is not to be human. Slavery didn't make people property, it just treated people like property, they remained human no matter how they were treated. In the theory we have been presented people start out as property and can return to the status of property or, conversely, they be non-human, become human, and then return to the status of human.
In many cultures slaves were dependent on their masters because the system made them so. In many welfare states everyone is dependent on the state for many aspects of life. Does this mean the state owns them? Does this make the citizens property of the ruling elite? If so, then in theory, a welfare state can't violate the rights of people because property doesn't have rights.
Leon wrote; ...Accordingly, I don't like distinctive laws/rules applying to children. I see children as indistinguishable from incapacitated adults. Identical constraints arise for adults in a host of circumstances eg ... My view is that no special law/rule is necessary. The basic consent axiom suffices for all these situations.
Law is not my field of expertise, but I recall a lecture during varsity in a course on commercial law where the professor (who's name I can't recall now) discussed the 5 criteria for a valid contract. On the criteria of capacity, he pointed to being over 21 or not certifiably dotty or sober (not under the influence of a substance) or...
Two interesting things I recall him mentioning were that a cafe would not refuse selling a loaf of bread to a 10-year old even though that transaction is a effectively a verbal contract with a minor, and that even the craziest of people occationally have what is called "a bright moment".
The court would consequently not consider a contract invalid based purely on the capacity of the minor / crazy person / drunkard. The lack of consent by the parent / curator / guardian does not in itself make the contract invalid either.
This did not make complete sense to me at the time, but later when we got to the module on representative law, it made more sense. The way I understood it, Roman law considered children, drunkards and people of dodgy capacity to still be in charge of their own decisions, aided by curators, guardians, etc. who filled the role of representatives, but most definitely not owners of those they represent.
Representatives act on behalf of someone, but that someone could still act on their own behalf in some cases where their actions could be considered sensible and within their capacity i.e. buying a loaf of bread. They could also take action agains the representative if actions initiated by the representative was not in their best interest or outside the specified limits of representation. Also, representation could be terminated and modified - unlike property.
I particularly liked the Roman approach, since another one of the 5 criteria for a valid contract was mutual consent. Of course it goes a lot further than that, but in my view, the Romans were on to something.
Upon reflection I agree with you, Garth, that a second axiom is required (this is a slippery slope, and soon we will be discussing a 17th axiom).I suggest there is a PRE-ACTION axiom, which is the consent axiom as described. This axiom (rule, directive) applies before any action is taken, and requires consent before action for the action to be considered legal. Then there is a POST-ACTION axiom, which might be described as the Jury axiom, which describes how disputes arising from illegal actions will be resolved. This is described as a corollary to the Consent axiom in my article, but I think it stands as an axiom in its own right. (There are many ways of resolving disputes, the Jury axiom proposes one way without justifying its specific choice, but taking it as a given). The jury axiom, as described in my article, includes a general limitation, "no jury may decide to take a human life". This, of course, is another area of wide disagreement.
> Garth: They are people who someone has agreed to support. They are not > slaves. I don't think you are entitled to abuse them - even if consent > doesn't apply and you think you have full property rights over them. I > don't think the non-applicability of consent plus ownership outlaws abuse at > all. You need an additional principle or axiom.
One can see why the concept of PROPERTY gets communists so fired up - it
even makes some of us non-communists quite bitchy.
Jim Harris was the first to suggest that children might be considered as
property, up until the age of 21. I duly responded with shock-horror at the
time, but have realised on reflection that inconsentible (a new word meaning
people that are incapable of informed consent) persons share many of the
characteristics of property, and therefore may be described as such (despite
the offence this may give to the more delicate-minded).
I seem to remember Leon describing your property as that which you may
"alienate", ie, dispose of as you will.
Bearing in mind 2 critical points from my Consent Axiom article, (1)anyone
may raise a dispute for any action, and (2)no jury may decide to take a
human life,
I suggest that most libertarians will agree that
(1)no guardian is bound by law to care for a dependant against the
guardian's will (ie the guardian may "walk away" from the dependant without
censure. In this case, some other element of society must take up the
dependant's case, or the dependant may wither away.)
(2)a guardian may sell a dependant in a willing buyer-willing seller
situation (adoption for money, surrogate motherhood)
(3)a guardian may discipline an unruly dependant, within limits defined by
the local society (ie a local witness raising a dispute on behalf of the
dependant.) Similar limits would apply to cruelty to animals, damage to the
environment, etc. (And of course, concerned individuals declaring disputes
would punish rape, torture and all the other stuff that some people think
the local society might not notice, pretty much like we do now).
(4) a guardian may attempt to recover the investment in care in some fashion
(getting an adult dependant to do some form of work, for example), or using
them when begging or requesting charity.
Do libertarians believe a dependant's body parts may be harvested for use or
profit? This is the subject of a current movie on circuit (My Sister's
keeper), which I have not yet seen. From the trailer it seems that the
dependant must go to court to preserve her organs, in our current legal
system.
From the above, allowing for the restrictions on killing, and local society
limits, it seems that inconsentible dependants are pretty close to property,
at least to me. This fact won't go away just because we think the term
"property" is politically incorrect when applied to cuddly little kiddies.
As I said in my article, if inconsentible dependants are not property of
their guardians, then what are they?
> Leon wrote;
> ...Accordingly, I don't like distinctive laws/rules applying to children.
> I see children as indistinguishable from incapacitated adults. Identical
> constraints arise for adults in a host of circumstances eg ... My view is
> that no special law/rule is necessary. The basic consent axiom suffices for
> all these situations.
> Law is not my field of expertise, but I recall a lecture during varsity in
> a course on commercial law where the professor (who's name I can't recall
> now) discussed the 5 criteria for a valid contract. On the criteria of
> capacity, he pointed to being over 21 or not certifiably dotty or sober (not
> under the influence of a substance) or...
> Two interesting things I recall him mentioning were that a cafe would not
> refuse selling a loaf of bread to a 10-year old even though that transaction
> is a effectively a verbal contract with a minor, and that even the craziest
> of people occationally have what is called "a bright moment".
> The court would consequently not consider a contract invalid based purely
> on the capacity of the minor / crazy person / drunkard. The lack of consent
> by the parent / curator / guardian does not in itself make the contract
> invalid either.
> This did not make complete sense to me at the time, but later when we got
> to the module on representative law, it made more sense. The way I
> understood it, Roman law considered children, drunkards and people of dodgy
> capacity to still be in charge of their own decisions, aided by curators,
> guardians, etc. who filled the role of representatives, but most definitely
> not owners of those they represent.
> Representatives act on behalf of someone, but that someone could still act
> on their own behalf in some cases where their actions could be considered
> sensible and within their capacity i.e. buying a loaf of bread. They could
> also take action agains the representative if actions initiated by the
> representative was not in their best interest or outside the specified
> limits of representation. Also, representation could be terminated and
> modified - unlike property.
> I particularly liked the Roman approach, since another one of the 5
> criteria for a valid contract was mutual consent. Of course it goes a lot
> further than that, but in my view, the Romans were on to something.
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