United States Supreme Court News

[Bob Hurt]

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Subject:	***SPAM*** United States Supreme Court News
Date:	Thu, 27 Jun 2019 18:07:38 -0000
From:	Willamette Law Online <wlo-...@willamette.edu>
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United States Supreme Court News Willamette Law Online - Willamette University College of Law  The United States Supreme Court has issued the following opinions: DECISIONS (1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: When determining whether a court must follow an order issued by an administrative agency, a court must first determine whether the order is legislative or interpretive and whether the petitioner had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order. [Read Summary Online]  (2) CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: Property owners with an actionable takings claim are no longer required to litigate state action for just compensation before pursuing a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, overruling Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985). [Read Summary Online]  (3) CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: The statute of limitations for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging the use of fabricated evidence, begins to run when criminal proceedings against a defendant are terminated in his or her favor. [Read Summary Online]  (4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) provision 34 U. S. C. §§20913(d), does not violate the nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to enforce and apply the Act registration requirements to pre-Act offenders. [Read Summary Online]  (5) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: States may not tax trusts based solely on the in-state residency of a beneficiary. [Read Summary Online]  (6) CRIMINAL LAW: A state may not use preemptory challenges that are substantially motivated by discriminatory intent to strike prospective jurors in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and United States Supreme Court precedent. [Read Summary Online]  (7) CRIMINAL LAW: In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. [Read Summary Online]  (8) FIRST AMENDMENT: Under the Establishment Clause, the passage of time gives rise to a presumption of constitutionality for monuments, symbols, and practices, even where such monuments, symbols, or practices include symbolic references to faith. [Read Summary Online]  DECISIONS (1) PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc. Date Filed: June 20, 2019 Case #: 17-1705 BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1705_8n59.pdf ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: When determining whether a court must follow an order issued by an administrative agency, a court must first determine whether the order is legislative or interpretive and whether the petitioner had a prior and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the order.  The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)prohibits any person from faxing an unsolicited advertisement. 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(C). The Administrative Orders Review Act (Hobbs Act) gives federal courts of appeals “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend. . . or to determine the validity of . . . final orders of the Federal Communication Commission"(FCC). 28 U.S.C. §2342(1). The FCC issued an order in 2006 which included faxes promoting free materials as “unsolicited advertisements.” Petitioners sent a fax to Respondents promoting Petitioner’s free reference manual. Respondents claim this violated the TCPA. The district court dismissed the case. The Fourth Circuit vacated, and held that the district court should have adopted the 2006 FCC interpretation of “unsolicited advertisement,” which includes faxes promoting free goods. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Hobbs Act requires a district court to follow the FCC’s order. The Court vacated and remanded for the lower court to decide two preliminary questions. First, whether the 2006 FCC Order is a legislative rule issued pursuant to statutory authority and having the force of law, or an interpretive rule which lacks the force of law. Second, whether PDR had a previous and adequate opportunity to seek judicial review of the FCC’s Order. If they did not, then the APA may permit Petitioner to challenge the Order’s validity in this proceeding. VACATED and REMANDED.[Summarized by: Margaret Dick] (2) Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania Date Filed: June 21, 2019 Case #: 17-647 ROBERTS, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, ALITO, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-647_m648.pdf CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: Property owners with an actionable takings claim are no longer required to litigate state action for just compensation before pursuing a federal claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, overruling Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985). Petitioner owns property containing a small ancestral cemetery and was notified that she violated an ordinance that required “all” cemeteries be open to the public during the day. Petitioner sought declaratory relief in state court alleging the ordinance “effected a taking” of the property, but did not seek compensation through “inverse condemnation.” The court found that Petitioner did not show irreparable harm for which relief could be granted. Petitioner filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging a violation of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.  The district court dismissed, finding that under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U. S. 172 (1985), Petitioner had not pursued the required action for just compensation in state court and the Third Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court overruled Williamson County, reasoning in favor of its holding in San Remo Hotel, L. P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U. S. 323 (2005), concluding the just compensation state-litigation requirement placed an “unjustifiable burden” and Catch-22 upon any property owner with an actionable takings claim because when a claim is filed first in state court, the owner runs the risk of the preclusive effect of barring the federal court action if the state action is unsuccessful. VACATED and REMANDED. [Summarized by: Jodi Maynard] (3) McDonough v. Smith Date Filed: June 20, 2019 Case #: 18-485 SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KAGAN and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-485_g2bh.pdf CIVIL RIGHTS § 1983: The statute of limitations for a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging the use of fabricated evidence, begins to run when criminal proceedings against a defendant are terminated in his or her favor.  Petitioner was criminally prosecuted for allegedly processing forged primary election ballots in Troy, New York. After aquittal, Petitioner sued Respondent under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging Respondent fabricated evidence to convict Petitioner of criminal charges and malicious prosecution. The district court dismissed both claims, holding the §1983 claims as untimely. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run when Petitioner had knowledge of the fabricated evidence, and when he suffered a loss of liberty as a result. The Supreme Court begins with identifying which liberty was infringed upon, and agrees with Petitioner that the common law tort of malicious prosecution was the injury suffered. Analogizing Petitioner’s case to Heck v. Humphrey, with the aid of Wallace v. Kato, the Court finds that challenging fabricated evidence in a criminal proceeding prior to its termination would likely create parallel civil and criminal litigation over the same topic. To avoid accrual of such litigation, the statute of limitations must begin at the termination of the criminal proceeding. The holding is further supported by the desire to avoid issues in jurisdictions where prosecutions can last as long or longer than the relevant civil limitations period. REVERSED AND REMANDED. [Summarized by: Matthew Flores] (4) Gundy v. United States Date Filed: June 20, 2019 Case #: 17-6086 KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-6086_2b8e.pdf CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) provision 34 U. S. C. §§20913(d), does not violate the nondelegation doctrine by allowing the Attorney General to enforce and apply the Act registration requirements to pre-Act offenders. The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 34 U.S.C. §20913, mandates that sex offenders register before completion of their prison sentences. Petitioner, a pre-Act offender released from prison post-Act, was convicted of failing to register. Petitioner argued that Congress’ delegation of legislative authority to the Attorney General regarding the applicability of SORNA to pre-Act offenders was unconstitutional. The district court and the Second Circuit rejected Petitioner’s claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the nondelegation doctrine prohibits the transfer of legislative power by Congress to another branch of government; however, this Court held in Reynolds v. United States,that the limited authority given to the Attorney General to apply SORNA to pre-Act offenders is constitutional. 565 U.S. 432 (2012). The Reynolds Court found that Congress intended the “basic statutory purpose” and “sex offender definition” of SORNA to include pre-Act offenders and understood that registering offenders who were never previously required to register, were missing, or dead, were legal complications. These complications allowed delegation to the Attorney General of the executive branch and required enforcement and application of the Act to pre-Act offenders “as soon as feasible.”  This limited delegation of authority does not violate the nondelegation doctrine. AFFIRMED.     [Summarized by: Jodi Maynard] (5) North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust Date Filed: June 20, 2019 Case #: 18-457 SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GORSUCH, J., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-457_2034.pdf CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: States may not tax trusts based solely on the in-state residency of a beneficiary. The trust to which Respondent is a beneficiary was taxed by Petitioner, although she had not received any income during the years at issue. Respondent argues that the tax violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent’s trustee filed suit in state court, which held in favor for Respondent, holding that the tax was unconstitutional because the requisite connection between the State and the trust was lacking. The state court of appeals and supreme court both affirmed. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that States are prohibited from taxing trusts “based only on the in-state residency of trust beneficiaries.” The Court reasoned that, in applying International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), a state is permitted to impose taxes only when “certain minimum contacts” have been established. Similar state taxes have been held constitutional where the trust itself, its trustees, or any income distributed therefrom reside or occur within the state. However, the “presence of in-state beneficiaries alone” is not enough to support the taxation of a trust when those beneficiaries have not received income, have no right to demand income, and may never actually receive income from the trust. Therefore, the State’s tax is unconstitutional. AFFIRMED.[Summarized by: Teresa Schulte] (6) Flowers v. Mississippi Date Filed: June 21, 2019 Case #: 17-9572 KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-9572_k536.pdf CRIMINAL LAW: A state may not use preemptory challenges that are substantially motivated by discriminatory intent to strike prospective jurors in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution and United States Supreme Court precedent.  Petitioner, a black man, stood trial for the murders of four people a total of six times. The Mississippi Supreme Court overturned several of the previous convictions for prosecutorial misconduct. Among other instances of misconduct, the State of Mississippi used preemptory strikes to dismiss prospective black jurors and the court found these strikes to be racially motivated. At the sixth trial, the State used preemptory strikes to dismiss five of the six prospective black jurors. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and upheld it on remand after appeal to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court applied the rule from Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), that prohibits a state from racial discrimination in a preemptory challenge of a prospective juror in a criminal trial. The Court examined four categories of evidence to find a clear pattern of racial discrimination over the course of Petitioner’s trials. The Court reviewed the large disparity in the treatment, questioning, and number of black prospective jurors dismissed compared to white jurors in each trial. The Court specifically found clear error in the dismissal of one black prospective juror at the sixth trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED. [Summarized by: Ayla O'Scannell] (7) Rehaif v. United States Date Filed: June 21, 2019 Case #: 17-9560 BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, GORSUCH, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-9560_new_onkq.pdf CRIMINAL LAW: In a prosecution under §922(g) and §924(a)(2), the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm. Petitioner was dismissed from university enrollment while under a nonimmigrant student visa. After failing to properly extend his visa, Petitioner shot weapons at a firing range. Petitioner was convicted of possessing firearms as an unlawful alien under 18 U.S.C. §922(g) and §924(a)(2). Petitioner appealed, arguing the trial court erred in issuing jury instructions which did not require the government to prove Petitioner knew of his illegal status. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding criminal law does not require knowledge of one’s own status. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the government must prove Petitioner both knew he possessed a firearm and also knew he belonged to a category barred from firearm possession. The Court reiterated the longstanding presumption that Congress intends a culpable mental state for each statutory element that criminalizes innocent conduct. The term “knowingly” modifies the elements of §922(g): (1) status; (2) possession; (3) jurisdiction; and (4) a firearm. The Court found no basis to not apply “knowingly” to “status,” when it is generally agreed to apply to “possession,” the second element. While Congress does not normally require defendants to know their own status, here status is the “crucial element” as the conduct would not be wrongful without such status. Without knowledge of his illegal status, one "does not have the guilty state of mind” demanded by the language and purpose of the statute. REVERSED and REMANDED.[Summarized by: Jessica Watkins] (8) American Legion v. American Humanist Assn. Date Filed: June 20, 2019 Case #: 17-1717 ALITO, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, II–C, III, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A and II–D, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which KAGAN, J., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a concurring opinion. KAGAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1717_4f14.pdf FIRST AMENDMENT: Under the Establishment Clause, the passage of time gives rise to a presumption of constitutionality for monuments, symbols, and practices, even where such monuments, symbols, or practices include symbolic references to faith. An agency of Maryland purchased and maintained a cross-shaped World War I monument on public land. Respondents filed suit requesting removal or destruction of the cross, claiming that the presence and maintenance of the cross violated the Establishment Clause. The district court determined that the monument did not violate the Establishment Clause, but the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that the government’s ownership and maintenance of the monument had the unconstitutional effect of endorsing Christianity. The Supreme Court disagreed, counseling against application of its Lemon test in favor of a presumption of constitutionality for longstanding monuments, symbols, and practices. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Focusing on monuments, the Court reasoned that original purposes in creating a monument become difficult to identify over time and that purposes and messages associated with such monuments often multiply or change. The Court noted that when such monuments become imbedded with a particular meaning within a community, removal by the government may seem hostile to religion in a manner that would equally offend the Establishment Clause. For these reasons, the Court held Maryland’s ownership of the monument at issue constitutional, as the monument had developed a secular meaning over time. REVERSED AND REMANDED.   [Summarized by: Connor McDonald] UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT NEWS Willamette Law Online – Willamette University College of Law Editor-in-Chief: Casey Gilmore, ckgi...@willamette.edu US Supreme Court Editors:  Laura Schifano, ldsch...@willamette.edu  Jessy Morris, jamo...@willamette.edu US Supreme Court Writers:  Margaret Dick, Matthew Flores, Jodi Maynard, Connor McDonald, Ayla O'Scannell, Teresa Schulte, Jessica Watkins - - - - - - - - - - - - To view and search WLO summaries online, go to http://www.willamettelawonline.com/  - - - - - - - - - - - - - Note: Willamette Law Online functions as a notification service, alerting users to legal decisions and trends, and is neither intended to be a comprehensive resource of case law nor a substitute for in-depth legal research.

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[Bob Hurt]

United States Supreme Court News Willamette Law Online - Willamette University College of Law

The United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari in the following cases and issued the following opinions: DECISIONS (1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Under the Auer deference doctrine, courts should defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a regulation only where such regulation is ambiguous; unambiguous regulations must be given the effect of their plain meaning. [Read Summary Online]  (2) ADMIRALTY: Punitive damages are unavailable for mariner plaintiffs in claims of unseaworthiness. [Read Summary Online]  (3) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: State-mandated durational residence requirements for business owners applying for retail liquor store licensing is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and is not protected by the Twenty-First Amendment § 2. [Read Summary Online]  (4) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of violence as an "offense that by its nature involves a risk of force" mandates the use of a categorical approach, making the clause unconstitutionally vague. [Read Summary Online]  (5) CORPORATIONS: Under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, commercial and financial information that is “customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of [express or implied] privacy” is deemed confidential. [Read Summary Online]  (6) CRIMINAL LAW: The mandatory minimum sentence imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3853(k) violates the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. [Read Summary Online]  (7) FIRST AMENDMENT: The prohibition against immoral or scandalous trademarks in 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) is viewpoint based discrimination and violates the First Amendment. [Read Summary Online]  CERTIORARI (1) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve an Important Point of Law and a Conflict Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of an Interpretive VA Regulation Under the Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502 When the Veterans Judicial Reform Act Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the Secretary’s Decisions [Read Summary Online]  (2) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), permits appeal of the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that the Act's § 315(b) time bar did not apply. [Read Summary Online]  (3) ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 502 to review an interpretive rule reflecting the Department of Veterans Affairs’ definitive interpretation of its own regulation, even if the VA chooses to promulgate that rule through its adjudication manual. [Read Summary Online]  (4) CIVIL PROCEDURE: Whether a request for equitable tolling by a person subject to the criminal alien bar is a factual determination such that judicial review is precluded by 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) or a legal determination such that it is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) as a question of law. [Read Summary Online]  (5) COPYRIGHT: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to––and thus renders uncopyrightable––works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. [Read Summary Online]  (6) CRIMINAL LAW: Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). [Read Summary Online]  (7) INSURANCE LAW: Whether a congressional intent derived from the legislative history of an appropriations rider can impliedly repeal a statutory payment obligation of the government. [Read Summary Online]  DECISIONS (1) Kisor v. Wilkie, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Date Filed: June 26, 2019 Case #: 18-15 KAGAN, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–B, III–B, and IV, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II–A and III–A, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined. ROBERTS, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part. GORSUCH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined, in which KAVANAUGH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, III, IV, and V, and in which ALITO, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. KAVANAUGH, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which ALITO, J., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-15_9p6b.pdf ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Under the Auer deference doctrine, courts should defer to a government agency’s interpretation of a regulation only where such regulation is ambiguous; unambiguous regulations must be given the effect of their plain meaning. Petitioner sought disability benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Petitioner's claim was denied, but reopened his claim with a new psychiatric report. The VA granted disability benefits going forward but would not grant retroactive benefits to the original application date without new “relevant” records. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and Court of Appeals Federal Circuit both affirmed but the later did so based on Auer deference for the Board’s interpretation of its rule. The Supreme Court held the court below did not use all of its interpretive tools prior to determining ambiguity and applying Auer deference. The Court granted certiorari specifically to decide whether to overrule Auer as Petitioner argues and the Court answered “No.” The Court must be convinced that Auer deference is wrong and also overcome stare decisis, which demands “special justification”. Because deference traces back to late nineteenth century, the Court has repeatedly held agency interpretations as the controlling weight when regulation is ambiguous, unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent. However, deference can only be used once a court finds the regulation genuinely ambiguous, exhausting all interpretive tools of construction as if there were no agency. Agency interpretation must also reflect “fair and considered judgment” to receive Auer deference. VACATED and REMANDED to reconsider whether Auer deference is warranted, bearing in mind the principles outlined in this opinion.[Summarized by: Jessica Watkins] (2) Dutra Group v. Batterton Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-266 ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which R OBERTS, C. J., and THOMAS, K AGAN, G ORSUCH, and K AVANAUGH, JJ., joined. G INSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which B REYER and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-266_m6io.pdf ADMIRALTY: Punitive damages are unavailable for mariner plaintiffs in claims of unseaworthiness.  Respondent is a mariner that was injured while working on Petitioner’s vessel and sought general and punitive damages in federal court.  Petitioner moved to dismiss the punitive damages claim, arguing punitive damages are not available for unseaworthiness actions.  The district court denied the motion but certified an interlocutory appeal on the question. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding punitive damages are available for claims of unseaworthiness, reaffirming a circuit court split on the issue. The Supreme Court reversed, following precedent in Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U. S. 19 (1990), and Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U. S. 404 (2009).  Miles established the primary focus for the Court is to consider “legislative enactments for policy guidance,” but also stated that the Court may supplement statutory remedies to ensure the policies served by the statutes are upheld. In Atlantic Sounding, the Court allowed a punitive damage award noting a historical basis for “certain maritime torts, including maintenance and cure.” In the instant case, finding no historical basis or precedent to allow punitive damages for unseaworthiness and to further uniform application in decisions, the Court held that punitive damages “remain unavailable in unseaworthiness actions.”  REVERSED and REMANDED. [Summarized by: Jodi Maynard] (3) Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers v. Thomas, Exec. Dir. of the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission  Date Filed: June 26, 2019 Case #: 18-96 ALITO, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, B REYER, S OTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. GORSUCH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined.  Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-96_5i36.pdf CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: State-mandated durational residence requirements for business owners applying for retail liquor store licensing is unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and is not protected by the Twenty-First Amendment § 2. Petitioner is a trade association for in-state liquor retailers. Respondent, acting under the direction of the state attorney general, declined to enforce statutory residency requirements on applicants with non-resident stockholders. Petitioner brought suit and the case was removed to federal court. The district court, following U.S. Supreme Court decision in Granholm v. Heald, 544 U. S. 460 (2005), concluded the residential requirements were unconstitutional. Petitioner appealed. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the state residential requirements were “facially discriminate against out-of-state economic interests” and unconstitutional under the Twenty-First Amendment and the dormant Commerce Clause precedents. However, the circuit divided over the constitutionality specific to the 2-year residential requirement for an initial license.  Petitioner sought certiorari, specifically challenging the Sixth Circuit's invalidation of the 2-year residency requirement applicable to initial liquor store applicants. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the 2-year residency requirement favored in-state residents over out-of-state residents, thus violating the dormant Commerce Clause. Further, as the requirement relates to the sale of alcohol, the Court considered the Twenty-First Amendment §2, which grants latitude to the states for legislation of alcohol, but reasoned that §2 is not intended to allow states “to restrict the importation of alcohol for purely protectionist purposes.” The Court held a 2-year durational residency requirement applicable to retail liquor store initial license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not shielded by the Twenty-First Amendment §2. AFFIRMED. [Summarized by: Jodi Maynard] (4) United States v. Davis Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-431 GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. KAVANAUGH, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined, and in which ROBERTS, C. J., joined as to all but Part II–C. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-431_7758.pdf CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of violence as an "offense that by its nature involves a risk of force" mandates the use of a categorical approach, making the clause unconstitutionally vague. A jury found Respondents guilty on multiple counts that included two separate violations of §924(c) based on Respondents brandishing a shotgun during robberies. Respondents appealed the convictions under §924(c)’s residual clause, arguing that §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of violence was unconstitutionally vague under Supreme Court precedent. The Fifth Circuit agreed but sustained most of Respondents’ convictions under §924(c)(3)(A). Respondents sought a rehearing and argued that the Fifth Circuit should have vacated all their convictions under §924(c) after deeming the residual clause unconstitutionally vague, which prompted Petitioner to seek further review of §924(c)(3)(B)’s constitutionality before a full resentencing occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed that §924(c)(3)(B)’s definition of a crime of violence made the residual clause unconstitutionally vague. The Court reasoned that the legislative history and language of §924(c)(3)(B) mandated a categorical approach requiring judges to apply the residual clause to an imagined “ordinary case” of an offense, as opposed to real-world conduct. The Court then cited prior precedent deeming such a categorical approach vague because it requires a judgment based on an abstraction with respect to an unspecified level of risk. Accordingly, the Court vacated and remanded the Fifth Circuit’s decision to address Respondent’s rehearing petitions. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED. [Summarized by: Connor McDonald] (5) Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-481 GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J.,and THOMAS, ALITO, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG and SOTOMAYOR, JJ., joined.  Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-481_5426.pdf CORPORATIONS: Under Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act, commercial and financial information that is “customarily and actually treated as private by its owner and provided to the government under an assurance of [express or implied] privacy” is deemed confidential.  Petitioner is an intervening party to a dispute between Respondent and the United States Department of Agriculture. Respondent requested access to “store-level data” regarding a nutrition assistance program, which the USDA retained. The USDA invoked Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which shields disclosure of certain confidential information. Respondent sued to compel disclosure. A federal district court found for Respondent and Petitioner intervened, appealing to the Eight Circuit, which affirmed. The Supreme Court first answers the question of whether Petitioner meets all factors required for standing, holding that it does. It then addresses the meaning of “confidential” as it is used in the FOIA. Finding that the lower courts grafted National Parks & Conservation Assn. v. Morton’s “competitive harm” test into the statute, the Court decides that they skipped the first step of looking to the common meaning of the term. The Court disagrees with this reliance on legislative history, and instead defines the term using Webster’s Dictionary. It further finds that earlier courts of appeals have accurately applied the same analysis, and agrees that Exemption 4 protects information that an individual wishes to keep private under either an express or implied promise from the government. REVERSED and REMANDED. [Summarized by: Matthew Flores] (6) United States v. Haymond Date Filed: June 26, 2019 Case #: 17-1672 GORSUCH, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and THOMAS and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-1672_5hek.pdf CRIMINAL LAW: The mandatory minimum sentence imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 3853(k) violates the right to a trial by jury guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.  Respondent was sentenced to thirty-eight months in prison and ten years of supervised release for possessing child pornography. Respondent violated the terms of his supervised release and the United States sought to impose a new prison sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which imposes a mandatory minimum of five years to life and disregards the length of the original sentence. Respondent appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which held that § 3583(k) violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. As a remedy the court struck the language concerning the mandatory minimum. The Supreme Court concluded that the statute is unconstitutional but made no ruling on the issue of remedy, remanding the issue to the court of appeals. The Court reasoned that precedent requires a jury to make factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt in order to “authorize a judicial punishment” and that a judge making such findings by a preponderance of the evidence standard “cannot stand.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 117 (2013). Furthermore, the Court reasoned that the usurpation of the jury function by a judge divests citizens of their control over the judicial branch. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004). Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) is unconstitutional. VACATED and REMANDED.[Summarized by: Teresa Schulte] (7) Iancu v. Brunetti Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-302 KAGAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS, GINSBURG, ALITO, GORSUCH and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. ROBERTS, C. J., and BREYER, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which BREYER, J., joined.  Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-302_e29g.pdf FIRST AMENDMENT: The prohibition against immoral or scandalous trademarks in 15 U.S.C. §1052(a) is viewpoint based discrimination and violates the First Amendment.  Respondent is an artist with a clothing line with the trademark “FUCT,” which is pronounced as the four letters spelled out. Petitioner found that this violated the Lanham Act’s prohibition against marks that are of immoral or scandalous matter. 15 U.S.C. §1052(a). Petitioner concluded that Respondent’s trademark was vulgar and failed its test of whether the general public would find it offensive. Respondent brought a facial challenge to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which found that the prohibition violated the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court previously held that the immoral or scandalous prohibition is viewpoint-based discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The Court previously struck down a similar prohibition against disparaging trademarks for the same reason in Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S.C. ___ (2017). The government may not regulate speech based on the ideas or opinions it conveys. The Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the statute was viewpoint-neutral because it found that the statutory language on its face regulated trademarks based on whether they expressed generally accepted views on moral topics.  The Court reiterated that the “‘immoral or scandalous’ bar is substantially overbroad,” and violates the First Amendment. AFFIRMED.

[Summarized by: Ayla O'Scannell]

CERTIORARI (1) Blue Water Navy Vietnam Veterans v. Wilkie, Sec. of VA Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 17-1693 875 F.3d 1102 (Fed Cir. 2017) Full Text Opinion: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/16-1782.Opinion.11-15-2017.1.PDF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether this Court Should Grant Certiorari to Resolve an Important Point of Law and a Conflict Between Circuits Concerning Judicial Review of an Interpretive VA Regulation Under the Administrative Procedures Act and Whether It Should Be Foreclosed Under 38 U.S.C. § 502 When the Veterans Judicial Reform Act Provides the Sole Avenue for Review of the Secretary’s Decisions For over fifteen years, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) refused to grant presumed Agent Orange exposure to “Blue Water Navy” Vietnam veterans.In Gray v. McDonald, Vet. App. 313 (2015), the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims found some circumstances were outside that scope of Haas v. Peake, 525 F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2008) and urged the VA to reevaluate its policy. Respondent issued changes to the M21-1 Manual to circumvent that ruling. The Federal Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for judicial review, holding the Manual as interpretive rather than substantive regulation and therefore it had no jurisdiction. Petitioner argues this holding is erroneous, establishing a substantial and unnecessary burden on veterans. Petitioner argues the decision effectively denies judicial review, allowing Respondent to bypass review by issuing regulatory changes through the Manual. The Supreme Court held previously the Administrative Procedures Act has a “well-settled presumption that agency actions are reviewable,” unless Congress clearly precludes such review shown by clear and convincing evidence, which Petitioner argues is not present. The Manual binds Veterans Benefits Authority personnel and is strong persuasive authority for the Board of Veterans Appeals and thus is more than a mere procedural handbook, leaving veterans without real remedy. The Court granted certiorari and issued a summary order stating that the case is moot under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). VACATED and REMANDED. [Summarized by: Jessica Watkins] (2) Dex Media, Inc. v. Click-To-Call Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-916 899 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2018) Full Text Opinion: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/15-1242.Opinion.8-16-2018.pdf ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), permits appeal of the PTAB’s decision to institute an inter partes review upon finding that the Act's § 315(b) time bar did not apply. Infrorocket.com, Inc., filed a suit challenging a patent owned by Keen, Inc. Keen then merged with Infrorocket and voluntarily dismissed the action.  Petitioner filed suit against Respondent, who acquired the patent, alleging infringement. Respondent believed “inter partes review” (IPR) was time-barred under the American Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 315(b), because Petitioner had been served the complaint from the previous action more than one year prior. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) rejected the argument, holding the Federal Circuit treat voluntary dismissals as though the action was never brought. PTAB denied Respondent’s request for rehearing and the Federal Circuit dismissed Respondent’s appeal. Respondent appealed to the Supreme Court, which vacated and remanded for consideration due to the decision in Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). The Federal Circuit dismissed, relying on Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2016), essentially holding that the presumption that Congress intends judicial review of an agency decision is insurmountable. Petitioner argues that the court’s narrow reading of § 315(b) directly contravenes the decision in Cuozzo, in which the Supreme Court held a specific agency decision to be unreviewable. Petitioner also argues that Congress intended IPR’s to improve efficiency of patent appeals and that the decision directly hinders this goal by allowing appeals of preliminary decisions to institute IPR’s. [Summarized by: Margaret Dick] (3) Gray v. Wilkie, Sec. of VA Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 17-1679 875 F.3d 1102 (Fed. Cir. 2017) Full Text Opinion: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/16-1782.Opinion.11-15-2017.1.PDF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 502 to review an interpretive rule reflecting the Department of Veterans Affairs’ definitive interpretation of its own regulation, even if the VA chooses to promulgate that rule through its adjudication manual. Petitioner filed a benefits claim with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and filed a petition for review by the Federal Circuit of the revision made to the VA’s Adjudication Procedures Manual, M21-1 (M21-1 Manual), which contains a narrowed interpretation of the Agent Orange Act of 1991. The Veterans’ Judicial Review Act grants jurisdiction to the Federal Circuit over any VA rules or policies referred to by 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1) or 553. 38 U.S.C. § 502. Petitioner argues that § 552(a)(1) directly refers to “statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by the agency.” Respondent asserted that the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because “agency manuals are more clearly referenced in 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(C).” A Federal Circuit panel decided Disabled American Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 859 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (DAV), finding sections 552(a)(1) and 552(a)(2) to be mutually exclusive and held that M21-1 Manual provisions are exempt from judicial review. In the instant case, the panel found that manual provisions fall under §552(a)(2)(C) and held that it lacked jurisdiction under the precedent set by DAV. Petitioner was denied a rehearing en banc. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued a summary order, stating that the case is moot under United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950). VACATED and REMANDED. [Summarized by: Teresa Schulte] (4) Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, Att'y Gen. Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-776 737 Fed. Appx. 230 (5th Cir. 2018); 741 Fed. Appx. 259 (5th Cir. 2018) Full Text Opinion: http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/unpub/17/17-60333.0.pdf CIVIL PROCEDURE: Whether a request for equitable tolling by a person subject to the criminal alien bar is a factual determination such that judicial review is precluded by 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C) or a legal determination such that it is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D) as a question of law.  Petitioners were admitted to the United States as lawful residents and subsequently underwent removal proceedings following criminal convictions. Both subsequently filed motions to reopen. The deadline for filing statutory motions to reopen is subject to equitable tolling, a point on which all the courts of appeals agree.Mata v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct. 2150 (2015).  However, they are split on whether review of a denial of a request for equitable tolling by someone subject to the criminal alien bar, 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(C), is a factual or legal determination. Petitioners’ requests for equitable tolling were denied by the Fifth Circuit. Generally, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits bar criminal aliens from judicial review of such requests under the criminal alien bar, holding that equitable tolling is a factual determination and thus unreviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). The Ninth Circuit holds that equitable tolling is a question of both law and fact and that it is reviewable under §1252(a)(2)(D). Other circuits are also split on this issue, although their opinions thus far have been unpublished. Petitioners argue that the issue is one of current and significant conflict, which affects all citizens’ statutory right to file motions to reopen and for courts to be able to “retain their jurisdiction to review” such motions. Petitioners claim this case is the “ideal vehicle” for resolving this issue. [Summarized by: Margaret Dick] (5) Georgia v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc. Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-1150 906 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2018) Full Text Opinion: http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201711589.pdf COPYRIGHT: Whether the government edicts doctrine extends to––and thus renders uncopyrightable––works that lack the force of law, such as the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. The State of Georgia appointed a Code Revision Commission in 1977 to assist with re-codifying its laws and subsequently adopted a manuscript created under the Commission’s supervision. After its adoption, non-statutory annotations were added to the manuscript now known as the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (OCGA). The State recognized that only the statutory portion of OCGA has “the force of law.” Respondent used the text for redistribution to paying users of the legal world. The State filed an infringement suit in district court and obtained injunctive relief. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that under the government edicts doctrine, the OCGA are not copyrightable. Because the court reversed on this ground alone, it did not address Respondent’s merger or fair use defenses. The court based its decision on the premise of “public authorship,” criticizing the district court for using a bright-line rule, ignoring matters of public policy for which it considered vital to the issue. The State argues that the decision widens an already growing circuit split and that the annotations here would be copyrightable in four other circuits, which have all held that the “force of law” is necessary to deem a government work uncopyrightable.  The State asserts that uniformity among the courts is “vitally important to the functioning of state governments.” Furthermore, Petitioner states that the decision below is wrong. [Summarized by: Matthew Flores] (6) Banister v. Davis Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-6943 Banister v. Davis, No. 17-10826, Mot. Reh’g (5th. Cir. Jun. 18, 2018) Full Text Opinion: https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/18/18-6943/74282/20181206134442597_00000030.pdf CRIMINAL LAW: Whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U. S. 524 (2005). Petitioner was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. After the district court denied his habeas corpus petition and Certificate of Appealability, Petitioner filed a motion to Amend of Alter the Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e) which was also denied. Petitioner’s motion and Certificate of Appealability was then appealed to the United States Court of appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The court denied the Rule 59(e) motion, characterizing it as a successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005), and therefore not timely filed with that court. Petitioner argues that this decision highlights a circuit split of whether a Rule 59(e) motion may be considered a successive habeas petition. Petitioner further argues that this extends the rule of Gonzalez beyond its holding and that Rule 59(e) is not a reexamination of the merits of a case, but merely a tolling function while an appeal is pending.[Summarized by: Ayla O'Scannell] (7) Maine Community Health Options v. United States Date Filed: June 24, 2019 Case #: 18-1023 892 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Full Text Opinion: http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/17-1994.Opinion.6-14-2018.pdf INSURANCE LAW: Whether a congressional intent derived from the legislative history of an appropriations rider can impliedly repeal a statutory payment obligation of the government. The consolidated Petitioners consist of insurers who relied on the Affordable Care Act’s “risk corridors” program. This program mandated that the government pay calculated amounts to health insurers so that insurers would participate in newly created health benefit exchanges and not raise premiums for perceived uncertainties in the market. After insurers provided insurance through these exchanges for nearly a year, Congress enacted an appropriations bill with an appropriations rider prohibiting the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from using funds to make risk corridor payments. Petitioners filed suit to obtain these payments. The cases in the Court of Federal Claims culminated in the Federal Circuit’s governing decision in Moda Health Plan, Inc. v. United States. The Federal Circuit held that the risk corridors program created an obligation for the government to pay participating insurers but concluded that Congress’s appropriations rider extinguished such an obligation based on an intent derived from legislative history. Petitoners argue to the United States Supreme Court that the Federal Circuit’s decision conflicts with Court precedent related to the canon of statutory construction against implied repeals. Petitioners reason that the Federal Circuit Court misread Court precedent as requiring a search for congressional intent when precedent requires a focus on statutory text. Petitioners emphasize that the Federal Circuit’s misreading of implied repeals undermines reliability on the government as a business partner, which will harm government contractors, while further devastating the healthcare market. [Summarized by: Connor McDonald]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT NEWS Willamette Law Online – Willamette University College of Law Editor-in-Chief: Casey Gilmore, ckgi...@willamette.edu US Supreme Court Editors:  Laura Schifano, ldsch...@willamette.edu  Jessy Morris, jamo...@willamette.edu US Supreme Court Writers:  Margaret Dick, Matthew Flores, Jodi Maynard, Connor McDonald, Ayla O'Scannell, Teresa Schulte, Jessica Watkins - - - - - - - - - - - - To view and search WLO summaries online, go to http://www.willamettelawonline.com/  - - - - - - - - - - - - - Note: Willamette Law Online functions as a notification service, alerting users to legal decisions and trends, and is neither intended to be a comprehensive resource of case law nor a substitute for in-depth legal research.

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