Piet was kind enough to add me to the group so others could benefit from our dialog. So here is my latest query, which arose as I read his wonderful essay "The Role Of Husserl's Epoche For Science". Since this is my first posting, I hope I do it correctly. If not, please feel free to suggest improvements.
Thanks, Ari
Piet,
Having read, enjoyed, and hopefully understood at least some of, your excellent article "The Role of Husserl's Epoche for Science", I would like to ask a question. You state:
"no matter how convinced one may be of the existence of the material world, an acceptance of that existence is bound to come in a package deal with a certain understanding of what 'material' implies. This will no doubt place limitations on one's expectations and on one's strategy of looking for new aspects of life."
I see "material" as limited by definition but unbounded in extent. This unbounded nature of materialism seems to remove any limits on what materialism is capable of explaining. I do not say that materialism is necessarily correct, only that it is one explanation, supported by much evidence, which seems capable of going as far as necessary. Also, my "strategy" is not limited by the apparent success of any one explanation (e.g. materialism), for appearances can be deceiving, and one must always be open to alternatives.
I may simply be unaware of these undoubted limits you mention, in which case I want to become aware of them. Or am I an exception to your rule? And thereby an answer to your ultimate argument? :)
I'm glad to see your comments on my paper. As I mentioned during our workshop last Friday, we may as well begin to discuss the paper via email.
There are two points I'd like to respond to.
1) Material World.
In a dream or movie, we are presented with phenomena that suggest the presence of material world. In daily life, too, we interpret similar phenomena to be indicative of the presence of an actually existing material world. And for every day purposes it makes sense of cource, to view the world that way. At the same time, matter seems to have all kind of limitations build in: water cannot burn, a piece of wood is opaque (but then X rays came along), there is only so much energy you can extract out of a pint of fuel (but then nucleor energy came along), etc. Somebody living in the 19th century, and believing in the existence of matter would have believed in the understanding of matter of that day, before X rays and nuclear energy, and would have had too narrow an understanding of materialism -- even more so since that person would not know about quantum mechanics. So leaving the question of the existence of matter open, we may be more openminded with respect to future discoveries.
2) Appearances.
When I use the word "appearances" I mean "phenomena" in a way even more radical than Husserl used the word. Husserl saw phenomena as objects appearing in the consciousness of a knowing subject. I use the term "appearances" to indicate what appears in awareness without Husserl's assumption that there are (human) subjects that have consciousness. I see the notion of "subject self" and of "consciousness" as useful fabrications that can, however, be questioned. Without buying into them as really existing in any way, we can leave the question of that kind of existence open.
Note that my use of the word "appearance" does not apply anything like "appearances that can be deceiving". I do not use the word "appearance" as "what something appears to be" in contrast to "what something really is". On the contrary, I do not assume that there is anything there there that is "appearing" through an appearance.
I hope that is not too confusing. I am aware that the word "appearance" has multiple meaning, but I hope that this explains what I mean with it. The alternative, to avoid multiple meanings, would be to introduce new words (like Husserl did with "epoche") but I don't like to introduce new jargon; I prefer to use existing English words.
Thank you for your excellent questions, Ari! I look forward to other questions, comments and resonses from all of us here in this email forum.
Cheers,
Piet
------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: "Earl Kiech" <eki...@gmail.com> Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2009 06:15:38 -0500 Subject: Question For Piet To: <kira-phenomenology-workshop@googlegroups.com>
Piet was kind enough to add me to the group so others could benefit from our dialog. So here is my latest query, which arose as I read his wonderful essay "The Role Of Husserl's Epoche For Science". Since this is my first posting, I hope I do it correctly. If not, please feel free to suggest improvements.
Thanks, Ari
Piet,
Having read, enjoyed, and hopefully understood at least some of, your excellent article "The Role of Husserl's Epoche for Science", I would like to ask a question. You state:
"no matter how convinced one may be of the existence of the material world, an acceptance of that existence is bound to come in a package deal with a certain understanding of what 'material' implies. This will no doubt place limitations on one's expectations and on one's strategy of looking for new aspects of life."
I see "material" as limited by definition but unbounded in extent. This unbounded nature of materialism seems to remove any limits on what materialism is capable of explaining. I do not say that materialism is necessarily correct, only that it is one explanation, supported by much evidence, which seems capable of going as far as necessary. Also, my "strategy" is not limited by the apparent success of any one explanation (e.g. materialism), for appearances can be deceiving, and one must always be open to alternatives.
I may simply be unaware of these undoubted limits you mention, in which case I want to become aware of them. Or am I an exception to your rule? And thereby an answer to your ultimate argument? :) ------- End of forwarded message -------
Thanks for your wonderful response to my question. This is one of
those circumstances where the meaning of words is important and you
did a great job of clarifying what you meant. I tend to respond most
vigorously to statements which include (implicitly or explicitly)
absolutes such as "always", "never", or "impossible". My original
question was prompted by your suggestion that a materialist philosophy
"necessarily" imposes limits on one's expectations and strategies,
i.e. that materialism was incapable of fully embracing certain aspects
of reality. You clarified with the excellent examples of water not
burning, wood being opaque, etc. However, I do not feel these (or any)
limitations and, assuming I am not simply deluding myself, suggest
that since I do not feel them, they are not "necessary" but perhaps
merely common among materialists. I would not say "water cannot burn"
but that, after carefully defining burn (google water and burn and you
will find examples of water "burning"), water does not appear to burn
as we understand burning, but that given a better understanding of the
laws of nature, we might well someday see water burn.
At heart I believe this may have been an example, perhaps unconscious,
of seeing limitations in an alternative philosophy, thereby
rationalizing its dimished probability of being correct. It is such a
common response to think that "since I cannot imagine how science
could ever explain this, I don't believe it can". But this attitude
belies a limitation of vision, not science. I believe in materialism
for what I consider to be a sound reason. Science has a long history,
thousands of years, of explaining (at least describing) more and more
of our perceived reality. Of course there remain many things yet to be
understood, but I think it is more reasonable to assume that the long
trend will continue than to assume it will suddenly end. This is a
version of Occam's razor, that given two alternatives I choose the
simpler one, simpler in that for the progress of science to end,
something must intervene to end it. And postulating this new
"something" which will end it seems arbitrary to me. I want to
emphasize that I fully accept the possibilities offered by other
philosophies and yearn to learn from those who hold them.
The Dalai Lama (in his book "The Universe In A Single Atom", which I
am thoroughly enjoying) states that demonstrated claims of science
must always supercede conflicting Buddhist claims. He is also wise
enough to include a critical qualifier in his statement that "There is
more to human existence and to reality itself than current science can
ever give us access to." "Current" science leaves the door open to a
future science which might indeed give us access to such subtle ideas.
Of course, even he can slip all too easily into the comforting
omission of that critical qualifier as when he states "...many
questions that pertain to our human existence, such as ethics,
aesthetics, and spirituality, remain outside the domain of science."
By omitting the word "current", the reader is very likely to assume he
meant "forever" outside, further assuming that science is inherently
incapable of addressing such questions. Including the word "current"
would have made clear the point that he was only judging the present
abilities of science. Of course, if he *did* mean that science was
inherently incapable, I would want to know the basis of his presumed
knowledge of the future abilities of science.
Though I see no inherent limits on materialism, I also place no limits
on spiritualism or any other beliefs. I simply see them (currently) as
both unnecessary and more complicated than materialism. My purpose
here might best be summarized by saying that I am not as convinced
that materialism *is* right, as I am that it *might be* right. Some
believe the implicit simplicity of materialism means its proponents
cannot appreciate the majesty of the universe and must therefore feel
impoverished in some fashion. I assure you this is not so--that we can
be as deeply moved as the most devout spiritualist by William Blake's
words:
"To see a world in a grain of sand,
And a heaven in a wildflower,
Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
And eternity in an hour."
Thanks for your attention,
Earl/Ari
On Mar 29, 8:13 pm, Piet Hut <p...@ias.edu> wrote:
> I'm glad to see your comments on my paper. As I mentioned during our
> workshop last Friday, we may as well begin to discuss the paper via
> email.
> There are two points I'd like to respond to.
> 1) Material World.
> In a dream or movie, we are presented with phenomena that suggest the
> presence of material world. In daily life, too, we interpret similar
> phenomena to be indicative of the presence of an actually existing
> material world. And for every day purposes it makes sense of cource,
> to view the world that way. At the same time, matter seems to have
> all kind of limitations build in: water cannot burn, a piece of wood
> is opaque (but then X rays came along), there is only so much energy
> you can extract out of a pint of fuel (but then nucleor energy came
> along), etc. Somebody living in the 19th century, and believing in
> the existence of matter would have believed in the understanding of
> matter of that day, before X rays and nuclear energy, and would have
> had too narrow an understanding of materialism -- even more so since
> that person would not know about quantum mechanics. So leaving the
> question of the existence of matter open, we may be more openminded
> with respect to future discoveries.
> 2) Appearances.
> When I use the word "appearances" I mean "phenomena" in a way even
> more radical than Husserl used the word. Husserl saw phenomena
> as objects appearing in the consciousness of a knowing subject.
> I use the term "appearances" to indicate what appears in awareness
> without Husserl's assumption that there are (human) subjects that
> have consciousness. I see the notion of "subject self" and of
> "consciousness" as useful fabrications that can, however, be
> questioned. Without buying into them as really existing in any
> way, we can leave the question of that kind of existence open.
> Note that my use of the word "appearance" does not apply anything
> like "appearances that can be deceiving". I do not use the word
> "appearance" as "what something appears to be" in contrast to
> "what something really is". On the contrary, I do not assume
> that there is anything there there that is "appearing" through
> an appearance.
> I hope that is not too confusing. I am aware that the word
> "appearance" has multiple meaning, but I hope that this explains
> what I mean with it. The alternative, to avoid multiple meanings,
> would be to introduce new words (like Husserl did with "epoche")
> but I don't like to introduce new jargon; I prefer to use existing
> English words.
> Thank you for your excellent questions, Ari! I look forward to
> other questions, comments and resonses from all of us here in this
> email forum.
I agree, there is nothing wrong with materialism, as long as we are willing to be flexible about what we mean with the notion of matter. I expect science to continue to grow, and the notion of matter to continute to evolve.
As for phenomenology, the important move of the epoche is to simply sidestep the question of whether materialism is right or not; that just isn't the concern of phenomenology. Whether or not materialism may be correct, we can study the phenomena in this world equally well, independent of whether there is an underlying stratum of matter.
This is my beginning of a book that I tried to write over the Christmas holidays -- alas, that was the time that the phenomenology workshop took off, taking all my attention for a week or so . . . I hope to continue working on that book soon!
Thank you for your comments, Earl/Ari!
Cheers,
Piet/Pema
------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: Ari <eki...@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 31 Mar 2009 12:45:17 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: Question For Piet To: Kira Phenomenology Workshop <kira-phenomenology-workshop@googlegroups.com>
Piet,
Thanks for your wonderful response to my question. This is one of those circumstances where the meaning of words is important and you did a great job of clarifying what you meant. I tend to respond most vigorously to statements which include (implicitly or explicitly) absolutes such as "always", "never", or "impossible". My original question was prompted by your suggestion that a materialist philosophy "necessarily" imposes limits on one's expectations and strategies, i.e. that materialism was incapable of fully embracing certain aspects of reality. You clarified with the excellent examples of water not burning, wood being opaque, etc. However, I do not feel these (or any) limitations and, assuming I am not simply deluding myself, suggest that since I do not feel them, they are not "necessary" but perhaps merely common among materialists. I would not say "water cannot burn" but that, after carefully defining burn (google water and burn and you will find examples of water "burning"), water does not appear to burn as we understand burning, but that given a better understanding of the laws of nature, we might well someday see water burn.
At heart I believe this may have been an example, perhaps unconscious, of seeing limitations in an alternative philosophy, thereby rationalizing its dimished probability of being correct. It is such a common response to think that "since I cannot imagine how science could ever explain this, I don't believe it can". But this attitude belies a limitation of vision, not science. I believe in materialism for what I consider to be a sound reason. Science has a long history, thousands of years, of explaining (at least describing) more and more of our perceived reality. Of course there remain many things yet to be understood, but I think it is more reasonable to assume that the long trend will continue than to assume it will suddenly end. This is a version of Occam's razor, that given two alternatives I choose the simpler one, simpler in that for the progress of science to end, something must intervene to end it. And postulating this new "something" which will end it seems arbitrary to me. I want to emphasize that I fully accept the possibilities offered by other philosophies and yearn to learn from those who hold them.
The Dalai Lama (in his book "The Universe In A Single Atom", which I am thoroughly enjoying) states that demonstrated claims of science must always supercede conflicting Buddhist claims. He is also wise enough to include a critical qualifier in his statement that "There is more to human existence and to reality itself than current science can ever give us access to." "Current" science leaves the door open to a future science which might indeed give us access to such subtle ideas. Of course, even he can slip all too easily into the comforting omission of that critical qualifier as when he states "...many questions that pertain to our human existence, such as ethics, aesthetics, and spirituality, remain outside the domain of science." By omitting the word "current", the reader is very likely to assume he meant "forever" outside, further assuming that science is inherently incapable of addressing such questions. Including the word "current" would have made clear the point that he was only judging the present abilities of science. Of course, if he *did* mean that science was inherently incapable, I would want to know the basis of his presumed knowledge of the future abilities of science.
Though I see no inherent limits on materialism, I also place no limits on spiritualism or any other beliefs. I simply see them (currently) as both unnecessary and more complicated than materialism. My purpose here might best be summarized by saying that I am not as convinced that materialism *is* right, as I am that it *might be* right. Some believe the implicit simplicity of materialism means its proponents cannot appreciate the majesty of the universe and must therefore feel impoverished in some fashion. I assure you this is not so--that we can be as deeply moved as the most devout spiritualist by William Blake's words:
"To see a world in a grain of sand, And a heaven in a wildflower, Hold infinity in the palm of your hand, And eternity in an hour."
Thanks for your attention, Earl/Ari ------- End of forwarded message -------
Thanks Piet, it is always a delight to converse with you.
I agree that materialism can be sidestepped by phenomenology and only
wish the phenomenologists would bear that in mind and not make any
comments about or references to science. It is all to easy to forget
and step back into (or onto) science. :)
I find your PaB book to be fascinating and can't wait to see it in
finished form. I do have some responses to your presumed signs that
current science is bursting at the seams.
1) "The very fact that the action of proving theorems has entered the
vocabulary of logic implies that we can no longer isolate the object
pole of experience, while excluding the subject and its actions on
objects."
I must admit that I do not see this implication, probably due to my
limited powers of deduction, and if I cannot then perhaps others will
miss it as well. Would you be able to explain it more clearly so
layman could see the implication and not be required to simply accept
your statement on your authority?
2) "In physics, in quantum mechanics, an exclusive study of objects
turned out to be equally impossible. Any description of an object
requires a description of how the object is measured."
I would advise caution when using the word "impossible" for there may
be others like me who assume you mean it literally. At any rate, there
is a quite viable theory which explains objects as independent
entities. Note, it does not have to be correct to refute your use of
"impossible", merely possible, not to mention plausible.
http://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/BohmHome/weingold.htm "Bohmian mechanics...describes a deterministic motion of point
particles ... from which emerges the entire quantum formalism. This
theory completely avoids all the quantum paradoxes, all the mysticism
of Bohr and Heisenberg, and replaces it with sharp mathematics."
3) "Excluding the latter would reduce brain science to studying wiring
diagrams, ignoring consciousness."
Again, I miss the reason for assuming that reducing brain science to
studying wiring diagrams would imply ignoring consciousness. One
reason I miss it is that many scientists believe that is precisely the
correct approach to explain consciousness. Please again note, this
theory does not have to be correct, only possible, in order to refute
your deduction.
From http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1580394-1,00.html "...neuroscientists agree...our thoughts, sensations, joys and aches
consist entirely of physiological activity in the tissues of the
brain. Consciousness does not reside in an ethereal soul that uses the
brain like a PDA; consciousness is the activity of the brain."
4) "In engineering, in robotics, we have no trouble building exquisite
hardware, but we still have great trouble writing the software that
guides robots to accomplish even the most mundane tasks."
Great strides have been made recently in addressing the problem of how
to program autonomous behavior, one promising approach being to
eliminate the need for programming altogether. Given this established
trend, I believe it is justifiable to assume the trend will continue
and the problem solved.
http://tnewton.solarbotics.net/robot1.html "This is an ongoing project to explore simple learning algorithms by
incorporating them into a small toy "Spider" robot. Although not
specifically programmed to do anything, it learns through experience
to make moves and seek conditions that satisfy pre-programmed
conditions. In other words, I don't tell it HOW to avoid obstacles in
its path, all I tell it is that objects in its path are not desirable.
It has to discover the proper solutions through trial and error then
remember the correct responses."
With regard to your glimpse into the future, you state
"What a "class" or a even a "room" may look like is of course
impossible to know, but let us not worry about such details. The main
question is: when we open a text book (in whatever form) what will we
find about the history of science? We have no way of knowing, but it
is instructive to consider a couple scenarios."
I agree with you that we have no way of knowing and wonder what is
instructive about dreaming up two stories, out of an infinite number
of possible ones? What about a third history which ends at 2050 with
the advent of the singularity and which relates that an advanced AI
has answered all questions about the universe in materialistic terms?
Thanks again for being so patient with me,
Earl/Ari
As for 1), before the 20th century, the proof of a theorem could be considered by itself, as a kind of object. There was no need to think about the subject, the one proving the theorem, nor the act of proving. Simply put: if a theorem was true, it could be proven.
oHwever, after Goedel, we now know that the a theorem can be true, and yet it may not be provable. So we cannot reduce the triple nature of experience, the subject-interaction-object form to the object, stripping off subject and interaction. There is more to experience than what can be distilled into only the object.
As for 2), I'd rather not get into the details of various quantum theory interpretations. It is clear that the classical picture of objects breaks down, but how it exactly breaks down can be argued about in great detail, I agree.
As for 3), the very fact that a first-person experience is different from the third-person description of the electrical and chemical changes means that the first-person experience cannot be reduced to the third-person description. To say that complex circuits somehow let consciousness "emerge" doesn't explain anything, and doesn't solve the big question of why information processing would somehow "generate" consciousness. Of course, many scientists like to believe they can wave a magic wand and delcare it to be so, but I beg to differ :-).
As for 4), we'll see. Robotics is still a young science.
And sure, scenarios don't prove anything, but they can make people reconsider their beliefs, suggesting new possibilities. The only way to find out which one will be right is to wait and see :).
Cheers,
Piet/Pema
------- Start of forwarded message ------- From: Ari <eki...@gmail.com> Date: Sat, 4 Apr 2009 06:25:42 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: Question For Piet To: Kira Phenomenology Workshop <kira-phenomenology-workshop@googlegroups.com>
Thanks Piet, it is always a delight to converse with you.
I agree that materialism can be sidestepped by phenomenology and only wish the phenomenologists would bear that in mind and not make any comments about or references to science. It is all to easy to forget and step back into (or onto) science. :)
I find your PaB book to be fascinating and can't wait to see it in finished form. I do have some responses to your presumed signs that current science is bursting at the seams.
1) "The very fact that the action of proving theorems has entered the vocabulary of logic implies that we can no longer isolate the object pole of experience, while excluding the subject and its actions on objects."
I must admit that I do not see this implication, probably due to my limited powers of deduction, and if I cannot then perhaps others will miss it as well. Would you be able to explain it more clearly so layman could see the implication and not be required to simply accept your statement on your authority?
2) "In physics, in quantum mechanics, an exclusive study of objects turned out to be equally impossible. Any description of an object requires a description of how the object is measured."
I would advise caution when using the word "impossible" for there may be others like me who assume you mean it literally. At any rate, there is a quite viable theory which explains objects as independent entities. Note, it does not have to be correct to refute your use of "impossible", merely possible, not to mention plausible.
http://www.mathematik.uni-muenchen.de/~bohmmech/BohmHome/weingold.htm "Bohmian mechanics...describes a deterministic motion of point particles ... from which emerges the entire quantum formalism. This theory completely avoids all the quantum paradoxes, all the mysticism of Bohr and Heisenberg, and replaces it with sharp mathematics."
3) "Excluding the latter would reduce brain science to studying wiring diagrams, ignoring consciousness."
Again, I miss the reason for assuming that reducing brain science to studying wiring diagrams would imply ignoring consciousness. One reason I miss it is that many scientists believe that is precisely the correct approach to explain consciousness. Please again note, this theory does not have to be correct, only possible, in order to refute your deduction.
"...neuroscientists agree...our thoughts, sensations, joys and aches consist entirely of physiological activity in the tissues of the brain. Consciousness does not reside in an ethereal soul that uses the brain like a PDA; consciousness is the activity of the brain."
4) "In engineering, in robotics, we have no trouble building exquisite hardware, but we still have great trouble writing the software that guides robots to accomplish even the most mundane tasks."
Great strides have been made recently in addressing the problem of how to program autonomous behavior, one promising approach being to eliminate the need for programming altogether. Given this established trend, I believe it is justifiable to assume the trend will continue and the problem solved.
http://tnewton.solarbotics.net/robot1.html "This is an ongoing project to explore simple learning algorithms by incorporating them into a small toy "Spider" robot. Although not specifically programmed to do anything, it learns through experience to make moves and seek conditions that satisfy pre-programmed conditions. In other words, I don't tell it HOW to avoid obstacles in its path, all I tell it is that objects in its path are not desirable. It has to discover the proper solutions through trial and error then remember the correct responses."
With regard to your glimpse into the future, you state
"What a "class" or a even a "room" may look like is of course impossible to know, but let us not worry about such details. The main question is: when we open a text book (in whatever form) what will we find about the history of science? We have no way of knowing, but it is instructive to consider a couple scenarios."
I agree with you that we have no way of knowing and wonder what is instructive about dreaming up two stories, out of an infinite number of possible ones? What about a third history which ends at 2050 with the advent of the singularity and which relates that an advanced AI has answered all questions about the universe in materialistic terms?
Thanks again for being so patient with me, Earl/Ari ------- End of forwarded message -------
Thanks for another wonderful reply Piet. It is such a pleasure to
discuss things with such an open and eager mind.
I will grant your point about the inability to prove some theorems,
since I believe that *nothing* can be proved, only shown to be more or
less likely.
I also agree with you about not getting into the details of QM, since
I know I couldn't follow them. However, the main point of the Bohm
theory is that one does *not* have to give up the classical (if by
this you mean deterministic or materialistic) picture of objects. All
the "spooky" and non-intuitive behavior which QM explains is also
explained by Bohmian theory, and without invoking an uncertainty
principle or relinquishing classical determinism. Again, the Bohmian
theory does not have to be correct, only a plausible alternative to
QM. For then the QM adherents are obliged to explain why they choose
both a more complicated theory, and one which requires embracing so
many non-intuitive aspects. The usual answer of "it fits the
experimental data" just does not work, for so does the Bohmian theory.
Taking a cue from your response to robotics, I will expand it to
include consciousness as well. We'll see, they are both young
sciences. :)
Your final point is the most pertinent. I am constantly reconsidering
my beliefs and agree with you that everyone else should too. And
whatever can help stimulate them to do so is a good thing. What a nice
note to conclude on. Some might think that a long journey which ends
where it began was a waste of steps. But I say if the journey itself
was enjoyable, then much has been gained. Thanks for a most
pleasurable journey.
