The Swiss & Guns - Proven Success!
J. Kendrick McPeters
thinks crack whores should have as much right to cast a vote as a
veteran like himself. Note that I use the Swiss system as a model,
but do not propose to replicate all the details; in particular, there
would be no conscription under my system.
Incidentally, the militia tradition is so ingrained in the Swiss, that
they'd probably enjoy 75% participation, even without the use of
conscription. In the United States, we could be fabulously well
defended if only a fourth of the population joined up--- that would
give us over 50 million well trained militiamen to guard our liberty.
Who would want to fight a nation so well armed--- especially
considering that it would be backed up with a nuclear triad? The
question practically answers itself. Nobody would mess with Fortress
America... of that you could be quite certain!
---Kendrick
----------------------------------------------------------------
The Swiss & Guns - Proven Success!
By David B. Kopel and Stephen D'Andrilli
(American Rifleman, February 1990)*
"What America can learn from Switzerland is that the best way to
reduce gun misuse is to promote responsible gun ownership."
In the right to bear arms debate, pro-gun Americans point to
Switzerland, where almost every adult male is legally required to
possess a gun. One of the few nations with a higher per capita rate of
gun ownership than the United States, Switzerland has virtually
no gun crime. Therefore, argue the pro-gunners, America doesn't need
gun control.
Yet Handgun Control, Inc. (HCI), in its brochure "Handgun Facts,"
points to Switzerland as one of the advanced nations with strict
handgun laws." The brochure states that all guns are registered, and
handgun purchases require a background check and a permit.
Gun crime in Switzerland is virtually non-existent. Therefore,
concludes Handgun Control, America needs strict gun control.
Who's right? As usual, Handgun Control is wrong, but that doesn't
necessarily make the pro-gun side right. Gun ownership in Switzerland
defies the simple categories of the American gun debate. Like America,
Switzerland won its independence in a revolutionary war fought by an
armed citizenry. In 1291, several cantons (states) began a war of
national liberation against Austria's Hapsburg Empire. In legend, the
revolution was precipitated by William Tell, although there is no
definitive proof of his existence.
Over the next century, the Swiss militia liberated most Switzerland
from the Austrians. The ordinary citizens who composed the militia
used the deadliest assault weapons the time, swords and bows. Crucial
to the Swiss victory was the motivation of the free Swiss troops. From
the very first years of Swiss independence, the Swiss were commanded
to keep and bear arms. After 1515. Switzerland adopted a policy of
armed neutrality. For the next four centuries, the great empires of
Europe rose and fell, swallowing many weaker countries.
Russia and France both invaded, and the Hapsburgs and later the
Austro-Hungarian Empire remained special threats. But Switzerland
almost always retained its independence. The Swiss policy was
Prévention de la guerre par la volonté de se défendre. During World
War I, both France and Germany considered invading Switzerland to
attack each other's flank. In World War II, Hitler wanted the Swiss
gold reserves and needed free communications and transit through
Switzerland to supply Axis forces in the Mediterranean. But when
military planners looked at Switzerland's well-armed citizenry,
mountainous terrain, and civil defense fortifications, Switzerland
lost its appeal as an invasion target. While two World Wars raged,
Switzerland enjoyed a secure peace.
At home, the "Swiss Confederation" developed only a weak central
government, leaving most authority in the hands of the cantons or
lower levels of government. The tradition of local autonomy helped
keep Switzerland from experiencing the bitter civil wars between
Catholics and Protestants that devastated Germany, France and England.
In 1847-48, liberals throughout Europe revolted against aristocratic
rule. Only in Switzerland did they succeed, taking control of the
whole nation following a brief conflict called the Sonderbrund War.
(Total casualties were only 128.)
Civil rights were firmly guaranteed, and all vestiges of feudalism
were abolished. Despite the hopes of German reformers, the Swiss did
not send their people's army into Germany in 1848 to assist popular
revolution there. When the German revolution failed, autocratic
Prussia considered invading Switzerland, but decided the task was
impossible. As one historian summarizes: "Switzerland was created in
battle, reached its present dimensions by conquest and defended its
existence by armed neutrality thereafter." The experience of Swiss
history has made national independence and power virtually synonymous
with an armed citizenry.
Today, military service for Swiss males is universal. At about age 20,
every Swiss male goes through 118 consecutive days of recruit training
in the Rekrutenschule. This training may be a young man's first
encounter with his countrymen who speak different languages.
(Switzerland has four official languages: German, French, Italian and
Romansch.) Even before required training begins, young men and women
may take optional courses with the Swiss army's M57 assault rifle.
They keep that gun at home for three months and receive six half-day
training sessions.
From age 21 to 32, a Swiss man serves as a "front-line" troop in the
Auszug, and devotes three weeks a year (in eight of the 12 years) to
continued training. From age 33 to 42, he serves in the Landwehr (like
America's National Guard); every few years, he reports for two-week
training periods. Finally, from ages 43, to 50, he serves in the
Landsturm; in this period, he only spends 13 days total in "home guard
courses." Over a soldier's career he also spends scattered days on
mandatory equipment inspections and required target practice.
Thus, in a 30-year mandatory military career, a Swiss man only spends
about one year in direct military service. Following discharge from
the regular army, men serve on reserve status until age 50 (55 for
officers). By the Federal Constitution of 1874, military servicemen
are given their first equipment, clothing and arms. After the first
training period, conscripts must keep gun, ammunition and equipment an
ihrem Wohnert ("in their homes") until the end of their term of
service. Today, enlisted men are issued M57 automatic assault rifles
and officers are given pistol. Each reservist is issued 24 rounds
of ammunition in sealed packs for emergency use. (Contrary to Handgun
Control's claim that "all ammunition must be accounted for," the
emergency ammunition is the only ammo that requires accounting.)
After discharge from service, the man is given a bolt rifle free from
registration or obligation. Starting in 1994, the government will give
ex-reservists assault rifles. Officers carry pistols rather than
rifles and are given their pistols at the end of their service. When
the government adopts a new infantry rifle, it sells the old ones to
the public. Reservists are encouraged to buy military ammunition (7.5
and 5.6mm -5.56 mm in other countries-for rifles and 9 and 7.65 mm
Luger for pistols, which is sold at cost by the government, for target
practice.
Non-military ammunition for long-gun hunting and. 22 Long Rifle (LR)
ammo are not subsidized, but are subject to no sales controls.
Non-military non-hunting ammunition more powerful than .22 LR (such as
..38 Spl.) is registered at the time of sale. Swiss military ammo must
be registered if bought at a private store, but need not be registered
if bought at a range. The nation's 3,000 shooting ranges sell the
overwhelming majority of ammunition. Technically, ammunition bought at
the range must be used at the range, but the rule is barely known and
almost never obeyed.
The army sells a variety of machine guns, submachine guns, anti-tank
weapons, anti-aircraft guns, howitzers and cannons. Purchasers of
these weapons require an easily obtained cantonal license, and the
weapons are registered. In a nation of six million people, there are
at least two million guns, including 600,000 fully automatic assault
rifles, half a million pistols, and numerous machine guns. Virtually
every home has a gun. Besides subsidized military surplus, the Swiss
can buy other firearms easily too.
While long guns require no special purchase procedures, handguns are
sold only to those with a Waffenerwerbsschien (purchase certificate)
issued by a cantonal authority. A certificate is issued to every
applicant over 18 who is not a criminal or mentally infirm. There are
no restrictions on the carrying of long guns. About half the cantons
have strict permit procedures for carrying handguns, and the other
half have no rules at all.
There is no discernible difference in the crime rate between the
cantons as a result of the different policies. Thanks to a lawsuit
brought by the Swiss gun lobby, semi-automatic rifles require no
purchase permit and are not registered by the government. Thus, the
only long guns registered by the government are full automatics.
(Three cantons do require collectors of more than 10 guns to
register.) Gun sales from one individual to another are regulated in
five cantons and completely uncontrolled in all the rest. Retail
gun dealers do keep records of over-the-counter gun transactions; but
transactions are not reported to or collected by the government.
(This is also the policy in the U.S. during those periods the Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms feels like obeying the law.) In
Switzerland, purchases from dealers of hunting long guns and of small
bore rifles are not even recorded by the dealer. In other words, the
dealer would not record the sale of a .30-06 hunting rifle, but would
record the sale of a .30-06 Garand. Thus, Handgun Control's assertion
that all Swiss guns are registered is just plain wrong, and its claim
that "Switzerland and Israel strictly control handgun availability" is
more than a little inaccurate. Anybody, including this author, can
make mistakes about the complexities about foreign gun laws.
Nevertheless, even the most careless authors ought to do better than
Handgun Control's brochure "Handgun Facts," in which almost every
"fact" about Switzerland is wrong.
But Handgun Control's misstatements are no worse than those contained
in a highly biased Library of Congress book Gun Control Laws in
Foreign Countries (which tax dollars paid for). That book claims that
in Switzerland "the policy is not to provide automatic guns and other
dangerous weapons to the general population" -an utter untruth, at
least if one considers adults to be part of "the general population."
The book also asserts that "the sale of handguns to individuals is
restricted and reflects a clear Swiss government policy of keeping
this strict control." Yet the only individuals who are "restricted"
from buying handguns are children, the insane and ex-criminals. If
ever a nation had "a well-regulated militia," it is Switzerland.
Nineteenth-century economist Adam Smith thought Switzerland the only
place where the whole body of the people had successfully been drilled
in militia skills. Indeed, the militia is virtually synonymous with
the nation. "The Swiss do not have an army, they are the army, says
one government publication. Fully deployed, the Swiss army has 15.2
men per square kilometre; in contrast, the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. have
only .2 soldiers per square kilometre.
Switzerland is 76 times denser with soldiers than either superpower.
Indeed, only Israel has more army per square kilometre. Switzerland is
also the only Western nation to provide shelters fully stocked with
food and enough supplies to last a year for all its citizens in case
of war. The banks and supermarkets subsidize much of the stockpiling.
The banks also have plans to move their gold into the mountainous
center of Switzerland in case of invasion. The nation is ready to
mobilize on a moment's notice. Said one Swiss citizen-soldier, "If we
start in the morning, we would be mobilized by late afternoon. That is
why the gun is at home, the ammunition is at home. The younger
people all have automatic rifles. They are ready to fight."
Citizen-soldiers on their way to mobilization points may flag down and
commandeer passing automobiles. Since 1291, when the landsgemeinden
(people's assemblies) formed circles in the village squares, and only
men carrying swords could vote, weapons have been the mark of
citizenship. As a Military Department spokesman said, "It is an old
Swiss tradition that only an armed man can have political rights."
This policy is based on the understanding that only those who bear the
burden of keeping Switzerland free are entitled to fully enjoy the
benefits of freedom.
In 1977, the Münchenstein Initiative proposed allowing citizens to
choose social or hospital work over military duty. It was rejected at
the polls, and in both houses of parliament (the Bundesversarn-
imlung's Nationalrat and Ständerat). There are provisions for
conscientious objectors, but this group only numbers .2% of
conscripts. In 1978, Switzerland refused to ratify a Council of Europe
Convention on Control of Firearms. Since then, Switzerland has been
pressured by other European governments, which charge that it is a
source for terrorist weapons. As a result, in 1982 the central
government proposed a law barring foreigners in Switzerland from
buying guns they could not buy in their own countries and also
requiring that Swiss citizens obtain a license to buy any gun, rather
than just handguns.
Outraged Swiss gun owners formed a group called "Pro Tell," named
after national hero William Tell. In 1983, the Federal Council (the
executive cabinet) abandoned the restrictive proposal because "the
opposition was too heavy" and suggested that the cantons regulate the
matter. A few months earlier, the Cantonal Council of Freiburg had
already enacted such a law by a one-vote margin. A popular referendum
overturned the law the next year, by a 60%-40% vote. Whatever the
effect of Swiss guns abroad, they are not even a trivial crime problem
domestically. Despite all the guns, the murder rate is a small
fraction of the American rate, and is less than the rate in Canada or
England, which strictly control guns, or in Japan, which virtually
prohibits them. The gun crime rate is so low that statistics are not
even kept.
The suicide rate, though, is almost double the American rate. Guns are
used in about one-fifth of all Swiss suicides compared to three-fifths
of American and one-third of Canadian suicides. It is not
Switzerland's cultural makeup, or its gun policies per se, that
explain that low crime rate. Rather, it is the emphasis on community
duty, of which gun ownership is the most important part, that best
explains low crime rate. In Cities With Little Crime, author Marshall
Clinard contrasts the low crime rate in Switzerland with the higher
rate in Sweden, where gun control is more extensive. The higher
Swedish rate is all the more surprising in view of Sweden's much lower
population density and its ethnic homogeneity.
One of the reasons for the low crime rate, says Clinard, is that Swiss
cities grew relatively slowly. Most families live for generations in
the same area. Therefore, large, heterogeneous cities with slum
cultures never developed. Proud to have the weakest central government
in the West, Switzerland is governed mainly by its 3,095
Einwohrnergemeinde (communes, sub-states of a canton). Several cantons
still make their laws by the traditional Landsgemeinden system,
whereby all eligible voters assemble in annual outdoor meetings.
Unlike the rest of Europe, the police force is decentralized. Judges
and jurors are popularly elected.
With less mobility, and more deeply developed community ties, there is
less crime. Most democratic nations impose long prison terms more
frequently than does America, but Switzerland does not. For all crimes
except murder, the Swiss rarely inflict a prison term of more than a
year. Most serious offenders receive suspended sentences. As in
Japan, the focus of the criminal justice system is on the
reintegration of the offender into the community, rather than
punishment.
As for the non-criminal Swiss, the saying is that everyone is his own
policeman. Foreign visitors are surprised to see Swiss pedestrians
always waiting at traffic lights, even when there is no traffic. The
mass transit systems successfully depend on voluntary payment.
Clinard infers that strong central governments weaken citizen
initiative and individual responsibility. He concludes: Communities or
cities that wish to prevent crime should encourage greater political
decentralization by developing small government units and
encouraging citizen responsibility for obedience to the law and crime
control."
In Nations Not Obsessed With Crime, Freda Adler comes to many of the
same conclusions as Clinard. She, too, emphasizes the communal system
of government-in which all laws are enacted by popular vote-and the
stability of residential patterns. Most Swiss still live in
traditional patriarchal families. In fact, Switzerland has the lowest
percentage of working mothers of any European country. While America
was debating the Equal Rights Amendment, Switzerland was wondering
whether women should be allowed to vote. (The long delay in female
suffrage may have something to do with the equation of civil rights
and militia service.)
'Schools are strict, and teenagers have less freedom than in most of
the rest of Europe. Studies shows that Swiss teenagers, unlike
teenagers in other countries, feel closer to their parents than to
their fellow teenagers. Communications between the generations
are open. Among the factors contributing to the inter-generational
harmony is military service, which provides an opportunity for all
groups of males to interact. Adults and youth share many sports, such
as skiing and swimming. Target shooting is another important shared
pastime, with community awards and team trophies often displayed in
restaurants and taverns.
At the annual Feldschiessen weekend, more than 200,000 Swiss attend
national marksmanship competitions. In the home, writes John McPhee,
"while a father cleans his rifle at the kitchen table his son is
watching, and 'the boy gets close to the weapon' " Marshall Clinard
explains that because army weapons must be kept in the home much
activity associated with the proper care of weapons, target practice,
or conversations about military activities become common in the
family. All of this, together with the other varied activities carried
out in Switzerland across age lines, has served to inhibit the age
separation, alienation, and growth of a separate youth culture that
has increasingly become characteristic of the United States, Sweden,
and many other highly developed countries.
Although these factors represent only one aspect of a total Swiss way
of life, they play no small part in the low crime rate and the crime
trend." Close analysis of Swiss gun laws also shows how silly it is
for Handgun Control to point to Switzerland as a model. If-as Handgun
Control claims - Switzerland's lenient licensing system is the reason
Switzerland has so little handgun crime, then Handgun Control ought to
commit itself to reform of several American laws. First of all,
Handgun Control should oppose the gun prohibition laws in Washington,
D.C., and other cities-since Switzerland proves that lenient licensing
is all that is needed to stop gun crime.
Second, Handgun Control should work to repeal laws which prohibit
Americans from owning howitzers, anti-aircraft guns, and other
military weapons. Switzerland allows ownership of these weapons by
anyone who can meet the simple requirements for a handgun license. And
thanks to the "howitzer licensing" system there is no howitzer crime
in Switzerland. Since Swiss-style handgun licensing is the main reason
Switzerland has no handgun crime (claims Handgun Control), a
Swiss-style system of howitzer licensing would also be a good idea for
America. Lastly, Handgun Control should reverse its policy, and work
for repeal of America's ban on the possession of machine guns
manufactured after 1986.
Handgun Control should push America to adopt the Swiss policy: having
the government sell machine guns at discount prices to anyone with an
easily obtained permit. It is not likely, though, that Handgun Control
will follow the logic of its advertising, and work to let Americans
own licensed machine guns and howitzers. But until Handgun Control
does so, it should stop talking about what a good handgun licensing
system Switzerland has.
If Handgun Control should stop its rhetoric about Switzerland, what
should pro-gun Americans do? They can talk about Switzerland, but they
cannot expect to win the American gun argument with the Swiss example.
Analysis of Switzerland does demolish the simplistic notion "more
guns, more gun crime." More important than the number of guns is their
cultural context. In Switzerland, guns are an important element of a
cohesive social structure that keeps crime low. While Switzerland is
clear proof that guns are not in themselves "daemons" (as one Denver
priest recently claimed), Switzerland does not by itself prove the
case against gun control in America. Indeed, author Clinard argues
that strict gun controls are necessary in the U.S. Clinard's argument
cannot be dismissed out of hand. After all, few readers of this
magazine would want America to adopt the lenient criminal sentencing
practices of Switzerland.
Opponents of lenient sentencing would argue, correctly, that America
does not have the stable, integrated community structures of
Switzerland. Thus, the American government must take a more coercive,
authoritarian role in controlling prisoners, to make up for the lack
of community controls. The same point might be made about guns.
Although guns are more available to the Swiss, Swiss gun culture is
more authoritarian than America's. Gun ownership is a mandatory
community duty, not a matter of individual free choice.
In Switzerland, defense of the nation is not a job for professional
soldiers or for people who join the army to learn technical skills for
civilian jobs. Defense of the nation is the responsibility of every
male citizen. Thus, American gun owners must win the gun control
argument based on conditions in America, not conditions in
Switzerland. The implicit argument of Clinard (and of most American
gun controllers) is that while the Swiss may be responsible enough to
own even the deadliest guns, Americans are not.
Before rejecting this argument, American gun owners might wonder if an
unmanned American mass transit system could count on payment by the
honor code. Further, America obviously has a large criminal class of
gun abusers, and Switzerland does not. If strict gun control could
actually disarm that criminal element in America, there might be an
argument for gun control. But as Josh Sugarmann, former communications
director for the National Coalition to Ban Handguns (NCBH), wrote in
The Washington Monthly: "Handgun controls do little to stop criminals
from obtaining handguns."
Sugarmann and NCBH favor gun control not to disarm criminals, but
because they believe that non-criminal Americans cannot be trusted
with handguns. The coalition's political affairs director, Eric
Ellman, has said that "the majority of gun owners are not
responsible." Yet a look at the facts shows that more than 99% of
American citizens who are not professional felons are just as suited
for gun ownership as any Swiss militia man. Ordinary American citizens
use guns competently.
Every 48 seconds ,someone uses a handgun to defend himself against a
crime (according to Florida State University's Gary Kleck, using data
collected by liberal pollster Peter Hart in a poll paid for by the
anti-gun lobby). Regular American citizens do not shoot each other in
moments of passion; the vast majority of such shootings are
perpetrated by thugs with a record of violence and substance abuse.
And contrary to the claims of the anti-gun lobby, Americans are not so
careless that they cannot be trusted with potentially dangerous
objects like guns. Gun accidents account for less than 2% of the
nation's 92,000 accidental deaths annually.
Suicides have little to do with gun availability. Japan has no guns,
while Switzerland is deluged with every gun in the book, and both
nations have the same suicide rate. Ofcourse the more that U.S.
governments can do to make gun use in America even more
responsible, the better. Switzerland shows how successful governments
can be in promoting responsible gun use. Elementary schools in America
should have gun safety classes which teach children never to touch a
gun unless a parent is present, and they should be taught to tell an
adult if they see an unattended gun.
The NRA actively promotes this idea, and the National Association of
Chiefs of Police endorses it. But Handgun Control opposes this
reasonable, sensible safety measure. Has HCI gone off the deep end?
High schools and colleges wishing to offer target shooting as a sport
should be allowed to do so. Unlike football or swimming, scholastic
target shooting has never resulted in a fatality.
The anti-gun groups oppose the sensible step of allowing the schools
to offer students the safest sport ever invented. Have they gone off
the deep end'? Finally, local governments should enact reasonable
zoning laws, which allow the construction of indoor shooting ranges
(properly ventilated and sound insulated) in urban areas. In some
cases, governments should subsidize the building of ranges. At target
ranges, Americans can take lessons in gun responsibility, and practice
safe gun handling skills. As you might expect, the anti-gunners oppose
this simple safety measure, too. They've gone off the deep end. What
have we learned from Switzerland' ?
Guns in themselves are not a cause of gun crime; if they were,
everyone in Switzerland would long ago have been shot in a domestic
quarrel. Cultural conditions, not gun laws, are the most important
factors in a nation's crime rate. Young adults in Washington,D.C., are
subject to strict gun control, but no social control, and they commit
a staggering amount of armed crime. Young adults in Zurich are subject
to minimal gun control, but strict social control, and they commit
almost no crime. America-with its traditions of individual
liberty-cannot import Switzerland's culture of social control.
Teenagers, women, and almost everyone else have more freedom in
America than in Switzerland.
What America can learn from Switzerland is that the best way to reduce
gun misuse is to promote responsible gun ownership. While America
cannot adopt the Swiss model, America can foster responsible gun
ownership along more individualistic, American lines. Firearms safety
classes in elementary schools, optional marksmanship classes in high
schools and colleges, and the widespread availability of adult safety
training at licensed shooting ranges are some of the ways that America
can make its tradition of responsible gun use even stronger.
Copyright © 1999, Gun Owners Alliance * * * * * (GOA-Texas).
Republication permitted provided this article & attribution is left
intact in its original state.* * * * * The views contained herein do
not necessarily reflect the views of any other individual or
organization.
Jim Austin
> NOTE: I'm posting this primarily for the benefit of Jim Austin,
Thanks loads.
> ...who thinks crack whores should have as much right to cast a vote as
> a veteran like himself.
Considering that prostitution and drug dealing would be perfectly
legal in a libertaian society, I find it interesting that McPeters
would invoke such activities here.
Anyway, I argued against restricted sufferage because of the hazzards
to the rights of the disfranchised. That argument remains uncontested.
> Note that I use the Swiss system as a model, but do not propose to
> replicate all the details; in particular, there would be no
> conscription under my system.
Wonderful.
> Incidentally, the militia tradition is so ingrained in the Swiss,
> that they'd probably enjoy 75% participation, even without the use
> of conscription. In the United States, we could be fabulously well
> defended if only a fourth of the population joined up--- that would
> give us over 50 million well trained militiamen to guard our liberty.
I think 75 percent might be a bit overly optimistic, particularly
since the militia tradition is not all that ingrained here. Currently,
all the National Guard units comprise about four divisions, give or
take.
> Who would want to fight a nation so well armed--- especially
> considering that it would be backed up with a nuclear triad? The
> question practically answers itself. Nobody would mess with Fortress
> America... of that you could be quite certain!
I'm not certain at all.
The articles posted by McPeters here and elsewhere refers to the
stoutness, determination and resolve of the Swiss in defending their
country in case of attack, that such determination and resolve entered
into the calculations of Hitler and others in deciding not to attack
Switzerland -- that plus the Swiss terrain.
I suspect, of course, that Swiss bank accounts held by numerous high
ranking Nazi officials who by certain accounts knew as early as 1941
that they could not win the war, might also have contributed to the
decision not to attack.
In any event, those who advocate the Swiss model for American policy
do so precisely because they lack the stoutness, determination and
resolve of the Swiss.
During the Cold War, American policies of forward defenses, alliances
and occasional intervention involved tensions, stresses and risks.
Those who grew weary of such tensions, stresses and risks imagined
all sorts of ways to relieve such tensions, stresses and risks.
Pacifists and liberals sought relief through appeasement and
unilateral disarmament. Ultimately, such policies lead to more
tensions, stresses and risks.
Similarly, libertarians sought relief by chucking the rest of the
world and retreating behind some kind of fortress America. In the
context of the Cold War, that meant ceding the rest of the world to
the communist countries.
The problem with that sort of retreat is that communist countries,
with the population and resources of the rest of the world at their
disposal, could easily amass sufficient troop, meaning regulars,
that could easily overwhelm the 50 million weekend warriors in
McPeters mighty militia.
In terms of nukes, American would need enough to obliterate the
rest of the planet even to approach an adequate nuclear deterrent.
Even then, Soviets would be able to amass intermediate range
ballistic missiles close enough to America to strike without
warning.
The Swiss adopted its policy of armed neutrality because, short of
surrender, it had no other option.
America gravitated toward an activist foreign and military policy
precisely because it was the most economical in terms of resources
as well as the risks, stress and tensions involved. Those who lacked
the resolve and determination necessary for an activist policy would
definitely lack the considerably greater resolve and determination
required for a fortress America policy.
I'm glad that America did not adopt a fortress America policy
during the Cold War. I don't think we should do so now.
Jim Austin
<Snip> Posted article.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Tym Parsons
in this era of nuclear armaments and economic globalisation. Swiss
"neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly UNprincipled, cowardly sellout
to the Nazis. I already took Tim Starr to task on this some time ago.
To paraphrase Goldwater, "neutrality" in the defense of freedom is no
virtue.
I also find it interesting that one of the articles that the poster
cites wants to laud Swiss "heroism" against the Nazis, yet dismisses
without explanation evidence from the _New York Times_ about Swiss
collusion with same.
Tym Parsons
Ernest Brown
On 7 Nov 2000, Tym Parsons wrote:
> Date: 7 Nov 2000 01:10:34 GMT
> From: Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com>
> Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> Subject: Re: The Swiss & Guns - Proven Success!
Since Mr. Starr has better things to do than waste unrecoverable time on
this statist suckling pig, here's an encore presentation from a few months
ago...
Subject: Re: Compromise and Empire
Date: 03/14/2000
Author: [16]Tim Starr <[17]tims...@my-deja.com>
<< [18]previous in thread · [19]next in thread >>
In article <8ak3v7$opr$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>The "Swiss militia" model is quaintly,laughably unrealistic;
>Swiss "neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly UNprincipled, cowardly
>sellout to the Nazis. I already took Tim Starr to task on this some
>time ago.
Yah, you got your ass kicked, too, as usual. Churchill, Walter
Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for their role in WWII. The
Nazis' own estimates of what
it would take to conquer Switzerland were so high that they kept deferri
ng the invasion of
Switzerland until after they'd conquered other "softer" or higher-priori
ty targets.
Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
Your argument was that it was wrong for the Swiss not to declare war on
Germany without Germany first
declaring war on Switzerland. But only a few countries in the world did
that: Britain, Canada,
France, & maybe Australia (I can't quite recall). Canada & Australia we
re British puppets at that
time. Britain only declared war because of a foolish & impossible-to-ke
ep promise made by
Chamberlain to guarantee Polish territory against German invasion (but n
ot Soviet invasion), & France
followed Britain's lead.
Since you seem to think France was the epitomy of honor in WWII, it's wo
rth pointing out that the
Swiss did have an agreement for joint defense against Nazi Germany in ca
se Germany tried an end-run
around the Maginot Line in the east, through Switzerland. So, before th
e fall of France, the Swiss
had a military alliance with the neighboring power most capable of helpi
ng it defend itself against
its most likely invader.
After the fall of France, Switzerland would've been suicidally stupid to
THEN declare war on Germany,
after the combination of Britain, France, & Belgium had failed to stop t
he German invasion of France.
That could've provoked an immediate German invasion of Switzerland, when
they weren't fully-prepared
to resist.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
Wisdom's Children: A Virtual Journal of Philosophy & Literature
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/wisdom.htm
Submissions welcomed.
Tym Parsons
doesn't show up on the original thread when I do a search on it now,
which is puzzling, since I did post it originally. In any case I pulled
this copy from my archives.
TP
Tim Starr wrote:
> Churchill, Walter Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for their
> role in WWII.
Appeal to authority.
> The Nazis' own estimates of what it would take to conquer Switzerland
> were so high that they kept deferring the invasion of Switzerland
> until after they'd conquered other "softer" or higher-priority
> targets.
Irrelevant, since Switzerland was a defacto Nazi puppet anyway.
> Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
Appeal to authority.
> Your argument was that it was wrong for the Swiss not to declare war
> on Germany without Germany first declaring war on Switzerland.
I can't make head or tail of this claim, much less claim ownership of it
%o
<snip irrelevance>
> Since you seem to think France was the epitomy of honor in WWII,
I've never claimed that France was the epitome of honor in WWII.
> it's
> worth pointing out that the Swiss did have an agreement for joint
> defense against Nazi Germany in case Germany tried an end-run around
> the Maginot Line in the east, through Switzerland. So, before the fall
> of France, the Swiss had a military alliance with the neighboring
> power most capable of helping it defend itself against its most likely
> invader.
>
> After the fall of France, Switzerland would've been suicidally stupid
> to THEN declare war on Germany, after the combination of Britain,
> France, & Belgium had failed to stop the German invasion of France.
> That could've provoked an immediate German invasion of Switzerland,
> when they weren't fully-prepared to resist.
I'm not in a position to evaluate this claim, but it has little if
anything to do with my argument. First and foremost I'm saying that in
a clearcut fight between good and evil, neutrality amounts to moral
agnosticism, which can only benefit evil. Therefore, for a country to
profess a morally indifferent, long-term policy of "neutrality", as the
Swiss did, is suicidal. They should have spoken up and acted YEARS
before the Nazis had them cornered, as should have Britain and France,
until it was too late. They should have all banded together and done
everything they could to stop the Nazis. A trade embargo probably would
have sufficed.
Apologising for Swiss neutrality is reminiscent of the sort of
pragmatist justifications made for Chamberlain's appeasement of the
Nazis over the Sudetenland, or FDR's conceding Eastern Europe to the
Soviets. Even if you buy the argument that they had no choice in each
of these situations (which I don't), that still leaves room for making
unequivocally clear one's moral condemnation. And that is something
that Chamberlain, FDR, and the Swiss (by the their avowed "neutrality")
most emphatically did NOT do.
Ka84376
>
>Irrelevant, since Switzerland was a defacto Nazi puppet anyway.
>
How so? Because they sheltered thousands of Jews during the war? Or was it
because they shot down Nazi planes flying over their territory? True they shot
down Allied planes and sheltered Nazi money in bank accounts, but Switzerland
played both sides of World War II precisely because they had no other choice.
>> Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
>
>Appeal to authority.
No, it's an appeal to read additional evidence.
>First and foremost I'm saying that in
>a clearcut fight between good and evil, neutrality amounts to moral
>agnosticism, which can only benefit evil.
How exactly was there a clearcut fight between good and evil. Even the US felt
compelled to side with the Soviets, who killed just as many people as the
Nazis. In the end, neither side in WWII really had much of a claim to moral
superiority. The Nazis just did everything on a grander scale. For that
matter, even the US had concentration camps (filled with US citizens, I might
add). Morally, the Allies (esp. when considering the Soviets) were just the
lesser of two evils.
>Therefore, for a country to
>profess a morally indifferent, long-term policy of "neutrality", as the
>Swiss did, is suicidal. They should have spoken up and acted YEARS
>before the Nazis had them cornered, as should have Britain and France,
>until it was too late.
> A trade embargo probably would
>have sufficed.
For what it's worth, the French invaded the Ruhr in 1923 (YEARS before the Nazi
threat) to enforce the Versailles treaty and quash German opposition. This
actually helped ignite the Nazi revolution.
>nd that is something
>that Chamberlain, FDR, and the Swiss (by the their avowed "neutrality")
>most emphatically did NOT do.
According to the Swiss Embassy's web site, the policy of neutrality came about
and continues to this day because the Swiss believe that neutrality is the best
way for a small country to survive. In almost any alliance, the Swiss would be
a small, almost insignificant voice. Germany, France, and Britain are each
almost 10 times as large as Switzerland in terms of population, and all are far
more rich in natural resources. 500 years of neutrality helped make
Switzerland a consistently wealthy nation. It also helped keep the country
together, preventing it from becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to
argue with success.
--
Kathryn P. O'Mara
Regnirps
>In terms of nukes, American would need enough to obliterate the
>rest of the planet even to approach an adequate nuclear deterrent.
>Even then, Soviets would be able to amass intermediate range
>ballistic missiles close enough to America to strike without
>warning.
Keep in mind no one has ever dropped a big bomb on an enemy. The effect of just
one multimegaton H-bomb could be a major wakeup call to any antagonist. I don't
think you need very many of them.
Charlie Springer
Regnirps
>The Swiss militia model is quaintly, laughably unrealistic, ESPECIALLY
>in this era of nuclear armaments and economic globalisation. Swiss
>"neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly UNprincipled, cowardly sellout
>to the Nazis.
And just how successful have we been with opponents where large numbers of
individuals have potent automatic weapons and other military hardware like
anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions? Those quaint folks in Mogadishu were so
laughably unrealistic, don't you think?
Charlie Springer
Regnirps
>> Churchill, Walter Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for their
>> role in WWII.
>Appeal to authority.
You're a funny guy. How do YOU check these things out; Mr. Peabody and his
Wayback Machine? I bet you refute an experimental result as an "appeal to
fact".
Charlie Springer
Jim Austin
That may not be the case if the enemy is the rest of the world.
Since there might not be any warning, a country will need to have
enough nukes on hand that some will survive a first strike, after which,
the country would have to be prepared to do more than just wake up the
antagonist.
Jim Austin
Jim Austin
>Tym Parsons writes:
>>Irrelevant, since Switzerland was a defacto Nazi puppet anyway.
>How so? Because they sheltered thousands of Jews during the war? Or
>was it because they shot down Nazi planes flying over their territory?
>True they shot down Allied planes and sheltered Nazi money in bank
>accounts, but Switzerland played both sides of World War II precisely
>because they had no other choice.
Score that one for O'Mara.
>>> Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
>>Appeal to authority.
>No, it's an appeal to read additional evidence.
And that one.
>>First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
>>and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
>>benefit evil.
>How exactly was there a clearcut fight between good and evil. Even the
>US felt compelled to side with the Soviets, who killed just as many
>people as the Nazis.
It wasn't due to any compelling feeling that the U.S. sided with the
Soviets. It was the decision of Adolf Hitler who, while Germany was at
War with the Soviet Union, decided to declare war on the U.S.
In any war against evil, one takes one's allies where one finds them.
There is no particular virtue in failure to strengthen one's own
position by spurning a formidable ally, however evil that ally might
be.
>In the end, neither side in WWII really had much of a claim to moral
>superiority. The Nazis just did everything on a grander scale. For
>that matter, even the US had concentration camps (filled with US
>citizens, I might add).
The U.S. did not have concentrations camps. The U.S. did round up
citizens of Japanese descent because the government doubted their
loyalty. Those doubts turned out to be totally and completely
unfounded. But in wartime, reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of the country at war which can make all the necessary
restitutions later.
The relocation camps were in no way comparable to Buchenwald or
Auschwitz or other death camps set up by the Nazis.
To assert their equivalency is the sort of effort expected of pacifists
and libertarians to undermine the resolve of a nation to resist
aggression.
>Morally, the Allies (esp. >when considering the Soviets) were just
>the lesser of two evils.
1. The lessor of two evils has the right to assert moral superiority
over the worse of the two evils.
2. While Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union are equivalent evils,
accepting the Soviets as allies does not diminish the rightness of
the allied cause.
>>Therefore, for a country to profess a morally indifferent, long-term
>>policy of "neutrality", as the Swiss did, is suicidal. They should
>>have spoken up and acted YEARS before the Nazis had them cornered,
>>as should have Britain and France, until it was too late. A trade
>>embargo probably would have sufficed.
>For what it's worth, the French invaded the Ruhr in 1923 (YEARS before
>the Nazi threat) to enforce the Versailles treaty and quash German
>opposition. This actually helped ignite the Nazi revolution.
More details are needed.
However, an activist policy aimed at squashing aggression before
it becomes a formidable threat is a righteous policy, more so than
waiting until one' back is to the wall before responding.
>>nd that is something that Chamberlain, FDR, and the Swiss (by the
>>their avowed "neutrality") most emphatically did NOT do.
>According to the Swiss Embassy's web site, the policy of neutrality
>came about and continues to this day because the Swiss believe that
>neutrality is the best way for a small country to survive. In almost
>any alliance, the Swiss would be a small, almost insignificant voice.
>Germany, France, and Britain are each almost 10 times as large as
>Switzerland in terms of population, and all are far more rich in
>natural resources. 500 years of neutrality helped make Switzerland a
>consistently wealthy nation. It also helped keep the country together,
>preventing it from becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to
>argue with success.
The Swiss, of course, have to do what's best for the Swiss. They are
under no altruistic duty to join in any fight that's contrary to their
own national interests.
Jim Austin
Firebug
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> Swiss
> "neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly UNprincipled, cowardly sellout
> to the Nazis.
As usual, this is completely incorrect.
> To paraphrase Goldwater, "neutrality" in the defense of freedom is no
> virtue.
What do you think that the Swiss should have done? Declaring war
against the Nazis would only have gotten their country conquered and
would have done nothing to help the West. It would have been a
_sacrifice for sacrifice's sake_. The primary goal of the Swiss
government was - quite properly and in keeping with Objectivist ethics -
to protect the rights and liberties of _Swiss_ citizens, not people in
other nations. You are saying that Switzerland should have
ALTRUISTICALLY sacrificed its own interests to protect people in other
countries; what could be more anti-Objectivist than that? If the Swiss
had allowed Nazi _policy_ to be implemented in their country, you might
have a point with your accusations, but in fact they did no such thing.
I suppose I shouldn't be surprised to see this blatant inversion of
Rand from someone to whom Objectivism is a set of WORDS, not a system
of PHILOSOPHY.
- Firebug
Firebug
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
>
> Appeal to authority.
You were the one who appealed to the authority of the _New York Times_,
hypocrite.
> I'm not in a position to evaluate this claim, but it has little if
> anything to do with my argument. First and foremost I'm saying that
in
> a clearcut fight between good and evil, neutrality amounts to moral
> agnosticism, which can only benefit evil.
Clearcut? OK, so which side was the USSR on: good, because they were
fighting the Nazis, or evil, because its own tyranny was every bit as
vile? If the latter (as I believe), then why did we ally ourselves with
them? And why did FDR take this as more than just an alliance of
convenience, and lie to the American people about Russia?
- Firebug
Tym Parsons
> >The Swiss militia model is quaintly, laughably unrealistic,
> >ESPECIALLY in this era of nuclear armaments and economic
> >globalisation. Swiss "neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly
> >UNprincipled, cowardly sellout to the Nazis.
>
> And just how successful have we been with opponents where large
> numbers of individuals have potent automatic weapons and other
> military hardware like anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions? Those
> quaint folks in Mogadishu were so laughably unrealistic, don't you
> think?
US involvement in Somalia was half-hearted and half-assed, as it has
been in so many other instances (like Vietnam) where you have
unprincipled pragmatist leaders like Clinton calling the shots. The
object of wars is to win them, with whatever it takes.
In contrast Clinton and his ilk do everything they can to tie the hands
of our military personnel, offer inconsistent support, and make brazen
concessions to the enemy in order to have a negotiated settlement at any
cost. In regard to this latter I offer the shameful image of Madeleine
Albright imploringly running after thug terrorist Yasser Arafat after he
stormed away from the last round of the "peace process" farce.
There's NO WAY that the Swiss militia could stand up to a determined
nation with nukes, any more than a bunch of raghead pastoralists could.
Get real.
Tym Parsons
> > > Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
> >
> > Appeal to authority.
>
> You were the one who appealed to the authority of the _New York
> Times_, hypocrite.
This seems to be a problem with reading comprehension, and dropping
context. Alert readers will have noticed that the original poster made
reference to the book IN CONNECTION with claims that I'd already deemed
irrelevant. In contrast I was specifically referring to NYT
documentation of Swiss/Nazi collusion, none of which is controversial.
*It happened*.
> > First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
> > and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
> > benefit evil.
>
> Clearcut? OK, so which side was the USSR on: good, because they were
> fighting the Nazis, or evil, because its own tyranny was every bit as
> vile?
This drops the context at hand, which was the craven appeasement,
passivity, and compromise with evil by the Swiss, French, and British.
Stop trying to chnage the subject.
> If the latter (as I believe), then why did we ally ourselves
> with them? And why did FDR take this as more than just an alliance of
> convenience, and lie to the American people about Russia?
Good question, one that Rand herself asked during the HUAC hearings.
But it has nothing to do with Swiss "neutrality".
Tym Parsons
> >Irrelevant, since Switzerland was a defacto Nazi puppet anyway.
>
> How so? Because they sheltered thousands of Jews during the war? Or
> was it because they shot down Nazi planes flying over their territory?
> True they shot down Allied planes and sheltered Nazi money in bank
> accounts, but Switzerland played both sides of World War II precisely
> because they had no other choice.
Begging the very question.
> >> Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
> >
> >Appeal to authority.
>
> No, it's an appeal to read additional evidence.
No it's an appeal to an argument I already deemed irrelevant.
> >First and foremost I'm saying that in
> >a clearcut fight between good and evil, neutrality amounts to moral
> >agnosticism, which can only benefit evil.
>
> How exactly was there a clearcut fight between good and evil. Even
> the US felt compelled to side with the Soviets,
See my reply to Firebug.
<snip>
> >Therefore, for a country to profess a morally indifferent, long-term
> >policy of "neutrality", as the Swiss did, is suicidal. They should
> >have spoken up and acted YEARS before the Nazis had them cornered, as
> >should have Britain and France, until it was too late. A trade
> >embargo probably would have sufficed.
>
> For what it's worth, the French invaded the Ruhr in 1923 (YEARS before
> the Nazi threat) to enforce the Versailles treaty and quash German
> opposition. This actually helped ignite the Nazi revolution.
Guess it "wasn't worth" then ;-)
Seriously, this isn't what I was talking about. My understanding was
that the Versailles treaty imposed unrealistically harsh indemnities on
Germany after WWI. This was due to the fact that Woodrow Wilson wanted
to appease a vindictive Georges Clemenceau after the war.
> >and that is something that Chamberlain, FDR, and the Swiss (by the
> >their avowed "neutrality") most emphatically did NOT do.
>
> According to the Swiss Embassy's web site, the policy of neutrality
> came about and continues to this day because the Swiss believe that
> neutrality is the best way for a small country to survive. In almost
> any alliance, the Swiss would be a small, almost insignificant voice.
> Germany, France, and Britain are each almost 10 times as large as
> Switzerland in terms of population, and all are far more rich in
> natural resources.
Significance isn't measured in terms of size, population, or resources
alone: far more important is speaking with a rational, moral, PRINCIPLED
voice i.e. having the right philosophy. Notice that countries like
Britain, Japan, and Singapore have little in the way of natural
resources and yet prosper. Or consider thirteen tiny colonies perched
on the edge of a vast unexplored continent, that had the MORAL voice to
stand up to the most powerful European empire of its time, and win.
> 500 years of neutrality helped make Switzerland a consistently wealthy
> nation. It also helped keep the country together, preventing it from
> becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to argue with success.
So you are saying that success is the enemy of the good?
Tim Starr
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Note: this was my reply to post that was mentioned. For some reason
>it doesn't show up on the original thread when I do a search on it
>now, which is puzzling, since I did post it originally. In any case
>I pulled this copy from my archives.
>
>TP
>
>Tim Starr wrote:
>
>>Churchill, Walter Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for
>>their role in WWII.
>
>Appeal to authority.
Appeal to expert opinion on the subject. Churchill may have been
wrong, but he certainly knew more than almost anyone about the
alliances involved in WWII, being one of the primary builders of those
alliances. Certainly a lot more than Par-Broil.
>>The Nazis' own estimates of what it would take to conquer Switzerland
>>were so high that they kept deferring the invasion of Switzerland
>>until after they'd conquered other "softer" or higher-priority
>>targets.
>
>Irrelevant, since Switzerland was a defacto Nazi puppet anyway.
False. Switzerland resisted Nazi control in many ways - by publishing
German-language newspapers critical of the Nazi regime, by giving
asylum to more Jews than any other country in the world except
Palestine, by giving asylum to Allied fliers & other soldiers who
escaped from Axis territory to Switzerland, by shooting down Axis
planes that tried to overfly Swiss territory, by refusing to allow the
Nazis to move troops through Swiss territory by train, etc.
>>Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
>
>Appeal to authority.
Nope, merely pointing out your ignorance of the facts here. I didn't
say you were wrong because Halbrook contradicted you. What I do say is
that your opinion on this subject is incompetent because you're too
ignorant of the facts.
>>Your argument was that it was wrong for the Swiss not to declare war
>>on Germany without Germany first declaring war on Switzerland.
>
>I can't make head or tail of this claim, much less claim ownership of
>it...
It's easy: you claimed that Switzerland ought to have declared war on
Germany, even though Germany hadn't committed any act of war against
Switzerland, just because Germany had committed an act of war against
another country. You claimed that it was morally wrong for Switzerland
not to make such a declaration of war.
><snip irrelevance>
>
>>Since you seem to think France was the epitomy of honor in WWII,
>
>I've never claimed that France was the epitome of honor in WWII.
But France did what you fault Switzerland for not doing, France
declared war on Germany even though Germany hadn't committed any act of
war against France. You rated France higher than Switzerland, even
though in all other matters France behaved worse than Switzerland in
WWII. So, clearly you care more about a declaration of war which
results in defeat & collaboration with the genocidal enemy to
neutrality which results in no invasion by or collaboration with a
genocidal foreign power.
[snip]
>>After the fall of France, Switzerland would've been suicidally stupid
>>to THEN declare war on Germany, after the combination of Britain,
>>France, & Belgium had failed to stop the German invasion of France.
>>That could've provoked an immediate German invasion of Switzerland,
>>when they weren't fully-prepared to resist.
>
>I'm not in a position to evaluate this claim...
Then you're incompetent to make the claims you've been making about
whether Switzerland ought to have declared war on Germany.
>...but it has little if anything to do with my argument.
It has everything to do with your argument. You demand suicidal
actions in the name of "morality." In case you haven't noticed,
suicide is contrary to a morality of self-interest as long as it
remains possible to live a good life.
>First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
>and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
>benefit evil.
In other words, you're deducing your conclusion from abstract
principles without bothering to check whether those abstract principles
correspond to reality or not. What "clearcut fight between good and
evil"? When, precisely, would you have had Switzerland declare war on
Germany? When Germany invaded Poland? When one dictatorship invaded
another? Poland was a semi-fascist dictatorship at the time, you know,
with dreams of imperial expansion of its own, and both Britain & France
were empires with oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe.
After the fall of France? After Germany invaded the Soviet Union?
Where is this "clear-cut good" to which you refer? What Allied country
represents it?
>They should have spoken up and acted YEARS before the Nazis had them
>cornered, as should have Britain and France, until it was too late.
>They should have all banded together and done everything they could to
>stop the Nazis. A trade embargo probably would have sufficed.
A TRADE EMBARGO? For a totalitarian regime bent on an economic policy
of total autarky? The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure
stopped Japan from waging war in China, didn't it? :-) A trade embargo
on Germany by Britain, France, & the rest of Western Europe would
probably have brought on the Nazi-Soviet Pact even sooner than when it
actually did happen. This is an absurd suggestion, given the
historical facts of the situation.
>Apologising for Swiss neutrality is reminiscent of the sort of
>pragmatist justifications made for Chamberlain's appeasement of the
>Nazis over the Sudetenland...
That's the line of argument Churchill used to get himself to replace
Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Funny, you reject Churchill's opinion
when it's pro-Swiss, but you implicitly accept it when it favors your
own position.
>Even if you buy the argument that they had no choice in each of these
>situations (which I don't)...
I don't, either. I just think the Swiss made the right choice.
>that still leaves room for making unequivocally clear one's moral
>condemnation. And that is something that Chamberlain, FDR, and the
>Swiss (by the their avowed "neutrality") most emphatically did NOT do.
So, you care more about empty rhetorical declarations of morality than
about actual military defense in a country's national self-interest.
Quite the altruist, aren't you? :-)
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>It wasn't due to any compelling feeling that the U.S. sided with the
>Soviets. It was the decision of Adolf Hitler who, while Germany was at
>War with the Soviet Union, decided to declare war on the U.S.
Roosevelt referred to the war as one of "survival" after the German
invasion of Russia, but before US entry into the war. Whose survival?
Not Britain's, the Battle of Britain had already been won. Not
America's, America wasn't in the war nor threatened by Germany at the
time. But Soviet Russia was fighting a war for survival against
Germany at that time. FDR was a Commie-sympathizer from way back, at
least to when he recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. FDR identified
America's "survival" with that of Stalinist Russia.
>The U.S. did not have concentrations camps.
Yes it did. They weren't death camps, but they most certainly were
concentration camps.
>The U.S. did round up citizens of Japanese descent because the
>government doubted their loyalty. Those doubts turned out to be
>totally and completely unfounded.
J. Edgar Hoover didn't doubt their loyalty, he opposed the interment of
Japanese-Americans. They weren't interned in Hawaii, which was much
closer to the Pacific War than California.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Jim Austin
> Jim Austin wrote:
> [snip]
> >It wasn't due to any compelling feeling that the U.S. sided with the
> >Soviets. It was the decision of Adolf Hitler who, while Germany was
> >at War with the Soviet Union, decided to declare war on the U.S.
> Roosevelt referred to the war as one of "survival" after the German
> invasion of Russia, but before US entry into the war. Whose survival?
> Not Britain's, the Battle of Britain had already been won. Not
> America's, America wasn't in the war nor threatened by Germany at the
> time. But Soviet Russia was fighting a war for survival against
> Germany at that time. FDR was a Commie-sympathizer from way back, at
> least to when he recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. FDR identified
> America's "survival" with that of Stalinist Russia.
I think that's pushing it a bit.
Roosevelt was definitely given to hyperbole, and it was known that in
private conversations, he could not talk about the Germans except in
tones of unrestrained belligerency.
His attitude towards the Soviets was typical of liberals of that time,
tolerant and indulgent, but it's still a way from a commie sympathizer.
> >The U.S. did not have concentrations camps.
> Yes it did. They weren't death camps, but they most certainly were
> concentration camps.
As I understand it, the term, "concentration camp", was first used by
the British during the Boar War where Boar civilians were rounded up
and interned in facilities where not a whole lot was done to be certain
they were well fed and thus some had reportedly starved.
The concept of concentration camp includes the notion of starvation
and/or ill-treatment, which wasn't the case at the internment camps
where the Japanese were placed.
> >The U.S. did round up citizens of Japanese descent because the
> >government doubted their loyalty. Those doubts turned out to be
> >totally and completely unfounded.
> J. Edgar Hoover didn't doubt their loyalty, he opposed the interment
> of Japanese-Americans.
From what I understand, neither did the Attorney General who, upon the
start of the war, rounded up a handful of Japanese he regareded as
dengerous, but reportedly regarded the rest as harmless.
Apparently, somebody convinced FDR to round up American citizens of
Japanese descent.
> They weren't interned in Hawaii, which was much closer to the Pacific
> War than California.
There were just too many Japaness there to ship across the Pacific.
Jim Austin
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Tim Starr wrote:
>
>>Jim Austin wrote:
>
>>[snip]
>
>>>It wasn't due to any compelling feeling that the U.S. sided with the
>>>Soviets. It was the decision of Adolf Hitler who, while Germany was
>>>at War with the Soviet Union, decided to declare war on the U.S.
>
>>Roosevelt referred to the war as one of "survival" after the German
>>invasion of Russia, but before US entry into the war. Whose survival?
>>Not Britain's, the Battle of Britain had already been won. Not
>>America's, America wasn't in the war nor threatened by Germany at the
>>time. But Soviet Russia was fighting a war for survival against
>>Germany at that time. FDR was a Commie-sympathizer from way back, at
>>least to when he recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. FDR identified
>>America's "survival" with that of Stalinist Russia.
>
>I think that's pushing it a bit.
>
>Roosevelt was definitely given to hyperbole, and it was known that in
>private conversations, he could not talk about the Germans except in
>tones of unrestrained belligerency.
>
>His attitude towards the Soviets was typical of liberals of that time,
>tolerant and indulgent, but it's still a way from a commie sympathizer.
At what point does tolerance and indulgence become sympathy? FDR also
pardoned the head of the CPUSA as a "good will gesture" to Stalin, and
gave the Soviets back one of their codebooks which had been captured by
the Finns and passed on to the US, without making any copies of it for
the US. FDR had active Soviet spies & agents of influence in high
posts in his administration, including Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White
(Assistant Treasury Secretary under Morgenthau, & "author" of the
infamous Morgenthau Plan), & Harry Hopkins (close personal advisor to
FDR).
>>>The U.S. did not have concentrations camps.
>
>>Yes it did. They weren't death camps, but they most certainly were
>>concentration camps.
>
>As I understand it, the term, "concentration camp", was first used by
>the British during the Boar War where Boar civilians were rounded up
>and interned in facilities where not a whole lot was done to be certain
>they were well fed and thus some had reportedly starved.
First use in English, perhaps, but they Brits got the idea from the
Spanish suppression of the Cuban Revolution, "concentrados."
>The concept of concentration camp includes the notion of starvation
>and/or ill-treatment...
Connotation, not denotation.
>...which wasn't the case at the internment camps where the Japanese
>were placed.
Unless you consider deprivation of property & relocation "ill-
treatment," but I'll grant that the treatment of the Japanese-AMERICANS
wasn't anywhere near as bad as the treatment of those in Nazi or Soviet
concentration camps.
>>>The U.S. did round up citizens of Japanese descent because the
>>>government doubted their loyalty. Those doubts turned out to be
>>>totally and completely unfounded.
>
>>J. Edgar Hoover didn't doubt their loyalty, he opposed the interment
>>of Japanese-Americans.
>
>From what I understand, neither did the Attorney General who, upon the
>start of the war, rounded up a handful of Japanese he regareded as
>dengerous, but reportedly regarded the rest as harmless.
Interesting.
>Apparently, somebody convinced FDR to round up American citizens of
>Japanese descent.
Racial bigotry.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>...I was specifically referring to NYT documentation of Swiss/Nazi
>collusion, none of which is controversial. *It happened*.
Void for vagueness. The fact that the Swiss made some concessions to
the Nazis doesn't mean that they were Nazi puppets, nor that they did
nothing to successfully resist the Nazis. Exactly what "collusion"
took place? Was Switzerland ever occupied? Did Switzerland ever
violate the laws of war as pertained to the rights of neutrals in
regards to Nazi Germany? Were Nazi troops ever allowed to cross Swiss
territory? Was the Luftwaffe ever allowed to overfly Switzerland?
Were Swiss Jews ever sent to the death camps? The answer to all of
these questions is: "No."
>>>First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
>>>and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
>>>benefit evil.
>>
>>Clearcut? OK, so which side was the USSR on: good, because they were
>>fighting the Nazis, or evil, because its own tyranny was every bit as
>>vile?
>
>This drops the context...
No, it's entirely to the point: who were the "clearcut" good guys in
WWII? The Allies, including Stalinist Russia? The Polish
dictatorship? The British & French Empires?
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>>>>Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
>>>
>>>Appeal to authority.
>>
>>No, it's an appeal to read additional evidence.
>
>No it's an appeal to an argument I already deemed irrelevant.
Your argument is that the Swiss were Nazi puppets. Halbrook's argument
is that the Swiss resisted Nazi domination with much success. How
could an argument directly contrary to yours possibly be irrelevant?
>>>and that is something that Chamberlain, FDR, and the Swiss (by the
>>>their avowed "neutrality") most emphatically did NOT do.
>>
>>According to the Swiss Embassy's web site, the policy of neutrality
>>came about and continues to this day because the Swiss believe that
>>neutrality is the best way for a small country to survive. In almost
>>any alliance, the Swiss would be a small, almost insignificant voice.
>>Germany, France, and Britain are each almost 10 times as large as
>>Switzerland in terms of population, and all are far more rich in
>>natural resources.
>
>Significance isn't measured in terms of size, population, or resources
>alone: far more important is speaking with a rational, moral,
>PRINCIPLED voice i.e. having the right philosophy.
When it comes to national defense, correct philosophy without the
military capability to back it up will get you conquered. This is an
instance of the mind-body dichotomy, the attitude that all that's
needed is the right philosophy for all material obstacles to be
overcome.
>Notice that countries like Britain, Japan, and Singapore have little
>in the way of natural resources and yet prosper.
Notice that none of them are first-tier military powers, either.
Britain used to be, but, largely thanks to WWII, not anymore.
>Or consider thirteen tiny colonies perched on the edge of a vast
>unexplored continent, that had the MORAL voice to stand up to the
>most powerful European empire of its time, and win.
Like Vietnam did to the USA, y'mean? Does that mean Vietnam had the
right philosophy? :-) Or could it be that more factors are involved
than merely whether David has the right philosophy when confronting
Goliath?
>>500 years of neutrality helped make Switzerland a consistently
>>wealthy nation. It also helped keep the country together, preventing
>>it from becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to argue with
>>success.
>
>So you are saying that success is the enemy of the good?
No, that your conception of "good" is wrong because it classifies one
of the most successful countries in the world by any reasonable
standard as evil.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
Regnirps <regn...@aol.com> wrote:
>Tym Parsons tym_p...@my-deja.com wrote:
>
>>The Swiss militia model is quaintly, laughably unrealistic, ESPECIALLY
>>in this era of nuclear armaments and economic globalisation. Swiss
>>"neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly UNprincipled, cowardly sellout
>>to the Nazis.
>
>numbers of individuals have potent automatic weapons and other
>military hardware like anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions? Those
>quaint folks in Mogadishu were so laughably unrealistic, don't you
>think?
By Par-Broil's argument, they must've had the right philosophy. :-)
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Regnirps wrote:
>
>>>The Swiss militia model is quaintly, laughably unrealistic,
>>>ESPECIALLY in this era of nuclear armaments and economic
>>>globalisation. Swiss "neutrality" during WWII was a brazenly
>>>UNprincipled, cowardly sellout to the Nazis.
>>
>>And just how successful have we been with opponents where large
>>numbers of individuals have potent automatic weapons and other
>>military hardware like anti-tank and anti-aircraft munitions? Those
>>quaint folks in Mogadishu were so laughably unrealistic, don't you
>>think?
>
>US involvement in Somalia was half-hearted and half-assed, as it has
>been in so many other instances (like Vietnam) where you have
>unprincipled pragmatist leaders like Clinton calling the shots. The
>object of wars is to win them, with whatever it takes.
Whatever you say, General Westmoreland. Another 200,000 troops this
year? You can see light at the end of the tunnel?
Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy, eh?
After all, according to you, that's all it takes to win wars.
>There's NO WAY that the Swiss militia could stand up to a determined
>nation with nukes...
Sure they could: develop their own nukes, just like the Israelis did.
Their own missile defense, too.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Firebug
Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> So, you care more about empty rhetorical declarations of morality than
> about actual military defense in a country's national self-interest.
> Quite the altruist, aren't you? :-)
I had already pointed that out explicitly, but Parsons didn't respond.
I didn't think that he would - he doesn't want to check his (faulty)
premises. That might cause him to actually begin to look upon
Objectivism as a system of integrated ideas, rather than a dogmatic
sequence of words. Fundamentally, there's no difference between Parsons
and a Biblical literalist - the only difference is the 'bibles' they
follow.
- Firebug
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>>Tim Starr wrote:
>>>Jim Austin wrote:
>>>[snip]
>>>>It wasn't due to any compelling feeling that the U.S. sided with the
>>>>Soviets. It was the decision of Adolf Hitler who, while Germany was
>>>>at War with the Soviet Union, decided to declare war on the U.S.
>>>Roosevelt referred to the war as one of "survival" after the German
>>>invasion of Russia, but before US entry into the war. Whose survival?
>>>Not Britain's, the Battle of Britain had already been won. Not
>>>America's, America wasn't in the war nor threatened by Germany at the
>>>time. But Soviet Russia was fighting a war for survival against
>>>Germany at that time. FDR was a Commie-sympathizer from way back, at
>>>least to when he recognized the Soviet Union in 1933. FDR identified
>>>America's "survival" with that of Stalinist Russia.
>>I think that's pushing it a bit.
>>Roosevelt was definitely given to hyperbole, and it was known that in
>>private conversations, he could not talk about the Germans except in
>>tones of unrestrained belligerency.
>>His attitude towards the Soviets was typical of liberals of that time,
>>tolerant and indulgent, but it's still a way from a commie
>>sympathizer.
>At what point does tolerance and indulgence become sympathy?
Good question.
I would say that when one consciously adopts the communist goals as
one's own, as in nationalization of all industries, dictatorship
of the prolitariate, etc.
>FDR also pardoned the head of the CPUSA as a "good will gesture"
>to Stalin, and gave the Soviets back one of their codebooks which
>had been captured by the Finns and passed on to the US, without
>making any copies of it for the US. FDR had active Soviet spies
>& agents of influence in high posts in his administration,
>including Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White (Assistant Treasury
>Secretary under Morgenthau, & "author" of the infamous Morgenthau
>Plan), & Harry Hopkins (close personal advisor to FDR).
All this is consistent with what I have come to expect of liberal
behavior.
>>>>The U.S. did not have concentrations camps.
>>>Yes it did. They weren't death camps, but they most certainly were
>>>concentration camps.
>>As I understand it, the term, "concentration camp", was first used by
>>the British during the Boar War where Boar civilians were rounded up
>>and interned in facilities where not a whole lot was done to be
>>certain they were well fed and thus some had reportedly starved.
>First use in English, perhaps, but they Brits got the idea from the
>Spanish suppression of the Cuban Revolution, "concentrados."
That's an argument for my side.
>>The concept of concentration camp includes the notion of starvation
>>and/or ill-treatment...
>Connotation, not denotation.
All part of the concept of concentration camp.
>>...which wasn't the case at the internment camps where the Japanese
>>were placed.
>Unless you consider deprivation of property & relocation "ill-
>treatment," but I'll grant that the treatment of the Japanese-AMERICANS
>wasn't anywhere near as bad as the treatment of those in Nazi or Soviet
>concentration camps.
Those who use the equivalency argument generally try to obscure that
very fact in their they're-no-worse-then-we-we're-no-better-than-they
type argument, the sort of argument that I expect from, uh, pacifists.
>>>>The U.S. did round up citizens of Japanese descent because the
>>>>government doubted their loyalty. Those doubts turned out to be
>>>>totally and completely unfounded.
>>>J. Edgar Hoover didn't doubt their loyalty, he opposed the interment
>>>of Japanese-Americans.
>>From what I understand, neither did the Attorney General who, upon the
>>start of the war, rounded up a handful of Japanese he regareded as
>>dengerous, but reportedly regarded the rest as harmless.
>Interesting.
>>Apparently, somebody convinced FDR to round up American citizens of
>>Japanese descent.
>Racial bigotry.
It was probably a factor. Also a factor was Japanese propaganda which
depicted the Japanese ever loyal, willing-to-die-for-the-Emporer types.
Jim Austin
Tim Starr
<bjaust...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Tim Starr wrote:
[snip]
>>At what point does tolerance and indulgence become sympathy?
>
>Good question.
Thank you.
>I would say that when one consciously adopts the communist goals as
>one's own, as in nationalization of all industries, dictatorship
>of the prolitariate, etc.
Well, FDR wanted the Commies to win the war against Nazi Germany, at a
time when America wasn't at war with Germany, & the Battle of Britain
had already been won, ending all Nazi plans for invasion of Britain.
So, whose foreign policy goals was he adopting as his own?
>>First use in English, perhaps, but they Brits got the idea from the
>>Spanish suppression of the Cuban Revolution, "concentrados."
>
>That's an argument for my side.
Perhaps, but I don't really see how it is. The concentrados weren't
death camps, either, as I understand it.
>>>The concept of concentration camp includes the notion of starvation
>>>and/or ill-treatment...
>
>>Connotation, not denotation.
>
>All part of the concept of concentration camp.
Not strictly speaking, no. The two categories "concentration camp"
and "death camp" have referents which have historically overlapped, but
the concepts remain distinct.
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>Similarly, libertarians sought relief by chucking the rest of the
>world and retreating behind some kind of fortress America. In the
>context of the Cold War, that meant ceding the rest of the world to
>the communist countries.
>
>The problem with that sort of retreat is that communist countries,
>with the population and resources of the rest of the world at their
>disposal, could easily amass sufficient troop, meaning regulars,
>that could easily overwhelm the 50 million weekend warriors in
>McPeters mighty militia.
What would it take to defeat a 50-million man militia? Military
science as I understand it has it that in a conventional war an
equivalent force would have to be 2-3 times as large; in guerilla war,
I've seen ratio's estimated at from 5 to 7 times. Let's estimate
conservatively, that a conventional force of 100 million regulars would
be enough to defeat the militia conventionally, but that it would take
250 million regulars to win the guerilla war.
You're absolutely right that if the whole rest of the world had fallen
to the Commies after WWII that it would've had the manpower to supply
100-250 million regulars. Since that would've had to have come from
industrialized societies for reasons I'll explain in a moment, that
would require a population base of about 1-2.5 billion people. The
Commies didn't have that big a population in industrialized countries
in 1950, and it's doubtful whether they ever would've managed to
combine both the conquest of that much population with
industrialization. China has enough population to meet the low end of
that, but not the industrial capacity. The Soviets did manage to
industrialize with the help of agricultural collectivization, foreign
aid during WWII, & the plunder of Eastern Europe after the war, but
still never had enough industrial capacity to support military forces
as big as we're contemplating - at it's Cold War peak, the Red Army was
about 3 million men.
Why would industrial capacity be so important? Primarily because of
the logistical need to transport 100-250 million regulars across the
Atlantic & Pacific oceans, either by air or by sea. The US would have
to maintain adequate air & naval forces to defend both coasts, but that
would only require a 2-ocean Navy and a substantially smaller air force
than what we currently have.
Any Commie invasion fleet or air squadron could be shot down or sunk
over the oceans. That should suffice for conventional military
defense, with only strategic defense remaining:
>In terms of nukes, American would need enough to obliterate the
>rest of the planet even to approach an adequate nuclear deterrent.
>Even then, Soviets would be able to amass intermediate range
>ballistic missiles close enough to America to strike without
>warning.
That depends on what you mean by "intermediate range." Within the
Western hemisphere? I would approve of Kennedy's position in the Cuban
Missile Crisis about denying nukes to Cuba, since Castro really wanted
to nuke the US & could've done so if he'd had nukes. The same would go
for any other Commie regimes in the Western hemisphere.
Jim Austin
> In article <8uenvh$50l$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, Jim Austin
> <bjaust...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> >Tim Starr wrote:
> [snip]
> >>At what point does tolerance and indulgence become sympathy?
> >Good question.
> Thank you.
> >I would say that when one consciously adopts the communist goals as
> >one's own, as in nationalization of all industries, dictatorship
> >of the prolitariate, etc.
> Well, FDR wanted the Commies to win the war against Nazi Germany, at a
> time when America wasn't at war with Germany, & the Battle of Britain
> had already been won, ending all Nazi plans for invasion of Britain.
The Battle of Britain had been won, but the British had not won the war.
I would guess that FDR also wanted the British to win.
> So, whose foreign policy goals was he adopting as his own?
Presumably, the goals of all the countries at war with Germany.
> >>First use in English, perhaps, but they Brits got the idea from the
> >>Spanish suppression of the Cuban Revolution, "concentrados."
> >That's an argument for my side.
> Perhaps, but I don't really see how it is. The concentrados weren't
> death camps, either, as I understand it.
Depends on the treatment.
> >>>The concept of concentration camp includes the notion of starvation
> >>>and/or ill-treatment...
> >>Connotation, not denotation.
> >All part of the concept of concentration camp.
> Not strictly speaking, no. The two categories "concentration camp"
> and "death camp" have referents which have historically overlapped,
> but the concepts remain distinct.
Death camp is where they deliberately kill people.
Concentration camp is generic to death camp, but includes other camps
involving ill-treatment which may result in death, but not necessarily
intending to cause death.
Jim Austin
Tym Parsons
> Your argument is that the Swiss were Nazi puppets. Halbrook's
> argument is that the Swiss resisted Nazi domination with much success.
Fudges the question of "success". My argument is that if you've already
sold your soul to the devil, it doesn't matter whether he physically
possesses you or not.
> >Significance isn't measured in terms of size, population, or
> >resources alone: far more important is speaking with a rational,
> >moral, PRINCIPLED voice i.e. having the right philosophy.
>
> When it comes to national defense, correct philosophy without the
> military capability to back it up will get you conquered. This is an
> instance of the mind-body dichotomy, the attitude that all that's
> needed is the right philosophy for all material obstacles to be
> overcome.
Nor have I argued otherwise. This is a strawman.
> >Notice that countries like Britain, Japan, and Singapore have little
> >in the way of natural resources and yet prosper.
>
> Notice that none of them are first-tier military powers, either.
> Britain used to be, but, largely thanks to WWII, not anymore.
So what? They all have the economic resources to defend themselves
militarily, were it not for America's military umbrella.
<snip pointless heckling>
> >>500 years of neutrality helped make Switzerland a consistently
> >>wealthy nation. It also helped keep the country together,
> >>preventing it from becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to
> >>argue with success.
> >
> >So you are saying that success is the enemy of the good?
>
> No, that your conception of "good" is wrong because it classifies one
> of the most successful countries in the world by any reasonable
> standard as evil.
My conception of the good is to not have anything to do with evil. Evil
by itself is impotent; it can only grow when otherwise good men (and
countries) morally compromise themselves. The moral is the practical.
Accordingly any success Switzerland has had is IN SPITE of its
neutrality. It might perhaps be one thing to stay neutral in an
unforeseen situation where you have no other choice; it's another to
engage in a centuries-long POLICY of it.
Tym Parsons
Ka84376
>My conception of the good is to not have anything to do with evil. Evil
>by itself is impotent; it can only grow when otherwise good men (and
>countries) morally compromise themselves. The moral is the practical.
>Accordingly any success Switzerland has had is IN SPITE of its
>neutrality. It might perhaps be one thing to stay neutral in an
>unforeseen situation where you have no other choice; it's another to
>engage in a centuries-long POLICY of it.
Switzerland's policy of armed neutrality allowed it to thrive while the rest of
Europe fought itself to death. It is also compatible with the Swiss notion of
limited government with limited power. The confederation dates back to the
12th century when 3 individuals entered into a common defense arrangement,
nothing more, nothing less. The primary unit of government in Switzerland is
the commune. Next is the canton, and finally, the federal government.
Fighting an organized offensive war requires mass organization from the top
down. This just couldn't happen in Switzerland the way it was organized.
Tym Parsons
> >...I was specifically referring to NYT documentation of Swiss/Nazi
> >collusion, none of which is controversial. *It happened*.
>
> Void for vagueness. The fact that the Swiss made some concessions to
> the Nazis doesn't mean that they were Nazi puppets,
Sure it does. They wouldn't have made concessions if they weren't
afraid of being taken over physically.
<snip>
> >>>First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
> >>>and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
> >>>benefit evil.
> >>
> >>Clearcut? OK, so which side was the USSR on: good, because they were
> >>fighting the Nazis, or evil, because its own tyranny was every bit
> >>as vile?
> >
> >This drops the context...
>
> No, it's entirely to the point: who were the "clearcut" good guys in
> WWII? The Allies, including Stalinist Russia? The Polish
> dictatorship? The British & French Empires?
Certainly the Americans were the clearcut good guys in WWII, even if the
wisdom of our involvement was in question.
Just to forestall Pest Starr from further nitpicking, trifling, and
skirmishing, I'll emphasise that there were a number of things that the
US should have done differently, but that has nothing to do with to the
Swiss.
Tym Parsons
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>[snip]
>>Similarly, libertarians sought relief by chucking the rest of the
>>world and retreating behind some kind of fortress America. In the
>>context of the Cold War, that meant ceding the rest of the world to
>>the communist countries.
>>The problem with that sort of retreat is that communist countries,
>>with the population and resources of the rest of the world at their
>>disposal, could easily amass sufficient troop, meaning regulars,
>>that could easily overwhelm the 50 million weekend warriors in
>>McPeters mighty militia.
>What would it take to defeat a 50-million man militia? Military
>science as I understand it has it that in a conventional war an
>equivalent force would have to be 2-3 times as large;...
Possibly larger. The U.S. Army has designed defensive positions
that, manned by regulars, it thinks can defend against an attack
by an army four times the size.
>...in guerilla war, I've seen ratio's estimated at from 5 to 7
>times. Let's estimate conservatively, that a conventional force
>of 100 million regulars would be enough to defeat the militia
>conventionally, but that it would take 250 million regulars to
>win the guerilla war.
It seems like the contemplated retreat behind America's borders
has turned into a retreat into America's hills and forests in
contemplation of conducting guerilla warfare, immediately ceding
America's cities to invaders.
>You're absolutely right that if the whole rest of the world had
>fallen to the Commies after WWII that it would've had the manpower
>to supply 100-250 million regulars. Since that would've had to have
>come from industrialized societies for reasons I'll explain in a
>moment, that would require a population base of about 1-2.5 billion
>people. The Commies didn't have that big a population in
>industrialized countries in 1950, and it's doubtful whether they
>ever would've managed to combine both the conquest of at much
>population with industrialization. China has enough population to
>meet the low end of that, but not the industrial capacity. The
>Soviets did manage to industrialize with the help of agricultural
>collectivization, foreign aid during WWII, & the plunder of Eastern
>Europe after the war, but still never had enough industrial
>capacity to support military forces as big as we're contemplating
>- at it's Cold War peak, the Red Army was about 3 million men.
The worst case senario assumption was that Canada, Mexico and the
rest of Latin America would also be in communist hand. If Cuba
can raise an army of 250,000, the rest of Latin America could come
up with a good portion of the necessary manpower. China and the
Soviet Union in cooperation could come up with the rest.
>Why would industrial capacity be so important? Primarily because
>of the logistical need to transport 100-250 million regulars across
>the Atlantic & Pacific oceans, either by air or by sea. The US
>would have to maintain adequate air & naval forces to defend both
>coasts, but that would only require a 2-ocean Navy and a
>substantially smaller air force than what we currently have.
>Any Commie invasion fleet or air squadron could be shot down or
>sunk over the oceans. That should suffice for conventional military
>defense, with only strategic defense remaining:
This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico.
Otherwise, the commies could build up their forces at liesure, and
attack at a time of their choosing.
>>In terms of nukes, American would need enough to obliterate the
>>rest of the planet even to approach an adequate nuclear deterrent.
>>Even then, Soviets would be able to amass intermediate range
>>ballistic missiles close enough to America to strike without
>>warning.
>That depends on what you mean by "intermediate range." Within
>the Western hemisphere?
Pretty much, including Canade and Mexico.
>I would approve of Kennedy's position in the Cuban Missile Crisis
>about denying nukes to Cuba, since Castro really wanted to nuke the
>US & could've done so if he'd had nukes. The same would go for any
>other Commie regimes in the Western hemisphere.
As it turned out, it was Kennedy who blinked during that crisis. He
agreed to remove intermediate range missiles in Western Europe in
exchange for getting similar missiles out of Cuba.
With the retreat behind America's borders, such a stand similar
to Kennedy's alleged stand in the Cuban missile crises would
be considerably more difficult since an American president would have
less to trade.
With the retreat behind America's borders, even if we don't go by
worst scenario assumption, one can look forward to hostile and
threatening armies at both American borders, constantly increasing
its size, constantly probing, looking for weak points, constantly
testing the resolve of America's defenders.
Like I said in my previous post, but which was omitted:
"America gravitated toward an activist foreign and military policy
precisely because it was the most economical in terms of resources
as well as the risks, stress and tensions involved. Those who
lacked the resolve and determination necessary for an activist
policy would definitely lack the considerably greater resolve and
determination required for a fortress America policy."
Jim Austin
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Tim Starr wrote:
>
>>Your argument is that the Swiss were Nazi puppets. Halbrook's
>>argument is that the Swiss resisted Nazi domination with much
>>success.
>
>Fudges the question of "success". My argument is that if you've
First, you're an altruist, now you're a mystic. What's next? :-)
>>>Significance isn't measured in terms of size, population, or
>>>resources alone: far more important is speaking with a rational,
>>>moral, PRINCIPLED voice i.e. having the right philosophy.
>>
>>When it comes to national defense, correct philosophy without the
>>military capability to back it up will get you conquered. This is an
>>instance of the mind-body dichotomy, the attitude that all that's
>>needed is the right philosophy for all material obstacles to be
>>overcome.
>
>Nor have I argued otherwise...
Easy for you to say if you never actually make any logical arguments,
but merely pretend you have.
>>>Notice that countries like Britain, Japan, and Singapore have little
>>>in the way of natural resources and yet prosper.
>>
>>Notice that none of them are first-tier military powers, either.
>>Britain used to be, but, largely thanks to WWII, not anymore.
>
>So what? They all have the economic resources to defend themselves
>militarily, were it not for America's military umbrella.
You demand more than mere national defense, you demand foreign conquest
of totalitarian regimes. Britain didn't have the resources to do that
in WWII without America.
>>>>500 years of neutrality helped make Switzerland a consistently
>>>>wealthy nation. It also helped keep the country together,
>>>>preventing it from becoming another Yugoslavia. It's difficult to
>>>>argue with success.
>>>
>>>So you are saying that success is the enemy of the good?
>>
>>No, that your conception of "good" is wrong because it classifies one
>>of the most successful countries in the world by any reasonable
>>standard as evil.
>
>My conception of the good is to not have anything to do with evil.
Which is impossible, so long as evil exists, so your notion of good
violates the principle of "Ought implies can."
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
> Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>>Well, FDR wanted the Commies to win the war against Nazi Germany, at
>>a time when America wasn't at war with Germany, & the Battle of
>>Britain had already been won, ending all Nazi plans for invasion of
>>Britain.
>
>The Battle of Britain had been won, but the British had not won the
>war. I would guess that FDR also wanted the British to win.
But Britain's survival was no longer at stake. At most, the British
would only have had to win the Battle of the Atlantic as well, and
British survival would've been secure. There was no need for the
conquest of Germany, as far as British national defense was concerned.
>>So, whose foreign policy goals was he adopting as his own?
>
>Presumably, the goals of all the countries at war with Germany.
Which was the biggest country whose survival was at stake in the war
with Germany at that time?
Tim Starr
No more than the existence of a safe in a bank implies the absence of
armed guards in the lobby. I would propose a conventional/strategic
first line of defense of the Western hemisphere, at least down to the
northern part of South America, followed up by a fully-prepared
guerilla defense as a last resort.
>>You're absolutely right that if the whole rest of the world had
>>fallen to the Commies after WWII that it would've had the manpower
>>to supply 100-250 million regulars. Since that would've had to have
>>come from industrialized societies for reasons I'll explain in a
>>moment, that would require a population base of about 1-2.5 billion
>>people. The Commies didn't have that big a population in
>>industrialized countries in 1950, and it's doubtful whether they
>>ever would've managed to combine both the conquest of at much
>>population with industrialization. China has enough population to
>>meet the low end of that, but not the industrial capacity. The
>>Soviets did manage to industrialize with the help of agricultural
>>collectivization, foreign aid during WWII, & the plunder of Eastern
>>Europe after the war, but still never had enough industrial
>>capacity to support military forces as big as we're contemplating
>>- at it's Cold War peak, the Red Army was about 3 million men.
>
>The worst case senario assumption was that Canada, Mexico and the
>rest of Latin America would also be in communist hand.
I wouldn't go that far, I'd draw the line at Mexico & the Caribbean on
the southern border, & Canada in the north. Those countries would have
to remain as buffers, without any military formations ready to invade
along either border. Any such formations would be legitimate military
targets.
>If Cuba can raise an army of 250,000...
Cuba could only do that as long as it was still getting 3 billion a
year in subsidies from the Soviets. When the Soviet subsidy dried up,
Cuban offense capability did the same. Hence the Cuban withdrawals
from Nicaragua, Angola, etc.
According to John Keegan, an industrialized society can only afford to
have about 10% of its population mobilized without seriously
compromising its industrial output. Full industrial capacity would be
required in order to match the technology of the US military, so that
would rule out compromise of industrial capacity.
>the rest of Latin America could come up with a good portion of the
>necessary manpower. China and the Soviet Union in cooperation could
>come up with the rest.
They could come up with the military manpower, or the industrial
capacity (maybe), but not both.
[snip]
>This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
>their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
>contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
>U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico.
Fine with me.
[snip]
>>I would approve of Kennedy's position in the Cuban Missile Crisis
>>about denying nukes to Cuba, since Castro really wanted to nuke the
>>US & could've done so if he'd had nukes. The same would go for any
>>other Commie regimes in the Western hemisphere.
>
>As it turned out, it was Kennedy who blinked during that crisis. He
>agreed to remove intermediate range missiles in Western Europe in
>exchange for getting similar missiles out of Cuba.
Yes, I know, I've made that argument to Kennedy-lovers myself. I only
meant that I agreed with the denial of intermediate-range nukes, not
the rest of Kennedy's diplomacy.
>With the retreat behind America's borders, such a stand similar
>to Kennedy's alleged stand in the Cuban missile crises would
>be considerably more difficult since an American president would have
>less to trade.
Nope, because Kruschev's main threat was to nuke Western Europe, & a
Fortress America could call that bluff.
[snip]
>Like I said in my previous post, but which was omitted:
>
>"America gravitated toward an activist foreign and military policy
>precisely because it was the most economical...
I disagree, obviously.
>Those who lacked the resolve and determination necessary for an
>activist policy would definitely lack the considerably greater resolve
>and determination required for a fortress America policy."
I ignored that the first time because it was insulting. Since you
repeated it, I'll point out that it's presumptuous, false, insulting, &
that I seriously doubt you'd care to match your resolve against mine in
a WEKAF-rules stick-fighting duel.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Ankle-biter Starr...
Only in your wet dreams, Par-Broil.
>wrote:
>
>>>...I was specifically referring to NYT documentation of Swiss/Nazi
>>>collusion, none of which is controversial. *It happened*.
>>
>>Void for vagueness. The fact that the Swiss made some concessions to
>>the Nazis doesn't mean that they were Nazi puppets,
>
>Sure it does. They wouldn't have made concessions if they weren't
>afraid of being taken over physically.
Fear of conquest & concessions made out of that fear is not the same
thing as puppetization, by any reasonable definition. Puppets have no
autonomy. If Switzerland had had no autonomy, Swiss Jews would've been
sent to the death camps, Axis military forces would've been allowed to
cross Swiss territory, Switzerland wouldn't have been allowed to trade
with the Allies, etc.
<snip>
>>...who were the "clearcut" good guys in WWII? The Allies, including
>>Stalinist Russia? The Polish dictatorship? The British & French
>>Empires?
>
>Certainly the Americans were the clearcut good guys in WWII...
Not by your standard, which is, in your own words, to have nothing to
do with evil. Stalin was evil, the US had an alliance with him in
WWII, so the Americans can't possibly have been "the clearcut good guys
in WWII." Thus are you hoist by your own petard.
I repeat the question: Who were the "clearcut goodguys in WWII"? Not
anyone allied with Stalin, obviously. So, who should the Swiss have
allied themselves with, and when?
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>>Tim Starr wrote:
>>>Jim Austin wrote:
>>>[snip]
With the U.S. following more or less activist policy, which
ultimately succeeded with Ronald Reagan, the U.S. never had to
contemplate giving up its cities or make other similar last-resort
plans comparable to a safe in a bank.
>I would propose a conventional/strategic first line of defense of
>the Western hemisphere, at least down to the northern part of
>South America, followed up by a fully-prepared guerilla defense as
>a last resort.
This assumes the cooperation of Canada, Mexico and Centeral American
countries. Under the new circumstances with the U.S. retreat, I
would not count on such cooperation.
With a leader like the late Trudeau, Canada could just as easily
switch sides. Mexico was never that great an ally. I've seen at
least one report where Soviet submarines were permitted in the
Gulf of California. More recently, I keep hearing about shots fired
by the Mexican soldiers at U.S. border patrol agents, at least
at one occasion confirmed by Fox News.
>>>You're absolutely right that if the whole rest of the world had
>>>fallen to the Commies after WWII that it would've had the manpower
>>>to supply 100-250 million regulars. Since that would've had to have
>>>come from industrialized societies for reasons I'll explain in a
>>>moment, that would require a population base of about 1-2.5 billion
>>>people. The Commies didn't have that big a population in
>>>industrialized countries in 1950, and it's doubtful whether they
>>>ever would've managed to combine both the conquest of at much
>>>population with industrialization. China has enough population to
>>>meet the low end of that, but not the industrial capacity. The
>>>Soviets did manage to industrialize with the help of agricultural
>>>collectivization, foreign aid during WWII, & the plunder of Eastern
>>>Europe after the war, but still never had enough industrial
>>>capacity to support military forces as big as we're contemplating
>>>- at it's Cold War peak, the Red Army was about 3 million men.
>>The worst case senario assumption was that Canada, Mexico and the
>>rest of Latin America would also be in communist hand.
>I wouldn't go that far, I'd draw the line at Mexico & the Caribbean on
>the southern border, & Canada in the north. Those countries would have
>to remain as buffers, without any military formations ready to invade
>along either border. Any such formations would be legitimate military
>targets.
Like I said, I would not count on the cooperation of Mexico and
Canada.
>>If Cuba can raise an army of 250,000...
>Cuba could only do that as long as it was still getting 3 billion a
>year in subsidies from the Soviets. When the Soviet subsidy dried up,
>Cuban offense capability did the same. Hence the Cuban withdrawals
>from Nicaragua, Angola, etc.
We were talking about a policy followed during the existance of the
Soviet Union.
>According to John Keegan, an industrialized society can only afford to
>have about 10% of its population mobilized without seriously
>compromising its industrial output. Full industrial capacity would be
>required in order to match the technology of the US military, so that
>would rule out compromise of industrial capacity.
As it was, the Soviets were able to flood the world markets with
AK-47s and other weapons.
>>the rest of Latin America could come up with a good portion of the
>>necessary manpower. China and the Soviet Union in cooperation could
>>come up with the rest.
>They could come up with the military manpower, or the industrial
>capacity (maybe), but not both.
True enough. However, with the division labor, the South Americans
could provide the bodies with the Soviets providing the weapons.
>[snip]
>>This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
>>their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
>>contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
>>U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico.
>Fine with me.
It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much actual
aggressiveness than the activist policy.
>[snip]
>>>I would approve of Kennedy's position in the Cuban Missile Crisis
>>>about denying nukes to Cuba, since Castro really wanted to nuke the
>>>US & could've done so if he'd had nukes. The same would go for any
>>>other Commie regimes in the Western hemisphere.
>>As it turned out, it was Kennedy who blinked during that crisis. He
>>agreed to remove intermediate range missiles in Western Europe in
>>exchange for getting similar missiles out of Cuba.
>Yes, I know, I've made that argument to Kennedy-lovers myself. I only
>meant that I agreed with the denial of intermediate-range nukes, not
>the rest of Kennedy's diplomacy.
With IRBMs in Canada and Mexico, the U.S. will have to be considerably
more aggressive and make a considerably stronger stand then Kennedy
could ever dare contemplate.
>>With the retreat behind America's borders, such a stand similar
>>to Kennedy's alleged stand in the Cuban missile crises would
>>be considerably more difficult since an American president would have
>>less to trade.
>Nope, because Kruschev's main threat was to nuke Western Europe, & a
>Fortress America could call that bluff.
Actually, Khrushchev talked in terms of defending Cuba with rockets.
Sounded like a threat against the U.S. Those IRBMs, of course, were to
be targeted against the U.S., not Europe.
>[snip]
>>Like I said in my previous post, but which was omitted:
>>"America gravitated toward an activist foreign and military policy
>>precisely because it was the most economical...
Again, to reinsert: "...in terms of resources as well as the risks,
stress and tensions involved."
>I disagree, obviously.
Not so obvious since Starr contemplated preemptive strikes, as in,
"Fine with me."
>>Those who lacked the resolve and determination necessary for an
>>activist policy would definitely lack the considerably greater resolve
>>and determination required for a fortress America policy."
>I ignored that the first time because it was insulting.
Insulting? Maybe. But it's true nonetheless. Arguments against
an activist policy focus on the costs in terms of resources, manpower,
as well as emotional costs of the fear, stress, tension, risks, and
grief. Indeed, if there were an alternative policy that would reduce
economic and emotional costs, I'd say, Let's do it.
My main argument against any kind of retreat is that it will
ultimately be more costly.
>Since you repeated it, I'll point out that it's presumptuous, false,
>insulting, & that I seriously doubt you'd care to match your resolve
>against mine in a WEKAF-rules stick-fighting duel.
Again, Starr resorts to the argument of the pre-adolescent thug:
"Want to fight about it!"
Jim Austin
Ernest Brown
altrusitic grounds.
Very interesting...
Wisdom's Children: A Virtual Journal of Philosophy & Literature
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/wisdom.htm
Submissions welcomed.
Billy Beck
Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Jim Austin <bjaust...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>>>Well, FDR wanted the Commies to win the war against Nazi Germany, at
>>>a time when America wasn't at war with Germany, & the Battle of
>>>Britain had already been won, ending all Nazi plans for invasion of
>>>Britain.
>>
>>The Battle of Britain had been won, but the British had not won the
>>war. I would guess that FDR also wanted the British to win.
>
>But Britain's survival was no longer at stake. At most, the British
>would only have had to win the Battle of the Atlantic as well, and
>British survival would've been secure.
Point of historical order: the Battle of the Atlantic was the
only thing that ever gave Churchill pause with fear. He says so
explicitly, with charts & graphs & circles & arrows, in his six volume
history of the war.
He never doubted defense of the British Isles. Indeed, he
clearly understood what virtually nobody did: the nature of amphibious
warfare necessary to that invasion. The German General Staff had no
bloody clue how to do it, and "Sea Lion" was always a pipe-dream.
Keitel took cover behind Raeder's inability to muster troop transport,
Raeder constantly moaned at Göring's inability to achieve air
superiority over the Channel, and Göring was a total pig-eyed dunce at
strategy who gave up the only offensive that stood a chance of gaining
air superiority just at the brink of victory. Hitler eventually threw
up his hands in helpless frustration at the lot of them, while
Churchill watched the whole thing not-happening and understood all.
On June 11, 1940, while the Nazi machine was eating France, he
was asked by the French what he would do if they failed.
"Well," he said with false humility, "I am not a military expert,
but my technical advisors are of the opinion that the best method of
dealing with German invasion of the island is to drown as many as
possible on the way over and knock the others on the head as they
crawl ashore."
He never once doubted.
The Battle of the Atlantic was not won until 1943, and it was
*the* crucial fight for Britain.
Churchill advances the case that, if Hitler succeeded in starving
Britain out, then he stood a very good chance of ruling the world.
It's a strong case, but I don't buy it. It essentially rests on the
state of world naval power at the beginning of the war, which cannot
be denied, but which also does not account for American production
capacity not yet in action when his conviction was concluded. I agree
with his view of the scope and determination of Nazi belligerent
audacity. This is also why he concluded that the Nazis had to be
stomped out of existence: they would never have stopped, otherwise.
It was Barbarossa that sealed their doom. No matter what - even
the fall of Moscow - the Nazis were never going to prevail in Russia.
Apart from that fact, Churchill and Roosevelt were complete fools
in their dealings with Stalin, who not only stood completely silent in
"Britain's hour of mortal peril," but also actually gave material
support to the Nazis right up to the moment when Panzers crossed the
Russian frontier.
The French were never worth fighting for. The only-ever fight
was for a fat bag of Nazi dead. Stalin (actually: Zhukov) was never
going to be denied that claim, all the way to Berlin. No way.
The money-move in World War II was to stand on defense and let
the Soviets and Nazis murder each other, knowing that the former would
command the last man on the battlefied.
Billy
VRWC Fronteer
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/promise.html
Tim Starr
<b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
[snip]
>>>It seems like the contemplated retreat behind America's borders has
>>>turned into a retreat into America's hills and forests in
>>>contemplation of conducting guerilla warfare, immediately ceding
>>>America's cities to invaders.
>
>>No more than the existence of a safe in a bank implies the absence of
>>armed guards in the lobby.
>
>With the U.S. following more or less activist policy, which ultimately
>succeeded with Ronald Reagan, the U.S. never had to contemplate giving
>up its cities or make other similar last-resort plans comparable to a
>safe in a bank.
False. Bunkers fortified against nuclear attack were built for NORAD
as well as for the US government. Some of them are still in operation
today. All civil defense measures for the US against nuclear attack
were totally abandoned after the 1950s. The loss of all major US
cities was assumed in any major nuclear exchange between the
superpowers.
>>I would propose a conventional/strategic first line of defense of
>>the Western hemisphere, at least down to the northern part of
>>South America, followed up by a fully-prepared guerilla defense as
>>a last resort.
>
>This assumes the cooperation of Canada, Mexico and Centeral American
>countries.
Yes - a little more cooperation than Cuba was forced into. I think
that if the diplomatic resources of the US were concentrated into the
Western hemisphere instead of being spread all around the globe that
the US would be able to get that much cooperation from its neighbors.
[snip]
>>>If Cuba can raise an army of 250,000...
>
>>Cuba could only do that as long as it was still getting 3 billion a
>>year in subsidies from the Soviets. When the Soviet subsidy dried
>>up, Cuban offense capability did the same. Hence the Cuban
>>withdrawals from Nicaragua, Angola, etc.
>
>We were talking about a policy followed during the existance of the
>Soviet Union.
Irrelevant. The Soviet union had the industrial capacity to support a
250,000-man military force of a puppet regime, but not the industrial
capacity to support a 100 million-man force. As I said before, that
would've required an industrialized society with a total population of
about 1 billion people - something the Commies have never come close to.
>>According to John Keegan, an industrialized society can only afford
>>to have about 10% of its population mobilized without seriously
>>compromising its industrial output. Full industrial capacity would
>>be required in order to match the technology of the US military, so
>>that would rule out compromise of industrial capacity.
>
>As it was, the Soviets were able to flood the world markets with
>AK-47s and other weapons.
That's because AK-47s are cheap to make. They couldn't afford to flood
the world markets with the hi-tech weapons that would've been required
for an invasion of North America (submarines, etc.). Assault rifles &
RPGs are fine for guerilla land wars, but not for conventional trans-
oceanic invasions.
[snip]
>>>This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
>>>their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
>>>contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
>>>U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico.
>
>>Fine with me.
>
>It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much actual
>aggressiveness than the activist policy.
Grammatical rephrase, please.
[snip]
>>>With the retreat behind America's borders, such a stand similar
>>>to Kennedy's alleged stand in the Cuban missile crises would
>>>be considerably more difficult since an American president would have
>>>less to trade.
>
>>Nope, because Kruschev's main threat was to nuke Western Europe, & a
>>Fortress America could call that bluff.
>
>Actually, Khrushchev talked in terms of defending Cuba with rockets.
Yes, with rockets that were withdrawn. When Kennedy denied the nukes
to Cuba, Kruschev threatened to nuke Europe, because he didn't have the
capability to nuke the US. You're talking about the missles that were
GOING to be installed, I'm talking about those that were ALREADY
installed.
[snip]
>>>Those who lacked the resolve and determination necessary for an
>>>activist policy would definitely lack the considerably greater
>>>resolve and determination required for a fortress America policy."
>
>>I ignored that the first time because it was insulting.
>
>Insulting? Maybe.
Yes.
>But it's true nonetheless.
It's a damn lie.
>Arguments against an activist policy focus on the costs...
Doesn't support your conclusion.
>>Since you repeated it, I'll point out that it's presumptuous, false,
>>insulting, & that I seriously doubt you'd care to match your resolve
>>against mine in a WEKAF-rules stick-fighting duel.
>
>Again, Starr resorts to the argument of the pre-adolescent thug:
>"Want to fight about it!"
Nope. You questioned MY resolve, thrice, insisting that it was true
that I lacked your resolve. I merely pointed out that my resolve is
tested regularly when I step into the ring to compete with world
champions in my martial art. I then questioned your resolve by
expressing my doubt that you'd be willing to do the same with me.
Tym Parsons
<snip lack of substance>
> You demand more than mere national defense, you demand foreign
> conquest of totalitarian regimes.
False alternatives. Offense is the best defense.
> Britain didn't have the resources to do that in WWII without America.
Starr pulls this idiotic punch all the time, and it makes replying
really tedious. I make a GENERAL point, e.g. a policy of neutrality
and appeasement on principle is immoral and impractical, and Starr
promptly zeroes in on isolated concretes, specific times and places
completely ripped from any context whatsoever. Then he pragmatically
demands that something must be done, "somehow". Chamberlain appeases
Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and both pay the price when Hitler
embarks on a program of conquest. Consequently Britain doesn't have the
resources to push back without America, and somehow the principle I
advocate is wanting?? Hardly. It just goes to show what happens when
the principle isn't followed, and proves my point.
> >My conception of the good is to not have anything to do with evil.
>
> Which is impossible, so long as evil exists, so your notion of good
> violates the principle of "Ought implies can."
This is an intrinsicist view of principles, which is not what I
advocate. I advocate absolute principles, wthat are contextually
applied.
Tym Parsons
> Fear of conquest & concessions made out of that fear is not the same
> thing as puppetization, by any reasonable definition.
Oh really?
> Puppets have no autonomy. If Switzerland had had no autonomy, Swiss
> Jews would've been sent to the death camps, Axis military forces
> would've been allowed to cross Swiss territory, Switzerland wouldn't
> have been allowed to trade with the Allies, etc.
Characterisation in terms of nonessentials. That fact was that
Switzerland's autonomy was COMPROMISED as a matter of principle.
<snip moronic strawmen dealt with in another post>
Tym Parsons
> >US involvement in Somalia was half-hearted and half-assed, as it has
> >been in so many other instances (like Vietnam) where you have
> >unprincipled pragmatist leaders like Clinton calling the shots. The
> >object of wars is to win them, with whatever it takes.
>
> Whatever you say, General Westmoreland. Another 200,000 troops this
> year? You can see light at the end of the tunnel?
Insinuation in place of argument. The US tied its hands in Vietnam as
well, and I explicitly said how in an exchange with Starr years ago. So
he should know better.
> Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy, eh?
What a dumb-ass assumption.
> After all, according to you, that's all it takes to win wars.
I've never said that.
> >There's NO WAY that the Swiss militia could stand up to a determined
> >nation with nukes...
>
> Sure they could: develop their own nukes, just like the Israelis did.
> Their own missile defense, too.
If the Swiss had nukes, why would they even "need" a policy of
neutrality?
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
> > To paraphrase Goldwater, "neutrality" in the defense of freedom is
> > no virtue.
>
> What do you think that the Swiss should have done? Declaring war
> against the Nazis would only have gotten their country conquered and
> would have done nothing to help the West. It would have been a
> _sacrifice for sacrifice's sake_. The primary goal of the Swiss
> government was - quite properly and in keeping with Objectivist ethics
> -to protect the rights and liberties of _Swiss_ citizens, not people
> in other nations.
See my reply to Tim Starr.
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Skirmisher Starr wrote:
Hmm, I seem to be moving up in the world. First I was "Pest Starr,"
now "Skirmisher Starr." :-)
><snip lack of substance>
>
>>You demand more than mere national defense, you demand foreign
>>conquest of totalitarian regimes.
>
>False alternatives.
Conquest of foreign tyrannies can be in the national self-interest of a
country, but it is not necessarily in the national self-interest of a
country to conquer foreign tyrannies, especially if that conquest is
beyond a country's capability.
>Offense is the best defense.
Tell it to Hitler, he certainly thought so. It was his offensive foray
into Russia that was his doom.
>>Britain didn't have the resources to do that in WWII without America.
>
>Starr pulls this idiotic punch all the time, and it makes replying
>really tedious. I make a GENERAL point, e.g. a policy of neutrality
>and appeasement on principle is immoral and impractical, and Starr
>promptly zeroes in on isolated concretes, specific times and places...
>completely ripped from any context whatsoever.
IOW, I point out how your abstract principles prove false when put to
the test of history. How dare I show your floating abstractions for
the mystical, intrinsicist altriusm they are! :-)
>Then he pragmatically demands that something must be done, "somehow".
>Chamberlain appeases Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and both pay the
>price when Hitler embarks on a program of conquest. Consequently
>Britain doesn't have the resources to push back without America, and
>somehow the principle I advocate is wanting?? Hardly. It just goes
>to show what happens when the principle isn't followed, and proves my
>point.
Your argument presumes that Britain had the resources to stop Nazi
Germany at Munich in 1938, but that is false. Britain didn't have the
necessary resources, & both Chamberlain & Churchill knew it. You
misinterpret Chamberlain's acceptance of Britain's limited resources as
a moral failing instead of a material one.
>>>My conception of the good is to not have anything to do with evil.
>>
>>Which is impossible, so long as evil exists, so your notion of good
>>violates the principle of "Ought implies can."
>
>This is an intrinsicist view of principles, which is not what I
>advocate.
That is precisely what you advocate. You condemn the Swiss for failing
to go on the offensive against Germany, when that course would've led
to certain defeat, conquest, occupation, & collaboration, all because
of your intrinsicist demand that they take a stand against evil.
>I advocate absolute principles, that are contextually applied.
But you fail to take historical context into account, and resist all my
attempts to put your principles into historical context - because your
principles fail the test of history.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Ankle-biter Starr wrote:
Only in your wet dreams, Par-Broil.
>>Fear of conquest & concessions made out of that fear is not the same
>>thing as puppetization, by any reasonable definition.
>
>Oh really?
Yes, really.
>>Puppets have no autonomy. If Switzerland had had no autonomy, Swiss
>>Jews would've been sent to the death camps, Axis military forces
>>would've been allowed to cross Swiss territory, Switzerland wouldn't
>>have been allowed to trade with the Allies, etc.
>
>Characterisation in terms of nonessentials. That fact was that
>Switzerland's autonomy was COMPROMISED as a matter of principle.
The autonomy of the countries who declared war on Germany because of
the German invasion of Poland was also compromised. So was the
autonomy of the countries who ended up at war with Germany after that.
They had to spend lots of time, money, & pay an enormous cost in human
suffering to fight Germany to eventual victory.
Autonomy must be more than merely compromised in order for
puppetization to occur. The autonomy of Japan is compromised by its
relations with the USA, but Japan's not a US puppet. The autonomy of
the US is compromised by its memberships in the UN & NATO, but the US
isn't a UN or NATO puppet. Your characterization of the Swiss as Nazi
puppets during WWII is false because it fails to take into account the
difference in the degree to which Swiss autonomy was actually
compromised and the degree to which it would've had to have been
compromised in order for the Swiss to have truly been Nazi puppets.
This is just more of your all-or-nothing intrinsicism.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tym Parsons
> >>Churchill, Walter Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for
> >>their role in WWII.
> >
> >Appeal to authority.
>
> Appeal to expert opinion on the subject.
His expertise is irrelevant here. This is a MORAL question, not a
tactical one.
> Churchill may have been wrong, but he certainly knew more than almost
> anyone about the alliances involved in WWII, being one of the primary
> builders of those alliances.
He was wrong in this regard *shrug*
> Switzerland resisted Nazi control in many ways - by publishing
> German-language newspapers critical of the Nazi regime, by giving
> asylum to more Jews than any other country in the world except
> Palestine, by giving asylum to Allied fliers & other soldiers who
> escaped from Axis territory to Switzerland, by shooting down Axis
> planes that tried to overfly Swiss territory, by refusing to allow the
> Nazis to move troops through Swiss territory by train, etc.
So what? They colluded with the Nazis nonetheless.
> >>Read Halbrook's "Target Switzerland" yet? No? Didn't think so.
> >
> >Appeal to authority.
>
> Nope, merely pointing out your ignorance of the facts here. I didn't
> say you were wrong because Halbrook contradicted you. What I do say
> is that your opinion on this subject is incompetent because you're too
> ignorant of the facts.
Except that Pest Starr hasn't shown that I'm ignorant of any of the
RELEVANT facts. He just has his own agenda and isn't interested in even
addressing MY argument. As usual he just wants to show off his
accumulation of factoids.
> >>Your argument was that it was wrong for the Swiss not to declare war
> >>on Germany without Germany first declaring war on Switzerland.
> >
> >I can't make head or tail of this claim, much less claim ownership of
> >it...
>
> It's easy:
No it wasn't easy. Your dependent clause above, especially the
"without", makes no sense in relation to the rest of the sentence.
Learn how to write.
> you claimed that Switzerland ought to have declared war on
> Germany, even though Germany hadn't committed any act of war against
> Switzerland, just because Germany had committed an act of war against
> another country. You claimed that it was morally wrong for
> Switzerland not to make such a declaration of war.
As usual Starr is twisting things. If Switzerland hadn't had a policy
of moral neutrality in the first place, the question of war would have
been moot.
> ><snip irrelevance>
> >
> >>Since you seem to think France was the epitomy of honor in WWII,
> >
> >I've never claimed that France was the epitome of honor in WWII.
>
> But France did what you fault Switzerland for not doing, France
> declared war on Germany even though Germany hadn't committed any act
> of war against France.
That hardly makes France "the epitomy [sic] of honor" in my view.
Sheesh. Expecting Starr to not manipulate what you say is like
expecting an elephant to pirouette, but it gets awfully tedious.
<snip endless straw-manning>
> >>After the fall of France, Switzerland would've been suicidally
> >>stupid to THEN declare war on Germany, after the combination of
> >>Britain, France, & Belgium had failed to stop the German invasion of
> >>France. That could've provoked an immediate German invasion of
> >>Switzerland, when they weren't fully-prepared to resist.
> >
> >I'm not in a position to evaluate this claim...
>
> Then you're incompetent to make the claims you've been making about
> whether Switzerland ought to have declared war on Germany.
No I'm not because this has nothing to do with my argument as usual %o
> >...but it has little if anything to do with my argument.
>
> It has everything to do with your argument. You demand suicidal
> actions in the name of "morality."
No I don't.
<snip>
> >First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
> >and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
> >benefit evil.
>
> In other words, you're deducing your conclusion from abstract
> principles without bothering to check whether those abstract
> principles correspond to reality or not.
No I'm not.
> What "clearcut fight between good and evil"? When, precisely, would
> you have had Switzerland declare war on Germany?
This is a meaningless, pragmatist question, and I've already responded
to it in other posts. Starr's scattershot tactics of making flurries of
posts all on the same subject make a consolidated reply impracticable.
And I think he wants it that way: he just tries to score rhetorical
points rather than have a substantive discussion.
> When Germany invaded Poland? When one dictatorship invaded another?
> Poland was a semi-fascist dictatorship at the time, you know, with
> dreams of imperial expansion of its own, and both Britain & France
> were empires with oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe.
> After the fall of France? After Germany invaded the Soviet Union?
What to do in particular situations is a matter of tactics: you apply
principles to context as best you can. By the time the Swiss found
themselves in a pickle, there may well have been nothing else they COULD
do but remain "neutral": they'd already forfeited the options.
Starr likewise seems clueless about the difference between tactics and
principles. In PRINCIPLE I say that Switzerland should have cast their
lot with liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France, or the US
if possible, DECADES before Hitler even came to power.
But ths Swiss didn't do this. Instead they had a centuries-long policy
of neutrality ON PRINCIPLE, and that brought them to the point of having
their autonomy compromised by the Nazis. THAT is what I'm objecting to.
The United States and Britain in particular were the freest countries in
the world, and it's unconscionable moral agnosticism to speak of
"oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe" in this regard.
Starr would have you believe that Britain with its policy of colonialism
was the moral equivalent of Nazi Germany. What rubbish.
> >They should have spoken up and acted YEARS before the Nazis had them
> >cornered, as should have Britain and France, until it was too late.
> >They should have all banded together and done everything they could
> >to stop the Nazis. A trade embargo probably would have sufficed.
>
> A TRADE EMBARGO? For a totalitarian regime bent on an economic policy
> of total autarky?
It's amusing to see a self-professed "capitalist" like Starr fearing
autarky. Common sense and history show that such policies are
impractical.
> The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure stopped Japan from
> waging war in China, didn't it? :-)
Who said it was supposed to, all by itself? This begs the question of
what legitimate interest the US had in East Asia, and whether it was
intelligently followed in a principled manner. It also begs relevance
to a concerted effort by the Swiss, Britain, France, and others against
Germany.
> A trade embargo on Germany by Britain, France, & the rest of Western
> Europe would probably have brought on the Nazi-Soviet Pact even sooner
> than when it actually did happen. This is an absurd suggestion, given
> the historical facts of the situation.
Why would an embargo have done that? The Soviets were initially opposed
to the Nazis, and rightly so. Their geopolitical interests lay with
supporting an embargo by the West. Or if not, it just means the West
should have embargoed the Soviets too, established blockades, come to
the aid of Czechoslavakia and Poland, and in general prepared for war a
lot sooner than than it did.
I don't see the Swiss advocating any of this. Instead they chose to
remain neutral. That's what I'm objecting to.
Dictatorships thrive because otherwise good nations let them get away
with shit. Dictatorships CRAVE moral sanction and respectability. If
everyone had boycotted the Munich Olympics, Hitler would have thought
twice about how far he could push the Western powers. Instead, he had
every reason to believe that the opposition wasn't that great, and he
kept pushing for more. He should have been cut off from the very
beginning.
> >Apologising for Swiss neutrality is reminiscent of the sort of
> >pragmatist justifications made for Chamberlain's appeasement of the
> >Nazis over the Sudetenland...
>
> That's the line of argument Churchill used to get himself to replace
> Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Funny, you reject Churchill's opinion
> when it's pro-Swiss, but you implicitly accept it when it favors your
> own position.
So? I think Churchill was right a lot of the time, even heroic, even if
he did make some huge blunders.
<snip idiotic strawman>
Tym Parsons
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Skirmisher Starr wrote:
>
>>>US involvement in Somalia was half-hearted and half-assed, as it has
>>>been in so many other instances (like Vietnam) where you have
>>>unprincipled pragmatist leaders like Clinton calling the shots. The
>>>object of wars is to win them, with whatever it takes.
>>
>>Whatever you say, General Westmoreland. Another 200,000 troops this
>>year? You can see light at the end of the tunnel?
>
>well, and I explicitly said how in an exchange with Starr years ago.
You were wrong about that, too. If US self-restraint was the reason
why the US lost the Vietnam war, it wasn't because of the restraints
you referred to.
>>Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy, eh?
>
>What a dumb-ass assumption.
Well, then, how'd they win, if they didn't have the right philosophy?
>>After all, according to you, that's all it takes to win wars.
>
>I've never said that.
You've clearly implied it. You've said that the Swiss ought to have
gone to war against Nazi Germany, & that they wouldn't have lost if
only they'd had the right philosophy, despite the overwhelming material
odds against them (80 million to 4 million). So, you clearly believe
material factors to be irrelevant, leaving only the right philosophy as
the sole determinant of victory.
>>>There's NO WAY that the Swiss militia could stand up to a determined
>>>nation with nukes...
>>
>>Sure they could: develop their own nukes, just like the Israelis did.
>>Their own missile defense, too.
>
>If the Swiss had nukes, why would they even "need" a policy of
>neutrality?
Because nukes aren't the means of invulnerability.
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>[snip]
>>>>It seems like the contemplated retreat behind America's borders has
>>>>turned into a retreat into America's hills and forests in
>>>>contemplation of conducting guerilla warfare, immediately ceding
>>>>America's cities to invaders.
>>>No more than the existence of a safe in a bank implies the absence of
>>>armed guards in the lobby.
>>With the U.S. following more or less activist policy, which ultimately
>>succeeded with Ronald Reagan, the U.S. never had to contemplate giving
>>up its cities or make other similar last-resort plans comparable to a
>>safe in a bank.
>False. Bunkers fortified against nuclear attack were built for NORAD
>as well as for the US government. Some of them are still in operation
>today. All civil defense measures for the US against nuclear attack
>were totally abandoned after the 1950s. The loss of all major US
>cities was assumed in any major nuclear exchange between the
>superpowers.
This is considerably different from planning to surrender cities to
an invading army and then fighting a guerrilla war in the coutryside.
The more one retreats, the further one will have to be willing to
retreat.
An activist policy does involve risks of a nuclear exchange. As I have
indicated, so does a fortress America policy, but under even less
favorable circumstances. In addition to contemplating the vaporization
of American cities, the fortress America must also contemplate
surrender of cities to an invader.
>>>I would propose a conventional/strategic first line of defense of
>>>the Western hemisphere, at least down to the northern part of
>>>South America, followed up by a fully-prepared guerilla defense as
>>>a last resort.
>>This assumes the cooperation of Canada, Mexico and Centeral American
>>countries.
>Yes - a little more cooperation than Cuba was forced into. I think
>that if the diplomatic resources of the US were concentrated into
>the Western hemisphere instead of being spread all around the globe
>that the US would be able to get that much cooperation from its
>neighbors.
I don't think more diplomats will necessarily make the Mexicans more
cooperative.
>[snip]
>>>>If Cuba can raise an army of 250,000...
>>>Cuba could only do that as long as it was still getting 3 billion a
>>>year in subsidies from the Soviets. When the Soviet subsidy dried
>>>up, Cuban offense capability did the same. Hence the Cuban
>>>withdrawals from Nicaragua, Angola, etc.
>>We were talking about a policy followed during the existance of the
>>Soviet Union.
>Irrelevant. The Soviet union had the industrial capacity to support a
>250,000-man military force of a puppet regime, but not the industrial
>capacity to support a 100 million-man force. As I said before, that
>would've required an industrialized society with a total population
>of about 1 billion people - something the Commies have never come
>close to.
If America retreats behind its borders, the Soviets would, of course,
have access to the industrial support of Western Europe which would
end up as Soviet satelites.
>>>According to John Keegan, an industrialized society can only afford
>>>to have about 10% of its population mobilized without seriously
>>>compromising its industrial output. Full industrial capacity would
>>>be required in order to match the technology of the US military, so
>>>that would rule out compromise of industrial capacity.
>>As it was, the Soviets were able to flood the world markets with
>>AK-47s and other weapons.
>That's because AK-47s are cheap to make. They couldn't afford to
>flood the world markets with the hi-tech weapons that would've been
>required for an invasion of North America (submarines, etc.). Assault
>rifles & RPGs are fine for guerilla land wars, but not for
>conventional trans- oceanic invasions.
As I indicated, I expect Canada and Mexico to become client states
of the Soviets, thus my expectation would be a land invasion following
a massive buildup of forces in those two countries.
>[snip]
>>>>This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
>>>>their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
>>>>contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
>>>>U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico.
>>>Fine with me.
>>It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much actual
>>aggressiveness than the activist policy.
>Grammatical rephrase, please.
One more time:
It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much more actual
aggressiveness than the activist policy.
>[snip]
>>>>With the retreat behind America's borders, such a stand similar
>>>>to Kennedy's alleged stand in the Cuban missile crises would
>>>>be considerably more difficult since an American president would
>>>>have less to trade.
>>>Nope, because Kruschev's main threat was to nuke Western Europe, & a
>>>Fortress America could call that bluff.
>>Actually, Khrushchev talked in terms of defending Cuba with rockets.
>Yes, with rockets that were withdrawn.
I don't recall Khrushchev specifying which rockets he'd use. At the
time, it seemed like a threat to use his ICBMs located on Russian
soil.
>When Kennedy denied the nukes to Cuba, Kruschev threatened to nuke
>Europe, because he didn't have the capability to nuke the US. You're
>talking about the missles that were GOING to be installed, I'm
>talking about those that were ALREADY installed.
Me too -- those ICBMs in the Soviet Union.
>[snip]
>>>>Those who lacked the resolve and determination necessary for an
>>>>activist policy would definitely lack the considerably greater
>>>>resolve and determination required for a fortress America policy."
>>>I ignored that the first time because it was insulting.
>>Insulting? Maybe.
>Yes.
>>But it's true nonetheless.
>It's a damn lie.
Which part? The part about requiring more resolve for the fortress
America policy or the part about those not having resolve for the
activist policy not having for the retreat policy as well?
>>Arguments against an activist policy focus on the costs...
>Doesn't support your conclusion.
No, but arguements focusing on the costs of a fortress America
does.
>>>Since you repeated it, I'll point out that it's presumptuous, false,
>>>insulting, & that I seriously doubt you'd care to match your resolve
>>>against mine in a WEKAF-rules stick-fighting duel.
>>Again, Starr resorts to the argument of the pre-adolescent thug:
>>"Want to fight about it!"
>Nope. You questioned MY resolve, thrice, insisting that it was true
>that I lacked your resolve.
I indicated that the resolve necessary for a fortress America policy
was greater than for an activist policy. If one couldn't handle the
latter policy, the former policy would definitely not be easier.
>I merely pointed out that my resolve is tested regularly when I step
>into the ring to compete with world champions in my martial art.
The resolve necessary for personal physical combat isn't necessarily
the same as that required of a leader of a nation facing down a
ruthless enemy armed with nuclear weapons. By all accounts, JFK was
not lacking in courage and resolve as a sailor during World War II,
though by certain accounts, he wasn't the brightest person ever to
command a PT boat. But when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as
we both agreed, he was the first to blink. Imagine if Kennedy were
the leader of fortress America where the slightest blink would lead
to disaster, or other World War II veterans like George McGovern or
Jimmy Carter, both of whom would haul up the white flag at the drop
of a hat.
>I then questioned your resolve by expressing my doubt that you'd be
>willing to do the same with me.
Still sounds like the response of a thug who's losing an argument.
Jim Austin
Tim Starr
wrote:
[snip]
>Point of historical order: the Battle of the Atlantic was the only
>thing that ever gave Churchill pause with fear. He says so
>explicitly, with charts & graphs & circles & arrows, in his six volume
>history of the war.
>
>He never doubted defense of the British Isles. Indeed, he clearly
>understood what virtually nobody did: the nature of amphibious warfare
>necessary to that invasion. The German General Staff had no bloody
>clue how to do it...
Yes. My friend Vince Cooks points out that if Germany had stuck to
making short-range U-boats instead of the long-range ones, Germany
could've made a lot more of them & done a better job of blockading
Britain at short range.
>Churchill advances the case that, if Hitler succeeded in starving
>Britain out, then he stood a very good chance of ruling the world.
>It's a strong case, but I don't buy it. It essentially rests on the
>state of world naval power at the beginning of the war, which cannot
>be denied, but which also does not account for American production
>capacity not yet in action when his conviction was concluded.
Britain won the Battle of Britain in 1940, before the US entered the
war. Once the Battle of the Atlantic, there was no longer any national
defense need for Britain to continue the war against Germany, & if
Germany was incapable of invading & conquering Britain across the
English Channel, then there was certainly no chance of Germany invading
& conquering America across the entire Atlantic.
[snip]
>Apart from that fact, Churchill and Roosevelt were complete fools
>in their dealings with Stalin, who not only stood completely silent in
>"Britain's hour of mortal peril," but also actually gave material
>support to the Nazis right up to the moment when Panzers crossed the
>Russian frontier.
By the time of Barbarossa, Churchill was desperate for a great power
ally against Germany. He had been trying to get the USA to play that
role for quite some time, but had not yet succeeded. See John
Charmley's "Churchill: The End of Glory" on this.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>>>With the U.S. following more or less activist policy, which
>>>ultimately succeeded with Ronald Reagan, the U.S. never had to
>>>contemplate giving up its cities or make other similar last-resort
>>>plans comparable to a safe in a bank.
>
>>False. Bunkers fortified against nuclear attack were built for NORAD
>>as well as for the US government. Some of them are still in operation
>>today. All civil defense measures for the US against nuclear attack
>>were totally abandoned after the 1950s. The loss of all major US
>>cities was assumed in any major nuclear exchange between the
>>superpowers.
>
>This is considerably different...
Oh? The loss of all the major cities in the US was a basic assumption
of any strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers in the Cold
War. That's LOSS, not temporary retreat & attempted recapture.
>...from planning to surrender cities to an invading army and then
>fighting a guerrilla war in the coutryside.
The claim that a guerilla defense as a backup to conventional defense
would necessarily involve withdrawal from urban areas to the
countryside is yours, not mine. There is such a thing as urban
guerilla warfare, too, as the Germans learned to their regret at
Stalingrad.
>An activist policy does involve risks of a nuclear exchange. As I have
>indicated, so does a fortress America policy, but under even less
>favorable circumstances. In addition to contemplating the vaporization
>of American cities, the fortress America must also contemplate
>surrender of cities to an invader.
As if that contingency was never considered during the Cold War? It
most certainly was. Exactly the sort of worst-case scenario you've
been posing - a Commie invasion through Mexico & by air - was a real
contingency which was planned for by the US military during the Cold
War. That scenario was used as the basis for the movie "Red Dawn." In
this respect, there's no difference between your policy & mine. The
only difference is that you think the US would be better able to
prevent the formation of troops concentrations for invasion with its
diplomatic resources spread out over the entire globe than with them
concentrated on the Western hemisphere.
>>Yes - a little more cooperation than Cuba was forced into. I think
>>that if the diplomatic resources of the US were concentrated into
>>the Western hemisphere instead of being spread all around the globe
>>that the US would be able to get that much cooperation from its
>>neighbors.
>
>I don't think more diplomats will necessarily make the Mexicans more
>cooperative.
I said "more diplomatic resources," not "more diplomats."
[snip]
>>Irrelevant. The Soviet union had the industrial capacity to support a
>>250,000-man military force of a puppet regime, but not the industrial
>>capacity to support a 100 million-man force. As I said before, that
>>would've required an industrialized society with a total population
>>of about 1 billion people - something the Commies have never come
>>close to.
>
>If America retreats behind its borders, the Soviets would, of course,
>have access to the industrial support of Western Europe which would
>end up as Soviet satelites.
Unless the US had sold nukes to Britain & France, & allowed West
Germany to re-arm after WWII. The conventional Us presence in Western
Europe during the Cold War was never enough to stop conventional Soviet
attack, it was just a tripwire defense that would trigger strategic
nuclear retaliation against the Soviets in case of Soviet attack. That
tripwire would've been unnecessary if Western Europe had its own
independent strategic nuclear capability.
However, the European Union today is only what, 300-350 million people,
& still not as industrialized as the USA. It would've been as
industrialized as East Germany if it had come under Soviet occupation -
still nowhere near the level that would've been required to support a
conventional invasion force of 100 million.
[snip]
>It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much more actual
>aggressiveness than the activist policy.
Not really. I just propose to have the diplomatic resources of the US
concentrated in the Western hemisphere, while you want them spread out
all over the entire globe.
[snip]
>I don't recall Khrushchev specifying which rockets he'd use. At the
>time, it seemed like a threat to use his ICBMs located on Russian
>soil.
Kruschev didn't have any nukes capable of reaching the USA at the
time. That was why the threat of nukes in Cuba was so significant, as
they would've been the first Soviet nukes capable of reaching the USA.
Kruschev couldn't possibly have threatened to nuke the USA from Soviet
soil at the time, he could only threaten to nuke Western Europe. See
John L. Gaddis' "We Now Know" on this.
[snip]
>>It's a damn lie.
>
>Which part? The part about requiring more resolve for the fortress
>America policy or the part about those not having resolve for the
>activist policy not having for the retreat policy as well?
Both.
>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey, I didn't agree
that Kennedy did so out of a lack of resolve.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>[snip]
>>>>With the U.S. following more or less activist policy, which
>>>>ultimately succeeded with Ronald Reagan, the U.S. never had to
>>>>contemplate giving up its cities or make other similar last-resort
>>>>plans comparable to a safe in a bank.
>>>False. Bunkers fortified against nuclear attack were built for NORAD
>>>as well as for the US government. Some of them are still in operation
>>>today. All civil defense measures for the US against nuclear attack
>>>were totally abandoned after the 1950s. The loss of all major US
>>>cities was assumed in any major nuclear exchange between the
>>>superpowers.
>>This is considerably different...
>Oh? The loss of all the major cities in the US was a basic assumption
>of any strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers in the Cold
>War. That's LOSS, not temporary retreat & attempted recapture.
In a nuclear exchange, yes.
>>...from planning to surrender cities to an invading army and then
>>fighting a guerrilla war in the coutryside.
>The claim that a guerilla defense as a backup to conventional
>defense would necessarily involve withdrawal from urban areas
>to the countryside is yours, not mine. There is such a thing as
>urban guerilla warfare, too, as the Germans learned to their
>regret at Stalingrad.
The German's defeat at Stalingrad was not due to urban guerilla
warfare but to General Zhukov's strategy of giving defenders just
enough to hold out while secretly building up reserve forces. Thus
at one moment, the Germans had all but a slight corner of Stalingrad,
and then the next moment, the German Army was surrounded by fresh
Soviet forces which seemingly came out of nowhere.
The successful guerilla wars I know about have been fought out in
the countrysides with the cities last to fall.
>>An activist policy does involve risks of a nuclear exchange. As I have
>>indicated, so does a fortress America policy, but under even less
>>favorable circumstances. In addition to contemplating the vaporization
>>of American cities, the fortress America must also contemplate
>>surrender of cities to an invader.
>As if that contingency was never considered during the Cold War? It
>most certainly was. Exactly the sort of worst-case scenario you've
>been posing - a Commie invasion through Mexico & by air - was a real
>contingency which was planned for by the US military during the Cold
>War. That scenario was used as the basis for the movie "Red Dawn."
>In this respect, there's no difference between your policy & mine.
>The only difference is that you think the US would be better able
>to prevent the formation of troops concentrations for invasion with
>its diplomatic resources spread out over the entire globe than with
>them concentrated on the Western hemisphere.
I don't think diplomatic resources are particularly useful in
preventing troop concentrations.
The U.S. activist policy, using military and other resources kept
concentration of Soviet forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe. Better there than in Canada and Mexico.
>>>Yes - a little more cooperation than Cuba was forced into. I think
>>>that if the diplomatic resources of the US were concentrated into
>>>the Western hemisphere instead of being spread all around the globe
>>>that the US would be able to get that much cooperation from its
>>>neighbors.
>>I don't think more diplomats will necessarily make the Mexicans more
>>cooperative.
>I said "more diplomatic resources," not "more diplomats."
That would involve more embassy buildings, CIA agents, clerks,
secretaries as well as diplomats and other State Department officials.
I don't think more of them would make much difference in Mexico.
>[snip]
>>>Irrelevant. The Soviet union had the industrial capacity to support a
>>>250,000-man military force of a puppet regime, but not the industrial
>>>capacity to support a 100 million-man force. As I said before, that
>>>would've required an industrialized society with a total population
>>>of about 1 billion people - something the Commies have never come
>>>close to.
>>If America retreats behind its borders, the Soviets would, of course,
>>have access to the industrial support of Western Europe which would
>>end up as Soviet satelites.
>Unless the US had sold nukes to Britain & France, & allowed West
>Germany to re-arm after WWII. The conventional Us presence in Western
>Europe during the Cold War was never enough to stop conventional
>Soviet attack, it was just a tripwire defense that would trigger
>strategic nuclear retaliation against the Soviets in case of Soviet
>attack. That tripwire would've been unnecessary if Western Europe
>had its own independent strategic nuclear capability.
The U.S. must take its allies as it finds them. Left to themselves,
Western Europeans would not have put up much resistance against
the Soviets, even if they had access to nuclear weapons. Each one
would have folded before the first threat by the Soviet Union. The
U.S. constantly had to cajole, prod, sometimes lean on its European
allies to get them to put up some resistance to a Soviet takeover
in Europe when their strongest desire was to follow the foreign
policy of Finland.
U.S. resistance against the Soviets would be more difficult with
Western Europe dominated by the Soviets.
>However, the European Union today is only what, 300-350 million
>people, & still not as industrialized as the USA. It would've been
>as industrialized as East Germany if it had come under Soviet
>occupation - still nowhere near the level that would've been
>required to support a conventional invasion force of 100 million.
Actually, the more I think about it, the less likely that the
Soviets and the their allies would need 100 million. Originally
were talking about 50 million militia types, as in weekend
warriers. Going one on one, a unit of regular military would easily
defeat a militia force. Therefore 100 million would not be needed,
probably not even 50 million.
>[snip]
>>It's interesting that the retreat policy involves much more actual
>>aggressiveness than the activist policy.
>Not really. I just propose to have the diplomatic resources of the
>US concentrated in the Western hemisphere, while you want them spread
>out all over the entire globe.
What he had snipped out was a reference to a preemptive attack against
Soviet attempts to move forces into Canada, as in:
I said:
"This assumes a massive invasion by sea. Since they could transport
their troops to Canada and Mexico, the U.S. would have to
contemplate a preemptive attack on transport ship going from the
U.S.S.R or China to Canada or Mexico."
Starr said:
"Fine with me."
We weren't talking about diplomatic resources.
>[snip]
>>I don't recall Khrushchev specifying which rockets he'd use. At the
>>time, it seemed like a threat to use his ICBMs located on Russian
>>soil.
>Kruschev didn't have any nukes capable of reaching the USA at the
>time. That was why the threat of nukes in Cuba was so significant,
>as they would've been the first Soviet nukes capable of reaching the
>USA. Kruschev couldn't possibly have threatened to nuke the USA from
>Soviet soil at the time, he could only threaten to nuke Western
>Europe.
Actually, the Soviets did. They had a force of SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMs
deployed. The Soviets used the modified version of SS-6 to launch
the Sputnik in 1957. The Soviets also had their Bear and Badger
bombers which were also capable of reaching the U.S.
>See John L. Gaddis' "We Now Know" on this.
I'll check it out.
>[snip]
>>>It's a damn lie.
>>Which part? The part about requiring more resolve for the fortress
>>America policy or the part about those not having resolve for the
>>activist policy not having for the retreat policy as well?
>Both.
We've got two alternatives. There's the activist policy which
ultimately succeeded under Ronald Reagan. Then we've got the
cornered rat defense, a strategy which has no chance of ultimate
success.
The first required some resolve, and not all presidents had it.
One had it, and that was all that was needed.
The second requires all the desperation of a cornered animal.
I'm glad America didn't adopt the second strategy.
>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
be determined.
>I didn't agree that Kennedy did so out of a lack of resolve.
Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
Jim Austin
Billy Beck
Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>wj...@mindspring.com wrote:
>>Churchill advances the case that, if Hitler succeeded in starving
>>Britain out, then he stood a very good chance of ruling the world.
>>It's a strong case, but I don't buy it. It essentially rests on the
>>state of world naval power at the beginning of the war, which cannot
>>be denied, but which also does not account for American production
>>capacity not yet in action when his conviction was concluded.
>
>Britain won the Battle of Britain in 1940, before the US entered the
>war. Once the Battle of the Atlantic, there was no longer any national
>defense need for Britain to continue the war against Germany, & if
>Germany was incapable of invading & conquering Britain across the
>English Channel, then there was certainly no chance of Germany invading
>& conquering America across the entire Atlantic.
That is quite correct. A lynchpin of Churchill's "Hitler ruling
the world" idea was the threat of the Royal Navy falling into his
hands, a very unlikely event because there were no (French) Darlans in
the Royal Navy. Even so, America would have been completely
impossible for Hitler to conquer under any circumstances. Anyone who
finds that remotely possible is simply delusional.
>[snip]
>
>>Apart from that fact, Churchill and Roosevelt were complete fools
>>in their dealings with Stalin, who not only stood completely silent in
>>"Britain's hour of mortal peril," but also actually gave material
>>support to the Nazis right up to the moment when Panzers crossed the
>>Russian frontier.
>
>By the time of Barbarossa, Churchill was desperate for a great power
>ally against Germany. He had been trying to get the USA to play that
>role for quite some time, but had not yet succeeded. See John
>Charmley's "Churchill: The End of Glory" on this.
Oh, it's quite evident in all Churchill's own words of official
correspondance included in his history.
Billy Beck
Jim Austin <bjaust...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Tim Starr wrote:
>>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>
>>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
>
>Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
>from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
>be determined.
They were useless, and I am convinced that everybody knew it, to
include Khrushchev. Kennedy *certainly* knew it, and while I have no
documentary evidence at hand, everything I know about Soviet
intelligence of the period can only lead me to the conclusion that
Khrushchev knew, as well. If you don't know where Jupiter stood, as a
matter of technical evolution, in the US defense scheme, you can't
understand this point or what it means. That program was on its very
last quivering legs, already superceded by Atlas (the first ICBM) by
over two years at the time of the Cuban crisis. Kennedy gave away
nothing by pulling the Jupiters out of Turkey (half of which *never*
came to operational status in any case in the whole time they were
there).
I've pointed this out to you before, Tim. This whole subject is
conditioned by things about which most people are nearly completely
ignorant. They're mainly about force structure evolution throughout
the period, and McNamara's technocratic meddling also has a lot to do
with it. Things were changing quite drastically through Kennedy's
term. It's necessary to understand IRBM's, which he inherited, as a
temporary strategic *adjunct* to manned bomber forces, on the way to
the true strategic "triad" model in place by the mid-60's. What that
means is that forward basing diminished in importance nearly weekly
throughout the entire Kennedy administration as the triad came online.
By 1964, active CONUS ICBM deployments surpassed alert-bomber forces.
("Official SAC Chronology", 1979) The earliest Air-Launched Cruise
Missiles (Hound Dog/B-52) were active even before then, and the combat
implications are that forward-based IRBM's were simply unnecessary to
strategy because of the range of other weapons. Kennedy didn't need
the foreign policy headaches, and the Air Force certainly didn't need
*Jupiter* because it was a pain-in-the-ass system hand-me-down from
the Navy and Army, both of which had previously rejected it.
Jupiter was one of only two IRBM's ever deployed. (The other and
older was Thor, the last of which was deactivated in December 1963.)
Thirty of them drove the maintenance troops batty in Turkey, and the
other thirty went to Italy. The whole gag was shut down by 1965, and
that was in the works before October 1962. (I suspect the Italian
contingent is what Austin is referring to with the "IRBMs out of
Western Europe" remark, but who knows?) Missiles somewhat in the
class of "IRBM's" made an encore much later on, but with the Army, in
a tactical role, which is a different thing.
Galt knows I'm no fan of Kennedy. But this "appeasement" deal
over Cuba and the IRBM's is rank nonsense in terms of serious
military/strategic matters once one understands the technical
underpinnings. My own conclusion is that Khrushchev squeezed him as
hard as he could for *anything* he could get in order to save
something of his prestige on the world stage. (It didn't really work,
because, for instance, even Ho Chi Minh took note that the Cuban
missiles went home.) Kennedy was throwing out the strategic hardware
trash, and made it look like a bone for Khrushchev to the rest of the
world. The diplomatic aspects of that might not be very attractive to
some, but make no mistake that there was a military compromise
involved. It's just not true.
And, by the way, this...
>Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
...is nearly comically simple. One thing it doesn't "say" is
"Gen. Curtis LeMay". Try to imagine what it would take to impress
*that* guy with a resolve to use nuclear weapons if the whistle blew.
Kennedy did just exactly that.
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
[snip]
>>>This is considerably different...
>
>>Oh? The loss of all the major cities in the US was a basic assumption
>>of any strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers in the Cold
>>War. That's LOSS, not temporary retreat & attempted recapture.
>
>In a nuclear exchange, yes.
So the comparison is between the total loss of every major city in the
country, vs. the possible temporary retreat from & attempted recapture
of those cities. What makes the latter worse than the former?
>>>...from planning to surrender cities to an invading army and then
>>>fighting a guerrilla war in the coutryside.
>
>>The claim that a guerilla defense as a backup to conventional
>>defense would necessarily involve withdrawal from urban areas
>>to the countryside is yours, not mine. There is such a thing as
>>urban guerilla warfare, too, as the Germans learned to their
>>regret at Stalingrad.
>
>The German's defeat at Stalingrad was not due to urban guerilla
>warfare...
1) Irrelevant. The point is that a guerilla defense doesn't require
abandonment of cities.
2) False, because without the urban guerilla warfare in the Battle of
Stalingrad, the Germans wouldn't have been tied up there when Zhukov
was able to hit them with his reserves. Without urban guerilla
warfare, tbe Battle of Stalingrad would've been lost, so Germany's
defeat in that battle WAS due to urban guerilla warfare, in part.
[snip]
>The successful guerilla wars I know about have been fought out in
>the countrysides with the cities last to fall.
The IRA's successful guerilla war against the British was conducted in
the cities as well as the countryside. I believe the same can be said
about the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli invasion which was
just recently withdrawn.
[snip]
>I don't think diplomatic resources are particularly useful in
>preventing troop concentrations.
They were pretty good at keeping nukes out of Cuba.
>The U.S. activist policy, using military and other resources kept
>concentration of Soviet forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern
>Europe.
And in Cuba, Nicaragua, & Grenada.
>>I said "more diplomatic resources," not "more diplomats."
>
>That would involve more embassy buildings, CIA agents, clerks,
>secretaries as well as diplomats and other State Department officials.
That's what you think. Diplomacy doesn't just involve the CIA & State
Department. Military threats are acts of diplomacy, too.
[snip]
>>Unless the US had sold nukes to Britain & France, & allowed West
>>Germany to re-arm after WWII. The conventional Us presence in Western
>>Europe during the Cold War was never enough to stop conventional
>>Soviet attack, it was just a tripwire defense that would trigger
>>strategic nuclear retaliation against the Soviets in case of Soviet
>>attack. That tripwire would've been unnecessary if Western Europe
>>had its own independent strategic nuclear capability.
>
>The U.S. must take its allies as it finds them. Left to themselves,
>Western Europeans would not have put up much resistance against
>the Soviets, even if they had access to nuclear weapons. Each one
>would have folded before the first threat by the Soviet Union.
Nonsense. Britain refused to surrender to Hitler, but would've done so
with Stalin?
>The U.S. constantly had to cajole, prod, sometimes lean on its
>European allies to get them to put up some resistance to a Soviet
>takeover in Europe...
Bullshit. The US didn't want to be in Europe at all after WWII, it was
the European allies of the US that wanted US protection. See
Gaddis' "We Now Know" on this. NATO was originally supposed to be
temporary, at least as far as the US was concerned. Continued US
membership in NATO came at European insistence. European opposition to
US anti-Communist foreign policy was primarily aimed at activities in
Asia or elsewhere besides Europe.
>...when their strongest desire was to follow the foreign
>policy of Finland.
Total military resistance to Soviet aggression, even alliance with Nazi
Germany? Sounds good to me. :-) Finland was compromised after WWII by
its alliance with the defeated Nazis, which is why it had to make more
concessions to the Soviets than it would've liked. Finland is still
pretty anti-Russian in its foreign policy - Finland is one of the few
other countries in the world besides the US opposed to an international
ban on land mines, because it needs them to defend its eastern border.
>Actually, the more I think about it, the less likely that the
>Soviets and the their allies would need 100 million. Originally
>were talking about 50 million militia types, as in weekend
>warriers. Going one on one, a unit of regular military would easily
>defeat a militia force.
Which is why the Russian regulars have so easily defeated the Chechen
militia, right? :-) That's why the Soviets so easily defeated the
Afghans? The Nazis' own estimates for the conquest of Switzerland said
they'd need a ratio of 5-to-1 to beat the Swiss.
Every major military power in the world has lost a war against
guerillas since WWII. Even the Viet Cong were unable to defeat the
Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, despite a total lack of restraint in
prosecuting that war. They've all had overwhelming conventional
superiority, & have had varying degrees of restraint, from lots to
virtually none. E.g., The Soviets had a literal take-no-prisoners
policy in Afghanistan & used chemical weapons.
[snip]
>>>I don't recall Khrushchev specifying which rockets he'd use. At the
>>>time, it seemed like a threat to use his ICBMs located on Russian
>>>soil.
>
>>Kruschev didn't have any nukes capable of reaching the USA at the
>>time. That was why the threat of nukes in Cuba was so significant,
>>as they would've been the first Soviet nukes capable of reaching the
>>USA. Kruschev couldn't possibly have threatened to nuke the USA from
>>Soviet soil at the time, he could only threaten to nuke Western
>>Europe.
>
>Actually, the Soviets did. They had a force of SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMs
>deployed.
How many? That wouldn't be the half-dozen or so that Kennedy blew into
the "missile gap" by swallowing Khruschev's propaganda whole before he
became POTUS & saw the same intel photos Ike had seen to disprove
Khruschev's bluff?
>The Soviets used the modified version of SS-6 to launch the Sputnik in
>1957. The Soviets also had their Bear and Badger bombers which were
>also capable of reaching the U.S.
We were talking about missiles, not bombers.
[snip]
>>>>It's a damn lie.
>
>>>Which part? The part about requiring more resolve for the fortress
>>>America policy or the part about those not having resolve for the
>>>activist policy not having for the retreat policy as well?
>
>>Both.
>
>We've got two alternatives. There's the activist policy which
>ultimately succeeded under Ronald Reagan. Then we've got the
>cornered rat defense...
Question-begging by disparaging characterization.
>a strategy which has no chance of ultimate success.
Question-begging, again.
>The first required some resolve, and not all presidents had it.
>One had it, and that was all that was needed.
Who was that? Truman? Ike? Nixon? You aren't even accurate in your
judgement of Kennedy's anti-Communist resolve, now you're saying all it
took was one anti-Commie president to win the Cold War? How was Reagan
any more anti-Commie than Ike>
>>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>
>>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
>
>Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
>from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
>be determined.
That resulted from the obsolescence of the missiles & their replacement
by ICBMs. Kennedy didn't even recall the ones in Turkey until
Khruschev brought them up in one of his demands. They were mostly
symbolic, same as the ones in Italy.
>>I didn't agree that Kennedy did so out of a lack of resolve.
>
>Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
Kennedy was hardly any less anti-Communist than Reagan, as demonstrated
by his reinforcement of the US army garrison in Berlin in the Berlin
Wall crisis, the escalation of US military support for South Vietnam, &
his denial of Soviet nukes to Cuba. His policies had their failures,
but not because of a lack of resolve.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
wj...@mindspring.com wrote:
[snip]
>>Britain won the Battle of Britain in 1940, before the US entered the
>>war. Once the Battle of the Atlantic, there was no longer any
>>national defense need for Britain to continue the war against
>>Germany, & if Germany was incapable of invading & conquering Britain
>>across the English Channel, then there was certainly no chance of
>>Germany invading & conquering America across the entire Atlantic.
>
>That is quite correct. A lynchpin of Churchill's "Hitler ruling
>the world" idea was the threat of the Royal Navy falling into his
>hands, a very unlikely event because there were no (French) Darlans in
>the Royal Navy.
Right. The officers of the Royal Navy would've proudly scuttled their
ships before letting them fall into enemy hands.
[rest snipped because of agreement]
Tym Parsons
> >>Whatever you say, General Westmoreland. Another 200,000 troops this
> >>year? You can see light at the end of the tunnel?
> >
> >Insinuation in place of argument. The US tied its hands in Vietnam
> >as well, and I explicitly said how in an exchange with Starr years
> >ago.
>
> You were wrong about that, too. If US self-restraint was the reason
> why the US lost the Vietnam war, it wasn't because of the restraints
> you referred to.
So the Pest asserts.
> >>Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy,
> >>eh?
> >
> >What a dumb-ass assumption.
>
> Well, then, how'd they win, if they didn't have the right philosophy?
The Pest ignores the fact that I already responded to this.
<snip strawman>
> >If the Swiss had nukes, why would they even "need" a policy of
> >neutrality?
>
> Because nukes aren't the means of invulnerability.
"Void for vagueness", as the Pest would say.
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
> >Starr pulls this idiotic punch all the time, and it makes replying
> >really tedious. I make a GENERAL point, e.g. a policy of neutrality
> >and appeasement on principle is immoral and impractical, and Starr
> >promptly zeroes in on isolated concretes, specific times and
> >places...completely ripped from any context whatsoever.
>
> IOW, I point out how your abstract principles prove false when put to
> the test of history.
No he doesn't. More chestbeating from Ankle-biter Starr.
> How dare I show your floating abstractions for the mystical,
> intrinsicist altriusm they are! :-)
Except that Ankle-biter doesn't show any of this.
> >Then he pragmatically demands that something must be done, "somehow".
> >Chamberlain appeases Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and both pay the
> >price when Hitler embarks on a program of conquest. Consequently
> >Britain doesn't have the resources to push back without America, and
> >somehow the principle I advocate is wanting?? Hardly. It just goes
> >to show what happens when the principle isn't followed, and proves my
> >point.
>
> Your argument presumes that Britain had the resources to stop Nazi
> Germany at Munich in 1938, but that is false. Britain didn't have
> the necessary resources,
Oh they had the resources all right. The problem was that the greatest
world power of the previous century had failed to prepare for this sort
of eventuality. It was disgraceful.
> & both Chamberlain & Churchill knew it. You misinterpret
> Chamberlain's acceptance of Britain's limited resources as a moral
> failing instead of a material one.
Chamberlain's moral failing lay not in acknowledging Britain's political
reality; it lay in PRETENDING to the world that Hitler wasn't a thug who
would take advantage of every concession the West gave him. His failing
lay in pretending that letting Hitler take the Sudetenland would somehow
lead to "peace in our time". It morally disarmed the West. Even if
there was nothing he could have done about it at the time, he should
have denounced Hitler for the thug he was, and tried to wake up public
opinion in Britain and the Continent about it.
<snip idiotic strawman>
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Ankle-biter Starr
Only on your wet dreams, Par-Broil.
>wrote:
>
>>>>Churchill, Walter Lippman, & other experts praised the Swiss for
>>>>their role in WWII.
>>>
>>>Appeal to authority.
>>
>>Appeal to expert opinion on the subject.
>
>His expertise is irrelevant here.
It most certainly is, since you haven't any.
>This is a MORAL question, not a tactical one.
False (mind-body) dichotomy. Strategic & tactical considerations are
part & parcel of the moral question of whether the Swiss ought to have
declared war on Germany. Since ought implies can, if the Swiss
couldn't possibly have won a war against Germany, then they can't have
been under any moral obligation to go to war against Germany. It was
different for Britain & France since they were Great Powers, it wasn't
obvious ex ante that they couldn't possibly have beaten Germany between
the two of them plus any other minor European powers they could pick
up, but Germany was an industrialized power 20 times the size of
Switzerland at the time. There was no way in hell the Swiss were going
to defeat Germany in an offensive war, or escape invasion & conquest if
they weren't neutral.
>>Churchill may have been wrong, but he certainly knew more than almost
>>anyone about the alliances involved in WWII, being one of the primary
>>builders of those alliances.
>
>He was wrong in this regard *shrug*
Says the guy who says the historical facts are irrelevant to his
morality.
[snip]
>>...you claimed that Switzerland ought to have declared war on
>>Germany, even though Germany hadn't committed any act of war against
>>Switzerland, just because Germany had committed an act of war against
>>another country. You claimed that it was morally wrong for
>>Switzerland not to make such a declaration of war.
>
>As usual Starr is twisting things. If Switzerland hadn't had a policy
>of moral neutrality in the first place, the question of war would have
>been moot.
1) Non-responsive.
2) False, Switzerland has no "policy of moral neutrality," it has a
policy of neutrality in international affairs, not morality. Swiss
diplomats worked actively behind the scene to end the war and to stop
the Holocaust.
<snip irrelevance>
>>>I've never claimed that France was the epitome of honor in WWII.
>>
>>But France did what you fault Switzerland for not doing, France
>>declared war on Germany even though Germany hadn't committed any act
>>of war against France.
>
>That hardly makes France "the epitomy [sic] of honor" in my view.
Why not? France did what you demand of the Swiss, with the same
outcome that would've resulted from any Swiss declaration of war
against Germany - except that the outcome would've been even more
certain for Switzerland: Defeat, conquest, occupation, & collaboration.
<snip>
>>>>After the fall of France, Switzerland would've been suicidally
>>>>stupid to THEN declare war on Germany, after the combination of
>>>>Britain, France, & Belgium had failed to stop the German invasion
>>>>of France. That could've provoked an immediate German invasion of
>>>>Switzerland, when they weren't fully-prepared to resist.
>>>
>>>I'm not in a position to evaluate this claim...
>>
>>Then you're incompetent to make the claims you've been making about
>>whether Switzerland ought to have declared war on Germany.
>
>No I'm not because this has nothing to do with my argument as usual %o
Yes you are, because it has everything to with it. It would've been
suicidal for the Swiss to have gone to war against Germany. That fact
means that your condemnation of their neutrality amounts to
condemnation of the Swiss for not committing national suicide - hardly
compatible with any morality of rational self-interest.
>>>...but it has little if anything to do with my argument.
>>
>>It has everything to do with your argument. You demand suicidal
>>actions in the name of "morality."
>
>No I don't.
Yes, you most certainly do. You condemn the Swiss for not declaring
war on a neighboring country that was 20 times their size, when they
were surrounded on all other sides by that neighbor's allies or
occupied territories. That would've been suicidal, but you condemn
them for not doing it.
><snip>
>
>>>First and foremost I'm saying that in a clearcut fight between good
>>>and evil, neutrality amounts to moral agnosticism, which can only
>>>benefit evil.
>>
>>In other words, you're deducing your conclusion from abstract
>>principles without bothering to check whether those abstract
>>principles correspond to reality or not.
>
>No I'm not.
You most certainly are. You repeatedly declare that the actual
historical strategic situation of the Swiss is irrelevant to your moral
condemnation of them. You repeatedly deny that the fact that they
couldn't possibly have won an invasion of Germany bears any relevance
to your moral condemnation of them for not making offensive war against
Germany.
>>What "clearcut fight between good and evil"? When, precisely, would
>>you have had Switzerland declare war on Germany?
>
>This is a meaningless, pragmatist question, and I've already responded
>to it in other posts.
The timing of a Swiss declaration of war against Germany goes to
establish the strategic situation of the Swiss at the time, which is
directly relevant to their ability to make war on Germany. Your
calling it "pragmatist" is more evidence of how you sunder the moral
from the practical. Your "response" in other posts has been to
complain about being challenged to apply your vaunted moral principles
in historical context, not to answer the question.
Your interpretation of "the moral is the practical" is to derive your
moral conclusions from abstract principles, then declare those
conclusions practical, no matter what practical limitations there may
be in the real world. A better approach is to start with an assessment
of all practical possibilities, then pick the one that is morally
best. Your attitude is that if reality doesn't live up to your
morality, so much for reality - not to make what's morally best of the
realistic options.
>Starr's scattershot tactics of making flurries of posts all on the
>same subject make a consolidated reply impracticable.
Since when do you care about what's "practicable"? How pragmatist of
you! :-) You don't give a shit about whether it was "practicable" for
the Swiss to make war on Germany in WWII, but you whine that it's a bit
inconvenient for you to make a consolidated reply to me?
Since when have you ever made any reply at a length of more than a few
paragraphs (at a few lines per paragraph) to anyone? Since when have
you used this newsgroup for any sort of discussion more substantive
than the flippancy of an IRC channel?
>And I think he wants it that way: he just tries to score rhetorical
>points rather than have a substantive discussion.
I'd love to have a substantive discussion, but every time I ask you a
substantive question, you complain about having to apply your moral
principles in the historical context of the real world.
>>When Germany invaded Poland? When one dictatorship invaded another?
>>Poland was a semi-fascist dictatorship at the time, you know, with
>>dreams of imperial expansion of its own, and both Britain & France
>>were empires with oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe.
>>After the fall of France? After Germany invaded the Soviet Union?
>
>What to do in particular situations is a matter of tactics: you apply
>principles to context as best you can. By the time the Swiss found
>themselves in a pickle, there may well have been nothing else they
>COULD do but remain "neutral": they'd already forfeited the options.
What options did they have, and when?
>In PRINCIPLE I say that Switzerland should have cast their lot with
>liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France, or the US if
>possible, DECADES before Hitler even came to power.
Like Poland did? Fat lot of good it did Poland. What good would that
have possibly done the Swiss? Where would you have rather spent WWII,
in Poland, or Switzerland?
>The United States and Britain in particular were the freest countries
>in the world, and it's unconscionable moral agnosticism to speak of
>"oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe" in this regard.
>Starr would have you believe that Britain with its policy of
>colonialism was the moral equivalent of Nazi Germany.
Moral equivalency is your strawman, not my position.
Do you think Britain was the "clear-cut good guy" in WWII?
>>>They should have spoken up and acted YEARS before the Nazis had them
>>>cornered, as should have Britain and France, until it was too late.
>>>They should have all banded together and done everything they could
>>>to stop the Nazis. A trade embargo probably would have sufficed.
>>
>>A TRADE EMBARGO? For a totalitarian regime bent on an economic
>>policy of total autarky?
>
>It's amusing to see a self-professed "capitalist" like Starr fearing
>autarky.
No "fear" about it, just a recognition that Hitler didn't give a shit
about foreign trade with the West.
>>The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure stopped Japan from
>>waging war in China, didn't it? :-)
>
>Who said it was supposed to, all by itself?
You said a trade embargo would've been enough to stop Hitler. Why, if
it wasn't enough to stop Japan?
>>A trade embargo on Germany by Britain, France, & the rest of Western
>>Europe would probably have brought on the Nazi-Soviet Pact even
>>sooner than when it actually did happen. This is an absurd
>>suggestion, given the historical facts of the situation.
>
>Why would an embargo have done that?
Because the Nazis would still have wanted raw materials, & would no
longer be able to get them from anywhere else besides Soviet Russia.
>The Soviets were initially opposed to the Nazis...
No, they weren't, they were initially in favor of an alliance between
the German Communist Party & the Nazi Party, in the 1920s. The
alliance was in effect for a while, but broken off by Hitler. in 1932,
the KPD was pro-Nazi & anti-Social Democrat ("Social Fascist"), under
Stalin's orders. Hitler & Stalin collaborated in the Nazi Show Trial
of the Brownshirts who were accused of burning the Reichstag (see
Koch's "Secret Lives") in '34, Stalin had the German secret police
forge documents with which to frame the Soviet officers who he purged
in 1937, he had political opponents repatriated from Germany to Soviet
Russia by the Nazis, etc.
The Popular Front wasn't even Stalin's idea, it was the idea of Wili
Munzenburg, Lenin's Comintern propaganda chief, who was trying to save
himself from Stalin by making himself indispensable. It was never
anything more than a snow-job for the West to make Stalin look good by
making Hitler look bad.
>Their geopolitical interests lay with supporting an embargo by the
>West.
Nope. Soviet Russia had been helping Germany circumvent the Versailles
treaty restrictions on military R&D since the early 1920s, & that was
only stopped by Hitler when he first came to power, then continued in
the late 1930s. Who do you think taught the Soviets to make tanks &
airplanes, or trained the Soviet officer corps?
>Or if not, it just means the West should have embargoed the Soviets
>too...
The West was unable to win the Battle of the Atlantic until 1943 with
the Soviets tying up the bulk of German resources on the Eastern
Front. It would've been much harder to do so with Nazi Germany &
Soviet Russia in alliance with each other.
>...established blockades, come to the aid of Czechoslavakia and
>Poland...
How many divisions could "the West" have fielded in Poland in 1939, to
defend it against a dual invasion by both Germany & Russia? One of the
deciding factors in Stalin's decision to enter into the Nazi-Soviet
Pact was the fact that Britain could barely field any divisions in
Poland, being primarily a naval power.
>I don't see the Swiss advocating any of this.
It's not the job of small countries to do the work of big countries for
them.
>Instead they chose to remain neutral.
Yes, they chose not to commit suicide.
>That's what I'm objecting to.
Yes, you object when people choose not to commit suicide on your order.
>Dictatorships thrive because otherwise good nations let them get away
>with shit.
No. Evil is impotent. It takes more than "letting them get away with
shit" for evil to thrive, it takes active support.
>Dictatorships CRAVE moral sanction and respectability. If everyone
>had boycotted the Munich Olympics, Hitler would have thought twice
>about how far he could push the Western powers.
Like the Soviets "thought twice" about the invasion of Afghanistan
because the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics? What a laugh!
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tym Parsons
> The autonomy of the countries who declared war on Germany because of
> the German invasion of Poland was also compromised. So was the
> autonomy of the countries who ended up at war with Germany after that.
> They had to spend lots of time, money, & pay an enormous cost in human
> suffering to fight Germany to eventual victory.
This is patently ridiculous, and makes an anticoncept of "autonomy". It
obliterates the distinction between nations that are able and willing to
defend their national security interest, and those who don't.
You'd think I wouldn't be astonished anymore when the Pest makes these
sort of comments with a straight face, but I am. It boggles the mind %o
> Autonomy must be more than merely compromised in order for
> puppetization to occur. The autonomy of Japan is compromised by its
> relations with the USA, but Japan's not a US puppet. The autonomy of
> the US is compromised by its memberships in the UN & NATO, but the US
> isn't a UN or NATO puppet. Your characterization of the Swiss as Nazi
> puppets during WWII is false because it fails to take into account the
> difference in the degree to which Swiss autonomy was actually
> compromised and the degree to which it would've had to have been
> compromised in order for the Swiss to have truly been Nazi puppets.
Semantic hairsplitting that completely evades my argument about Swiss
"neutrality".
Go away Pest. You're a timewaster.
Tym Parsons
Jim Klein
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Go away Pest. You're a timewaster.
Considering Tim's last response to you, this is probably your best shot.
If that doesn't work, maybe beg some more. AFAICT, that's your _only_ shot!
jk
Billy Beck
Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> wj...@mindspring.com wrote:
>>A lynchpin of Churchill's "Hitler ruling
>>the world" idea was the threat of the Royal Navy falling into his
>>hands, a very unlikely event because there were no (French) Darlans in
>>the Royal Navy.
>
>Right. The officers of the Royal Navy would've proudly scuttled their
>ships before letting them fall into enemy hands.
Well, the French finally got around to it in 1943 when they sank
225,000 tons of cruisers, destroyers and various service shipping at
Toulon. (It was the largest single French naval action of the war.)
However, they only finally did it after Torch and declaration of the
provisional government pissed off the Nazis enough to occupy the rest
of France. Meanwhile, the Navy - a first rate instrument - had
languished and been shot to bits under Allied guns at various ports
around the world under Vichy since the start of the war. Churchill
always begged Darlan to sail it to an Allied port and then fight for
his homeland. It would have been a stellar contribution to the
effort, and Darlan's name would have been guilded forever in the
annals of heroism.
The sick sonofabitch cheezed-out, spent two years licking Nazi
boots, and was assassinated by a junior officer the week before
Toulon.
The difference is that Churchill, on the understanding of
imminent defeat, would have made damned sure the Royal Navy went
someplace safe and fit for battle under Allied command.
Tym Parsons
> > So, you care more about empty rhetorical declarations of morality
> > than about actual military defense in a country's national
> > self-interest. Quite the altruist, aren't you? :-)
>
> I had already pointed that out explicitly, but Parsons didn't respond.
I didn't respond because it was a strawman. There was nothing to
respond to.
Tym Parsons
> >This is a MORAL question, not a tactical one.
>
> False (mind-body) dichotomy. Strategic & tactical considerations are
> part & parcel of the moral question of whether the Swiss ought to have
> declared war on Germany.
Strawman. I never said that Switzerland should have declared war on
Germany all by itself. This is getting really tedious.
<snip>
> >If Switzerland hadn't had a policy of moral neutrality in the first
> >place, the question of war would have been moot.
>
> 1) Non-responsive.
No it isn't "nonresponsive". I've already said why it would be moot.
> 2) False, Switzerland has no "policy of moral neutrality," it has a
> policy of neutrality in international affairs, not morality.
"Neutrality in international affairs" is an anticoncept. When the good
compromises with evil, evil wins. So you're either on one side or the
other.
> Swiss diplomats worked actively behind the scene to end the war and to
> stop the Holocaust.
That was just rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
<snip continual strawman and repetition>
> >In PRINCIPLE I say that Switzerland should have cast their lot with
> >liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France, or the US if
> >possible, DECADES before Hitler even came to power.
>
> Like Poland did? Fat lot of good it did Poland. What good would that
> have possibly done the Swiss?
Poland has nothing to do with what I'm talking about, so it's not
meaningful to say that Poland ever cast its lot with the West. I'm
talking about a long-term commonality of strategic interests, based on
freedom, prosperity, and economic might. There's simply no way that
Hitler could have stood up to a principled, combined and timely
opposition. That's why it was in the interest of the Swiss, with their
relatively free markets, to cast their lot with the West.
> Where would you have rather spent WWII, in Poland, or Switzerland?
Meaningless, pointless question in this context. See above.
> >The United States and Britain in particular were the freest countries
> >in the world, and it's unconscionable moral agnosticism to speak of
> >"oppressed colonial subjects all around the globe" in this regard.
> >Starr would have you believe that Britain with its policy of
> >colonialism was the moral equivalent of Nazi Germany.
>
> Moral equivalency is your strawman, not my position.
>
> Do you think Britain was the "clear-cut good guy" in WWII?
Yes. Who did Ankle-biter think I meant, the Nazis? Now we'll see who's
making a strawman.
> >>>They should have all banded together and done everything they could
> >>>to stop the Nazis. A trade embargo probably would have sufficed.
> >>
> >>A TRADE EMBARGO? For a totalitarian regime bent on an economic
> >>policy of total autarky?
> >
> >It's amusing to see a self-professed "capitalist" like Starr fearing
> >autarky.
>
> No "fear" about it, just a recognition that Hitler didn't give a shit
> about foreign trade with the West.
Well, he should have given a shit. Autarky doesn't work. It's really a
matter of trade or die.
> >>The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure stopped Japan from
> >>waging war in China, didn't it? :-)
> >
> >Who said it was supposed to, all by itself?
>
> You said a trade embargo would've been enough to stop Hitler. Why, if
> it wasn't enough to stop Japan?
Notice that Ankle-biter snipped the rest of my query without indicating
thus, in hopes of evading the issue. It's just one indication of how he
fights dirty. My whole query read:
"Who said it was supposed to, all by itself? This begs the question of
what legitimate interest the US had in East Asia, and whether it was
intelligently followed in a principled manner. It also begs relevance
to a concerted effort by the Swiss, Britain, France, and others against
Germany."
> >>A trade embargo on Germany by Britain, France, & the rest of Western
> >>Europe would probably have brought on the Nazi-Soviet Pact even
> >>sooner than when it actually did happen. This is an absurd
> >>suggestion, given the historical facts of the situation.
> >
> >Why would an embargo have done that?
>
> Because the Nazis would still have wanted raw materials, & would no
> longer be able to get them from anywhere else besides Soviet Russia.
All the more reason to have blockaded Hitler's access to raw materials,
back when he became a forseeable threat. This is just common sense.
Before Hitler, Germany was prostrate militarily and economically.
> >The Soviets were initially opposed to the Nazis...
>
> No, they weren't, they were initially in favor of an alliance between
> the German Communist Party & the Nazi Party, in the 1920s. The
> alliance was in effect for a while, but broken off by Hitler. in
> 1932, the KPD was pro-Nazi & anti-Social Democrat ("Social Fascist"),
> under Stalin's orders. Hitler & Stalin collaborated in the Nazi Show
> Trial of the Brownshirts who were accused of burning the Reichstag
> (see Koch's "Secret Lives") in '34, Stalin had the German secret
> police forge documents with which to frame the Soviet officers who he
> purged in 1937, he had political opponents repatriated from Germany to
> Soviet Russia by the Nazis, etc.
>
> The Popular Front wasn't even Stalin's idea, it was the idea of Wili
> Munzenburg, Lenin's Comintern propaganda chief, who was trying to save
> himself from Stalin by making himself indispensable. It was never
> anything more than a snow-job for the West to make Stalin look good by
> making Hitler look bad.
>
> >Their geopolitical interests lay with supporting an embargo by the
> >West.
>
> Nope. Soviet Russia had been helping Germany circumvent the
> Versailles treaty restrictions on military R&D since the early 1920s,
> & that was only stopped by Hitler when he first came to power, then
> continued in the late 1930s. Who do you think taught the Soviets to
> make tanks & airplanes, or trained the Soviet officer corps?
I have neither the time nor the interest in arguing this point, altho it
is a commonplace that Germany was historically Russia's nemesis. But
none of this is essential to my argument. Even if the claims above are
assumed for the sake of argument, it doesn't change anything:
> >Or if not, it just means the West should have embargoed the Soviets
> >too...
>
> The West was unable to win the Battle of the Atlantic until 1943 with
> the Soviets tying up the bulk of German resources on the Eastern
> Front.
That's because the Western powers didn't mobilise until it was too late;
they brought it on themselves. Like I said, they should have nipped
Hitler in the bud by withdrawing any sort of sanction whatsoever earlier
on e.g. the Munich Olympics.
> It would've been much harder to do so with Nazi Germany & Soviet
> Russia in alliance with each other.
It's arguably possible that we couldn't have opposed the Nazis and the
Soviets at the same time, which is in fact why the West took on the
Soviets as an ally during WWII itself. So what? It's just applying
principles to context. You take on the worst element and deal with the
rest later.
> >...established blockades, come to the aid of Czechoslavakia and
> >Poland...
>
> How many divisions could "the West" have fielded in Poland in 1939, to
> defend it against a dual invasion by both Germany & Russia?
This presumes that I ever made such a tactical recommendation, which I
didn't. As usual Ankle-biter is lurching at another strawman. In
general it would have made sense to give the Poles material aid, if not
send divisions. It would have helped drive a wedge between Germany and
Russia.
And aiding the Czechoslavakian republic would have provided a truncheon
poised on Hitler's southern flank. There's simply no way he would have
been able to embark on a campaign of conquest had that happened. Hitler
was just feeling out weakness and taking advantage of it. That's what
all dictators do. They're pathetic in and of themselves.
> One of the deciding factors in Stalin's decision to enter into the
> Nazi-Soviet Pact was the fact that Britain could barely field any
> divisions in Poland, being primarily a naval power.
It wasn't as if Britain didn't have the economic might to kick ass:
firepower is more important than manpower. When it became apparent that
Hitler was a forseeable threat, why couldn't Britain have established a
naval presence in the eastern Baltic, say centered in Gdansk, to say
nothing of the North Sea?
> >I don't see the Swiss advocating any of this.
>
> It's not the job of small countries to do the work of big countries
> for them.
This begs the question of the WHOLE THREAD. _It's the job of ANY
country that cares about its freedom_. Ankle-biter can endlessly
nitpick and skirmish on particular items of fact, but nothing can change
this essential point: rather than advocate the right IDEAS, the Swiss
chose neutrality. "Neutrality in the defense of freedom is no virtue".
<snip>
> >Dictatorships thrive because otherwise good nations let them get away
> >with shit.
>
> No. Evil is impotent. It takes more than "letting them get away with
> shit" for evil to thrive, it takes active support.
I mean first and foremostly MORAL support, of the sort that Chamberlain
gave Hitler.
> >Dictatorships CRAVE moral sanction and respectability. If everyone
> >had boycotted the Munich Olympics, Hitler would have thought twice
> >about how far he could push the Western powers.
>
> Like the Soviets "thought twice" about the invasion of Afghanistan
> because the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics? What a laugh!
Inapt (and inept) analogy. The Soviets were already in a position to
invade Afghanistan, and they likewise largely assumed that they would be
unopposed.
Tym Parsons
Tim Starr
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Firebug, in response to Ankle-biter Starr wrote:
>
>>>So, you care more about empty rhetorical declarations of morality
>>>than about actual military defense in a country's national
>>>self-interest. Quite the altruist, aren't you? :-)
>>
>>I had already pointed that out explicitly, but Parsons didn't respond.
>
>I didn't respond because it was a strawman.
It describes your position exactly. You condemn the Swiss for not
committing national suicide by going to war against Nazi Germany.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Pest Starr wrote:
>
>>>>Whatever you say, General Westmoreland. Another 200,000 troops
>>>>this year? You can see light at the end of the tunnel?
>>>
>>>Insinuation in place of argument. The US tied its hands in Vietnam
>>>as well, and I explicitly said how in an exchange with Starr years
>>>ago.
>>
>>You were wrong about that, too. If US self-restraint was the reason
>>why the US lost the Vietnam war, it wasn't because of the restraints
>>you referred to.
>
>So the Pest asserts.
Along with many other military historians of the Vietnam War.
>>>>Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy,
>>>>eh?
>>>
>>>What a dumb-ass assumption.
>>
>>Well, then, how'd they win, if they didn't have the right philosophy?
>
>The Pest ignores the fact that I already responded to this.
You've never answered the question, you've only claimed to have
answered it. What were the self-imposed restraints to which you
attribute the US loss in Vietnam?
<snip>
>>>If the Swiss had nukes, why would they even "need" a policy of
>>>neutrality?
>>
>>Because nukes aren't the means of invulnerability.
>
>"Void for vagueness", as the Pest would say.
Not at all. The fact that a country has nukes doesn't mean that a
country is invulnerable to invasion by a neighbor 20 times its size.
Israel has nukes, & is still vulnerable to military attack.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Ankle-biter Starr wrote:
>
>>>Starr pulls this idiotic punch all the time, and it makes replying
>>>really tedious. I make a GENERAL point, e.g. a policy of neutrality
>>>and appeasement on principle is immoral and impractical, and Starr
>>>promptly zeroes in on isolated concretes, specific times and
>>>places...completely ripped from any context whatsoever.
>>
>>IOW, I point out how your abstract principles prove false when put to
>>the test of history.
>
>No he doesn't. More chestbeating from Ankle-biter Starr.
More sour grapes from Par-Broil.
>>How dare I show your floating abstractions for the mystical,
>>intrinsicist altriusm they are! :-)
>
>Except that Ankle-biter doesn't show any of this.
OK, then, how would it not have been national suicide for the Swiss to
have declared war on Germany along with Britain & France? How would
the Swiss have been better off being invaded, conquered, occupied, &
forced to collaborate, like France?
>>>Then he pragmatically demands that something must be done, "somehow".
>>>Chamberlain appeases Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and both pay the
>>>price when Hitler embarks on a program of conquest. Consequently
>>>Britain doesn't have the resources to push back without America, and
>>>somehow the principle I advocate is wanting?? Hardly. It just goes
>>>to show what happens when the principle isn't followed, and proves my
>>>point.
>>
>>Your argument presumes that Britain had the resources to stop Nazi
>>Germany at Munich in 1938, but that is false. Britain didn't have
>>the necessary resources,
>
>Oh they had the resources all right...
Bullshit. They didn't. Chamberlain & Churchill both knew it.
Churchill just counted on bringing America into the war on Britain's
side, to make up for Britain's shortfall.
>The problem was that the greatest world power of the previous
>century...
...was bankrupted by WWI, had never recovered from the Great War, had
been in a recession ever since, had already lost Ireland, was losing
influence in India, & simply couldn't afford to prepare any more or
sooner than it did.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>The Star Pest wrote:
>
>>The autonomy of the countries who declared war on Germany because of
>>the German invasion of Poland was also compromised. So was the
>>autonomy of the countries who ended up at war with Germany after
>>that. They had to spend lots of time, money, & pay an enormous cost
>>in human suffering to fight Germany to eventual victory.
>
>This is patently ridiculous, and makes an anticoncept of "autonomy".
>It obliterates the distinction between nations that are able and
>willing to defend their national security interest, and those who
>don't.
But Switzerland WAS "able and willing" to defend its "national security
interest," thanks in part to its policy of armed neutrality. The Swiss
were protected from Nazi rule throughout the entire war, despite being
entirely encircled by Axis territory.
>>Autonomy must be more than merely compromised in order for
>>puppetization to occur. The autonomy of Japan is compromised by its
>>relations with the USA, but Japan's not a US puppet. The autonomy of
>>the US is compromised by its memberships in the UN & NATO, but the US
>>isn't a UN or NATO puppet. Your characterization of the Swiss as
>>Nazi puppets during WWII is false because it fails to take into
>>account the difference in the degree to which Swiss autonomy was
>>actually compromised and the degree to which it would've had to have
>>been compromised in order for the Swiss to have truly been Nazi
>>puppets.
>
>Semantic hairsplitting...
No, recognition of differences of degree which you fail to take into
account.
>that completely evades my argument about Swiss "neutrality".
What argument? The one entirely devoid of factual content?
>Go away Pest.
Make me, coward.
>You're a timewaster.
You're a laughingstock blowhard.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
Thanks, Jim, it's nice to know my words aren't only falling upon deaf
ears. Trying to reason with Par-Broil is like administering medicine
to the dead.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tym Parsons
> >>You were wrong about that, too. If US self-restraint was the reason
> >>why the US lost the Vietnam war, it wasn't because of the restraints
> >>you referred to.
> >
> >So the Pest asserts.
>
> Along with many other military historians of the Vietnam War.
Oh please. The strongest nation in the world lost a war with a piss-ant
collectivist dump for reasons other tying its own hands? Right.
> >>>>Guess those Somalis & Viet Cong must've had the right philosophy,
> >>>>eh?
> >>>
> >>>What a dumb-ass assumption.
> >>
> >>Well, then, how'd they win, if they didn't have the right
> >>philosophy?
> >
> >The Pest ignores the fact that I already responded to this.
>
> You've never answered the question, you've only claimed to have
> answered it. What were the self-imposed restraints to which you
> attribute the US loss in Vietnam?
I answered years ago, but Ankle-biter will do anything to try and keep
the ball rolling..
> >>>If the Swiss had nukes, why would they even "need" a policy of
> >>>neutrality?
> >>
> >>Because nukes aren't the means of invulnerability.
> >
> >"Void for vagueness", as the Pest would say.
>
> Not at all. The fact that a country has nukes doesn't mean that a
> country is invulnerable to invasion by a neighbor 20 times its size.
Size is irrelevant if you're the one with the nukes. Stop wasting my
time.
> Israel has nukes, & is still vulnerable to military attack.
Israel AKAIK has never offically admitted to having nukes, much less
threatening to use them.
Tym Parsons
> >>>Then [Starr] pragmatically demands that something must be done,
> >>>"somehow". Chamberlain appeases Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and
> >>>both pay the price when Hitler embarks on a program of conquest.
> >>>Consequently Britain doesn't have the resources to push back
> >>>without America, and somehow the principle I advocate is wanting??
> >>>Hardly. It just goes to show what happens when the principle isn't
> >>>followed, and proves my point.
> >>
> >>Your argument presumes that Britain had the resources to stop Nazi
> >>Germany at Munich in 1938, but that is false. Britain didn't have
> >>the necessary resources,
> >
> >Oh they had the resources all right...
>
> Bullshit. They didn't. Chamberlain & Churchill both knew it.
> Churchill just counted on bringing America into the war on Britain's
> side, to make up for Britain's shortfall.
You mean to make up for Britain's short-sighted pragmatism.
> >The problem was that the greatest world power of the previous
> >century...
>
> ...was bankrupted by WWI, had never recovered from the Great War, had
> been in a recession ever since, had already lost Ireland, was losing
> influence in India, & simply couldn't afford to prepare any more or
> sooner than it did.
But "somehow" Germany, the LOSER in WWI, that was also in permanent
recession, plus saddled with heavy indemnities, the worst inflation ever
known, and had part of its territory occupied by France was able to
rearm and embark on a conquest spree with no problem at all? Uh-huh.
Tim Starr
>>>>>"somehow". Chamberlain appeases Hitler, the Swiss are neutral, and
>>>>>both pay the price when Hitler embarks on a program of conquest.
>>>>>Consequently Britain doesn't have the resources to push back
>>>>>without America, and somehow the principle I advocate is wanting??
>>>>>Hardly. It just goes to show what happens when the principle isn't
>>>>>followed, and proves my point.
>>>>
>>>>Your argument presumes that Britain had the resources to stop Nazi
>>>>Germany at Munich in 1938, but that is false. Britain didn't have
>>>>the necessary resources,
>>>
>>
>>Bullshit. They didn't. Chamberlain & Churchill both knew it.
>>Churchill just counted on bringing America into the war on Britain's
>>side, to make up for Britain's shortfall.
>
>You mean to make up for Britain's short-sighted pragmatism.
No, I mean to make up for Britain's lack of resources.
>>>The problem was that the greatest world power of the previous
>>>century...
>>
>>...was bankrupted by WWI, had never recovered from the Great War, had
>>been in a recession ever since, had already lost Ireland, was losing
>>influence in India, & simply couldn't afford to prepare any more or
>>sooner than it did.
>
>But "somehow" Germany, the LOSER in WWI, that was also in permanent
>recession...
Germany wasn't in "permanent recession," Germany recovered during the
first few years of Hitler's rule, thanks largely to Schacht's putting
the economy on a sound footing. Economic recovery was Hitler's first
priority, by any means necessary, whether they'd be sustainable in the
long run or not, so he could finance his military mobilization.
>plus saddled with heavy indemnities...
...which Germany defaulted on, de facto, via:
>...the worst inflation ever known...
As for this:
>and had part of its territory occupied by France was able to rearm and
>embark on a conquest spree with no problem at all? Uh-huh.
Germany's rearmament wasn't done "with no problem at all," it was done
at a very real cost in terms of the trade-off between military spending
& domestic priorities. The recovery was largely done through Keynesian
deficit-spending on the military ("Military Keynesianism") which
couldn't last - but Hitler didn't need it to last, he only needed it to
last long enough to conquer the territory he wanted for his autarkic
regime. In a command economy like Nazi Germany, domestic consumption
could be sacrificed to military spending, but not in a free-market
democracy like Britain. In order for Britain do have done what you
advocate, Britain would've had to have become a command economy in
peacetime, as Germany did.
Also, Germany's re-armament wasn't in-depth, it was in-breadth. That's
why most foreign observers over-estimated Germany's level of re-
armament, they were fooled into thinking he had a lot more depth to his
forces than he had. The whole reason for the Blitzkrieg strategy of
the first part of the war was economic - Germany couldn't afford to
fight any long protracted battles. That's why Germany did fine as long
as it could keep the battles short & decisive, but started doing badly
as soon as it got into battles that couldn't be won right away.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Tim Starr
deja.com> wrote:
>Ankle-biter Starr wrote:
>
>>>This is a MORAL question, not a tactical one.
>>
>>False (mind-body) dichotomy. Strategic & tactical considerations are
>>part & parcel of the moral question of whether the Swiss ought to have
>>declared war on Germany.
>
>Strawman. I never said that Switzerland should have declared war on
>Germany all by itself. This is getting really tedious.
What's tedious is your routine of never saying what you think the Swiss
ought to have done, but condemning them for not having done it anyways,
just so you can reject any & all descriptions of your implied position
as strawmen.
What DO you think Switzerland ought to have done? When should the
Swiss have declared war on Germany, & with whom? Until you've answered
those questions, you have no ground to stand on when it comes to
judging what they actually did.
<snip>
>>>If Switzerland hadn't had a policy of moral neutrality in the first
>>>place, the question of war would have been moot.
>>
>>1) Non-responsive.
>
>No it isn't "nonresponsive".
Yes it is, because it doesn't answer the question of what Swiss foreign
policy ought to have been in the 1930s. When should the Swiss have
declared war on Germany, & with whom?
>>2) False, Switzerland has no "policy of moral neutrality," it has a
>>policy of neutrality in international affairs, not morality.
>
>"Neutrality in international affairs" is an anticoncept.
Now you're just retreating to your intrinsicist "if you're not with me,
you're against me" crap. Moral neutrality means saying that good is no
better than evil. A neutral foreign policy means not allying with
either of two countries at war with each other. Neither
are "anticoncepts", both refer to real things which are distinct from
each other.
>>Swiss diplomats worked actively behind the scene to end the war and
>>to stop the Holocaust.
>
>That was just rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
Was sheltering more Jewish refugees from the Holocaust than any other
country in the world but Palestine was also insignificant to you?
[snip]
>>>In PRINCIPLE I say that Switzerland should have cast their lot with
>>>liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France, or the US if
>>>possible, DECADES before Hitler even came to power.
>>
>>Like Poland did? Fat lot of good it did Poland. What good would
>>that have possibly done the Swiss?
>
>Poland has nothing to do with...
Poland did exactly what you advocate. The Poles "cast their lot with
liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France," etc. They also
refused to ally with Stalin.
Where would you have rather spent WWII, in Poland, or Switzerland?
[snip]
>>Do you think Britain was the "clear-cut good guy" in WWII?
>
>Yes.
Thanks for admitting that alliance with Stalin & the forced
repatriation of people back to Stalin's grasp is your idea of what
a "clear cut good guy" does. Thanks for admitting that the firebombing
of Dresden is your idea of what a "clear cut good guy" does.
[snip]
>>No "fear" about it, just a recognition that Hitler didn't give a shit
>>about foreign trade with the West.
>
>Well, he should have given a shit. Autarky doesn't work. It's really
>a matter of trade or die.
No, it's a matter of trade, INVADE, or die. When goods don't cross
borders, armies do. Hitler was already planning on conquering the
territory with the economic resources needed for the German economy. A
trade embargo would've just brought that on sooner, rather than
delaying it.
>>>>The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure stopped Japan from
>>>>waging war in China, didn't it? :-)
>>>
>>>Who said it was supposed to, all by itself?
>>
>>You said a trade embargo would've been enough to stop Hitler. Why,
>>if it wasn't enough to stop Japan?
>
>Notice that Ankle-biter snipped the rest of my query...
You didn't answer my question, you just tried to change the subject.
[snip]
>>>The Soviets were initially opposed to the Nazis...
>>
>>No, they weren't, they were initially in favor of an alliance between
>>the German Communist Party & the Nazi Party, in the 1920s. The
>>alliance was in effect for a while, but broken off by Hitler. in
>>1932, the KPD was pro-Nazi & anti-Social Democrat ("Social Fascist"),
>>under Stalin's orders. Hitler & Stalin collaborated in the Nazi Show
>>Trial of the Brownshirts who were accused of burning the Reichstag
>>(see Koch's "Secret Lives") in '34, Stalin had the German secret
>>police forge documents with which to frame the Soviet officers who he
>>purged in 1937, he had political opponents repatriated from Germany to
>>Soviet Russia by the Nazis, etc.
>>
>>The Popular Front wasn't even Stalin's idea, it was the idea of Wili
>>Munzenburg, Lenin's Comintern propaganda chief, who was trying to save
>>himself from Stalin by making himself indispensable. It was never
>>anything more than a snow-job for the West to make Stalin look good by
>>making Hitler look bad.
>>
>>>Their geopolitical interests lay with supporting an embargo by the
>>>West.
>>
>>Nope. Soviet Russia had been helping Germany circumvent the
>>Versailles treaty restrictions on military R&D since the early 1920s,
>>& that was only stopped by Hitler when he first came to power, then
>>continued in the late 1930s. Who do you think taught the Soviets to
>>make tanks & airplanes, or trained the Soviet officer corps?
>
>I have neither the time nor the interest in arguing this point...
Too bad for you, because your argument depends on establishing that
Stalin really was hostile to Hitler before Barbarossa.
>altho it is a commonplace that Germany was historically Russia's
>nemesis.
Irrelevant. Vietnam & China have been historically enemies, too, but
that didn't stop Vietnam from being China's ally from 1945-1979. Both
Germany & the Soviet Union were pariah nations after WWI.
>But none of this is essential to my argument.
It most certainly is. Your argument is that if a collective action by
all the European powers had opposed Germany in no uncertain terms right
from the start that Hitler wouldn't have gotten anywhere. My point is
that Stalin wouldn't have participated in any such collective action,
because he was more sympathetic to his fellow totalitarian dictator
than to the democracies.
>>>Or if not, it just means the West should have embargoed the Soviets
>>>too...
>>
>>The West was unable to win the Battle of the Atlantic until 1943 with
>>the Soviets tying up the bulk of German resources on the Eastern
>>Front.
>
>That's because the Western powers didn't mobilise until it was too
>late...
No, it's because the Western allies didn't HAVE the resources to
mobilize until after the US entered the war.
[snip]
>>>...established blockades, come to the aid of Czechoslavakia and
>>>Poland...
>>
>>How many divisions could "the West" have fielded in Poland in 1939, to
>>defend it against a dual invasion by both Germany & Russia?
>
>This presumes that I ever made such a tactical recommendation, which I
>didn't.
How else would the West have come to the "aid" of Poland, other than by
fielding troops in Poland to defend against German invasion? There
wasn't anything else the West could've done that would've hindered
Hitler, & the West couldn't even do that.
>As usual Ankle-biter is lurching at another strawman. In general it
>would have made sense to give the Poles material aid...
How? Through Danzig? How long do you think the Polish Corridor
would've remained free of German invasion if Poland was getting big
shipments of military supplies through it? :-)
>And aiding the Czechoslavakian republic...
HOW? With what, when?
>>One of the deciding factors in Stalin's decision to enter into the
>>Nazi-Soviet Pact was the fact that Britain could barely field any
>>divisions in Poland, being primarily a naval power.
>
>It wasn't as if Britain didn't have the economic might to kick ass...
Yes, it most certainly was, & both Chamberlain & Churchill knew it.
See John Charmley's "Churchill: The End of Glory" on this.
>...firepower is more important than manpower. When it became apparent
>that Hitler was a forseeable threat, why couldn't Britain have
>established a naval presence in the eastern Baltic, say centered in
>Gdansk, to say nothing of the North Sea?
Oh, no reason - except for those little things known as the wolfpacks,
which were the single most effective arm of the German military in the
whole war, & which would've been even more effective had they been
confined to short-range missions in the Baltic & North Sea, instead of
being spread out across the whole north Atlantic.
There was simply no way Britain could've resisted the German invasion
of Poland without fielding lots of Army divisions on the ground in
Poland, & Britain simply couldn't do that because Britain simply wasn't
a land power. The Soviets couldn't believe how few Army divisions
Britain had when they were holding talks to come up with a collective-
security policy against the Nazis.
>>>I don't see the Swiss advocating any of this.
>>
>>It's not the job of small countries to do the work of big countries
>>for them.
>
>This begs the question of the WHOLE THREAD. _It's the job of ANY
>country that cares about its freedom_.
The Swiss did a fine job of preserving their freedom - better than
France or Poland, the countries who did what you condemn the Swiss for
not doing.
<snip>
>>>Dictatorships CRAVE moral sanction and respectability. If everyone
>>>had boycotted the Munich Olympics, Hitler would have thought twice
>>>about how far he could push the Western powers.
>>
>>Like the Soviets "thought twice" about the invasion of Afghanistan
>>because the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics? What a laugh!
>
>Inapt (and inept) analogy. The Soviets were already in a position to
>invade Afghanistan...
Like Germany was already prepared to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, or
Poland in 1939?
>...and they likewise largely assumed that they would be unopposed.
Bullshit. The whole reason they were sent in was because their puppet
ruler had provoked so much popular armed resistance that he was in
danger of being overthrown.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Ernest Brown
On 17 Nov 2000, Tim Starr wrote:
> In article <8v25og$q87$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>, Jim Klein
> <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Thanks, Jim, it's nice to know my words aren't only falling upon deaf
> ears. Trying to reason with Par-Broil is like administering medicine
> to the dead.
>
Well, considering that even Jim Austin has pointed out that the Swiss were
in no position to launch an offensive war against Germany, I think that
your point is amply substantiated.
Wisdom's Children: A Virtual Journal of Philosophy & Literature
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/billramey/wisdom.htm
Submissions welcomed.
xx
x
x
Jim Klein
Ernest Brown <c50...@showme.missouri.edu> wrote:
>>Trying to reason with Par-Broil is like administering medicine
>>to the dead.
>>
>
>Well, considering that even Jim Austin has pointed out that the Swiss were
>in no position to launch an offensive war against Germany, I think that
>your point is amply substantiated.
An understatement if ever there were one; this is getting embarrassing
already. Tym has tried every approach, from ignoring the principles and
rationalizing concretes, to ignoring concretes and rationalizing principles.
IOW, he's tried everything but integrating the two; in this his is the
perfect antithesis of Objectivism. Every which way he's gone and Tim just
keeps coming back with fact after fact after fact.
Philosophically, the interesting thing is that Tym just _refuses_ to
consider the facts; he's got a pre-ordained position totally impenetrable
by the facts. The final refuge of every ARIan is simple evasion, as it must
be. I guess that makes some sense emotionally---here Tym gets his ass
kicked up and down (again!) in broad daylight and doesn't even have the
simple awareness to know it.
jk
J. Kendrick McPeters
> Philosophically, the interesting thing is that Tym just _refuses_ to
> consider the facts; he's got a pre-ordained position totally
> impenetrable by the facts.
Did you ever consider that he might simply be stoo-pid?
> The final refuge of every ARIan is simple evasion, as it must be.
Why be so quick to chalk up to evasion, that which might easily be
accounted for by stupidity? IMHO, Par-Broil makes the Bimbo Schoolmarm
look like rocket scientist material.
> I guess that makes some sense emotionally---here Tym gets his ass
> kicked up and down (again!) in broad daylight and doesn't even have
> the simple awareness to know it.
It's quite fun to watch-- as usual. But personally, what I like best is
the rich irony that drips from this thread!
Here we have Par-Broil claiming that the Swiss were (somehow) obligated
to "do something" about the Nazis BEFORE they became a threat--- while,
as we all know from earlier debates, an American has NO RIGHT to form
even a "paintball militia" and practice guerilla warfare until AFTER a
dictatorship comes into being--- at which time, we'd be entitled to form
"revolutionary cadres" rather than militias.
(What precisely Par-Broil's "cadres" would DO, having been disarmed
during the process that gave rise to the dictatorship, was never quite
explained, alas.)
---Kendrick
PS: If Gore manages to steal the election via "hanging chad," I wonder
if we'll be ready for Par-Broil's "revolutionary cadres?" Probably not.
Gorus Maximus will be entitled to do anything he pleases, so long as
we're still free to bitch and moan about it. Freedom to speak is, after
all, the only freedom that matters even a whit. (Well, that, along with
the Sacred Right To Exterminate Fetuses!)
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>[snip]
>>>>This is considerably different...
>>>Oh? The loss of all the major cities in the US was a basic
>>>assumption of any strategic nuclear exchange between the
>>>superpowers in the Cold War. That's LOSS, not temporary
>>>retreat & attempted recapture.
>>In a nuclear exchange, yes.
>So the comparison is between the total loss of every major city in the
>country, vs. the possible temporary retreat from & attempted recapture
>of those cities. What makes the latter worse than the former?
It doesn't. It's just that the retreat strategy make the latter more
likely.
>>>>...from planning to surrender cities to an invading army and then
>>>>fighting a guerrilla war in the coutryside.
>>>The claim that a guerilla defense as a backup to conventional
>>>defense would necessarily involve withdrawal from urban areas
>>>to the countryside is yours, not mine. There is such a thing as
>>>urban guerilla warfare, too, as the Germans learned to their
>>>regret at Stalingrad.
>>The German's defeat at Stalingrad was not due to urban guerilla
>>warfare...
>1) Irrelevant. The point is that a guerilla defense doesn't require
>abandonment of cities.
I'm not certain that the house-to-house fighting in Stalingrad between
German and Soviet regulars constitute guerilla warfare. The Soviet
defenders fought bitterly for every inch of ground. This is contrary
to guerilla hit and run tactics which involve a readiness to give up
ground to gain other objectives.
>2) False, because without the urban guerilla warfare in the Battle
>of Stalingrad, the Germans wouldn't have been tied up there when
>Zhukov was able to hit them with his reserves. Without urban guerilla
>warfare, tbe Battle of Stalingrad would've been lost, so Germany's
>defeat in that battle WAS due to urban guerilla warfare, in part.=20
Like I said. Reports of the Battle of Stalingrad refer mainly to
house-to-house fighting and a tenacious defense by Soviet troops.
>[snip]
>>The successful guerilla wars I know about have been fought out in
>>the countrysides with the cities last to fall.
>The IRA's successful guerilla war against the British was conducted
>in the cities as well as the countryside. I believe the same can be
>said about the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli invasion which
>was just recently withdrawn.
I stand corrected about the IRA.
>[snip]
>>I don't think diplomatic resources are particularly useful in
>>preventing troop concentrations.
>They were pretty good at keeping nukes out of Cuba.
I think the keeping nukes out of Cuba had to do more with military
threats rather than diplomacy.
>>The U.S. activist policy, using military and other resources kept
>>concentration of Soviet forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern
>>Europe.
>And in Cuba, Nicaragua, & Grenada.
Extremely small numbers, like one brigade in Cuba, not massive Soviet
troop concentrations.
>>>I said "more diplomatic resources," not "more diplomats."
>>That would involve more embassy buildings, CIA agents, clerks,
>>secretaries as well as diplomats and other State Department
>>officials.
>That's what you think. Diplomacy doesn't just involve the CIA & State
>Department. Military threats are acts of diplomacy, too.
Yes. But they involve military resources. Diplomacy alone threatens
nothing.
>[snip]
>>>Unless the US had sold nukes to Britain & France, & allowed West
>>>Germany to re-arm after WWII. The conventional Us presence in
>>>Western Europe during the Cold War was never enough to stop
>>>conventional Soviet attack, it was just a tripwire defense that
>>>would trigger strategic nuclear retaliation against the Soviets
>>>in case of Soviet attack. That tripwire would've been unnecessary
>>>if Western Europe had its own independent strategic nuclear
>>>capability.
>>The U.S. must take its allies as it finds them. Left to themselves,
>>Western Europeans would not have put up much resistance against
>>the Soviets, even if they had access to nuclear weapons. Each one
>>would have folded before the first threat by the Soviet Union.
>Nonsense. Britain refused to surrender to Hitler, but would've done
>so with Stalin?
World War II understandably took a lot of fight out of America's
Western European allies. Just after the war, the British dumped
Winston Chruchill and elected Clement Atlee who began giving things
away to the Soviets like jet engines which they copied to create
the MIG-15, etc.
>>The U.S. constantly had to cajole, prod, sometimes lean on its
>>European allies to get them to put up some resistance to a Soviet
>>takeover in Europe...
>Bullshit. The US didn't want to be in Europe at all after WWII, it was
>the European allies of the US that wanted US protection. See Gaddis'
>"We Now Know" on this. NATO was originally supposed to be temporary,
>at least as far as the US was concerned. Continued US membership in
>NATO came at European insistence. European opposition to US anti-
>Communist foreign policy was primarily aimed at activities in Asia
>or elsewhere besides Europe.
I'm certain the Europeans wanted U.S. protection, but getting them
to contribute was always a hard sell.
Their refusal to support U.S. foreign policy elsewhere showed a
definite weakness in our European allies.
>>...when their strongest desire was to follow the foreign
>>policy of Finland.
>Total military resistance to Soviet aggression, even alliance with
>Nazi Germany? Sounds good to me. :-) Finland was compromised after
>WWII by its alliance with the defeated Nazis, which is why it had
>to make more concessions to the Soviets than it would've liked.
Finland was mostly compromised by its close proximity to the Soviet
Union.
>Finland is still pretty anti-Russian in its foreign policy - Finland
>is one of the few other countries in the world besides the US opposed
>to an international ban on land mines, because it needs them to defend
>its eastern border.=20
Finland always attempted to keep up their militay, but their policy
toward the Soviets was always appeasement. Those who escaped the
Soviet Union were routinely rounded up by Finnish authorities and
turned over to the Soviet government. They voted with the Soviet
bloc at the U.N. On at least one occasion, when a Finnish election
turned to the right, the Soviets objected to a center-right coalition
government, so the another coalition was organized.
>>Actually, the more I think about it, the less likely that the
>>Soviets and the their allies would need 100 million. Originally
>>were talking about 50 million militia types, as in weekend
>>warriers. Going one on one, a unit of regular military would easily
>>defeat a militia force.
>Which is why the Russian regulars have so easily defeated the
>Chechen militia, right? :-)
After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a rapid decline in
Russia's conventional military power. I doubt that the original
Soviet army would have had any problems with the Chechens. Indeed,
they didn't have any problems with the Chechens.
>That's why the Soviets so easily defeated the Afghans?
The Stinger missiles definitely helped the Afghans. By all acounts,
that turned the tide.
>The Nazis' own estimates for the conquest of Switzerland said they'd
>need a ratio of 5-to-1 to beat the Swiss.
Citations?
>Every major military power in the world has lost a war against
>guerillas since WWII. Even the Viet Cong were unable to defeat
>the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, despite a total lack of restraint
>in prosecuting that war.
He confuses the Viet Cong with the Vietnamese army, formerly the
North Vietnamese Army.
The Viet Cong was wiped out during the Tet offensive in 1968. After
that, the fighting was entirely carried on by the NVA.
>They've all had overwhelming conventional superiority, & have had
>varying degrees of restraint, from lots to virtually none. E.g.,
>The Soviets had a literal take-no-prisoners policy in Afghanistan
>& used chemical weapons.
Guerilla warfare definitely has potential when absolutely necessary.
However, because America did not follow the retreat policy, or the
cornered rat defense, America was able to keep its sovereignty, win
the Cold War, all without having to resort to guerilla war.
>[snip]
>>>>I don't recall Khrushchev specifying which rockets he'd use. At the
>>>>time, it seemed like a threat to use his ICBMs located on Russian
>>>>soil.
>>>Kruschev didn't have any nukes capable of reaching the USA at the
>>>time. That was why the threat of nukes in Cuba was so significant,
>>>as they would've been the first Soviet nukes capable of reaching the
>>>USA. Kruschev couldn't possibly have threatened to nuke the USA from
>>>Soviet soil at the time, he could only threaten to nuke Western
>>>Europe.
>>Actually, the Soviets did. They had a force of SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMs
>>deployed.
>How many?
I don't know. The sourse said the deployment of SS-6 began in 1960
with about 30 or so launchers. The SS-7 came about a year later.
>That wouldn't be the half-dozen or so that Kennedy blew into
>the "missile gap" by swallowing Khruschev's propaganda whole before he
>became POTUS & saw the same intel photos Ike had seen to disprove
>Khruschev's bluff?
Possibly.
>>The Soviets used the modified version of SS-6 to launch the Sputnik
>>in 1957. The Soviets also had their Bear and Badger bombers which
>>were also capable of reaching the U.S.
>We were talking about missiles, not bombers.
I was talking about the Soviet's nuclear capability.
>[snip]
>>>>>It's a damn lie.
>>>>Which part? The part about requiring more resolve for the fortress
>>>>America policy or the part about those not having resolve for the
>>>>activist policy not having for the retreat policy as well?
>>>Both.
>>We've got two alternatives. There's the activist policy which
>>ultimately succeeded under Ronald Reagan. Then we've got the
>>cornered rat defense...
>Question-begging by disparaging characterization.
It is a characterization that names the essence of the strategy
being advocated. It involves ceding the rest of the world to the
Soviets and retreating, not just behind America's borders but well
within America's borders.
>>a strategy which has no chance of ultimate success.
>Question-begging, again.
The policy cedes not only the rest of the world but also a chunk
of U.S. territory as well. The burden is entirely on those who
advocate such a policy to at least indicate what sort of success
it could possible hope for.
>>The first required some resolve, and not all presidents had it.
>>One had it, and that was all that was needed.
>Who was that? Truman? Ike? Nixon? You aren't even accurate in your
>judgement of Kennedy's anti-Communist resolve, now you're saying all
>it took was one anti-Commie president to win the Cold War? How was
>Reagan any more anti-Commie than Ike>
Let's see. From Truman through to Carter, the presidents were either
liberal Democrats or moderate Republicans. The former urged on us
a willingness to give up a lot of ground in confronting the Soviets.
The latter was only willing to yield a little ground. Reagan not only
did not want to yield any ground at all, he wanted to take some back.
>>>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>>>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
>>Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
>>from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
>>be determined.
>That resulted from the obsolescence of the missiles & their
>replacement by ICBMs. Kennedy didn't even recall the ones in Turkey
>until Khruschev brought them up in one of his demands. They were
>mostly symbolic, same as the ones in Italy.
The IRBMs were not all that old or obsolete. The development started
in the mid-50, so they were still relatively new.
>>>I didn't agree that Kennedy did so out of a lack of resolve.
>>Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
>Kennedy was hardly any less anti-Communist than Reagan, as
>demonstrated by his reinforcement of the US army garrison in
>Berlin in the Berlin Wall crisis, the escalation of US military
>support for South Vietnam, & his denial of Soviet nukes to Cuba.
Kennedy was considerably less anti-communist than Reagan. Kennedy's
military policy was unilateral disarmament. He and Johnson scrapped
all 1,400 B-47 and about 200 B-52s. Those bombers contained the bulk
of America's nuclear delivery capability. They cancelled numerous
major weapons programs that had begun in the Eisenhower
administration. The only new weapons system they started was the
FB-100, which by most accounts was flawed.
Kennedy and Johnson left America militarily weaker than they found it
at the end of Ike's term.
>His policies had their failures, but not because of a lack of resolve.
Kennedy was a liberal, and the liberal moral position on violence is
explicitly pacifist. The extent they allow for self defense is out of
cynical tolerance rather than moral conviction.
Thus liberals stand morally paralyzed before aggressors, whether they
be communist dictators or local thugs.
Jim Austin
Jim Austin
>Jim Austin wrote:
>>Tim Starr wrote:
>>>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>>>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
>>Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
>>from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
>>be determined.
>They were useless, and I am convinced that everybody knew it, to include
>Khrushchev. Kennedy *certainly* knew it, and while I have no documentary
>evidence at hand, everything I know about Soviet
>intelligence of the period can only lead me to the conclusion that
>Khrushchev knew, as well. If you don't know where Jupiter stood, as a matter
>of technical evolution, in the US defense scheme, you can't understand this
>point or what it means. That program was on its very last quivering legs,
>already superceded by Atlas (the first ICBM) by over two years at the time
>of the Cuban crisis. Kennedy gave away nothing by pulling the Jupiters out
>of Turkey (half of which *never* came to operational status in any case in
>the whole time they were there).
"Last quivering legs"? I don't think so. The Jupiter and Thor missiles
weren't that old. Development of those missiles started in the mid
1950s so by 1962, they were still relatively new. They were probably
still in the deployment stages, thus it wasn't surprising that "half
...never came to operational status."
>I've pointed this out to you before, Tim. This whole subject is conditioned
>by things about which most people are nearly completely ignorant. They're
>mainly about force structure evolution throughout the period, and McNamara's
>technocratic meddling also has a lot to do with it. Things were changing
>quite drastically through Kennedy's term.
Indeed they were. The total nuclear megaton delivery capability
dropped 90 percent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Kennedy and Johnson were unilateral disarmers. They tried to obscure
that fact from the public, which is why they insisted that cancelled
weapon systems were obsolete.
>It's necessary to understand IRBM's, which he inherited, as a temporary
>strategic *adjunct* to manned bomber forces, on the way to the true
>strategic "triad" model in place by the mid-60's. What that means is
>that forward basing diminished in importance nearly weekly throughout
>the entire Kennedy administration as the triad came online.
While the specific liquid-fueled Jupiter and Thor missiles might have
originally been considered a temporary expedient, it's doubtful that
Ike considered IRBMs in Europe as a temporary measure.
>By 1964, active CONUS ICBM deployments surpassed alert-bomber forces.
>("Official SAC Chronology", 1979) The earliest Air-Launched Cruise
>Missiles (Hound Dog/B-52) were active even before then, and the
>combat implications are that forward-based IRBM's were simply
>unnecessary to strategy because of the range of other weapons. Kennedy
>didn't need the foreign policy headaches, and the Air Force certainly didn't
>need *Jupiter* because it was a pain-in-the-ass system hand-me-down from the
>Navy and Army, both of which had previously rejected it.
Actually, the removal of IRBMs from Western Europe caused foreign
policy headaches since it raised doubts of America's willingness to
use nukes to defend Western Europe. It was about that time when France
started causing problems for the U.S.
>Jupiter was one of only two IRBM's ever deployed. (The other and older was
>Thor, the last of which was deactivated in December 1963.) Thirty of them
>drove the maintenance troops batty in Turkey, and the other thirty went to
>Italy. The whole gag was shut down by 1965, and that was in the works before
>October 1962. (I suspect the Italian contingent is what Austin is referring
>to with the "IRBMs out of Western Europe" remark, but who knows?) Missiles
>somewhat in the class of "IRBM's" made an encore much later on, but with the
>Army, in a tactical role, which is a different thing.
>Galt knows I'm no fan of Kennedy. But this "appeasement" deal over Cuba and
>the IRBM's is rank nonsense in terms of serious military/strategic matters
>once one understands the technical underpinnings. My own conclusion is
>that Khrushchev squeezed him as hard as he could for *anything* he could
>get in order to save something of his prestige on the world stage. (It
>didn't really work, because, for instance, even Ho Chi Minh took note
>that the Cuban missiles went home.) Kennedy was throwing out the
>strategic hardware trash, and made it look like a bone for Khrushchev
>to the rest of the world. The diplomatic aspects of that might not be
>very attractive to some, but make no mistake that there was a military
>compromise involved. It's just not true.
Considering that America's entire nuclear forces were weakened during
the Kennedy and Johnson years, in that context, Kennedy wasn't
"throwing out the...trash." It was part of his overall policy to
weaken America.
>And, by the way, this...
>>Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
>...is nearly comically simple. One thing it doesn't "say" is "Gen. Curtis
>LeMay". Try to imagine what it would take to impress *that* guy with a
>resolve to use nuclear weapons if the whistle blew. Kennedy did just exactly
>that.
Interestingly enough, Gen. Curtis LeMay eventually wrote a book,
"America is in Danger," where he denounced the Kennedy-Johnson
administrations for weakening America's military power.
Jim Austin
Tym Parsons
> Here we have Par-Broil claiming that the Swiss were (somehow)
> obligated to "do something" about the Nazis BEFORE they became a
> threat---
Not "somehow". First and foremostly it would have meant engaging brain,
opening mouth, and speaking the truth. Very simple.
> while, as we all know from earlier debates, an American has NO RIGHT
> to form even a "paintball militia" and practice guerilla warfare until
> AFTER a dictatorship comes into being--- at which time, we'd be
> entitled to form "revolutionary cadres" rather than militias.
As with Ankle-biter Starr and others of his ilk, McPeters can't be
trusted to honestly convey anything about my position. My position is
(and was) that no dictatorship is impending in America for the
forseeable future. If it WERE forseeable, Americans would be justified
in joining revolutionary cadres in an attempt to overthrow the
government and put another one in its place. Militias are properly a
part of a government; to join an unregulated militia is just an exercise
in anarchy.
Tym Parsons
> >>The autonomy of the countries who declared war on Germany because of
> >>the German invasion of Poland was also compromised. So was the
> >>autonomy of the countries who ended up at war with Germany after
> >>that. They had to spend lots of time, money, & pay an enormous cost
> >>in human suffering to fight Germany to eventual victory.
> >
> >This is patently ridiculous, and makes an anticoncept of "autonomy".
> >It obliterates the distinction between nations that are able and
> >willing to defend their national security interest, and those who
> >don't.
>
> But Switzerland WAS "able and willing" to defend its "national
> security interest," thanks in part to its policy of armed neutrality.
> The Swiss were protected from Nazi rule throughout the entire war,
> despite beingentirely encircled by Axis territory.
This is going around in circles. Ankle-biter is saying nothing new
here, and I leave up to the reader to decide who is right.
<snip>
J. Kendrick McPeters
> My position is (and was) that no dictatorship is impending in America
> for the forseeable future.
Can you say "range of the moment consciousness" boys and girls?
But, seriously, has it escaped your notice that the clear loser of the
presidential elecion is, at this very moment, staging a coup d'etat?
> If it WERE forseeable, Americans would be justified in joining
> revolutionary cadres in an attempt to overthrow the government and put
> another one in its place.
Were the heroes in "Atlas" justified in resorting to "cadres," rather
than passively shrugging? If so, perhaps you'd like to define the clear
differences between the corrupt ficticious government of Mr. Thompson,
and the corrupt actual government that exists today? Please note that,
since Rand's death, in 1982, government has approximately doubled in
size and scope, and is WAY, WAY larger than what existed in the early
fifties, when she wrote "Atlas Shrugged." How many more doublings do
you suppose we can endure before all vestiges of freedom are crushed?
(For god's sake, man, even Stephen Speicher thinks today's government
has already crossed the line, and that there are only tactical --not
moral-- reasons not to launch an insurrection.)
> Militias are properly a part of a government;
That's what liberals say about gun ownership. So what? By what right
do you propose to jail innocent folks for the "crime" of simulateously
exercising their "freedom of assembly" and "right to bear arms?"
> to join an unregulated militia is just an exercise in anarchy.
Care to explain the clear difference between an "unregulated militia"
and a company of "Civil War re-enactors?" Didn't think so.
---Kendrick
Tym Parsons
> >I never said that Switzerland should have declared war on Germany all
> >by itself. This is getting really tedious.
>
> What's tedious is your routine of never saying what you think the
> Swiss ought to have done,
Alert readers of this thread, without an axe to grind, will note that
I've plainly stated what I think the Swiss should have done.
<snip>
> >>2) False, Switzerland has no "policy of moral neutrality," it has a
> >>policy of neutrality in international affairs, not morality.
> >
> >"Neutrality in international affairs" is an anticoncept.
>
> Now you're just retreating to your intrinsicist "if you're not with
> me, you're against me" crap. Moral neutrality means saying that good
> is no better than evil. A neutral foreign policy means not allying
> with either of two countries at war with each other.
Regardless of which side is in the right, as one certainly was in this
case.
<snip>
> >>Swiss diplomats worked actively behind the scene to end the war and
> >>to stop the Holocaust.
> >
> >That was just rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic.
>
> Was sheltering more Jewish refugees from the Holocaust than any other
> country in the world but Palestine was also insignificant to you?
It's irrelevant to the issue at hand, which is the sovereignty of a free
Switzerland. It hardly matters how many refugees you shelter, if you
"have" to appease a neighbor twenty times your size, or be taken over.
> >>Like Poland did? Fat lot of good it did Poland. What good would
> >>that have possibly done the Swiss?
> >
> >Poland has nothing to do with...
Notice how Starr dishonestly snips what I subsequently said, which was
to point out that Poland had nothing _long-term_ in common with Western
liberal bourgeois democracies.
> Poland did exactly what you advocate. The Poles "cast their lot with
> liberal bourgeois democracies like Britain, France," etc.
No they didn't. See above. Starr will do anything to make it seem like
he's winning an argument. It's pathetic.
> They also refused to ally with Stalin.
Thank god for that.
<snip irrelevance>
> >>Do you think Britain was the "clear-cut good guy" in WWII?
> >
> >Yes.
>
> Thanks for admitting that alliance with Stalin & the forced
> repatriation of people back to Stalin's grasp is your idea of what
> a "clear cut good guy" does.
This is massive context-dropping. While repatriating people to Stalin
was heinously inexcusable, it's not the fundamental issue.
> Thanks for admitting that the firebombing of Dresden is your idea of
> what a "clear cut good guy" does.
This one requires no apology at all.
> [snip]
Notice that Starr again dishonestly snips my point that in a war with
Nazi Germany, there's NO QUESTION that one of the freest countries in
the world, Britain, is going to be the clearcut good guy. Again Starr
wants to make it seem like I haven't replied to his claims. He fights
dirty.
<Whether a trade embargo was practical>
> >>No "fear" about it, just a recognition that Hitler didn't give a
> >>shit about foreign trade with the West.
> >
> >Well, he should have given a shit. Autarky doesn't work. It's
> >really a matter of trade or die.
>
> No, it's a matter of trade, INVADE, or die.
It's fascinating to see an alleged "capitalist" assert that the
initiation of force is a practical mode of existence :-(>
> When goods don't cross borders, armies do. Hitler was already
> planning on conquering the territory with the economic resources
> needed for the German economy.
Didn't work, did it. The Allies won the war after all. So much for the
practicality of invasion, especially in a modern global industrial
economy.
> A trade embargo would've just brought that on sooner, rather than
> delaying it.
Starr just got done saying that an embargo would have had no effect at
all, because Germany was supposedly following a policy of total economic
self-sufficiency! As if it could.
> >>>>The trade embargo the US imposed on Japan sure stopped Japan from
> >>>>waging war in China, didn't it? :-)
> >>>
> >>>Who said it was supposed to, all by itself?
> >>
> >>You said a trade embargo would've been enough to stop Hitler. Why,
> >>if it wasn't enough to stop Japan?
> >
> >Notice that Ankle-biter snipped the rest of my query...
>
> You didn't answer my question, you just tried to change the subject.
No I didn't. It was Starr that was trying to change the subject to
Japan, and fray the topic further. He's good at that.
<whether the Soviets were opposed to the Nazis>
> >I have neither the time nor the interest in arguing this point...
>
> Too bad for you, because your argument depends on establishing that
> Stalin really was hostile to Hitler before Barbarossa.
No it doesn't.
> >altho it is a commonplace that Germany was historically Russia's
> >nemesis.
>
> Irrelevant. Vietnam & China have been historically enemies, too, but
> that didn't stop Vietnam from being China's ally from 1945-1979. Both
> Germany & the Soviet Union were pariah nations after WWI.
No it's not irrelevant. I was talking about _long-term_ commonality of
interests. For my analysis of that, see below.
> >But none of this is essential to my argument.
>
> It most certainly is. Your argument is that if a collective action by
> all the European powers had opposed Germany in no uncertain terms
> right from the start that Hitler wouldn't have gotten anywhere.
YES. That is my argument. Finally Starr admits (contrary to elsewhere)
that I've said what should have been done, and what the Swiss should
have worked for instead of being neutral on principle.
> My point is that Stalin wouldn't have participated in any such
> collective action, because he was more sympathetic to his fellow
> totalitarian dictator than to the democracies.
There's definitely a sense in which this is true for the long-term,
which is precisely the same reason why I say that Poland had nothing
long-term in common with the West. In order for that, Poland would have
had to have been...a liberal bourgeois democracy. On the other hand
Russia had an understandable historical distrust of Germany, no doubt
augumented here by the fact that there's no honor among thieves, and
makes for shaky alliances. Which is after all why the Soviets
eventually joined the Allies. Civilised nations have plenty in common
for the long-term; thug nations don't. Of course this doesn't imply
that the SU was a civilised nation; just that civilised nations make for
more reliable allies.
> >>>Or if not, it just means the West should have embargoed the Soviets
> >>>too...
> >>
> >>The West was unable to win the Battle of the Atlantic until 1943
> >>with the Soviets tying up the bulk of German resources on the
> >>Eastern Front.
> >
> >That's because the Western powers didn't mobilise until it was too
> >late...
>
> No, it's because the Western allies didn't HAVE the resources to
> mobilize until after the US entered the war.
I disagree; altho it could be argued that the US could have done more,
and earlier, short of entering the war. That certainly would have made
all the difference.
<Whether it was practical for the West to have established blockades,
and come to the aid of Czechoslavakia and Poland, long before the war>
> >As usual Ankle-biter is lurching at another strawman. In general it
> >would have made sense to give the Poles material aid...
>
> How? Through Danzig? How long do you think the Polish Corridor
> would've remained free of German invasion if Poland was getting big
> shipments of military supplies through it? :-)
Starr's switching contexts again. I proposed this BEFORE Hitler was
fully mobilised and able to invade.
> >And aiding the Czechoslavakian republic...
>
> HOW? With what, when?
Same idea. Maybe even divisions. I can't imagine it would take much to
defend a small territory like the Sudetenland. For chrissake all it
might have taken was a token force, ANYTHING to show Hitler that the
West had any sort of spine at all.
> >>One of the deciding factors in Stalin's decision to enter into the
> >>Nazi-Soviet Pact was the fact that Britain could barely field any
> >>divisions in Poland, being primarily a naval power.
> >
> >It wasn't as if Britain didn't have the economic might to kick ass...
>
> Yes, it most certainly was, & both Chamberlain & Churchill knew it.
> See John Charmley's "Churchill: The End of Glory" on this.
Starr wants us to do his dirty work for him. He can cite "sources"
until he's blue in the face, but it's impossible to evaluate them here
(much less know what they actually say) until he's actually adduced
QUOTES, in context.
> >...firepower is more important than manpower. When it became
> >apparent that Hitler was a forseeable threat, why couldn't Britain
> >have established a naval presence in the eastern Baltic, say centered
> >in Gdansk, to say nothing of the North Sea?
>
> Oh, no reason - except for those little things known as the wolfpacks,
> which were the single most effective arm of the German military in the
> whole war, & which would've been even more effective had they been
> confined to short-range missions in the Baltic & North Sea, instead of
> being spread out across the whole north Atlantic.
Starr is just trying to sow confusion by switching contexts again. I
was referring to BEFORE Hitler was fully mobilised. I refuse to buy the
idea that the West had no inkling of what was going on, thru
intelligence and conventional sources.
A far better explanation is that the West ignored all the signals of
Hitler's militarisation, in favor of pragmatism, "diplomacy", and pure
wishful thinking. After all this is precisely what the West is doing
today with regard to Saddam, even tho we know full well that his biochem
and nuclear warfare programs are going full tilt.
> There was simply no way Britain could've resisted the German invasion
> of Poland without fielding lots of Army divisions on the ground in
> Poland,
Why? To my mind having a British fleet in Gdansk would have been very
threatening to the Germans. They wouldn't dare pull any shenanigans.
> & Britain simply couldn't do that because Britain simply wasn't
> a land power. The Soviets couldn't believe how few Army divisions
> Britain had when they were holding talks to come up with a collective-
> security policy against the Nazis.
Again I have to wonder whether this wasn't a matter of unpreparedness.
If it was just a matter of sheer manpower (which I don't think it was),
the Brits had a huge empire to draw from, even then.
> >>>I don't see the Swiss advocating any of this.
> >>
> >>It's not the job of small countries to do the work of big countries
> >>for them.
> >
> >This begs the question of the WHOLE THREAD. _It's the job of ANY
> >country that cares about its freedom_.
>
> The Swiss did a fine job of preserving their freedom -
No they didn't; begs the question.
> better than France or Poland, the countries who did what you condemn
> the Swiss for not doing.
No they didn't do that. Readers already know what MY argument was.
> >>>Dictatorships CRAVE moral sanction and respectability. If everyone
> >>>had boycotted the Munich Olympics, Hitler would have thought twice
> >>>about how far he could push the Western powers.
> >>
> >>Like the Soviets "thought twice" about the invasion of Afghanistan
> >>because the US boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics? What a laugh!
> >
> >Inapt (and inept) analogy. The Soviets were already in a position to
> >invade Afghanistan...
>
> Like Germany was already prepared to invade Czechoslovakia in 1938, or
> Poland in 1939?
The Soviets had a huge army decades before the 1980 Moscow Olympics,
because the West let them get away with it, when it wasn't aiding the
Soviets outright. In contrast, Starr claims that the Nazis had a
Potemkin military capability in 1938. Hardly the same thing at all.
> >...and they likewise largely assumed that they would be unopposed.
>
> Bullshit. The whole reason they were sent in was because their puppet
> ruler had provoked so much popular armed resistance that he was in
> danger of being overthrown.
I mean resistance from the West. Count on Starr to endlessly skirmish,
and evade the larger point.
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
> > My position is (and was) that no dictatorship is impending in
> > America for the forseeable future.
>
> Can you say "range of the moment consciousness" boys and girls?
No, more like for at least the next twenty years. If McPeters can see
beyond that and definitively prove that we'll have a dictatorship, I'll
hand him the Hari Seldon Award ;-)
> But, seriously, has it escaped your notice that the clear loser of the
> presidential elecion is, at this very moment, staging a coup d'etat?
>
> > If it WERE forseeable, Americans would be justified in joining
> > revolutionary cadres in an attempt to overthrow the government and
> > put another one in its place.
>
> Were the heroes in "Atlas" justified in resorting to "cadres," rather
> than passively shrugging?
Sure. But TODAY is not the world of Atlas.
> If so, perhaps you'd like to define the clear differences between the
> corrupt ficticious government of Mr. Thompson, and the corrupt actual
> government that exists today?
There's no comparision. I seem to recall that you've been taken to task
for this dumb-ass argument plenty of times before, so I'm not going to
waste time with it.
> Please note that, since Rand's death, in 1982, government has
> approximately doubled in size and scope, and is WAY, WAY larger than
> what existed in the early fifties, when she wrote "Atlas Shrugged."
Disingenuous; we don't have a dictatorship today. Not even close.
> How many more doublings do you suppose we can endure before all
> vestiges of freedom are crushed?
Begs the question that it will happen.
> (For god's sake, man, even Stephen Speicher thinks today's government
> has already crossed the line, and that there are only tactical --not
> moral-- reasons not to launch an insurrection.)
I don't think that's Stephen's position at all.
> > Militias are properly a part of a government;
>
> That's what liberals say about gun ownership. So what? By what right
> do you propose to jail innocent folks for the "crime" of simulateously
> exercising their "freedom of assembly" and "right to bear arms?"
I'm not going let you pretend that I haven't addressed this ages ago.
> > to join an unregulated militia is just an exercise in anarchy.
>
> Care to explain the clear difference between an "unregulated militia"
> and a company of "Civil War re-enactors?" Didn't think so.
I don't have a problem with Civil War re-enactors. Jeez 8-{)
Tym Parsons
> Germany's rearmament wasn't done "with no problem at all," it was done
> at a very real cost in terms of the trade-off between military
> spending & domestic priorities. The recovery was largely done through
> Keynesian deficit-spending on the military ("Military Keynesianism")
> which couldn't last - but Hitler didn't need it to last, he only
> needed it to last long enough to conquer the territory he wanted for
> his autarkic regime.
Which gamble depended on the sanction of victims, particularly Britain,
France, and the US.
> In a command economy like Nazi Germany, domestic consumption
> could be sacrificed to military spending, but not in a free-market
> democracy like Britain. In order for Britain do have done what you
> advocate, Britain would've had to have become a command economy in
> peacetime, as Germany did.
Bullshit. The Brits would just have needed to care more about national
defense than about building a socialist welfare state. I.e. the command
economy they DID build.
> Also, Germany's re-armament wasn't in-depth, it was in-breadth. That's
> why most foreign observers over-estimated Germany's level of re-
> armament, they were fooled into thinking he had a lot more depth to
> his forces than he had.
Taken in by a Potemkin military huh? Pretty pathetic.
Tym Parsons
Jim Klein
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>My position is (and was) that no dictatorship is impending in America for
>the forseeable future.
Funny how your position about Switzerland requires an enormous amount of
"seeing the future" on their part--a future which Tim has amply demonstrated
wasn't there to see--but somehow you can't see what's happening here and now
right in front of your face.
>If it WERE forseeable, Americans would be justified in joining
>revolutionary cadres in an attempt to overthrow the
>government and put another one in its place.
Tymmy Parson's definition of "forseeable": what I would've known two days
ago about yesterday if I had the information I have tomorrow.
Except when it comes to Switzerland...then it's the negation of that!
>Militias are properly a part of a government; to join an unregulated
>militia is just an exercise in anarchy.
Oh, now you're explaining why the _law_ in this country isn't "proper" with
regard to militias? As has been pointed out to you many, many times
before...as a matter of _law_, the largest part of the militia in _this_
country is _not_ part of the government, explicitly and unambiguously.
And more...at least half of the male posters to this forum are members of
that militia, and _not_ part of the government, and further _not_
regulated, as a matter of _law_.
How it is in the socialist nirvana from where you hail, I can't say. But
kindly don't come around _this_ country arguing that it's "proper" for the
government to _violate_ the law like your idol Peikoff did. America was
founded, at least ostensibly, on the Rule of Law and we don't need yahoo
statists like you guys explaining why it's "proper" to break the law.
And for goodness sakes...if you're going to argue that _somebody_ ought to
break the law, PLEASE don't make it the government. We've got enough
problems as it is!
You really don't understand a whit what America is about, do you? Why don't
you go back and reread Rand or something...the idea that the _government_
ought to be limited is American History 101, not to mention Objectivism 101.
jk
Jim Klein
"J. Kendrick McPeters" <mcpe...@usit.net> wrote:
>(For god's sake, man, even Stephen Speicher thinks today's government
>has already crossed the line, and that there are only tactical --not
>moral-- reasons not to launch an insurrection.)
C'mon...and give up his lil' red Corvette? Do you have a cite for this?
jk
J. Kendrick McPeters
> >(For god's sake, man, even Stephen Speicher thinks today's government
> >has already crossed the line, and that there are only tactical --not
> >moral-- reasons not to launch an insurrection.)
Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> replied:
> C'mon...and give up his lil' red Corvette?
Nope--- he wasn't in favor of fighting right now. He simply said that a
revolution against the current regime would be justified.
> Do you have a cite for this?
I don't suppose you'd accept my infallible memory, would you? ;-)
Actually, I just did a search at Deja, using "s...@compbio.caltech.edu"
as "author," looking for "revolution" as the keyword, and found this:
> From: Stephen Speicher <s...@compbio.caltech.edu>
> Subject: Re: Black Saturday
> Date: 24 Apr 2000 00:00:00 GMT
[remaining headers trimmed, and cutting to the chase]
> I think our country _is_ worth fighting for, but the battle to be
> fought is a philosophical one. Even if there were to be a
> revolution--which, as I have said before, would be
> justifiable--without a philosophical revolution we would just
> return to the mixed state we have today.
This post refers to an earlier one, made (if I recall correctly) shortly
after the stormtrooper raid on Elian Gonzales, where The Speicher said
that our government had stepped over the line, and reached the point
where the shedding of blood was justified.
Needless to say, he also advocated that non-violent solutions be pursued
until there was a chance that a revolution might actually succeed, but,
yes, Virginia, Stevie did say that the US was "close enough" to tyranny
for a revolt to be justified.
Incidentally, he wasn't quite alone in The Brotherhood in recognizing
the rottenness of Govco. Alway was fairly close to despair, Steve Davis
advocated buying lots of guns, and Phil Oliver expressed a desire that
"a selective handful of the sub-human vermin occupying Washington" be
exterminated.
The amazing thing is, within a week of working up all of this sputtering
outrage against the US government, these folks careened wildly to the
position that Govco is a white knight that should go around nuking
millions of people who have the misfortune to live under governments
less perfect than our own.
I kid you not!
---Kendrick
PS: I'm certain a bit of extra poking around at Deja would turn up the
original "they've crossed the line" post by The Speicher. But I'm sure
you'll understand that I have lots and lots of better things to do, than
combing through The Speicher's hundreds of postings looking for the
rational needle in the haystack of idiocy. At any rate, I feel that the
above comment is more than enough to prove my point.
J. Kendrick McPeters
[blissfully assuming tyranny is no near term threat]
> No, more like for at least the next twenty years.
Here's a clue: research "unfunded liabilities," thereby discovering what
special treats we can look forward to within twenty years, and ask
yourself whether our ignorant rabble of an electorate will be likely to
make prudent decisions when the bills come due, or whether they, like so
many other ignorant mobs before them, will choose to put their faith in
a "strongman" who will promise to "restore order?"
The question practically answers itself, doesn't it? You don't have to
be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing; neither do you
have to be a psychohistorian to know how a feeble minded and ill
educated electorate will react to a bursting bubble--- all you have to
do is look at the slimy 52% who voted Gore/Nader, to be CERTAIN that
freedom's goose is cooked, the moment the good times stop rolling.
And they most certainly WILL stop rolling, when either (1) taxes are
doubled to pay for baby boomer entitlements, (2) promises made to baby
boomers are dishonered, or (3) the printing presses are run full spigot
to hyperinflate away the unfunded liabilities. There are no other
realistic scenarios, and, no matter which one is picked, the mob will be
riled up to vote away the last of our freedom. Think that "the American
sense of life" will be our savior? Forget it--- the "American sense of
life" these days involves loudly applauding when machine guns are stuck
in the face of a terrified six year old, who is then drug off to live in
a slave pen. The American sense of life, plus a quarter, won't even buy
you a cup of coffee--- sad, but true.
Since you know I'm dead right on this, you will (of course) evade the
matter, possibly claiming to having answered it in the distant past--
but, in truth, you know you aren't fooling anyone, least of all, your
own self. So, painful though this reality is, why not face up to it?
> If McPeters can see beyond that and definitively prove that we'll have
> a dictatorship, I'll hand him the Hari Seldon Award ;-)
Why should I make any predictions for the far flung future? I certainly
could, mind you, based on the dismal trend of the last twenty years of
galloping police statism, and spending totally out of control, but that
would be missing the point!
By any rational standard-- and certainly by the standard held by the
Founding Fathers-- we're ALREADY way past the point where we could
justifiably start "voting from the rooftops."
The level of spending-- two trillion dollars a year, simply at the
federal level-- is simply obscene. And the onerous taxation, collected
in one of the most brutal manners possible ---the US is one of only a
handful of nations that jails people for tax law violations--- is beyond
obscene. Then there is the not-so-minor issue of regulatory agencies
like the FDA murdering hundreds of thousands of people every year--- and
terrorizing millions of hapless small businessmen. And whole cities
full of innocents are incarcerated for violating "victimless" crimes,
locked into steel cages, sodomized, and sometimes even forced to fight
in gladiatorial battles for the entertainment of the guards.
Now, if you are still a college student, and haven't yet joined the real
world, then I can understand why you feel things are so peachy keen. I
suggest that you'd benefit by reading the courageous journalism of James
Bovard, who has meticulously documented the loss of our freedoms. Here,
this is a source of Bovard wisdom that's absolutely free of charge:
<http://www.spectator.org/campaign/bovard/bovardarchives.htm>
Be honest, Tym--- do you REALLY think that Jefferson and Madison would
regard our present government as anything other than a tyranny? Dontcha
think that, if they went to WAR over a piddling little tax, they'd
consider Govco's deathgrip on the economy (and on every individual) to
be orders of magnitude worse than the petty crap they endured?
> Sure. But TODAY is not the world of Atlas.
Sez you. Name a single policy the bad guys pursued in Atlas that isn't
on the books in the good ole USofA today....
> There's no comparision.
Why isn't there? What did Thompson's government do that was any worse
than our beloved FDA's killing millions of innocent people? What
irrational policy did the badguys in "Atlas" pursue that was any worse
than the godawful feeding frenzies we've seen directed against "Big
Tobacco" and Microsoft? What directive in "Atlas" was more coercive and
non-objective than the "regulations" the EPA uses against landowners?
If you can't see "any comparison," you're either remarkably uninformed,
terribly stupid, or both. So what's your major malfunction?
> I seem to recall that you've been taken to task for this dumb-ass
> argument plenty of times before, so I'm not going to waste time with
> it.
"Taken to task?" I don't think so. I can recall making this argument
many times, and never getting any response from the likes of you. I
know that running away is your favorite debating tactic, but, for your
own sense of self respect, you really should TRY answering tough
questions, rather than running away like a gutless coward.
> Disingenuous; we don't have a dictatorship today. Not even close.
Tell that to Peter McWilliams, why dontcha? Ooops! Too late... he
choked to death on his own vomit, since the drug warriors demanded, at
point of a gun, that he not use the only effective anti-nausea medicine
that would keep him from vomiting up his AIDS cocktail.
I imagine that Elian Gonzales might have a hard time discerning the
reasons why the US is "not even close" to dictatorship. Or the eighty
or so folks who were incinerated at Waco. Or the countless landowners
that find themselves trapped in the Kafkaesque nightmare of "wetlands"
law. Or the hapless elderly Russian emigre, who was sentenced to life
for manufacturing plastic vials that --egad!-- were used to hold crack.
And on and on and on and on... just open your eyes, and unplug your
ears, and you'll see what I mean. Who knows? You might even notice that
the incumbent party in power is refusing to recognize the results of a
legitimate election and step down--- just like in a banana republic.
> > How many more doublings do you suppose we can endure before all
> > vestiges of freedom are crushed?
>
> Begs the question that it will happen.
Why not use some common sense? In the last forty-odd years, Govco has
gone from consuming 20% of the economic pie, to 40%. And Govco's own
accountants predict another doubling over the next 40 years, in order to
pay for all the entitlements already promised. Once we get to the
(predicted by the OMB) 82% tax rate, only 18% of the economy will remain
in private hands, leaving precious little to enjoy a modicum of freedom,
dontcha think?
I hate to break it to you, Tym, but Ayn Rand is dead, and all of her
rose colored glasses views on America are rather badly dated. A lot has
happened since 1982-- an awful lot. Just looking at the damage wrought
by our glorious leader, Maximum Bill, consider the trashing of the rule
of law, and (especially) of the separation of powers that has come from
his nasty habit of ruling via executive order.
We are already in a post Constitutional age, and we're rapidly rushing
to shed all of our vestigial freedoms. We may not live in a dictatorship
with a single fuhrer, but being ruled by a thousand petty despots does
not exactly make us free. America is moving toward totalitarianism, and
it makes no difference to me (or any true freedom lover) that the coming
total state is based on CONSENSUAL totalitarianism, rather than IMPOSED
totalitarianism. Total rule is total rule-- and I won't be comforted by
the fact that a bunch of idiot soccer moms voted it in "for the sake of
the chill-dren." If I'm shackled to the yoke of tyranny, I don't give a
rat's ass whether everyone else VOTED to enslave me. I'll resent it
just the same, I promise you!
> > (For god's sake, man, even Stephen Speicher thinks todays government
> > has already crossed the line, and that there are only tactical --not
> > moral-- reasons not to launch an insurrection.)
>
> I don't think that's Stephen's position at all.
Of course it is! Why dontcha ask him what he meant when he said: "Even
if there were to be a revolution--which, as I have said before, would be
justifiable...?"
[regarding militias]
> I'm not going let you pretend that I haven't addressed this ages ago.
And I'm not gonna let you pretend that you ever did more than blow smoke
and evade like crazy. Just like you will (I confidently predict) evade
my challenge to come up with a definition of "private militia" that
doesn't make outlaws of those who engage in "reenactment." Let's watch!
> I don't have a problem with Civil War re-enactors.
I never said you'd have a problem with them, nitwit. I simply challenged
you to come up with a sensible definition for "private militia" that
wouldn't rope in the Civil War re-enactors. And if you think THAT is a
toughie, try coming up with one that wouldn't include WWII re-enactors!
<http://www.reenactor.net/main_htmls/ww2.html>
Then, there are the VIETNAM WAR reenactors--- boy, I'll bet it's mighty
damned hard to tell _them_ from a "private militia," huh?
<http://www.reenactor.net/main_htmls/korea_nam.html>
By all means, when you're able to come up with a meaningful definition
of "private militia" that excludes these re-enactors, let me be the
first to know! Thanks!
---Kendrick
PS: Care to address the argument in the essay below?
<http://www.eoffshore.com/mlaughlin/illogic.html>
Didn't think so!
Jim Klein
"J. Kendrick McPeters" <mcpe...@usit.net> wrote:
[The Horse's Ass...]
>> I think our country _is_ worth fighting for, but the battle to be
>> fought is a philosophical one. Even if there were to be a
>> revolution--which, as I have said before, would be
>> justifiable--without a philosophical revolution we would just
>> return to the mixed state we have today.
>
>This post refers to an earlier one, made (if I recall correctly) shortly
>after the stormtrooper raid on Elian Gonzales, where The Speicher said
>that our government had stepped over the line, and reached the point
>where the shedding of blood was justified.
Okay, you produced such a cite, "...which, as I have said before, would be
justifiable..."
>Incidentally, he wasn't quite alone in The Brotherhood in recognizing
>the rottenness of Govco. Alway was fairly close to despair, Steve Davis
>advocated buying lots of guns, and Phil Oliver expressed a desire that
>"a selective handful of the sub-human vermin occupying Washington" be
>exterminated.
Oh okay, I remember now. They were all tied up in knots over non-citizen
Elian. As I recall, most of them felt it was wrong to use stormtroopers to
kidnap him from his relatives (which it was, of course), but it would've
been fine and dandy to use stormtroopers to keep him from his father.
That's what's so lovely about their brand of "rationality"...we just need to
be "objective" about when to use the stormtroopers!
>The amazing thing is, within a week of working up all of this sputtering
>outrage against the US government, these folks careened wildly to the
>position that Govco is a white knight that should go around nuking
>millions of people who have the misfortune to live under governments
>less perfect than our own.
I think we can reduce this to a general principle: "A is not-A."
>PS: I'm certain a bit of extra poking around at Deja would turn up the
>original "they've crossed the line" post by The Speicher. But I'm sure
>you'll understand that I have lots and lots of better things to do, than
>combing through The Speicher's hundreds of postings looking for the
>rational needle in the haystack of idiocy. At any rate, I feel that the
>above comment is more than enough to prove my point.
Indeed, but it doesn't prove anything anyway because you forgot something...
He lies!
jk
Billy Beck
Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>Billy Beck wrote:
>>>Tim Starr wrote:
>
>>>>>...when it came to the Cuban missile crisis, as we both agreed, he
>>>>>[Kennedy] was the first to blink.
>
>>>>I only agreed that he withdrew US nukes from Turkey,...
>
>>>Kennedy also pulled IRBMs out of Western Europe. Whether it resulted
>>>from his blink or from just being a unilateral disarmer has yet to
>>>be determined.
>
>>They were useless, and I am convinced that everybody knew it, to include
>>Khrushchev. Kennedy *certainly* knew it, and while I have no documentary
>>evidence at hand, everything I know about Soviet
>>intelligence of the period can only lead me to the conclusion that
>>Khrushchev knew, as well. If you don't know where Jupiter stood, as a matter
>>of technical evolution, in the US defense scheme, you can't understand this
>>point or what it means. That program was on its very last quivering legs,
>>already superceded by Atlas (the first ICBM) by over two years at the time
>>of the Cuban crisis. Kennedy gave away nothing by pulling the Jupiters out
>>of Turkey (half of which *never* came to operational status in any case in
>>the whole time they were there).
>
>"Last quivering legs"? I don't think so.
Well, of course, you don't have to think so.
> The Jupiter and Thor missiles
>weren't that old. Development of those missiles started in the mid
>1950s so by 1962, they were still relatively new.
"Relative" to what? Atlas? How about Minuteman? The "SAC
Chronology" lists 204 Atlas missiles online in 1962. There were 62
Titan I's online that year, and 20 Minutemen already. Booster
technology had completely outstripped the IRBM's with both range and
throw-weight. Solid fuels were coming into their own in a big way.
Minuteman I arrived with a 1M warhead and a range of 6200 nm, and in
1963, the year of the Cuban crisis, there were more than five times as
many Minutemen (372) online for deterrent alert as all the Jupiters
that ever existed. These numbers went nowhere but up, all through the
60's. Titan II came up operational in 1963 with the 10M warhead and a
9300 nm. range. Meanwhile up to about 1968, total bomber numbers
dropped by nearly a third as the B-47's were retired, but the B-52
force carried the load admirably through both conventional combat in
Vietnam *and* nuke alert with the Hound Dogs and a wide variety of
nuke shapes. Strategic attack doctrine exploited the stand-off
capability of Hound Dog in the direction of full-fruition of MIRV's
when they arrived in the early 70's.
"Force structure evolution" was a good thing. It's about making
the technology work.
>They were probably still in the deployment stages, thus it wasn't
>surprising that "half ...never came to operational status."
That's just nonsense. Thor was adpated for *Navy* operations in
1955. USAF inherited it in 1957 when SecDef arbitrarily assigned them
all missiles with more than 200 nm. range. In the middle of the
interservice turf fight, the Navy was happy to be rid of Jupiter that
year and got behind Polaris. Jupiter never became fully operational
because it was a dog system. That's all there is to it.
>>I've pointed this out to you before, Tim. This whole subject is conditioned
>>by things about which most people are nearly completely ignorant. They're
>>mainly about force structure evolution throughout the period, and McNamara's
>>technocratic meddling also has a lot to do with it. Things were changing
>>quite drastically through Kennedy's term.
>
>Indeed they were. The total nuclear megaton delivery capability
>dropped 90 percent during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Cite that. That's just flatly ridiculous. "Ninety percent"?
In 1961, there were a total of 353 nuclear missiles in service,
230 of which were Hound Dog AGM's with a 500 mn. stand-off range and a
1M warhead. (The rest were Atlas, Thor, Jupiter, and a single Titan.)
There were 1598 strategic bombers in service, 889 of which were
B-47's, rapidly on their way out of business. Sorted to delivery
capability, the USAF in that year was worth about 1250 megatons on
target. (B-52 loads in particular are fairly complex and difficult to
break out. They would vary according to individual unit tasking, and
included combinations of gravity shapes up to 10M and stand-off AGM's
of 1M yield.)
In 1968, the operational bomber force was down to 655 (including
76 B-58's), but the missile force included 59 Titan II's, 967
Minuteman I's, and 312 Hound Dogs, all adding up to operational
delivery capability something on the order of 5000 megatons. (Again:
that number is variable +- about 10% depending on the bomber uploads.)
The total delivery reduction in the period you're talking about
isn't quite the scary "90%" at all. In a previous discussion with
Tim, I asserted that it didn't make sense to toss the B-47's, but this
is where I'm going to cop to a goof: by '68, they were due. At a
glance, it looks like the bomber force took a 65% or so loss during
your reference period, but there are good reasons for it. It's also
not very sensible to take up this issue in simple terms of "delivery
capability" because the strategic challenge just ain't that simple.
For one obvious thing, the whole bomber force would face defensive
combat issues to which ICBM's were perfectly immune. Therefore, it's
quite naive to calculate "delivery capability" as it stood in the
first year of Kennedy's term because there really was no way to know
how many of the bombers would actually make their assigned targets.
Strategic planners and arm-chair critics have it fairly easy. The
guys on the flight line knew better.
I don't know where you're getting your "90% reduction" number,
but it's just not that clean cut, even if I don't add up the actual
hardware in service in 1968.
>Kennedy and Johnson were unilateral disarmers. They tried to obscure
>that fact from the public, which is why they insisted that cancelled
>weapon systems were obsolete.
B-47 really was obsolete. No question about it. Jupiter was,
too, and that's not to mention the fact that pulling the plug on that
whole system only depleted delivery capability by 60M over a 2000 nm.
range. If they were "unilateral disarmers", then I would be curious
to see the rationale behind a 4.5x increase in operational missiles
and larger yields in both missile and bomber loads during those two
administrations, as well as goodies like MIRV development for future
operations. (Oh, and let's not forget stuff like tactical-nuke
capability in FB-111 aimed at "Warsaw Pact Central Heating", to cop a
slogan from the SAC/TAC fighter bomber troops. That system came up
under Johnson.)
Kennedy and Johnson were in no way "unilateral disarmers", and
it's just dumb to say that.
>>It's necessary to understand IRBM's, which he inherited, as a temporary
>>strategic *adjunct* to manned bomber forces, on the way to the true
>>strategic "triad" model in place by the mid-60's. What that means is
>>that forward basing diminished in importance nearly weekly throughout
>>the entire Kennedy administration as the triad came online.
>
>While the specific liquid-fueled Jupiter and Thor missiles might have
>originally been considered a temporary expedient, it's doubtful that
>Ike considered IRBMs in Europe as a temporary measure.
We're not talking about Ike, and he didn't have 6-9000 nm. ICBM's
in his kit. If he had, I can't imagine him getting seriously
interested in forward-based IRBM's. We're talking about
Kennedy/Johnson, and they had the hardware to work the scene in ways
that simply weren't available to Ike. They did.
>>By 1964, active CONUS ICBM deployments surpassed alert-bomber forces.
>>("Official SAC Chronology", 1979) The earliest Air-Launched Cruise
>>Missiles (Hound Dog/B-52) were active even before then, and the
>>combat implications are that forward-based IRBM's were simply
>>unnecessary to strategy because of the range of other weapons. Kennedy
>>didn't need the foreign policy headaches, and the Air Force certainly didn't
>>need *Jupiter* because it was a pain-in-the-ass system hand-me-down from the
>>Navy and Army, both of which had previously rejected it.
>
>Actually, the removal of IRBMs from Western Europe caused foreign
>policy headaches since it raised doubts of America's willingness to
>use nukes to defend Western Europe. It was about that time when France
>started causing problems for the U.S.
Listen: the French could go fuck themselves. Period. Those
bitches started "causing problems" on May 10, 1940 when they turned
tail in the face of the Nazis, and that was that: the "problems" they
"caused" were strictly their own. One of my all-time favorite foreign
policy anecdotes concerns the time when De Gaulle informed Dan Rusk
that he wanted all US troops off French soil immediately. Rusk looked
him in the eye and asked him, "Does that include the dead ones in the
cemetaries"? IOW: "Shut your insipid yap, cheez-dick. Just who the
hell do you think you are?"
If you think the French were a "headache", then I guess you get
to think so.
>>Galt knows I'm no fan of Kennedy. But this "appeasement" deal over Cuba and
>>the IRBM's is rank nonsense in terms of serious military/strategic matters
>>once one understands the technical underpinnings. My own conclusion is
>>that Khrushchev squeezed him as hard as he could for *anything* he could
>>get in order to save something of his prestige on the world stage. (It
>>didn't really work, because, for instance, even Ho Chi Minh took note
>>that the Cuban missiles went home.) Kennedy was throwing out the
>>strategic hardware trash, and made it look like a bone for Khrushchev
>>to the rest of the world. The diplomatic aspects of that might not be
>>very attractive to some, but make no mistake that there was a military
>>compromise involved. It's just not true.
>
>Considering that America's entire nuclear forces were weakened during
>the Kennedy and Johnson years, in that context, Kennedy wasn't
>"throwing out the...trash." It was part of his overall policy to
>weaken America.
Bullshit. You don't know what you're talking about.
>>And, by the way, this...
>
>>>Kennedy was a liberal. That says it all.
>
>>...is nearly comically simple. One thing it doesn't "say" is "Gen. Curtis
>>LeMay". Try to imagine what it would take to impress *that* guy with a
>>resolve to use nuclear weapons if the whistle blew. Kennedy did just exactly
>>that.
>
>Interestingly enough, Gen. Curtis LeMay eventually wrote a book,
>"America is in Danger," where he denounced the Kennedy-Johnson
>administrations for weakening America's military power.
Well, he didn't think so in October of '62.
I don't know if you clearly understand this, but LeMay was a
madman by the end of his career. That he got the chop was a *good*
thing.
Billy
VRWC Fronteer
http://www.mindspring.com/~wjb3/promise.html
Billy Beck
Billy Beck <wj...@mindspring.com> wrote:
>... when De Gaulle informed Dan Rusk...
(Who?) Really quite hate *that*.
I think this keyboard needs retirement.
J. Kendrick McPeters
> Kennedy and Johnson were in no way "unilateral disarmers", and
> it's just dumb to say that.
You certainly make a good case that they weren't, leaving me only one
question--- what are we to make of Department of State Publication
7277-- "The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament
in a Peaceful World?"
It's available on the net in many places, for instance:
<http://williamcooper.com/7277.htm>
Read it, and see for yourself. Perhaps it's a right wing hoax along the
lines of "Report From Iron Mountain," but it sure looks authentic to me,
and I've yet to see it debunked.
Convince me it's a hoax, and I'll gladly raise JFK and LBJ a few rungs
up from my estimation of their place in hell! ;-)
---Kendrick
Billy Beck
"J. Kendrick McPeters" <mcpe...@usit.net> wrote:
>Billy Beck wrote:
>
>> Kennedy and Johnson were in no way "unilateral disarmers", and
>> it's just dumb to say that.
>
>You certainly make a good case that they weren't, leaving me only one
>question--- what are we to make of Department of State Publication
>7277-- "The United States Program for General and Complete Disarmament
>in a Peaceful World?"
>
>It's available on the net in many places, for instance:
>
><http://williamcooper.com/7277.htm>
>
>Read it, and see for yourself. Perhaps it's a right wing hoax along the
>lines of "Report From Iron Mountain," but it sure looks authentic to me,
>and I've yet to see it debunked.
>
>Convince me it's a hoax, and I'll gladly raise JFK and LBJ a few rungs
>up from my estimation of their place in hell! ;-)
I just read it. It's plainly nonsense on its face. (I'm
stipulating to its authenticity. I've never seen it before, but I'm
completely prepared to believe that it was indeed issued by the
Kennedy State Department.)
There are two things right off the bat that make it dismiss it
summarily:
1) Hard domestic political realities. Given the way US politics can
turn on a relative dime with prospective installation of opposing
foreign policy outlook in any given four year interval, it is just the
height of utopian hooey to imagine that such a plan stood the remotest
chance of execution. See Nixon and Reagan for details. IOW: a plan
like that wasn't worth worrying seriously about then, and isn't worth
citing now.
2) The actual, factual procession of technology development and
application as it went through the 60s and into the 70's. Look: there
is no question that nuclear forces were reduced in the Kennedy/Johnson
period. To call it "unilateral disarmament", however, is to
completely ignore the professional dedication of military leadership
who understood and refined technology advance. In terms of the way
things had worked out by the early 70's, to call the 60's force
reduction "unilateral disarmament" would like preferring a roomful of
286 computers over a pair of 700 mHz Celerons because the room *looks*
busier with more hardware in it.
There are two other things that I would point out:
1) Another technical item that I left out of my earlier note:
Tactical Air Command. I estimated the USAF worth about 1250 megatons
on target in 1961. That was exclusively SAC. All through the 60's,
and although there was great excitement in Southeas Asia, TAC had not
neglected its stand in Western Europe. There were whole fighter wings
(30 to 40 aircraft) devoted to nuke alert against Soviet attack.
These people were tasked with single-aircraft low-level penetration
and delivery, and some of them could not *buy* a combat billet in the
actual shooting war, in spite of the stated USAF Vietnam policy of
"everybody goes once before anyone goes back". Even so, others
rotated through Vietnam and out to the alert billets in Europe.
The hardware available to this alert force constantly improved
throughout the Kennedy/Johnson administrations. Older fighters like
F-100, F-101, and F-105, capable of the nuclear strike role (unlike
interceptor types like F-102, F-104, and F-106) were heavily involved
in SEA and slowly retired in obsolescence across the entire force.
That process ran throughout the 60's, but guess what: they were
replaced by new types that seamlessly took up the tactical nuke role
with greater capability. (F-4, A-7, FB-111. Later; F-15, which began
development in the late 60's.)
The upshot of this point is that the total nuclear delivery
capability of the Air Force alone was considerably more than 1250
megatons in 1961, and the tactical delivery force was never subject to
reductions that SAC went through as the missiles came online.
2) It should not be forgotten that in 1960 Kennedy campaigned on the
"missile gap". Now, anyone could go ahead and call that a cynical
maneuver, but they would also have to deal with the actual history of
missile development throughout his term and into Johnson's.
Tym Parsons
> Here's a clue: research "unfunded liabilities," thereby discovering
> what special treats we can look forward to within twenty years, and
> ask yourself whether our ignorant rabble of an electorate will be
> likely to make prudent decisions when the bills come due, or whether
> they, like so many other ignorant mobs before them, will choose to put
> their faith in a "strongman" who will promise to "restore order?"
Dunno. And McPeters can't know either. Since this is a matter of free
will, projecting past twenty years down the road with any certainty is
impossible. By far the biggest unfunded liability is Social Security,
and there's already a movement afoot to privatise that. Plus there's
the example of nations like Chile and South Africa that have privatised
their pension systems. If nations far more philosophically corrupt than
the US can do that, why not the US?
What the US will choose to do on down the road is an open question, but
even if Social Security defaults, that hardly equates to collapse and
dictatorship. It just means you'll have a lot a very poor seniors with
drastically cut benefits, and even more poor younger people bailing them
out. Kinda like Britain thru most of this century :-p
BTW a letter of mine just got printed in Sunday's NYT Business section
on this very topic :D What's McPeters doing to change things?
> The question practically answers itself, doesn't it? You don't have
> to be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing; neither do
> you have to be a psychohistorian to know how a feeble minded and ill
> educated electorate will react to a bursting bubble--- all you have to
> do is look at the slimy 52% who voted Gore/Nader, to be CERTAIN that
> freedom's goose is cooked, the moment the good times stop rolling.
I disagree that this means dictatorship is likely, even twenty years
away. This is really tenuous.
> And they most certainly WILL stop rolling, when either (1) taxes are
> doubled to pay for baby boomer entitlements, (2) promises made to baby
> boomers are dishonered, or (3) the printing presses are run full
> spigot to hyperinflate away the unfunded liabilities. There are no
> other realistic scenarios, and, no matter which one is picked, the mob
> will be riled up to vote away the last of our freedom.
I don't think that's a foregone conclusion at all. After all Americans
might decide to phase out Social Security, Medicare, etc.
> Think that "the American sense of life" will be our savior? Forget
> it--- the "American sense of life" these days involves loudly
> applauding when machine guns are stuck in the face of a terrified six
> year old, who is then drug off to live in a slave pen. The American
> sense of life, plus a quarter, won't even buy you a cup of coffee---
> sad, but true.
Agreed, but Elian isn't the whole story. There are positive trends as
well, especially the fact that Objectivism is gaining ground.
> Since you know I'm dead right on this, you will (of course) evade the
> matter, possibly claiming to having answered it in the distant past--
> but, in truth, you know you aren't fooling anyone, least of all, your
> own self. So, painful though this reality is, why not face up to it?
But you're not right on this.
> > If McPeters can see beyond that and definitively prove that we'll
> > have a dictatorship, I'll hand him the Hari Seldon Award ;-)
>
> Why should I make any predictions for the far flung future? I
> certainly could, mind you,
No you couldn't. Men have free will, and there's no such thing as
"psychohistory".
> based on the dismal trend of the last twenty years of galloping police
> statism, and spending totally out of control, but that would be
> missing the point!
>
> By any rational standard-- and certainly by the standard held by the
> Founding Fathers-- we're ALREADY way past the point where we could
> justifiably start "voting from the rooftops."
No we aren't. The signs of a dictatorship are: censorship, especially
of political ideas; one-party state; nationalised economy; and the
imprisonment, show trials, and execution of dissidents. We're not
anywhere close to any of those.
<snip non-essentials>
> I hate to break it to you, Tym, but Ayn Rand is dead, and all of her
> rose colored glasses views on America are rather badly dated. A lot
> has happened since 1982-- an awful lot. Just looking at the damage
> wrought by our glorious leader, Maximum Bill, consider the trashing of
> the rule of law, and (especially) of the separation of powers that has
> come from his nasty habit of ruling via executive order.
Every president has issued executive orders, and it's perfectly
constitutional as such. As far as "trashing the rule of law", that's
hardly unique to Clinton.
<snip rant>
<militias>
> > I don't have a problem with Civil War re-enactors.
>
> I never said you'd have a problem with them, nitwit. I simply
> challenged you to come up with a sensible definition for "private
> militia" that wouldn't rope in the Civil War re-enactors.
Um, Civil War re-enactors aren't looking to overthrow the government?
<snip>
> PS: Care to address the argument in the essay below?
>
> <http://www.eoffshore.com/mlaughlin/illogic.html>
>
> Didn't think so!
But...I didn't even answer yet. Easy on the caffeine there. What's in
it for me?
Tym Parsons
Tym Parsons
> >My position is (and was) that no dictatorship is impending in America
> >for the forseeable future.
>
> Funny how your position about Switzerland requires an enormous amount
> of "seeing the future" on their part--
There's nothing clairvoyant about knowing what will happen ON PRINCIPLE
if you're "neutral" in a struggle between good and evil, or appease
evil.
> a future which Tim has amply demonstrated wasn't there to see--
No he didn't. Instead he continually distorted or evaded my argument.
<snip>
> >Militias are properly a part of a government; to join an unregulated
> >militia is just an exercise in anarchy.
>
> Oh, now you're explaining why the _law_ in this country isn't "proper"
> with regard to militias? As has been pointed out to you many, many
> times before...as a matter of _law_, the largest part of the militia
> in _this_ country is _not_ part of the government, explicitly and
> unambiguously.
Not true. This is just libertarian hogwash, and I've been over it many
times before.
<snip rant>
> You really don't understand a whit what America is about, do you? Why
> don't you go back and reread Rand or something...
Rand was against vigilantism too.
Jim Klein
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>> Oh, now you're explaining why the _law_ in this country isn't "proper"
>> with regard to militias? As has been pointed out to you many, many
>> times before...as a matter of _law_, the largest part of the militia
>> in _this_ country is _not_ part of the government, explicitly and
>> unambiguously.
>
>Not true. This is just libertarian hogwash, and I've been over it many
>times before.
Whaddya mean "not true"? I've cited the relevant sections of the U.S. Code
to you before; do I really have to dig it up again?
Every able-bodied civilian male in this country between two ages (that I
forget) is a member of the "unorganized militia" as a matter of law. Do you
deny this, or are you saying that all of us are "part of the government"?
jk
Tim Starr
<b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>Tim Starr wrote:
>
>>Jim Austin wrote:
>
>>[snip]
>
>>>>>This is considerably different...
>
>>>>Oh? The loss of all the major cities in the US was a basic
>>>>assumption of any strategic nuclear exchange between the
>>>>superpowers in the Cold War. That's LOSS, not temporary
>>>>retreat & attempted recapture.
>
>>>In a nuclear exchange, yes.
>
>>So the comparison is between the total loss of every major city in
>>the country, vs. the possible temporary retreat from & attempted
>>recapture of those cities. What makes the latter worse than the
>>former?
>
>It doesn't. It's just that the retreat strategy make the latter more
>likely.
1) I didn't advocate any "retreat strategy" - that's your strawman.
2) Retreat doesn't necessarily make total loss more likely. The
retreat of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) in the Korean War did
make it easier for MacArthur to invade North Korea, but it also made it
easier for the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) to drive the UN forces
back, because their lines of supply were too long & drawn-out.
>>>The German's defeat at Stalingrad was not due to urban guerilla
>>>warfare...
>
>>1) Irrelevant. The point is that a guerilla defense doesn't require
>>abandonment of cities.
>
>I'm not certain that the house-to-house fighting in Stalingrad between
>German and Soviet regulars constitute guerilla warfare.
Then you don't understand the meaning of guerilla warfare.
>The Soviet defenders fought bitterly for every inch of ground. This is
>contrary to guerilla hit and run tactics which involve a readiness to
>give up ground to gain other objectives.
Guerilla warfare doesn't mean nothing but hit and run tactics. If it
did, there would be no such thing as the 3rd phase of guerilla warfare
as defined by Mao. You're confusing one part of guerilla warfare with
the whole.
[snip]
>>>I don't think diplomatic resources are particularly useful in
>>>preventing troop concentrations.
>
>>They were pretty good at keeping nukes out of Cuba.
>
>I think the keeping nukes out of Cuba had to do more with military
>threats rather than diplomacy.
False dichotomy. Diplomacy includes military threats.
>>>The U.S. activist policy, using military and other resources kept
>>>concentration of Soviet forces in the Soviet Union and Eastern
>>>Europe.
>
>>And in Cuba, Nicaragua, & Grenada.
>
>Extremely small numbers, like one brigade in Cuba, not massive Soviet
>troop concentrations.
Nicaragua had 500,000 men under arms, Cuba about the same. Cuba was a
Soviet puppet, & Nicaragua was a Cuban puppet. So, the policy you
defend allowed about a million Soviet-aligned soldiers in the Western
Hemisphere. It also allowed a lot more Soviet-aligned guerillas &
terrorists throughout the rest of Latin America & the Caribbean.
[snip]
>>Nonsense. Britain refused to surrender to Hitler, but would've done
>>so with Stalin?
>
>World War II understandably took a lot of fight out of America's
>Western European allies. Just after the war, the British dumped
>Winston Chruchill and elected Clement Atlee who began giving things
>away to the Soviets...
Atlee didn't BEGIN giving things away to the Soviets, he CONTINUED
Churchill's policy of giving things away to the Soviets. The high
point of Anglo-American generosity to Soviet Russia was during WWII,
not afterwards.
>>>The U.S. constantly had to cajole, prod, sometimes lean on its
>>>European allies to get them to put up some resistance to a Soviet
>>>takeover in Europe...
>
>>Bullshit. The US didn't want to be in Europe at all after WWII, it was
>>the European allies of the US that wanted US protection. See Gaddis'
>>"We Now Know" on this. NATO was originally supposed to be temporary,
>>at least as far as the US was concerned. Continued US membership in
>>NATO came at European insistence. European opposition to US anti-
>>Communist foreign policy was primarily aimed at activities in Asia
>>or elsewhere besides Europe.
>
>I'm certain the Europeans wanted U.S. protection, but getting them
>to contribute was always a hard sell.
Western Europe didn't want to contribute to its own defense? That's
not true at all. For instance, Germany wanted to re-arm & join NATO
long before it was finally allowed to. Objections from other NATO
allies like France prevented German entry into NATO for a few years
after WWII. NATO members contributed some of their best troops to the
Korean War.
>Their refusal to support U.S. foreign policy elsewhere showed a
>definite weakness in our European allies.
Nope, it showed a preference for concentration of US protection in
Western Europe, instead of its dispersion all over the world. Europe
didn't think Korea or Vietnam were worth the risk of nuclear war, but
Europe did think Europe was worth that risk.
>>>...when their strongest desire was to follow the foreign
>>>policy of Finland.
>
>>Total military resistance to Soviet aggression, even alliance with
>>Nazi Germany? Sounds good to me. :-) Finland was compromised after
>>WWII by its alliance with the defeated Nazis, which is why it had
>>to make more concessions to the Soviets than it would've liked.
>
>Finland was mostly compromised by its close proximity to the Soviet
>Union.
If that were true, then the Winter War would've never happened, the
Finns would've simply surrendered from the outset.
[snip]
>>>Actually, the more I think about it, the less likely that the
>>>Soviets and the their allies would need 100 million. Originally
>>>were talking about 50 million militia types, as in weekend
>>>warriers. Going one on one, a unit of regular military would easily
>>>defeat a militia force.
>
>>Which is why the Russian regulars have so easily defeated the
>>Chechen militia, right? :-)
>
>After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was a rapid decline in
>Russia's conventional military power.
You've got it backwards, the decline in Russia's military power
preceded the fall of the Soviet Union.
>I doubt that the original Soviet army would have had any problems with
>the Chechens. Indeed, they didn't have any problems with the Chechens.
That's because the Chechens didn't have any weapons supplied to them,
because the anti-Soviet powers considered Chechnya part of undisputed
Russian territory. The Chechens got their original weapon stock after
it was abandoned by the Russian troops that withdrew from Chechnya
after the fall of the Soviet Union.
>>That's why the Soviets so easily defeated the Afghans?
>
>The Stinger missiles definitely helped the Afghans. By all acounts,
>that turned the tide.
Yes - after 6-7 years of resistance by Afghans against the Soviets -
time in which the Soviets certainly didn't have "no problem" with the
Afghan resistance.
>>The Nazis' own estimates for the conquest of Switzerland said they'd
>>need a ratio of 5-to-1 to beat the Swiss.
>
>Citations?
Halbrook's "Target Switzerland." Sorry, don't have the page number
handy.
>>Every major military power in the world has lost a war against
>>guerillas since WWII. Even the Viet Cong were unable to defeat
>>the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, despite a total lack of restraint
>>in prosecuting that war.
>
>He confuses the Viet Cong with the Vietnamese army, formerly the
>North Vietnamese Army.
>
>The Viet Cong was wiped out during the Tet offensive in 1968. After
>that, the fighting was entirely carried on by the NVA.
No, "Viet Cong" means "Vietnamese Communists," not the National
Liberation Front (NLF) or the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF),
which were what was wiped out in Tet '68. "NVA" is an obsolete term
for the People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN), too.
Your incorrect dispute of my terminology misses the point, which is
that the PAVN was unable to defeat the KR guerillas in Cambodia,
despite the total lack of restraint characteristic of the PAVN, which
not only used land mines with abandon in its war against the KR, but
also used chemical weapons supplied by the Soviets. Your position was
akin to Maoist voluntarism, or the theories of the German & Japanese
leadership towards the end of WWII, that willpower alone could explain
the defeat of major powers by guerillas.
[snip]
>>>Actually, the Soviets did. They had a force of SS-6 and SS-7 ICBMs
>>>deployed.
>
>>How many?
>
>I don't know. The sourse said the deployment of SS-6 began in 1960
>with about 30 or so launchers. The SS-7 came about a year later.
Source?
>>That wouldn't be the half-dozen or so that Kennedy blew into
>>the "missile gap" by swallowing Khruschev's propaganda whole before he
>>became POTUS & saw the same intel photos Ike had seen to disprove
>>Khruschev's bluff?
>
>Possibly.
In that case, they wouldn't have been enough for the sort of attack you
described, in which undetected IRBMs would've taken out all the major
cities in the US.
>>>The Soviets used the modified version of SS-6 to launch the Sputnik
>>>in 1957. The Soviets also had their Bear and Badger bombers which
>>>were also capable of reaching the U.S.
>
>>We were talking about missiles, not bombers.
>
>I was talking about the Soviet's nuclear capability.
You were talking specifically about IRBMs which could take out all
major US cities without detection.
[more lies snipped]
>>>The first required some resolve, and not all presidents had it.
>>>One had it, and that was all that was needed.
>
>>Who was that? Truman? Ike? Nixon? You aren't even accurate in your
>>judgement of Kennedy's anti-Communist resolve, now you're saying all
>>it took was one anti-Commie president to win the Cold War? How was
>>Reagan any more anti-Commie than Ike...
>
>Let's see. From Truman through to Carter, the presidents were either
>liberal Democrats or moderate Republicans. The former urged on us
>a willingness to give up a lot of ground in confronting the Soviets.
>The latter was only willing to yield a little ground. Reagan not only
>did not want to yield any ground at all, he wanted to take some back.
Reagan was hardly the first POTUS to have a rollback policy against the
Soviets. See "Operation Rollback" by Peter Grose on this. The US had
a covert action policy of rollback under George Kennan, of all people,
shortly after WWII. It failed, but not because of a lack of resolve.
[snip]
>The IRBMs were not all that old or obsolete. The development started
>in the mid-50, so they were still relatively new.
They weren't old, but they were obsolete. They were never more than a
temporary stopgap measure. See Billy Beck's posts about the evolution
of US nuclear capability, he went into more detail about it than I can.
>Kennedy was considerably less anti-communist than Reagan. Kennedy's
>military policy was unilateral disarmament.
Bullshit. Kennedy increased spending on US conventional forces, which
had been starved for funds by Ike.
>He and Johnson...
I wasn't referring to Johnson, who did have his pacifistic streak, I
was only referring to Kennedy. Don't lump them together.
>...scrapped all 1,400 B-47 and about 200 B-52s. Those bombers
>contained the bulk of America's nuclear delivery capability.
They were replaced with more advanced nuclear delivery capability, as
detailed by Beck.
--
Tim Starr
Class of '91, Capitalist State - Go Pigs!
(timstarr(at)c2.net)
Billy Beck
Tim Starr <tims...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>>The IRBMs were not all that old or obsolete. The development started
>>in the mid-50, so they were still relatively new.
>
>They weren't old, but they were obsolete. They were never more than a
>temporary stopgap measure. See Billy Beck's posts about the evolution
>of US nuclear capability, he went into more detail about it than I can.
You can point out the facts for some people, Tim, but that's
about all you can do.
>>Kennedy was considerably less anti-communist than Reagan. Kennedy's
>>military policy was unilateral disarmament.
>
>Bullshit. Kennedy increased spending on US conventional forces, which
>had been starved for funds by Ike.
>
>>He and Johnson...
>
>I wasn't referring to Johnson, who did have his pacifistic streak, I
>was only referring to Kennedy. Don't lump them together.
>
>>...scrapped all 1,400 B-47 and about 200 B-52s. Those bombers
>>contained the bulk of America's nuclear delivery capability.
>
>They were replaced with more advanced nuclear delivery capability, as
>detailed by Beck.
I hate this argument. Honestly: it quite pains me. That's
because I simply adore the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. To begin with, I
maintain that it is the most beautiful warplane ever built, bar none.
("I think that I shall never see... nacelles as sweet as those on
thee...") That airplane, in terms of sheer style in aviation, is the
single most finely distilled expression of its time, and so cleanly
American in the expression (no matter the Nazi scientists' seminal
contribution of swept-wing research during World War II) that it
transcends its military and technical import all the way out the
iconic. It stands as signal event on the cusp of an era.
Almost nobody with a sense of 20th century American history ,
whether aviation connoisseur or not, can get away with a single look
at that airplane without a searing impression of graceful power that
stamps an era: it was a perfect model of "the jet age", a true avatar
of a culture in confident motion, possessed of the latest and
brightest lights, and with murderous darkness receding, vanquished, to
its rear.
Virtually everything we know about large jet aircraft comes from
the B-47. All by itself, it turned a sharp technical corner away from
the lumbering throb and toward the high-whispering howl. Power
assumes unprecedented aspect in the Stratojet, and almost nothing
airborne in its wake is without principle debt to its existence.
Have I said that I love this airplane?
It was built in greater numbers (2,032) than any other post-WW II
bomber in the world, ever. It "established the Strategic Air Command
as the most powerful military force in the history of the world."
(Walter J. Boyne, "Beyond The Wild Blue, A History Of The U.S. Air
Force, 1947-1997", St. Martin's Press, 1997) Its sixteen years of
active service saw America through the prospect of unthinkable horror,
and then it happened that this instantly crucial benefit was
second-place to the B-47's blessing on the future: the B-52
Stratofortress.
Where the '47 is beautiful, the Stratofort is awesome in the most
strict military sense. The B-52 never concedes a single aspect to
poetry: it naturally commands radical deference to the essential
raison d'etre of a nuclear bomber. "Culture" be damned: this is an
in-your-face warning of implacable doom, world-wide. Aesthetes can
burn, along with everybody else.
What happened with the B-52 was a *concentration* of everything
its predecessor was about, without any of the B-47's debilities as a
point of departure. The new large jet technology found its greatest
strength in this design, wrung from lessons taught by over a decade of
B-47 operations. The word "operations", here, is fundamental to
understanding how and why the last 1400 of these aircraft were
dispatched to the boneyards by the end of the year before Khe Sanh and
LBJ's abdication. It was not a trivial thing to hurl them across the
globe, day in and day out, years on end, and the understatement here
is the looking-glass through which the manner of its passing can be
glimpsed.
As nearly as anyone can discern the limits of the B-52, today,
over seventy years of that design in active service will have been
written before it is finally gone. That will be something surpassing
every possible grasp of nearly all those who live and die in any way,
under its preeminent shadow. In 1982, on the thirtieth anniversary of
Stratofortress dominance of a critical element of power projection,
the B-52 community had its own secret and proprietary laugh on the
idiot hippies who never had a remote clue what to value, or how.
With the particular heraldic style of proud aviators, a small
fabric patch began to adorn their flight jackets in proclamation of
their domain: "B-52 Stratofortress - Someone Over Thirty You Can
Trust".
The B-47 never had a hope of anything like that.
Boyne, cited above, was a B-47 pilot, and people like him are
famous for their loyalty to their aircraft. Like other historians who
have addressed the period, he attributes retirement of the B-47 to
"reasons of economy". (See also "Peace Was Their Profession:
Strategic Air Command", Hill, Campbell & Campbell, 1995, Schiffer
Publishing) It was not, however, a *false* economy. Boyne points out
LeMay's perspicacity in fostering the B-52 as supercedant to it
predecessor in the face of strident objection to the new program even
within the Air Force.
LeMay saw past the currency of infatuation to the potential of
maximum technology illustrated in the flaws of the B-47, and he was
right about it. That airplane had, in fact, leaped beyond itself. By
the mid-60's, the defects of the leap were being revealed in airframe
failures due to states of metallurgy and fabrication at the time of
its production that could not rise to the quality of the concept, and
more: the concept itself had fallen woefully behind the capacity,
demonstrated even then, of the B-52 for leading-edge airframe
versatility at adapting to battlespace evolution. Although the
superior mass and structure of the B-52 are essential to its success
in strictly physical terms, they also sustain technical advances in
various support systems unimaginable when the first one rolled out
forty eight years ago.
The B-47 made it through most of the 1960's. If it is argued
that it should *not* have been retired when it was - no matter its
actual airframe defects - then it is also implied that it should have
carried on into the 1970's. To understand military aviation in the
1970's and beyond is also to dismiss that prospect as absurd.
I am great fan of the B-47, but I cannot pause before that
judgment. The facts don't permit it.
J. Kendrick McPeters
> I simply adore the Boeing B-47 Stratojet. To begin with, I
> maintain that it is the most beautiful warplane ever built, bar none.
> ("I think that I shall never see... nacelles as sweet as those on
> thee...") That airplane, in terms of sheer style in aviation, is the
> single most finely distilled expression of its time, and so cleanly
> American in the expression (no matter the Nazi scientists' seminal
> contribution of swept-wing research during World War II) that it
> transcends its military and technical import all the way out the
> iconic. It stands as signal event on the cusp of an era.
In a similar vein, I adore the XB-70, which has to be the most beautiful
bomber never put into production. If the B-47 was the harbinger of the
Jet Age, the XB-70 was the harbinger of the stillborne Supersonic Age.
It was truly an amazing plane, especially considering that it was
designed for mass production and, for instance, made minimal use of
titanium, unlike the SR-71.
Speaking of the Blackbird, isn't it true that the Soviet SAMs were never
quite able to reach out and touch it? If so, then the reason given for
cancelling the Valkyrie doesn't really hold water, does it?
---Kendrick