Kant's floating deontology vs. Prescott's vulgar egoism
Chris Cathcart
The dichotomy, in briefest essence, hinges on what is contained in the
recognition of the normative reality of other humans beings. Tara
Smith already exposes some of the floating deontology that goes on in
the Kantian tradition, in her -Moral Rights and Political Freedom-, but
let me give you the gist: Kantian floating deontologists take the
reality of other human beings with free will and free agency as having,
*on its own*, crucial moral import. It would be a failure of practical
rational recognition not to recognize that other human beings are not
just a physical resource like anything else. From this there is a
highly *intuitive*-driven argument that, because of others' moral
reality, one should not exploit them as one would any other natural
resource.
Supposedly from the fact, alone, of other human beings' being free
agents, derives the alleged "ought" that one should respect them. Not
recognizing the moral reality of others is presumed to be a moral
failing of egoism, since egoism on the traditional interpretations has
it that the self is the only important repository of value, and others
are merely instrumental to my ends. So Kant's project consists in
opposing this "egoist" and instill in folks a respect for the moral
law, which is not of instrumental value in its own right. The problem
with the egoist? Presumably, it's that egoistic moral prescriptions
are not universalizable. Presumably, it's that the egoist sees things
in terms of "the only good is what serves my interests." From the
alleged egoistic moral standpoint, others are reduced merely to means
to this end.
(This is by no means a made-up characterization of standard
interpretations, either. It's well-stated in such places as Michael
Huemer's webbed "Why I Am Not an Objectivist" essay, just for a
starter.)
So we get Jim Prescott coming along and saying something to this effect
as well. As he puts it: others are means to my ends. He calls this a
proper Objectivist interpretation of egoism, even though the text of
Rand's argument explicitly rejects this notion.
Now, there is one un-controversial sense that all moral theorists seem
to agree on, and that is that treating others as means to one's ends is
permissible; it's treating others *merely* as means to our ends, just
like any other natural resource open for exploitation, that's usually
considered wrong.
Now, I do give Prescott the benefit of the doubt that he does recognize
the moral reality of others as beings just like him, as free and
end-directed agents. But he also happens to view others as instruments
to his well-being, and I'm going to be more bold here and say that he
regards others as *mere* instruments to his ends. That's what a coldly
rational egoist in his view takes in regard to his attitude to others.
No Kantian-deontological sentiment to cloud his perspective. Now, he
*does* also take a *correct* tack in acknowledging, first, that egoism
*does*, contrary to standard interpretations, provide universal
prescriptions, and he also *does* correctly acknowledge that others'
being free agents by itself doesn't command his respect. But what
*does* command his respect? It's how the behaviors of others in
response to his behaviors can be strategically calculated so as to
produce what's best for himself. And so it's this strategic response
and what falls out of it -- namely, contractual exchange -- and not the
fact of others being free agents, that gives rise to all involved
parties having rights.
What is absolutely clear, though, is that Rand's position is neither
the floating Kantian one, *nor* the Prescottian one. It is the *fact*
of what human beings are, and the *recoginition* of the conditions of
existence required by man's life qua man, coupled with the moral
*purpose* of each person's life being the achievement of his own
happiness, that gives rise to the fully context-informed,
rationally-grounded principle that every man is an end in himself. It
is in virtue of a man being an end in himself on *this* understanding,
that man has a *right* to exist for his own sake.
That's straightforward Randianism, without any unnecessary
complications, and it's a fully-grounded basis for our having rights.
These rights are *pre-contractual*. We have them in virtue of the
conditions of existence required of our life as human beings, with our
own happiness as our highest moral purpose. This is not some flight of
fancy or floating sentiment that Prescott's ridiculous straw-men keep
insinuating about "natural rights" theories. There is no room here for
having to bargain for one's rights to be *left alone.* Such would run
totally contrary to Rand's argument as explained and illustrated
throughout her works, fiction and non-fiction. We have a right *to
exist for our own sake*, not a right to exist as long as it's for Jim
Prescott's sake. There is one obligation with respect to others
required of Jim Prescott, given the requirements of man's life qua man:
to *leave alone* others who haven't entered into any agreement with
him. That's not an "unchosen" obligation, but rather an obligation
based on one's conscious, rational recognition of the facts of reality.
(One truly incapable of consciously and rationally recognizing such
falls, at best, into a class of beings designated "insane.")
As John Galt puts this whole matter:
"Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None --
except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects, and to all
of existence: rationality. I deal with men as my nature and theirs
demands: by means of reason. I seek or desire nothing from them except
such relations as they care to enter of their own voluntary choice. It
is only with their mind that I can deal and only for my own
self-interest, when they see that their interest coincides with theirs.
When they don't, I enter no relationship; I let dissenters go their
way and I do not swerve from mine. I win by means of nothing but logic
and surrender to nothing but logic. I do not surrender my reason or
deal with men who surrender theirs."
(From the -Lexicon-, p. 449.)
Galt lets dissenters go their own way, just as he goes his own. Why?
Because he recognizes in them the *right* to go their own way. Just as
he wouldn't regard himself going his own way as a right-less creature
just because he and the dissenters didn't enter into contract.
This is all much too clear to keep being assaulted in any supposedly
plausible way by Prescott's contractualist agenda.
Robert J. Kolker
>
>
> This is all much too clear to keep being assaulted in any supposedly
> plausible way by Prescott's contractualist agenda.
That is the real weakness of Prescott's thesis. The Contract to which he
alludes does not exist.
Bob Kolker
TC
> Subtitled: False dichotomy to be exposed here.
> This is all much too clear to keep being assaulted in any supposedly
> plausible way by Prescott's contractualist agenda.
Nary a "fuck"!
Is this an instance of a new Cathcart algorithm?
TC
Joe Teicher
Chris Cathcart wrote:
>
> What is absolutely clear, though, is that Rand's position is neither
> the floating Kantian one, *nor* the Prescottian one. It is the *fact*
> of what human beings are, and the *recoginition* of the conditions of
> existence required by man's life qua man, coupled with the moral
> *purpose* of each person's life being the achievement of his own
> happiness, that gives rise to the fully context-informed,
> rationally-grounded principle that every man is an end in himself. It
> is in virtue of a man being an end in himself on *this* understanding,
> that man has a *right* to exist for his own sake.
This may be the randian position, but that certainly doesn't keep it
from being stupid. It hinges on the whole nebulous concept of "life qua
man" which is pure bullshit. Why should anyone be concerned with what
Rand or her followers considered the nature of man? Why should they put
that ahead of their own subjective experience of happiness? I can't
think of a reason. Why should the BTK killer have worried about the
rights of his victims? He wanted to kill them and he did. You want to
pretend that isn't egoism because it isn't what you want to do. But you
can't do that because your preferences are not universal principles.
Joe Teicher
Chris Cathcart
Joe Teicher wrote:
> Chris Cathcart wrote:
>
> >
> > What is absolutely clear, though, is that Rand's position is neither
> > the floating Kantian one, *nor* the Prescottian one. It is the *fact*
> > of what human beings are, and the *recoginition* of the conditions of
> > existence required by man's life qua man, coupled with the moral
> > *purpose* of each person's life being the achievement of his own
> > happiness, that gives rise to the fully context-informed,
> > rationally-grounded principle that every man is an end in himself. It
> > is in virtue of a man being an end in himself on *this* understanding,
> > that man has a *right* to exist for his own sake.
>
> This may be the randian position, but that certainly doesn't keep it
> from being stupid. It hinges on the whole nebulous concept of "life qua
> man" which is pure bullshit.
Uh, no, it's not bullshit, much less pure. It means just what it says:
a life that is lived in accordance with the requirements of a rational
being, with the central virtue being rationality. Its chief
prescriptive recommendation is that by practicing the virtue of
rationality, your life will go best; you will be happy and successful
at attaining your ends without running into psychological and
existential conflict and dysfunction. (Like Fred Weiss brought up
recently: a dictator like Hussein isn't motivated by, much less
successful in attaining, happiness; he is motivated by power lust and
bears the shameful psychological dsyfunction of that; if he is after
happiness, he encounters a conflict between his seeking that and his
power lust.)
Rand adopts and applies a perfectly non-controversial notion of ought:
that which is in accordance with your nature as a being who has ends,
to whom it *makes a difference* whether one attains one's ends or not.
The substantive oughts fall out of rational deliberation about what
ends are consistent with others, what produces a real sense of
well-being, and so on; it's the practice of rationality that leads to
getting to what makes your life go best.
This really isn't all that unusual a theory compared to the better main
lines of moral thought that center around the concept of living a life
by the standard of reason; Aristotle and Kant's better half are major
contributors to this treatment of practical reason. Running through
many of these treatments is the recognition that there is a practical
analogue to cognitive norms, which we as reason-guided beings are bound
by and which we ought to follow in order to have the right path to
attaining knowledge. "Why should I care about being reasonable?" is a
non-response at best; actually, it's a self-defeating one.
At this point, I might be content to turn the rest over to Coop and let
him reason you into awkward submission. :-)
> Why should anyone be concerned with what
> Rand or her followers considered the nature of man? Why should they put
> that ahead of their own subjective experience of happiness?
Because a "subjective experience of happiness" is on its own ephemeral,
short-range, and without appropriate and reliable guidance as to how a
lasting sense of well-being can be achieved. A life committed to the
exercise of reason, however, is one that is most suited to achieving
such. And that is because the life of reason is the life in accordance
with the human mode of living.
> I can't
> think of a reason. Why should the BTK killer have worried about the
> rights of his victims? He wanted to kill them and he did. You want to
> pretend that isn't egoism because it isn't what you want to do. But you
> can't do that because your preferences are not universal principles.
But it's also all-too-apparent what kind of truly unhappy an existence
a BTK-type killer lives. It's not unlike the life of a junkie whose
main preoccupation is getting that next fix. Most such folks are
self-admittedly miserable, if not in denial about their problem. And
the "Kantian" element all comes back into it, when he's caught and
punishment is inflicted; he has no rational cause to complain, as he
has reduced himself to the level of whatever it is that he treated his
victims as.
None of this is all that tough. Alas, I remember you as being a
skilled troll, a one-time member (having dropped out due to lack of
recent output) of the official HPO Top Posters list because of your
quality trolling. Back to claim your position?
Malrassic Park
<joeo...@aol.com> wrote:
>Chris Cathcart wrote:
.
>> What is absolutely clear, though, is that Rand's position is neither
>> the floating Kantian one, *nor* the Prescottian one. It is the *fact*
>> of what human beings are,
That is Kantianism.
>> and the *recoginition* of the conditions of
>> existence required by man's life qua man,
Which says nothing about the conditions that make such recognition
possible. So it would seem that Randianism is the floating ontological
abstraction, not Kantianism.
>> coupled with the moral
>> *purpose* of each person's life being the achievement of his own
>> happiness, that gives rise to the fully context-informed,
>> rationally-grounded principle that every man is an end in himself. It
>> is in virtue of a man being an end in himself on *this* understanding,
>> that man has a *right* to exist for his own sake.
.
Kant also held that man is an end in himself, and has a right to exist
for the sake of his own reason.
Mark N
> At this point, I might be content to turn the rest over to Coop and let
> him reason you into awkward submission. :-)
Coop has been eerily silent for the past few days. Maybe it's the calm
before the storm?
Mark
Robert J. Kolker
>
> Coop has been eerily silent for the past few days. Maybe it's the calm
> before the storm?
Or maybe he has real work to do.
Bob Kolker
Mark N
Well, training cadets is important, I admit. But surely it's not as
important as posting to HPO!
Mark
Reggie Perrin
That prospect usually provokes an increase in my posting volume. HPO
forms a key part of my Advanced Avoidance Strategy :-)
Atlas Bugged
>> Or maybe he has real work to do.
"Reggie Perrin" <reggie...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1125539050.1...@g44g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
> > That prospect usually provokes an increase in my posting volume. HPO
> forms a key part of my Advanced Avoidance Strategy :-)
I suffer from this.
Atlas Bugged
>> This is all much too clear to keep being assaulted in any supposedly
>> plausible way by Prescott's contractualist agenda.
"TC" <polyma...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:1125514345.2...@f14g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
> Nary a "fuck"!
> Is this an instance of a new Cathcart algorithm?
Not to worry, he does this at odd intervals. I sometimes don't mention
lesbian videos in a post, although this is clearly not one of them
Atlas Bugged
cant...@dieznet.com
here is the first one. the others need some editing still
James E. Prescott
> [...] The dichotomy, in briefest essence, hinges on what is
> contained in the recognition of the normative reality of other
> humans beings. [...]
You make an excellent argument, Chris. My compliments.
> [...] I do give Prescott the benefit of the doubt that he does
> recognize the moral reality of others as beings just like him,
> as free and end-directed agents.
Very gracious, and correct.
> But he also happens to view others as instruments to his well-
> being, [....]
Correct again. I do find the greatest part of my happiness in sharing joy
with other human beings. Without them, without my wife and children in
particular, I would be miserable I'm sure. So I'd even go so far as to say
that after my own independent work is accomplished human beings are the
primary instruments of my happiness. (And even my independent work would
not be of much value to me if there were not human beings willing to do
trade for it!)
> [...] and I'm going to be more bold here and say that he
> regards others as *mere* instruments to his ends. That's
> what a coldly rational egoist in his view takes in regard to
> his attitude to others.
Well, now, that's a bit too bold. I am at least coolly rational, I guess.
But I am not a cold person. And as Mark so often smiles at, the term I
prefer is "thoroughgoing egoist," and that's just to distinguish myself from
any professed proponents of rational egoism who would make any sort of
compromise or accommodation with Kantian duty.
But you should know -- and you do; I give you enormous credit for being
careful here -- that I do not regard humans as mere instruments in the sense
of making any crude denial that they are moral agents like myself. In fact,
it is precisely their moral agency -- and the fact that to themselves they
are ends-in-themselves -- that is of such great value, such utter joy to me,
as I deal with them as equals, as trade partners, as friends and as loved
ones.
> [...I]t's this strategic response and what falls out of [Prescott's
> view] -- namely, contractual exchange -- and not the fact of
> others being free agents, that gives rise to all involved parties
> having rights.
I don't mean to take us aside, but I'd like to just quickly point out Ayn
Rand's conception of love and friendship, because I believe it is at least
tangentially relevant here. She called it a trade. Love was the emotional
price, she said, paid by one person for the joy he receives from the virtues
of another. I point this out as important to understanding just how deeply
fundamental to proper human relationships she regarded the notion of trade,
of the *exchange* of values. It will come up again, just below, on the
"bridge to rights."
But, yes, Chris, you have it right again. I regard contractual exchange --
of the form "I will respect the rights that you and I define together only
if you fairly define them with me and you *scrupulously* respect them
in exchange" -- as at the root of the very concept of rights. It depends
crucially on the fact that others are free moral agents, of course. You
can't have a contract without moral agency. But their being free moral
agents is just not enough. They must also choose correctly. They must
not make the morally wrong choice that thieves and looters and thugs
make, rejecting rights.
> What is absolutely clear, though, is that Rand's position is
> neither the floating Kantian one, *nor* the Prescottian one.
> It is the *fact* of what human beings are, and the *recognition*
> of the conditions of existence required by man's life qua man,
> coupled with the moral *purpose* of each person's life being
> the achievement of his own happiness, that gives rise to the fully
> context-informed, rationally-grounded principle that every man
> is an end in himself. It is in virtue of a man being an end in himself
> on *this* understanding, that man has a *right* to exist for his
> own sake.
Here, I'm afraid, at the very end of the above paragraph -- which I leave
unsnipped because it is all so crucial! -- you are drifting out of focus and
into some soapy mush. Of course we must look to the requirements of human
life and to each person's purpose being properly his own happiness, just as
you say. You've gotten a lot of things rights. Good on ya'!
But you are not explaining here how you get from the fact that a man
*should* exist for his own sake across to the notion of a *right to be
left free* to act for his own sake. You simply assert, "It is on this
understanding of what he *needs* that a man has a *right* to be free."
That does nothing to bridge the gap. Rights do not follow from needs.
If they do, then explain HOW? For myself, I cross that gap quite
comfortably on the bridge of agreement. I say men simply reason together
and each recognizing the others' and his own need of independent,
self-serving action, they all simply then, in response to this recognized
need, *agree* to each respect such freedom of self-serving action on the
part of others *in return* for the others respecting such freedom in
himself. It is, as you correctly assessed it, a reason-guided *contractual
exchange* that is at the root of rights.
> That's straightforward Randianism, without any unnecessary
> complications, and it's a fully-grounded basis for our having rights.
Except that you have neither explained how it works nor yet shown
any textual basis for attributing such a notion to Ayn Rand.
> These rights are *pre-contractual*. We have them in virtue of the
> conditions of existence required of our life as human beings, with our
> own happiness as our highest moral purpose. This is not some flight of
> fancy or floating sentiment that Prescott's ridiculous straw-men keep
> insinuating about "natural rights" theories.
Then what is it? You have not explained it any better than Ken does.
The reason is, you can't. Face it. It *is* a flight of fancy and a floating
abstraction. If it weren't, then you or Ken or somebody would be able
to explain *how* the need for freedom generates a right to be free.
How does the need for freedom of action generate -- without anybody's
choosing it remember!!! -- an *obligation* on the part of others to respect,
permit and protect such freedom of action?
(And, please, "Rand said so, that's how," is not an answer. I got so tired
of hearing that from Ken. I don't need to hear it from you!)
> There is no room here for having to bargain for one's rights to
> be *left alone.* Such would run totally contrary to Rand's
> argument as explained and illustrated throughout her works,
> fiction and non-fiction.
You are wildly wrong about Ayn Rand. She recognized and wrote that
man is a *contractual* animal not either a lone wolf nor a social animal.
She understood that there could be no compromise with thieves and
looters who claim a "right" based on need to take form you the products
of your efforts. Without agreement on the fundamental principles, she said,
there can be no basis for peaceful association.
> We have a right *to exist for our own sake*, not a right
> to exist as long as it's for Jim Prescott's sake. There is
> one obligation with respect to others required of Jim
> Prescott, given the requirements of man's life qua man:
> to *leave alone* others who haven't entered into any
> agreement with him. [...]
I accept this obligation. I accept it with respect to agreements such as the
price of the car I'm trying to buy. If the dealer refuses agreement, that's
his right, and I leave him alone. He dissents. So, he goes his own way with
no interference from me. We don't have a deal, that's all.
> As John Galt puts this whole matter:
> "[...] When they don't [agree], I enter no relationship; I let dissenters
> go their way and I do not swerve from mine.[...] (From the
> -Lexicon-, p. 449.)
Perfect. That's my attitude as well. Here John Galt is talking about his
relationship with someone who dissents from him -- as Ayn Rand said
regarding compromise -- "in regard to concretes or particulars [while]
implementing a mutually accepted basic principle." The basic principle that
both John Galt and the dissenter must already have mutually accepted
(agreed upon) is the right of each to be left *free*. How do I know they
agree? Well, just suppose that they /didn't/ agree on that! Suppose that the
dissenter was dissenting from John Galt's opinion that John Galt is entitled
to keep the product of John Galt's own productive efforts! Then, if Galt
took the same "live and let thieves and burglars live" attitude, you would
have a case of what Ayn Rand called an attempt at compromise between a
property owner and a burglar. In that case, John Galt's remarks would not be
making any sense. It becomes "When someone denies to me the right to live
for my own sake, I shrug and let the dissenter have his way with me."
And that is certainly not what Ayn Rand meant.
> Galt lets dissenters go their own way, just as he goes his own. Why?
> Because he recognizes in them the *right* to go their own way.
Absolutely. But only once he recognizes that they recognize it, too. If they
do *not* agree on -- if they dissent from -- the fundamental moral principle
of individual rights, then they have a serious problem -- with John Galt and
not just with Jim Prescott.
====
Sadly, in all this, you've distracted attention from what I was really
doing, which was answering at Fred's behest the question of how
Ayn Rand's "a man is an end-in-himself" differs from Immanuel Kant's
"a man is an end-in-himself."
I answered that question correctly. You did not. You are still sadly
infected with that Kantian idea that moral obligations (as to leave a
person alone, for example) somehow "just (magically) exist" based only on
*need*, with nothing to bridge the gap between need and obligation but a
nebulous, undefined, mystical and merely intuitively half-grasped notion of
"inherent rights." You are still in Kant's camp.
And so long as this non-thinking infects you, you will never fully grasp the
thoroughgoing egoism that is the true and simple Objectivist approach. There
is -- the thoroughgoing sometimes-predator egoist proclaims -- no right
whatsoever "to be left alone" *unless* you *agree* to leave others alone.
Agreement, then, in true Objectivism, is the *rational* -- no mysticism
here! -- basis of the concept of individual rights. And that, friends, is
the *fundamental* difference between Kant and Rand. Immanuel Kant
believed in the existence of *unchosen* obligations (duty). Ayn Rand
did not. Ayn Rand recognized that the idea of an unchosen obligation
(toward others, or even toward some floating moral imperative) was the
despicable "mysticism root" of altruism and collectivism and all of the
evils they represent.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Tom Robertson
<snip>
>Agreement, then, in true Objectivism, is the *rational* -- no mysticism
>here! -- basis of the concept of individual rights. And that, friends, is
>the *fundamental* difference between Kant and Rand. Immanuel Kant
>believed in the existence of *unchosen* obligations (duty). Ayn Rand
>did not. Ayn Rand recognized that the idea of an unchosen obligation
>(toward others, or even toward some floating moral imperative) was the
>despicable "mysticism root" of altruism and collectivism and all of the
>evils they represent.
I'm skeptical that there's much practical difference between a
philosophy that believes in natural rights and a philosophy that
believes in agreements as the source of rights, but liberally
incorporates implicit agreements. Don't the implicit agreements in
your system suffer from the same vagueness that you criticize natural
rights for? What if people disagree about what they've implicitly
agreed upon? I do a lot of gambling and I frequently face what is to
me the moral dilemma of what I should do when the venue at which I'm
gambling makes a mistake in my favor. Sometimes I tell them about it
and sometimes I don't. I risk being too unselfish if I tell them
about it and I risk my conscience telling me I'm wrong if I don't.
That I feel dirty if I don't tell them about it may be Kant telling me
that I'm simply wrong or it might be Rand telling me that I have an
implicit agreement to tell them about it, but what's the difference?
Or would Rand tell me to ignore that feeling and keep the extra money,
since, assuming no one will ever know about it, it's in my
self-interest? Also, you claim to bridge the gap from is to ought
without using intuition, but only rationality, and I don't believe
that's possible. On what rational basis is violating an agreement
wrong? Assuming your answer would involve saying that there's no such
thing as a prudent predator, I'm skeptical that that can be done on a
strictly rational basis. You may be happier than Hitler was, and only
because he was a thug and you're not, but I don't see how it can be
objectively demonstrated. What practical difference is there between
believing that it's never in one's interest to be a predator and
believing that predation is simply wrong?
Could you give an example of how Kant would be evil in a situation
that Rand would be good in? To convince me, it would have to be clear
that Rand would not be a party to any implicit agreements that would
make her act the same way as Kant would.
Robert J. Kolker
>
> I'm skeptical that there's much practical difference between a
> philosophy that believes in natural rights and a philosophy that
> believes in agreements as the source of rights, but liberally
> incorporates implicit agreements.
What is an "implicity agreement". There are written agreements and
verbal agreements (both binding when entered into freely). There cannot
be an agreement unless the terms are completely and precisely known by
all parties. If the terms are known the agreement is explicit. If the
terms are not known there is no agreement.
Bob Kolker
Jim Klein
>I do a lot of gambling and I frequently face what is to
>me the moral dilemma of what I should do when the venue at which I'm
>gambling makes a mistake in my favor. Sometimes I tell them about it
>and sometimes I don't. I risk being too unselfish if I tell them
>about it and I risk my conscience telling me I'm wrong if I don't.
>That I feel dirty if I don't tell them about it may be Kant telling me
>that I'm simply wrong or it might be Rand telling me that I have an
>implicit agreement to tell them about it, but what's the difference?
Neither. It comes from the only source it could.
It's Tom Robertson having an iota of regret that he chooses to gain a
benefit from another person's error.
If you were fully convinced that such errors were completely "part of the
game," then you would feel no dirt from the failure to return them.
The reason you do, I'm guessing, is that you're not the sort to enjoy
profiting from other people's mistakes. Like all egoists and capitalists,
you'd prefer to benefit from their talents, willingly offered.
Maybe you and Rob Bass should start a club---Egoists Against Egoism!
You should keep the money and not feel dirty. This is because it's not
really a mistake. The owners of the casino are operating their business as
they see fit. That includes slight imperfections in roulette wheels and
video poker games, as well as arithmetic failings on the part of their
employees. FWIW I vary like you do, but I don't think I will any more.
They taunt people to come try and get their money. So do.
jk
Joe Teicher
Chris Cathcart wrote:
>
> Uh, no, it's not bullshit, much less pure. It means just what it says:
> a life that is lived in accordance with the requirements of a rational
> being, with the central virtue being rationality. Its chief
> prescriptive recommendation is that by practicing the virtue of
> rationality, your life will go best; you will be happy and successful
> at attaining your ends without running into psychological and
> existential conflict and dysfunction.
Sorry that it has taken me so long to respond. I have been on vacation.
I agree with this, but what rationality can't do is prescibe what
people's ends should be. Only their own subjective experience of
happiness can do that. Rationality is excellent for helping people
balance their ends to achieve real happiness.
> (Like Fred Weiss brought up
> recently: a dictator like Hussein isn't motivated by, much less
> successful in attaining, happiness; he is motivated by power lust and
> bears the shameful psychological dsyfunction of that; if he is after
> happiness, he encounters a conflict between his seeking that and his
> power lust.)
Now you are going off the deep end. You are nuts to think that Hussein
didn't want to have power, that he didn't enjoy having power and that
power didn't make him happy. Of course, he might have been unhappy
overall, but you can't show that he would have been happier if he had
been a nobody rather than a dictator. Personally, I am willing to bet
that Hussein doesn't regret becoming dictator of Iraq. He may regret a
lot of things since then, but I bet he thinks that was a really good
move on his part.
>
> > Why should anyone be concerned with what
> > Rand or her followers considered the nature of man? Why should they put
> > that ahead of their own subjective experience of happiness?
>
> Because a "subjective experience of happiness" is on its own ephemeral,
> short-range, and without appropriate and reliable guidance as to how a
> lasting sense of well-being can be achieved.
No, its not. That's a strawman. All using your subjective experience
of happiness means is that you discover, through introspection and
experience, what makes you happy and what doesn't, and then you balance
what makes you happy and avoid whats makes you unhappy in order to
maximize your overall happiness. There is nothing short-range or
ephemeral about that.
> A life committed to the
> exercise of reason, however, is one that is most suited to achieving
> such. And that is because the life of reason is the life in accordance
> with the human mode of living.
You seem to think that reason is an end in itself rather than a tool. I
don't know what you mean by "the human mode of living," but the
question remains, if I believe something will make me happy, but it is
inconsistent with "the human mode of living" then why should I give a
fuck about "the human mode of living"? You haven't presented an
argument for why I will not be happy if I do not conform to your mode
of living, you've just asserted it.
>
> > I can't
> > think of a reason. Why should the BTK killer have worried about the
> > rights of his victims? He wanted to kill them and he did. You want to
> > pretend that isn't egoism because it isn't what you want to do. But you
> > can't do that because your preferences are not universal principles.
>
> But it's also all-too-apparent what kind of truly unhappy an existence
> a BTK-type killer lives. It's not unlike the life of a junkie whose
> main preoccupation is getting that next fix. Most such folks are
> self-admittedly miserable, if not in denial about their problem.
So what? Good advice is not the same as universal philosophical truth.
In order for you to translate your introspection and experience into
this universal presscription for human happiness, you have to say
something extremely strong about human nature. You need to argue that
no one could possibly enjoy harming another person, and no one could
possibly enjoy doing drugs or whatever. I don't think you can do that.
That doesn't mean that you can't live by the tenets of objectivism,
you just can't universalize them. And that's fine. I think a limited
but true philosophy is much better than a broad but false one.
>
> None of this is all that tough. Alas, I remember you as being a
> skilled troll, a one-time member (having dropped out due to lack of
> recent output) of the official HPO Top Posters list because of your
> quality trolling. Back to claim your position?
No. Posting in this group and even just reading it makes me feel
really guilty. It is such a waste of time.
Joe Teicher