Meet the Undefended Assertions
R Lawrence
pages) as a major part of his response to questions or criticisms. Of all
his writings, the one he refers to most is an essay called, "Meet the Third
Thing." This 4000-plus-word essay purportedly contains Mr. Swann's proof
that the use of retaliatory force (along with other unequal uses of force)
is unjustified.
What is it really? Well, it's mostly Mr. Swann repeating himself a lot.
Despite the essay's length, Mr. Swann really only has a couple of points to
make, and they could be made much more briefly. Still, since I want neither
to argue the same points a dozen times, nor to be accused of
misrepresenting Mr. Swann, I have distilled about a page of the excepts
from "Meet the Third Thing" that cover all of the relevant points. The
following excerpts are taken from the version of Mr. Swann's essay that may
be found on the Web at <http://www.primenet.com/~gswann/ThirdThing.html>:
<-----begin quote----->
When I come to arrest you, there is only you and only me. I am like you and
you are like me. We are equal as things, as equal as two rocks or two cans
of soup or two kittens. You can jump a little higher than me and I can run
a little faster than you, but these are merely differences of degree. There
is no power or potential that you have that I lack, nor do I have any
special capacities that you do not have. We are equal. If I have the right
or power or capacity to do something to you, then you have the right or
power or capacity to do it right back to me.
So how is it that I have the right to use pain compliance on you and submit
you to a cavity search, but you lack the right to do those same things
right back to me?
For this brutality to be justified, there must be some Third Thing present
with us. There is you and there is me, and if we are alone, then we are
equal. If we are not equal, then there must be a Third Thing in the room
that confers upon me super-human powers and consigns you to sub-human
responses. [...]
[T]he Third Thing, ultimately, is insanity defended with devout solemnity.
There is no Social Contract imagined by you but binding upon me. There is
no Divine Right of Kings. Every person is possessed of free will, but there
is no accumulation of that will, and the voluntary support of many or even
most people does not justify anything. There is no zeitgeist. Neither your
convenience nor mine justifies our domination of our neighbors, or each
other. You have the capacity to act in self-defense, but it absurd to argue
that this somehow prevents future injuries. "The consent of the governed"
could only have meaning if the consent were explicit and unanimous. The
"race" has no rights. Neither Socialism nor any other creation of the mind
of man is inevitable. And, finally, the sacred ceremonial amulet is just a
rock suspended from a rope. [...]
And the question that each one of these creeds--and many others--is an
answer to is this:
How can we dominate people without claiming that "might makes right"? [...]
We're asking whether or not you have the right or power or capacity to
dominate me, to break me like you'd break your horse to saddle. If you
don't, then we must either find a way to cooperate or part company. But if
you do, then we are not the same kind of thing, we are as unlike as you and
your horse, and "might makes right" is the only philosophical justification
for your actions. [...]
In order for you to claim any justification for your domination of me, you
must insist that there is some distinction between us, some right or power
or capacity that makes you super-human and renders me sub-human. This
distinguishing property, whatever it is, is the Third Thing.
And, whatever it is, it is imaginary. It does not exist. We are equal. You
are what I am and I am what you are. We are equally human, the same kind of
thing, and there is no basis in evidence for claiming that we are in some
way distinct. [...]
We cannot dominate people without claiming that "might makes right". And we
cannot rationally claim that "might makes right". Ergo, we cannot in
justice attempt to dominate each other. We can do it, if we want, but
cannot justify it in reason. [...]
<-----end quote----->
And there you have it. The really short version (using terminology that Mr.
Swann might or might not approve) is: Human beings are metaphysically
equal. In order to justify a moral distinction that would allow one to use
force when another may not, one must assume the existence of a "Third
Thing" that makes the one superior over the other. There is no such Third
Thing, and therefore unequal uses of force cannot be justified.
The discerning reader may have noticed that Mr. Swann's "argument" relies
on a series of undefended assertions. First, and least controversially, is
the claim: "If I have the right or power or capacity to do something to
you, then you have the right or power or capacity to do it right back to
me." Now this statement is a bit vague, because Mr. Swann does not clearly
distinguish between overall metaphysical equality (we generally have the
same rights and powers) and specific moral equality (the same rights and
powers are equally applicable to both of us in every specific situation).
The generous interpretation is that he means metaphysical equality. I say
this is the generous interpretation because if Mr. Swann is asserting moral
equality so early in the essay, then he is simply asserting his conclusion
without offering any argument at all. Assuming he means metaphysical
equality, then this is a common assumption among his readers, and one that
is presumably true, so it seems safe to grant him this particular
assertion.
Next comes his claim that any unequal use of force must rely on a "Third
Thing," which "confers upon me super-human powers and consigns you to
sub-human responses." Now, such a description might apply to some of the
theories Mr. Swann mentions -- the Divine Right of Kings, for example. It
does not seem like a very good description of many other theories, such as
traditional libertarian rights theories, which typically justify the use of
force because of an imbalance of circumstance or action, not of powers or
rights. Such theories typically justify Person A using force against Person
B because of something Person B has *done*, not because of some third
object that grants special powers to Person A. In other circumstances, such
a theory might claim that the right to use force belongs to Person B
instead. To call such justifications a "Third Thing," when they rely
entirely on attributes and actions of the two "things" (people) under
discussion, is odd rhetoric at the least.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the "Third Thing" description, Mr.
Swann asserts that no such "Thing" exists. That is, he asserts that there
is no justification for unequal uses of force. Thus does metaphysical
equality lead to moral equality. And assert it is all that he does. He does
not refute, or even analyze, any of the major theories that attempt to
justify the unequal use of force -- not even the unpopular Divine Right of
Kings. A few, such as the Social Contract, get off-handed one-sentence
swipes that are not likely to persuade anyone with any real knowledge of
those theories. In response to thousands of pages of philosophical
discourse propounded by dozens of authors promoting these theories, of
which at least one is accepted by virtually every one of Mr. Swann's
readers, Mr. Swann offers absolutely nothing but his own claim that they
are all wrong, backed by the Argument from Repeated Assertion. Mr. Swann
does convincingly undermine the authority of "the sacred ceremonial
amulet," which unfortunately does not appear in any prominent philosophical
position of which I am aware.
There are other dubious elements to Mr. Swann's theories. I have not
touched, for example, on his use of the term "domination" to describe every
unequal use of force. Since this quirky terminology can be translated into
normal English, I have simply done so. However, the emotional resonance of
his argument certainly flags when one realizes that his vision of
"attempted dominance" includes a little old lady asking the police to
retrieve her purse from the snatcher, or a rape victim demanding what most
would consider justice for her attacker. I might also note how he manages
to define those who disagree with him as "insane." But these items are
beside the point when one realizes that at its heart, Mr. Swann's argument
is a non-argument. It is simply Mr. Swann's elaborate assertion that every
contrary theory is wrong, with no attempt to refute, or apparently even to
understand, those theories.
Now, I do not wish to be accused of misplacing the burden of proof. Those
who want to justify the unequal use of force have a responsibility to make
the case for their theories. However, if Mr. Swann wishes to dismiss them
all without addressing their individual arguments, then he will have to
find some common flaw or fallacy in those theories, and his willingness to
lump them all under the banner of the "Third Thing" and denounce them
without argument, is not a flaw in *their* claims.
Perhaps Mr. Swann has, hidden in some corner of the Web or Usenet or simply
in the recesses of his own mind, a convincing set of arguments against the
numerous moral and political theories that make claims contrary to his own.
If so, he should bring them forth. As long as he continues to refer people
to the non-arguments of "Meet the Third Thing," he cannot credibly claim to
have done so.
============================================================================
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com>
Rod Nibbe
>Greg Swann often refers readers to his online writings (found on his Web
>pages) as a major part of his response to questions or criticisms. Of all
>his writings, the one he refers to most is an essay called, "Meet the Third
>Thing." This 4000-plus-word essay purportedly contains Mr. Swann's proof
>that the use of retaliatory force (along with other unequal uses of force)
>is unjustified.
Well, you've come a long way from regarding it as nothing but a - how
did you say it last year... "indecipherable bombast?" Good to see this polite
reconsideration, Richard.
A general comment about ethical argumentation. Of Greg's essay you
say...
> This 4000-plus-word essay purportedly contains Mr. Swann's proof
>that the use of retaliatory force (along with other unequal uses of force)
>is unjustified.
Is it really intended by Greg as a proof? Maybe it is. But, in as much
as ethical arguments need to be persuasive to be worth anything, I don't hold
them to the same kind of rigor I do the formalism of proof in mathematics. You
go on to say ...
>... Mr. Swann does not clearly
>distinguish between overall metaphysical equality (we generally have the
>same rights and powers) and specific moral equality (the same rights and
>powers are equally applicable to both of us in every specific situation).
>The generous interpretation is that he means metaphysical equality. I say
>this is the generous interpretation because if Mr. Swann is asserting moral
>equality so early in the essay, then he is simply asserting his conclusion
>without offering any argument at all.
Ultimately, I see ethical arguments as prescriptive, sorta like making
a pie - use these ingredients, in these proportions, mixed this way and you'll
have made my recipe. I've argued Rand did this in the Objectivist Ethics. If
you submit that essay to the same scrutiny as you did Greg's, you'll discover,
I think, that Rand asserts a conclusion of her own. I've talked at length to
this in the Prudent Predator Rebuttals thread. She begins with identifying
what man is, how his nature is distinct from other animals, what values are
and why man needs them at all, and then finally why man needs ethics. All that
is well and good and logically pretty tight, and few would disagree with it.
But then, somewhat out of the blue, though not without evidence, Rand simply
asserts what *good* values and concomitant virtues are, and *aserts* these as
the cardinal values and virtues of her Objectivist Ethics. In other words, if
you want to become an egoist, here's the ingredients and here's how to achieve
the result.
She didn't *prove* what was good - a typical misunderstanding of the
purpose of ethical arguments - she identifies it, *asserts* it, and proceeds
to build the egoistic arguments from that. You gotta begin somewhere, and Rand
began with postiting what was good, without "proving" it in any rigourous
sense. Though without doubt there is oodles of emprical evidence for her
assertion. This is why, by the way, you can't get the prudent predator from
Rand's ethics, she disposed of him in the premise. This is what drives people
like Wolf into pretzel fits trying to defeat the PP, he thinks Rand proved it,
too. He doesn't see the two-step in the middle of the essay and thus thinks
that continously yelling "One must live by principle, without exception" is a
persuasive argument against the PP. It's a lot easier to recognize Rand's
assertion of what is good, and show that the prudent predator value of
"unproductiveness" is antithetic to the cardinal Objectivist value of
"productiveness" and hence without any egoistic virtue. In other words, cut
corners on ingredients, don't follow the recipe, and you don't get cherry pie
- you don't get an egoist - you get "Something Else".
So is Greg asserting morality early on; is he asserting what's good in
the premise? Probably. But all ethicists have done this to some extent in
their prescriptive ethics. You gotta begin somewhere. Greg has simply created
a recipe for someone interested in making a Janoist.
-RKN
(rni...@alaska.net)
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
[Interesting reconstruction of Rand's ethical enterprise cut]
> So is Greg asserting morality early on; is he asserting what's good in
> the premise? Probably. But all ethicists have done this to some extent in
> their prescriptive ethics. You gotta begin somewhere. Greg has simply cre
> ated
> a recipe for someone interested in making a Janoist.
This may well be true, Rod. Ethics may be a circular argument. But if
you are going to engage in it, it needs to be a big enough circle to be
interesting and useful. Or, to use your metaphor, while everything that
we taste at the end is the result of the recipe we started with, some
recipes create more startling effects with more humble ingredients than
others. And some recipes just call for us to add some pre-packaged
ingredient that ends up doing all the work. Easy when you're in a hurry,
but not much fun for those of us who like to cook.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Freebootrr
Although I am not familiar with Mr Swann, or this particular controversy, I
chanced to read the referenced post on my once-a-moth visit to APO.
I note that your post is civil, reasonable, and grammatical. No ad hominems, no
sophomoric rhetoric, no spite or petulance.
So I am moved to ask: "What on earth on you doing here?"
J. C. LeGere
freeb...@aol.com
R Lawrence
> A general comment about ethical argumentation. Of Greg's essay you
>say...
>
>> This 4000-plus-word essay purportedly contains Mr. Swann's proof
>>that the use of retaliatory force (along with other unequal uses of force)
>>is unjustified.
>
> Is it really intended by Greg as a proof? Maybe it is.
I don't wish to put words in Mr. Swann's mouth, but he certainly seems to
think his essay accomplishes quite a bit. For example, in a recent post to
the "Arguments Against AC" thread, he declared, "I picked this carcass
clean some years ago in Meet the Third Thing ..."
> But, in as much
>as ethical arguments need to be persuasive to be worth anything, I don't hold
>them to the same kind of rigor I do the formalism of proof in mathematics.
Nor do I. However, I would like to see a level of argument that might be
considered "proof" in a less deductive context -- for instance, the proof
levels of a jury trial: beyond a reasonable doubt, or at least
preponderance of the evidence. I don't think Mr. Swann meets any of these
standards.
>>... Mr. Swann does not clearly
>>distinguish between overall metaphysical equality (we generally have the
>>same rights and powers) and specific moral equality (the same rights and
>>powers are equally applicable to both of us in every specific situation).
>>The generous interpretation is that he means metaphysical equality. I say
>>this is the generous interpretation because if Mr. Swann is asserting moral
>>equality so early in the essay, then he is simply asserting his conclusion
>>without offering any argument at all.
>
> Ultimately, I see ethical arguments as prescriptive, sorta like ma
> king
>a pie - use these ingredients, in these proportions, mixed this way and yo
>u'll
>have made my recipe. I've argued Rand did this in the Objectivist Ethics. If
>you submit that essay to the same scrutiny as you did Greg's, you'll disco
>ver,
>I think, that Rand asserts a conclusion of her own.
Well, in the first place I would not claim rigor as one of Rand's strong
points as a philosopher. I find much more to admire in the breadth of her
vision, the vigor of her rhetoric (compare the pallid formulas of the
average academic), and the overall correctness of her ideas. If she were to
appear here dismissing her critics with a wave towards her essays and a few
ripe ad hominems, as Mr. Swann tends to do, then I would be just as
unimpressed with such behavior from her as I am from him.
> I've talked at length to
>this in the Prudent Predator Rebuttals thread.
My apologies, but I tend to avoid reading threads with the term "Prudent
Predator" in the Subject header, so I have not seen your previous arguments
on this issue.
> She begins with identifying
>what man is, how his nature is distinct from other animals, what values are
>and why man needs them at all, and then finally why man needs ethics. All
>that
>is well and good and logically pretty tight, and few would disagree with it.
>But then, somewhat out of the blue, though not without evidence, Rand simply
>asserts what *good* values and concomitant virtues are, and *aserts* these as
>the cardinal values and virtues of her Objectivist Ethics. In other words, if
>you want to become an egoist, here's the ingredients and here's how to ach
>ieve
>the result.
I agree with you that Rand does not provide proof of the importance of each
of the virtues she lists. I would be just as loathe to put words into Miss
Rand's mouth as I am to put them into Mr. Swann's (even more so, since she
cannot correct me), but I think she would say that any such proof would be
inductive in nature, and that such inductions can be worked out by the
individual far more readily than they can be laid down in an essay. I think
her intent was to describe the virtues, not so much as a "recipe," but
simply so the reader would be able to see what the Objectivist ethics
*is*. She was describing, not proving, at least once she got beyond the
basic meta-ethical question of why human beings need morality in the first
place.
> She didn't *prove* what was good - a typical misunderstanding of the
>purpose of ethical arguments - she identifies it, *asserts* it, and proceeds
>to build the egoistic arguments from that.
I agree that she was primarily identifying in her discussion of the
virtues. I disagree that she went on to build egoistic arguments from those
identifications. I don't see that she even attempted that in "The
Objectivist Ethics." "I have presented the barest essentials of my system,"
is what Rand said about that essay, not anything more than that.
> You gotta begin somewhere, and Rand
>began with postiting what was good, without "proving" it in any rigourous
>sense. Though without doubt there is oodles of emprical evidence for her
>assertion.
And I think that is where she would have turned for proof, had she been
trying to offer one.
<snip details of prudent predator issue>
> So is Greg asserting morality early on; is he asserting what's goo
> d in
>the premise? Probably. But all ethicists have done this to some extent in
>their prescriptive ethics. You gotta begin somewhere. Greg has simply created
>a recipe for someone interested in making a Janoist.
I think you are again reading more into an essay (in this case Mr. Swann's)
than the author has attempted. Mr. Swann does not provide any Janoist
recipe, or a positive ethical vision of any kind in "Meet the Third Thing."
He pretty much sticks to criticizing the use of force and theories that
attempt to justify it. This is a relatively narrow topic, and one would
think that in the amount of space he uses, he could at least correctly
identify the relevant theories and classify them for the purpose of viable
critiques. Instead all we get is the dubious blanket grouping of the "Third
Thing," which is critiqued only to the extent of Mr. Swann baldly asserting
that no such "Thing" exists. That and some quoted poetry is all he offers.
There simply isn't much *there* there, much less any cleaned carcasses.
============================================================================
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com>
R Lawrence
>Although I am not familiar with Mr Swann, or this particular controversy, I
>chanced to read the referenced post on my once-a-moth visit to APO.
I assume you mean HPO, not APO, unless you got lost.
>I note that your post is civil, reasonable, and grammatical. No ad hominem
>s, no
>sophomoric rhetoric, no spite or petulance.
>
>So I am moved to ask: "What on earth on you doing here?"
"I'm finding my way back home." (Rush, "Finding My Way")
============================================================================
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com>
Jim Klein
<RL0...@ix.netcom.com> writes:
>Instead all we get is the dubious blanket grouping of the "Third
>Thing," which is critiqued only to the extent of Mr. Swann baldly
>asserting that no such "Thing" exists. That and some quoted poetry is
>all he offers. There simply isn't much *there* there, much less any
>cleaned carcasses.
This is false. As I recall, there are several "cleaned carcasses" in
there. There is a limit to how much positive evidence one can enter in
support of the absence of something.
The _fact_ is that ALL human action is _strictly_ individual, period
period period. Many, if not all, ethical theories implicitly posit
that there's _something_ else there. It's so basic and habitual to us
that we don't even notice that we're doing it. And some of us go to
great lengths to rationalize that we're not positing any such thing,
even as we are.
There may be problems with some of Greg's assertions, but this ain't
one of them.
jk
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com> writes:
>
>>Instead all we get is the dubious blanket grouping of the "Third
>>Thing," which is critiqued only to the extent of Mr. Swann baldly
>>asserting that no such "Thing" exists. That and some quoted poetry is
>>all he offers. There simply isn't much *there* there, much less any
>>cleaned carcasses.
>
>there. There is a limit to how much positive evidence one can enter in
>support of the absence of something.
Mr. Swann's essay is available online. You are free to quote the actual
cleaning, if it exists, rather than simply "recall" it. Personally, I do
not consider a one-sentence potshot to be a "carcass cleaning," so if you
can find a case where Mr. Swann does more than that in "Meet the Third
Thing," I would like you to provide the passage. And please don't try to do
the cleaning for him. I want to see where he did it.
============================================================================
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@ix.netcom.com>
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> The _fact_ is that ALL human action is _strictly_ individual, period
> period period.
Action are taken by individuals, but often the best way to understand or
explain their actions is by reference to relationships among individuals.
Is this "strictly" individual? If we adopt the theory of methodological
individualism (which I am certainly willing to do), then it is a "fact".
But let's not be intellectually arrogant (or dishonest) enough to claim
that methodological individualism /must/ be true.
> It's so basic and habitual to us
> that we don't even notice that we're doing it. And some of us go to
> great lengths to rationalize that we're not positing any such thing,
> even as we are.
Exactly.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@virginia.edu
Jim Klein
<gsol...@virginia.edu> writes:
>> The _fact_ is that ALL human action is _strictly_ individual, period
>> period period.
>
>Action are taken by individuals, but often the best way to understand
>or explain their actions is by reference to relationships among
>individuals. Is this "strictly" individual?
Is _what_ strictly individual? The actions? Yes. The understanding
of the actions? Yes. The conceptual process by which one comes to
understand those actions? Yes. One of the aspects of that conceptual
process, specifically our ability to quantify multiple actions? Then
no, I guess that's a sense which isn't "strictly individual."
>If we adopt the theory of methodological individualism (which I am
>certainly willing to do), then it is a "fact".
Sorry...I don't know what methodoligical individualism is. I hope it's
closer to reality than "market failure."
>But let's not be intellectually arrogant (or dishonest) enough to
>claim that methodological individualism /must/ be true.
Okay, I won't. But mostly because I don't know to what it refers.
I remarked in another thread that we have David around to quantify the
summation of individual actions. I have absolutely no objection
whatsoever if you wish to join him in that endeavor.
jk