Some credit where it's due: Prescott
Chris Cathcart
Rights" thread:
I wrote:
> Obsesscott conveniently chooses the example of a river
> and a forest. What about the rights over my own body
> and mind and the products of my mind?
Jim Prescott responded:
[quote]
That's easy. Anyone would be a fool not to agree immediately that you
must
have that right, in exchange for your agreeing that he must have the
same
right over his own body and mind and his mind's products. I've made
this
argument myself many times here that property is the product of one's
creative efforts and is one of the three unalienable rights (life and
liberty being the other two).
But now suppose that the other beast of a sub-human being over there
/rejects/ this principle and alleges instead that your body belongs to
him
as, for example, the "natural right" of a white slave-owner over his
black
human property (ala Bob Kolker's scheme). My theory handles this
situation
neatly. He possesses no right over his own body -- so you may kill him
to
set yourself free! -- precisely /because/ he has /refused agreement/ on
the
principle that each person's body must belong to himself. Thus, that
sub-human's right to his own body was itself contingent upon his
agreeing,
and it does not exist without it.
Thus, even the three unalienable rights are agreement dependent. You
simply
cannot have them while at the same time renouncing them!
They are "unalienable" in the sense that they are implicit in every
agreement and they cannot be waived by agreement. You cannot "agree"
that
you have no right of free choice (liberty). If you had no such right
then
how could you choose to agree? And if you do not choose, it is not
agreement. This means, life, liberty and property are implicitly
required by
the concept of agreement. But it still does not mean these rights
somehow
magically exist /without/ agreement!
[/quote]
I do have to say, Jim gets ever-so-close to the correct position, i.e.,
that rights logically precede contractual agreements, are indeed
preconditions for valid contractual agreements, but for whatever reason
doesn't want to concede that the "three inalienable rights" of bodily
and property integrity ("life, liberty, and property") are rights we
necessarily have irrespective of particular agreements. On his view,
these rights are actually something like meta-rights, that are
necessarily presupposed in any valid contract, or necessarily contained
in the concept of contract.
And yet, unless I'm missing some *really fine* distinctions, Jim's
position here amounts, in actual meaning, to the same thing as the
Rand/Objectivist theory of rights. The relation between the "three
inalienable rights" and contractually-derived rights would then be that
between the general and the particular, the procedural and the
substantive. (Regarding this latter: the procedural principle applying
to all contractual relations is "respect each individual's person and
property"; substantive rights are rights defined by contractual
agreement.)
So to use the example of Galt: he doesn't enter into agreement with
dissenters, so the dissenters either go their own way or move to
initiate force against Galt (law of excluded middle here, folks), in
which latter case they renounce any claim against Galt's defensive use
of force. As far as I can tell, this amounts in actual substance to
unconditional rights held by both Galt and the dissenters, to be free
from initiatory force against person and property.
What's a little funny is that Prescott's argument sounds something like
Hans-Hermann Hoppe's argument regarding the rational preconditions for
human interaction:
http://www.hanshoppe.com/publications/Soc&Cap7.pdf
This cause for some curiosity and fascination in "libertarian circles"
is actually nice and brief, covering all of about 8 pages in PDF. A
similar version of argument comes from N. Stephan Kinsella, who argues
from the legal concept of "estoppel"
http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/12_1/12_1_3.pdf
What's funny is that these arguments are formalist-rationalist and
Hoppe in particular is explictly Kantian throughout in his philosophy.
Their whole argument centers more or less on the idea that ones is
guilty of inconsistency in denying basic rights of bodily and property
integrity.
Of course (and here I'm back to addressing another Prescott objection),
the Randian approach says that there *is* an inconsistency in not
upholding rights, but the normative substance and justification of this
comes from her egoistic ethics. (The Kantian-formalist-rationalist
approach suffers from the problem of answering *why* it is wrong to
uphold contradictions. "You should not uphold contradictions" needs
justification as to the grounding of the "should," otherwise the
alleged fact-value gap remains.) Rand makes the rhetorical move in
Galt's speech between its being *right* that one exercise one's mind to
one's having *a right* to exercise one's mind. While Rand is often
criticized for this rhetorical maneuver, it is actually essentially
correct when spelled out. One would be guilty of incoherence in
affirming, on one hand, the rightness (paraphrasing Galt) of using
one's mind, of acting on one's own free judgment, of working for his
values and keeping the products of his work, but then not recognizing,
on the other hand, the implications of this as it applies to
inter-personal interactions. It's a simple matter of fidelity and
commitment to oneself and one's own.
Finally, I note in emphasis one passage of Jim's argument. Regarding
the white slaveholder's claim to ownership over a non-white:
"My theory handles this situation
neatly. He possesses no right over his own body -- so you may kill him
to
set yourself free! -- precisely /because/ he has /refused agreement/ on
the
principle that each person's body must belong to himself."
While I would agree that one may (*may*! is morally permitted!) employ
whatever means, up to and including killing the slaveholder if
necessary, to set oneself free, I also note that Jim references the
principle that *each person's body must belong to himself*. It's just
a matter of semantics, but that's a simple re-statement of the standard
formulations of a ("natural") right of self-ownership. The concepts of
belonging or ownership *do* reference, in a social context, the
rightful sphere of action one has.
James E. Prescott
"Chris Cathcart" <cath...@gmail.com> wrote:
> [...]
> I do have to say, Jim gets ever-so-close to the correct
> position, i.e., that rights logically precede contractual
> agreements, are indeed preconditions for valid contractual
> agreements, but for whatever reason doesn't want to concede
> that the "three inalienable rights" of bodily and property
> integrity ("life, liberty, and property") are rights we
> necessarily have irrespective of particular agreements.
The credit is due you, Chris! Among the many who have vehemently denounced
me for the opinions I have expressed here over the years, very few have ever
taken the trouble to actually try to understand what I was saying, to assess
it fairly in the context that I offered. You've done that. I appreciate your
carefulness and candor.
And I actually will concede, as I have all along, that those are three basic
rights we necessarily have irrespective of particular agreements.
But what I mean is, preceding -- and contained within as implicitly
accepted -- any particular agreements aimed at creating and defining
particular rights, there is /first/ an implicit agreement on the basic
rights of life, liberty and property. For example, in an agreement giving
you the right to traverse my property in exchange for a small fee there is
necessarily already an implicit agreement between us that I own this
property and that I may charge fees of those traversing it. And even before
that, there is agreement that "people own property."
If someone does /not/ agree to the principle of property, then, guess what,
he has no business participating in a trade society. It is only him who does
not own property, and only by virtue of his refusal to agree that property
exists.
What I do not concede -- and I'm willing to lay out my reasons for this
at any time (heck, I'll do it right now) -- is that the unalienable rights
precede /all/ agreement, even the most basic "agreement that they exist."
What I say is, just as particular agreements create particular rights, so,
too, the most general and basic agreement ("the three unalienable rights
hereby exist") is what creates the most basic and general and necessary
rights.
The proof, again, is astonishingly simple. Just imagine a condition of
non-agreement! Imagine that a sub-human beast who although possessed of a
reasoning capacity chooses to reject and renounce agreement on this
principle, proclaiming that as a matter of natural rights no man (or he
might say no black man in a white society ) has any right to defend his
life, nor to own any property, nor to enjoy any liberty. Does such a beast,
while renouncing and trampling the rights of others, still possess for
himself these unalienable rights? I say, of course not. I say you cannot
have rights and deny them, too. You are not entitled to a contradiction. So
therefore, if his own rights depend on his recognition of rights in others,
QED. The source of his rights is his /agreement/.
But the way Ken and others would prefer to say this is, the rights,
including his own, already naturally existed but our beast simply "lost
them" when he breached and/or renounced them.
Well, that's true in a way (I'll get to it). Unfortunately, that does not
make logical sense when you look at it carefully. Man begins as a beast and
then he makes his way out of the jungle. Imagine a condition in which not
just this particular beast but /nobody at all/ agrees that anybody at all
has any rights of life or liberty or property. Hard to imagine perhaps, but
there it is. In such a condition nobody at all would have any rights because
/everybody/ would be exactly like the sub-human beast described in the
paragraphs above.
Ken and others are right, though, that rights /do/ exist before an
individual beast in an otherwise civilized society renounces and by breach
loses them. But, those are only the existing rights of him and others in the
civilized society that the beast is betraying. And those pre-existing rights
(existing pre-betrayal) themselves still only existed by /prior/ agreement,
as shown above.
> On his view, these rights are actually something like meta-
> rights, that are necessarily presupposed in any valid contract,
> or necessarily contained in the concept of contract.
Yes, indeed!
If I may say, you are, "oh, so close!" The unalienable rights are implicit
in any valid agreement/contract. You cannot be said to "agree" on something
if you do not agree on these rights. However, this does not mean these
rights already exist (out there in the ether somewhere? I. too, get tired of
saying "mystical") in the complete absence of any agreement whatsoever,
/even/ of any agreement that they exist! If nobody at all agrees upon them
then by that unfortunate jungle state they don't (yet) exist.
> And yet, unless I'm missing some *really fine* distinctions, Jim's
> position here amounts, in actual meaning, to the same thing as the
> Rand/Objectivist theory of rights.
Good insight! I go further, as you know, and say that what I am advocating
IS the Objectivist theory of rights. And it is not a natural rights theory,
not an innate rights theory, not an inherent rights theory, and not an
intrinsic rights theory. It is recognition that those four terms are
synonymous and that the whole natural-to-intrinsic theory business is
artificial, mystical, invalid and is in fact the source of breaches of
rights such as of slavery imposed on black men for mystical and purportedly
"natural" reasons.
> The relation between the "three inalienable rights" and contractually-
> derived rights would then be that between the general and the particular,
> the procedural and the substantive.
Perfectly said! You are insightful and on target. I would call your
attention to my reply to your previous piece, where I wrote
John Galt is talking about his relationship with someone who
dissents from him -- as Ayn Rand said regarding compromise
-- "in regard to concretes or particulars [while] implementing
a mutually accepted basic principle." The basic principle that
both John Galt and the dissenter must already have mutually
accepted (agreed upon) is the right of each to be left *free*.
> (Regarding this latter: the procedural principle applying
> to all contractual relations is "respect each individual's
> person and property"; substantive rights are rights defined
> by contractual agreement.)
Yes! The "social contract" is /akin/ to normal contractual agreements but is
different from them in important respects. When we speak of contract
normally, we think of written documents or spoken words, of course. The
terms must be conveyed and known (as Bob reminds us). The agreement of which
I am speaking here -- the most basic, pertaining to the most fundamental
procedural meeting of minds possible (that we must have and respect basic
rights) -- cannot itself be spoken or written down (well, it could, but that
would add nothing; and, its terms are still conveyed and still understood)
because it -- the acceptance of the principle of individual rights -- is
what gives moral and legal substance in the first place to the spoken and
written word!
So, you are correct to say that normal contract is what defines substantive
particular rights in our day to day experience (I own this particular car,
for example) . I add only that an agreement /akin/ to such contract (and an
agreement preceding and implied by such contract) is the /foundation/ upon
which such normal contract builds. And this foundational agreement takes the
normally unspoken form, "We both and we all agree that each of us has the
right to own (a car, and other things) if we create, or earn/contract for,
what we would own."
> So to use the example of Galt: he doesn't enter into agreement with
> dissenters, so the dissenters either go their own way or move to
> initiate force against Galt (law of excluded middle here, folks), in
> which latter case they renounce any claim against Galt's defensive use
> of force. As far as I can tell, this amounts in actual substance to
> unconditional rights held by both Galt and the dissenters, to be free
> from initiatory force against person and property.
Well, not quite. It's wrong to regard "be free from initiatory force" as an
unconditional right. It is highly conditional. The condition is that one
accept this rule!
John Galt would not hesitate -- hesitation would be suicidal! -- to
initiate the use of force against a person who refused to accept the
principle that one ought not initiate force. If you grant to such a
"dissenter from fundamental principle" the purported "right" (!) to be the
first one to use force, then you are going to die at his hands. And this is
just another illustration of why the notion of inherent, intrinsic, innate
and pre-agreement rights is non-sensical and would lead us to
self-destruction.
> [...] Rand makes the rhetorical move in Galt's speech
> between its being *right* that one exercise one's mind to
> one's having *a right* to exercise one's mind. While
> Rand is often criticized for this rhetorical maneuver, [...]
I've criticized her myself on that precise point. Many times.
> [...] it is actually essentially correct when spelled out.
> One would be guilty of incoherence in affirming, on
> one hand, the rightness (paraphrasing Galt) of using
> one's mind, of acting on one's own free judgment, of
> working for his values and keeping the products of his
> work, but then not recognizing,on the other hand, the
> implications of this as it applies to inter-personal
> interactions. It's a simple matter of fidelity and
> commitment to oneself and one's own.
True. But all that shows is that rights are necessary (to happiness) and
proper. A thing being necessary and proper to some purpose (happiness) does
not establish that that thing exists or is possessed. Food is necessary and
proper to my life. This establishes that I need food, /not/ that I already
possess food. To possess food I must go out and get it. Rights are necessary
and proper to my life as a human being (and anyone who rejects rights is
upholding a contradiction and is evil). But this does not establish that I
already possess rights, /only/ that I need them. To actually possess rights
I must go out and get them by striking agreement with fellow men and women
establishing them. Why should I/we do this? Because we all need them,
that's why!
> [...] I also note that Jim references the principle that *each
> person's body must belong to himself*. It's just a matter
> of semantics, but that's a simple re-statement of the standard
> formulations of a ("natural") right of self-ownership. [...]
It's strikingly similar I readily admit, but similar for a very good
reason. I do not dispute the relevance of nature. Man needs rights, I say,
by his rational nature. And laws of nature determine what rights he MUST
have, IF the purpose for having rights in the first place is to be secured
(which is trade, to wealth to happiness).
So, just exactly as Ayn Rand said, "IF a man wishes to live in a civilized
society he MUST consent [to the rule of law]," so I say, "if a man wishes to
live in a civilized society he MUST agree that each person's body must
belong to himself." And so on.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Robert J. Kolker
>
> John Galt would not hesitate -- hesitation would be suicidal! -- to
> initiate the use of force against a person who refused to accept the
> principle that one ought not initiate force.
In short, you believe it is alright to use force or violence on someone
whose judgment differs from yous. Do I have that right. Even if they
have never initiated force against you or anyone else, if they don't
accept your Principle it is alright to harm them? Yes? Do I have it
right. You are a fucking Shi'ite.
You are as bad as Robespierre. It is isn't enough to conform. One must
be enthusiastic as well. Lack of enthusiasm deserves extreme measures.
Bob Kolker
Mark N
> If someone does /not/ agree to the principle of property, then, guess what,
> he has no business participating in a trade society. It is only him who
> does not own property, and only by virtue of his refusal to agree that pr
> operty
> exists.
>
> What I do not concede -- and I'm willing to lay out my reasons for this
> at any time (heck, I'll do it right now) -- is that the unalienable rights
> precede /all/ agreement, even the most basic "agreement that they exist."
>
> What I say is, just as particular agreements create particular rights, so,
> too, the most general and basic agreement ("the three unalienable rights
> hereby exist") is what creates the most basic and general and necessary
> rights.
>
> The proof, again, is astonishingly simple. Just imagine a condition of
> non-agreement! Imagine that a sub-human beast who although possessed of a
> reasoning capacity chooses to reject and renounce agreement on this
> principle, proclaiming that as a matter of natural rights no man (or he
> might say no black man in a white society ) has any right to defend his
> life, nor to own any property, nor to enjoy any liberty. Does such a beast,
> while renouncing and trampling the rights of others, still possess for
> himself these unalienable rights? I say, of course not. I say you cannot
> have rights and deny them, too. [...]
Let's look at a more difficult case, the case of a person who minds his
own business and never aggresses against anyone, but does not
acknowledge himself to be a party to the multi-faceted "social contract"
that you claim everyone is (somehow) implicitly committed to.
Let's suppose that this person *explicitly* affirms his respect for your
(and everyone's) basic rights of life, liberty, and property, and he
*explicitly* renounces aggression. But he balks at your demand that he
obey every ridiculous, arbitrary law that "society" comes up with.
Would you consider this person to be a rightless sub-human beast also?
Is there any limit to the amount of aggression that "society" may
properly commit against this person, to punish him for not agreeing with
all of the fine points of your "social contract"?
[...]
> Well, not quite. It's wrong to regard "be free from initiatory force" as an
> unconditional right. It is highly conditional. The condition is that one
> accept this rule!
>
> John Galt would not hesitate -- hesitation would be suicidal! -- to
> initiate the use of force against a person who refused to accept the
> principle that one ought not initiate force. [...]
OK, fair enough. Now, what about someone who *explicitly accepts* that
principle, and shows no sign of any intention to violate it? Under what
circumstances do you think Galt would contemplate aggressing against
*that* person?
Mark
Mark N
> You are as bad as Robespierre. It is isn't enough to conform. One must
> be enthusiastic as well. Lack of enthusiasm deserves extreme measures.
Vee haff vays to make you enthusiastic!
Mark
James E. Prescott
news:C90Se.10$rh.7@trndny03...
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>> [...] I say you cannot have rights and deny them, too. [...]
> Let's look at a more difficult case, the case of a person who
> minds his own business and never aggresses against anyone,
> but does not acknowledge himself to be a party to the multi-
> faceted "social contract" that you claim everyone is (somehow)
> implicitly committed to.
The somehow is by trade participation in a free society, as I've explained a
number of times. It obligates a person in Ayn Rand's words, "To delegate his
right of self-defense to the government for the purpose of an
orderly,objective enforcement of rights," which is true, but not complete.
It obligates a person in my words "to comply with the free society's
constitutional and tolerable laws." A person who participates in trade while
considering himself excluded from this necessary obligation is a fraud and a
thief of service, since he only has property to trade and people to trade it
with thanks to the protection of the law. Such a scoundrel does not deserve
or get the law's protection when his duplicity is exposed, as when he tries
to decline a subpoena by whining that he never knew of or never consciously
accepted his moral and legal obligations. What, was he living under a rock
somewhere with Bob Kolker???
> Let's suppose that this person *explicitly* affirms his respect
> for your (and everyone's) basic rights of life, liberty, and property,
> and he *explicitly* renounces aggression. But he balks at your
> demand that he obey every ridiculous, arbitrary law that "society"
> comes up with.
I never made such a demand. I have always and only said that the obligation
applies to no more than the constitutional (legal) and tolerable laws (able
to be obeyed without losing your life or otherwise losing a reasonable
expectation of happiness in life) of a free society (a society founded on
the principle of individual rights and dedicated in its laws to the
protection of those rights).
Some of these laws may indeed be ridiculous and unjust. But A) not every
ridiculous and unjust law is legal or tolerable just because the legislature
passed it. And B) it doesn't matter if the law is sensible and just; if it
doesn't meet the three requirements there is no obligation to obey it, so in
some respects I'm more tolerant of social dissent than you libertarians!
> Would you consider this person to be a rightless sub-human
> beast also?
No. I would just consider him as, in spirit, in breach of his moral
obligations. And if ever he translates that duplicitous spirit into action
by, say, refusing to comply with a subpoena, then I'd want to see him locked
up and punished as he deserves.
> Is there any limit to the amount of aggression that "society"
> may properly commit against this person, to punish him for
> not agreeing with all of the fine points of your "social contract"?
The punishment should fit the crime. The object should be to teach him a
moral lesson and persuade him to live up to his obligations the next chance
he gets -- say, in 6 to 8 months.
>> [...]
>> John Galt would not hesitate -- hesitation would be suicidal! -- to
>> initiate the use of force against a person who refused to accept the
>> principle that one ought not initiate force. [...]
> OK, fair enough. Now, what about someone who *explicitly accepts*
> that principle, and shows no sign of any intention to violate it? Under
> what circumstances do you think Galt would contemplate aggressing
> against *that* person?
If he believed that person's expressed acceptance and they were alone
together in the jungle then probably never.
But if they are part of a group then Galt would be morally right and well
advised to insist -- to DEMAND upon threat of force -- that objective
enforcement measures be adopted by the group as a guarantee of everyone's
commitment and as a violence-free recourse in case honest disagreements
should ever arise among them, as surely would happen now and then. Anyone
refusing this offer should be dealt with forcibly to deny him the ability to
ever threaten members of the group regardless of whether he has or has not
initiated force himself. Banishment might suffice; imprisonment is a good
option; summary execution is not out of the question depending on the
direness of the jungle circumstances.
The object is not to rob anyone of values nor to attempt to live as
parasites. The object is to establish the rule of law so that every member
of society has his rights protected objectively, thereby precluding any
possibility of there arising a deadly cycle of force, retaliation and
violence. Anyone unhappy with this does not belong among the members of a
civilized society and should be treated as the beast he is.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Robert J. Kolker
>
>
> The somehow is by trade participation in a free society, as I've
> explained a number of times. It obligates a person in Ayn Rand's words,
> "To delegate his right of self-defense to the government for the purpose
> of an orderly,objective enforcement of rights," which is true, but not
> complete. It obligates a person in my words "to comply with the free
> society's constitutional and tolerable laws."
Who says what is tolerable? You? Or does the gummint say so, in which
case ALL laws are tolerable so the term has no particular meaning.
Bob Kolker
James E. Prescott
"Robert J. Kolker" <now...@nowhere.com>
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>>
>>
>> [Trade participation] obligates a person in my words "to comply
>> with the free society's constitutional and tolerable laws."
> Who says what is tolerable? You?
No. Bob, I've answered this exact question for you so many times I've lost
count. You never pay attention. But okay, I'll answer it for you yet again,
and again, and again. Then, perhaps you should do a Google search and look
back over the years. You'll find a couple interesting things. One, I've
answered the question the exact same way each time and you have asked it.
And two, never -- not once! -- have you offered any argument in reply.
The answer I give ALWAYS shuts you up! And it will this time, too.
At least until next time!
Here it is...
The law violator /himself/ gets to decide and then in order for him to walk
free he only needs to get just ONE single person to agree with him from
among the arresting officer, the prosecutor, the judge, the 12 members of
the jury, the Governor and the President. That's right, if just a single ONE
from among those 17 or so people looking at the evidence agrees that he had
no choice but to act as he did, the law violator gets to walk away on a Get
Out of Jail Free card. That's our system, and it works. It rarely gets
publicized because when a law is intolerable to someone it seldom gets
beyond the prosecutor, who is paid to know when he can't get a conviction.
It makes headlines, though, sometimes, when juries refuse to convict. But,
then, if it gets by the jury, when a governor or a president pardons there
is usually no publicity at all because pardons happen so frequently in our
society that no single case can get noticed in the flurry.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Atlas Bugged
news:001a01c5b016$865b8100$6801a8c0@HPPresc...
> That's right, if just a single ONE from among those 17 or so people
> looking at the evidence agrees that he had no choice but to act as he did,
> the law violator gets to walk away on a Get Out of Jail Free card. That's
> our system, and it works.
Beeeeeeeep. Wrong. It would have to happen three or four times in a row.
A hung jury is *not* a "not guilty" verdict. The prosecutor can and usually
will go for another bite. A third time is legally permitted in all
jurisdictions I know of. Around prosecution #4, some jurisdictions prohibit
further activity. Others do not.
>It rarely gets publicized because when a law is intolerable to someone it
>seldom gets beyond the prosecutor, who is paid to know when he can't get a
>conviction.
That's amazingly clueless, Jim.
> It makes headlines, though, sometimes, when juries refuse to convict. But,
> then, if it gets by the jury, when a governor or a president pardons there
> is usually no publicity at all because pardons happen so frequently in our
> society that no single case can get noticed in the flurry.
Yeah, sure, here is a list of death-row people Bush pardoned as Governor of
Texas for two terms:
Pardons happen all the time - in your fevered clueless imagination.
James E. Prescott
> "James E. Prescott" <jep...@comcast.net> wrote in message
> news:001a01c5b016$865b8100$6801a8c0@HPPresc...
> > That's right, if just a single ONE from among those 17 or so people
> > looking at the evidence agrees that he had no choice but to act as he
> > did, the law violator gets to walk away on a Get Out of Jail Free
> > card. That's our system, and it works.
> Beeeeeeeep. Wrong. It would have to happen three or four times in a row.
Only if you've a bonehead for a prosecutor, and judge
> A hung jury is *not* a "not guilty" verdict. The prosecutor can and
> usually will go for another bite.
That depends on the reason for the hung jury. A judgement that the
defendant had no choice but to act as he did (remember context,
Bugged; it's everything!) is not the same as a judgement that there
is reasonable doubt concerning how the defendant acted.
> A third time is legally permitted in all jurisdictions I know of. Around
> prosecution #4, some jurisdictions prohibit further activity. Others do
> not.
When you are trying to convict someone for vandalism whose defense is, "Yes,
I did it, but I had no choice. My wife and children would have died if I had
not broken the window to get them out of that burning building," it seldom
goes to 4 prosecutions.
> >It rarely gets publicized because when a law is intolerable to someone it
> >seldom gets beyond the prosecutor, who is paid to know when he can't
> >get a conviction.
> That's amazingly clueless, Jim.
Then clue me in. Tell me of cases where men were prosecuted for breaking
laws they had no choice but to break. Casino looters in New Orleans will be
prosecuted when caught. But many others down there stole from grocery stores
because they'd run out of food. Prosecutors are going to have to make
choices. Which to prosecute? Which will never be convicted? Prosecutors are
paid to make these choices. What's clueless, Bugged?
> > It makes headlines, though, sometimes, when juries refuse to convict.
> > But, then, if it gets by the jury, when a governor or a president
> > pardons there is usually no publicity at all because pardons happen
> > so frequently in our society that no single case can get noticed in the
> > flurry.
> Yeah, sure, here is a list of death-row people Bush pardoned as Governor
> of Texas for two terms:
You pick a bad example. Bush issued far, far fewer pardons than other
governors, only about 25. As president he's pardoned about 30 times (from
among thousands of petitions), and he's commuted the sentences of only a
dozen or so others. This means he's pardoned fewer people than any president
in U.S. history other than Washington, Adams and a couple who died before
they could pardon anybody. FDR pardoned thousands. Bush's father pardoned
dozens in a single term. Carter issued hundreds of pardons in his single
term. And a president can only pardon for federal crimes, so the vast
majority of pardons are issued by governors, and it happens every day. Even
a couple law and order Republicans -- Ehrlich in Maryland and Schwarzenegger
in California -- have been pardoning people left and right.
> Pardons happen all the time - in your fevered clueless imagination.
???
What's clueless here, Bugged? All I said was that pardon happens so
frequently in our society that single cases tend not to get noticed in the
flurry. Do you have any facts with which to dispute that? There were a
couple Clinton pardons that got a lot of attention, but do you know anything
about the dozens of other pardons he issued at the time. Of course not. If
pardoning were rare then it would make the newspaper every time it happens.
But the fact of the matter is, it's so commonplace in our society that it is
simply ignored.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Robert J. Kolker
>
> That depends on the reason for the hung jury. A judgement that the
> defendant had no choice but to act as he did (remember context,
> Bugged; it's everything!) is not the same as a judgement that there
> is reasonable doubt concerning how the defendant acted.
If a juror is asked explicitly whether he favors jury nullification and
says he does he will dismissed right on the spot. Juries, by law, are
judges of fact, not law. In fact juries can nullify, but doing so is
illegal and involves lying under oath. All juries take an oath to judge
the case on the basis of the facts admitted as evidence. Intentional
breach of oath can rarely be proven, so juries occassionally get away
with nullification. Suicide doctor, Jack Kavorkian got several free
passes until he went a death too far. Then he got convicted.
Jury nullification is a rare thing. Most juries will acquit or convict
on the basis of the evidence, not on their opinion of the law.
Bob Kolker
James E. Prescott
"Robert J. Kolker" <now...@nowhere.com> wrote:
> James E. Prescott wrote:
>> That depends on the reason for the hung jury. A judgement that the
>> defendant had no choice but to act as he did (remember context,
>> Bugged; it's everything!) is not the same as a judgement that there
>> is reasonable doubt concerning how the defendant acted.
> If a juror is asked explicitly whether he favors jury nullification and
> says he does he will dismissed right on the spot.
I'm not talking about jury nullification.
> Juries, by law, are judges of fact, not law. In fact juries can nullify,
> but doing so is illegal and involves lying under oath. [...]
I'm not talking about jury nullification. A jury's job is to judge the facts
of the case, not the law. If the facts show that the defendent in his
particular circumstances had no choice but to act as he did, then he is NOT
GUILTY of any crime, and that is a finding of /fact/, /not/ a questioning of
the propriety of the law.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Mark N
> The somehow is by trade participation in a free society, as I've
> explained a number of times. It obligates a person in Ayn Rand's words,
> "To delegate his right of self-defense to the government for the purpose
> of an orderly,objective enforcement of rights," which is true, but not
> complete. It obligates a person in my words "to comply with the free
> society's constitutional and tolerable laws."
Well, I'm afraid that your "tolerability" criterion still seems
arbitrary to me, not to mention hopelessly subjective. How about this
alternative proposal: I define a law to be "ridiculous" if no rational
person could reasonably believe that it has anything to do with
protecting anyone's rights. And a "non-ridiculous" law is any law that
is not ridiculous. Then my proposal is that we all have an obligation to
obey all of the non-ridiculous, constitutional laws of a free society.
What do you think of my proposal? I assume that you won't like it, but
can you give me a good reason why your "tolerability" criterion is more
reasonable than my "non-ridiculousness" criterion?
> A person who participates
> in trade while considering himself excluded from this necessary
> obligation is a fraud and a thief of service, since he only has property
> to trade and people to trade it with thanks to the protection of the
> law.
I'm curious about the role that "trade" plays in your theory. Let's say
that I never engage in trade with the members of the "society," but I
live in their midst. (I do my trading elsewhere.) Now, I do walk down
the streets, and usually I am not attacked by criminals. In that case,
would you perhaps say that I'm benefiting from the atmosphere of law and
order, and so I'm already bound by the "social contract" because of
that? Or is trading with the members of the society really essential?
> Such a scoundrel does not deserve or get the law's protection when
> his duplicity is exposed, as when he tries to decline a subpoena by
> whining that he never knew of or never consciously accepted his moral
> and legal obligations. What, was he living under a rock somewhere with
> Bob Kolker???
No, actually, he had heard talk about his supposed obligations under the
"social contract," and he had dismissed such talk as nonsense! But I
have a feeling that a few months in the pokey will help him to get his
mind right! ;-)
[...]
> Some of these laws may indeed be ridiculous and unjust. But A) not every
> ridiculous and unjust law is legal or tolerable just because the
> legislature passed it. And B) it doesn't matter if the law is sensible
> and just; if it doesn't meet the three requirements there is no
> obligation to obey it, so in some respects I'm more tolerant of social
> dissent than you libertarians!
Jim, there's no need to resort to insults! ;-)
Mark
Jim Klein
> I define a law to be "ridiculous" if no rational
> person could reasonably believe that it has anything to do with
> protecting anyone's rights. And a "non-ridiculous" law is any law that
> is not ridiculous. Then my proposal is that we all have an obligation to
> obey all of the non-ridiculous, constitutional laws of a free society.
I see one problem, at least. Who decides whether the enforcement mechanism
of this obligation, in its instances, is ridiculous or not? After all,
there's an axiomatic assumption that the enforcement mechanism itself, is
not ridiculous.
Besides, we tried this tack once. It was called the Bill of Rights,
basically, though your principle here is more general than even that. I'd
say it was the very fabric of the founding of this country.
And just in case anyone ever came around with arguments like Prescott's,
those guys even threw in the 9th and 10th Amendments!
So you're in good company, but still it didn't work. Sorry.
jk
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > The somehow is by trade participation in a free society, as I've
> > explained a number of times. It obligates a person in Ayn Rand's
> > words, "To delegate his right of self-defense to the government
> > for the purpose of an orderly,objective enforcement of rights,"
> > which is true, but not complete. It obligates a person in my words
> > "to comply with the free society's constitutional and tolerable laws."
> Well, I'm afraid that your "tolerability" criterion still seems
> arbitrary to me, not to mention hopelessly subjective. How about this
> alternative proposal: I define a law to be "ridiculous" if no rational
> person could reasonably believe that it has anything to do with
> protecting anyone's rights. And a "non-ridiculous" law is any law that
> is not ridiculous. Then my proposal is that we all have an obligation to
> obey all of the non-ridiculous, constitutional laws of a free society.
> What do you think of my proposal? I assume that you won't like it, but
> can you give me a good reason why your "tolerability" criterion is more
> reasonable than my "non-ridiculousness" criterion?
Of course I can. Here's the answer: What for?
You see, Chris was saying a while back that it appeared I had "an agenda."
Well, I do! That's the whole point! The requirements I've named for valid
law are not found written in any natural form nor handed down by any
revelation; they are specifically aimed at something; they are purposefully
directed at what I and you need a civilized society to be and to do so that
I and you can each attain our moral purpose, happiness.
I need for this purpose (and so do you and so does everyone) to be free to
act according to my own reason judging a law to be illegal or in this case
judging a law in my circumstances to be incompatible with "happiness the
moral purpose of law" and /not/ then have the force of the law come crashing
down on my head. Without this "escape clause" of "no legal obligation to
obey an intolerable law" the first accident that came along would put me or
you or the horns of an impossible dilemma. Obey the law and destroy any hope
of ever being happy (because the circumstances of that accident cause you to
die or to lose all hope of happiness). Or disobey the law and destroy any
hope of being happy (because you go to jail for the rest of your life -- the
only deterrent strong enough to compel compliance under such a
circumstance). I obviously cannot agree to such a "bargain." Why would I
agree to something the only reasonable outcome of which would be the
eventual loss of everything I hold dear? What's my motivation? What's my
"agenda" when entering into that sort of "agreement"? What /purpose/ would
it serve? With /whom/ would I be striking such a self defeating bargain and
for what purpose would HE be doing it? It's contrary to HIS happiness
interest every bit as much as it is contrary to mine!
Therefore, no such agreement exists. The social contract obligates us to
obey laws, yes, but for the /sake/ of free trade under objective protection
precluding the cycle of force, retaliation and violence that would destroy
us if we did not have law, /and/ obviously /not/ at the expense of the very
purpose for which we have law! Why would we want such a contract?
And, if we do not want such a social contract then such a social contract
does not exist!
That is the REASON for concluding that intolerable laws are not valid laws.
And, note that by "not valid" I mean not law. I mean you have /no/ moral and
/no/ legal obligation to obey an intolerable so-called "law." It is in fact
/contrary/ to the law to hold you responsible to obey it. You are acting
within your legal rights and you not committing any criminal act when you
break it. Therefore no punishment can be applied to you; and that is why you
are set free, acquitted or pardoned by the first person to recognize that
your assessment of the situation was objectively correct.
Now, what is your agenda, Mark? What are you trying to accomplish with the
notion that a ridiculous law is not a valid law? Let's take an example of a
ridiculous law that would be constitutional and tolerable. Let's say the
legislature passed a law saying that you may not paint a Devonshire cat
pink and put a ring through its nose /unless/ you /also/ tie a yellow ribbon
to the tip of its tail. You want us to say that you must to be left free to
disobey this law. Okay, then, what for? Is there some purpose you have in
mind here? Are you worried that unless you are free to paint any sort of cat
pink and put a ring through its nose /without/ tying a yellow ribbon to
its tail that the fabric of civilized society will dissolve?
In other words, what for? What are you getting at?
I think you are poking at the edges of invalidating drug laws and seatbelt
laws and suicide laws and welfare laws as "ridiculous" just because /you/ do
not happen to be among those who approve of them! Well, they may be
wrong but if they were truly "ridiculous" (like my pink cat rule, above!)
then they would not have sailed through legislatures and they would not
today retain the considerable support of the free American people.
Oh I forgot. You in your libertarian wisdom have come to think that
obviously (to you!) "no rational person" could conclude that these laws have
anything to do with protecting people's rights? Well, think again my freedom
feathered friend!. All of those laws are aimed a protecting rights, just
misguidedly so. People -- some perfectly rational people (though seriously
misguided) -- think they have a right not to have drug-crazed neighbors, not
to have to pay for needlessly expensive injury claims due to neglect of
seatbelts, not to be left unprotected from their own momentary despair or
bewilderment provoking thoughts of suicide, and not to be left homeless and
penniless on the streets of a wealthy society as the outcome of injustice
and misfortune for which they are morally blameless.
You and I do not share that view of what rights they have, but this does not
mean they and their legislatures are deliberately trying to subvert rather
than to protect individual rights. "To secure these rights governments are
instituted among men." Believe it or not, Kennedy and Bush believe in that
as much as you do. They really do both want a free society. Republicans make
a lot of noise about it. But no Republican since Lincoln has spoken as
eloquently in defense of individual liberties as the social welfare liberals
do. Look back at JFK, for example, or at Martin Luther King.
> > [...]
> I'm curious about the role that "trade" plays in your theory. Let's say
> that I never engage in trade with the members of the "society," but I
> live in their midst. (I do my trading elsewhere.) Now, I do walk down
> the streets, and usually I am not attacked by criminals. In that case,
> would you perhaps say that I'm benefiting from the atmosphere of law and
> order, and so I'm already bound by the "social contract" because of
> that? Or is trading with the members of the society really essential?
It's really essential. You are not a party to the social contract just
because you benefit from it. You are a party to the social contract -- if
you are -- /only/ because you /choose/ to be, and choosing to be means
taking some positive action needing the free choice of others (in this
case, their choice to do trade with you) when you know their choice was
premised on your accepting the same moral and legal obligations as they,
and you do the trade with them anyway such that your choice then
unmistakably signals -- to them and to everyone else who participates
in our economy -- that you have indeed freely accepted these obligations
yourself.
If you do /no/ trade with anybody this obviously does /not/ apply to you. Be
happy in your isolation. You will never be taxed and you will never possess
any thing worth taxing. You will never be called for jury duty and nobody
in government will even know you exist because you will never have voted
and never have owned and registered a motor vehicle, and so on.
> > Such a scoundrel does not deserve or get the law's protection
> > when his duplicity is exposed, as when he tries to decline a
> > subpoena by whining that he never knew of or never consciously
> > accepted his moral and legal obligations. What, was he living
> > under a rock somewhere with Bob Kolker???
> No, actually, he had heard talk about his supposed obligations
> under the "social contract," and he had dismissed such talk as
> nonsense! But I have a feeling that a few months in the pokey
> will help him to get his mind right! ;-)
Now you're getting the idea. And a few months or a hefty fine may be tacked
on for contempt of court when he uses the word "nonsense" within earshot of
the judge!
> [...]
> > ]...] I'm more tolerant of social
> > dissent than you libertarians!
>
> Jim, there's no need to resort to insults! ;-)
Sorry. This old jackbootlicking thug is sometimes so unkind.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Mark N
> Mark N wrote:
>
>>I define a law to be "ridiculous" if no rational
>>person could reasonably believe that it has anything to do with
>>protecting anyone's rights. And a "non-ridiculous" law is any law that
>>is not ridiculous. Then my proposal is that we all have an obligation to
>>obey all of the non-ridiculous, constitutional laws of a free society.
>
> I see one problem, at least. Who decides whether the enforcement mechanism
> of this obligation, in its instances, is ridiculous or not? After all,
> there's an axiomatic assumption that the enforcement mechanism itself, is
> not ridiculous.
Well, in that respect it's just like Jim's "intolerability" condition.
And I can give the same sort of answer as Jim gives. That is, I can say
that any individual who is involved in the enforcement of the law can
decide that a law is "ridiculous" and that, therefore, a person who
disobeys it should not be prosecuted.
My "proposal" was mainly intended as something to contrast with Jim's
criteria for laws that one is obligated to obey. The hope is that, by
seeing how Jim reacts to such suggested variations, I will be able to
get a better understanding of his theory.
> Besides, we tried this tack once. It was called the Bill of Rights,
> basically, though your principle here is more general than even that. I'd
> say it was the very fabric of the founding of this country.
>
> And just in case anyone ever came around with arguments like Prescott's,
> those guys even threw in the 9th and 10th Amendments!
>
> So you're in good company, but still it didn't work. Sorry.
Bummer. :-(
Mark
Mark N
> [...] Without this "escape clause" of "no legal obligation to
> obey an intolerable law" the first accident that came along would put me or
> you or the horns of an impossible dilemma. Obey the law and destroy any
> hope
> of ever being happy (because the circumstances of that accident cause
> you to
> die or to lose all hope of happiness). Or disobey the law and destroy any
> hope of being happy (because you go to jail for the rest of your life --
> the
> only deterrent strong enough to compel compliance under such a
> circumstance). I obviously cannot agree to such a "bargain." Why would I
> agree to something the only reasonable outcome of which would be the
> eventual loss of everything I hold dear? What's my motivation? What's my
> "agenda" when entering into that sort of "agreement"? What /purpose/ would
> it serve? With /whom/ would I be striking such a self defeating bargain and
> for what purpose would HE be doing it? It's contrary to HIS happiness
> interest every bit as much as it is contrary to mine!
>
> Therefore, no such agreement exists.
How come *you* get to say that a certain kind of contract can't exist,
just because you don't like some of its consequences? When *I* try to
say something like that, you call me nasty names! It's not fair! :-)
Seriously, tell me what's wrong with the following. I say that the
social contract has an implicit clause that says that no one has to obey
any law that restricts his freedom arbitrarily (that is, in a way that's
not necessary for the protection of anyone's rights). Any law that
restricts someone's freedom arbitrarily is contrary to the purpose of a
free, civilized society. Why would anyone agree to a social contract
that lacked such a clause? Clearly, no one would. Therefore, that clause
is implicit in the social contract. Q.E.D. :-)
> The social contract obligates us to
> obey laws, yes, but for the /sake/ of free trade under objective protection
> precluding the cycle of force, retaliation and violence that would destroy
> us if we did not have law, /and/ obviously /not/ at the expense of the very
> purpose for which we have law! Why would we want such a contract? [...]
Well, the parallel question that I would ask is, why in Rand's name
would anyone ever agree to a "contract" that involves committing oneself
to endless, absurd "obligations," which are not even fixed in any detail
at the outset, but can be changed arbitrarily, depending on the whims of
voters and politicians?
I think your answer to that question is that it's the only way that one
can get out of the Jungle[tm], and into a civilized society. But why
doesn't that same answer apply to your complaint about the obligation to
obey "intolerable" laws? The possibility that you may someday have to
obey an "intolerable" law is part of the deal. You don't know ahead of
time if that will ever happen. But if it does happen, why should you be
allowed to disobey the law? It seems to me that only a scoundrel would
refuse to obey a so-called "intolerable" law, after having happily
accepted the benefits of living in a civilized society for many years!
[...]
> Now, what is your agenda, Mark? What are you trying to accomplish with the
> notion that a ridiculous law is not a valid law? Let's take an example of a
> ridiculous law that would be constitutional and tolerable. Let's say the
> legislature passed a law saying that you may not paint a Devonshire cat
> pink and put a ring through its nose /unless/ you /also/ tie a yellow
> ribbon
> to the tip of its tail. You want us to say that you must to be left free to
> disobey this law. Okay, then, what for? Is there some purpose you have in
> mind here? Are you worried that unless you are free to paint any sort of
> cat
> pink and put a ring through its nose /without/ tying a yellow ribbon to
> its tail that the fabric of civilized society will dissolve?
>
> In other words, what for? What are you getting at?
Well, I certainly agree that such a law would qualify as ridiculous! I
guess if I'm "getting at" anything, in objecting to such laws, it would
be that people should be able to do as they wish, and be free from
aggression, at least so long as they don't aggress against others. Or so
it seems to me.
> I think you are poking at the edges of invalidating drug laws and seatbelt
> laws and suicide laws and welfare laws as "ridiculous" just because
> /you/ do
> not happen to be among those who approve of them! Well, they may be
> wrong but if they were truly "ridiculous" (like my pink cat rule, above!)
> then they would not have sailed through legislatures and they would not
> today retain the considerable support of the free American people.
>
> Oh I forgot. You in your libertarian wisdom have come to think that
> obviously (to you!) "no rational person" could conclude that these laws
> have
> anything to do with protecting people's rights? Well, think again my
> freedom
> feathered friend!. All of those laws are aimed a protecting rights, just
> misguidedly so. [...]
Well, I'm not claiming that everyone will necessarily agree on whether
or not a particular law is ridiculous. People just have to make
judgments, that's all. And if anyone violates a ridiculous law, he can
be spared prosecution if just one person (for instance, a police
officer, a prosecutor, a juror, or a governor) recognizes that the law
is, in fact, ridiculous. Sound reasonable?
[I actually had some further questions about trade, but I think I'll let
those go for now.]
Mark
James E. Prescott
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > [...N]o such agreement exists.
> How come *you* get to say that a certain kind of contract can't
> exist, just because you don't like some of its consequences?
I don't. It's those considering whether to be parties to a contract
who must decide. If they don't like the proposed contract, they
won't create and join it.
> When *I* try to say something like that, you call me nasty
> names! It's not fair! :-)
"Bob" is a nasty name? Naw! The social contract does exist. It is
desired; it is joined; and it is enforced.
> Seriously, tell me what's wrong with the following. I say that the
> social contract has an implicit clause that says that no one has to
> obey any law that restricts his freedom arbitrarily (that is, in a way
> that's not necessary for the protection of anyone's rights).
Laws don't create themselves. What's agreed on first is the method for
creating laws, which involves legislators debating and then voting, as well
as the purpose(s) for doing so. The problem in your scheme is therefore the
word "arbitrary," which is a bit of a sidestep from "ridiculous."
> Any law that restricts someone's freedom arbitrarily is contrary to
> the purpose of a free, civilized society.
I agree.
> Why would anyone agree to a social contract that lacked such a
> clause? Clearly, no one would.
Clearly, no one does.
> Therefore, that clause is implicit in the social contract. Q.E.D. :-)
Right, as I've already indicated. Unless a law is enacted in accordance with
the rules spelled out in a constitution it is disallowed. And to satisfy
this the law cannot be arbitrary but must be aimed at a legitimate, legal,
constitutional public purpose. The U.S. Supreme Court has struck down
capricious or religiously motivated laws a number of times and has heard the
argument "this law serves no legitimate constitutional purpose" many more
times than that.
> [...T]he parallel question that I would ask is, why in Rand's name
> would anyone ever agree to a "contract" that involves committing
> oneself to endless, absurd "obligations," which are not even fixed
> in any detail at the outset, but can be changed arbitrarily, depending
> on the whims of voters and politicians?
They wouldn't. That's why they need a system of checks and balances to
control the power that they are investing in their government. Otherwise,
they'd be writing a blank check. So, instead of that, they need to say
that laws can be made only by the legislature, only for certain purposes,
and only in a certain manner subject to review by the executive and
judiciary, and subject also to repeal, but even then that no laws shall be
made abridging freedom of speech, or of the press, and so on and on.
> I think your answer to that question is that it's the only way that one
> can get out of the Jungle[tm], and into a civilized society. [...]
No, not at all. My answer is that committing oneself to endless absurd
obligations -- writing a blank check --does not get you into a civilized
society at all. It gets you into a dictatorship, which is worse than the
Jungle(tm).
> > [...] What are you getting at?
> Well, I certainly agree that such a law would qualify as ridiculous! I
> guess if I'm "getting at" anything, in objecting to such laws, it would
> be that people should be able to do as they wish, and be free from
> aggression, at least so long as they don't aggress against others.
Yes, but to what end? I agree people should be left free, but /to the end/
that they are independently productive and that the free trade which follows
results in an abundance of health, wealth and security for yours truly --
and for them, of course, as my attainment of these things is tied up with
theirs. It is with that shared moral purpose in mind that we should have a
constitution and enact appropriate laws. If individuals for themselves or
leveraging the judicial branch were entitled to address the /wisdom/ of the
law (rather than just its legality), then you would have in effect
individuals and judges/juries writing or re-writing laws for themselves,
which is the very arbitrariness that you seem to want to avoid.
> [...] I'm not claiming that everyone will necessarily agree on
> whether or not a particular law is ridiculous. People just have
> to make judgments, that's all. And if anyone violates a ridiculous
> law, he can be spared prosecution if just one person (for instance,
> a police officer, a prosecutor, a juror, or a governor) recognizes
> that the law is, in fact, ridiculous. Sound reasonable?
No. You're mixing up those ripened apples and oranges again. The
"intolerable" assessment is not about the law itself (necessarily; though it
can be) so much as it is about the circumstances in which an individual
finds himself -- the facts of a particular case, which it is the job of the
police officer, prosecutor, judge, juror and executive to address. When a
person is set free because he had no choice but to disobey a law, that is
/not/ an assessment that the law itself was bad. People in New Orleans today
(I'm not talking about looters taking advantage of the situation; only about
people doing what they have to do in order to survive) are breaking quite a
few laws for which they will never be prosecuted or convicted or punished.
This says nothing about whether the laws themselves are good or bad. Mostly
they are good.
When it comes to judging the law itself, the individual is not saying "under
these circumstances I had no choice." He is saying, I could easily have
obeyed this law but I choose not to because in my opinion it is a bad law
and should not exist. In that he is attempting to judge the overall public
purpose of the law, as it affects everybody, and for that we have
legislators and popular elections under the limits of constitutionality. To
leave such a judgment in the hands of concerned individuals would be
anarchy.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Mark N
> "Mark N" <ma...@myinboxisbroken.com> wrote:
>
>> Seriously, tell me what's wrong with the following. I say that the
>> social contract has an implicit clause that says that no one has to
>> obey any law that restricts his freedom arbitrarily (that is, in a way
>> that's not necessary for the protection of anyone's rights).
>
> Laws don't create themselves. What's agreed on first is the method for
> creating laws, which involves legislators debating and then voting, as well
> as the purpose(s) for doing so. The problem in your scheme is therefore the
> word "arbitrary," which is a bit of a sidestep from "ridiculous."
Well, not really. The parenthetical that immediately followed the word
"arbitrarily" was intended as a (somewhat rough) definition. Sorry if
that wasn't clear.
>
>> Any law that restricts someone's freedom arbitrarily is contrary to
>> the purpose of a free, civilized society.
>
> I agree.
I *wish* you agreed with what I actually meant! :-(
[...]
>
>> Well, I certainly agree that such a law would qualify as ridiculous! I
>> guess if I'm "getting at" anything, in objecting to such laws, it would
>> be that people should be able to do as they wish, and be free from
>> aggression, at least so long as they don't aggress against others.
>
> Yes, but to what end?
That seems like such a strange question to me! Is there any doubt that
it's better for a person to be free than to be unfree? At least from his
own point of view? But maybe what you are asking is, from the point of
view of an egoist, what is the reason for respecting someone else's
freedom? What's in it for him? Is that the question?
> I agree people should be left free, but /to the end/
> that they are independently productive and that the free trade which
> follows
> results in an abundance of health, wealth and security for yours truly --
> and for them, of course, as my attainment of these things is tied up with
> theirs. [...]
Are you saying here that the possibility of productivity and trade is
the only thing that makes it rational for an egoist to respect the
freedom of others? Or am I misunderstanding? (I would have thought that
the other person's reciprocal commitment to respect the egoist's freedom
would be sufficient, regardless of any considerations of productivity or
trade.)
>
>> [...] I'm not claiming that everyone will necessarily agree on
>> whether or not a particular law is ridiculous. People just have
>> to make judgments, that's all. And if anyone violates a ridiculous
>> law, he can be spared prosecution if just one person (for instance,
>> a police officer, a prosecutor, a juror, or a governor) recognizes
>> that the law is, in fact, ridiculous. Sound reasonable?
>
> No. You're mixing up those ripened apples and oranges again. [...]
You're a tough man, Jim! I think I'm going to give up for now on trying
to challenge you on your "intolerability" criterion. You've worn me out!
It's like going up against an Immovable Object! But I reserve the right
to revisit this topic at some time in the future, after I've regained my
strength!
Mark
James E. Prescott
"Mark N" <ma...@myinboxisbroken.com> wrote:
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> > [...] The problem in your scheme is therefore the word
> > "arbitrary," which is a bit of a sidestep from "ridiculous."
> Well, not really. The parenthetical that immediately followed the word
> "arbitrarily" was intended as a (somewhat rough) definition. Sorry if that
> wasn't clear.
It was clear enough, I guess. But the parenthetical was, I'd say, a third
little spin or sidestep. Remember we began with something that "no rational
person could possibly see any rights-protecting purpose in" (to which I
offered up my harmless little kitten exercise). Then we also spoke of the
"arbitrary whims of the legislators and the people" (which you named
elsewhere in your posts), and to which I am responding that arbitrary whim
is not allowed for by the constitution. And, lastly, we have something that
is simply "not necessary to the protection of rights" -- which seems a step
back or at least to the side of "ridiculous." And, to that, I was saying
it's a matter for debate on the floor of a legislature, and if it is fairly
debated and then duly made into law by the proper voting and duly signed off
on by the executive (or his vetoed duly overridden), it may be mistaken but
still ought not qualify as "arbitrary."
>>> Any law that restricts someone's freedom arbitrarily is contrary to
>>> the purpose of a free, civilized society.
>> I agree.
> I *wish* you agreed with what I actually meant! :-(
I think I did.
> > [...T]o what end?
> That seems like such a strange question to me! Is there any doubt
> that it's better for a person to be free than to be unfree?
Depends on what kind of person, I suppose.
> At least from his own point of view?
Oh, well, yeah.
> But maybe what you are asking is, from the point of view of
> an egoist, what is the reason for respecting someone else's
> freedom? What's in it for him? [...]
For him, yes; and for you; and for other egoists.
I agree we are all better off free. But, "to what end" is still a valid
question. What makes us better off when we are free? Strange as it seems,
some people actually think some other people -- and some strange people even
think they themselves -- are better off as slaves, being fed and taken care
of. I say we are all better off free because freedom is what reason needs
for productivity, trade and ultimately happiness. (Freedom is not an end in
itself.)
> [...]
> Are you saying here that the possibility of productivity and trade is the
> only thing that makes it rational for an egoist to respect the freedom of
> others? Or am I misunderstanding?
I'm saying the promotion of productivity and trade are the purposes along
with the elimination of the otherwise constant threat of a deadly cycle of
force, retaliation and violence, which is destructive of productivity and
trade, and so which amounts to the same thing, really. So, no, I do not
think
you are misunderstanding.
> (I would have thought that the other person's reciprocal commit-
> ment to respect the egoist's freedom would be sufficient, regardless
> of any considerations of productivity or trade.)
In what way would that be sufficient if not for my own productivity and
resulting wealth through trade? If what I can do with my freedom is just
"not a consideration," then I'm at a loss to understand why you would have
thought of it.
>> [...] You're mixing up those ripened apples and oranges again. [...]
> You're a tough man, Jim! I think I'm going to give up for now on
> trying to challenge you on your "intolerability" criterion. You've
> worn me out! It's like going up against an Immovable Object! [...]
I take that as a compliment. I'm sure you're not one of those who blames the
Rock of Gibraltar for the fog and swirling seas that surround it.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Mark N
> "Mark N" <ma...@myinboxisbroken.com> wrote:
>
>> Are you saying here that the possibility of productivity and trade is the
>> only thing that makes it rational for an egoist to respect the freedom of
>> others? Or am I misunderstanding?
>
> I'm saying the promotion of productivity and trade are the purposes along
> with the elimination of the otherwise constant threat of a deadly cycle of
> force, retaliation and violence, which is destructive of productivity and
> trade, and so which amounts to the same thing, really. So, no, I do not
> think you are misunderstanding.
>
>> (I would have thought that the other person's reciprocal commit-
>> ment to respect the egoist's freedom would be sufficient, regardless
>> of any considerations of productivity or trade.)
>
> In what way would that be sufficient if not for my own productivity and
> resulting wealth through trade? If what I can do with my freedom is just
> "not a consideration," then I'm at a loss to understand why you would have
> thought of it.
Hmmm. I'm not sure exactly what you're saying here, and I'm not sure
exactly what's behind the apparent communication breakdown on this
particular topic. But I'll take another stab at making clear what I was
trying to say.
Here is the scenario. An egoist comes upon Mr. X, and is he is trying to
decide whether or not it would make sense for him to respect Mr. X's
freedom. (Freedom for what, you ask? For doing whatever Mr. X feels like
doing, that doesn't interfere with any of our egoist's activities.)
I'm saying that an agreement along the lines of "I won't bother you if
you don't bother me" seems reasonable. And, as far as I can tell, such
an agreement would be reasonable even if the egoist has no particular
plans to engage in "trade" with Mr. X. That's all I was trying to say.
Do you disagree with that? Do you think that some kind of "trade
agreement" is somehow inseparable from a "mutual non-interference"
agreement? I don't see why the latter could not exist without the former.
>
>>> [...] You're mixing up those ripened apples and oranges again. [...]
>
>> You're a tough man, Jim! I think I'm going to give up for now on
>> trying to challenge you on your "intolerability" criterion. You've
>> worn me out! It's like going up against an Immovable Object! [...]
>
> I take that as a compliment.
Please do!
> I'm sure you're not one of those who blames
> the Rock of Gibraltar for the fog and swirling seas that surround it.
No, Jim, I don't blame you for my "fog." I take full responsibility for
it! :-)
Mark
James E. Prescott
"Mark N" <ma...@myinboxisbroken.com> wrote:
> James E. Prescott wrote:
> [...]
> >> (I would have thought that the other person's reciprocal
> >> commitment to respect the egoist's freedom would be sufficient,
> >> regardless of any considerations of productivity or trade.)
> > In what way would that be sufficient if not for my own productivity
> > and resulting wealth through trade? If what I can do with my freedom
> > is just "not a consideration," then I'm at a loss to understand why you
> > would have thought of it.
> Hmmm. I'm not sure exactly what you're saying here, and I'm not sure
> exactly what's behind the apparent communication breakdown on this
> particular topic. But I'll take another stab at making clear what I was
> trying to say.
> Here is the scenario. An egoist comes upon Mr. X, and is he is trying to
> decide whether or not it would make sense for him to respect Mr. X's
> freedom. (Freedom for what, you ask? For doing whatever Mr. X feels
> like doing, that doesn't interfere with any of our egoist's activities.)
Not freedom for what.
I was asking, for what purpose is freedom to be respected? I was not asking
what freedoms (freedom aimed at what purposes) should be respected. I was
only asking, what does the egoist gain by respecting X's freedom, and what
does X gain by respecting the egoist's freedom in return?
> I'm saying that an agreement along the lines of "I won't bother you if
> you don't bother me" seems reasonable.
It surely does, but to what end? Why should we desire such an agreement?
> And, as far as I can tell, such an agreement would be reasonable even
> if the egoist has no particular plans to engage in "trade" with Mr. X.
> That's all I was trying to say.
That's fine so long as you have some valid reason for thinking that such an
agreement is reasonable.
It's not reasonable just because it seems like an even trade. Suppose he
said, I'll trade you a poke in your eye with my sharp stick for a poke in my
eye with yours. That sounds reasonable in terms of being an even exchange
but there's just nothing in it for either one of us but a lot of pain. So
it's not really a reasonable proposition. Why should I desire such an
exchange? I shouldn't.
On the other hand, I /should/ desire a non-interference agreement. And I
should, not just because it's an even exchange, but because it produces
specific desirable results, which I'll name again below.
> Do you disagree with that? Do you think that some kind of "trade
> agreement" is somehow inseparable from a "mutual non-interference"
> agreement? I don't see why the latter could not exist without the former.
There are two related benefits, not one. Trade is certainly a purpose, and
not only with this Mr. X but with others as well. But in addition -- and
related -- to that, there's our shared interest in preventing violence. By
respecting mutually agreed upon spheres of action (you respect my freedom to
do this and I'll respect yours to do that), we reduce the possibility that
we will ever come to blows. That serves us both, and not only by keeping
sharp sticks out of our eyes. It also serves our production and trade
interests /even/ if we never envision any trade happening directly between
the two of us.
The problem -- the breakdown of communication between you and I, I guess --
happens when you seem to insist on divorcing the purported "rightness" or
"goodness" of a non-interference agreement from the moral purposes that are
served by such an agreement. Yes, the agreement is good. But no, it isn't
good just because it is an even exchange nor just because it seems
intuitively good. It's good because it really does serve an identifiable
moral purpose. By reducing violence and promoting cooperative production and
trade it gets each egoist closer to his highest moral purpose in life, his
own happiness.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.
Tom Robertson
<snip>
>I /should/ desire a non-interference agreement. And I
>should, not just because it's an even exchange, but because it produces
>specific desirable results
The obligation to seek a non-interference agreement is therefore
unchosen (or "natural," "intrinsic," or "inherent"). Or when you say
that you believe there is no such thing as an unchosen obligation, do
you only mean in the context of interpersonal relationships? Aren't
all obligations to oneself unchosen?
<snip>
James E. Prescott
"Tom Robertson" <thomasrr...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> "James E. Prescott" <jep...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>[...]
> The obligation to seek a non-interference agreement is therefore
> unchosen (or "natural," "intrinsic," or "inherent").
It's not an obligation. It's just the right thing to do.
> Or when you say that you believe there is no such thing as an
> unchosen obligation, do you only mean in the context of inter-
> personal relationships?
Yes. Only in the context of interpersonal relationships does the concept of
obligation apply.
> Aren't all obligations to oneself unchosen?
They would be, were there such things. But there aren't.
When Ayn Rand had John Galt mention "the obligation I owe to myself, to
material objects and to all of existence: rationality," she did not (I hope)
mean for that to be taken literally. Of course nothing is owed to material
things, as if of a debt incurred.
Nor can you be indebted to or under any sort of literal obligation to
yourself. You just either do what your happiness requires or you fail.
"Obligation" is a concept that necessarily involves the expectations of
others justified by expressions, acceptance and awareness of commitment or
indebtedness. You might consider yourself obligated to gods or demons, of
course, but rationally it applies only to interpersonal relationships among
humans (there being no such things as gods or demons). There are
additionally false obligations known as "duty," which are unchosen. But
again, that is mere mysticism even if of the Kantian variety. Rationally,
the only truly existing kinds of obligation are those /chosen/ by the
parties to the obligations themselves, as they each for his own benefit
willingly take on obligation in return for obligation.
Best Wishes,
Jim P.