Contradictions within Objectivism...?
Patrick Bateman
years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
where they go wrong.
I have used Google's newsgroup search and that response was as
disappointing as the responses that I get from people.
Thanks
Chris Cathcart
news:MPG.171bb6186...@news.optonline.net...
I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
metaphysics:
http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
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Posted via Mailgate.ORG Server - http://www.Mailgate.ORG
Tom S.
news:MPG.171bb6186...@news.optonline.net...
> years now.
That's probably true, though it is usually claimed by people whose
familiarity with Objectivism is marginal at best. Often, it's done by people
who only repeat what they've "heard".
A major tenant of Objectivism is to find things out for yourself and to
verify anything that creates doubt.
>Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly.
Did they explain where the "backing up" failed? Did you check their claims
against the body of work that Rand produced?
>I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
We'd have to know what it is that they claim. The claims I've seen run the
gammut from the symantical to the psychotic. Though I'm certainly not an
Objectivist scholar, I have yet to see any such claims stand up under
scrutiny. My assessment is that they're often made by savants (??) trying to
make a name, or to bolster their own self-esteem.
Unless you're WELL versed in Objectivism, you're at the mercy of those who
are terrified of what Objectivism represents. In that, all I can suggest is
to dig in and find out for yourself.
Good luck, and good premises.
Tom Scheeler
--
From a 1964 interview in Playboy magazine:
Playboy: Has no religion, in your estimation,
ever offered anything of constructive value
to human life?
Rand: Qua religion, no - in the sense of blind
belief, belief unsupported by, or contrary to,
the facts of reality and the conclusions of reason.
Faith, as such, is extremely detrimental to human
life: it is the negation of reason. But you must
remember that religion is an early form of philosophy,
that the first attempts to explain the universe, to
give a coherent frame of reference to man's life
and a code of moral values, were made by religion,
before men graduated or developed enough to
have philosophy.
Chris Cathcart
news:t8os8.1014$tF2.1...@news.uswest.net...
> We'd have to know what it is that they claim. The claims I've seen run the
> gammut from the symantical to the psychotic.
Oh? So what's your opinion of the following argument at Rob Bass's
website:
-------- all items below this line blocked by filter ---------
John Shafto
news:f07b75b6c4552cebd27...@mygate.mailgate.org...
>
> I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
> But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
> there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
> metaphysics:
>
> http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
Can you explain something to me, since you seem to accept
his propositions as plausible on some level:
"It is the assumption that time is non-cyclical. There is a definite future
and past, so it is not the case that, say, a future event is the very same
event as some past event. "
Stop there. When he says some past 'event', does he mean
a point in time, or does he mean an actual event that occurs
at some point in time? I agree with the proposition as presented
there, but I don't think that it precludes what follows.....
"In fact,"
Well, rhetorically anyway..... :)
"if time were cyclical, every event would be in both the future
and past of every other (and even in its own future and past). There
could be, say, three events, A, B and C, with A preceding B, B
preceding C and C preceding A. (This is not to say that the cycle
would repeat. Rather, the very same event, occurring only once,
would both precede and follow itself.)"
Now he is definately proposing that time is cyclical, but not
events. Am I correct?
I am not sure how this is really much different than saying time
is infinite, but that events are finite (here assuming finite space/matter
for the sake of this discussion), because they are basically
'overwriting' each other all the time. He doesn't say whether he
means that what happened a split-second ago is replaced by what is
happening now, or whether he is talking about millenium, which
would matter a lot (events in the past -not just their effects- would
continue to "exist" for thousands or billions of years). I also don't
think I have ever read any Objectivist literature that posits that time
is either straight line or cyclical, so it is not clear to me why he thinks
one or the other is assumed by Objectivists. It seems to me that
neither position is objectively given at this point in time (pun :), so
neither can be used to claim contradictions in Objectivism, at least
in the current context of knowledge. If the moon were made out of
cheese, Objectivism would definately be in contradiction.
He says in the first sentence:
"There are three propositions that many Objectivists believe - and
that Rand herself almost certainly believed - that form an inconsistent tr
iad."
How does he come to this premise for his criticism, at least
with regard to his first proposed Objectivist assumption?
He doesn't support it with quotes or footnotes.
(I also have some reservations about the second proposed
Objectivist position, given volition as a first cause in a chain,
but ignoring that for now.)
--
Malo periculosam libertatem quam quietam servitutem.
Fear nothing. Live free. --1001001
dave odden
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
I interpret the question in two ways. One is that different objectivists
hold mutually incompatible beliefs. The other is that Rand's philosophical
beliefs were contradictory. The former conclusion is certainly true on the
face of it, and sifting through this NG will provide many examples. However,
there is a fair amount of chaff that has to be removed, for example, Acar
doesn't pretend to be an objectivist, nor does Bob Kolker. Not that they're
chaff, but, an awful lot of the postings here are by people that do not even
claim to be objectivists.
If you just focus on objectivists as they appear here, you will still find
contradictions (mutually incompatible positions being held). The ARIans have
the position that they are the only true objectivists, and that anyone else
is some kind of Kantian scum or something like that. If you take ARIanism to
be the one true form of objectivism, then you'd have to very narrowly
restrict your investigation to just those people. It would not surprise me
at all if they presented a uniform and non-contradictory front, and here is
why I believe that they could not disagree. First, contradictions don't
exist. Second, they seem to take the position that by correctly applying
reason to what you know about reality, you will reach a single conclusion
[put differently, two rational people can reach different conclusions only
if they differ in their factual knowledge; given the same factual knowledge,
two people can reach different conclusions only if at least one of them is
irrational]. Third, all members of the club are rational. Therefore, ARIans
should agree, unless one of them lacks some piece of knowledge (if that
arises, I expect that they would educate the sinner). It might be an
interesting study to see exactly how uniform ARIanism is, and what kind of
self-correcting mechanisms exist.
As to whether Rand herself presented a mutually consistent set of
philosophical statements, that isn't clear to me. The argument by Robert
Bass that Chris Cathcart mentioned strikes me as a remarkably clear example
of three fundamental and mutually contradictory propositions. The only
possible defense that I can imagine would be to deny that Rand actually held
all three of these beliefs, but that would be about as believable as
claiming that David Friedman isn't an anarchist.
R Lawrence
>I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
>But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
>there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
>metaphysics:
>
>http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
For those who haven't read it, the link above goes to a short essay by
Robert Bass, called, "An Inconsistent Triad." In it, Bass attributes three
specific metaphysical claims to Objectivism, and then argues that all three
cannot be simultaneously true.
There are three problems undercutting Bass's claim of inconsistency within
Objectivism:
1) One of the three legs of his "inconsistent triad" is a claim that is not
formally a part of Objectivism. I'm referring specifically to the claim
that time is non-cyclical. Technically this is the most damaging problem,
because it means that the inconsistency Bass finds cannot be a formal part
of Objectivism. Objectivism can be held to be entirely consistent, as long
as it is acceptable within Objectivism for time to be cyclical. In
practice, however, this is the least important of the three problems,
because AFAIK most or all Objectivists do in fact believe that time is
non-cyclical, even though that belief is not part of Objectivism per se.
Thus, while Objectivism might not be inconsistent, the beliefs of
Objectivists would be, if the remainder of his argument were correct.
(Still, individual Objectivists might be willing to change their beliefs
about time if there were some reason to, so this point cannot be completely
discounted.)
2) His description of the Objectivist theory of causality is technically
incorrect, in a way that is important to his point. Bass states that, "for
every event, there will be at least one before it to be or to be part of
its causal condition." This description assumes that events are caused by
other events. But the Objectivist view of causality is that events are
caused by entities, not other events. As Rand put it, "The law of causality
is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by
entities." (_Atlas Shrugged_, p. 954)
Unlike the prior point, this one is important to his argument. According to
Bass, "if you suppose time to be non-cyclical and every event to require a
causal condition, you can prove that any particular finite number suggested
cannot be equal to the total number of events; there will have to be at
least one more than any finite number to provide a causal condition for the
earliest member or members of the set of events. Since that argument works
for each finite number, the total number of events must not be finite."
This would be true if the cause of each event had to be a prior event. But
if the cause of an event is an entity, then there can be an end to the
series, because an entity is not formally required to have any prior causal
conditions.
To put it another way, if Bass could trace the causal chain backwards, he
might come to a first event that was caused simply by the nature of the
universe, by the bare fact of the universe's existence, with no prior
events or states to be counted. He would therefore not have an infinite
series, and no inconsistency.
3) Point (2) notwithstanding, Bass also fails to show precisely how a
proposed infinite regression of causal conditions would contradict the
Objectivist position on infinities. The Objectivist position, as described
by Leonard Peikoff, is "Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited
in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the
universe as well. ... For example, one can continually subdivide a line;
but however many segments one has reached at a given point, there are only
that many and no more. The _actual_ is always finite." (_Objectivism: The
Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, pp. 31-32)
What Bass has postulated, however, is not an infinite number of things that
exist in the present, or an infinite extent of any present quality. Rather,
he has proposed that there is no countable end to the number of causal
conditions that occurred in the past -- that is, no starting point for the
series of causal conditions. The problem for his argument is that past
causal conditions are not present entities or qualities. They are things
that existed in the past, but do not any longer. So there is no clear
contradiction between claiming that the sequence of causal conditions has
no starting point, and also claiming that no actual, present-day entity is
infinite.
Note that points (2) and (3) are compossible -- that is, they might both be
true at the same time. It is conceivable that while an infinite series of
past causal conditions is consistent with Objectivist theory on infinities,
there was not in fact an infinite series of past causal conditions. But
problems (2) and (3) are fatal to the argument Bass presents in his essay,
either separately or in combination. In other words, it is not required
that both be true. Either one will do to refute his argument.
BTW, regarding point (2): I don't personally claim to know whether there
was a first causal condition or not. I consider this a scientific question,
with either answer being acceptable within the Objectivist philosophy.
--
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com>
Visit the Objectivism Reference Center: http://www.objectivism.addr.com/
R Lawrence
>As to whether Rand herself presented a mutually consistent set of
>philosophical statements, that isn't clear to me. The argument by Robert
>Bass that Chris Cathcart mentioned strikes me as a remarkably clear example
>of three fundamental and mutually contradictory propositions. The only
>possible defense that I can imagine would be to deny that Rand actually held
>all three of these beliefs, but that would be about as believable as
>claiming that David Friedman isn't an anarchist.
One of the three cannot be documented as attributable to Rand at all, and
the other two are, as presented in the essay by Bass, inaccurate
representations of Rand's documented beliefs. So it is actually quite
believable that she didn't hold all three of the beliefs presented by Bass.
See my longer post on the subject in this thread.
R Lawrence
For what it is worth, the Objectivism Reference Center website includes a
page listing criticisms of Objectivism that are available at various other
websites. Since the author's of these essays thought them worthy of being
put out for long-term access on the web, perhaps they will be more helpful
to you than archived newsgroup postings.
Go to http://www.objectivism.addr.com/critics/index.html for the list of
links to critical essays. (This list includes, BTW, the essay by Robert
Bass that is being discussed in this thread.)
dave odden
> dave odden <od...@ling.ohio-state.edu> wrote:
> >The only
> >possible defense that I can imagine would be to deny that Rand actually
held
> >all three of these beliefs, but that would be about as believable as
> >claiming that David Friedman isn't an anarchist.
[xref to the defense]
Well, that was swift and merciful.
Now that you put it that way, I don't know what an "event" is, taken as a
technical concept. It seems that an infinite set of events has "taken place"
CC's posting a few hours ago. Or, for that matter, since I started writing
this post a few minutes ago. Presumably, an entity A at time T is "the same
as" A' at time T', and when we enumerate entities we don't sum up each
"entity at a time" across the infinitely subdividable continuum of times in
the finite existence span of A. Intuitively, it seems that events have time
built in as an essential property, which allows the infinite proliferation
of events.
It would be helpful to know what an event is.
Ken Gardner
> Unless you're WELL versed in Objectivism, you're at the mercy of those who
> are terrified of what Objectivism represents. In that, all I can suggest is
> to dig in and find out for yourself.
> Good luck, and good premises.
All excellent advice, to which I would add: read or re-read The
Emperor's New Clothes. Rand more or less covers this entire topic, and
how to respond to such people, in the last chapter of her book The
Virtue of Selfishness.
Ken
David Schwartz
The resolution of these contradictions is trivial -- there was a first
state of the universe.
No, you can't ask what caused it because if something caused it, it
wouldn't be the first state. No, you can't ask what came before it, it
had no prior state.
That solves the problem neatly.
DS
Resijinth
rp.supernews.com>...
You know, there is absolutely only ONE way in which all three could be
true. After all, the very fact that there are no infinities in time
would imply the beginning of time. This beginning of time could exist,
and the first event would the direct result of being adjacent (in
chronological perspective) to the beginning of time, therefore
assuming casual relations. The beginning of time itself would be
caused by the fact that there are no infinities. And the fact that
there are no infinities stands alone as not being an event which need
to be caused, since it exists in and of itself. That is, like many
other things (such as mathematics) it is wrapped up into itself.
Furthermore, it would be a single point, with no distinct definition.
It can't have a distinct definition since all definitions existing
today are the result of being compared to this first single point, and
any changes which occur to the first point would occur to the universe
which proceeded from it, so such a comparison of the first point as
being a definate is contradictory to the fact that one of the objects
in comparison is a direct result of the form of the other.
This is logical, is it not? Also, it is logical that only three
spacial dimensions and a chronological dimension are needed. The
chronological dimensions is needed because of causality. There needs
to be three spacial dimensions simply because that is the first number
of dimensions that would allow the degrees of freedom necessary for
existence to exist. For instance. Imagine a brain of only two
dimensions. Any brain would require interconnecting linear paths.
Ultimately, however, the paths of such line segments, whether of the
linear or the curved sort, would come into conflict. This comes from
the fact that no two particles of ANY sort may exist in the exact same
point of time-space.
Imagine, for example, five points which create the points of the
figure of a pentagon. Now try connecting each point with all four of
the other points, either with a straight line segment or a curved line
segment, WITHOUT making the lines intersect with any other lines or
with any points other than the two which define its beginning and end.
Ultimately, however, it is impossible, no matter HOW you try to shape
the pentagon. Now try this with three dimensions. Since you can simply
push one down and the other up, there is no such competition for
space. In fact, you could imagine a set of an indefinately large (not
infinite, however) number points in three dimensional space.
It is ALWAYS possible to make line segments (linear or curved) from
each point connecting to each other point without intersecting with
either any other line segments (linear or curved) nor any unrelated
points. Of course, such infinitesimal line segments cannot truly
exist, but ultimately if even an infinitesimal line segment cannot
even be used to a certain extent, than a line segment of finite
(non-infinitesimal) thickness CERTAINLY cannot exist.
Does this make sense to you why the universe exists as it does?
Tom S.
"Ken Gardner" <kesga...@charter.net> wrote in message
news:MPG.171c0a60...@news.charter.net...
Quite so.
As long as we're doling out free advice and all, I wonder how many people
devoured Atlas and Fountainhead, but never read any of Rand's non-fiction.
Certainly tens of millions read AS and FH, and VOS, C-UI, and others have
had more limited exposure. How many people have read even traces of "The
Objectivist" and such?
Not that I've read a lot of them, but the Rand critics I have read have
demonstrated only a "passing familiarity" with her works, and most
(particularly in HPO) have it completely backwards (i.e., the old
"Objectivism is fascism" strain).
Tom Scheeler
--
"Madness is rare among individuals,
but nations can behave like raving
lunatics." -- Peter Bennesh, IBD
Ken Gardner
I think that the problem here is with the word "first." There are many,
many people who just don't get the idea of what a "primary" or "axiom"
is.
Ken
Rod Nibbe
Now, Ken, you wouldn't be suggesting that,
like, you know, maybe definitions are
important, wouldya? ;-)
-RKN
Beaten Paths Are For Beaten Men
Larry Tate
"Tom S." <tms...@qwest.com> wrote in message
news:t8os8.1014$tF2.1...@news.uswest.net...
> We'd have to know what it is that they claim. The claims I've seen run the
> gammut from the symantical to the psychotic. Though I'm certainly not an
> Objectivist scholar, I have yet to see any such claims stand up under
> scrutiny. My assessment is that they're often made by savants (??) trying
to
> make a name, or to bolster their own self-esteem.
How exactly would finding a contradiction in Objectivism allow one to make a
name for oneself?
f
t
b
Ken Gardner
> Now, Ken, you wouldn't be suggesting that,
> like, you know, maybe definitions are
> important, wouldya? ;-)
Of course.
Ken
David Schwartz
> >>The resolution of these contradictions is trivial -- there was a first
> >>state of the universe.
> > I think that the problem here is with the word "first." There are many,
> > many people who just don't get the idea of what a "primary" or "axiom"
> > is.
I don't have Ken Gardner's post on my news server, so I'm replying
here.
The word "first" has a very simple meaning here, namely having no
predecessor. The concept of successive states is as fundamental a
concept as you can have -- you can't have causality without it.
DS
Rob
6...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>
> >I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
> >But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
> >there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
> >metaphysics:
> >
> >http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
>
> For those who haven't read it, the link above goes to a short essay by
> Robert Bass, called, "An Inconsistent Triad." In it, Bass attributes three
> specific metaphysical claims to Objectivism, and then argues that all three
> cannot be simultaneously true.
You didn't read what I said very carefully. I did not attribute these
claims to Objectivism. I said they were believed by many Objectivists
and almost certainly by Rand.
> There are three problems undercutting Bass's claim of inconsistency within
> Objectivism:
Again, I didn't make that claim.
> 1) One of the three legs of his "inconsistent triad" is a claim that is not
> formally a part of Objectivism. I'm referring specifically to the claim
> that time is non-cyclical. Technically this is the most damaging problem,
> because it means that the inconsistency Bass finds cannot be a formal part
> of Objectivism.
More precisely, it would be the most damaging problem if I had claimed
an inconsistency within Objectivism rather than what I did claim.
Objectivism can be held to be entirely consistent, as long
> as it is acceptable within Objectivism for time to be cyclical. In
> practice, however, this is the least important of the three problems,
> because AFAIK most or all Objectivists do in fact believe that time is
> non-cyclical, even though that belief is not part of Objectivism per se.
And that is why I attributed the belief to many Objectivists and to
Rand herself.
Actually, something a little stronger can be said here. The
non-cyclicity of time follows from two other theses. One is that
humans have free will in the sense Rand attached to it. The other is
that the past is settled and unalterable (there's no way to bring it
about that the sun didn't rise yesterday). If both of those are true,
it follows that time is non-cyclical, because the cyclicity of time
implies that the future and the past are, at a sufficiently great
remove from the present, identical. But that means either that the
future is as settled as the past (and therefore that we don't have
free will) or that the past is as subject to alteration as the future
(and therefore that, if we have free will, the past can be altered).
> 2) His description of the Objectivist theory of causality is technically
> incorrect, in a way that is important to his point.
I didn't describe the Objectivist theory of causality and therefore
did not describe it incorrectly. I attributed a claim about causal
conditions to (many)Objectivists.
> Bass states that, "for
> every event, there will be at least one before it to be or to be part of
> its causal condition." This description assumes that events are caused by
> other events.
No, it doesn't. It makes a claim about causal conditions of events
rather than about their causes. The cause of an event is what is
sufficient for that event to occur in the circumstances. A causal
condition of an event, however is something that is (causally)
necessary for its occurrence.
> But the Objectivist view of causality is that events are
> caused by entities, not other events. As Rand put it, "The law of causality
> is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by
> entities." (_Atlas Shrugged_, p. 954)
Right. But nothing in my argument depended upon denying that. (In
passing, I _would_ deny it. It's a barely intelligible piece of
scholastic metaphysics. It starts falling apart as soon as you start
asking questions about the event of an entity causing an action. Is
there a cause for that event?)
> Unlike the prior point, this one is important to his argument. According to
> Bass, "if you suppose time to be non-cyclical and every event to require a
> causal condition, you can prove that any particular finite number suggested
> cannot be equal to the total number of events; there will have to be at
> least one more than any finite number to provide a causal condition for the
> earliest member or members of the set of events. Since that argument works
> for each finite number, the total number of events must not be finite."
> This would be true if the cause of each event had to be a prior event. But
> if the cause of an event is an entity, then there can be an end to the
> series, because an entity is not formally required to have any prior causal
> conditions.
Maybe an entity need not have a causal condition, but that just evades
the question. As hinted in the parenthetical note above, there is
still an event to be explained, the event of that entity causing
whatever it does cause. Does that event have a prior causal condition?
If so, does its causal condition have a causal condition? And so on.
Alternatively, it's open to you to deny that every event has a causal
condition, but that's no problem for my argument. It was stated in
terms of what follows _if_ two claims were assumed.
> 3) Point (2) notwithstanding, Bass also fails to show precisely how a
> proposed infinite regression of causal conditions would contradict the
> Objectivist position on infinities. The Objectivist position, as described
> by Leonard Peikoff, is "Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited
> in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the
> universe as well. ... For example, one can continually subdivide a line;
> but however many segments one has reached at a given point, there are only
> that many and no more. The _actual_ is always finite." (_Objectivism: The
> Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, pp. 31-32)
>
> What Bass has postulated, however, is not an infinite number of things that
> exist in the present, or an infinite extent of any present quality. Rather,
> he has proposed that there is no countable end to the number of causal
> conditions that occurred in the past -- that is, no starting point for the
> series of causal conditions. The problem for his argument is that past
> causal conditions are not present entities or qualities. They are things
> that existed in the past, but do not any longer. So there is no clear
> contradiction between claiming that the sequence of causal conditions has
> no starting point, and also claiming that no actual, present-day entity is
> infinite.
I think this depends on an equivocation. Peikoff said -- and it's the
standard understanding among people who deny the existence of actual
infinities -- that the "_actual_ is always finite." You replaced that
by talking about what _presently_ exists being finite. But my claim
was that, if the other two conditions are true, there have _actually_
been infinitely many events in the past -- that something, the number
of events in the past, is actually infinite. That does contradict the
claim that the actual is always finite. Switching to talking about
what presently exists is just missing the point.
There's also a further problem, connected with whatever rationale is
given for denying actual infinities. I don't know that Rand ever
spelled out why she denied their existence, but _if_ you thought you
had a good reason for denying that any infinite set or collection is
possible in the present, how could that reason fail to apply to an
infinite set of past events? Every argument that I've seen for the
denial of actual infinities would, if correct, show that there could
not be an infinite number of events in the past. (I'll add that I've
never seen an impressive argument for the denial of actual
infinities.)
Rob
Rob
6...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
>
> >I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
> >But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
> >there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
> >metaphysics:
> >
> >http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
>
> For those who haven't read it, the link above goes to a short essay by
> Robert Bass, called, "An Inconsistent Triad." In it, Bass attributes three
> specific metaphysical claims to Objectivism, and then argues that all three
> cannot be simultaneously true.
You didn't read what I said very carefully. I did not attribute these
claims to Objectivism. I said they were believed by many Objectivists
and almost certainly by Rand.
> There are three problems undercutting Bass's claim of inconsistency within
> Objectivism:
Again, I didn't make that claim.
> 1) One of the three legs of his "inconsistent triad" is a claim that is not
> formally a part of Objectivism. I'm referring specifically to the claim
> that time is non-cyclical. Technically this is the most damaging problem,
> because it means that the inconsistency Bass finds cannot be a formal part
> of Objectivism.
More precisely, it would be the most damaging problem if I had claimed
an inconsistency within Objectivism rather than what I did claim.
Objectivism can be held to be entirely consistent, as long
> as it is acceptable within Objectivism for time to be cyclical. In
> practice, however, this is the least important of the three problems,
> because AFAIK most or all Objectivists do in fact believe that time is
> non-cyclical, even though that belief is not part of Objectivism per se.
And that is why I attributed the belief to many Objectivists and to
Rand herself.
Actually, something a little stronger can be said here. The
non-cyclicity of time follows from two other theses. One is that
humans have free will in the sense Rand attached to it. The other is
that the past is settled and unalterable (there's no way to bring it
about that the sun didn't rise yesterday). If both of those are true,
it follows that time is non-cyclical, because the cyclicity of time
implies that the future and the past are, at a sufficiently great
remove from the present, identical. But that means either that the
future is as settled as the past (and therefore that we don't have
free will) or that the past is as subject to alteration as the future
(and therefore that, if we have free will, the past can be altered).
> 2) His description of the Objectivist theory of causality is technically
> incorrect, in a way that is important to his point.
I didn't describe the Objectivist theory of causality and therefore
did not describe it incorrectly. I attributed a claim about causal
conditions to (many)Objectivists.
> Bass states that, "for
> every event, there will be at least one before it to be or to be part of
> its causal condition." This description assumes that events are caused by
> other events.
No, it doesn't. It makes a claim about causal conditions of events
rather than about their causes. The cause of an event is what is
sufficient for that event to occur in the circumstances. A causal
condition of an event, however is something that is (causally)
necessary for its occurrence.
> But the Objectivist view of causality is that events are
> caused by entities, not other events. As Rand put it, "The law of causality
> is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by
> entities." (_Atlas Shrugged_, p. 954)
Right. But nothing in my argument depended upon denying that. (In
passing, I _would_ deny it. It's a barely intelligible piece of
scholastic metaphysics. It starts falling apart as soon as you start
asking questions about the event of an entity causing an action. Is
there a cause for that event?)
> Unlike the prior point, this one is important to his argument. According to
> Bass, "if you suppose time to be non-cyclical and every event to require a
> causal condition, you can prove that any particular finite number suggested
> cannot be equal to the total number of events; there will have to be at
> least one more than any finite number to provide a causal condition for the
> earliest member or members of the set of events. Since that argument works
> for each finite number, the total number of events must not be finite."
> This would be true if the cause of each event had to be a prior event. But
> if the cause of an event is an entity, then there can be an end to the
> series, because an entity is not formally required to have any prior causal
> conditions.
Maybe an entity need not have a causal condition, but that just evades
the question. As hinted in the parenthetical note above, there is
still an event to be explained, the event of that entity causing
whatever it does cause. Does that event have a prior causal condition?
If so, does its causal condition have a causal condition? And so on.
Alternatively, it's open to you to deny that every event has a causal
condition, but that's no problem for my argument. It was stated in
terms of what follows _if_ two claims were assumed.
> 3) Point (2) notwithstanding, Bass also fails to show precisely how a
> proposed infinite regression of causal conditions would contradict the
> Objectivist position on infinities. The Objectivist position, as described
> by Leonard Peikoff, is "Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited
> in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the
> universe as well. ... For example, one can continually subdivide a line;
> but however many segments one has reached at a given point, there are only
> that many and no more. The _actual_ is always finite." (_Objectivism: The
> Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, pp. 31-32)
>
> What Bass has postulated, however, is not an infinite number of things that
> exist in the present, or an infinite extent of any present quality. Rather,
> he has proposed that there is no countable end to the number of causal
> conditions that occurred in the past -- that is, no starting point for the
> series of causal conditions. The problem for his argument is that past
> causal conditions are not present entities or qualities. They are things
> that existed in the past, but do not any longer. So there is no clear
> contradiction between claiming that the sequence of causal conditions has
> no starting point, and also claiming that no actual, present-day entity is
> infinite.
I think this depends on an equivocation. Peikoff said -- and it's the
Eddie '/Hi There!'/ Lowther
message news:<I_ps8.261119$s43.66...@typhoon.columbus.rr.com>...
> Patrick Bateman wrote:
>
...bjectivists.
>
> If you just focus on objectivists as they appear here, you will still find
> contradictions (mutually incompatible positions being held). The ARIans have
> the position that they are the only true objectivists, and that anyone else
> is some kind of Kantian scum or something like that. If you take ARIanism
Okay okay. Most posters here know you mean the
Aromatheraputic Rand Instifute
and are tacking on the suffix "ans" and "anism"
for your complete "Ayn" pleasure.
But, I hasten to point out in the style of
Mr. H.G.Wells, as written and
scanned by many telegraphic-google web agents
and hoplessly mind-crippled
drones with web access, you seem to be confusing
an old style type of
Arabian people or something.
Just not done old boy!
Cheers!@
E"HT"L.
> ... but that would be about as believable as
> claiming that David Friedman isn't an anarchist.
KINKY
++==--
++
Q.L.I.M.E.
(Quid lucrem iste mihi est.)
--------========///=======--------( Show me the money!! ) --=-
Disclaimer: Yeah, they know. They don't mind. Anything else?
George Dance
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
It has often been argued that these assertions are mutually
inconsistent:
1. "Right are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his
proper survival." ("Man's Rights, Vos 1964, 95)
2. "As for his neighbours, his rights impose on him no obligations
except of a *negative* kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
(ibid)
3. "A morality that holds *need* as a claim, holds emptiness -
non-existence - as its standard of value." (AS 1957, 1032)
Acar
> I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
IMO some of the most important contradictions in Objectivism refer to the
prudent predator question and the question of thriving vs. survival. The
fact that these questions have not been resolved to the satisfaction of all
committed Objectivists shows that the premises are not objective.
John Shafto
news:6312c50b.02040...@posting.google.com...
>
> It has often been argued that these assertions are mutually
> inconsistent:
>
> 1. "Right are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his
> proper survival." ("Man's Rights, Vos 1964, 95)
>
> 2. "As for his neighbours, his rights impose on him no obligations
> except of a *negative* kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
> (ibid)
>
> 3. "A morality that holds *need* as a claim, holds emptiness -
> non-existence - as its standard of value." (AS 1957, 1032)
I agree that this is a contradiction, and think that statement 3
is wrong on it's face. But, given everything else she said
about morality and rights, I take *need* there to mean
a certain kind of need. A need for the efforts/product
of others, not a need for freedom of action within the
boundaries of what is in one's best interest.
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>For those who haven't read it, the link above goes to a short essay by
>>Robert Bass, called, "An Inconsistent Triad." In it, Bass attributes three
>>specific metaphysical claims to Objectivism, and then argues that all three
>>cannot be simultaneously true.
>
>You didn't read what I said very carefully. I did not attribute these
>claims to Objectivism. I said they were believed by many Objectivists
>and almost certainly by Rand.
So you are not offering any criticism of Objectivism here? I'll certainly
keep that in mind for the next time someone offers a reference to your
essay as an example of the deficiencies of Objectivism. Let me add that I
find it interesting that you did not bother to make this clarification when
your essay was cited as showing an inconsistency in Objectivism (as Mr.
Cathcart did, and as others have in the past), but instead waited until I
refuted the claim that it did. Then suddenly it is important to deny that
you were claiming any inconsistency in Objectivism. Very interesting
indeed.
In the meantime, your claim that "many Objectivists and almost certainly
Rand" hold/held the three positions you describe is dubious, at best. You
offer no documentation to show that they do, and I have already quoted
material from Rand and Peikoff that suggests disagreement with two of the
three.
>>2) His description of the Objectivist theory of causality is technically
>>incorrect, in a way that is important to his point.
>
>I didn't describe the Objectivist theory of causality and therefore
>did not describe it incorrectly. I attributed a claim about causal
>conditions to (many)Objectivists.
>
>>Bass states that, "for
>>every event, there will be at least one before it to be or to be part of
>>its causal condition." This description assumes that events are caused by
>>other events.
>
>No, it doesn't. It makes a claim about causal conditions of events
>rather than about their causes. The cause of an event is what is
>sufficient for that event to occur in the circumstances. A causal
>condition of an event, however is something that is (causally)
>necessary for its occurrence.
I was not distinguishing the terms "cause" and "causal condition" in the
way that you have chosen. See below for more on the irrelevance of this
distinction in terminology. In any case, how is my complaint about the
soundness of your argument affected by this distinction? As far as I can
see, it is not. As you point out in your own essay, if every event has a
(sufficient) "cause," then every event must have a "causal condition," so
nothing in my phrasing contradicts the idea of every event having a causal
condition. And you *do* assume that those causal conditions must be other
events. My writing "events are caused by other events," instead of "events
have other events as their causal conditions," does not change this at all.
>>But the Objectivist view of causality is that events are
>>caused by entities, not other events. As Rand put it, "The law of causality
>>is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by
>>entities." (_Atlas Shrugged_, p. 954)
>
>Right. But nothing in my argument depended upon denying that.
It would be a mistake to assume that Rand followed your careful distinction
between a "causal condition" and a "cause." Rand's comment goes to the
fundamental relationship between identity and causality. Whether one is
talking about a necessary cause (what you call a "causal condition") or a
sufficient cause, is not relevant to this aspect of Rand's position on
causality. Moreover, your point does not become an accurate representation
of Objectivist beliefs simply because Rand (or other Objectivists) failed
to conform to your choice of terminology. A "causal condition," as you call
it, is simply one type of "cause" as that term is used by Objectivists.
Objectivists have an entity-based theory of causation, and your "triad"
depends on an event-based theory.
> (In
>passing, I _would_ deny it. It's a barely intelligible piece of
>scholastic metaphysics. It starts falling apart as soon as you start
>asking questions about the event of an entity causing an action. Is
>there a cause for that event?)
Who said that the relationship between a cause (or causal condition) and
the events it causes is itself an event? If one claims that it is, the type
of sophistry you offer above can be applied to any theory of causation, not
just entity-based causation. If events are the causal conditions of other
events, then what event was the causal condition event(1) causing event(2),
etc. Does that make event-based theories of causation "fall apart"? I don't
think so. Better to accept that the relationship between an event and its
cause (causal condition, whatever) is not itself an event. Then this
imagined problem simply disappears.
>Maybe an entity need not have a causal condition, but that just evades
>the question. As hinted in the parenthetical note above, there is
>still an event to be explained, the event of that entity causing
>whatever it does cause. Does that event have a prior causal condition?
>If so, does its causal condition have a causal condition? And so on.
See my response above. There are no unexplained events being "evaded."
>Alternatively, it's open to you to deny that every event has a causal
>condition, but that's no problem for my argument. It was stated in
>terms of what follows _if_ two claims were assumed.
So you can discuss any three incompatible positions that you want,
attribute them to Objectivists, and when challenged say that your argument
is simply about the claims themselves? This type of rhetorical sleight of
hand might impress the yokels, but I'm not buying it. _If_ Objectivists
don't agree to your three premises, then your argument fails *as a
criticism or Objectivism or Objectivists.* And everyone knows darn well
that that is what it is supposed to be. Why else post it to an Objectivist
mailing list, or even mention Objectivists at all?
I suggest that you should re-write your essay to eliminate all references
to Objectivists. Say that "some people" hold these three beliefs, and that
they are incompatible. Then you could honestly say that it doesn't matter
whether any given person rejects one of them. And don't forget to remove
the link to this essay from your web list of commentaries related to
Objectivism, because it has nothing to do with Objectivism.
>>3) Point (2) notwithstanding, Bass also fails to show precisely how a
>>proposed infinite regression of causal conditions would contradict the
>>Objectivist position on infinities. The Objectivist position, as described
>>by Leonard Peikoff, is "Every entity, accordingly, is finite; it is limited
>>in the number of its qualities and in their extent; this applies to the
>>universe as well. ... For example, one can continually subdivide a line;
>>but however many segments one has reached at a given point, there are only
>>that many and no more. The _actual_ is always finite." (_Objectivism: The
>>Philosophy of Ayn Rand_, pp. 31-32)
>>
>>What Bass has postulated, however, is not an infinite number of things that
>>exist in the present, or an infinite extent of any present quality. Rather,
>>he has proposed that there is no countable end to the number of causal
>>conditions that occurred in the past -- that is, no starting point for the
seriries of causal conditions. The problem for his argument is that past
>>causal conditions are not present entities or qualities. They are things
>>that existed in the past, but do not any longer. So there is no clear
>>contradiction between claiming that the sequence of causal conditions has
>>no starting point, and also claiming that no actual, present-day entity is
>>infinite.
>
>I think this depends on an equivocation. Peikoff said -- and it's the
>standard understanding among people who deny the existence of actual
>infinities -- that the "_actual_ is always finite." You replaced that
>by talking about what _presently_ exists being finite. But my claim
>was that, if the other two conditions are true, there have _actually_
>been infinitely many events in the past -- that something, the number
>of events in the past, is actually infinite. That does contradict the
>claim that the actual is always finite. Switching to talking about
>what presently exists is just missing the point.
The only equivocation going on here is your waffling among different
tenses. Past events, past entities, past "causal conditions" -- past
whatever -- are things that exist*ed*, not things that exist. This is
exactly what I was attempting to emphasize through the use of terms like
"present-day." The problem with infinities lies in the finite *identities*
of things that exist. This is why Peikoff refers specifically to entities.
A sequence of past causes is not an entity with an identity to worry about.
It doesn't actually exist -- we simply project its past existence in our
minds.
Or, you can tackle this from a different angle: As Peikoff states, "Every
entity ... is limited in the number of its qualities and in their extent;
this applies to the universe as well." What quality of an entity exists in
an infinite extent if there was an infinite prior sequence of causes? None.
What quality of the universe exists in an infinite extent if there was an
infinite prior sequence of causes? None. Do there exist an infinite number
of qualities for anything, if there was an infinite prior sequence of
causes? No. So there is no incompatibility between a supposed infinite
prior sequence of causes and the position Peikoff describes.
Malenor
"Patrick Bateman" <Zap...@removemeHotmail.Com> wrote in message
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
>
> disappointing as the responses that I get from people.
>
>
Try this:
-----------------------
From: David Tomlin <jet...@home.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Eternity
Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 08:41:40 +0000 (UTC)
Eternity is infinite time.
The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
contradict the proposition that there can be no
actual infinities.
If it doesn't, then why not?
---------------------
The "Eternity" thread is one good place to start.
Another good source is webpages by Michael Huemer. For
example, he takes Rand to task for her claim that "man is
an end in himself" (as do I).
http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~owl/rand.html#5.3.6
My take on that issue is: man can not be an end in himself
for Rand because she has only effectively relocated the
Hegelian dialectic of master-slave in the individual himself.
If man is his own master, then he is his own slave because to
be a master requires having a slave. This slave cannot
take the form of other people (and you can't be a slave
to others in her view), therefore the master-slave relationship
is within yourself.
If man were truly an end in himself, however, the end would
not be the relationship you have with yourself, it would be
your self. Therefore Rand is inconsistent in holding to her
own premise that man is an end in himself.
It is likely that her inconsistency in that premise is caused
by her poor justification for it, but then that is the type of
criticism you are not looking for.
But I can tell you the reason her premise fails her: it is
because she refuses to admit the transcendentality of
the premise. In order to properly justify the idea of
man as literally an end in himself, it is necessary to consider
man in abstraction from empirical considerations, that is,
noumenally as constructed in pure thought alone. But Rand
of course considered such justification invalid and such ideas
nonsensical. And so she tried to "have her transcendental
cake and eat it too."
Rand's acceptance of suicide as a rational alternative
is telling. Let us take "man is an end in himself" to mean "man's
*life* is an end in itself." But her theory of rational suicide
indicates that life *has to be worth living* in order to
justify its continuation. When living fails to provide this
worth to you because of some extenuating circumstances
beyond your volitional control, she adopted suicide as a
rational alternative, a way out.
There are problems with her theory on two levels.
(1) How does one really, absolutely know, when life is no
longer worth living? How do you know that reality won't
suddenly begin providing this worthiness? Or perhaps you
have only made an intellectual error and simply did not
see any other alternatives. Life and death is a very absolute
subject, yet *Rand provides absolutely no black-and-white
standard for deciding when this absolute end of existence has
been reached and living should be voluntarily discontinued.*
In the absence of such justification or standard, suicide is
nothing more than self-murder.
(2) Related to this issue is the fact that once again Rand
necessarily avoids any transcendental treatment of a thoroughly
transcendental subject. That transcendental subject, in this
case, is "life." It is transcendental because an empirical
investigation into the subject reveals that life is nothing more
than chemical and biological processes, hardly a thing worthy
of the great reverence and respect Rand provides for it.
empirically speaking, life is nothing more than a thing, and she
provides a description (never a definition) for this "thing": "life
is a process of self-sustaining and self-generation action." This
is as close to transcendental as Rand ever goes. She has not,
however, told us what she means by "self." What is a "self" in
this case? A living being, a being that we have *identified* as
living. Her description of "life" is therefore circular. And it must
be circular, because all empiricism can do is revolve in circles
around these transcendental subjects without ever coming to any
absolute conclusion about them. In the long run, the empiricist
ends up settling for the scientific, positivist solution, which declares
"life" to be more or less unreal while actions (behaviors) of
living things and their processes are the appropriate reality to
focus their investigations on. The unjustified transcendental
concept of "self-ness" in Rand's description is thus justifiably
lost in favor of rational, though emipirical, clarity. Thus, because
of the inevitable and eternal circularity of Rand's delving into the
transcendental from an empiricist perspective, such concepts as
"life" eventually are obliterated in favor of that which is the
appropriate object of scientific investigation, living beings
reduced to chemical reactions and *processes*. Meanwhile,
the whole idea of a "self" vanishes into obscurity; it becomes
for science some unknown, unquantifiable superstitition of a
more religious, faith-bound era. And Rand's theory does
nothing reasonable or objective to provide the solution to the
dilemma of how to have some idea of life, as living or
self-contained independent organisms, within the context of
empiricist doctrine.
This is the reason why I have recently termed Objectivism
a naive secular religion. It is naive in that it pretends to worship
that which it does not understand or justify. Objectivism can
"describe" life, but this is hardly different from a Christian's
attempt to describe God. They know that it exists, they know it
when they see it -- but apparently, if you can't understand it,
then they can't explain it!
Malenor
> 2. "As for his neighbours, his rights impose on him no obligations
> except of a *negative* kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
> (ibid)
>
Was it really spelled "neighbours" with the added vowel? Rand
was not educated into the British variants of spelling these words.
Now you got me imagining Rand with a Brit accent instead of
a Russian accent...
Chris Cathcart
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>
> >I have seen next to no contradictions or inconsistencies in Objectivism.
> >But note that I say "next to." Here's one website that argues for how
> >there is an inconsistency between substantive claims Rand makes in
> >metaphysics:
> >
> >http://personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/triad.html
>
> For those who haven't read it, the link above goes to a short essay by
> Robert Bass, called, "An Inconsistent Triad." In it, Bass attributes three
> specific metaphysical claims to Objectivism, and then argues that all three
> cannot be simultaneously true.
>
> There are three problems undercutting Bass's claim of inconsistency within
> Objectivism:
[...]
I'll let Rob speak for his own essay, but the way I see it, there is an
inconsistency in claims that Rand (or at least Peikoff or Branden in
authorized interpretations) makes in her metaphysics. The claims aren't
a triad as I see them, but two claims.
The first claim is: There are no actual infinities.
The second claim is: The universe is eternal.
I take the second claim to mean that if you run the history of the
universe on a timeline, it isn't like a point with an arrow running in
one direction, but arrows running in both directions. (Please, let's
not nitpick endlessly about this; I take the claim "the universe is
eternal" to mean something readily understandable, else the Objectivist
metaphysics -- on this point, anyway -- isn't so easy to understand
after all.)
The first claim I take to imply that the universe is not infinite in
extent in any sense. Accepting that involves suspending our ordinary,
everyday application of our understanding of space to something like the
universe itself; there just is no "outside" the universe. Indeed, there
is no infinity of space stretching out beyond the universe within which
the universe sits.
The second claim I take to imply a denial of standard Big Bang theory
about the origins of the universe. Quite literally, it denies that
there is such thing as an "origin" in any sense.
I don't see a denial of the Big Bang theory -- at the level of a
metaphysical impossibility -- as anything other than a denial that the
universe has a FINITE past.
What I find weird about this, on its face, and I alluded to this in
another thread, is that the denial of an infinitude of space involves
our suspending our everyday notions about space, whereas the finite-past
view doesn't require anything different of us with respect to time;
there is no "outside" of the universe either way.
I think that's what Rob's argument is basically trying to show -- that
the denial of the universe having a finite past implies that there was
an infinite series of events. He is just putting things in more
generalized terms. The Big Bang theory would be just something that
involves denial of one of the three propositions, namely, that for every
event there was a sufficient causal condition. As I understand it,
standard Big Bang theory denies that there was something that caused it,
because there was literally no "before" it.
I had taken the official statements by Branden and Peikoff pretty much
at face value, and that this leads to some pretty substantive claims
that would affect the validity of theories in the special sciences, like
that of the Big Bang.
My own view is that this just sounds too rationalistic an approach to
metaphysics -- to make claims about the cosmological structure of the
universe presumably warranted by the ontological theory of existence as
such. I take Parmenides to be a kind of rationalist in his approach to
metaphysics.
R Lawrence
>I'll let Rob speak for his own essay, but the way I see it, there is an
>inconsistency in claims that Rand (or at least Peikoff or Branden in
>authorized interpretations) makes in her metaphysics. The claims aren't
>a triad as I see them, but two claims.
>
>The first claim is: There are no actual infinities.
>The second claim is: The universe is eternal.
>
>I take the second claim to mean that if you run the history of the
>universe on a timeline, it isn't like a point with an arrow running in
>one direction, but arrows running in both directions.
What is meant by the claim that the universe is eternal is explained
clearly by Leonard Peikoff in the entry for "Time" in _The Ayn Rand
Lexicon_ (excerpted from his lectures on "The Philosophy of Objectivism"):
"Time is a measurement of motion; as such it is a type of relationship.
Time applies only within the universe ... The universe is eternal in the
literal sense: non-temporal, out of time." The claim is not that time
extends infinitely into either the past or the future, but rather that
there is no standard to measure time for the universe as a whole. (That
doesn't mean that time *doesn't* extend infinitely in either direction. It
just means that isn't what the claim is when Peikoff, etc., say that the
universe is eternal.)
> (Please, let's
>not nitpick endlessly about this; I take the claim "the universe is
>eternal" to mean something readily understandable, else the Objectivist
>metaphysics -- on this point, anyway -- isn't so easy to understand
>after all.)
I hope the simple explanation above is easy to understand and not
considered nitpicking.
>The first claim I take to imply that the universe is not infinite in
>extent in any sense. Accepting that involves suspending our ordinary,
>everyday application of our understanding of space to something like the
>universe itself; there just is no "outside" the universe. Indeed, there
>is no infinity of space stretching out beyond the universe within which
>the universe sits.
That is generally correct, as long as "extent" is understood to mean some
quality of an entity. However, as I have explained in my two long posts in
response to Rob, this is not an issue for time, because time is not an
entity, nor does any infinite quality exist for an entity if time is
unbounded.
>The second claim I take to imply a denial of standard Big Bang theory
>about the origins of the universe. Quite literally, it denies that
>there is such thing as an "origin" in any sense.
There is nothing in Objectivism that is contrary to the possibility of a
"Big Bang." That is, the physical events postulated by many physicists may
have happened. That leaves open the question of what there might have been
*before* the Big Bang. Perhaps there was some prior state of the universe.
Or perhaps not. I don't claim to know, and no claim in this regard is a
part of Objectivism, either. (Some Objectivists undoubtedly have their own
personal theories in this regard, beyond Objectivism. I do not.)
If by "origin" you simply mean that first state, then perhaps the Big Bang
is the origin of the universe. But if "origin" is taken to mean more, such
as "cause" or "time of creation," then no, there is no such thing. The
universe does not have a cause, and it is outside of time.
>What I find weird about this, on its face, and I alluded to this in
>another thread, is that the denial of an infinitude of space involves
>our suspending our everyday notions about space, whereas the finite-past
>view doesn't require anything different of us with respect to time;
>there is no "outside" of the universe either way.
Well, our "ordinary" notions of time are based on creationist traditions:
the universe is assumed to have a finite past because God created it.
Whether this notion of bounded time is reflective in any way of reality is
an open question.
>I think that's what Rob's argument is basically trying to show -- that
>the denial of the universe having a finite past implies that there was
>an infinite series of events. He is just putting things in more
>generalized terms. The Big Bang theory would be just something that
>involves denial of one of the three propositions, namely, that for every
>event there was a sufficient causal condition.
Since he got a bit uptight over the subject, I think I should point out
that Mr. Bass uses "causal condition" to mean a *necessary* condition, not
a sufficient one. But having picked that nit, any theory that says the
universe has a first state (a Big Bang state, something before a Big Bang,
or whatever) would indeed contradict the idea of an unbounded, infinite
series of events.
However, Objectivism does not require (nor does it deny) an infinite series
of events.
> As I understand it,
>standard Big Bang theory denies that there was something that caused it,
>because there was literally no "before" it.
I don't really know what the latest versions of such theories claim in this
regard, but if they claim that there was a first state of the universe, and
that was the initial state of the "Bang," then that's fine.
Tom S.
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>> > As I understand it,
> >standard Big Bang theory denies that there was something that caused it,
> >because there was literally no "before" it.
AIUI, BB theory only claims the BB was a change in form.
> I don't really know what the latest versions of such theories claim in
this
> regard, but if they claim that there was a first state of the universe,
and
> that was the initial state of the "Bang," then that's fine.
Cyclical Universe implies that the BB was the result of a previous "Big
Crunch". This make, to me, much more sense.
Eddie LeBaron
fe7...@posting.google.com>...
> R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<Giqs8.31894$VQ2.149273
> 6...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> > Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> >
>> But the Objectivist view of causality is that events are
>> caused by entities, not other events. As Rand put it, "The law of
causality
>> is the law of identity applied to action. All actions are caused by
>> entities." (_Atlas Shrugged_, p. 954)
>
>Right. But nothing in my argument depended upon denying that. (In
>passing, I _would_ deny it. It's a barely intelligible piece of
>scholastic metaphysics. It starts falling apart as soon as you start
>asking questions about the event of an entity causing an action. Is
>there a cause for that event?)
There are other problems with this causality theory as well. It is
tautological and hence, empirically empty. Hence, the air of
"scholastic metaphysics" that hangs about it. Worse, it doesn't do
what it's suppose to do, i.e., refute Hume's skepticism about
causality. Hume's attack on causality is largely epistemological,
stemming from his contention that induction is not logically provable.
He argues, in brief, that since are knowledge of causality all comes
from past experience, we can't be sure it will hold true for the
future. Rand countered this by arguing that, since entities have a
specific nature, we can know how they will behave in the future. But
this misses Hume's point altogether. Because Hume's argument, stated
in Randian terms, concerns whether we can fully know, through logical
reasoning alone, what an entity's nature is. All our knowledge is of
how things have acted in the past. How, then, can we know that this
knowledge will hold good in the future? Because, stated Rand, a thing
must act according to its nature. Very well. But what if it's in the
nature of a thing to change its behavior over time? Rand is here
guilty of drawing empirical conclusions from a simple tautology. The
tautological fact that everything has a nature does not mean that
everything must have the nature we, in our limited experience, must
find in it. Before we can be sure what the total nature of a thing
is, we are going to first have to solve the problem of induction.
Whether this constitutes a "contradiction" in Objectivism, I'll leave
to others to thrash out. I would call it a poor formulation or a
over-hasty conclusion on insufficient evidence. Rand was on the
"right track," but she was led astray by her adherence to Aristotlean
metaphysics. Aristotle never really understood mechanism all that
well. He was influenced by Plato and Socrates in this regard, rather
than Democritus. I suspect that if Rand has based her theory on
modern science rather than ancient philosophical speculation, she
might have come closer to refuting Hume's skepticism.
Malenor
"Eddie LeBaron" <eleb...@altavista.com> wrote in message
news:f200c1dc.02040...@posting.google.com...
> Whether this constitutes a "contradiction" in Objectivism, I'll leave
> to others to thrash out. I would call it a poor formulation or a
> over-hasty conclusion on insufficient evidence. Rand was on the
> "right track," but she was led astray by her adherence to Aristotlean
> metaphysics. Aristotle never really understood mechanism all that
> well. He was influenced by Plato and Socrates in this regard, rather
> than Democritus. I suspect that if Rand has based her theory on
> modern science rather than ancient philosophical speculation, she
> might have come closer to refuting Hume's skepticism.
>
Excellent points. I think Bateman is getting more than he bargained
for when he asked for contradictions and inconsistencies in
Objectivism.
I will only question you on one issue, and tentatively so. Rand was
not attempting to oppose Hume with her own theory of
metaphysical causality. Her arguments against Hume consist of
calling his philosophy "Walt Disney metaphysics."
While I agree that her theory misses his point, it was never her
intention to understand his theory, but only to characterize it as a
bad idea. Hume, in her view, *invented* a theory of causality that
was subjectivist in nature. Of course, we know that's not what
Hume was up to, his tactic has been known for decades, centuries.
Hume is an easy read, therefore Rand cannot be generously granted
any excuse for misinterpreting him. Was she a liar? Hmmm, no...
I think she was just crazy.
Chris Cathcart
0...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>
> >I'll let Rob speak for his own essay, but the way I see it, there is an
> >inconsistency in claims that Rand (or at least Peikoff or Branden in
> >authorized interpretations) makes in her metaphysics. The claims aren't
> >a triad as I see them, but two claims.
> >
> >The first claim is: There are no actual infinities.
> >The second claim is: The universe is eternal.
> >
> >I take the second claim to mean that if you run the history of the
> >universe on a timeline, it isn't like a point with an arrow running in
> >one direction, but arrows running in both directions.
>
> What is meant by the claim that the universe is eternal is explained
> clearly by Leonard Peikoff in the entry for "Time" in _The Ayn Rand
> Lexicon_ (excerpted from his lectures on "The Philosophy of Objectivism"):
> "Time is a measurement of motion; as such it is a type of relationship.
> Time applies only within the universe ... The universe is eternal in the
> literal sense: non-temporal, out of time." The claim is not that time
> extends infinitely into either the past or the future, but rather that
> there is no standard to measure time for the universe as a whole. (That
> doesn't mean that time *doesn't* extend infinitely in either direction. It
> just means that isn't what the claim is when Peikoff, etc., say that the
> universe is eternal.)
I'm aware of this quotation, and prior to getting the Peikoff lecture
courses on tape and all that, when I just had the _Lexicon_ to go on,
I had assumed that this statement was all well and good in being
consistent with the universe having a finite past.
But I get the lecture courses where Peikoff discusses the likes of
Parmenides, and I think I get a pretty unequivocal picture of the
Objectivist position on this: the universe is uncreated in the
broadest sense of that term, i.e., the "stuff" of the universe is
permanent and indestructible, not capable of going out of existence or
ever having come into existence.
The standard Big Bang theory as I understand it is that the universe
originated in that massive explosion, with no "prior" to that. The
Parmenidean/Objectivist view is that nonexistence is ontologically
impossible -- that "what is, is" translates into something
non-tautological like "existence can't come into or go out of
existence." (The tautological translation would just say that "what
is, is" is the case whether or not there IS something to be.)
> If by "origin" you simply mean that first state, then perhaps the Big Bang
> is the origin of the universe. But if "origin" is taken to mean more, such
> as "cause" or "time of creation," then no, there is no such thing. The
> universe does not have a cause, and it is outside of time.
Let's say that the Big Bang is the story about the origin of the
universe. It is uncaused, with no "prior to" its happening. I would
say that this is what is meant by "the universe originated in or with
the Big Bang." That's what I meant by origin: SOME starting point.
My understanding of the Parmenidean ontology is that there is no
starting point to existence, period.
David Tomlin
> But, I hasten to point out in the style of
> Mr. H.G.Wells, as written and
> scanned by many telegraphic-google web agents
> and hoplessly mind-crippled
> drones with web access, you seem to be confusing
> an old style type of
> Arabian people or something.
Aryans are Indo-European.
Arabs are Semitic.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
John Shafto
.uswest.net...
>
> "R Lawrence" <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:dnKs8.34302$VQ2.15...@twister.socal.rr.com...
> > Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> >> > As I understand it,
> > >standard Big Bang theory denies that there was something that caused it,
> > >because there was literally no "before" it.
>
> AIUI, BB theory only claims the BB was a change in form.
>
> > I don't really know what the latest versions of such theories claim in
> this
> > regard, but if they claim that there was a first state of the universe,
> and
> > that was the initial state of the "Bang," then that's fine.
>
> Cyclical Universe implies that the BB was the result of a previous "Big
> Crunch". This make, to me, much more sense.
Yes, this is what I have heard several times also, and it
makes the most sense to me as well. All matter crunches,
then explodes, then crunches, ad inifintum.
Gsnyquist
I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
where they go wrong. >>
The stress on contradictions is misplaced and not very important. In fact,
that's one of the problems with Objectivists, especially of the ARI camp: a
tendency to concentrate too much on questions of logic at the expense of
questions of fact. A contradiction, in and of itself, proves nothing in regard
to the factual truth of a conclusion. It is quite possible, and, indeed, we
find evidence of this all over the place, for someone to believe in something
that is true for contradictory reasons (those who believe in honesty for
religious reasons, for example). And likewise, it is possible for a conclusion
to be false even though it follows logically from the premises. That is why
the real issue in Objectivism for those of us who criticize Rand from the
scientific and naturalist point of view is that we find Rand making far too
many extremely controversial assertions without bothering to back them up with
sufficient evidence. So we are told by Rand that man is self-created being,
that his emotion are solely the product of his fundamental convictions, that
the social order can eventually be changed by refuting the errors of
philosophers like Kant, that there's no such thing as innate knowledge, that
all knowledge is ultimately "conceptual" in nature, and that "reason" is man's
only means of survival. These are all interesting positions; perhaps they
contain a lot of truth. But without detailed evidence to back them up, they
are scientifically worthless; for there's a great deal of evidence suggesting
that all these postitions are, at best, only partially true. And so before any
naturalist can take Rand seriously, he's going to want to know why all the
evidence accumulated by cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, biologists,
sociologists, and historical scholars does not in fact constitute a refutation
of many of the core premises of Objectivism. Unfortunately, most orthodox
Objectivists don't seem to know or even care whether this evidence exists.
I've been told that some of the people associated with David Kelley have at
least some inkling of these problems and are trying to remedy them. Perhaps
so. But I'll remain skeptical until I see something tangible forthcoming.
Greg Nyquist
homepage.mac.com/machiavel
Brad Aisa
contradicts her detailed and well defended definition and exposition of
the nature of art.
Architecture is, in fact, not art, but a species of design, akin to
industrial design.
--
Brad Aisa <ba...@NOSPAMbrad-aisa.com>
http://www.brad-aisa.com/ -- PGP public key available at:
http://pgp.mit.edu:11371/pks/lookup?search=Brad+Aisa&op=index
R Lawrence
>>What is meant by the claim that the universe is eternal is explained
>>clearly by Leonard Peikoff in the entry for "Time" in _The Ayn Rand
>>Lexicon_ (excerpted from his lectures on "The Philosophy of Objectivism"):
>>"Time is a measurement of motion; as such it is a type of relationship.
>>Time applies only within the universe ... The universe is eternal in the
>>literal sense: non-temporal, out of time." The claim is not that time
>>extends infinitely into either the past or the future, but rather that
>>there is no standard to measure time for the universe as a whole. (That
>>doesn't mean that time *doesn't* extend infinitely in either direction. It
>>just means that isn't what the claim is when Peikoff, etc., say that the
>>universe is eternal.)
>
>I'm aware of this quotation, and prior to getting the Peikoff lecture
>courses on tape and all that, when I just had the _Lexicon_ to go on,
>I had assumed that this statement was all well and good in being
>consistent with the universe having a finite past.
>
>But I get the lecture courses where Peikoff discusses the likes of
>Parmenides, and I think I get a pretty unequivocal picture of the
>Objectivist position on this: the universe is uncreated in the
>broadest sense of that term, i.e., the "stuff" of the universe is
>permanent and indestructible, not capable of going out of existence or
>ever having come into existence.
Well, pardon me if I seem to "nitpick" at this point, but the universe is
*not* "capable of going out of existence or ever having come into
existence." This description is inapplicable to the universe. The universe
*is* existence, and there is nothing else for it to come into or go out of.
The problem here is not that there cannot be a first (or last) state of the
universe, but that one cannot say that there was a "before" when the
universe did not exist, or an "after" when it will not exist. Temporal
concepts simply can't be applied to the universe as a whole, any more than
you can ask what color loud is or how happy a rock is.
To put it another way: If there is a first state of the universe, then how
long was the universe in that state? Since there is no prior state to
measure against, the only plausible answer in temporal terms is "forever."
And this is how the situation is sometimes described. But the better
response is to reject the question. Accepting any type of temporal
description, even passive ones like "permanent," creates confusion. The
only precise description for the universe with regard to time is
"non-temporal" or "eternal" or some equivalent term or phrase.
>The standard Big Bang theory as I understand it is that the universe
>originated in that massive explosion, with no "prior" to that.
If that is the first state of the universe, then there would not be any
"prior" -- the concept would be inapplicable. But the concept being
inapplicable does not mean that there was "nothing before that" or that the
universe "became" or "came into existence" with that first state. It means
that nothing temporal -- including such basic ideas as change, motion and
events -- can be coherently discussed except as *after* that first state.
> The
>Parmenidean/Objectivist view is that nonexistence is ontologically
>impossible -- that "what is, is" translates into something
>non-tautological like "existence can't come into or go out of
>existence." (The tautological translation would just say that "what
>is, is" is the case whether or not there IS something to be.)
That's correct. There is nothing other the existence that existence could
"come into." To discuss it in such terms is simply nonsense.
>>If by "origin" you simply mean that first state, then perhaps the Big Bang
>>is the origin of the universe. But if "origin" is taken to mean more, such
>>as "cause" or "time of creation," then no, there is no such thing. The
>>universe does not have a cause, and it is outside of time.
>
>Let's say that the Big Bang is the story about the origin of the
>universe. It is uncaused, with no "prior to" its happening. I would
>say that this is what is meant by "the universe originated in or with
>the Big Bang." That's what I meant by origin: SOME starting point.
>My understanding of the Parmenidean ontology is that there is no
>starting point to existence, period.
There may be a first state, which marks the earliest possible measurement
of time. But there is not a "starting point to existence." The concept of
"starting," which implies a "before" state that was not "started," is not
applicable to the universe as a whole. As long as you try to frame the
issue in ways that apply time to the universe as a whole, as if time
somehow existed outside or separate from the universe, you will come up
with nonsense.
R Lawrence
>There are other problems with this causality theory as well. It is
>tautological and hence, empirically empty.
Precisely how is the belief that entities cause events more "empty" or
"tautological" than the belief that events cause events?
> Worse, it doesn't do
>what it's suppose to do, i.e., refute Hume's skepticism about
>causality.
I wasn't aware that it was "supposed" to do that.
> Hume's attack on causality is largely epistemological,
>stemming from his contention that induction is not logically provable.
>He argues, in brief, that since are knowledge of causality all comes
>from past experience, we can't be sure it will hold true for the
>future. Rand countered this by arguing that, since entities have a
>specific nature, we can know how they will behave in the future. But
>this misses Hume's point altogether. Because Hume's argument, stated
>in Randian terms, concerns whether we can fully know, through logical
>reasoning alone, what an entity's nature is.
To my knowledge, Rand never claimed that "logical reasoning alone" provides
knowledge about the nature of specific entities. Perhaps you have a cite
where she does this?
<remainder snipped>
Resijinth
cinci.rr.com>...
Oh? Please tell me more.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Chris Cathcart
[....]
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> >The standard Big Bang theory as I understand it is that the universe
> >originated in that massive explosion, with no "prior" to that.
>
> If that is the first state of the universe, then there would not be any
> "prior" -- the concept would be inapplicable. But the concept being
> inapplicable does not mean that there was "nothing before that" or that the
> universe "became" or "came into existence" with that first state. It means
> that nothing temporal -- including such basic ideas as change, motion and
> events -- can be coherently discussed except as *after* that first state.
Here's where I'm curious: how does saying that there is no "prior to the
universe" (something I'm of course in agreement with) lead to the denial
that the universe could come into existence a la the Big Bang? Or: how
does "come into" imply that there was something prior? I know that the
wording here is awkward and perhaps there's no way around that, but how
does objection to the use of the terms like "came into" or "began"
amount to more than a semantical issue about the event in question (the
Big Bang)? The Big Bang theory is that the stuff of the universe,
matter and energy, appeared at some finite amount of time in the past.
Maybe I should ask you, concerning the Parmenidean view that Objectivism
accepts: do you think, given your understanding of the Parmenidean view,
that it could very well mean that the universe does not have a finite
past? That is how I understood that view, i.e., that the stuff of the
universe has not been here for a finite amount of time, but for an
unlimited amount of time.
Your responses seem to have been focused on attacking the objection
mainly on a semantic level, but I'm not sure I'm seeing any
clarification or defense of the Parmenidean view in what you say.
Just look at the response that Scheeler gave. That before the Big Bang
could have been a series of contractions and expansions. What if the
claim were that there was no *first* contraction or expansion?
You've made reference to a "first state" of the universe, and that the
Big Bang could be that first state. My understanding of the Parmenidean
view is that it denies that there IS a first state. And that, to me,
suggests the claim that the universe has an infinite past.
[...]
> >Let's say that the Big Bang is the story about the origin of the
> >universe. It is uncaused, with no "prior to" its happening. I would
> >say that this is what is meant by "the universe originated in or with
> >the Big Bang." That's what I meant by origin: SOME starting point.
> >My understanding of the Parmenidean ontology is that there is no
> >starting point to existence, period.
>
> There may be a first state, which marks the earliest possible measurement
> of time.
Okay, but is that what the Parmenidean view of "existence" would say?
> But there is not a "starting point to existence." The concept of
> "starting," which implies a "before" state that was not "started,"
I don't see this as obvious. Maybe it is true, but it looks like an
assertion that isn't defended.
> is not
> applicable to the universe as a whole. As long as you try to frame the
> issue in ways that apply time to the universe as a whole, as if time
> somehow existed outside or separate from the universe, you will come up
> with nonsense.
Maybe this is more semantic than substantive. I haven't actually said
anything about their being such thing as "before" the universe -- like
you say, it makes no sense. The substance of this claim is not
something that I wish to use any of the other things I say in order to
deny. However, I don't see that other things that I've said would
involve denying that. I don't see how the concept "start" implies that
something goes before it, for instance. In any case, I'm more
interested in getting clear on what, in your view, the *Parmenidean*
metaphysics claims with respect to whether the universe has a finite or
infinite past. (I think "finite past" vs. "infinite past" may best
explain the primary distinction involved. Speaking in terms of whether
the universe "always" existed is unhelpful since by definition time is
within the universe. But I don't think that answers the question of
whether the universe has a finite or infinite past.)
Eudaimonus
"Chris Cathcart" <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote in message
news:72809c8d696f170ddae...@mygate.mailgate.org...
>
> The first claim is: There are no actual infinities.
> The second claim is: The universe is eternal.
The answer to this is as old as Aristotle (from whom all of this comes).
Different points in time are not co-extensive. Once one time has comes into
being, then out of being, it is no longer actual. So, there is not an
actual infinity.
Eudaimonus
news:ub7gf79...@corp.supernews.com...
> Yes, this is what I have heard several times also, and it
> makes the most sense to me as well. All matter crunches,
> then explodes, then crunches, ad inifintum.
That is cyclical time, but that is not circular time - a truely circular
view of time would not say that the universe just keeps expanding and
contrading over and over again - the point of it being a CIRLCE is that the
end of the Big Crunch and the beginning of the Big Bang are not merely
alike, but are numerically the same - the same point in time (that both
stands behind as as the origine of the universe, and ahead of us as the fate
of the universe.)
Eddie LeBaron
@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> While I agree that her theory misses his point, it was never her
> intention to understand his theory, but only to characterize it as a
> bad idea. Hume, in her view, *invented* a theory of causality that
> was subjectivist in nature. Of course, we know that's not what
> Hume was up to, his tactic has been known for decades, centuries.
> Hume is an easy read, therefore Rand cannot be generously granted
> any excuse for misinterpreting him. Was she a liar? Hmmm, no...
>
> I think she was just crazy.
In <BAOs8.4295$3P4.3...@newsread2.prod.itd.earthlink.net> Malenor
<smu...@earthlink.net> wrote:
>
>I will only question you on one issue, and tentatively so. Rand was
>not attempting to oppose Hume with her own theory of
>metaphysical causality. Her arguments against Hume consist of
>calling his philosophy "Walt Disney metaphysics."
>
>While I agree that her theory misses his point, it was never her
>intention to understand his theory, but only to characterize it as a
>bad idea. Hume, in her view, *invented* a theory of causality that
>was subjectivist in nature. Of course, we know that's not what
>Hume was up to, his tactic has been known for decades, centuries.
>Hume is an easy read, therefore Rand cannot be generously granted
>any excuse for misinterpreting him. Was she a liar? Hmmm, no...
>
> I think she was just crazy.
I don't think Rand was crazy. I doubt she ever read Hume all the way
through. People who, like Rand, are more intelligent than nearly
everyone else, sometimes end up over-estimating what intelligence can
accomplish. They think they can figure out a subject by merely
thinking about rather than doing a lot of hard work and research.
Rand could be very penetrating even on subjects she didn't know
intimately; but sometimes she got in a bit over her head. Her views
of other philosophers, though they contain a number of fascinating
insights, also contain gross exaggerations. This has hurt Rand,
because those handful of scholars who are men of integrity look at her
works and think she's "just crazy."
You may be right that Rand was not trying to oppose Rand with her
metaphysical theory of causality. That was simply the impression I
was left with from some Peikoff lecture series I once heard years ago.
I'm also under the impression that Rand's view of time, space and
eternity was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to refute the
antimonies in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."
EL
Eddie LeBaron
1...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> Eddie LeBaron <eleb...@altavista.com> wrote:
>
> >There are other problems with this causality theory as well. It is
> >tautological and hence, empirically empty.
>
> Precisely how is the belief that entities cause events more "empty" or
> "tautological" than the belief that events cause events?
It isn't. They're both tautological and empirical empty. (That
doesn't mean they're wrong, it means you can't deduce any specific
fact from them. A good essay on this general subject can be found in
David Stove's attack against idealism in "Against the Idols of Age,"
where Stove shows that all of idealism is based on drawing interesting
conclusions from an empirically empty truism.)
> > Worse, it doesn't do
> >what it's suppose to do, i.e., refute Hume's skepticism about
> >causality.
>
> I wasn't aware that it was "supposed" to do that.
Among other things. Obviously, that wasn't it's sole metaphysical
purpose. But many of Rand's doctrines were devised largely to combat
the errors of previous philosophers.
> > Hume's attack on causality is largely epistemological,
> >stemming from his contention that induction is not logically provable.
> >He argues, in brief, that since are knowledge of causality all comes
> >from past experience, we can't be sure it will hold true for the
> >future. Rand countered this by arguing that, since entities have a
> >specific nature, we can know how they will behave in the future. But
> >this misses Hume's point altogether. Because Hume's argument, stated
> >in Randian terms, concerns whether we can fully know, through logical
> >reasoning alone, what an entity's nature is.
>
> To my knowledge, Rand never claimed that "logical reasoning alone" provides
> knowledge about the nature of specific entities. Perhaps you have a cite
> where she does this?
No, she never claimed it; but occassionally she and her orthodox
followers act as if they believe such a doctrine. David Kelley's
criticism of Peikoff's Objectivist book for stressing the deductive
side of the axioms illustrates this problem. Also, the tendency to
rely on such arguments in debates. The free will argument, for
instance, which is almost entirely deductive (and inadequate, as all
critical objectivists know).
Let me just say this in conclusion. I'm not offering these critcisms
in order to tear down Rand. But if we want objectivism to ever be
more than a fringe movement in the culture, we're going to have to
acknowledge Rand's shortcomings and try to address some of the
problems that plague this philosophy.
R Lawrence
>You may be right that Rand was not trying to oppose Rand with her
>metaphysical theory of causality. That was simply the impression I
>was left with from some Peikoff lecture series I once heard years ago.
> I'm also under the impression that Rand's view of time, space and
>eternity was motivated, at least in part, by a desire to refute the
>antimonies in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."
The view that Rand takes of "time, space and eternity" -- actually, her
metaphysical view in general -- is essentially a classical one that
pre-dates Hume and Kant by centuries. So it is possible that she discovered
it while looking for a way to respond to Hume or Kant (during her college
studies, for example), but such views were clearly not developed for the
purpose of such refutation.
Unless perhaps you believe in cyclical time. :-)
R Lawrence
>>
>>>There are other problems with this causality theory as well. It is
>>>tautological and hence, empirically empty.
>>
>>Precisely how is the belief that entities cause events more "empty" or
>>"tautological" than the belief that events cause events?
>
>It isn't. They're both tautological and empirical empty.
Then it would appear that this concern -- if it is a concern at all -- is
not relevant to my dispute with Mr. Bass or his criticism of Objectivism
(oops, I meant, "his criticism of the beliefs of many Objectivists").
>>> Worse, it doesn't do
>>>what it's suppose to do, i.e., refute Hume's skepticism about
>>>causality.
>>
>>I wasn't aware that it was "supposed" to do that.
>
>Among other things. Obviously, that wasn't it's sole metaphysical
>purpose. But many of Rand's doctrines were devised largely to combat
>the errors of previous philosophers.
But her metaphysical doctrines are not new, and pre-date Hume. See my other
response to you from this morning.
>> Because Hume's argument, stated
>>>in Randian terms, concerns whether we can fully know, through logical
>>>reasoning alone, what an entity's nature is.
>>
>>To my knowledge, Rand never claimed that "logical reasoning alone" provides
>>knowledge about the nature of specific entities. Perhaps you have a cite
>>where she does this?
>
>No, she never claimed it; but occassionally she and her orthodox
>followers act as if they believe such a doctrine.
Then this might be a problem of their behavior, of individuals not being
consistent in applying principles and such, but it doesn't appear to be a
problem of Objectivism.
R Lawrence
>>If that is the first state of the universe, then there would not be any
>>"prior" -- the concept would be inapplicable. But the concept being
>>inapplicable does not mean that there was "nothing before that" or that the
>>universe "became" or "came into existence" with that first state. It means
>>that nothing temporal -- including such basic ideas as change, motion and
>>events -- can be coherently discussed except as *after* that first state.
>
>Here's where I'm curious: how does saying that there is no "prior to the
>universe" (something I'm of course in agreement with) lead to the denial
>that the universe could come into existence a la the Big Bang? Or: how
>does "come into" imply that there was something prior?
"Come into existence" implies that there is some other existence, into
which the universe "came." But that is specific to "come into" and so is
what you might call a semantic quibble. More broadly, the problem is
that this and all similar phrasings refer to some sort of event. Think
about what you imagine when thinking about any other thing "starting" or
"becoming": first there is a time when there is not that thing, and then
there is a time when there is. That is how the "becoming" is identified as
an event. But for the universe, the first half of that comparison is
missing.
This is not simply an issue of semantics. It isn't just that you picked the
wrong word or phrase to use. The issue is that no temporal concept of any
kind -- including concepts related to events or actions -- is applicable to
the universe as a whole. We are used to using such concepts for the
universe because of the tradition of imagining a super-universe -- God or
heaven or some sort of ineffable nothing-verse "outside" existence --
against which the universe can be compared. But Objectivists reject such
notions, and with the super-universe must go any super-time by which the
actual universe could be measured. So there are no events of the entire
universe, no actions taken by it or done to it, no beginnings or endings of
it. No time-bound measurements or concepts *at all*.
>Maybe I should ask you, concerning the Parmenidean view that Objectivism
>accepts: do you think, given your understanding of the Parmenidean view,
>that it could very well mean that the universe does not have a finite
>past? That is how I understood that view, i.e., that the stuff of the
>universe has not been here for a finite amount of time, but for an
>unlimited amount of time.
As long as the concept of time is restricted to "stuff" within the
universe, and not applied to the universe as a whole, either should be
acceptable. So you might be able to track events back through time until
you came to some state in which you cannot detect any past change: what I
refer to as a "first state." I say "might" -- I don't know that it will
ever be possible to test this empirically. Finding a past terminus for
change would mean that time is bounded in the past -- because time is a
measurement of change.
But none of this can be taken to a meta-level: you cannot say that this
means the universe "started" at a given time in the past, or that the
universe has "been here" (where?) for some amount of time. Nor can
you say that the first state "began" at some time. Whatever that first
state was -- if there was such a state -- it was eternal, because without
change there is no time, and without a prior state there was no change.
>>There may be a first state, which marks the earliest possible measurement
>>of time.
>
>Okay, but is that what the Parmenidean view of "existence" would say?
Pardon me if I don't scramble through textbooks to verify the beliefs of
Parmenides himself, but it is compatible with Objectivism, which is
presumably the more relevant point. Note that I say compatible, not
required. It is also entirely possible that there was no first state, that
change has occurred endlessly.
>>But there is not a "starting point to existence." The concept of
>>"starting," which implies a "before" state that was not "started,"
>
>I don't see this as obvious. Maybe it is true, but it looks like an
>assertion that isn't defended.
Which part? That "starting" implies a prior state, or that there was not a
starting point to existence? I believe you mean the former, in which case,
see my comments at the top of this post about the temporal nature of
events.
> In any case, I'm more
>interested in getting clear on what, in your view, the *Parmenidean*
>metaphysics claims with respect to whether the universe has a finite or
>infinite past. (I think "finite past" vs. "infinite past" may best
>explain the primary distinction involved. Speaking in terms of whether
>the universe "always" existed is unhelpful since by definition time is
>within the universe. But I don't think that answers the question of
>whether the universe has a finite or infinite past.)
That is correct. To put it in (hopefully) more precise terms: knowing that
temporal concepts do not apply to the universe as a whole does *not* tell
you whether time is bounded in the past or not. That is exactly what I have
been arguing through this entire thread.
Perhaps you consider it unacceptable not to have a specific metaphysical
claim about whether time is bounded in the past or not. And perhaps a lot
of Objectivists would agree, as they do have their own opinions about
whether time is or is not bounded in the past. But if you are asking the
content of Objectivism, as it is presented in Rand's works and in OPAR,
then the answer is that there is no such position in Objectivism per se.
Acar
OK. What about the ethics of emergencies? In an emergency it is not required
that man act according to his nature because if he did he might not survive
to be able to act according to his nature in less troubled times. And some
people wonder why Academia does not take this logic seriously! Indeed it
does say something about the academics and scholars and everybody else who
do take it seriously.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
> It has often been argued that these assertions are mutually
> inconsistent:
>
> 1. "Right are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his
> proper survival." ("Man's Rights, Vos 1964, 95)
>
> 2. "As for his neighbours, his rights impose on him no obligations
> except of a *negative* kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
> (ibid)
>
> 3. "A morality that holds *need* as a claim, holds emptiness -
> non-existence - as its standard of value." (AS 1957, 1032)
In the context of (1) and (2) I would think that "need" in (3) equals
entitlement. If so, I think that they are consistent.
x
x
Chris Cathcart
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> >"R Lawrence" <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >>If that is the first state of the universe, then there would not be any
> >>"prior" -- the concept would be inapplicable. But the concept being
> >>inapplicable does not mean that there was "nothing before that" or that
> >> the
> >>universe "became" or "came into existence" with that first state. It means
> >>that nothing temporal -- including such basic ideas as change, motion and
> >>events -- can be coherently discussed except as *after* that first state.
> >
> >Here's where I'm curious: how does saying that there is no "prior to the
> >universe" (something I'm of course in agreement with) lead to the denial
> >that the universe could come into existence a la the Big Bang? Or: how
> >does "come into" imply that there was something prior?
>
> "Come into existence" implies that there is some other existence, into
> which the universe "came." But that is specific to "come into" and so is
> what you might call a semantic quibble.
I thought the "come into" that I meant was fairly clear, though there
really may be no way to state what I was stating in a non-awkward
fashion. "Come into existence" didn't imply that there was some
existence already there to come into as I used the phrase; it's that
existence began at some finite point in the past. Now I'm already well
aware that you claim that the term "began" is wholly inapplicable to the
nature of existence as such, but I think that's what's involved in
saying that the universe is not bound in the past time-wise. Like I
said, consult the Big Bang theory as many understand it: the Big Bang is
literally the point in a finite past that the universe sprang into
being. Since it is the starting point of a finite past, and time is
bound by that finite past, it says nothing in the way of there ever
having been a time when there was nothing in existence.
> More broadly, the problem is
> that this and all similar phrasings refer to some sort of event. Think
> about what you imagine when thinking about any other thing "starting" or
> "becoming": first there is a time when there is not that thing, and then
> there is a time when there is. That is how the "becoming" is identified as
> an event. But for the universe, the first half of that comparison is
> missing.
>
> This is not simply an issue of semantics. It isn't just that you picked the
> wrong word or phrase to use. The issue is that no temporal concept of any
> kind -- including concepts related to events or actions -- is applicable to
> the universe as a whole. We are used to using such concepts for the
> universe because of the tradition of imagining a super-universe -- God or
> heaven or some sort of ineffable nothing-verse "outside" existence --
> against which the universe can be compared. But Objectivists reject such
> notions, and with the super-universe must go any super-time by which the
> actual universe could be measured. So there are no events of the entire
> universe, no actions taken by it or done to it, no beginnings or endings of
> it. No time-bound measurements or concepts *at all*.
I'll have to give this more thought before I comment further.
> Finding a past terminus for
> change would mean that time is bounded in the past -- because time is a
> measurement of change.
I know that this is the way time is (spoken of? defined?) in the
Objectivist literature, but I've been hesitant about that since first
reading it. There may be a more generalized way of talking about time,
though I wouldn't offer a formulation of such myself. I believe that
time pertains to a sort of relation between things, but I haven't nailed
it down. But this is more of a side-point....
Onto the central issue as I see it:
[...]
> Pardon me if I don't scramble through textbooks to verify the beliefs of
> Parmenides himself, but it is compatible with Objectivism, which is
> presumably the more relevant point. Note that I say compatible, not
> required. It is also entirely possible that there was no first state, that
> change has occurred endlessly.
Well, this is just what I was getting at with the first point of the
thread. And you appear to reference the same point at the end of your
post:
> Perhaps you consider it unacceptable not to have a specific metaphysical
> claim about whether time is bounded in the past or not. And perhaps a lot
> of Objectivists would agree, as they do have their own opinions about
> whether time is or is not bounded in the past. But if you are asking the
> content of Objectivism, as it is presented in Rand's works and in OPAR,
> then the answer is that there is no such position in Objectivism per se.
This is what I have been getting at. I take "change has occurred
endlessly" and "time is not bounded in the past" to mean the same, and
that this is the consequence of a Parmenidean metaphysics. Now, I don't
know the extent to which Parmenides is discussed in the published
literature, but having listened to Peikoff's lectures on the history of
philosophy, it was quite clear that, speaking for the Objectivist
position, he endorsed Parmenides' metaphysics. The amount of stuff in
the universe is fixed; nothing ever came into being or will go out of
being, everything just changes form. (This last may be an Aristotelian
expansion on the basic theme; Parmenides himself apparently denied that
things really changed.) I've got the copious lecture notes sitting
around here somewhere, maybe I can dig 'em up.
Okay, even if it's in doubt as to whether Objectivism wholeheartedly
endorsed Parmenides' metaphysics or that this is what this metaphysics
requires, you actually do leave it as an open question that:
Change has occurred ENDLESSLY
(or: that time is not bounded in the past)
But if Objectivism rejects that there could be actualized infinities,
then how could this even be an open question?
David Tomlin
> Try this:
> -----------------------
> From: David Tomlin <jet...@home.com>
> Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> Subject: Eternity
> Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2001 08:41:40 +0000 (UTC)
>
> Eternity is infinite time.
>
> The proposition that matter is eternal seems to
> contradict the proposition that there can be no
> actual infinities.
>
> If it doesn't, then why not?
>
> ---------------------
>
> The "Eternity" thread is one good place to start.
Thanks for reposting one of my screw-ups. :-)
That should have been "existence is eternal." I went
by memory instead of looking up the exact wording. As
as result many words were wasted on the relationship
between "existence" and "matter."
Here's the start of another thread, labeled "causation
and volition."
---------------------
From: David Tomlin (jet...@home.com)
Subject: Causation and Volition
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Date: 2001-07-16 15:10:12 PST
From OPAR:
"A thing cannot act against it's nature, i.e., in contradiction
to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are
impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore,
there is only one action possible to an entity, the action
expressive of its identity."
"The law of causality by itself by itself, therefore, does
not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible choice. It
says only this much: if such a choice does exist, then it,
too, as a form of action, is performed and necessitated by
an entity of a specific nature....Given a certain kind of
cause, in other words, a certain kind of effect must follow.
This is not a violation of the law of causality, but an
instance of it."
Peikoff's answer to the causation/volition problem is to
slip definitions, from "only one" to "a certain kind of."
Does anyone want to defend this, or improve on it?
---------------------
Malenor
"David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com> wrote in message
news:c61bab99.02041...@posting.google.com...
> > The "Eternity" thread is one good place to start.
>
> Thanks for reposting one of my screw-ups. :-)
>
> That should have been "existence is eternal." I went
> by memory instead of looking up the exact wording. As
> as result many words were wasted on the relationship
> between "existence" and "matter."
Yes I remember trying to work out the exact meaning
of your question, and you finally clarified it. The universe
consists of matter, so it wasn't that big a deal. (And for those
who think the universe consists of energy, that is just another
way of saying "matter," and vice versa.)
> Here's the start of another thread, labeled "causation
> and volition."
>
> "A thing cannot act against it's nature, i.e., in contradiction
> to its identity, because A is A and contradictions are
> impossible. In any given set of circumstances, therefore,
> there is only one action possible to an entity, the action
> expressive of its identity."
>
> "The law of causality by itself by itself, therefore, does
> not affirm or deny the reality of an irreducible choice. It
> says only this much: if such a choice does exist, then it,
> too, as a form of action, is performed and necessitated by
> an entity of a specific nature....Given a certain kind of
> cause, in other words, a certain kind of effect must follow.
> This is not a violation of the law of causality, but an
> instance of it."
>
> Peikoff's answer to the causation/volition problem is to
> slip definitions, from "only one" to "a certain kind of."
>
> Does anyone want to defend this, or improve on it?
>
It can't be defended, but it can be improved upon.
Peikoff doesn't explain what he means by an "irreducible
choice." Knowing that much would be a great improvement
right there.
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
m
Resijinth
Ah, okay. Well, in this sense, doesn't this justify the crusades of
communists against their 'opressors'? Not because their opressors are
immoral, but just so they can survive?
An emergency can only be the result of acting irrationally and not
thinking ahead, which means you have violated your nature. In fact,
emergency situations are what make objectivists politics so
subjective. There are no such things as emergency situations. The
needs of of rationality and justice trump any emergency needs at all
times.
Also, I don't want to have to point out that I'm contradicting Ayn
Rand. Of course I am. However, the thinking of the Piekoff tribe of
thought goes as follows right here:
a. Ayn Rand was an Objectivist. (Duh.)
b. Those that contradict Objectivism are contradicting Ayn Rand.
(Mostly.)
c. Therefore anybody contadicting Ayn Rand must also be contradicting
Objectivism! (Which is bad logic!)
And, of course, said people cannot be Objectivists. The sad thing
about this, is that these tribal 'Objectivists' do not even see the
problem with this kind of thinking!
At anyways, I'm a Kelleyite. And for the most part I'm a Libertarian.
That is, not so much that I beleive in Metaphysical Free Will, but
that I beleive in Epistimilogical Free Will.
Eddie LeBaron
1...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> >>To my knowledge, Rand never claimed that "logical reasoning alone" prov
> >>ides
> >>knowledge about the nature of specific entities. Perhaps you have a cite
> >>where she does this?
> >
> >No, she never claimed it; but occassionally she and her orthodox
> >followers act as if they believe such a doctrine.
>
> Then this might be a problem of their behavior, of individuals not being
> consistent in applying principles and such, but it doesn't appear to be a
> problem of Objectivism.
How convenient would it be if we could just blame the rationalism of
orthodox Objectivism on the behavior of Objectivists! But isn't this
a bit like Marxists trying to blame the failure of practical Marxism
on the behavior of Marxists? If people calling themselves Marxists
would only behave differently, then maybe Marxism would work(!) No,
the problems are not just on the practical side of the ledger; the
theoretical side is also affected. Some of Rand's doctrines leave the
door open to rationalism. For example, Rand's "foundationalism,"
which is criticized by Bass is one of his essays--and rightfully so.
David Kelley has noted, in his review of Peikoff's OPAR, that this is
a problem, that it leads people to think that if they know the
foundations, they can reduce the rest of it form that. Hence the
scholasticism of orthodox Objectivism. Unfortunately, the affected
Rand herself. She liked to believe that she could discover the truth
from mere thinking alone, simply because she could do it better than
anybody else. From thinking alone, she decided that Kant was the most
evil man of all time. George Walsh has had to straighten us out about
that one.
David Tomlin
> An emergency can only be the result of acting irrationally and not
> thinking ahead, which means you have violated your nature.
You obviously didn't grow up in an earthquake zone.
R Lawrence
>>"Come into existence" implies that there is some other existence, into
>>which the universe "came." But that is specific to "come into" and so is
>>what you might call a semantic quibble.
>
>I thought the "come into" that I meant was fairly clear, though there
>really may be no way to state what I was stating in a non-awkward
>fashion.
I'm sure there isn't, for the reasons we have discussed. But I'll let you
think on that.
<mega snip>
>Okay, even if it's in doubt as to whether Objectivism wholeheartedly
>endorsed Parmenides' metaphysics or that this is what this metaphysics
>requires, you actually do leave it as an open question that:
>
>Change has occurred ENDLESSLY
>(or: that time is not bounded in the past)
>
>But if Objectivism rejects that there could be actualized infinities,
>then how could this even be an open question?
This takes us back through the thread to something which has already been
discussed. Here is a pastiche from my previous comments on this topic:
What Bass has postulated, however, is not an infinite number of things that
exist in the present, or an infinite extent of any present quality. Rather,
he has proposed that there is no countable end to the number of causal
conditions that occurred in the past -- that is, no starting point for the
series of causal conditions. The problem for his argument is that past
causal conditions are not present entities or qualities. They are things
that existed in the past, but do not any longer. So there is no clear
contradiction between claiming that the sequence of causal conditions has
no starting point, and also claiming that no actual, present-day entity is
infinite.
Or, you can tackle this from a different angle: As Peikoff states, "Every
entity ... is limited in the number of its qualities and in their extent;
this applies to the universe as well." What quality of an entity exists in
an infinite extent if there was an infinite prior sequence of causes? None.
What quality of the universe exists in an infinite extent if there was an
infinite prior sequence of causes? None. Do there exist an infinite number
of qualities for anything, if there was an infinite prior sequence of
causes? No. So there is no incompatibility between a supposed infinite
prior sequence of causes and the position Peikoff describes.
Plus the following concise comment from Eudaimonus:
"The answer to this is as old as Aristotle (from whom all of this comes).
Different points in time are not co-extensive. Once one time has comes
into being, then out of being, it is no longer actual. So, there is not an
actual infinity."
--
R Lawrence
>R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>Eddie LeBaron <eleb...@altavista.com> wrote:
>>>No, she never claimed it; but occassionally she and her orthodox
>>>followers act as if they believe such a doctrine.
>>
>>Then this might be a problem of their behavior, of individuals not being
>>consistent in applying principles and such, but it doesn't appear to be a
>>problem of Objectivism.
>
>How convenient would it be if we could just blame the rationalism of
>orthodox Objectivism on the behavior of Objectivists!
The distinction is really quite simple: "Objectivism" is a philosophy.
"Objectivists" are people. Now, you have described a doctrine that is not
articulated anywhere in the philosophy, but which you say some people "act
as if they believe." In order to claim that the behavior of the people is
the result of the philosophy, you need to establish a connection. So far
you haven't done that; you've simply asserted one.
If you can establish a connection between the philosophy and a problem of
those who espouse it, you can show a problem with the philosophy --
although not necessarily a "contradiction" of the type posited in the
thread title.
Remainder snipped until you establish the connection.
Malenor
"Patrick Bateman" <Zap...@removemeHotmail.Com> wrote in message
news:MPG.171bb6186...@news.optonline.net...
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
>
> disappointing as the responses that I get from people.
>
> Thanks
>
Oh yes, in my answer to a recent post I was reminded of the "prudent
predator" hypothesis which is intended to show a contradiction between
certain elements of Objectivist ethics. For example:
From: Acar <g...@d-g-s.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Question for David on Prudent Predation
Date: Sat, 29 Dec 2001 01:12:05 +0000 (UTC)
"The point of the prudent predator argument is to show an unintended
contradiction in Objectivist moral theory. Following Objectivist views
reality is not faked because the predator is valuing his interest above that
of the other guy, and because he realistically considers the value of the
thing being stolen."
As I recall, there is an alleged conflict between Rand's egoism and theory
of Rights. A loophole in her theory is then created allowing for the
theoretical invention of a "prudent predator." I just don't remember
all the details about the theory. Acar?
Eddie LeBaron
3...@twister.socal.rr.com>...
> Eddie LeBaron <eleb...@altavista.com> wrote:
> >R Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> >>Eddie LeBaron <eleb...@altavista.com> wrote:
>
"Objectivism" is a philosophy.
> "Objectivists" are people. Now, you have described a doctrine that is not
> articulated anywhere in the philosophy, but which you say some people "act
> as if they believe." In order to claim that the behavior of the people is
> the result of the philosophy, you need to establish a connection. So far
> you haven't done that; you've simply asserted one.
>
> If you can establish a connection between the philosophy and a problem of
> those who espouse it, you can show a problem with the philosophy --
> although not necessarily a "contradiction" of the type posited in the
> thread title.
The issue is a difficult one because of the complexities involved.
The "contradiction" is a matter of interpretation. But it is
interpretation that is quite common because Rand and Peikoff are not
very clear about the relation between their foundationalism and their
claims that knowledge is sensory based. Kelley has indicated that
there's a problem here, as follows:
"Peikoff defines proof as 'the process of establishing truth by
reducing a proposition to axioms, i.e., ultimately, to sensory
evidence.' (120) This definition suggests that our knowledge has the
following structure: Sensory evidence tells us that something exists,
that it is what it is, and that we are aware of it (the axioms of
existence, identity, and consciousness); from these axiomatic
propositions we then infer everything else that we know. This picture
is wildly inaccurate. Axioms are involved in any proof, since they
underlie the canons of logical inference. But the substance of any
conclusion is derived from sensory observation of particular objects
and events, from which we form generalizations by induction and
scientific hypothesis."
It would be a waste of time to argue whether this is a contradiction
"in" Objectivism. At the very least, it constitutes a bad formulation
or inept presentation of Objectivist principles which encourages
uncritical Objectivists to become overly rationalistic in their
thinking.
Resijinth
5626...@posting.google.com>...
I did. I live on the West Coast. And obviously if I in any way failed
to gain Earthquake Insurance then I have acted irationally. The
morality of an act is not relative to the situation causing one to
execute that act. Morality is applied to a situation. The situation is
not applied to morality.
David Schwartz
> > > An emergency can only be the result of acting irrationally and not
> > > thinking ahead, which means you have violated your nature.
> > You obviously didn't grow up in an earthquake zone.
> I did. I live on the West Coast. And obviously if I in any way failed
> to gain Earthquake Insurance then I have acted irationally. The
> morality of an act is not relative to the situation causing one to
> execute that act. Morality is applied to a situation. The situation is
> not applied to morality.
So an earthquake isn't an emergency if you have insurance?
DS
Churl Beck
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
[...]
This is a hard question to answer, if only because it is a topic of endless
debate. I can give light descriptions of some things that I personally like
to harp on, but this by no means exhausts the possibilities.
#1. Ethics. A good place to start is with Rand's "is-ought" derivation
from "The Objectivist Ethics." IMO, Rand's whole argument rests on her
contradictory uses of the word "value." She starts by saying that value
"presupposes an answer to the question: of value to /whom/ and for /what/
[purpose]?" [VOS, 16] (The word "purpose" is only implied here. However,
she is more explicit about it elsewhere: "An objective theory [of value]
does not permit...the separation of 'value' from 'purpose'..." [CUI, 22]
"'Value' presupposes...a purpose..." [AS, 1012]) Later on in the essay she
says that everything that lives must pursue values--from a heart that beats
to a plant that grows. Yet in a footnote she denies that these things are
purposive, so in what sense can they be said to have values at all?
In my experience, most Objectivists do not understand why this is even
important. They regard Rand's discussions of lower lifeforms as an
interesting, albeit irrelevant, tangent. Therefore they simply dismiss the
contradiction as inconsequential. But I see it as vital to her argument,
because she is using it to prove that "the validation of value judgments is
to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality." [VOS, 18]
#2. Epistemology. Next look at Rand's theory of concepts and whether or
not she is able to apply it consistently. She defines a concept as "a
mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing
characteristc(s), with their particular measurements omitted." [ITOE, 13]
In the following chapter she tries to illustrate this principle by offering
a definition of "furniture." She says furniture is any "Movable man-made
objects intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the
weight of the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects."
[ITOE, 22]
Now, I challenge anyone to identify furniture's "distinguishing
characteristic." In other words, what is it that all furniture has in
common, according to this definition? To be sure, all pieces of furniture
must be objects, they must be moveable, they must be man-made, and they must
be intended to be used in a human habitation. However, this in itself is
too broad to be useful as a definition of furniture (if this is all that
there was to it, then silverware would be furniture, for example). But
beyond that, what Rand has actually done is say that furniture can be any
one of *three* things: (a) it can support the weight of a human body, (b) it
can support other, smaller objects, or (c) it can store other, smaller
objects. Realize that she is not saying that there are three seperate
concepts; she is saying that there is one concept which can be any of three
things. Which is to say that two pieces of furniture do not have to possess
the *same* distinguishing characteristc(s).
(P.S. She also says that a cabinet is furniture, even though it is not
moveable [ITOE, 22] and that there is such a thing as "inbuilt furniture"
(which is likewise not moveable) [ITOE, 269].)
#3. Metaphysics. Rand claims that a metaphysically-given fact "cannot be
changed." [PWNI, 27] Then she calls a mountain a metaphysically-given fact
and says that it can be blown up. [PWNI, 31].
I'll just leave it at that for now.
--CHuRL
Resijinth
db4a0$77de1b3f@res0h7s0>...
> Patrick Bateman wrote:
>
> > I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> > years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> > think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> > properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> > better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> > where they go wrong.
> [...]
>
> This is a hard question to answer, if only because it is a topic of endless
> debate. I can give light descriptions of some things that I personally like
> to harp on, but this by no means exhausts the possibilities.
>
> #1. Ethics. A good place to start is with Rand's "is-ought" derivation
> from "The Objectivist Ethics." IMO, Rand's whole argument rests on her
> contradictory uses of the word "value." She starts by saying that value
> "presupposes an answer to the question: of value to /whom/ and for /what/
> [purpose]?" [VOS, 16] (The word "purpose" is only implied here. However,
> she is more explicit about it elsewhere: "An objective theory [of value]
> does not permit...the separation of 'value' from 'purpose'..." [CUI, 22]
> "'Value' presupposes...a purpose..." [AS, 1012]) Later on in the essay she
> says that everything that lives must pursue values--from a heart that beats
> to a plant that grows. Yet in a footnote she denies that these things are
> purposive, so in what sense can they be said to have values at all?
>
I dislike the way she played with dictionary definitions. This is one
of the reasons why. A goal is the more appropriate term.
> In my experience, most Objectivists do not understand why this is even
> important. They regard Rand's discussions of lower lifeforms as an
> interesting, albeit irrelevant, tangent. Therefore they simply dismiss the
> contradiction as inconsequential. But I see it as vital to her argument,
> because she is using it to prove that "the validation of value judgments is
> to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality." [VOS, 18]
>
This is the same thing. A goal. A value is a judgement of something's
worth. A goal is its purpose. Value can be given to a goal or a
purpose, but ultimately they are not the same thing.
> #2. Epistemology. Next look at Rand's theory of concepts and whether or
> not she is able to apply it consistently. She defines a concept as "a
> mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing
> characteristc(s), with their particular measurements omitted." [ITOE, 13]
> In the following chapter she tries to illustrate this principle by offering
> a definition of "furniture." She says furniture is any "Movable man-made
> objects intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the
> weight of the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects."
> [ITOE, 22]
>
What about their being out in the open? A jam jar then is a piece of
furnature. Wait, I can take the challenge you mention below.
> Now, I challenge anyone to identify furniture's "distinguishing
> characteristic." In other words, what is it that all furniture has in
> common, according to this definition? To be sure, all pieces of furniture
> must be objects, they must be moveable, they must be man-made, and they must
> be intended to be used in a human habitation. However, this in itself is
> too broad to be useful as a definition of furniture (if this is all that
> there was to it, then silverware would be furniture, for example). But
> beyond that, what Rand has actually done is say that furniture can be any
> one of *three* things: (a) it can support the weight of a human body, (b) it
> can support other, smaller objects, or (c) it can store other, smaller
> objects. Realize that she is not saying that there are three seperate
> concepts; she is saying that there is one concept which can be any of three
> things. Which is to say that two pieces of furniture do not have to possess
> the *same* distinguishing characteristc(s).
>
Rather, she should add that it can be used to store a number of things
simultanously, and serves a distinguishable purpose. It also has a
quality of being part of the household environment and, while movable,
generally isn't moved as a whole in its common usage. That would be
more consistent.
> (P.S. She also says that a cabinet is furniture, even though it is not
> moveable [ITOE, 22] and that there is such a thing as "inbuilt furniture"
> (which is likewise not moveable) [ITOE, 269].)
>
And, yes, she has contradicted herself. Nothing can be perfected by
intuition alone. Yet she uses what I call 'rational intuition', which
is an oxymoron. An attempt to try to use pre-set rational conventions
to make rational extention less difficult. This was obviously a
failure of such a method.
> #3. Metaphysics. Rand claims that a metaphysically-given fact "cannot be
> changed." [PWNI, 27] Then she calls a mountain a metaphysically-given fact
> and says that it can be blown up. [PWNI, 31].
>
It's not a metaphsyically given fact, then. It's an observationally
derived fact. The two are quite distinct. A fact cannot be changed
once it has been established, but then of course a fact can ONLY be
factual if it refers to a specific frame of reference, not an infinite
one, unless of course it is a TRUE metaphsyical fact. One derived from
reasoning alone, and does not require any actual observation to
derive, and as for affirming it, yes it can be affirmed from
observation, but then said facts are less metaphsyical and more
scientific. There is a distinct difference.
> I'll just leave it at that for now.
>
> --CHuRL
Well, I put my two cents in, if that's okay.
Resijinth
E...@webmaster.com>...
Well, if you get caught in it, what can you do? Still, it doesn't
justify violence of any sort. And it's your job to make sure
emergencies require less urgent attention. That must be paid for, but
it is still your responsibility.
R Lawrence
>The issue is a difficult one because of the complexities involved.
>The "contradiction" is a matter of interpretation. But it is
>interpretation that is quite common because Rand and Peikoff are not
>very clear about the relation between their foundationalism and their
>claims that knowledge is sensory based.<snip>
>It would be a waste of time to argue whether this is a contradiction
>"in" Objectivism. At the very least, it constitutes a bad formulation
>or inept presentation of Objectivist principles which encourages
>uncritical Objectivists to become overly rationalistic in their
>thinking.
Like I said, this is a problem of individual behavior. If Objectivist
principles don't actually say or imply X, but a "bad formulation or inept
presentation of Objectivist principles" misleads some people into X, then
the error is not in the principles, it is in the way some individuals have
presented or interpreted them.
Jim Klein
> The resolution of these contradictions is trivial -- there was a first
> state of the universe.
Still cracking jokes, I see. Will there be a last one, too?
> No, you can't ask what caused it
Sure I can; watch..."What caused it?"
> because if something caused it it wouldn't be the first state.
Cool...an uncaused state. Can there be others, or was that the only one?
> No, you can't ask what came before it,
Sure I can; watch..."What came before it?"
> it had no prior state.
If it had no prior state, what in the world makes you think it could have
subsequent states?
> That solves the problem neatly.
So does God, but I thought we were looking for the right answers!
There is no problem because the question--"Was there a first state of the
universe"--is invalid. There is only the universe--existence--and first,
next and last are contextual impositions by a consciousness. There's a
first and last, and now and then, because there is _to us_. Take us out of
the picture and the universe will manage along nicely, thank you. Nothing
will have happened before or after anything else; it will have all just
happened and keep happening.
Be thankful that one of things that happened is your ability to experience
it, and leave it at that.
jk
1Z
C...@webmaster.com>...
> The resolution of these contradictions is trivial -- there was a first
> state of the universe.
>
> wouldn't be the first state. No, you can't ask what came before it, it
> had no prior state.
>
It breaks the second principle: you are saying that
the First State has no causal conditions. Of course
th eproblem can be 'solved' by contradicting one of the three
principles. The trick is to show that they are really compatible -- or
are not all part of objectivism.
R Lawrence
> Of course
>the problem can be 'solved' by contradicting one of the three
>principles. The trick is to show that they are really compatible -- or
>are not all part of objectivism.
A trick that has been accomplished. Two of the three are not part of
Objectivism, and Bass has misunderstood the third. So it turns out that the
problem is solved both ways.
Churl Beck
>> But "goal" and "purpose" both signify intent, and plants do not
>> intend for things to happen.
>
> Why Not?
You're making this too easy. :)
> Humans usually have 'intent' when they talk about
> their volitional/concious goals/purposes, but why is it so
> strange to suggest that a plant has purpose in what it
> does?
"Intent" is solely an epistemological term. It means that an organism
starts at point A, decides to move to point B, and then moves there.
Without the ability to conceptualize possible future states and the
motivation to act accordingly, an organism cannot intend for the result to
happen. If you don't make a conscious, premeditated decision to fall down a
flight of stairs, for instance, then you cannot be said to have intended for
it to happen.
> Even if it is strictly a natural determined purpose, the 'intent'
> of a plant is to further it's life and reproduce.
As a metaphor, it's fine. As metaphysics, it's downright lousy. It is no
more true that sun "intends" for there to be life on Earth, or that the moon
"intends" for there to be ocean tides. The idea of literal purpose in the
universe has theological underpinnings. Rand probably got it from
Aristotle, who believed something similar re: "final causes" and an "unmoved
mover."
> I don't find that strange at all. Any high school biology
> teacher will tell you the 'purpose' of various biological
> functions.
Then all the worse for them.
> A plant may not choose to do something, but it does what it
> does toward a consistent creative end. Life is a very
> different thing than the other entropic forces in the
> universe. Why ignore that? Why muddle the distinction?
I never said that life wasn't different. I said that it wasn't different in
the way that you claim that it is. You are right that plants do not choose,
but that is precsely what the word "value" implies. Why? Because to value
something is to prefer it over something else. And an involuntary
preference is a contradiction in terms. Even Rand recognized this ("A value
which one is forced to accept...is not a value to anyone." [CUI, 23]). See
also a message titled "Metaphysically-given" values which I posted earlier
this year.
--CHuRL
John Shafto
> John Shafto wrote:
>
> >> But "goal" and "purpose" both signify intent, and plants do not
> >> intend for things to happen.
> >
> > Why Not?
>
> You're making this too easy. :)
>
> > Humans usually have 'intent' when they talk about
> > their volitional/concious goals/purposes, but why is it so
> > strange to suggest that a plant has purpose in what it
> > does?
>
> "Intent" is solely an epistemological term.
Let me ask it more concisely:
Why do 'goal' and 'purpose' have to signify 'intent'?
Churl Beck
>> "Intent" is solely an epistemological term.
> Let me ask it more concisely:
> Why do 'goal' and 'purpose' have to signify 'intent'?
Good question. The short answer is that a goal (by definition) is
"something that somebody wants to achieve."
The long answer is that a goal is a state of affairs that has not yet
occurred. (*) So in order for an organism to be "goal-directed," its
conduct has to be informed, guided, or otherwise influenced by a condition
which does not metaphysically exist. In other words, its behavior has to be
determined by mediate (rather than immediate) forces. As far as I know,
this temporal gap can only be bridged by a mind. I.e., the organism must be
capable of foreseeing the goal and modifying its behavior accordingly. As
Rand has argued, a goal is only possible to a being with alternatives. As I
have argued, alternatives are only applicable to a being with free will.
Granting this, it follows that a goal must be chosen. And any action is
intended if it is preceeded by a conscious choice to do it.
This is probably not the best way to explain things. To me it makes more
sense to start at a point of agreement between us: that some human actions
are intended. Once we have defined what it means for a human to intend
something, we can then see if the concept is applicable to other lifeforms.
Following this method, it doesn't take long to see that an action must be
premeditated in order for it to have been intended.
(*) In Rand's "famous footnote," she claims that an organism is
"goal-directed" in the sense that its actions /result/ in the preservation
of its life. This is nonsense. A goal is not a result, it is something
which has not yet resulted. (In homage to her, I address this issue in a
footnote of my own. 8-))
--CHuRL
Eric Dennis
> said, consult the Big Bang theory as many understand it: the Big Bang is
> literally the point in a finite past that the universe sprang into
> being.
The Big Bang theory currently breaks down when the energy density of
the universe is greater than a certain amount. In fact the current
lack of a complete theory of quantum gravity precludes any description
of such states of the universe without a rather huge breakthrough in
physics generally. In particular, the Big Bang theory does not address
at all any philosophic question of the "origin" of the universe. As
the theory stands, it is completely irrelevant to any such philosophic
issue.
Churl Beck
[...]
> This is probably not the best way to explain things. To me it makes more
> sense to start at a point of agreement between us: that some human actions
> are intended. Once we have defined what it means for a human to intend
> something, we can then see if the concept is applicable to other
> lifeforms. Following this method, it doesn't take long to see that an
action
> must be premeditated in order for it to have been intended.
[...]
I got carried away here. I meant to say:
...To me it makes more sense to start at a point of agreement between us:
that some human actions are goal-oriented. Once we have defined what it
means for a human to have a goal, we can then see if the concept is
applicable to other lifeforms. Following this method, it doesn't take long
to see that an action must be premeditated in order for it to qualify as a
goal.
--CHuRL
Ian Campbell
db4a0$77de1b3f@res0h7s0>...
> #1. Ethics. A good place to start is with Rand's "is-ought" derivation
> from "The Objectivist Ethics." IMO, Rand's whole argument rests on her
> contradictory uses of the word "value." She starts by saying that value
> "presupposes an answer to the question: of value to /whom/ and for /what/
> [purpose]?" [VOS, 16] (The word "purpose" is only implied here. However,
> she is more explicit about it elsewhere: "An objective theory [of value]
> does not permit...the separation of 'value' from 'purpose'..." [CUI, 22]
> "'Value' presupposes...a purpose..." [AS, 1012]) Later on in the essay she
> says that everything that lives must pursue values--from a heart that beats
> to a plant that grows. Yet in a footnote she denies that these things are
> purposive, so in what sense can they be said to have values at all?
Hello...
We are not watching the critters to find out what is valuable, we are
watching them to find out what valuing is. We are born with exactly
zero concepts. We haven't a clue about even the possibility of grading
options to make a decision or of basing the decision according to a
desired outcome.
When we watch the plants and animals, whether they know what they're
doing doesn't matter. The fact is that their actions *result* is the
preservation of life. This gives the appearance of acting toward a
goal and allows us to form the concept of such. In actual truth, they
are likely just bio-computers, the concept of acting toward a goal is
only really possible to us.
The key point about this essay is that it's an epistemological
argument. She doesn't say "It is only life that makes value possible."
she says "It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of
'Value' possible." We do not look in reality to find an example of a
value, we look to find the very concept "value."
When we do find it (when the animals show it to us and we abstract
from their actions), we find that we can't further abstract 'Life'
from the definition. This means that though we are free to choose
whatever ethical system we want, no system may violate Life. Not
because Life is an observed good, but because the whole concept of
valuing per se rests on it. Just like the whole of Epistemology and
Logic rest on Identity, in that same sense.
> #2. Epistemology. Next look at Rand's theory of concepts and whether or
> not she is able to apply it consistently. She defines a concept as "a
> mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing
> characteristc(s), with their particular measurements omitted." [ITOE, 13]
> In the following chapter she tries to illustrate this principle by offering
> a definition of "furniture." She says furniture is any "Movable man-made
> objects intended to be used in a human habitation, which can support the
> weight of the human body or support and/or store other, smaller objects."
> [ITOE, 22]
>
> Now, I challenge anyone to identify furniture's "distinguishing
> characteristic." In other words, what is it that all furniture has in
> common, according to this definition? To be sure, all pieces of furniture
> must be objects, they must be moveable, they must be man-made, and they must
> be intended to be used in a human habitation. However, this in itself is
> too broad to be useful as a definition of furniture (if this is all that
> there was to it, then silverware would be furniture, for example). But
> beyond that, what Rand has actually done is say that furniture can be any
> one of *three* things: (a) it can support the weight of a human body, (b) it
> can support other, smaller objects, or (c) it can store other, smaller
> objects. Realize that she is not saying that there are three seperate
> concepts; she is saying that there is one concept which can be any of three
> things. Which is to say that two pieces of furniture do not have to possess
> the *same* distinguishing characteristc(s).
You are looking for one thing (an essence) which will both unite all
furniture and simultaneously distinguish it from everything else, but
that is not what the theory says.
It says that all the members of the concept must have one thing in
common, but not that that same thing must also serve to distinguish
the concept from all others.
Each concept has a *list* of "Distinguishing Characteristics" which
together distinguish the members of the set from everything else, so
the use of words like "or" is fine. Only one of these characteristics,
the Conceptual Common Denominator (CCD) has to be common across all
the members, and it alone does not have to do the differentiation (it
does the uniting).
The CCD is the furniture example is "large objects inside a human
habitation." (p.22)
[...]
> #3. Metaphysics. Rand claims that a metaphysically-given fact "cannot be
> changed." [PWNI, 27] Then she calls a mountain a metaphysically-given fact
> and says that it can be blown up. [PWNI, 31].
In the first quote she says "metaphysically given" and only in the
second she says "metaphysically given fact".
The metaphysically given is the Law of Identity (and its corollary the
Law of Causality) and can not be changed. A metaphysically given
"fact" or "natural phenomenon" or "flood" is a physical manifestation
which resulted purely from these laws with no human intervention.
You can't alter the metaphysical laws, you're stuck with them, but you
can alter a fact that resulted from them. To use Rand's examples you
could dam the flood source or blow up the mountain.
Cheers,
--
Ian Campbell
George Dance
>
> > It has often been argued that these assertions are mutually
> > inconsistent:
> >
> > 1. "Right are conditions of existence required by man's nature for his
> > proper survival." ("Man's Rights, Vos 1964, 95)
> >
> > 2. "As for his neighbours, his rights impose on him no obligations
> > except of a *negative* kind: to abstain from violating his rights."
> > (ibid)
> >
> > 3. "A morality that holds *need* as a claim, holds emptiness -
> > non-existence - as its standard of value." (AS 1957, 1032)
>
> In the context of (1) and (2) I would think that "need" in (3) equals
> entitlement. If so, I think that they are consistent.
I agree that Rand was probably thinking of (what are now called)
entitlements as needs, but not that this saves her foundation of
rights from her own criticism. What she needs is an argument that,
because I need rights, others should respect them, and because others
need rights, I should respect theirs; and that is missing. Maybe she
considered it too obvious to mention; but that is always a bad
assumption to make when righting on philosophy.
George Dance
> I have heard that there have been contradictions within Objectivism for
> years now. Yet every person I have asked to explain this, doesn't. I
> think the most that I have heard is that the premises are not backed up
> properly. I was wondering if any of you know the argument (preferably
> better than I do), and can either explain the truths to them, or explain
> where they go wrong.
>
> disappointing as the responses that I get from people.
>
On further looking, I've found another triplet of sentences that
appears to entail a contradiction, and would appreciate comments:
" The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
" The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
" Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and today has
the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
self-interest." (104; eio)
David Tomlin
> On further looking, I've found another triplet of sentences that
> appears to entail a contradiction, and would appreciate comments:
> " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
>
> " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
> " Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and today has
> the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> self-interest." (104; eio)
I don't see a contradiction. The decision to invade the tyranny
is made by a vote of the people's representatives, not by a single
person.
There is a problem with the fiction that every individual "delegates"
to the government the "right" to do things from which a particular
individual dissents, but that applies to domestic issues as well.
The obvious example is whether murderers should be executed.
Jim Austin
It's not at all apparent to me where the contradictions are. I'm
afraid it will take some explanation.
Show me.
Jim Austin
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
John Shafto
news:6312c50b.02041...@posting.google.com...
> What she needs is an argument that, because I need rights,
> others should respect them, and because others
> need rights, I should respect theirs; and that is missing.
I believe what she offered in it's stead is:
Because others need me to have rights, they should
respect them, and because I need others to have rights,
I should respect theirs.
John Shafto
>
> I got carried away here. I meant to say:
>
> ...To me it makes more sense to start at a point of agreement between us:
> that some human actions are goal-oriented. Once we have defined what it
> means for a human to have a goal, we can then see if the concept is
> applicable to other lifeforms. Following this method, it doesn't take long
> to see that an action must be premeditated in order for it to qualify as a
> goal.
We are only allowed to use the word 'goal' in the context of
human volitional ends? Why?
(ain't equivocation/semantics fun :)
John Shafto
> John Shafto wrote:
>
> >> "Intent" is solely an epistemological term.
> > Let me ask it more concisely:
> > Why do 'goal' and 'purpose' have to signify 'intent'?
>
> Good question. The short answer is that a goal (by definition) is
> "something that somebody wants to achieve."
Or, "the end toward which effort is directed" (by definition).
If you want to say that 'directed' signifies 'intent', I will
simply ask why again. Genes direct their lifeforms in
many ways (physically and mentally).
> The long answer is that a goal is a state of affairs that has not yet
> occurred. (*) So in order for an organism to be "goal-directed," its
> conduct has to be informed, guided, or otherwise influenced by a
> condition which does not metaphysically exist.
Okay.
> In other words, its behavior has to be determined by mediate
> (rather than immediate) forces.
I don't follow this. A 'mediate force' would be one that shows
indirect causation, and you are saying that this intermediate force
has to be determining behavior. What is causing this 'mediate force',
or are you saying that the behavior is the mediate force
(that can only be determined by 'intent')?
> As far as I know, this temporal gap can only be bridged by a mind.
Or plants, which bridge 'temporal gaps' everyday, like when
they point their leaves toward the east before sunrise (a row of
sunflowers are amazing things to behold :).
> I.e., the organism must be capable of foreseeing the goal and
> modifying its behavior accordingly.
Why? Can't it just be programmed to do something that usually
leads toward some consistent end?
> As Rand has argued, a goal is only possible to a being with alternatives.
I don't think she has argued that.
(In TOE, the part that is footnoted says the opposite, which is
the very reason for the footnote, to clarify her use of terms.)
> As I have argued, alternatives are only applicable to a being with free will.
> Granting this, it follows that a goal must be chosen. And any action is
> intended if it is preceeded by a conscious choice to do it.
I'm not convinced.
> This is probably not the best way to explain things. To me it makes more
> sense to start at a point of agreement between us: that some human actions
> are intended. Once we have defined what it means for a human to intend
> something, we can then see if the concept is applicable to other lifeforms.
> Following this method, it doesn't take long to see that an action must be
> premeditated in order for it to have been intended.
Why get hung up on what 'intent' is? I am trying to figure out
why there is no distinction between goals/purposes that
are conciously intended, and those that aren't. If those
words cannot label the ends of plants, what does?
Are we to say that plants have no goals, and if so,
what do we call 'the ends that they are directed toward'?
Must we use that phrase only?
> (*) In Rand's "famous footnote," she claims that an organism is
> "goal-directed" in the sense that its actions /result/ in the preservation
> of its life. This is nonsense. A goal is not a result, it is something
> which has not yet resulted. (In homage to her, I address this issue in a
> footnote of my own. 8-))
A goal can be an end, or place toward which actions are directed,
or it can be something that someone has as an aim or intent.
Why should we eliminate the former usage of the word?
What should we call Goalposts, "the place where everyone aims
to kick the ball posts"?
Churl Beck
>> ...a goal (by definition) is "something that somebody
>> wants to achieve."
>
> Or, "the end toward which effort is directed" (by definition).
>
> If you want to say that 'directed' signifies 'intent', I will
> simply ask why again. Genes direct their lifeforms in
> many ways (physically and mentally).
Suppose that you are playing darts. As you take aim and throw, the dart is
directed toward a bullseye. In this case we can (rightly) say that you
intend to hit the bullseye, or that your goal is to hit the bullseye.
Now suppose that you are playing pinball. The ball is launched and begins
to roll down the playfield. The pinball is consistent in its movement
toward the gutter. (Even when you try to stop it with your flippers, it
eventually turns around and heads back toward you.) So is the pinball
"goal-directed?" Is it actually being directed by a long-range goal, or is
it directed by range-of-the-moment mechanical forces? Is the pinball
exerting "effort?"
[...]
>> In other words, its behavior has to be determined by mediate
>> (rather than immediate) forces.
>
> I don't follow this. A 'mediate force' would be one that shows
> indirect causation and you are saying that this intermediate force
> has to be determining behavior. What is causing this 'mediate force',
> or are you saying that the behavior is the mediate force
> (that can only be determined by 'intent')?
Understand that there is no causation of any kind if there is nothing to do
the causing. As I already said, a goal is a state of affairs that does not
yet exist. Therefore a goal cannot physically impell an organism to behave
differently (in the way that one billiard ball physically impells another).
However, an organism can cause itself to behave differently in relation to a
goal *if* it is able to conceptualize that goal. It is this self-modifying
behavior that I call a mediate cause.
[...]
>> I.e., the organism must be capable of foreseeing the goal and
>> modifying its behavior accordingly.
>
> Why? Can't it just be programmed to do something that usually
> leads toward some consistent end?
The answer is no, for reasons already covered.
>> As Rand has argued, a goal is only possible to a being with
>> alternatives.
> I don't think she has argued that.
You're kidding, right? "Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values
are possible." [VOS, 16] Does the "immortal robot" ring a bell?
> (In TOE, the part that is footnoted says the opposite, which is
> the very reason for the footnote, to clarify her use of terms.)
Well, I don't see how the two thoughts oppose each other, but I never said
that Rand was immune from contradictions.
>> As I have argued, alternatives are only applicable to a being with free
>> will. Granting this, it follows that a goal must be chosen. And any
>> action is intended if it is preceeded by a conscious choice to do
>> it.
>
> I'm not convinced.
My argument that alternatives are impossible without choice can be found in
the link that I provided earlier. If you want to address that specifically
we can discuss it.
>> Following this method, it doesn't take long to see that an action must
>> be premeditated in order for it to have been intended.
>
> Why get hung up on what 'intent' is? [...]
This was a mistake that I made when I wrote the message. I amended it in my
follow-up.
> If those words cannot label the ends of plants, what does?
> Are we to say that plants have no goals, and if so,
> what do we call 'the ends that they are directed toward'?
> Must we use that phrase only?
They aren't directed toward ends at all. Just as the Earth isn't directed
toward the end of revolving around the sun. It is just something that it
does.
> A goal can be an end, or place toward which actions are directed,
> or it can be something that someone has as an aim or intent.
> Why should we eliminate the former usage of the word?
Nothing I have said would change how the word is used. It would only change
how it is misused.
> What should we call Goalposts, "the place where everyone aims
> to kick the ball posts"?
I dunno, John. But the last time I watched a sports game, the players in it
were intentionally trying to score points. Unless that has changed
recently, I think the word "goalposts" will work just fine.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
[...]
>> ...To me it makes more sense to start at a point of agreement between us:
>> that some human actions are goal-oriented. Once we have defined what it
>> means for a human to have a goal, we can then see if the concept is
>> applicable to other lifeforms. Following this method, it doesn't take
>> long to see that an action must be premeditated in order for it to
>> qualify as a goal.
>
> We are only allowed to use the word 'goal' in the context of
> human volitional ends? Why?
I didn't say anything of the kind. I proposed a method of discovering
criteria for deciding whether something did or did not qualify as a "goal."
FWIW, I believe that there are many animals that are perfectly capable of
pursuing goals. That's why I usually limit the discussion to plants.
> (ain't equivocation/semantics fun :)
You must think so, considering that I never said what you claim that I did.
--CHuRL
Churl Beck
> Hello...
Hi.
> We are not watching the critters to find out what is valuable, we
> are watching them to find out what valuing is.
I agree. This seems to be exactly what Rand was trying to communicate.
[...]
> In actual truth, they are likely just bio-computers, the
> concept of acting toward a goal is only really
> possible to us.
Again I agree.
> The key point about this essay is that it's an epistemological
> argument. She doesn't say "It is only life that makes value
> possible." she says "It is only the concept of 'Life' that
> makes the concept of 'Value' possible."
Here I emphatically disagree. For instance, she says that "Metaphysically,
life is...a value..." [VOS, 18] In fact the entire first part of her essay
seems to be directed toward proving this point.
[...]
> You are looking for one thing (an essence) which will both unite all
> furniture and simultaneously distinguish it from everything else, but
> that is not what the theory says.
>
> It says that all the members of the concept must have one thing in
> common, but not that that same thing must also serve to distinguish
> the concept from all others.
[...]
Sorry, but I think you're just wrong on this point. Rand says unambiguously
that the units of a concept must "possess the same distinguishing
characteristc(s)" [ITOE, 13].
>> #3. Metaphysics. Rand claims that a metaphysically-given fact "cannot be
>> changed." [PWNI, 27] Then she calls a mountain a metaphysically-given
>> fact and says that it can be blown up. [PWNI, 31].
>
> In the first quote she says "metaphysically given" and only in the
> second she says "metaphysically given fact".
[...]
What's the difference? She says that the metaphysically-given cannot be
changed. Presumably a metaphysically-given fact is metaphysically given, is
it not?
> The metaphysically given is the Law of Identity (and its corollary the
> Law of Causality) and can not be changed. A metaphysically given
> "fact" or "natural phenomenon" or "flood" is a physical manifestation
> which resulted purely from these laws with no human intervention.
[...]
No, according to Rand, "Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs
without human participation, is the metaphysically given..." [PWNI, 27] She
says that the metaphysically-given cannot be changed, not that what cannot
be changed is the metaphysically-given.
--CHuRL
John Shafto
to the last part of your reponse, the senses of the
word 'goal'. I will respond here by parts, but the
crux is at the end.
"Churl Beck" <churl...@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:003601c1e73b$e9acfec0$88de1b3f@res0h7s0...
> John Shafto wrote:
>
> >> ...a goal (by definition) is "something that somebody
> >> wants to achieve."
> >
> > Or, "the end toward which effort is directed" (by definition).
> >
> > If you want to say that 'directed' signifies 'intent', I will
> > simply ask why again. Genes direct their lifeforms in
> > many ways (physically and mentally).
>
> Suppose that you are playing darts. As you take aim and throw, the dart is
> directed toward a bullseye. In this case we can (rightly) say that you
> intend to hit the bullseye, or that your goal is to hit the bullseye.
I understand that there is this sense of the word, what I am
trying to understand is why you seem to want this to be the
*only* sense of the word.
> Now suppose that you are playing pinball. The ball is launched and begins
> to roll down the playfield. The pinball is consistent in its movement
> toward the gutter. (Even when you try to stop it with your flippers, it
> eventually turns around and heads back toward you.) So is the pinball
> "goal-directed?" Is it actually being directed by a long-range goal, or is
> it directed by range-of-the-moment mechanical forces? Is the pinball
> exerting "effort?"
What does this have to do with what we are talking about?
Pinballs are not alive. Here you are again muddling
the distinction between animate (living) and inanimate
things. Pinballs can only react to the external forces of the
moment, but living things (even determined ones) can span
'temporal gaps', succeeding in reaching their 'goals' by virtue
of this ability. Since pinballs don't reproduce, we will never
see them changing their behavior/form toward some end
as we do with living things. Pinballs are not driven to continue
their existence in any state, nothing but living things do that.
> [...]
> >> In other words, its behavior has to be determined by mediate
> >> (rather than immediate) forces.
> >
> > I don't follow this. A 'mediate force' would be one that shows
> > indirect causation and you are saying that this intermediate force
> > has to be determining behavior. What is causing this 'mediate force',
> > or are you saying that the behavior is the mediate force
> > (that can only be determined by 'intent')?
>
> Understand that there is no causation of any kind if there is
> nothing to do the causing.
> As I already said, a goal is a state of affairs that does not yet exist.
It doesn't matter how many times you say it, you need to explain
why we should eliminate all but your narrow use of the word.
To what advantage? Maybe your biggest complaint with Rand here
is that she didn't use enough words, or that the english language
doesn't have enough words to be very clear about the concepts
that they label.
> Therefore a goal cannot physically impell an organism to behave
> differently (in the way that one billiard ball physically impells another).
I don't know about billard balls, but plants do behave in ways (now)
that will benefit them in the future, no conceptualization at all, just
past success that leads to future (modified) behavior.
> However, an organism can cause itself to behave differently in relation to a
> goal *if* it is able to conceptualize that goal. It is this self-modifying
> behavior that I call a mediate cause.
Many forms of life are self-modifying, and have no brains at all.
What external force drives a plant to grow? You seem to be
suggesting that only a conciousness can cause life.
<snip>
> >> As Rand has argued, a goal is only possible to a being with
> >> alternatives.
> > I don't think she has argued that.
>
> You're kidding, right? "Where no alternative exists, no goals and no values
> are possible." [VOS, 16] Does the "immortal robot" ring a bell?
Okay, so a plant has no choice, it must live if it can, and
like the 'immortal robot', can have no values or 'goals' in
your preferred sense of the word (intent) without volition.
What of the other senses of the word (see below), which
we all use, and Rand also used in TOE?
<snip>
> > If those words cannot label the ends of plants, what does?
> > Are we to say that plants have no goals, and if so,
> > what do we call 'the ends that they are directed toward'?
> > Must we use that phrase only?
>
> They aren't directed toward ends at all. Just as the Earth isn't directed
> toward the end of revolving around the sun. It is just something that it
> does.
Gravity is not life, nor is the earth self-propelled.
Please make this distinction, or explain why you see no difference.
> > A goal can be an end, or place toward which actions are directed,
> > or it can be something that someone has as an aim or intent.
> > Why should we eliminate the former usage of the word?
>
> Nothing I have said would change how the word is used.
> It would only change how it is misused.
But you didn't explain why the first sense is 'misuse' of
the word 'goal'.
> > What should we call Goalposts, "the place where everyone aims
> > to kick the ball posts"?
>
> I dunno, John. But the last time I watched a sports game, the players in it
> were intentionally trying to score points. Unless that has changed
> recently, I think the word "goalposts" will work just fine.
Right. There are definately three senses of the word that I see,
but I am not sure you see. I will list them here, and then I hope
you will explain to me why certain senses should not exist.
Let's stick with the football metaphor.
1. A player has a 'goal'
(with concious intent, because he is human).
2. A player reaches the 'goal' (a place).
3. A player scores a 'goal' (an act and/or result).
You seem to only acknowledge the first sense.
We started this discussion by me asking why the
first sense must presuppose intent (or volition). I don't
think it does, but we got lost here in the 2nd and 3rd senses
as you were picking another nit from TOE.
I still think that unconcious (non-volitional) living things
can have a 'goal' from a concious/human perspective,
because they strive to continue their existence.
Even plants have alternatives at some level (if not volitional),
because they consistently "choose" to do the things that
continue their existence (live). Inanimate objects, rolling down
a hill or whatever, do not have goals though, because they
are not self-directed.
Gravity has no choice, it just is. Matter and energy have
no choice either, they just are (always in some form), and
they only change forms to settle in their most stable states
(never changing their behavior), but life "wants" to exist, it is
self-generating and self-directed, it goes against the grain
of the matter and energy it is made of, seeking a less stable
state. It fights the universe everyday. Life has a 'goal', to exist,
no volition (intent) is necessary though.
Churl Beck
[...]
> Pinballs can only react to the external forces of the moment, but
> living things (even determined ones) can span 'temporal gaps',
> succeeding in reaching their 'goals' by virtue of this ability.
[...]
Please explain. How can a determined entity react to long-range forces
without using conceptualization?
>> As I already said, a goal is a state of affairs that does not yet exist.
>
> It doesn't matter how many times you say it you need to explain why
> we should eliminate all but your narrow use of the word.
[...]
Well, you wanted me to explain what I meant by a "mediate force," so I
hardly think that you should object when I try to answer.
>...no conceptualization at all, just past success that leads to
> future (modified) behavior. [...]
What do you mean? Learning? Evolution?
> You seem to be suggesting that only a conciousness can
> cause life.
No, I am suggesting that only a consciousness can pursue goals. You are
confusing your belief (that all life is goal-directed) with mine (that
it is not).
> Okay, so a plant has no choice, it must live if it can, and
> like the 'immortal robot', can have no values or 'goals' in
> your preferred sense of the word (intent) without volition.
> What of the other senses of the word (see below), which
> we all use, and Rand also used in TOE?
I'll answer this question below. But really the other senses of the
word don't matter, because Rand didn't use them. I mean, if we forget
about goals for a moment, it is still true that Rand believed that
plants have values, and she explicitly stated that values presuppose
purpose. (Of course, most of the time she only implied it, but that was
probably wise.) So--contrary to what she said in her footnote--she
still attributed purposive behavior to plants, and that is at issue
here.
> Gravity is not life, nor is the earth self-propelled.
> Please make this distinction, or explain why you see no difference.
Because if a goal is literally just a result, then what makes it
different from any other result? (A result is a result is a result.)
The only difference between them is in how those results are obtained.
For instance, let's say that an apple falls off a tree and lands on the
ground. Now instead suppose that a person picks that apple off of the
tree and places it on the ground. In both cases the results are the
same (there is an apple on the ground), but in only one of those cases
was there a goal involved.
[...]
> A goal can be an end, or place toward which actions are directed,
> or it can be something that someone has as an aim or intent.
> Why should we eliminate the former usage of the word?
>
>> Nothing I have said would change how the word is used.
>> It would only change how it is misused.
>
> But you didn't explain why the first sense is 'misuse' of
> the word 'goal'.
Nor should I need to, considering that I never said that it was a misuse
of the word.
> Right. There are definately three senses of the word that I see,
> but I am not sure you see. I will list them here, and then I hope
> you will explain to me why certain senses should not exist.
>
> Let's stick with the football metaphor.
>
> 1. A player has a 'goal'
> (with concious intent, because he is human).
> 2. A player reaches the 'goal' (a place).
> 3. A player scores a 'goal' (an act and/or result).
>
> You seem to only acknowledge the first sense.
[...]
No, but I only think that the first sense is relevant to this
discussion. Or to be more precise, I would say that the other two uses
of the word are conceptually derived from the first. IOW, it only makes
sense to talk about players reaching a goal (as in #2) because it is
their goal to reach it (as in #1). Likewise, we would not talk about
scoring goals (as in #3) if the players did not have that as their goal.
I simply do not think that the latter can be divorcd from the former.
> I still think that unconcious (non-volitional) living things
> can have a 'goal' from a concious/human perspective,
> because they strive to continue their existence.
> Even plants have alternatives at some level (if not volitional),
> because they consistently "choose" to do the things that
> continue their existence (live). Inanimate objects, rolling down
> a hill or whatever, do not have goals though, because they
> are not self-directed.
>
> Gravity has no choice, it just is. Matter and energy have
> no choice either, they just are (always in some form), and
> they only change forms to settle in their most stable states
> (never changing their behavior), but life "wants" to exist, it is
> self-generating and self-directed, it goes against the grain
> of the matter and energy it is made of, seeking a less stable
> state. It fights the universe everyday. Life has a 'goal', to exist,
> no volition (intent) is necessary though.
Very well put. But if a plant is not volitional, then why do you
describe its behavior in terms of choice? I know you put quotes around
that, but what meaning are you hoping to convey by it? It is my
contention that concepts such as "goal" and "alternative" cannot be
understood apart from choice, which is precisely why I argue that
non-volitional lifeforms cannot be goal-directed. In that respect you
seem to be confirming my argument. So how do you define choice and how
do you distinguish it from "choice?"
--CHuRL
--
Posted via Mailgate.ORG Server - http://www.Mailgate.ORG
George Dance
3fe8...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance wrote
>
> > On further looking, I've found another triplet of sentences that
> > appears to entail a contradiction, and would appreciate comments:
>
> > " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> > decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
> >
> > " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> > to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
> >
> > the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> > Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> > self-interest." (104; eio)
>
> I don't see a contradiction. The decision to invade the tyranny
> is made by a vote of the people's representatives, not by a single
> person.
OK; they're not only people, but also representatives.
As people, they don't have a right to invade the tyranny at their
discretion, as no one has that right (by I). So they have to have
that right as representatives.
But they don't have any rights as representatives, except those that
are delegated to them by the people. But people can delegate only
rights that they have. If no person has the right to invade the
tyranny at his discretion, he cannot delegate that right to a
representative. So no representative has that right as a
representative, either.
> There is a problem with the fiction that every individual "delegates"
> to the government the "right" to do things from which a particular
> individual dissents, but that applies to domestic issues as well.
> The obvious example is whether murderers should be executed.
This claim that rights are delegated isn't meant as an historical
claim (I guess that's what you mean by 'fiction'), but as a moral
justification. If I have a right to kill someone who murders me, and
if I can delegate that right to a third party, then that third party
has the right to kill someone who murders me. It may be that I don't
want to kill someone who murders me, but if I have a right to, as part
of a general right of self-defence, and if I delegate that general
right to a government, then it still has the right.
(I recognize the problems with that view: since I never explicity
delegated any rights to government, then government is free to
interpret this general right as it chooses. But that's a practical
problem rather than a logical one; it's possible to have such
delegation spelled out explicitly.
It's a different situation when it comes to me delegating a right that
I did not have in the first place. That is a logical impossibility.
George Dance
a00...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance wrote:
> > On further looking, I've found another triplet of sentences that
> > appears to entail a contradiction, and would appreciate comments:
>
> > " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> > decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
>
> > " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> > to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
>
> > " Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and today has
> > the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> > Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> > self-interest." (104; eio)
>
> It's not at all apparent to me where the contradictions are. I'm
> afraid it will take some explanation.
>
> Show me.
1. No person has a right to use force at his discretion (ie, he has a
right to use 'discretionary force').
2. No government has any rights that have not been delegated it to by
its citizens.
3. Some governments have a right to use force solely at their
discretion (ie, they do have a right to use 'discretionary force')
If 2 and 3 are true, then some governments have a right to use
discretionary force, and for them to have it it had to have been
delegated to them by their citizens. But no one can delegate a right
he does not have. So those citizens must have had a right to use
discretionary force, and therefore 1 is false.
If 1 and 2 are true, then no persons have a right to use discretionary
force, so they cannot delegate it. But no government has any rights
that have not been delegated to it, so they cannot have a right to use
discretionary force, and therefore 3 is false.
If 1 and 3 are true, then no persons have a right to use discretionary
force, including the citizens of a free nation. Yet the latter's
governments do have such a right. Therefore those governments have
rights other than those delegated to them by their citizens, and
therefore 2 is false.
There is no way to make all 3 premises true, except by the claim that
a person can delegate a right he does not have. Which sounds like
nonsense.
Resijinth
> a person can delegate a right he does not have. Which sounds like
> nonsense.
I've made the same argument for nuclear weaponary. Either no
government has a right to nuclear weaponary, or any citizen has a
right to nuclear weaponary, or the government has rights that the
citizens never had.
What if I want to delegate myself as my own government? Make the
nation of Resijinth consisting soley of myself? Would I then have the
same rights that a government has?
Resijinth
> watching them to find out what valuing is. We are born with exactly
> zero concepts. We haven't a clue about even the possibility of grading
> options to make a decision or of basing the decision according to a
> desired outcome.
>
We are NOT born on a blank slate. We have some instincts and some
preprogrammed ideals. The only thing which distinguishes us from other
animals is that it is in our very nature that we can be reprogrammed,
at least at a young age.
David Tomlin
> If no person has the right to invade the
> tyranny at his discretion, he cannot delegate that right to a
> representative. So no representative has that right as a
> representative, either.
According to my dictionary, "arbitrary" means "at individual
discretion." That would mean that any decision taken by two
or more people would not be arbitrary.
I don't think that's a good definition, by the criterion of
capturing common usage. But what matters is what Rand intended.
I don't think there is any doubt she would consider a lynch mob
to be as arbitrary as any lone vigilante.
In context, it is clear that decisions made by the legal processes
of a legitimate government are not arbitrary, in the sense Rand
intended. The vote of a legislature to declare war is not arbitrary,
any more than the sentence of a jury.
Also, Rand is not saying that no one ever has the right to use
force by arbitrary decision. The word "right" does not appear in
the statement "the use of force against one man cannot be left
to the arbitrary decision of another." The context of that
statement is a discussion that begins "If men are to live together
in a peaceful, productive, rational society . . ." She is not
talking about fundamental rights, but about the internal requirements
of a well-governed state.
A good example is the time Ross Perot employed mercenaries to get
his people out of Iran. The thugs in charge of Iran were not sharing
a civil society with us. We were in a Lockean "state of nature" with
respect to them. The "arbitrary decision" statement does not apply
in that context.
Jim Austin
> Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<bc3dd28f.0204162106.7
> a00...@posting.google.com>...
> > George Dance wrote:
> > > On further looking, I've found another triplet of sentences that
> > > appears to entail a contradiction, and would appreciate comments:
> > > " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> > > decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
> > > " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> > > to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
> > > " Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and today has
> > > the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> > > Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> > > self-interest." (104; eio)
> > It's not at all apparent to me where the contradictions are. I'm
> > afraid it will take some explanation.
> > Show me.
> 1. No person has a right to use force at his discretion (ie, he has a
> right to use 'discretionary force').
The statement was: "The use of physical force--even its retaliatory
use--cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens." ("The
Nature of Government", VOS)
That means government laws specify when individuals may use force, as
in when they have reason to belive they need to defend themselves.
> 2. No government has any rights that have not been delegated it to by
> its citizens.
The statement was: "The source of the government's authority is 'the
consent of the governed.'" (Same source.)
Close enough, I suppose.
> 3. Some governments have a right to use force solely at their
> discretion (ie, they do have a right to use 'discretionary force')
I have no idea where that came from.
Rand did say, "Since the protection of individual rights is the only
proper purpose of a government, it is the only proper suject of
legislation..."
<Snip> Analysis based on Dance's misstatements of Rand's positions.
Jim Austin
Ian Campbell
a3a60$88de1b3f@res0h7s0>...
> > The key point about this essay is that it's an epistemological
> > argument. She doesn't say "It is only life that makes value
> > possible." she says "It is only the concept of 'Life' that
> > makes the concept of 'Value' possible."
>
> Here I emphatically disagree. For instance, she says that "Metaphysically,
> life is...a value..." [VOS, 18] In fact the entire first part of her essay
> seems to be directed toward proving this point.
You're right - she clearly does say "metaphysically." She names the
epistemological argument I was talking about in the very next
sentence, but I no longer think it's the main thrust. The
epistemological argument just follows from correctly forming concepts
based on the metaphysical situation.
"Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself:
a value gained and kept by a constant process of action.
Epistemologically, the concept of 'value' is genetically dependent
upon and derived from the antecedent concept of 'life.'"
[VOS top p18]
> > You are looking for one thing (an essence) which will both unite all
> > furniture and simultaneously distinguish it from everything else, but
> > that is not what the theory says.
> >
> > It says that all the members of the concept must have one thing in
> > common, but not that that same thing must also serve to distinguish
> > the concept from all others.
> [...]
>
> Sorry, but I think you're just wrong on this point. Rand says unambiguously
> that the units of a concept must "possess the same distinguishing
> characteristc(s)" [ITOE, 13].
If you consider "functionality" to be a measurable aspect of a thing,
then "support the weight of the human body or support and/or store
other, smaller objects" can be collapsed down to measurements of one
aspect: functionality - and you no longer have three disjoint sets.
"The distinguishing characteristics of 'furniture' are a specified
range of functions in a specified place (both are measurable
characteristics): 'furniture' must be no larger than can be placed
inside a human habitation, no smaller than can perform the specified
functions, etc."
[ITOE 22]
> > In the first quote she says "metaphysically given" and only in the
> > second she says "metaphysically given fact".
> [...]
>
> What's the difference? She says that the metaphysically-given cannot be
> changed. Presumably a metaphysically-given fact is metaphysically given, is
> it not?
I was taking it as not. A metaphysically given is a thing at the
metaphysical level, a metaphysically given fact is a thing at the
physical level.
A metaphysically given fact is distinguished from other facts at the
physical level in that it came about purely due to the action of
metaphysical laws with no human help.
In that sense it is special in that it could not have been any other
way due to no randomness being injected by humans. She is trying to
separate out the things in reality which it makes sense to judge or
evaluate from those that it does not.
> > The metaphysically given is the Law of Identity (and its corollary the
> > Law of Causality) and can not be changed. A metaphysically given
> > "fact" or "natural phenomenon" or "flood" is a physical manifestation
> > which resulted purely from these laws with no human intervention.
> [...]
>
> No, according to Rand, "Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which occurs
> without human participation, is the metaphysically given..." [PWNI, 27] She
> says that the metaphysically-given cannot be changed, not that what cannot
> be changed is the metaphysically-given.
But here she says "event" - which is a physical thing again, the same
as saying "fact" earlier.
--
Ian Campbell
Ian Campbell
722f...@posting.google.com>...
> > [...] We are born with exactly zero concepts. [...]
>
> We are NOT born on a blank slate. We have some instincts and some
> preprogrammed ideals. The only thing which distinguishes us from other
> animals is that it is in our very nature that we can be reprogrammed,
> at least at a young age.
Being born with the ability to suckle or wiggle your toes is not the
same as being born with concepts. Concepts are noticing similarities
in objects you observe and then naming the similarity. You haven't
observed any objects prior to being born. If you even see anything at
all it would be a dark, undifferentitated environment seen through
underdeveloped eyes.
If by "preprogrammed ideals" you mean that we are born with knowledge
of good or rightness then I would have to disagree with that.
--
Ian Campbell
Darien
with sociological concepts blah dee blah...i find it interesting
because i agree and disagree entirely; i believe that we are not born
with concepts however i believe that one must first define concept. i
do not believe that it lies in similarities within objects; rather
that it lies in predicated beliefs proposed by a figure of importance
that a younger, less influential figure will either choose to follow
or ignore; objectivism, in this sense, seem to me an abstract notion,
considering that if we are not born on a blank slate-then what are we
born on? I ask those that argue the case for this 'objective'(?)
rather misanthropic-individual vs the powers of the state-what kind of
slates do you believe you were born on; i speculate that you were
probably born into a seemingly Orwellian universe, however, if you
hadn't been would you not feel a little different? i know that i have
been born into a world wherein the 'blank-slate' concept seems much of
an ideal rather than a reality, however, i am also pretty sure that if
i had been born in the wilderness somewhere, born like a 'Kasper
Hauser' of sorts, things would have been very different; which leads
me to the end of this statement; i believe that we are all born on a
blank slate, however this is blemished with those impassable marks of
imperfection like instinct and the inherent ability to be violent;
yes, these things
Churl Beck
[...]
> If you consider "functionality" to be a measurable aspect of a thing,
> then "support the weight of the human body or support and/or store
> other, smaller objects" can be collapsed down to measurements of
> one aspect: functionality - and you no longer have three disjoint sets.
>
> "The distinguishing characteristics of 'furniture' are a specified
> range of functions in a specified place (both are measurable
> characteristics): 'furniture' must be no larger than can be placed
> inside a human habitation, no smaller than can perform the
> specified functions, etc." [ITOE 22]
That's certainly an original answer. But I don't think that you can say
that all pieces of furniture are functional in the same respect. At
best you could say that furniture is "functional for reclining or
functional for supporting and/or storing small objects." If you try to
break it down in terms of the specific measurements, then I see no
reason to believe that you wouldn't end up with three distinct sets of
measurements.
[...]
>> Presumably a metaphysically-given fact is metaphysically given,
>> is it not?
>
> I was taking it as not.
On its face this claim is very hard to swallow. It's like saying that a
red car is not red.
> A metaphysically given is a thing at the metaphysical level, a
> metaphysically given fact is a thing at the physical level.
I think you're reading too far into it, but I will concede the point if
you can demonstrate that Rand herself made this distinction.
[...]
> She is trying to separate out the things in reality which it makes
> sense to judge or evaluate from those that it does not.
Correct. But also note that she says: "that which is proper to the life
of a rational being is the good; that which negates, opposes or destroys
it is the evil." [VOS, 25] By this standard, an erupting volcano is
evil, and it really doesn't matter whether it is metaphysically given or
not. Rand's problem was that she was unable to distinguish evaluative
statements ("that is bad") from normative ones ("you shouldn't do
that"). So she thought that there as no point to evaluating the
metaphysically given--to her it is like trying to "deal with nature by
persuasion" [PWNI, 32] Of course, saying that one cannot evaluate a
volcano is just as ridiculous as saying that a volcano is evil.
>> No, according to Rand, "Any natural phenomenon, i.e., any event which
>> occurs without human participation, is the metaphysically given..."
>> [PWNI, 27]
>
> But here she says "event" - which is a physical thing again, the same
> as saying "fact" earlier.
True. And if Rand thought that "the metaphysically given" was different
from "a metaphysically given fact," then she would have used the latter
term instead. But she didn't.
George Dance
94c...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance wrote:
>
> > Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<bc3dd28f.0204162106.7
> > a00...@posting.google.com>...
> > > George Dance wrote:
> > > > " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> > > > decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
>
> > > > " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> > > > to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
>
> > > > " Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and today has
> > > > the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> > > > Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> > > > self-interest." (104; eio)
>
> > > It's not at all apparent to me where the contradictions are. I'm
> > > afraid it will take some explanation.
>
> > > Show me.
>
> > 1. No person has a right to use force at his discretion (ie, he has a
> > right to use 'discretionary force').
>
> The statement was: "The use of physical force--even its retaliatory
> use--cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens." ("The
> Nature of Government", VOS)
No, the quoted sentence reads, in full: "Whether his neighbors'
intentions are good or bad, whether their judgement is rational or
irrational, whether they are motivated by a sense of justice or by
ignorance or by prejudice or by malice - the use of force against one
man cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of another." (VoS 1964,
109)
> That means government laws specify when individuals may use force, as
> in when they have reason to belive they need to defend themselves.
No, it is a statement about when a person may use force against
another at his own discretion, and Rand's answer is: never. It's not
a statement about laws, because it's meant to justify the laws in the
first place.
>
> > 2. No government has any rights that have not been delegated it to by
> > its citizens.
>
> The statement was: "The source of the government's authority is 'the
> consent of the governed.'" (Same source.)
No, the quoted statement reads, in full: "This means that the
government is not the /ruler/' but the /agent/ of the citizens; it
means that the government as such has no rights /except/ the rights
delegated to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (VoS 110;
emphasis in original)
> Close enough, I suppose.
You managed to find the right page. Try reading the whole page, and
you'll be sure to come across this quotation.
> > 3. Some governments have a right to use force solely at their
> > discretion (ie, they do have a right to use 'discretionary force')
>
> I have no idea where that came from.
The quoted statement reads, in full: " Any free nation had the /right/
to invade Nazi Germany and today has the /right/ to invade Soviet
Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen. Whether a free nation chooses to
do so or not is a matter of its own self-interest." (VoS, 104; eio)
Since you can find p. 110 of VoS, an easy way to find p. 104 is to go
to that page, and then turn two of the left-hand-pages from the left
side of the book over to the right side.
>
> Rand did say, "Since the protection of individual rights is the only
> proper purpose of a government, it is the only proper suject of
> legislation..."
She also said: "Howard Roark laughed." So what?
> <Snip>
After you've succeeded in finding the quotes, you may have something
to say about them.
Jim Austin
> Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<bc3dd28f.0204240704.4
> 94c...@posting.google.com>...
> > George Dance wrote:
> > > Jim Austin <b...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
> > > news:<bc3dd28f.02041...@posting.google.com>...
> > > > George Dance wrote:
> > > > > " The use of force against one man cannot be left to the arbitrary
> > > > > decision of another." (VoS 1964, 109)
> > > > > " The government as such has no rights except the rights /delegated/
> > > > > to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (110; eio)
> > > > > " Any free nation had the /right/ to invade Nazi Germany and toda
> > > > > y has
> > > > > the /right/ to invade Soviet Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen.
> > > > > Whether a free nation chooses to do so or not is a matter of its own
> > > > > self-interest." (104; eio)
> > > > It's not at all apparent to me where the contradictions are. I'm
> > > > afraid it will take some explanation.
> > > > Show me.
> > > 1. No person has a right to use force at his discretion (ie, he has a
> > > right to use 'discretionary force').
> > The statement was: "The use of physical force--even its retaliatory
> > use--cannot be left at the discretion of individual citizens." ("The
> > Nature of Government", VOS)
> No, the quoted sentence reads, in full: "Whether his neighbors'
> intentions are good or bad, whether their judgement is rational or
> irrational, whether they are motivated by a sense of justice or by
> ignorance or by prejudice or by malice - the use of force against one
> man cannot be left to the arbitrary decision of another." (VoS 1964,
> 109)
It doesn't mean that a person can never use force under any circumstances.
It means that government laws specifies when it's OK to use force.
> > That means government laws specify when individuals may use force, as
> > in when they have reason to belive they need to defend themselves.
> No, it is a statement about when a person may use force against
> another at his own discretion, and Rand's answer is: never.
Dance should explain what he thinks "at his own discretion" adds to
the sentence.
I think it means the final decision as to whether it's justified.
Consider the following situation that I once heard about:
A man arrived home late at night intoxicated. He was unable to
get in his house through the front door. He thus decided to
climb in through a window. In going to a window, be became
disoriented and ended up going through a window of his neighbor's
house. The neighbor, mistaking him for a burglar, shot and killed
him.
The police investigated, and the incident was ruled "justifiable
homicide."
It's apparent that the neighbor had some discretion in deciding
whether or not to shoot someone entering his window. He didn't
have to call anybody to get permission to shoot, but his decision
was subject to review by the government.
> It's not a statement about laws, because it's meant to justify
> the laws in the first place.
It is a statement about laws. It is meant to justify laws, but it's
also meant to describe the purpose of laws.
> > > 2. No government has any rights that have not been delegated it to by
> > > its citizens.
> > The statement was: "The source of the government's authority is 'the
> > consent of the governed.'" (Same source.)
> No, the quoted statement reads, in full: "This means that the
> government is not the /ruler/' but the /agent/ of the citizens; it
> means that the government as such has no rights /except/ the rights
> delegated to it by the citizens for a specific purpose." (VoS 110;
> emphasis in original)
> > Close enough, I suppose.
> You managed to find the right page. Try reading the whole page, and
> you'll be sure to come across this quotation.
I did.
> > > 3. Some governments have a right to use force solely at their
> > > discretion (ie, they do have a right to use 'discretionary force')
> > I have no idea where that came from.
> The quoted statement reads, in full: " Any free nation had the /right/
> to invade Nazi Germany and today has the /right/ to invade Soviet
> Russia, Cuba or any other slave pen. Whether a free nation chooses to
> do so or not is a matter of its own self-interest." (VoS, 104; eio)
It is typical of Rand's critics to take one of her perfectly clear
statements and restate it in a vague form, a form more amenable to
equivocation, often distorting it beyond all recognition. This would
be such a case.
> Since you can find p. 110 of VoS, an easy way to find p. 104 is to go
> to that page, and then turn two of the left-hand-pages from the left
> side of the book over to the right side.
Whatever.
> > Rand did say, "Since the protection of individual rights is the only
> > proper purpose of a government, it is the only proper suject of
> > legislation..."
> She also said: "Howard Roark laughed." So what?
Disingenuous and unresponsive.
> > <Snip>
> After you've succeeded in finding the quotes, you may have something
> to say about them.
Ho hum.
Jim Austin