For Owl and User: comment on moral anti-realism
Luka Yovetich
"moral anti-realism". Later in the discussion he pointed me to Owl's website
and, specifically, his pages on subjectivist morality. On one of those pages
I found this:
"There are, then, four possible forms of anti- realism:
(1) Moral claims do not assert propositions.
(2) Moral claims assert false propositions.
(3) Moral claims assert propositions that are neither true nor false.
(4) Moral claims assert propositions whose truth depends on some
attitudes of
observers."
Since User claims that my moral theory isn't actual a moral theory but
rather a form of moral anti-realism, I thoughtit might be interesting to see
if it matches with any of the claims listed above.
In short, my theory is that the only sense in which a person must do
anything is for the purpose of achieving a goal. There are absolutely no
unchosen obligations. Obligations only arise out of set goals. Thus, I use
the words "should" and "ought" as synonymous with "need" in reference to a
goal. An example of a moral claim that I would make is:
"If you want to live a happy life, then you should eat some food."
How does that match up?
1) Does that assert a proposition? Yes. It is a proposition.
2) Does that imply that all moral propositions are false? No. If "should"
means "need", then the statement is not false.
3) Does it assert a proposition which is neither true nor false? No. If
"should" just means "need", then the proposition above is true.
4) Does the claim depend on any attitudes of observers? No. The statement is
true regardless of the attitudes of observers.
So, measured by Owl's criterion on his site, my moral claim is not an
example of moral anti-realism. Perhaps there are other ways in which it is
but I haven't heard of them yet so I can't really address that.
Also, Owl might have been defining "moral claims" as something completely
different than the example I give above. In this case, it could be that my
theory which includes the claim that there are no unchosen obligations
doesn't qualify as a moral theory in Owl's view. If this is the case, I azm
interested in hearing what his definition of "moral theory" is.
Any comments?
--Luka
Bert Clanton
Luka Yovetich <lu...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> In my discussion with User about morality he brought up the concept of
> "moral anti-realism". Later in the discussion he pointed me to Owl's website
> and, specifically, his pages on subjectivist morality. On one of those pages
> I found this:
>
> "There are, then, four possible forms of anti- realism:
> (1) Moral claims do not assert propositions.
> (2) Moral claims assert false propositions.
> (3) Moral claims assert propositions that are neither true nor false.
> (4) Moral claims assert propositions whose truth depends on some
> attitudes of
> observers."
>
Cool.
But I'd say that
1) Any expression of the form "X is good" can be intended in either of
two ways:
a) *Valuatively*, to evoke a feeling of positive regard on the part
of the addressee toward its referent, in which case it is equivalent in
intended interpretation to an expression like "X? Hooray!", or "Approve
of X!", and is neither true nor false. If this is what you mean by a
moral claim, then I'm a non-realist.
b) *Descriptively*, to evoke in its addressee a supposition that
its referent X satisfies the criteria for approval-worthiness embodied
in some moral theory held in common by the originator and the
addressee, in which case it is a statement of fact, but is such only
relative to some particular moral system. Here IMHO moral realism is
still a supportable position if, but only if, there are "good reasons"
for choosing one moral system over others. I believe that this is the
case. At this level, then, I'm a moral realist.
2) Any expression of the form "One ought to perform act Y in
circumstances C" can be intended in either of two ways:
a) *Prescriptively*, to evoke in its addressee an inclination to
perform its referent act Y, in which case it is equivalent in intended
interpretation to an expression like "Do Y!", and is again neither true
nor false. Again, if this is what you mean by a moral claim, I'm a
moral non-realist.
b) *Descriptively*, to evoke in its addressee a supposition that its
referent act Y satisfies the criteria for performance-worthiness
embodied in the assumed moral system. There is again a fact of the
matter about whether Y actually satisfies those criteria. But here
again IMHO moral realism is supportable if and only if there are "good
reasons" for choosing one moral system over another. I think that there
are, and so at this level I'm a moral realist.
> Since User claims that my moral theory isn't actual a moral theory but
> rather a form of moral anti-realism, I thoughtit might be interesting to see
> if it matches with any of the claims listed above.
>
> In short, my theory is that the only sense in which a person must do
> anything is for the purpose of achieving a goal.
Rather than "for the purpose of achieving a goal", I'd say "as an
objective causal pre-requisite for collective survival and health and
flourishing".
> There are absolutely no
> unchosen obligations.
But individual and collective *needs* are not chosen: they are
objective facts concerning what it takes to survive, function well, and
flourish. So needs-based obligations, in this sense, are not chosen.
> Obligations only arise out of set goals.
I disagree. I think that obligations arise out of needs--not needs in
the sense of what it takes to attain personal goals, but needs in the
sense of what it takes to promote individual *and collective* survival,
effective functioning, and flourishing.
> Thus, I use
> the words "should" and "ought" as synonymous with "need" in reference to a
> goal.
I use the words "should" and "ought", in their *descriptive* moral
sense, to refer to what must be done to promote personal and collective
survival, effective functioning, and flourishing--not with respect to
attaining egocentric personal goals.
> An example of a moral claim that I would make is:
>
> "If you want to live a happy life, then you should eat some food."
>
> How does that match up?
>
I'd agree--bot not on the same grounds that you would. IMHO, that isn't
a *moral* claim.
> 1) Does that assert a proposition? Yes. It is a proposition.
Yup.
> 2) Does that imply that all moral propositions are false? No. If "should"
> means "need", then the statement is not false.
Yup.
> 3) Does it assert a proposition which is neither true nor false? No. If
> "should" just means "need", then the proposition above is true.
Yup.
> 4) Does the claim depend on any attitudes of observers? No. The statement is
> true regardless of the attitudes of observers.
>
Yup.
> So, measured by Owl's criterion on his site, my moral claim is not an
> example of moral anti-realism. Perhaps there are other ways in which it is
> but I haven't heard of them yet so I can't really address that.
>
But of course Owl might properly say, "But in the first place, that
isn't a *moral* claim, and in the second place, that's a "hypothetical
imperative", and ultimately you have to justify a hypothetical
imperative by appeal to some "categorial imperative", such as "You
ought to want to live".
> Also, Owl might have been defining "moral claims" as something completely
> different than the example I give above.
As would almost any moral theorist, including Rand herself.
> In this case, it could be that my
> theory which includes the claim that there are no unchosen obligations
> doesn't qualify as a moral theory in Owl's view. If this is the case, I azm
> interested in hearing what his definition of "moral theory" is.
>
I would guess that it would be much more like mine than like yours.
Best wishes,
Bert
Owl
news:MPxA6.4335$GB2.3...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
> In short, my theory is that the only sense in which a person must do
> anything is for the purpose of achieving a goal. There are absolutely no
Are some goals better than others? If so, what makes them better?
Luka Yovetich
Owl wrote in message <9b0ia9$dia$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>...
If you are asking if some ~ultimate goals~ are better than others, then I
would have to say no. Although I have trouble imagining someone wanting
anything more than happiness, I'll just concede that I can't be sure that
~nobody~ feels that way.
Certainly though, given an ultimate goal, some less important goals are
better than others. But only in an instrumental way.
--Luka
Churl Beck
> ...I have trouble imagining someone wanting anything
> more than happiness, I'll just concede that I can't be sure that
> ~nobody~ feels that way.
Can happiness ever properly be a goal? It seems to me that happiness is the
result of successfully achieving a goal. If so, then the only way to be
happy is by acheiving a goal, and the only way to achieve this particular
goal is by being happy. Thus it is self-defeating.
One counter-argument to this might be that, even though happiness is an
ultimate goal, one should still recognize that there are lesser goals by
which it is achieved. But even so, isn't it true that the strength of an
emotional response is proportionate to the perceived importance of the goal?
Aren't lesser goals therefore less rewarding? And is it reasonable to
expect one to take pride in an involuntary physiological response anyway?
If that is the goal, why not simply turn to drugs?
--CHuRL
Les Cargill
Churl Beck wrote:
>
<snip>
> If that is the goal, why not simply turn to drugs?
"Because drugs are hippie shit, and hippie shit sucks" - South Park (Cartman,
I think).
>
> --CHuRL
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
Churl Beck <nep2...@gte.net> wrote in message
news:Kz5B6.2939$VS2.2...@dfiatx1-snr1.gtei.net...
> One counter-argument to this might be that, even though happiness is an
> ultimate goal, one should still recognize that there are lesser goals by
> which it is achieved. But even so, isn't it true that the strength of an
> emotional response is proportionate to the perceived importance of the
goal?
> Aren't lesser goals therefore less rewarding? And is it reasonable to
> expect one to take pride in an involuntary physiological response anyway?
> If that is the goal, why not simply turn to drugs?
Drugs don't let you experience fully, what it is to be human.
Being human, that is exercising your mind in pursuit of goals brings a
happiness that cannot be faked. For an example of this, a lone golfer can
pretend he made a hole in one, but he cannot fake the emotion he would have
had from the actual achievement. We are made that way for our survival.
Happiness is the motivator for reaching goals, and it's reward.
--
Arnold
Luka Yovetich
Churl Beck wrote in message ...
>Luka Yovetich wrote:
>
>> ...I have trouble imagining someone wanting anything
>> more than happiness, I'll just concede that I can't be sure that
>> ~nobody~ feels that way.
>
>Can happiness ever properly be a goal? It seems to me that happiness is
the
>result of successfully achieving a goal. If so, then the only way to be
>happy is by acheiving a goal, and the only way to achieve this particular
>goal is by being happy. Thus it is self-defeating.
I don't agree with this. Happiness seems to ~sometimes~ accompany the
achievement of a goal. But other times achieving a goal (cheating on one's
wife or ,aking money for itsown sake) can lead to unhappiness. And I think
that it isn't best to define happiness by how you think it is achieved (if
that's what you're doing). Rather, I think it better to define it as "a
positive emotional state" or "a state of enjoying one's life" or something
like that. In the end, we basically need to resort to an almost ostensible
definition due to the fact that happiness is experienced perceptually (we
literally ~feel~ happiness).
>One counter-argument to this might be that, even though happiness is an
>ultimate goal, one should still recognize that there are lesser goals by
>which it is achieved. But even so, isn't it true that the strength of an
>emotional response is proportionate to the perceived importance of the
goal?
>Aren't lesser goals therefore less rewarding? And is it reasonable to
>expect one to take pride in an involuntary physiological response anyway?
Again, the attainment of goals aren't the only thing that brings one
happiness. Not in the sense that you seem to be saying. We also have
psychological needs such as pleasure, visibility, etc. which can give us
happiness even if we are not consciously pursuing them. To be clear, they
may be things that our actions bring us but the happiness that we get from
them aren't ~soley~ due to the fact that we understand that we purposively
achieved them. It seems that we are just hard-wired to enjoy them. Also, I
don't see the problem pursuing physical pleasure ~reagardless~ of whether or
not one feels pride in achieving them. We always can have other things we
can be proud of.
>If that is the goal, why not simply turn to drugs?
I don't see what's wrong with ~some~ amount of ~some~ drugs. But, certainly,
if one wants long-term happiness, then becoming a heroin addict isn't the
best way to achieve one's goal.
--Luka
Luka Yovetich
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message ...
>
>Drugs don't let you experience fully, what it is to be human.
>Being human, that is exercising your mind in pursuit of goals brings a
>happiness that cannot be faked.
So why can't one just do drugs some of the time and pursue goals others? I
know a lot of seemingly happy people who sometimes drink or smoke pot or do
other drugs. Are you saying that ALL drug use is inimical to happiness?
--Luka
Robert J. Kolker
Luka Yovetich wrote:
>
> I don't agree with this. Happiness seems to ~sometimes~ accompany the
> achievement of a goal.
What good is happiness? Happiness can't buy money.
Bob Kolker
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
I would say that any drug taken for the purpose of dulling your mind is
destructive in the long run. I enjoy a good wine, and the occasional beer
when hot and thirsty. Alcohol is a drug, so clearly I believe there are
benefits from it's use. It is essential to realise that there is a
difference between one who drinks alcohol for the express purpose of getting
stoned, to one who consumes it as an essential component of a pleasant
drink. In moderation, wine can be good for you.
If one smoked pot for medical reasons, that too is a different mentality to
one who just enjoys tuning out from reality. Getting stoned as a goal, is an
affront to reasonableness. Anyone who is cold sober is unlikely to enjoy the
company of
those who's minds are not firing on all cylinders.
--
Arnold
SANDRAMEND
I don't drink. I don't smoke. I don't do drugs. But reading Arnold makes me
want to do all three.
I always feel so sorry for Objectivists. They know less about having fun than
White Anglo Saxon Protestants.
Makes me want to go hang out with hedonistic types.
Sandra ;-)
Luka Yovetich
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message ...
>
>Luka Yovetich <lu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
>news:0FdB6.679$Pj2....@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net...
>>
>> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou wrote in message ...
>> >
>> >Drugs don't let you experience fully, what it is to be human.
>> >Being human, that is exercising your mind in pursuit of goals brings a
>> >happiness that cannot be faked.
>>
>> So why can't one just do drugs some of the time and pursue goals others?
I
>> know a lot of seemingly happy people who sometimes drink or smoke pot or
>do
>> other drugs. Are you saying that ALL drug use is inimical to happiness?
>
>I would say that any drug taken for the purpose of dulling your mind is
>destructive in the long run. I enjoy a good wine, and the occasional beer
>when hot and thirsty. Alcohol is a drug, so clearly I believe there are
>benefits from it's use. It is essential to realise that there is a
>difference between one who drinks alcohol for the express purpose of
getting
>stoned, to one who consumes it as an essential component of a pleasant
>drink. In moderation, wine can be good for you.
Right. But can't we agree that it is possible to have a drink or smoke some
pot for the ~pleasure~ of it? I don't think that everyone who drinks or
smokes does it to dull their mind. That's just a side effect. Alcohol and
marijuana can make one's body tingle with pleasure and can also take the
edge off. It's just a matter of how much you do these things that is of real
significance. Too much can make one miserable.
>If one smoked pot for medical reasons, that too is a different mentality to
>one who just enjoys tuning out from reality. Getting stoned as a goal, is
an
>affront to reasonableness. Anyone who is cold sober is unlikely to enjoy
the
>company of
> those who's minds are not firing on all cylinders.
True. But we're not talking about getting stoned all of the time. And it can
be nice to be high on pot or beer with close friends.
--Luka
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
>
>
> Right. But can't we agree that it is possible to have a drink or smoke
some
> pot for the ~pleasure~ of it? I don't think that everyone who drinks or
> smokes does it to dull their mind. That's just a side effect. Alcohol and
> marijuana can make one's body tingle with pleasure and can also take the
> edge off. It's just a matter of how much you do these things that is of
real
> significance. Too much can make one miserable.
As I said, I enjoy wine. I have had many a blind tasting with my friends, to
see how well we judge. Perhaps the wine relaxes us, but that isn't why _I_
drink it.
I honestly don't like the feeling of being drunk. It makes me feel clumsy
and numb. I don't get a buzz or tingle, but admit I feel a certain loss of
focus.
That such loss of focus is a benefit, may depend on the situation, such as
being unable to stop thinking of something negative. For driving, it is a
detriment.
--
Arnold
Arnold Broese-van-Groenou
SANDRAMEND <sandr...@aol.comsf> wrote in message
news:20010413025817...@ng-mk1.aol.com...
> Is fun-loving Objectivist an oxymoron?
>
> I don't drink. I don't smoke. I don't do drugs. But reading Arnold makes
me
> want to do all three.
>
> I always feel so sorry for Objectivists. They know less about having fun
than
> White Anglo Saxon Protestants.
Oh come on Sandra, there is no reason to think I don't have fun. I just
don't get it in ways you might enjoy. Would it help if I told you I was a
fan of the _Goon Show_, or is that too silly for you?
--
Arnold
Luka Yovetich
I'm interested in how you would classify my theory. In your opinion, is it
moral anti-realism or ethical subjectivism? Or is it something esle
altogether? Basically, I hold that one's ultimate goal is a subjective
choice and what one should do (read: must do) is based on the objectively
identifiable means to that goal.
Below is my response to a post of yours. You were responding to a previous
post of mine. (Just in case you didn't get it.)
Owl wrote in message <9b0ia9$dia$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>...
>"Luka Yovetich" <lu...@earthlink.net> wrote in message
If you are asking if some ~ultimate goals~ are better than others, then I
would have to say no. Although I have trouble imagining someone wanting
anything more than happiness, I'll just concede that I can't be sure that
~nobody~ feels that way.
Certainly though, given an ultimate goal, some less important goals are
Owl
> I'm interested in how you would classify my theory. In your opinion, is it
> moral anti-realism or ethical subjectivism? Or is it something esle
> altogether? Basically, I hold that one's ultimate goal is a subjective
> choice and what one should do (read: must do) is based on the objectively
> identifiable means to that goal.
I don't know how to classify your view, since I think it is unclear or
inconsistent. My classification of the five possible kinds of meta-ethical
theories includes only consistent theories.
As far as I can understand it, your position is that
1. It is true that one should do the things that are effective for achieving
one's ultimate goal.
2. It is not true that one *should* pursue any ultimate goal.
Jesus 1DE7
>From: Owl a@a.a
>Date: 4/18/01 5:32 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <9bl4ma$hj4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>
>As far as I can understand it, your position is that
>1. It is true that one should do the things that are effective for achieving
>one's ultimate goal.
>2. It is not true that one *should* pursue any ultimate goal.
Let it also be known that Luka uses "should" such that:
"I should do X" is equivalant to "X is necessary for the achievement of some
implicit goal" or something. He isn't saying that you should do what achieves
your goals, he claims that that is simply what should means, or something.
-User
Luka Yovetich
Owl wrote in message <9bl4ma$hj4$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>...
Yeah. And by "should" I just mean "need to". That's why in my last post I
wrote that you should read "should" as "must". But I guess that isn't
entirely clear.
>2. It is not true that one *should* pursue any ultimate goal.
Right. Absent any ultimate goal one doesn't need to pursue anything. Does
that make my position clearer? How would you label it in light of my
comments here?
--Luka
Owl
> >As far as I can understand it, your position is that
> >1. It is true that one should do the things that are effective for
> achieving
> >one's ultimate goal.
> >2. It is not true that one *should* pursue any ultimate goal.
Or, in other words, your position seems to be: There are instrumental
values, but no intrinsic values.
> Right. Absent any ultimate goal one doesn't need to pursue anything. Does
> that make my position clearer? How would you label it in light of my
> comments here?
Well, one might consider it to be ethical subjectivism, because an action is
made right by one's simply choosing to pursue a certain ultimate end.
Luka Yovetich
Owl wrote in message <9bn6th$30a$1...@slb4.atl.mindspring.net>...
Okay. Thanks. So, could you tell me how my position is different from moral
anti-realism? User keeps telling me that that's what category he thinks my
position falls into. Or are you saying that the categories overlap in some
way?
Thanks,
Luka
Luka Yovetich
Owl
> Okay. Thanks. So, could you tell me how my position is different from
moral
> anti-realism? User keeps telling me that that's what category he thinks my
> position falls into. Or are you saying that the categories overlap in some
> way?
Realists believe there are objective values. Anti-realists deny this. There
are 3 forms of anti-realism.
1. Ethical subjectivists and relativists hold that values are subjective.
2. Non-cognitivists hold that value statements are neither true nor false.
3. Nihilists hold that value statements are all false.
There are 2 forms of realism.
1. Naturalists hold that values are reducible to objective, natural
(non-moral) properties.
2. Intuitionists hold that values are objective, irreducible properties.