Survival Qua Man
David Tomlin
the definition: that which is required for man's survival _qua_
man. It does not mean a _momentary_ or a merely _physical_
survival."
She goes on at some length about the meaning of survival qua
man. However, I do not see that she ever makes the meaning
clear.
But there is a much worse problem with this passage. It
presents us with a fallacy of equivocation, which completely
undermines Rand's argument.
This was demonstrated very effectively by Michael Huemer (aka Owl)
in his critique of TOE. This is at
http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand5.htm
Below I have reproduced, with some editing, Huemer's summary
of Rand's argument and his comments on this point.
- - -
1. Value is agent-relative; things can only be valuable for particular
entities. premise
2. Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces
alternatives. premise
3. No non-living things face any alternatives. premise
4. Therefore, values exist only for living things. from 1,2,3
5. Anything an entity acts to gain or keep is a value for that entity.
premise
6. Every living thing acts to maintain its life, for its own sake.
premise
(7. There is no other thing that they act to gain or keep for its own
sake.) implicit premise
8. Therefore, its own life, and nothing else, is valuable for its own
sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
9. Therefore, life and nothing else is valuable for its own sake. from
4,8
(10. Everyone should always do whatever promotes what is valuable for
himself.) implicit premise
11. Therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own
life. from 8,10
12. A person can live only if he is rational. premise
13. Therefore, everyone should be 100% rational. from 11,12
Some time after getting to step 9 in her argument, Rand introduces the
idea of "the life of man qua man" (hereafter, MQM).
Let's distinguish, then, between life qua existence (hereafter, LQE)
and MQM. LQE means simply one's continued literal survival--i.e., life
in the sense of not being dead (what everyone else means by "life").
MQM is something more than that--the kind of life proper to a rational
being.
If "life" in the argument means LQE, then Rand cannot switch over to
MQM as her standard of value and claim that she gave an argument for
it; she only gave an argument for LQE. On the other hand, if we assume
"life" means MQM throughout the argument, then the premises preceding
step 11 that mention life or living are all false: 3 will be false,
because many entities that do not possess life MQM face alternatives.
4 is false similarly. 6 is false, because most living things do not
have MQM life. Moreover, it is clear that Rand meant LQE, since she
starts off the argument by saying the only fundamental alternative is
that of existence or non-existence.
- - -
On hpo I have seen occasional claims that Huemer's critique
has been rebutted. My search turned up a few such responses,
but not, I think, the best of them. I guess I'm not very good
at using that damned search engine. Anyway, if this issue has
already been beaten to death, I would appreciate being pointed
to the threads.
Eudaimonus
"David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com> wrote in message
news:c61bab99.02042...@posting.google.com...
> On hpo I have seen occasional claims that Huemer's critique
> has been rebutted. My search turned up a few such responses,
> but not, I think, the best of them. I guess I'm not very good
> at using that damned search engine. Anyway, if this issue has
> already been beaten to death, I would appreciate being pointed
> to the threads.
Well, I don't know about if it has, but it can, and easily, though not
simply.
You see, it is not enough to mearly _exist_ to be alive - being alive is not
a matter of keeping yourself in existence. You can't go out of existence,
not compleately. Even when you die, you do not stop existing, you merely
stop being alive. That is to say, all of your matter remains, but just in a
different form. You go from being a human being to being a corpse - but all
of the atoms in your body remain. There has been no loss of matter, but, if
you will, only an increase in entropy.
Huemer's critique, and others who make essentially the same critique, rest
the alledgation of equivocation on an equivocation between simply existing,
and existing as a man. But being alive isn't a matter of existing, but
existing in a particular _form_. Indeed, there is no real alternative
between 'existing' and 'not existing', understood in the absolute sense,
nothing goes into or out of existence in that sense. What things do is
change their arrangement or form. When Rand refers to the choice of
existence versus non-existence facing a living thing, she is obviously
refering not to the choice between existing at all and not existing at all,
but between the _living_ existing or not existing.
Huemer sees Rand making an equivocation, only because he is foisting upon
her a false dichotomy, between a things existence, and what a thing is.
Rand's answer would be obvious here : Existence is Identity.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Sunday, April 21, 2002 1:15 AM
Subject: Survival Qua Man
> Below I have reproduced, with some editing, Huemer's summary
> of Rand's argument and his comments on this point.
> 1. Value is agent-relative; things can only be valuable for particular
As I see it (1) to (11) cover LQE. MQM is introduced (per Owl's sequence) at
(11) and (12).
A problem that I see is as follows:
(13) No one can be 100% rational. (premise)
(14) Irrationality is evil. (premise)
(15) Original sin is true. (13) and (14)
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Lon
.68919@rwcrnsc54>...
It may be possible to answer Huemer's critique, but what you
have written above does not do so. His claim is that in
establishing the earlier premises of the argument which he
gives she uses a standard of pursuing life which is different
than the standard she uses at the end of her argument. Your
response ridicules a third standard of existence which nobody
was using, and claim that Huemer has missed that she is
using the second of his standards of existence in her argument.
But he knows she is using that standard at the end of the
argument and you have not done anything to show that he is
wrong that she cannot be using it in the beginning part of the
argument.
His claim is that the early premises are only true if one
uses mere continued life, and the later premises are only true
if one means the kind of more meaningful existence which you
tout above. You could answer him by showing that the early
premises are true under the more robust sense of living, or
that his early premises are the wrong premises. But what you
give above talks past his argument rather than answering it.
Lon
David Tomlin
> But what you
> give above talks past his argument rather than answering it.
Exactly.
Thank you.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Actually the weakness in Owl's argument is typical of the problems with
complex deductive arguments and equally typical IMO of Owl's style of
debate. He neglects to mention the premises with which Rand attempts to
reconcile the standard of life used in the early part of the argument with
the standard of (11) and (12). The omitted premises are that entities act
according to their nature, that man's nature is to be rational, and that man
is volitional. When those premises are considered the same standard of life
applies though Rand's entire argument. However Rand does not escape Owl's
rap because he shows that Objectivist morality paints a bleak picture of
man: "All men are evil" (12).
As I have stated before, the error is assuming that man's nature is to be
rational. When it is recognized that the faculty of volition trumps the
faculty of reason then it becomes clear that man acts according to his
nature when he acts as a volitional being. That is why the only way to
reconcile human nature with Rand's doctrine of egoism is by regarding
respect for rights as a tactic rather than a principle which is mandated by
the nature of man.
Resijinth
> (11) and (12).
>
Don't you mean (12) and (13)?
> A problem that I see is as follows:
> (13) No one can be 100% rational. (premise)
> (14) Irrationality is evil. (premise)
> (15) Original sin is true. (13) and (14)
>
Wait, you made a big jump there. First off, I can understand
irrationality as being detrimental to life, but only a certain level
of irrationality can be anti-life, and thus evil. And second, original
sin has to do with the Garden of Eden, which is part of Christianity,
and to a greater extent, Judism. And, in fact, in a state where no
real choices exist, can you be said to have sinned, or acted
irrationally?
You are right that no person can be 100% rational. Just like there is
no such thing as a perfect circle actually existing. A circle may
exist, but a perfect circle does not exist. It has an identity, but it
does not exist. To exist, you must have an identity. But having an
identity doesn't mean you exist. Existence and nonexistence are part
of identity. The closest thing to not having an identity is to have an
unintelligeable identity. An identity which is flawed on its very
basic premises. I'll show you the case, of a triangle with an angle of
30 between the base and the side adjacent to the angle, and for which
the side is 4 cm in length, and the side opposite of the given 30
degree angle is 1 cm. Try constructing the triangle.
To this point, there are certain notions which are in contradiction
with themselves, either before or after applying other principals. In
this case, the laws of geometry preclude such a triangle from actually
existing, even in a universe where things like perfect circles and
exactly equilateral triangles actually could exist. It can't exist
mathematically, and since mathematics involves laws at the completely
fundamental level, an identity of such things is completely
unintelligable. At least, given the current coordinate system. I'm
sure that there's some weird, non-cartesian coordinate system where a
triangle of that sort can exist, but that's talking past the argument.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Resijinth" <Resi...@Yahoo.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2002 1:26 PM
Subject: Re: Survival Qua Man
> > As I see it (1) to (11) cover LQE. MQM is introduced (per Owl's
sequence) at
> > (11) and (12).
> >
>
> Don't you mean (12) and (13)?
> > A problem that I see is as follows:
> > (13) No one can be 100% rational. (premise)
> > (14) Irrationality is evil. (premise)
> > (15) Original sin is true. (13) and (14)
> >
>
> Wait, you made a big jump there. First off, I can understand
> irrationality as being detrimental to life, but only a certain level
> of irrationality can be anti-life, and thus evil.
Objectivism admits of irrational ideas which are not evil; but no man is
free from the evil kind. If everyone gets a pass based on good intentions,
subjectivity prevails.
> And second, original
> sin has to do with the Garden of Eden, which is part of Christianity,
> and to a greater extent, Judism.
Sin is to Judeo-Christian morality what "evil" is to Objectivist morality.
Same connotation.
>And, in fact, in a state where no
> real choices exist, can you be said to have sinned, or acted
> irrationally?
That is for Objectivist scholars to address. Perhaps living in such a state
is a protracted state of emergency, where you get a pass?
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Acar" <g...@d-g-s.com>
>
> > > As I see it (1) to (11) cover LQE. MQM is introduced (per Owl's
> sequence) at
> > > (11) and (12).
> >
> > Don't you mean (12) and (13)?
Yes. I meant 12 and 13. I screwed up those numbers in another reply as well.
Sorry.
x
Acar
> He neglects to mention the premises with which Rand attempts to
> reconcile the standard of life used in the early part of the argument with
> the standard of (11) and (12).
Make that (12) and (13).
>The omitted premises are that entities act
> according to their nature, that man's nature is to be rational, and that
man
> is volitional. When those premises are considered the same standard of
life
> applies though Rand's entire argument. However Rand does not escape Owl's
> rap because he shows that Objectivist morality paints a bleak picture of
> man: "All men are evil" (12).
That should be (13).
x
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George Dance
5196...@posting.google.com>...
> In "The Objectivist Ethics", Rand wrote "Such is the meaning of
> the definition: that which is required for man's survival _qua_
> man. It does not mean a _momentary_ or a merely _physical_
> survival."
>
> She goes on at some length about the meaning of survival qua
> man. However, I do not see that she ever makes the meaning
> clear.
That may be. But it's certainly clear that MQM is not 'momentary' but
long-range, and not merely 'physical' but something else. For the
sake of Huemer's argument, let's use Michael Huemer's definition
(moved from its place):
> Let's distinguish, then, between life qua existence (hereafter, LQE)
> and MQM. LQE means simply one's continued literal survival--i.e., life
> in the sense of not being dead (what everyone else means by "life").
> MQM is something more than that--the kind of life proper to a rational
> being
> But there is a much worse problem with this passage. It
> presents us with a fallacy of equivocation, which completely
> undermines Rand's argument.
>
> This was demonstrated very effectively by Michael Huemer (aka Owl)
> in his critique of TOE. This is at
> http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand5.htm
[also moved from below]
> On hpo I have seen occasional claims that Huemer's critique
> has been rebutted. My search turned up a few such responses,
> but not, I think, the best of them. I guess I'm not very good
> at using that damned search engine. Anyway, if this issue has
> already been beaten to death, I would appreciate being pointed
> to the threads.
I've written on Huemer's summary of Rand's 'argument', but not about
that 'argument' itself. My reason for not doing so previously, has
been even Huemer thinks it wasn't Rand's actual argument - he believes
she did not make one - but just something he's constructed,
paraphrasing statements she made, to demonstrate how illogical she is.
In short, it's a strawman.
As this demonstrates. First, Rand is careful to distinguish between
'physical survival' and living qua man, in her argument (as the above
quote shows); it's Huemer's paraphrase that introduces substitutes the
equivocal word 'life' in every step for both; his equivocal wording,
not hers.
Second, one can make an obvious argument from LQE to MQM, from the
text alone; an argument that Huemer ignores completely. [I've
inserted it below, in the square brackets]
snip
> 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its own
> sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> 9. Therefore, [LQE] and nothing else is valuable for its own sake. from
> 4,8
[9a. For a human being, LQE requires engaging in rational thought.
(premise)
[9b. Engaging in rational thought is living proper to a rational
being. (def.)
[9c. Living proper to a rational being is MQM. (def.)
[9d. Therefore, for a human being, MQM is necessary to LQE. (9a-c)
[9e. Whatever is necessary to realize a value is a value. (premise?
means-ends rule)
[9f. Therefore, MQM is valuable for a human. (8,9d,9e)]
> (10. Everyone should always do whatever promotes what is valuable for
> himself.) implicit premise
> 11. Therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own
> LQE]. from 8,10
[11b. Therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own
MQM.
(9f, 10)]
That's the connection between LQE and MQM which Huemer completely
ignores (ruling these steps of the argument out implicitly). He even
rules them out explicitly, by saying that Rand did not even introduce
the concept of rationality in this part of the argument (which
contradicts what he gives as her definition of MQM, BTW), and that she
introduced it only later, here:
> 12. A person can live only if he is rational. premise
> 13. Therefore, everyone should be 100% rational. from 11,12
In short, Huemer's charge of ambiguity rests on two assertions: first,
that Rand used the ambiguous word "life" for both LQE and MQM; and
second, that she did not try to prove the necessity for MQM from LQE,
but merely switched her definition of "life."
And, as I hope I've made clear, both those assertions are false and
even baseless, except perhaps in Huemer's fevered imagination.
Resijinth
> her a false dichotomy, between a things existence, and what a thing is.
> Rand's answer would be obvious here : Existence is Identity.
Okay. So, let us try this thought experiment on Existence and
Identity.
1. Posit a being, God, which by definition is a perfect being.
2. It is an imperfection to not exist. That is, existence is better
than non existence.
Therefore 3 (from 1 and 2) God, being a perfect being, must exist,
because to not exist would be to make him imperfect, and that goes
against his definition.
Let us assume 1 and 2 as premises, that is, let's exclude the fact
that they may be incorrect.
Since to Exist is the same as to have Identity, then doesn't 3
logically follow from 1 and 2?
I dare you to try to reject the argument for God (Which is the
Ontological argument, by the way) without resorting to such lame
excuses as "Then a perfect ANYTHING must exist".
I bet you can't do it without necessetating a distinction between
existence and identity, or esscence.
Resijinth
> even baseless, except perhaps in Huemer's fevered imagination.
Huemer is not infalliable. But he has provided rational proof against
Rand's idea of ethical egoism. Not that ethical egoism is incorrect,
but Huemer has shown that Rand is incompitent when it comes to actual
logic.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2002 8:59 PM
Subject: Re: Survival Qua Man
I can't help noticing how carefully you avoid the "according to his nature"
wording and fall back on the more ambiguous "proper to a rational being". It
is my understanding that Rand relied heavily on the argument of identity
("according to his nature") to justify the precedence of principle over LQE
without contradiction of "life as the standard". (If problem solving is just
a tool, the ability to problem solve can not trump LQE. "Qua man" is a
reference to identity.)
Unless I am mistaken, (13) is Owl's punch line. If so, that criticism is not
avoided by reconciling the LQE with MQM as you correctly claim that Rand
does. In either case (13) follows as a moral standard which contradicts the
Objectivist vision of what is possible to man.
Lon
3897...@posting.google.com>...
is provided by Huemer and not by Rand. If Huemer has failed
to capture her argument, how could he possibly have shown that
her argument is logically inept?
Lon
Symmetry
>Date: 4/23/02 4:05 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <b967c56d.02042...@posting.google.com>
>Okay. So, let us try this thought experiment on Existence and
>Identity.
>
>1. Posit a being, God, which by definition is a perfect being.
>2. It is an imperfection to not exist. That is, existence is better
>than non existence.
False. Nothing is better than anything else.
>1. Posit a being, God, which by definition is a perfect being.
>2. It is an imperfection to not exist. That is, existence is better
>than non existence.
>Therefore 3 (from 1 and 2) God, being a perfect being, must exist,
>because to not exist would be to make him imperfect, and that goes
>against his definition.
The argument in its entireity is awful. I haven't read the rest of the thread,
but I'll assume someone has already explained why to you. If not, you should
try to understand why on your own.
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Eudaimonus
"Resijinth" <Resi...@Yahoo.com> wrote in message
> > Huemer sees Rand making an equivocation, only because he is foisting
upon
> > her a false dichotomy, between a things existence, and what a thing is.
> > Rand's answer would be obvious here : Existence is Identity.
>
> Okay. So, let us try this thought experiment on Existence and
> Identity.
>
> 1. Posit a being, God, which by definition is a perfect being.
> 2. It is an imperfection to not exist. That is, existence is better
> than non existence.
> Therefore 3 (from 1 and 2) God, being a perfect being, must exist,
> because to not exist would be to make him imperfect, and that goes
> against his definition.
>
> Let us assume 1 and 2 as premises, that is, let's exclude the fact
> that they may be incorrect.
>
> Since to Exist is the same as to have Identity, then doesn't 3
> logically follow from 1 and 2?
No, it does not.
> I dare you to try to reject the argument for God (Which is the
> Ontological argument, by the way) without resorting to such lame
> excuses as "Then a perfect ANYTHING must exist".
> I bet you can't do it without necessetating a distinction between
> existence and identity, or esscence.
Of course I can. It is the idea of God, which has an identity and an
existence, however, the existence of a relationship between that idea and an
extent is external to the idea, even as postulate that such a relationship
exists is a neccessary part of the idea.
In other words, it's one thing to say that we must neccessarily concieve of
God as existing, and another to prove that it exists - not because of any
distinction between "existence" and "identity", but because the change from
"neccessarly concieved as" and "is" is a non-sequetor.
Gsnyquist
- - -
Besides the faulty logic, pointed out by others in this thread, there is a far
more serious problem: many of the premises are either false, misleading, or
irrelevant.
<< Something is valuable to an entity, only if the entity faces >>
Not true. Even someone completely controlled by outside (or inside) forces
could value some of the experiences forced upon him while abhoring others.
What he couldn't do is pursue any values.
<< Therefore, values exist only for living things. >>
True, but misleading. This premise is frequently interpreted as suggesting
that there is a logical or causal connection between life and value. Wrong.
Life is a precondition of values, but it's not their cause. Desire, emotion,
feeling is the cause of value. A perfectly indifferent individual, if such a
thing were possible, would be incapable of valuing anything.
<< Every living thing acts to maintain its life, for its own sake. >>
Usually true, but not always. Living creatures do hold things higher than
life. Evolutionary psychologists have found evidence suggesting that survival
of genes, whether one's own or a close relatives, may play a very significant
role in the motivation of animals.
<< Therefore, its own life, and nothing else, is valuable for its own
sake, for any living thing >>
Rand's biggest mistake. The only thing valuable for its own sake is the
satisfaction of some need or desire or sentiment. Life is merely a means
toward satisfying these emotions. Eudaemonism is the only moral morality.
<< A person can live only if he is rational >>
Another falsehood. At best, people only need to be rational about about issues
dealing with problems of imminent survival. But once this is attained, there
is ample room for irrationality. If human beings needed to be rational in
order to live, the human race would have gone extinct long ago.
Greg Nyquist
jrnyquist.com
homepage.mac.com/machiavel
Resijinth
Resijinth
Resijinth
> is provided by Huemer and not by Rand. If Huemer has failed
> to capture her argument, how could he possibly have shown that
> her argument is logically inept?
If you have failed to capture his argument, how can you possibly have
shown that his argument is logically inept?
Lon
552a...@posting.google.com>...
realize your reading comprehension was so poor or I
wouldn't have bothered to respond. You responded to
someone (I believe it was George Dance) who argued
that Owl's argument structure does not capture Rand's
actual argument. You seemed to accept this, (although
you may well have simply missed that to refute his claim
you need to give an argument or at least some reasons
to support your view). But given that you had not
answered the argument that Owl's argument doesn't
capture Rand's actual argument, your claim that Owl
had proven Rand's logically inept was something of
a non-sequitor. In general you cannot show that someones
argumentis inept by replacing it with a strawman and
defeating the strawman. Rand may well be logically
inept, but Owl did not show it unless he got her
argument right. If you can answer Dance's objection
to this claim by all means do so. Then you might be
justified in your claim that Owl proved Rand logically
inept. Otherwise your assertion is that Rand is
logically inept because Owl gave an argument that wasn't
hers and it was logically inept. This is not a great
proof.
Lon
Lon
cinci.rr.com>...
> > > 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its own
> > > sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> > >(10. Everyone should always do whatever promotes what is valuable for
> > > himself.) implicit premise
> > > 11. Therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own
> > > LQE]. from 8,10
> > > 12. A person can live only if he is rational. premise
> > > 13. Therefore, everyone should be 100% rational. from 11,12
> >
>
> Unless I am mistaken, (13) is Owl's punch line. If so, that criticism is not
> avoided by reconciling the LQE with MQM as you correctly claim that Rand
> does. In either case (13) follows as a moral standard which contradicts the
> Objectivist vision of what is possible to man.
>
If this is Owl's point then it is not a very good
response since 13 does not follow 11 and 12. The
actual conclusion should at best be that everyone
should always do whatever they can to promote their
rationality. But this is not a claim that most
objectivists would have a problem with. It is by no
means absurd. If Rand had actually managed to show
that then I think she would have a right to be proud
of her accomplishment.
The actual conclusion here might actually be weaker
since it is doubtful that the level of rationality
which is required by 10 actually requires such extreme
effort (as someone else noted in this thread. Life
does not require more than a minimal level of rationality.
You only have to look around you to see that that is
true.)
Lon
David Tomlin
the argument now. This is just the kind of thing I wanted to get
on hpo.
George Dance wrote
> David Tomlin wrote
> > In "The Objectivist Ethics", Rand wrote "Such is the meaning of
> > the definition: that which is required for man's survival _qua_
> > man. It does not mean a _momentary_ or a merely _physical_
> > survival."
> > She goes on at some length about the meaning of survival qua
> > man. However, I do not see that she ever makes the meaning
> > clear.
> That may be. But it's certainly clear that MQM is not 'momentary' but
> long-range, and not merely 'physical' but something else. For the
> sake of Huemer's argument, let's use Michael Huemer's definition
> (moved from its place):
> > Let's distinguish, then, between life qua existence (hereafter, LQE)
> > and MQM. LQE means simply one's continued literal survival--i.e., life
> > in the sense of not being dead (what everyone else means by "life").
> > MQM is something more than that--the kind of life proper to a rational
> > being
> > But there is a much worse problem with this passage. It
> > presents us with a fallacy of equivocation, which completely
> > undermines Rand's argument.
> > This was demonstrated very effectively by Michael Huemer (aka Owl)
> > in his critique of TOE. This is at
> > http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/rand5.htm
> I've written on Huemer's summary of Rand's 'argument', but not about
> that 'argument' itself.
Thanks for telling me that. I did a search by your name and found
several interesting threads I had missed before.
> My reason for not doing so previously, has
> been even Huemer thinks it wasn't Rand's actual argument - he believes
> she did not make one -
Huemer said she didn't make an argument for egoism, because he thinks
egoism is implicit in one of her premises. I don't know that he
ever said she made no argument at all.
> but just something he's constructed,
> paraphrasing statements she made, to demonstrate how illogical she is.
I see you have a personality conflict with Huemer. Far be it from me
to meddle with strife that belongs to others. I will just state for
the record that I disagree with this characterization, and pass on.
> First, Rand is careful to distinguish between
> 'physical survival' and living qua man, in her argument (as the above
> quote shows);
The Fallacy of Equivocation is defined as substituting one sense
of a term for another in the course of an argument. If Rand is
"careful to distinguish" the two senses, that just means
that she is unusually clear in her equivocation. That may be to
her credit, but it does not save the argument.
> it's Huemer's paraphrase that introduces substitutes the
> equivocal word 'life' in every step for both; his equivocal wording,
> not hers.
I don't understand. Do you mean to suggest that Rand never said
that "life" is the ultimate value for man?
> Second, one can make an obvious argument from LQE to MQM, from the
> text alone; an argument that Huemer ignores completely. [I've
> inserted it below, in the square brackets]
> > 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its own
> > sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> > 9. Therefore, [LQE] and nothing else is valuable for its own sake. from
> > 4,8
> [9a. For a human being, LQE requires engaging in rational thought.
> (premise)
> [9b. Engaging in rational thought is living proper to a rational
> being. (def.)
> [9c. Living proper to a rational being is MQM. (def.)
> [9d. Therefore, for a human being, MQM is necessary to LQE. (9a-c)
> [9e. Whatever is necessary to realize a value is a value. (premise?
> means-ends rule)
> [9f. Therefore, MQM is valuable for a human. (8,9d,9e)]
This shows that MQM (as so defined) is an instrumental value.
It does not show that MQM should replace LQE as the ultimate
value. Nor does it show that surviving by rational thought
cannot be "a merely physical survival."
> That's the connection between LQE and MQM which Huemer completely
> ignores (ruling these steps of the argument out implicitly).
The question is not whether there is a connection. It is whether
MQM must, for man, replace LQE as the ultimate value.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:07 AM
Subject: Re: Survival Qua Man
> Acar <g...@d-g-s.com> wrote in message
news:<002401c1eafa$6925e7e0$6501a8c0@
> cinci.rr.com>...
>
> > > > 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its
own
> > > > sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> > > >(10. Everyone should always do whatever promotes what is valuable for
> > > > himself.) implicit premise
> > > > 11. Therefore, everyone should always do whatever promotes his own
> > > > LQE]. from 8,10
> > > > 12. A person can live only if he is rational. premise
> > > > 13. Therefore, everyone should be 100% rational. from 11,12
> > >
> >
> > Unless I am mistaken, (13) is Owl's punch line. If so, that criticism is
not
> > avoided by reconciling the LQE with MQM as you correctly claim that Rand
> > does. In either case (13) follows as a moral standard which contradicts
the
> > Objectivist vision of what is possible to man.
> >
> If this is Owl's point then it is not a very good
> response since 13 does not follow 11 and 12. The
> actual conclusion should at best be that everyone
> should always do whatever they can to promote their
> rationality.
I think that (12) "A person can live only if he is rational." is a
reasonable encapsulation of Rand's doctrine that if a person is not living
"as man" he is not living at all but actually dying. By "as man" Rand means
thinking rationally. Since rational thinking implies arriving at conclusions
that Rand thinks are correct (arriving at opposite conclusions is
irrational) then (13) "therefore, everyone should be 100% rational" follows
from (12), IMO. I agree that "everyone should always do whatever they can
to promote their rationality" is the intended conclusion, but I agree with
Owl that the other is what follows from her argument. We all know what she
meant, but Owl points out that it does not follow from the premises.
>But this is not a claim that most
> objectivists would have a problem with. It is by no
> means absurd. If Rand had actually managed to show
> that then I think she would have a right to be proud
> of her accomplishment.
> The actual conclusion here might actually be weaker
> since it is doubtful that the level of rationality
> which is required by 10 actually requires such extreme
> effort (as someone else noted in this thread. Life
> does not require more than a minimal level of rationality.
> You only have to look around you to see that that is
> true.)
>
> Lon
*Should always* is a tall order when the alternative is death.
Here's another discrepancy:
All who think incorrectly are promoting their own death, regardless of
whether they are ignorant, young, uninformed or whatever. But the young,
uninformed, etc are not evil. Therefore in some cases promoting your own
death is not evil.
x
x
x
x
George Dance
3897...@posting.google.com>...
The argument Huemer gives is quite illogical in places, but remember,
it is not an argument Rand made. Nor does Huemer think it is Rand's
argument; he says he cannot find the actual argument, and this is the
best he can do.
There have been other attempts to formalize this argument of Rand's.
I think the one most faithful to the text was made by Mark Lewis,
which you can read one that looks the most textually faithful to me at
<8qiu4a$dvh$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "David Tomlin" <Jet...@home.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 10:41 AM
Subject: Re: Survival Qua Man
>
> It does not show that MQM should replace LQE as the ultimate
> value. Nor does it show that surviving by rational thought
> cannot be "a merely physical survival."
>
> > That's the connection between LQE and MQM which Huemer completely
> > ignores (ruling these steps of the argument out implicitly).
>
> The question is not whether there is a connection. It is whether
> MQM must, for man, replace LQE as the ultimate value.
Although you are correct in your claim that there is a problem in that area,
IMO you have not addressed the argument by which Rand claims to have avoided
the problem. As I understand it Rand relies on the law of identity which
prescribes that entities act according to their nature. "Life" then has to
be defined in terms of the nature of the entity. In lower forms of life what
you call LQE is sufficient to express the nature of the entity. But when
Rand talks about life as the standard of value she does not deviate from the
concept of identity. She claims that free will allows man to act in a manner
contrary to his nature and of course, that is a bizarre contradiction, but
it is her basis for defining "life" for a human in terms of correct
thinking, which she calls "qua man". In other words in her view LQE is not a
sufficient criterion of "life" in a man because it does not say if his
alleged nature is being expressed or not. So the argument should revolve
around the question of whether man or any other entity can ever act in a
manner contrary to what they are (their nature). I detect an oxymoron there.
George Dance
4540...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance wrote
> > I've written on Huemer's summary of Rand's 'argument', but not about
> > that 'argument' itself.
>
> Thanks for telling me that. I did a search by your name and found
> several interesting threads I had missed before.
>
> > My reason for not doing so previously, has
> > been even Huemer thinks it wasn't Rand's actual argument - he believes
> > she did not make one -
>
> Huemer said she didn't make an argument for egoism, because he thinks
> egoism is implicit in one of her premises. I don't know that he
> ever said she made no argument at all.
Huemer does say 'argument for egoism' in the passage to which I think
we're both referring:
<quote>
I have hitherto thought that Rand gave a bad argument for egoism in
"The
Objectivist Ethics." I have recently changed my mind, however. I
have
gone through that essay line by line, and I can't find this argument.
I
now believe that Rand did not give a bad argument for egoism; she gave
no
argument at all.
</quote>
On rereading and rethinking, I realize this passage can be read at
least two ways. One can simply identify egoism with preserving one's
life or LQE, (which Rand did advocate in TOE, and did refer to as
'egoism'), and say that she never gave any argument for that; that's
what I did previously. Or one can identify egoism with Huemer's
definition of egoism - which I'll have to paraphrase (as I can copy in
only one quote per article) as the belief that one should always
promote one's own benefit, no matter the costs to anyone else.
Rand did not argue for egoism by this second definition, but neither
did she assume it as a premise (as he goes on to charge). So Huemer
is wrong on either count.
> I see you have a personality conflict with Huemer. Far be it from me
> to meddle with strife that belongs to others. I will just state for
> the record that I disagree with this characterization, and pass on.
That makes sense to me. You are not Huemer's proxy, and should not be
held responsible for his wording. If you agree with his conclusion,
you are agreeing for your reasons rather than his, and those are the
actual topic of discussion here.
> > First, Rand is careful to distinguish between
> > 'physical survival' and living qua man, in her argument (as the above
> > quote shows);
>
> The Fallacy of Equivocation is defined as substituting one sense
> of a term for another in the course of an argument. If Rand is
> "careful to distinguish" the two senses, that just means
> that she is unusually clear in her equivocation. That may be to
> her credit, but it does not save the argument.
You haven't defined the fallacy exactly right. I'd like to offer a
textbook definition here: "Equicocation. An informal fallacy in
which the inference depends upon using a term or phrase in two
different senses." (Johnson, /Fundamentals of Reasoning/ Wadsworth
2000, 408). Equivocating then means changing the meaning of a term in
an argument and to using it throughout as if it were the same term.
By equivocating, one smuggles in an unproved premise that those
different semnses are equivalent. And I don't see that Rand does
that at all.
> > it's Huemer's paraphrase that [...] substitutes the
> > equivocal word 'life' in every step for both; his equivocal wording,
> > not hers.
>
> I don't understand. Do you mean to suggest that Rand never said
> that "life" is the ultimate value for man?
No, she clearly did, but (I think; it's hard to find every example in
the text, given the way 'life' is cited in the index) by 'life' she
always meant LQE. As in: "An organism's life is its standard of
value." (TOE, 17) Even in this passage, which sounds like the one
most likely to have spawned the charge of equivocation:
"The standard of value of the Objectivists ethics - the standard by
which one judges what is good or evil - /man's life/, or: that which
is required by man's survival /qua/ man" (23),
it's clear that 'life' means 'survival' or LQE. Rand is here claiming
that there is such a thing as MQM, and that it is required by the
standard of LQE; she is not claiming that MQM (as she goes on to
define it) is the same thing as LQE. That claim needs an argument,
and it's an argument she gives immediately afterwards (the same
argument, I think, that I've spelled out below as step 9a etc.).
> > > 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its own
> > > sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> > > 9. Therefore, [LQE] and nothing else is valuable for its own sake. from
> > > 4,8
> > [9a. For a human being, LQE requires engaging in rational thought.
> > (premise)
> > [9b. Engaging in rational thought is living proper to a rational
> > being. (def.)
> > [9c. Living proper to a rational being is MQM. (def.)
> > [9d. Therefore, for a human being, MQM is necessary to LQE. (9a-c)
> > [9e. Whatever is necessary to realize a value is a value. (premise?
> > means-ends rule)
> > [9f. Therefore, MQM is valuable for a human. (8,9d,9e)]
>
> This shows that MQM (as so defined) is an instrumental value.
> It does not show that MQM should replace LQE as the ultimate
> value. Nor does it show that surviving by rational thought
> cannot be "a merely physical survival."
I think that's correct: MQM has a purely instrumental value, as a
means to the end of LQE. For Rand, people survive by the use of
reason, and there is no other way for them to survive. So while MQM
is a means, not an end, it is a necessary means to the ultimate end
(of LQE); one cannot 'act to gain or keep' LQE without at the same
time acting to gain or keep MQM.
> > That's the connection between LQE and MQM which Huemer completely
> > ignores (ruling these steps of the argument out implicitly).
>
> The question is not whether there is a connection. It is whether
> MQM must, for man, replace LQE as the ultimate value.
I think that, for Rand, it does not: LQE remains the ultimate value,
and MQM is a value only by virtue of being necessary for realizing
LQE.
BTW, my own argument is that this reasoning does not depend on Rand's
premise that there is such a thing as an 'ultimate end'. The
reasoning works just as well if one assumes the subjectivist premise
that the ultimate end is whatever the agent chooses to do with his
life. As he requires a life to do anything with it, then LQE is also
validated as a necessary means - and MQM is in turn validated as a
necessary means to LQE.
I think Rand would have condemned this argument as 'subjectivism' or
whim-worship. But I don't believe that would follow. For this
ultimate subjectivity still commits one to valuing LQE, and therefore
to valuing MQM. And MQM in turn commits one to valuing rationality,
or non-contradiction. An agent who explicitly rejects rationality,
while surviving by others' use of reason and by his own unacknowledged
use of reason, is attempting to realize a contradiction, in the same
way that say a farmer who wanted to harvest his crop, but didn't want
to plant it, would be attempting to realize a contradiction - and,
contradictions not being possible in reality, would not have any crop
to harvest in reality.
George Dance
> From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
> Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
> > snip
> >
> > > 8. Therefore, its own [LQE], and nothing else, is valuable for its own
> > > sake, for any living thing. from 5,6,7
> > > 9. Therefore, [LQE] and nothing else is valuable for its own sake. from
> > > 4,8
> > [9a. For a human being, LQE requires engaging in rational thought.
> > (premise)
> > [9b. Engaging in rational thought is living proper to a rational
> > being. (def.)
>
> I can't help noticing how carefully you avoid the "according to his nature"
> wording and fall back on the more ambiguous "proper to a rational being".
That was Huemer's phrasing, not mine.
> It
> is my understanding that Rand relied heavily on the argument of identity
> ("according to his nature") to justify the precedence of principle over LQE
> without contradiction of "life as the standard".
I think that is correct. That argument from identity or nature is her
justification for the premise I've called 9a):
> > [9a. For a human being, LQE requires engaging in rational thought.
By their nature, humans survive by human action, and therefore by
reasoning (as reason is necessary to acting); there is no other way
for them to survive. So a commitment to one's survival entails (by
necessity) a commitment to reason; either one is rational, or one does
not survive (except, as Rand noted, to the degree that one can survive
by others' rationality).
For a human to survive, without any use of reason at all, would be a
contradiction - which would not only violate rationality (which a
person does by rejecting reason anyway) but would be impossible in
reality - as, for Rand, non-contradiction was a metaphysical
principle:
"A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and
all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same
time.... A contradiction cannot exist." (/AS/ Random House 1957,
1016)
> (If problem solving is just
> a tool, the ability to problem solve can not trump LQE. "Qua man" is a
> reference to identity.)
Indeed it is. But reason is not just 'problem solving' - ie, using
reason on occasion to accomplish a specific end - but integrating all
of one's knowledge without contradiction. For Rand, non-contradiction
is a metaphysical principle which entails that, by committing to
survival, one must also commit to reason.
Committing to reason in turn means committing to non-contradiction as
an epistemological principle; moral agents must not only act as if
non-contradiction were true, but must also recognize that
non-contradiction is true; they are not only prevented from doing the
impossible in reality, but also (by the necessity of their committing
to reason) are committed to not trying to do the impossible, indeed to
reject the very idea of doing the impossible; which means eliminating
all contradictions - all contradictory premises, and all premises
which entail contradictions, in one's beliefs.
David Tomlin
> David Tomlin wrote
> > The Fallacy of Equivocation is defined as substituting one sense
> > of a term for another in the course of an argument. If Rand is
> > "careful to distinguish" the two senses, that just means
> > that she is unusually clear in her equivocation. That may be to
> > her credit, but it does not save the argument.
> You haven't defined the fallacy exactly right. I'd like to offer a
> textbook definition here: "Equivocation. An informal fallacy in
> which the inference depends upon using a term or phrase in two
> different senses." (Johnson, /Fundamentals of Reasoning/ Wadsworth
> 2000, 408). Equivocating then means changing the meaning of a term in
> an argument and to using it throughout as if it were the same term.
> By equivocating, one smuggles in an unproved premise that those
> different senses are equivalent.
OK. I agree that "the inference depends" is more precise than "in the
course of an argument." I don't see how that affects the point at issue.
> And I don't see that Rand does
> that at all.
It seems crystal clear to me.
It might help to think of the equivocation as being between two senses
of MQM, only one of which is equivalent to LQE.
The MQM that follows from Rand's argument, would mean using reason to
maximize life expectancy. The person who acts on these values would do
whatever his reason told him was necessary to achieve that end. He
would be a kind of prudent predator, which I would call the
"survivalist prudent predator." (SPP)
The MQM that Rand wants to derive, is not "a merely physical survival."
A person acting on these values would sacrifice his life, if necessary,
rather than violate rights. He would not steal Nanook's parka, or
murder a potential organ donor, even with his life at stake.
The two senses of MQM are not only distinct, they are contradictory.
There can be no valid derivation of one from the other.
> For Rand, people survive by the use of
> reason, and there is no other way for them to survive. So while MQM
> is a means, not an end, it is a necessary means to the ultimate end
> (of LQE); one cannot 'act to gain or keep' LQE without at the same
> time acting to gain or keep MQM.
I disagree. Rand explicitly identifies "survival qua man" as the
_ultimate end for man_, and explicitly states that it is not "a
merely physical survival."
> BTW, my own argument is that this reasoning does not depend on Rand's
> premise that there is such a thing as an 'ultimate end'. The
> reasoning works just as well if one assumes the subjectivist premise
> that the ultimate end is whatever the agent chooses to do with his
> life. As he requires a life to do anything with it, then LQE is also
> validated as a necessary means - and MQM is in turn validated as a
> necessary means to LQE.
I agree that it works just as well. Zero equals zero. :-)
Either argument is fine if all you want to advocate is using reason
to understand what's what, and so avoid doing things that defeat our
purposes. Neither argument gives us a reason to let Nanook keep his
parka. I don't see that either argument gives us a reason not to vote
for income redistribution. The things I want to do with my life would
get a nice boost from a share of Bill Gates's money. :-)
> I think Rand would have condemned this argument as 'subjectivism' or
> whim-worship. But I don't believe that would follow.
But you said yourself it was based on a subjectivist premise.
> For this
> ultimate subjectivity still commits one to valuing LQE, and therefore
> to valuing MQM.
Suppose what I want to do with my life is be a serial killer. This
conflicts with LQE, since being a serial killer is risky. But if
LQE is only an instrumental value, I have no reason to sacrifice
my ultimate goal for its sake.
Of course, none of us live as if LQE were our ultimate value. David
Friedman has painted a picture of what that would be like. It would
mean never riding in a car, bus, or plane unless it was necessary
for earning money; carefully targeting expenditures on maximizing
life expectancy; forgoing everyday pleasures; etc. A person who lived
like that would be considered eccentric to the point of madness.
Perhaps there has been such a person, but I've never heard of him.
"Whoever dies with the most toys, wins," is an old joke. Some people
may act as if they believe it. But no one believes "whoever dies at
the most advanced age, wins."
That is another reason, besides avoiding the prudent predator, for
Rand to distinguish MQM from LQE. IMO, it just shows that the whole
idea of basing "values" on "survival" is misguided.
> An agent who explicitly rejects rationality,
> while surviving by others' use of reason and by his own unacknowledged
> use of reason, is attempting to realize a contradiction, in the same
> way that say a farmer who wanted to harvest his crop, but didn't want
> to plant it, would be attempting to realize a contradiction - and,
> contradictions not being possible in reality, would not have any crop
> to harvest in reality.
Hasn't all this been covered, not to say smothered, in numerous
prudent predator threads?
You and Rand may describe people who don't accept your ethics as
"rejecting rationality." In fact, the cat burglar and the con artist
have to make more use of reason than many people in honest lines of
work.
As for "surviving by others' use of reason", we all do that. We are
all mental parasites on that brilliant, if speechless, australopithecine
who first put an edge on a flint.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Subject: Re: Survival Qua Man
Human action as performed by a human is not different in that sense from
simian action. Human reasoning is not necessary to acting. (Lower animals
also act). It seems that by human action (as opposed to other species) you
mean discretionary action. It is not in the nature of man that his actions
will enhance his survival. It is in the nature of man that he can
discriminate more finely between options based on his prediction of the
oucome of his choices.
> there is no other way
> for them to survive.
This is where "correct" thinking comes in. You have not succeded in bridging
the gap between identity and heroism. You and Rand are saying: "If man is
born with the tools to be a hero, it is correct to say that he is a natural
hero." This can be correct only to the extent that it will not ignore the
fact that he is a natural bum by the same logic. But this would create a
contradiction in identity. The logical conundrum is resolved by defining
identity in terms of volition.
>So a commitment to one's survival entails (by
> necessity) a commitment to reason; either one is rational, or one does
> not survive (except, as Rand noted, to the degree that one can survive
> by others' rationality).
>
> For a human to survive, without any use of reason at all, would be a
> contradiction -
Reason makes humans dominant. I don't think that the extent to which humans
would be able to survive with the intelligence of a chimpanzee is a matter
that has been been worked out. Perhaps some modicum of survival would be
possible, in which case it is not a contradiction. But the issue is not
whether it is necessary to survival, but whether heroism is mandated by
human nature, inasmuch as identity is mandatory.
> which would not only violate rationality (which a
> person does by rejecting reason anyway) but would be impossible in
> reality - as, for Rand, non-contradiction was a metaphysical
> principle:
>
> "A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and
> all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same
> time.... A contradiction cannot exist." (/AS/ Random House 1957,
> 1016)
See above.
I have to stop now. I hope to continue later.
x
x
x
x
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
>
> For a human to survive, without any use of reason at all, would be a
> contradiction - which would not only violate rationality (which a
> person does by rejecting reason anyway) but would be impossible in
> reality - as, for Rand, non-contradiction was a metaphysical
> principle:
>
> "A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and
> all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same
> time.... A contradiction cannot exist." (/AS/ Random House 1957,
> 1016)
>
> > (If problem solving is just
> > a tool, the ability to problem solve can not trump LQE. "Qua man" is a
> > reference to identity.)
>
> Indeed it is. But reason is not just 'problem solving' - ie, using
> reason on occasion to accomplish a specific end - but integrating all
> of one's knowledge without contradiction. For Rand, non-contradiction
> is a metaphysical principle which entails that, by committing to
> survival, one must also commit to reason.
"Committing" implies a choice, as I don't tire to emphasize. It also
implies, albeit circuitously, committing to Rand's ideas of what is
rational. Thus Rand claims that the burglar who survives by his wits is not
using the thinking skills which are naturally given to him. But he is indeed
cerebrating qua human. Rand implicitly goes to the unvoidable conclusion
that he is not a man, indeed that he is not human. Of course this seems like
a distortion or deliberate misrepresentation, but I claim that it is exactly
what follows from a loose scheme that simply does not hold together.
> Committing to reason in turn means committing to non-contradiction as
> an epistemological principle; moral agents must not only act as if
> non-contradiction were true, but must also recognize that
> non-contradiction is true; they are not only prevented from doing the
> impossible in reality, but also (by the necessity of their committing
> to reason) are committed to not trying to do the impossible, indeed to
> reject the very idea of doing the impossible; which means eliminating
> all contradictions - all contradictory premises, and all premises
> which entail contradictions, in one's beliefs.
You are putting all your eggs on the contradiction basket, but there is no
contradiction between predatory conduct and survival, unless one circularly
starts from the premise that there is such a contradiction.
There may be a contradiction in your argument, however, since on the one
hand you arbitrate the issue of survival vs. flourishing in favor of the
survivalists when you say that (Randian) rationality (the noble aspect of
human life) is only instrumental to survival. And Rand says that she is not
talking about survival as a beast, which implies that man may survive as a
beast. Then you say that no survival is possible without Randian
rationality. You reconcile this discrepancy by claiming that those who
survive like beasts are surviving on the nobility of others. But that
circularly validates the Randian definition of rationality, since it implies
that the "beast-like humans" are not thinking. The entire Randian system
revolves on an axis of circularity.
Your refutation makes only a glancing mention of morality, yet that is where
the entire bailiwick falls apart. Rand is not discredited by the fact that
she said that life is the standard of value, or that man survives by the use
of reason. All that is conventional wisdom and none of it is original. Where
Rand's philosophical skills falter is in the original stuff, the
specifically Objectivist stuff, the morality stuff (which includes the
egoism stuff). You have not addressed the contradiction between the concept
of evil and human (rational) imperfection, vis a vis the heroic vision of
man. Rand said "as he should be and can be." But can man be perfect? If he
can not be, is it OK to serve the injunction that he should be? If
perfection is not the injunction, then evil is in his nature and the heroic
vision of a natural rights respecter falls apart.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
>
> Committing to reason in turn means committing to non-contradiction as
> an epistemological principle; moral agents must not only act as if
> non-contradiction were true, but must also recognize that
> non-contradiction is true; they are not only prevented from doing the
> impossible in reality, but also (by the necessity of their committing
> to reason) are committed to not trying to do the impossible, indeed to
> reject the very idea of doing the impossible; which means eliminating
> all contradictions - all contradictory premises, and all premises
> which entail contradictions, in one's beliefs.
Forgive me for doing this in installments. I had not addressed directly the
specific argument above. AIU you are saying that it is logical to think that
it is impossible to be logical all the time. In terms of Rand's theory of
morality this means that man cannot avoid evil. There is no escape. Man is
doomed because there is no such thing as total amnesty. Man can
re-habilitate himself from this or that evil but then, like Gilda Radner
complained, there's always something. Man can never get one foot out of the
dung. Somehow I think that this is not what she intended to convey.
George Dance
4f61...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance wrote in message
>
> > David Tomlin wrote
>
> > > The Fallacy of Equivocation is defined as substituting one sense
> > > of a term for another in the course of an argument.
> > I'd like to offer a
> > textbook definition here: "Equivocation. An informal fallacy in
> > which the inference depends upon using a term or phrase in two
> > different senses." (Johnson, /Fundamentals of Reasoning/ Wadsworth
> > 2000, 408). Equivocating then means changing the meaning of a term in
> > an argument and to using it throughout as if it were the same term.
snip
>
> OK. I agree that "the inference depends" is more precise than "in the
> course of an argument." I don't see how that affects the point at issue.
Let me give an example, from the same source (276):
1. Philosophy is an art.
2. Art is studied by art historians.
-----------
3. Philosophy is studied by art historians.
The fallacy occurs not just because art means two different concepts -
a general practice in the first case, and 'the fine arts' in the
second - but also because they're treated as one concept, and the
inference looks valid only because they appear to be one concept.
OTOH, if one used different terms, and instead added a new premise:
2b. The study of philosophy is necessarily part of the study of the
fine arts.
There would be no equivocation. And that last is what Rand is doing:
she makes an identity claim that humans survive only by behaving in
the way that t humans do to survive (ie, they survive /qua man/), but
also a substantive claim that using reason is the way that humans
behave to survive, and hence necessary to human survival.
> It seems crystal clear to me.
>
> It might help to think of the equivocation as being between two senses
> of MQM, only one of which is equivalent to LQE.
>
> The MQM that follows from Rand's argument, would mean using reason to
> maximize life expectancy. The person who acts on these values would do
> whatever his reason told him was necessary to achieve that end.
No, I don't think so. Reason tells me that I have to stay alive now,
if I'm going to gain or keep any values (so, assuming that I do want
to gain or keep any right now, which I do) I have to want to stay
alive). It also tells me I'm going to die at some point, and when
that happens can be more or less significant (whether I die tomorrow
or not is important to my values, while whether I die on my 80th
birthday or the day before is not).
> He would be a kind of prudent predator, which I would call the
> "survivalist prudent predator." (SPP)
I don't think that follows. But we get into the PP later, so I'll
leave it at that for now.
> The MQM that Rand wants to derive, is not "a merely physical survival."
Right; it's, first, survival by reasoning: since reason is the means
of human survival, and the question of means is not open to choice;
second, long-term survival, because (all other things being equal)
survival is longevity.
> A person acting on these values would sacrifice his life, if necessary,
> rather than violate rights. He would not steal Nanook's parka, or
> murder a potential organ donor, even with his life at stake.
I don't think that follows either. Certainly in the case where one's
survival required violating property rights, Rand said, violate the
property rights - the most a commitment to rights obligated one to do,
would be to admit one's rights-violation and take the consequences.
(And, I would add, if the consequences were that one would
automatically be killed, there would be no obligation to report the
violation, either.)
> The two senses of MQM are not only distinct, they are contradictory.
> There can be no valid derivation of one from the other.
Well, no: all Rand has given, up to this point, is the dictum that
human valuing is constrained by reason: and reason could tell one to
be either a predator or a rights-respector. Whatever reason commands,
must be followed: that is the sum total of what Rand has proved so far
in her argument.
> > For Rand, people survive by the use of
> > reason, and there is no other way for them to survive. So while MQM
> > is a means, not an end, it is a necessary means to the ultimate end
> > (of LQE); one cannot 'act to gain or keep' LQE without at the same
> > time acting to gain or keep MQM.
>
> I disagree. Rand explicitly identifies "survival qua man" as the
> _ultimate end for man_, and explicitly states that it is not "a
> merely physical survival."
No, she identifies 'survival qua man' as the 'standard,' and
differentiates standard from purpose as follows: The purpose is the
end, or what one wants to achieve; the standard is what one uses to
measure how one's progress toward the end. Later tonight, eg, I will
have a purpose of going to work; and I will know that I am going to
work when I'm on the right bus travelling north. Going to work is the
purpose; whether I'm on the right bus, going in the right direction,
is the standard.
> > BTW, my own argument is that this reasoning does not depend on Rand's
> > premise that there is such a thing as an 'ultimate end'. The
> > reasoning works just as well if one assumes the subjectivist premise
> > that the ultimate end is whatever the agent chooses to do with his
> > life. As he requires a life to do anything with it, then LQE is also
> > validated as a necessary means - and MQM is in turn validated as a
> > necessary means to LQE.
>
> I agree that it works just as well. Zero equals zero. :-)
>
> Either argument is fine if all you want to advocate is using reason
> to understand what's what, and so avoid doing things that defeat our
> purposes. Neither argument gives us a reason to let Nanook keep his
> parka.
Of course the question of who gets Nanook's parka has to be determined
by other reasoning. All the argument so far has established is the
primacy of reason: whatever reason dictates, must be followed. Making
arguments and giving reasons becomes more than just an abstract game,
without practical relevance. The reasoning is highly relevant
because, in the Nanook situation or a similar one, that reason
determines what one should do is, necessarily, what one should do.
I don't see that either argument gives us a reason not to vote
> for income redistribution. The things I want to do with my life would
> get a nice boost from a share of Bill Gates's money. :-)
Gates has what, $25 billion? So your share would be $4 and change.
It's moot whether you'd gain even that, as your own income would also
have to be split 6 billion ways.
You might be saying, though, that some more limited type of income
redistribution would be to your advantage. But that's arguable as
well: the gain you receive (if any) could be cancelled out by the
reduction in goods and services, and higher prices you pay them, that
limiting people's ability to earn high incomes by providing them,
would result in.
> > I think Rand would have condemned this argument as 'subjectivism' or
> > whim-worship. But I don't believe that would follow.
>
> But you said yourself it was based on a subjectivist premise.
Now, here we do have an ambiguity, if not an equivocation. By
'subjectivist,' I specifically meant that the choice of ends is
subjective or personal: "the ultimate end [to any agent] is whatever
the agent chooses to do with his life." Whereas Rand defines
'subjectivism' as acting on feelings and not on reason, or
'whim-worship.' I think her usage is wrong, but, in fairness, many
mainstream philosophers also follow that usage.
> > For this
> > ultimate subjectivity still commits one to valuing LQE, and therefore
> > to valuing MQM.
>
> Suppose what I want to do with my life is be a serial killer. This
> conflicts with LQE, since being a serial killer is risky. But if
> LQE is only an instrumental value, I have no reason to sacrifice
> my ultimate goal for its sake.
If you ignore LQE, you will not be a very successful serial killer.
So, I suspect, you will not ignore LQE: on your way to your victims'
homes, you will still look both ways before crossing the street, eg.
If you do manage to ignore LQE as a value completely, you will die;
not a bad thing, if you really were a serial killer, and no more than
you deserve. (Note, though, that saying a serial killer deserves to
day is not saying that I have a right to kill him; that's a different
argument, too.)
> Of course, none of us live as if LQE were our ultimate value. David
> Friedman has painted a picture of what that would be like. It would
> mean never riding in a car, bus, or plane unless it was necessary
> for earning money; carefully targeting expenditures on maximizing
> life expectancy; forgoing everyday pleasures; etc. A person who lived
> like that would be considered eccentric to the point of madness.
> Perhaps there has been such a person, but I've never heard of him.
That doesn't affect my argument, which is that LQE is also a
necessarily instrumental value. And David, though he's tried, has not
been able to come up with anyone for whom LQE is not necessarily
instrumental (except, of course, for suicides; and a successful
suicide simply pays the penalty of death). (He's brought up
skydivers, for instance, but hasn't found any who don't invest in
equipment and training for the end of their survival.)
> "Whoever dies with the most toys, wins," is an old joke. Some people
> may act as if they believe it. But no one believes "whoever dies at
> the most advanced age, wins."
> That is another reason, besides avoiding the prudent predator, for
> Rand to distinguish MQM from LQE. IMO, it just shows that the whole
> idea of basing "values" on "survival" is misguided.
But the equivalence exists: survival is equivalent to acting - action
is impossible without life, and vice versa; and valuing is equivalent
to acting - acting is impossible without valuing, and vice versa.
> > An agent who explicitly rejects rationality,
> > while surviving by others' use of reason and by his own unacknowledged
> > use of reason, is attempting to realize a contradiction, in the same
> > way that say a farmer who wanted to harvest his crop, but didn't want
> > to plant it, would be attempting to realize a contradiction - and,
> > contradictions not being possible in reality, would not have any crop
> > to harvest in reality.
>
> Hasn't all this been covered, not to say smothered, in numerous
> prudent predator threads?
There's been lots of heat and smoke in those threads, but little
light. And Idon't think we'd do anything different if we began
discussing PP here. I hope we can at least agree that a wannabe PP
has no less reasons to want a rights-respecting society than anyone
else, the question being solely one of to what degree the society's
being rights-respecting depends on his choice, and therefore what the
choices are logically consistent with his choices.
> You and Rand may describe people who don't accept your ethics as
> "rejecting rationality."
I certainly don't. Rationality is reasoning, reaching valid
conclusions from one's premises. Someone can reach a different ethic
due to different premises, and that's not a rejection of rationality;
the most it could be called is an error of knowledge. (Those
premises, though, insofar as they depend on or contradict more basic
premises or beliefs of the agent, can be rationally criticized; and if
they do not follow from, or contradict, those more basic or beliefs,
than can be termed a rejection of rationality.)
> In fact, the cat burglar and the con artist
> have to make more use of reason than many people in honest lines of
> work.
Rand said something the same, which I'll have to paraphrase: a thief
invests considerable mental and physical effort into trying to live
without mental and physical effort.
> As for "surviving by others' use of reason", we all do that. We are
> all mental parasites on that brilliant, if speechless, australopithecine
> who first put an edge on a flint.
OK; but I think you're reading too much into that phrase. I just use
it because of the other 'proof', I think Symmetry's, that Rand was
wrong here: As people in comas, and newborn infants, can live, it is
false that reason is necessary to human survival. Whereas in fact, in
these cases, reason is still essential to their survival; just not
their own reason.
David Tomlin
>David Tomlin wrote
> > OK. I agree that "the inference depends" is more precise than "in the
> > course of an argument." I don't see how that affects the point at issue.
>
> Let me give an example, from the same source (276):
> 1. Philosophy is an art.
> 2. Art is studied by art historians.
> -----------
> 3. Philosophy is studied by art historians.
>
> The fallacy occurs not just because art means two different concepts -
> a general practice in the first case, and 'the fine arts' in the
> second - but also because they're treated as one concept, and the
> inference looks valid only because they appear to be one concept.
>
> OTOH, if one used different terms, and instead added a new premise:
> 2b. The study of philosophy is necessarily part of the study of the
> fine arts.
>
> There would be no equivocation. And that last is what Rand is doing:
> she makes an identity claim that humans survive only by behaving in
> the way that humans do to survive (ie, they survive /qua man/), but
> also a substantive claim that using reason is the way that humans
> behave to survive, and hence necessary to human survival.
The kind of survival at issue both is, and is not, "physical
survival."
That's the equivocation.
> > The MQM that follows from Rand's argument, would mean using reason to
> > maximize life expectancy. The person who acts on these values would do
> > whatever his reason told him was necessary to achieve that end.
> No, I don't think so. Reason tells me that I have to stay alive now,
> if I'm going to gain or keep any values (so, assuming that I do want
> to gain or keep any right now, which I do) I have to want to stay
> alive).
This is your modification of Rand's argument. It's interesting in
itself, but I don't know what it's doing here, as if it were
responsive to my point about Rand's argument.
> It also tells me I'm going to die at some point, and when
> that happens can be more or less significant (whether I die tomorrow
> or not is important to my values, while whether I die on my 80th
> birthday or the day before is not).
In your version, life is an instrumental value. In Rand's, it is the
ultimate value.
> > The MQM that Rand wants to derive, is not "a merely physical survival."
> Right; it's, first, survival by reasoning: since reason is the means
> of human survival, and the question of means is not open to choice;
> second, long-term survival, because (all other things being equal)
> survival is longevity.
Physical survival by reasoning, is physical survival.
> > A person acting on these values would sacrifice his life, if necessary,
> > rather than violate rights. He would not steal Nanook's parka, or
> > murder a potential organ donor, even with his life at stake.
> I don't think that follows either.
It doesn't follow, but it's the kind of thing Rand is trying to get
to.
I brought up Nanook and the organ donor to concretize what it means
to distinguish "survival qua man" from "merely physical survival."
> Certainly in the case where one's
> survival required violating property rights, Rand said, violate the
> property rights - the most a commitment to rights obligated one to do,
> would be to admit one's rights-violation and take the consequences.
Wasn't that restricted to "emergencies"? A quote would help.
I think she also emphasized the duty to make restitution to the
victim, which would rule out murder.
Perhaps Rand would have considered sacrificing poor Nanook acceptable
under the "life boat" exception (though I doubt it.) But I think I'm
on solid ground on the organ donor.
Rand wrote "Illness and poverty are not metaphysical emergencies, they
are part of the normal risks of existence . . ." ("The Ethics of
Emergencies", _The Virtue of Selfishness_) The validity of the
distinction Rand makes here is an interesting question, but beside the
point now at issue.
Somewhere else, Rand mentioned forcibly depriving people of their
corneas as a _reductio ad absurdum_ of egalitarianism.
So, I don't think Rand would support murdering people for their
transplantable organs.
I've been forgetting the most obvious example: John Galt's professed
willingness to die for Dagny.
Here's another, from Nathaniel Branden: "The selfishness of a man who
is willing to die, if necessary, fighting for his freedom, lies in
the fact that he is unwilling to go on living in a world where he is
no longer able to act on his own judgment = that is, a world where
_human_ conditions of existence are no longer possible to him."
("Isn't Everyone Selfish?", _The Virtue of Selfishness_)
> > The two senses of MQM are not only distinct, they are contradictory.
> > There can be no valid derivation of one from the other.
> Well, no: all Rand has given, up to this point, is the dictum that
> human valuing is constrained by reason:
Wrong. Rand has equated physical survival by means of reason with
another kind of survival that is not physical.
Btw, I don't think "constrained by reason" is language that Rand
would agree to. She would say that reason is man's _only_ means
of evaluation, not just a "constraint."
> and reason could tell one to
> be either a predator or a rights-respector.
That's correct. I did reach forward in the argument for the sake
of giving concrete illustrations.
> > Rand explicitly identifies "survival qua man" as the
> > _ultimate end for man_, and explicitly states that it is not "a
> > merely physical survival."
> No, she identifies 'survival qua man' as the 'standard,' . . .
"An _ultimate value_ is that final goal or end to which all lesser
goals are the means - and it sets the standard by which all lesser
goals are _evaluated_. An organism's life is its _standard of value_:
that which furthers its life is the _good_, that which threatens it
is the _evil_." ("The Objectivist Ethics", _The Virtue of
Selfishness_)
There is some ambiguity between _being_ and _setting_ the standard.
But it's clear that Rand, at least sometimes, identifies "ultimate
value" with "standard of value", and identifies both with "life" for
organisms generally.
I'll nail this down with another quote.
"An organism's life depends on two factors: the material or
fuel which it needs from the outside, from its physical
background, and the action of its own body, the action of
using that fuel _properly_. What standard determines what is
_proper_ in this context? The standard is the organism's life,
or: that which is required for the organism's survival." (Ibid)
Again there is some ambiguity, this time between "life" and what
is "required" for life/survival.
With some allowance for such imprecisions, we can say that in Rand's
terminology, "ultimate value" = "standard of value" = "life."
> . . . and
> differentiates standard from purpose as follows: The purpose is the
> end, or what one wants to achieve . . .
For Rand, the end is determined by the metaphysically given facts of
reality. It is not whatever anyone happens to want.
> . . . the standard is what one uses to
> measure how one's progress toward the end. Later tonight, eg, I will
> have a purpose of going to work; and I will know that I am going to
> work when I'm on the right bus travelling north. Going to work is the
> purpose; whether I'm on the right bus, going in the right direction,
> is the standard.
Rand wrote: "The difference between 'standard' and 'purpose' in this
context is as follows: a 'standard' is an abstract principle that
serves as a measurement or guage to guide a man's choices in the
achievement of a concrete, specific purpose. 'That which is required
for the survival of man _qua_ man' is an abstract principle that
applies to every individual man. The task of applying the principle
to a concrete, specific purpose - the purpose of living a life proper
to a rational being - belongs to every individual man, and the life
he has to live is his own." (Ibid)
Here Rand seems to want to emphasize the very distinction that she
blurred earlier in her argument - that between an individual life,
and the requirements for the survival of a given kind of organism.
I don't see that this distinction has any bearing on her argument.
The passage seems tangential, leading nowhere in particular.
> Of course the question of who gets Nanook's parka has to be determined
> by other reasoning.
By hypothesis, reason tells me that it's my life or Nanook's. If
survival is my ultimate end, Nanook's at the end of his luck.
> Gates has what, $25 billion? So your share would be $4 and change.
You're being over-literal, George.
I think income redistribution deserves a thread of its own. I will
start one presently.
> > Suppose what I want to do with my life is be a serial killer. This
> > conflicts with LQE, since being a serial killer is risky. But if
> > LQE is only an instrumental value, I have no reason to sacrifice
> > my ultimate goal for its sake.
> If you ignore LQE, you will not be a very successful serial killer.
True, but not responsive to the point I was making.
> > Of course, none of us live as if LQE were our ultimate value.
> That doesn't affect my argument, which is that LQE is also a
> necessarily instrumental value.
I was talking about Rand's argument.
> > Hasn't all this been covered, not to say smothered, in numerous
> > prudent predator threads?
> There's been lots of heat and smoke in those threads, but little
> light.
I'm at a loss for the words to express how much I disagree. I think
I have gained a much deeper understanding of these matters by reading
the arguments on both sides of the PP debate. There's been heat and
smoke, and I've contributed to both, but much light as well.
> And I don't think we'd do anything different if we began
> discussing PP here.
I think you understimate both of us.
> I hope we can at least agree that a wannabe PP
> has no less reasons to want a rights-respecting society than anyone
> else . . .
Sorry to disappoint, but I don't think that is at all obvious.
> the question being solely one of to what degree the society's
> being rights-respecting depends on his choice, and therefore what the
> choices are logically consistent with his choices.
Say what?
David Tomlin
> You might be saying, though, that some more limited type of income
> redistribution would be to your advantage. But that's arguable as
> well: the gain you receive (if any) could be cancelled out by the
> reduction in goods and services, and higher prices you pay them, that
> limiting people's ability to earn high incomes by providing them,
> would result in.
Indeed it is arguable - arguable either way. Economic analysis alone
cannot rule out the possibility that a majority of some political
community could benefit from some redistribution scheme.
It's important to distinguish this argument from the utilitarian
one. The latter depends on the assumption that income has declining
marginal utility for most people, so that redistributing from high
to low increases total utility.
The egoist argument is that if I expect the redistribution to benefit
_me_, I should vote for it. If the majority of a PP democracy expect
to benefit, then it will pass. (Of course that raises the question of
whether an all-PP society would, or could, be a democracy.)
Since the economic case against redistribution is not airtight, the
ethical issue cannot be avoided. If my best rational calculation is
that a proposed redistribution will benefit me, why should I vote
against it?
George Dance
12ae...@posting.google.com>...
Dave, thanks for snipping down our rambling discussion into a more
manageable length. Since reading it only makes me want to write even
more, I've made some drastic snips myself to make room; I hope the
result is a bit more focussed.
>
>
> The kind of survival at issue both is, and is not, "physical
> survival."
> That's the equivocation.
> This is your modification of Rand's argument. It's interesting in
> itself, but I don't know what it's doing here, as if it were
> responsive to my point about Rand's argument.
> In your version, life is an instrumental value. In Rand's, it is the
> ultimate value.
> Physical survival by reasoning, is physical survival.
Here's our first point of contention; whether Rand is mixing up
physical survival (LQE) with survival 'proper to a rational being'
(MQM).
What you've said fits with my own reading of the text: Rand begins by
identifying life as LQE [=physical survival], and then at a certain
point, begins to talk of life both LQE and MQM (or as MQM [=survival
as a rational agent] only). I agree that she does that, but that is
not an equivocation; for at the point she does that she explains that
she is identifying both concepts, and gives an argument justifying it.
Which argument I've given as:
1. I should survive (ie survival is a value to me). A
2. Survival requires reason. (emp. premise) A->B
3. Reason is a value to me. B
4. I am sure of having reason, only by using reason.B->C
5. Using reason is of value to me. C
------
6. I should survive, and I should use reason. A&C
So if I value LQE. I should also value MQM, to the same extent. And
in general, if I value an end A, and there is in fact a necessary
means B to A, then I should also value B to the extent that I value A.
I think this argument is too important a step in Rand's thesis to be
glossed over, as it introduces and justifies her idea of 'objective'
values: of things that I value not just because I want to value them,
but because I should value them (which is essential, for her to have
an ethic at all). Making reason the first thing one should value,
lets her establish her method for determining these other values: I
should value those things that, rationally, are necessary for me to
achieve the things I value only because I want them.
You are right that I am treating life as a necessarily instrumental
value, rather than an 'ultimate' value-for-itself (and by emphasizing
that point, you've got me to see the distinction as more important
than I was holding it, to the point where I've spent time defending
it). That differs from Rand, but does not contradict her later
conclusions. In fact, I think it reinforces them: as it establishes
LQE itself as not only something one wants to value or not, but as
something one should value.
snip
I cut the whole discussion of PP, as I could see it becoming a
distraction - regretfully, as it was more interesting than what I've
left in - as I don't think we can actually go on to it, with the hope
of concluding anything, unless we cover this more basic point first.
Up to this point, Rand has argued only that a person who values LQE,
should also value MQM; meaning that he now values his reason as much
as his survival. This doesn't tell him anything about what rights he
should respect, in any particular case; it only gives him a method
(reason) for figuring those out, and a standard (conformity to reason)
for judging those later conclusions as correct or not.
In which case, what rights there are, and the degree to which they
should be respected, is a matter to be determined by further
arguments; and any such derivation, including Rand's own, should be
held to only if those further arguments succeed in meeting that
standard.
> I've been forgetting the most obvious example: John Galt's professed
> willingness to die for Dagny.
>
> Here's another, from Nathaniel Branden: "The selfishness of a man who
> is willing to die, if necessary, fighting for his freedom, lies in
> the fact that he is unwilling to go on living in a world where he is
> no longer able to act on his own judgment = that is, a world where
> _human_ conditions of existence are no longer possible to him."
> ("Isn't Everyone Selfish?", _The Virtue of Selfishness_)
People do choose to not value LQE in certain cases; in Objectivism,
there's nothing that says they should (LQE not being a means).
Even by my argument, a person could still decide that his companion,
or his freedom, was worth more than all his other values, in which
case he would be choosing death rationally. I cannot conceive of such
a judgement, as 'all his other values' includes his companion's
survival in the future, or the possibility of his future escape to
freedom. But if I'm right and he's wrong, he pays the price: he's
the one who dies. I can live with that.
snip
> > all Rand has given, up to this point, is the dictum that
> > human valuing is constrained by reason:
>
> Wrong. Rand has equated physical survival by means of reason with
> another kind of survival that is not physical.
But not just by calling both 'life'. The argument from which she gets
from one to the other, is one of the most important in her ethics -
the place where she actually attempts to jump the is-ought gap, on the
face of it successfully - and it's a misreading that can only lead to
confusion to read this argument out of existence, as Huemer does and
as you may still be doing.
> Btw, I don't think "constrained by reason" is language that Rand
> would agree to. She would say that reason is man's _only_ means
> of evaluation, not just a "constraint."
I read 'just' here as 'merely'; but there's nothing 'mere' about it.
Committing that one's actions should be constrained by reason, means
committing to the first of Rand's virtues, Rationality.
This is a continuation of the earlier argument:
7. I should live as a rational being. (A&C restated)
8. Reason, Purpose and Self-Esteem are necessary for me to live as a
rational being. C->D
9. I should act to gain & keep Reason et al. D
10. Living by the virtues (of Rationality, Productiveness, and Pride)
is necessary for me to gain and keep Reason et al. D->E
11. I should live by the virtues. E
> > and reason could tell one to
> > be either a predator or a rights-respector.
>
> That's correct. I did reach forward in the argument for the sake
> of giving concrete illustrations.
Well, that's why I snipped the PP discussion; it depends on whether
Rand's argument so far is correct; first on whether LQE entails MQM,
then on whether MQM entails the virtues, and finally on what the
virtues entail. (Which is not the same thing as whether I, you, or
even Rand thought they did or not.)
At this point, we've not even agreed on the first point; so it's back
to that.
> > > Rand explicitly identifies "survival qua man" as the
> > > _ultimate end for man_, and explicitly states that it is not "a
> > > merely physical survival."
>
> > No, she identifies 'survival qua man' as the 'standard,' . . .
>
> "An _ultimate value_ is that final goal or end to which all lesser
> goals are the means - and it sets the standard by which all lesser
> goals are _evaluated_. An organism's life is its _standard of value_:
> that which furthers its life is the _good_, that which threatens it
> is the _evil_." ("The Objectivist Ethics", _The Virtue of
> Selfishness_)
>
> There is some ambiguity between _being_ and _setting_ the standard.
> But it's clear that Rand, at least sometimes, identifies "ultimate
> value" with "standard of value", and identifies both with "life" for
> organisms generally.
I'd agree that this is confusing; it blurs the very distinction
between purpose and standard that Rand needs here. I would also call
it counterfactual: even in the case of an animal, I think the standard
is pleasure/pain, physical sensation of well-being or illness, and
emotional states such as fear.
For a conceptual being, the distinction is even clearer. A purpose
such as LQE is ongoing or open-ended; one never can say definitively
that it's been achieved. All one can do is translate the purpose into
empirically verifiable results; one can then determine whether one is
achieving one's purpose, by the standard of whether one is
accomplishing the results or not.
> I'll nail this down with another quote.
>
> "An organism's life depends on two factors: the material or
> fuel which it needs from the outside, from its physical
> background, and the action of its own body, the action of
> using that fuel _properly_. What standard determines what is
> _proper_ in this context? The standard is the organism's life,
> or: that which is required for the organism's survival." (Ibid)
>
> Again there is some ambiguity, this time between "life" and what
> is "required" for life/survival.
I see your point. "That which is required for the organism's
survival" is not just another name for "the organism's life". As in
my bus analogy: my reaching gwork on time (A) is not the same thing as
my catching the right bus at the (different) right time (B). The only
way to justify Rand's 'or' is to read in the argument I gave earlier
(A&(A->B)->(A&B); by valuing the one, one values both, but not just
'in other words'.
It's clear in the bus analogy that, if I gain B, then I can reliably
expect to achieve A (even though I know B is not sufficient; the bus
could go out of service leaving me stranded). A is my purpose, and B
the standard by which I can judge whether I am achieving A or not.
> With some allowance for such imprecisions, we can say that in Rand's
> terminology, "ultimate value" = "standard of value" = "life."
I think rather that this identification relies on the imprecisions.
Rand has to be read as if she's making an argument here, not just
switching definitions.
> > . . . and
> > differentiates standard from purpose as follows: The purpose is the
> > end, or what one wants to achieve . . .
>
> For Rand, the end is determined by the metaphysically given facts of
> reality. It is not whatever anyone happens to want.
I'm willing to admit that she was unclear in her writing in some
places, and even that her thinking was imprecise in her thinking in
those places. To me that's not a problem, if her argument can be
given in a more precise form (which I hope I've been doing here).
Whether the result of that formulation is 'Objectivism' or not is
really a side issue, to me; my standard in this case is a philosophy
that is rationally consistent, both internally and externally (with
reeality as I perceive it; if that's not Objectivism, then goodbye
Objectivism.
> > . . . the standard is what one uses to
> > measure how one's progress toward the end. Later tonight, eg, I will
> > have a purpose of going to work; and I will know that I am going to
> > work when I'm on the right bus travelling north. Going to work is the
> > purpose; whether I'm on the right bus, going in the right direction,
> > is the standard.
>
> Rand wrote: "The difference between 'standard' and 'purpose' in this
> context is as follows: a 'standard' is an abstract principle that
> serves as a measurement or guage to guide a man's choices in the
> achievement of a concrete, specific purpose. 'That which is required
> for the survival of man _qua_ man' is an abstract principle that
> applies to every individual man. The task of applying the principle
> to a concrete, specific purpose - the purpose of living a life proper
> to a rational being - belongs to every individual man, and the life
> he has to live is his own." (Ibid)
That sounds like what I was saying earlier. Maybe the bus analogy
didn't make it clear to you, because you're a driver; so let me try a
different analogy:
Say your purpose is to keep your job by getting to work on time, every
day; and your only means of doing that is your new car. So you have
to value keeping your car full of gas, oil, air in the tires, etc.
All of those things are empirically verifiable - is there enough gas
in the tank to reach work is a matter of fact, which you can easily
judge - which lets you measure how successful you are in achieving
your purpose: if you always keep the car full of gas, you will be that
much more successful at getting to work on time, than if you do not.
>
> Here Rand seems to want to emphasize the very distinction that she
> blurred earlier in her argument - that between an individual life,
> and the requirements for the survival of a given kind of organism.
> I don't see that this distinction has any bearing on her argument.
> The passage seems tangential, leading nowhere in particular.
While to me, making this distinction seems all-important to her
argument, and where she seems to blur it is where her argument
suffers.
<more on PP snipped>
> >David Tomlin wrote
> > > Hasn't all this been covered, not to say smothered, in numerous
> > > prudent predator threads?
>
> > There's been lots of heat and smoke in those threads, but little
> > light.
>
> I'm at a loss for the words to express how much I disagree. I think
> I have gained a much deeper understanding of these matters by reading
> the arguments on both sides of the PP debate. There's been heat and
> smoke, and I've contributed to both, but much light as well.
>
> > And I don't think we'd do anything different if we began
> > discussing PP here.
>
> I think you understimate both of us.
I meant we I don't think we'd accomplish much if we went on to PP
without first agreeing on the more foundational stuff we've been going
over above.
>
> > I hope we can at least agree that a wannabe PP
> > has no less reasons to want a rights-respecting society than anyone
> > else . . .
>
> Sorry to disappoint, but I don't think that is at all obvious.
I'd argue that a PP wants others to respect his rights; and therefore
he wants to be able to expect them to be rights respecters (RRs). As
well, he wants others to treat him as an RR, and to expect him to be
an RR. So he wants a society in which everyone treats everyone as an
RR, which has to be a society in which everyone (him included) has to
appear to be an RR.
> > the question being solely one of to what degree the society's
> > being rights-respecting depends on his choice, and therefore what the
> > choices are logically consistent with his choices.
>
> Say what?
I can't make any sense out of the above, either. 8) What I wanted to
say is that the PP can logically justify his actions only by believing
that his society would still be an RR one even if he were not, but
only appeared to be; otherwise (say, if everyone was really a PP
pretending to be an RR, and everyone knew that) he would not be able
to prey prudently.
Basically, if he's rational, he's confronted with the same argument
from necessity that I used above:
1. I want to prey on others at little risk to myself. P
2. I can prey on others, at little risk to myself, only in a generally
rights-respecting society. P->R
3. I want a rights-respecting society. R
--------
4. I want to prey on others at little risk to myself, and I want a
generally rights-respecting society. P&R
I think Rand would have claimed that wanting both P and R was wanting
a contradiction - "to have your cake and eat it too" - and thus a
violation of rationality. But, again, I don't think we can profitably
get into that, unless we have agreed on the earlier argument first.
That was a bit ambiguous, wasn't it?
David Tomlin
> Here's our first point of contention; whether Rand is mixing up
> physical survival (LQE) with survival 'proper to a rational being'
> (MQM).
I think our first point of contention is over what Rand meant when
she wrote: "It does not mean a _momentary_ or a merely _physical_
survival." I still don't understand what you think she meant by
that.
> What you've said fits with my own reading of the text: Rand begins by
> identifying life as LQE [=physical survival], and then at a certain
> point, begins to talk of life both LQE and MQM (or as MQM [=survival
> as a rational agent] only). I agree that she does that, but that is
> not an equivocation; for at the point she does that she explains that
> she is identifying both concepts, and gives an argument justifying it.
>
> Which argument I've given as:
> 1. I should survive (ie survival is a value to me). A
> 2. Survival requires reason. (emp. premise) A->B
> 3. Reason is a value to me. B
> 4. I am sure of having reason, only by using reason.B->C
> 5. Using reason is of value to me. C
> ------
> 6. I should survive, and I should use reason. A&C
>
> So if I value LQE. I should also value MQM, to the same extent. And
> in general, if I value an end A, and there is in fact a necessary
> means B to A, then I should also value B to the extent that I value A.
Here's how I would state the argument:
1. There are only three ways for an entity to choose instrumental
values - reason, innate knowledge, or whim.
2. Man can choose proper values by reason.
3. Man cannot choose proper values by innate knowledge.
4. Man cannot choose proper values by whim.
5. Reason is the only method by which man can choose proper
instrumental values.
> I think this argument is too important a step in Rand's thesis to be
> glossed over, as it introduces and justifies her idea of 'objective'
> values: of things that I value not just because I want to value them,
> but because I should value them (which is essential, for her to have
> an ethic at all).
Do you mean to suggest that I have been glossing over the argument?
If so, I don't agree.
> Making reason the first thing one should value,
> lets her establish her method for determining these other values: I
> should value those things that, rationally, are necessary for me to
> achieve the things I value only because I want them.
Again you confuse Rand's argument with yours.
> You are right that I am treating life as a necessarily instrumental
> value, rather than an 'ultimate' value-for-itself (and by emphasizing
> that point, you've got me to see the distinction as more important
> than I was holding it, to the point where I've spent time defending
> it).
It's good to know I've had an influence. :-)
> That differs from Rand, but does not contradict her later
> conclusions.
I don't think Rand's conclusions follow from her own argument.
But Rand's argument at least rules out imprudent predation, while
yours does not.
> Up to this point, Rand has argued only that a person who values LQE,
> should also value MQM; meaning that he now values his reason as much
> as his survival.
He values reason as a means to his survival.
> This doesn't tell him anything about what rights he
> should respect, in any particular case; it only gives him a method
> (reason) for figuring those out, and a standard (conformity to reason)
> for judging those later conclusions as correct or not.
Here's what Rand says at "this point":
"Such is the meaning of the definition: that which is required for
man's survival _qua_ man. It does not mean a _momentary_ or a
merely _physical_ survival. It does not mean the momentary
physical survival of a mindless brute, waiting for another brute
to crush his skull. It does not mean the momentary physical
survival of a crawling aggregate of muscles who is willing to
accept any terms, obey any thug and surrendur any values, for
the sake of what is known as "survival at any price," which may
or may not last a week or a year."
I agree that this is getting ahead of the argument. Blame Rand,
not me.
> > Rand has equated physical survival by means of reason with
> > another kind of survival that is not physical.
> But not just by calling both 'life'.
How many rounds do you want to go with that strawman?
It doesn't matter how many ways she did it. A contradiction is
a contradiction.
You don't agree that it is a contradiction, apparently because
you interpret "non-physical survival" in some way that I don't
yet understand.
> The argument from which she gets
> from one to the other, is one of the most important in her ethics -
> the place where she actually attempts to jump the is-ought gap, on the
> face of it successfully - and it's a misreading that can only lead to
> confusion to read this argument out of existence, as Huemer does and
> as you may still be doing.
We seem to be going in circles, and talking past one another.
The argument you speak of ends with _physical survival by means of
reason_. I haven't contested that. I'm focused on the _next step_,
from "physical survival" to "non-physical survival."