Rights and recognition

[James E. Prescott]

Does a right exist prior to being recognized as a right? Or does
its existence depend on recognition?

First, a stipulation. A right is one man's freedom of action that
other men may not, or must not, or ought not interfere with.
Deliberate interference with a right is called a "violation," of
morality at the very least, and of law, generally. Let's all agree
to at least that much, and see where it leads.

Imagine (here I go again!) two desperately hungry men who
see a single banana growing in the wild. Neither of them owns
it. If either of them eats it, the other may well starve to death.

In such a circumstance, it wouldn't make any sense to say
that either of them has the "right" to eat the banana. (See
the meaning of a right, just above!)

If they fight over it, let's say, the banana may well be destroyed,
such that they /both/ starve. But there is an obvious way out, for
both of them:

If one of them eats the banana, he'll have more than enough
strength to find another banana for the other, starving man.

So, let's assume they recognize these facts of reality, and,
based on a sober appreciation of their circumstance, they
simply /agree/ to avoid a conflict by drawing straws -- a kind
of contractual /trade/ -- with the long straw getting this particular
banana, and the short straw getting the /promise/ of the /next/
banana. By such a simple, logical procedure they can end up
working together, and both /will/ survive, and both /will/ be
well fed -- so long as the promise is kept.

Now, suddenly, it /does/ make sense to say that the long
straw produced a /right/ that is /recognized/ by /both/ men!
And, they are recognizing something that truly exists: an
agreement.

Does such a right's existence depend on /continued/
recognition? Well, /not/ the other party's right! Suppose
that the man who drew the short straw violates the agree-
ment by taking this banana. In that case, he would be both
/violating/ the other's existing right and /forfeiting/ his own
right to the /next/ banana!

So, yes, indeed, one's /own/ rights always depend on
one's /own/ continued recognition of the rights of others.
The concept of a right wouldn't make any sense if this
weren't the case.

So, have I answered the question?

Yes. Rights /do/ depend on recognition in the sense of
recognizing the existence of some agreement that was
the original /source/ of rights, AND, one's own rights always
depend on one's continued fidelity to the agreement, i.e.,
depend on one's continued recognition of the rights of
others. To refuse /all/ agreement is to remain as a wild
animal in the jungle, /rightless/. And to renounce an existing
agreement is to /forfeit/ the rights that the agreement had
conveyed to oneself.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 10, 4:40 am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Does a right exist prior to being recognized as a right? Or does
> its existence depend on recognition?
>

[upshot is that the latter is Prescott's premise]

Note to reader:

Prescott is a collectivist who pretends that his beliefs have some
relationship to Objectivism.

The right to life of a man is in his nature from Nature.

Prescott, on the other hand, has said:

"The reason you have rights is that rights are an objective benefit to
myself and to my fellow human beings"

<<{T]he right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and
self-generated action . . . The United States was the first moral
society in history. All previous systems had regarded man as a
sacrificial means to the ends of others.>>

[Jim Klein]

Jim, at least you're addressing the topic. That's more
than we can say for Gordon.

Problem is, you're still left with the same metaphysical
bullshit that the rest of your theories engender. If A's
right IS B's recognition, then no action on the part of A
can literally CAUSE the forfeiture of his rights. This is
because no action in one person can literally cause an action
in another.

The closest you could get is, "If B is rational and A does
such-and-such, then B should consider A's rights forfeited."

That's alright, I suppose, since it captures what's actually
going on. The problem with your imaginary "Rule of Law" is
that it pretends this action is going on somewhere other than
in B's cognition. And further, the theory says that we can
objectively note those actions by A that the rational person
B would recognize as a forfeiture of A's rights.

Even that would be alright by me, if it actually did it. This
was the whole principle of the USA that Rand liked so much. It
was an attempt to do precisely that, noting that ANY action by
A was within his "rights," except the only thing that a rational
man would recognize as forfeiture...the initiation of force
against another in a social context.

Sounds great, and what rational person wouldn't go along with
that? It's the codification of freedom and liberty after all,
and so is perfectly fine in that respect.

The thing is, by failing to recognize the nature of the
action--being the cognitive action of B in this example--it
tries to do what can't be done, removing the action from B
and putting it into a piece of paper. This is a huge misunderstanding
of what's going on, and so necessarily leads to failure. As we see.

Or, as some of us see. A's right to life will be respected
when B, and C and D and E..., respect them. Period. There's
nothing more to it, and there never was. With that recognition,
you don't need the piece of paper. Without it, the piece of
paper can't accomplish doo-doo.

If you haven't seen it, here's Chris Dates's take on the matter:

http://zerogov.com/?p=1867

"in·al·ien·a·ble > -- adjective 1. not to be taken away or transferred"

That's right. Pretending that an act of cognition can be transferred
to a piece of paper, is a misidentification of the highest order, and
is why it has led humans down the road that every contradiction leads.


jk

[jts]

On Tuesday, January 10, 2012 2:40:49 AM UTC-7, James E. Prescott wrote:

> Imagine (here I go again!) two desperately hungry men who
> see a single banana growing in the wild. Neither of them owns
> it. If either of them eats it, the other may well starve to death.

According to Tim's reasoning, that is an imaginary scenario and therefore
any question based on it is invalid.

[Tim]

"jts" <story...@gmail.com> wrote in message
news:hpo.20120110171902$27...@news.killfile.org...

No, according to my reasoning, your scenario was imaginary in such a way as
to be impossible. It is not invalid to assume a hypothetical or imaginary
scenario so as to demonstrate a point, as long as the point to be made can
be shown to relate to reality. Hence, if you study basic economics your
teacher may ask you to imagine a scenario where you are alone on an island
and have to provide for yourself, your teacher does so to illustrate the
notion of opportunity cost. But your notion of wealth was itself imaginary
in that it did not and could not pertain to a reality where scarcity is a
fact of life. Jerry, you'd be better of trying to pick up some reasoning
skills before you attempt to assess anyone else's.

[jts]

On Tuesday, January 10, 2012 10:52:06 AM UTC-7, Tim wrote:

> > According to Tim's reasoning, that is an imaginary scenario and therefore
> > any question based on it is invalid
>
> No, according to my reasoning, your scenario was imaginary in such a way as
> to be impossible.

In my second version of the question, #2 was clearly possible but still
invalid according to you.

[Tim]

"jts" <story...@gmail.com> wrote in message

news:hpo.20120110183803$7b...@news.killfile.org...

> In my second version of the question, #2 was clearly possible but still
> invalid according to you.

So maybe instead of asking stupid questions based on your imaginary world,
you should just make your point and then shut up.

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 10, 9:51�am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> Jim, at least you're addressing the topic.

Thanks. You, too, are addressing the topic. That's
more than can be said for anyone who responds
to an argument with mere counter-assertion and
personal attack.

>�That's more than we can say for Gordon.

Gordon has always been polite and reasonable in
my experience. It's possible he may not have
appreciated the true nature of the argument that you
were asking him to respond to.

> Problem is, you're still left with the same metaphysical
> bullshit that the rest of your theories engender.

Now, was that polite? No matter. We can still focus on
the argument.

>�If A's right IS B's recognition, then no action on the part

> of A can literally CAUSE the forfeiture of his rights. �This
> is because no action in one person can literally cause an
> action in another.

If I recognize that you are arguing with me, you can always
stop arguing and thereby cause me to recognize something
else. In my illustration, B was recognizing that A was saying,
"If you promise me the next banana you find, I won't interfere
with you eating this one." To this, B replied, "Okay. Agreed.
You must let me eat this one, and in return I promise that I'll
give you the next."

Both were recognizing something. They were recognizing
that they had an agreement.

But just a moment later, A reneges. He eats the /present/
banana. His action causes B to recognize something else,
namely, that they never truly had an agreement, or else,
they may have had one, but only until B dropped his guard
long enough for A to grab the banana and eat it. Either way,
does A still have the "right" to the /next/ banana, even though
he violated the condition on which B's promise was offered?

Of course not. As you yourself say, "A's right IS B's
recognition," but so of course A /can/ behave in a manner
which /changes/ B's recognition because B, all along, was
doing nothing more than recognizing A's behavior.

> The closest you could get is, "If B is rational and A does
> such-and-such, then B should consider A's rights forfeited."

That's pretty damn close, I'd say!

> That's alright, I suppose, since it captures what's actually
> going on.

Yes, it does, doesn't it?

>�The problem with your imaginary "Rule of Law" is that it

> pretends this action is going on somewhere other than
> in B's cognition.

Not quite. The Rule of Law can't actually exist with just two
men in the wild. But suppose there's a third, C, who isn't
hungry, perhaps, and who doesn't even like bananas, but
he, C, overhears the verbal exchange between A and B.
Well, in that case, C, too, is able then to recognize the
rights of each, B's right to the present banana, and A's to
the promised next. Or, suppose C is also hungry. He can
become a party to an agreement as well. Three men working
together to find and trade fruit are better than two.

In such a new agreement, it can be implicit or explicit that
if any /one/ of the three violates an agreement-specified right,
then the /other two/ will punish him for it. Now you have the
/beginnings/ of the Rule of Law. Since it /might/ start to get
harder to keep track of which man is entitled to which fruit,
the three men might decide to start keeping a written log.
Now you have the /beginnings/ of written law.

>�And further, the theory says that we can

> objectively note those actions by A that the
> rational person B would recognize as a forfeiture
> of A's rights.

Throw a thousand men into the scenario and things
will get /really/ complicated. In order to have a rights-
based society, they'll need to draft some form of
constitution spelling out the basic, inalienable
rights of each member, /and/ for the objective
enforcement of those rights, they'll also need to
have a basic, implicit kind of "Social Contract" that
says, in essence, "in order for you to /have/ the rights
enumerated in this constitution (which means, to have
one's rights /recognized/ and protected under law),
you must /accept/ the Rule of Law.

Constitutions can be good or bad. A proper constitution,
I say, is one that enshrines the concept of /contract/, of
/agreement/ among individuals, as being /the/ thing that
produces rights. The reason for this is exactly the same
reason that motivated those first two individuals, A and B,
when they first chose agreement over conflict. In other
words, the purpose of agreement and the proper purpose
of law are one and the same: to get force /out/ of the
interactions among men, thereby avoiding a cycle of
retaliation and violence that would destroy bananas
and other things. Agreement does the trick, by itself,
/assuming/ that agreements are never violated. Legally
enforceable agreements (contract) are possible when
more than two people are involved, and they are necessary,
I say, whenever dozens or hundreds or millions are involved.

> Even that would be alright by me, if it actually did it.

Yes. I understand your skepticism. You see a world
where the Rule of Law doesn't work now, and where it
has never worked. I see a world with many serious
problems, but I also see a great deal of prosperity
security, all of it related to contract-based trade.
This, agreements that are enforceable under law, thus
really does /work/, by any reasonable standard.

>�This was the whole principle of the USA that Rand
> liked so much.

I like it, too.

>�It was an attempt to do precisely that, noting that

> ANY action by A was within his "rights," except the
> only thing that a rational man would recognize as
> forfeiture...the initiation of force against another in
> a social context.

Ah, well, here again we have a situation were the
"epistemic priority" of concepts, one might say,
can get a bit skewed. The role of "rights" (stemming
from agreement, remember) is not just to avoid the
initiation of force. It is also to /define/, under the
terms of an agreement, what actions (post-
agreement) /constitute/ the initiation of force. For
example, consider a man /alone/ in the wild eating
a banana. He is not using force against anyone.
But now add /another/ hungry man, and, then,
suddenly, whichever /one/ of them takes the banana
for himself is forcing the other to starve. Is that the
"initiation of force"? Of course it is! But that's
/precisely/ the problem that having /agreement/
instead of force serves to remedy! Once the
two men agree to a procedure that defines the
"rights" of each (e.g., A gets the promise of the
next banana in return for B eating this one), then
you have situation where eating one's own bananas
is /not/ the initiation use of force but violating
the agreement (the agreement that made certain
bananas one's own to begin with) /is/ the initiation
of force.

> Sounds great, and what rational person wouldn't
> go along with that? �It's the codification of freedom
> and liberty after all, and so is perfectly fine in that
> respect.

I agree. But now consider the "Natural Rights" theory.
Under the notion that rights somehow /pre-exist/ in
or from Nature (which means, /absent/ any agreement!),
a man's "natural right" to his own life means that, if he
is starving, even if there's no agreement, he is rightfully
entitled to eat a banana growing in the wild even though
it /forces/ another man to starve! Force being agreement's
/only/ alternative, "Natural right," therefore, means nothing
at all unless it means that there's some "inborn right" to
initiate the use of force against another human being.

This is self-contradiction, and there's just no way a natural
rights theorist can avoid it.

> [...]

> [...A]s some of us see. �A's right to life will be respected

> when B, and C and D and E..., respect them. �Period. �There's
> nothing more to it, and there never was. �With that recognition,
> you don't need the piece of paper. �Without it, the piece of
> paper can't accomplish doo-doo.

Pieces of paper can be useful, as in providing evidence of
agreement to a court of law (and so evidence of the respective
rights of the contracting parties). But in general, you are correct.

The point is, however, that /what/ B and C and D and E are
actually recognizing when we say they "recognize A's rights" is
and must be some /agreement(s)/ involving A. Otherwise,
where did those "rights" come from? As I said to Gordon,
rights don't grow on trees. Bananas grow on trees. Rights
are the /consequence/ of rational men and women choosing
agreement over force.

> If you haven't seen it, here's Chris Dates's take on the matter:
>
> http://zerogov.com/?p=1867
>
> "in�al�ien�a�ble > -- adjective 1. �not to be taken away or transferred"

For me, inalienable means, not /capable/ of being taken away
or transferred "via contract," and, not /to/ be taken away by law.

I see the rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,
for example, as /preconditions/ of and implicit within any
valid contract, and not things that an agreement can be
construed as having "surrendered." B might simply /choose/
to starve to death for the sake of A, for example, but that's
just a crude act of self-sacrifice and it is not any kind of
"trade" or "contract" with A.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 11, 3:08�am, "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I agree. But now consider the "Natural Rights" theory.
> Under the notion that rights somehow /pre-exist/ in
> or from Nature (which means, /absent/ any agreement!),
> a man's "natural right" to his own life

Prescott is a collectivist who pretends that his beliefs have some
relationship to Objectivism.

The right to life of a man is in his nature from Nature.

Prescott, on the other hand, has said:

"The reason you have rights is that rights are an objective benefit to
myself and to my fellow human beings"

<<{T]he right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and
self-generated action . . . The United States was the first moral
society in history. All previous systems had regarded man as a

sacrificial means to the ends of others.>> Ayn Rand

[Jim Klein]

On 1/11/2012 3:08 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> If I recognize that you are arguing with me, you can always
> stop arguing and thereby cause me to recognize something
> else.

I've no time right now, but this is the same error.

Read it closely until you get it. I'm sure it'll seem
trivial to you, just as everything like this seems trivial
to Gordon, but my stopping arguing does not thereby cause
you to recognize that I stopped arguing. If it did, then
we'd be omniscient.

I'm confident this is relevant to the larger discussion.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 11, 10:49 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

[...M]y stopping arguing does not thereby cause

> you to recognize that I stopped arguing.

You cause me to smile, Jim. Your argument being off the topic
and fruitless is not, by itself alone, a sufficient cause of my amuse-
ment.

I also have to be capable of recognizing what you are saying.

However, you saying this is nonetheless a significant contributing
cause of me smiling.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

Today I don't have time to even read any other posts.

It's good that you're smiling, but don't forget to get
back to the point, because what I wrote is not off-topic
at all. If there was any sentence in there that you didn't
understand or with which you disagree, set it out.

"He made me laugh" is simple enough to understand, but it's
neither scientifically accurate nor precise ethics. You see,
he didn't make you laugh just as he didn't make you obligated.

But he did, or did not, recognize a right to life that you
have. IOW, you've got everything exactly backwards.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/11/2012 5:29 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> Prescott is a collectivist who pretends that his beliefs have some
> relationship to Objectivism.
>
> The right to life of a man is in his nature from Nature.

Gee, that says a lot. Are you sure it's not around his
nature from Nature?

> Prescott, on the other hand, has said:
>
> "The reason you have rights is that rights are an objective benefit to
> myself and to my fellow human beings"

It's funny that of all the bullshit Prescott offers,
you pick the one thing that can at least be interpreted
as sensible from an egoist POV. That's not to say it's
correct, but at least on its own it reads sensibly.

> <<{T]he right to life means the right to engage in self-sustaining and
> self-generated action . . . The United States was the first moral
> society in history. All previous systems had regarded man as a
> sacrificial means to the ends of others.>> Ayn Rand

Charles, it finally became grown-up time around here, if
only temporarily. How about you put down the Bible as a
source of evidence, and point to the reality that you yourself
are able to integrate?

Or do you believe that "according to Objectivism," that
would be a sin?


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 12, 6:57 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/11/2012 5:29 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Prescott is a collectivist who pretends that his beliefs have some
> > relationship to Objectivism.
>
> > The right to life of a man is in his nature from Nature.
>
> Gee, that says a lot.  Are you sure it's not around his
> nature from Nature?
>

A semantic distinction without a difference.

> > Prescott, on the other hand, has said:
>
> > "The reason you have rights is that rights are an objective benefit to
> > myself and to my fellow human beings"
>
> It's funny that of all the bullshit Prescott offers,
> you pick the one thing that can at least be interpreted
> as sensible from an egoist POV.

That would be his wedge issue: something that may sound right to those
who kinda, sorta believe in the value of selfishness but who do not
actually know what it entails from genuine Objectivist ethics. At
best is it utilitarianism but more likely leads to separatist
totalitarianism as in fascism and either way is 100% collectivism. It
is the sort of thinking from those who object to Objectivist ethics
and implicit politics as fascism: "off to the gas chambers you go"
Whittaker Chambers and others who comment on Objectivism.

. . . or . . .

If "rights" are left to a singular meaning as in a "right to turn
right at a red light after full stop" the moral content of /individual
rights/ is trivialized to something no one seriously interested in
ethics and politics ought to be discussing.

>snip [incomprehensible nonsense]

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 12, 11:09 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/12/2012 4:36 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>

> > [..Y]ou saying this is nonetheless a significant contributing
> > cause of me smiling.

> [...]

> "He made me laugh" is simple enough to understand, but it's
> neither scientifically accurate nor precise ethics.

You are right about that. My recognition of his actions is what
caused me to laugh, and he didn't literally "make me laugh,"
or even "make me recognize," as if he had some power over
my muscles or my mind.

>  You see, he didn't make you laugh just as he didn't make
> you obligated.

Well, here it's a different situation. He didn't literally "make"
me feel obligated when, say, he threatened me with a lawsuit,
even though my recognition of his words is relevant there.
He can't control my feelings with some mysterious power.

However, Jim, "feeling obligated" and "being obligated" are
NOT the same thing. As I've explained to you many times, if
you sign a contract without reading it first, you can end up /being/
obligated in countless ways that you don't even know about.

Your recognition of your own obligations is a /very/ good
thing to have, but it isn't necessary to the existence of an
obligation. So it is you, Jim, who have things exactly back-
wards here: /You/ have no mysterious power to control
the expectations, reliance and demands of /others/.

> But he did, or did not, recognize a right to life that you

> have. [...]

The question was, how do you have it? I liked your response
to Charles, BTW, that you think my statement, that rights exist
/because/ they are of objective benefit to those agreeing to
have and to respect them, is correct or at least logically
defensible. A right is a freedom to act in a social context,
and, like obligations, you can have some rights that you
don't even realize you have.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/13/2012 5:28 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> The question was, how do you have it? I liked your response
> to Charles, BTW, that you think my statement, that rights exist
> /because/ they are of objective benefit to those agreeing to
> have and to respect them, is correct or at least logically
> defensible. A right is a freedom to act in a social context,
> and, like obligations, you can have some rights that you
> don't even realize you have.

Yeahbut when broken down, it turns out that your rights
ARE actually something that resides in the others.

Your claim breaks down that when the cognition happens
in others, then YOU have the obligation.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 13, 9:57 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/13/2012 5:28 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>

> > [...] A right is a freedom to act in a social context,

> > and, like obligations, you can have some rights that you
> > don't even realize you have.
>
> Yeahbut when broken down, it turns out that your rights
> ARE actually something that resides in the others.

A right is a freedom to act. If other's interfere with you acting,
then it's either that you had no right to act so, or that you had
such a right but it is being violated. Rights can't exist in the
first place, though, without being recognized (and respected
and protected) by at least /some/ others in a/the community.

Alone on an island you have no "rights." Without some cognition
on the part of others you have no rights. This should be obvious.

> Your claim breaks down that when the cognition happens
> in others, then YOU have the obligation.

And....so....you have a problem with that?

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/14/2012 2:13 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> Alone on an island you have no "rights." Without some cognition
> on the part of others you have no rights. This should be obvious.
>
>> Your claim breaks down that when the cognition happens
>> in others, then YOU have the obligation.
>
> And....so....you have a problem with that?

Sure...your obligation to intellectual honesty, assuming you
have it as you claimed, still exsits on that deserted island.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

What are you talking about? Alone on an island I would have
no obligations whatsoever. Obviously.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/14/2012 10:48 PM, James E. Prescott wrote:

>> Sure...your obligation to intellectual honesty, assuming you
>> have it as you claimed, still exsits on that deserted island.
>
> What are you talking about? Alone on an island I would have
> no obligations whatsoever. Obviously.

In your definition, obviously. But then, your definition
says that others create some state in you, since that's
what obligation is. This is distinguished from rights,
since precisely speaking, the state of your rights is in
others.

I brought up intellectual honesty because you brought it
up. As I intimated at the time, what difference would
it make if you were on an island or not? Just make it
"honesty" if you prefer. If you have created an obligation
in yourself to be honest, would you not be honest, at least
with yourself, on the island?

What if you created an obligation for yourself to brush your
teeth daily, and you have your toothbrush with you? Would
the obligation disappear? For that matter, does that obligation
here on Earth really rest on the expectations, yadda yadda of others?


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 15, 12:17 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/14/2012 10:48 PM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> >> Sure...your obligation to intellectual honesty, assuming you
> >> have it as you claimed, still exsits on that deserted island.
>
> > What are you talking about? Alone on an island I would have
> > no obligations whatsoever. Obviously.
>
> In your definition, obviously.

Yes. In my definition.

> But then, your definition says that others create some state

> in you [...]

No. A "state within you" arises when you apprehend the
obligations that you are under. This can be the moment
that you make a promise to someone, or, it might be the
moment someone informs you of the passage of a new
law.

>, since that's what obligation is.

Come again?

Is that /your/ definition of obligation, Jim? Obligation is
"some state within you"? Please try again. Some state
within you could refer to vertigo or indigestion.

> This is distinguished from rights,
> since precisely speaking, the state
> of your rights is in others.

Now, this is helpful! Both rights /and/ obligations (sticking
with my definition for a moment; humor me; it's the only
definition that's out there on the table, so to speak)
require /people/, the plural of person.

In other words...

A right that you have is just an obligation of a negative kind
on the part of /others/. It is the obligation of others not to
interfere with the specified freedom of action.

But, if my definition is assumed, then who is it, exactly,
that expects, relies upon and demands that they fulfill
this particular obligation? Well, for one's own rights, we
might say it is oneself: Jim Klein expects, relies upon
and demands that others respect Jim Klein's rights.

But that doesn't go nearly far enough. I, also, demand
that others respect Jim's rights.

In general, though it is a bit of a figurative expression,
the law demands it. Law isn't a person, so the expression
actually denotes anyone and everyone who believes in
law: People make and enforce laws. And it is people that
expect, rely upon and demand compliance with law. So,
judges in courts demand that others respect Jim's rights.
Prosecutors demand it. Juries demand it. And so forth.
I, as a particular individual, am just one of many who also
demand it, especially when I'm sitting on a jury.

> I brought up intellectual honesty because you brought it
> up.  As I intimated at the time, what difference would
> it make if you were on an island or not?  Just make it
> "honesty" if you prefer.  If you have created an obligation
> in yourself to be honest, would you not be honest, at least
> with yourself, on the island?

I would be honest. I believe I should be honest at all times,
in all circumstances, especially with myself, whether alone
on a deserted island or in the middle of Manhattan.

However, I would not call this, or any other principle of
morality, an "obligation," unless it is something that others
expect, rely upon and demand of me.

I would indeed call it a /requirement/, yes, even without
the involvement of others, in the sense of its being a step
needed for the attainment of a moral purpose.

But if obligation and requirement were synonymous,
we'd need a different word (I recall you suggesting
one, once) to denote what I'm talking about when I say
obligation.

But we don't actually need a new word at all, because
obligation does just fine by itself, so long as we have
the word requirement for other meanings.

All we do need, is for you to acknowledge the distinction
between moral "requirements," which do not necessarily
involve other people, and promissory, legal, contractual,
or even just crudely imposed "expectations, reliance and
demands," which always /do/ involve other people, and
which all are neatly denoted by the word "obligation."

You /should/ be moral, I say. Always. But you are not
"obligated" to be moral.

If you are not moral, you will simply fail, because morality
is the set of values and principles you require in order to
obtain a moral purpose. If you /were/ obligated to behave
in certain way, the implication, I say, would be that others
expect, rely upon and demand that behavior,

Nonetheless, you are right, Jim, about one important
aspect of this: Your free will is necessarily involved,
also, in any obligation that you have. For example, if,
while you are asleep or otherwise unconscious, I were
to lift you up and carry you from one place to another,
it wouldn't make sense to say that you were "obligated
to move." I never expected, relied upon and demanded
that you move. I simply moved you myself.

To say that you /are/ "obligated to move" is to say that I,
or the law, or somebody else, expects, relies upon and
demands that you move /yourself/, exercising your own
control over your own muscles. You can't be obligated
unless you are a reasoning being who is free to control
his own actions, which means, free to fulfill, or to not
fulfill, his own obligations.

> What if you created an obligation for yourself to brush
> your teeth daily, and you have your toothbrush with you?

How do you create an obligation for yourself, Jim?
Please explain what that means, if you can. I believe
you can indeed create an obligation for yourself when
you make a promise to someone else and when that
promise becomes a thing that he expects, relies upon
and demands that you fulfill.

But even if you promised me that you would brush your
teeth, that would not (unless I was your mother, perhaps!)
become something that I would ever expect, rely upon or
demand.

I couldn't care less if you brush your teeth or not, and you
promising to do so just wouldn't make any difference at all.

So, there is just no way on Earth you can create an obligation
within yourself to brush your own teeth. You /ought/ to brush
your teeth, of course. But you don't ever create an obligation
to do so. That just doesn't make any sense. Or, can you
explain how it /might/ make sense? I'll be listening.

> Would the obligation disappear?

It wouldn't exist in the first place.

> For that matter, does that obligation here on Earth really
> rest on the expectations, yadda yadda of others?

Well, it would, I suppose, if there were some law,
or insurance contract, perhaps, requiring you to
brush your teeth or else pay a fine or go without
dental coverage for not doing so -- a kind of
"individual mandate."

Otherwise, there is no such obligation here on Earth.

I do suggest, of course, that you brush your teeth. And
you already know that you /ought/ to brush your teeth.
What you can't do, however, is create an "obligation within
yourself" to do it. That phrase just doesn't make any sense.
Or, perhaps you can explain what it means?

I'm listening.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/15/2012 6:29 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> A right that you have is just an obligation of a negative kind
> on the part of /others/. It is the obligation of others not to
> interfere with the specified freedom of action.
>
> But, if my definition is assumed,

If a definition is assumed, then there's never anything
to talk about. Charles has plants having some odd sort
of "purpose" /because/ he defines "purpose" as synonymous
with "the self-generation of animate entities," Gordon
has intrinsic "rights" /because/ he defines "rights" as
some existent external to the cognition of the actors, and
you have "obligation" as a myriad of building blocks for
statism /because/ you define it as you do.

Me, I'm trying to identify this stuff. For this, I'm known
by the faithful as "an enemy of Objectivism."

> then who is it, exactly,
> that expects, relies upon and demands that they fulfill
> this particular obligation? Well, for one's own rights, we
> might say it is oneself: Jim Klein expects, relies upon
> and demands that others respect Jim Klein's rights.
>
> But that doesn't go nearly far enough. I, also, demand
> that others respect Jim's rights.
>
> In general, though it is a bit of a figurative expression,
> the law demands it.

I can't say that this is my point with you, but I'll note
that this is one reason it never works...or at least never
has over the long run. You've got words "demanding" something,
and of course that's a huge category error.

> All we do need, is for you to acknowledge the distinction
> between moral "requirements," which do not necessarily
> involve other people, and promissory, legal, contractual,
> or even just crudely imposed "expectations, reliance and
> demands," which always /do/ involve other people,

Sure I acknowledge that distinction. I can just look
out there and see those things, regardless of what they're called.

> and
> which all are neatly denoted by the word "obligation."

No, and that's your trick. By /defining/ them "all" as
obligation, you're off to the races with a series of
misidentifications, concept-switches and who knows what
all else, to get to the conclusion you want.

Sure, it's "neat." So is defining "America" as something
other than Americans; so is defining "highest good" as something
outside of yourself; so is defining "morality" as altruism.

Big deal...what does neatness have to do with accurate identification?

> To say that you /are/ "obligated to move" is to say that I,
> or the law, or somebody else, expects, relies upon and
> demands that you move /yourself/, exercising your own
> control over your own muscles.

I am obligated to move when I decide to move and accept that
as an obligation. Period. There is /nothing/ you can do to
give rise to that obligation...outside of persuasion, of course.

Period. You can move move me physically and you can even coerce
me to move, but you /can't/ obligate me to move. Only I can do
that.

As I note, you can use various means to /persuade/ me to be
obligated to move. /This/ is what's going on with all your
contracts, agreements, reliances and so on. But the obligation
itself...is /exclusively/ within me and of my choice. That's
why you need your screwy "legal obligation" and its screwy
derivation...to pretend that this isn't so.

> You can't be obligated
> unless you are a reasoning being who is free to control
> his own actions, which means, free to fulfill, or to not
> fulfill, his own obligations.

There it is---"HIS OWN OBLIGATIONS." That's why this is related
to exactly what owning and owing are, and it's why I wrote the
essay at splendorquest.

You /say/ "his own," but you don't really /mean/ "his own."
You mean, "something within him and something within someone
else."

>> What if you created an obligation for yourself to brush
>> your teeth daily, and you have your toothbrush with you?
>
> How do you create an obligation for yourself, Jim?

Uh...volitionally?

> Please explain what that means, if you can. I believe
> you can indeed create an obligation for yourself when
> you make a promise to someone else and when that
> promise becomes a thing that he expects, relies upon
> and demands that you fulfill.

We've only gone over this about a dozen times. If you
make a promise--even completely within yourself and not
shared with anyone at all--to be intellectually honest,
then you have an obligation to be intellectually honest,
without regard to any expectations of anyone else.

This is both sensible on its face, and it's accurate with
regard to the state of reality. That is, it's true.

You just /define/ your way out of this fact, which is an
invalid approach.

> But even if you promised me that you would brush your
> teeth, that would not (unless I was your mother, perhaps!)
> become something that I would ever expect, rely upon or
> demand.

Just look at how ridiculous this is. I don't have the
obligation according to you, but if suddenly you do
expect it, then suddenly I have the obligation.

You'd recognize that as crazy were it not for why you
hold the belief. Down the road, you're going to transform
it into the expectations of a bunch of looters to create
some obligation in me.

Sorry, it's no more sensible there than it is here.

> I couldn't care less if you brush your teeth or not, and you
> promising to do so just wouldn't make any difference at all.

Right, but like I say, if suddenly you do care, then suddenly
some "state of obligation" is created /within me/.

> So, there is just no way on Earth you can create an obligation
> within yourself to brush your own teeth. You /ought/ to brush
> your teeth, of course. But you don't ever create an obligation
> to do so. That just doesn't make any sense.

"I'm obligating myself to brush my teeth daily," doesn't make sense?

> Or, can you
> explain how it /might/ make sense? I'll be listening.

The question isn't whether you're listening; it's
whether you're hearing!

>> Would the obligation disappear?
>
> It wouldn't exist in the first place.
>
>> For that matter, does that obligation here on Earth really
>> rest on the expectations, yadda yadda of others?
>
> Well, it would, I suppose, if there were some law,
> or insurance contract, perhaps, requiring you to
> brush your teeth or else pay a fine or go without
> dental coverage for not doing so -- a kind of
> "individual mandate."

Uh huh. So I can't obligate myself to brush my teeth daily,
but some clerk in Hartford that I've never met, can?

And you're telling me about what makes sense?


> I'm listening.

That's nice. Now just step it up a drop, and hear.


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/15/2012 10:51 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
...

> Gordon
> has intrinsic "rights" /because/ he defines "rights" as
> some existent external to the cognition of the actors, and

Just as the rules of chess are "external" to the cognition of the
actors. That is, *some* actors moving the pieces around on the board
knew the rules and *some* do not.

You have not yet addressed my question about where the rules of chess go
in my hypothetical when all the chess players die, and then a person
comes along and learns the rules from a book (a hypo that you thought of
independently!). Or, for that matter, where the "cognitive existents"
go when we are asleep.

It's beginning to seem that you only have a "cognitive existents" hammer
in your toolbox, so you use it even when, say, a screw driver is needed.

--
Gordon

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 15, 10:51 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On 1/15/2012 6:29 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>

> > [...]

> I am obligated to move when I decide to move and accept that
> as an obligation.

What do you mean, "obligation"?

>  Period.

??? What does it mean to "accept moving as an obligation"?
Jim. seriously, I've no idea what you are trying to say here.
Define "obligation," please!

> [...Y]ou /can't/ obligate me to move.  Only I can do
> that.

Do WHAT??????????????????

/What/ on earth do you mean by "obligate myself to move,"
Jim? Do you mean, "move"? If you mean, move, say, move. Why
on earth would you instead say, "obligate myself to move."
What the heck is that supposed to mean??????

> [...]

> "I'm obligating myself to brush my teeth daily," doesn't make
> sense?

Correct. Now you're getting the idea. It doesn't make any sense
whatsoever.

Even to /you/, Jim, that statement, "I'm obligating myself to brush
my teeth," makes no sense whatsoever. If it did make any sense,
even to YOU, then you'd be able to explain what it /means/, don't
you think?

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 15, 12:04 pm, Gordon Sollars <gsoll...@pobox.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 10:51 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
> ...
>
> > Gordon
> > has intrinsic "rights" /because/ he defines "rights" as
> > some existent external to the cognition of the actors, and
>
> Just as the rules of chess are "external" to the cognition of the
> actors.

There are no rules which are external to the cognition of any actor,
and moving chess pieces around on a chess board is moving chess pieces
around on a chess board according to rules or not according to rules
without or without awarness of any rules.

Which rule was external to your cognition when you wrote:

"So the Jew has no right to life."

or did you know a rule and ignored it, or did you not know the rule
and therefore could not follow it even with intent to follow, or did
you not know rule and had no intent to follow any rule, or do you
claim that the rule was external to your cognitive ability?

If a moral rule, external to cognition, constrains one nevertheless,
how? On the other hand, inasmuch as there is no such thing in reality
any constraint on an obligation not self-imposed there is no conflict
or contradiction in reality between an obligation to do nothing and an
unimposable obligation.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 15, 10:51 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 6:29 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> > A right that you have is just an obligation of a negative kind
> > on the part of /others/. It is the obligation of others not to
> > interfere with the specified freedom of action.
>
> > But, if my definition is assumed,
>
> If a definition is assumed, then there's never anything
> to talk about.  Charles has plants having some odd sort
> of "purpose" /because/ he defines "purpose" as synonymous
> with "the self-generation of animate entities,"

purpose: something as an object or end to be attained

Rand excludes teleology from "action" "goal" and "value", and removes
conscious human intent from "purpose" (and "value") in the Webster's
definition one has "something as an object or end to be attained.

Prescott makes no attempt to stay with Rand.

> Me, I'm trying to identify this stuff.  For this, I'm known
> by the faithful as "an enemy of Objectivism."
>

No, you do not in the case of Rand's argument for O'ist ethics. You
dismiss her words as she uses them as not to your liking, do not call
yourself an Objectivist, and hold various viewpoints (e.g., on
anarchy) that are antithetical to Objectivism. You are very bad at
"identifying" from a disinterested POV and fairly assessing meaning,
intent, and logical conclusions. One should always pick a Democrat to
analyze Republican speeches, right?

[Jim Klein]

On 1/15/2012 12:04 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> You have not yet addressed my question about where the rules of chess go
> in my hypothetical when all the chess players die, and then a person
> comes along and learns the rules from a book (a hypo that you thought of
> independently!). Or, for that matter, where the "cognitive existents" go
> when we are asleep.

Gee, I don't know, Gordon. Where does the ownership of my
land go, if the State collapses?

> It's beginning to seem that you only have a "cognitive existents" hammer
> in your toolbox, so you use it even when, say, a screw driver is needed.

Guilty, but on the level I'm speaking, everything IS a nail!


jk

[Jim Klein]

In your lingo, Jim, call it a "promise" or an "oath."

I understand the etymology, but I don't care. This is
a case where historic usage won't help us. Whatever it
is, it's an epistemic state within myself, and only I can
create those. As I say, period.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/15/2012 4:30 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> purpose: something as an object or end to be attained

That's what I thought. So the rolling rock does indeed
have the purpose to get to the bottom of the hill.

You can't plead to "to be attained" as if it were from
the object's POV, since you yourself have eliminated
teleology as having anything to do with it.

So what...did we just prove that rocks are alive?


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 15, 7:17 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 4:30 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > purpose: something as an object or end to be attained
>
> That's what I thought.  So the rolling rock does indeed
> have the purpose to get to the bottom of the hill.
>

No, external force of gravity acts between the rock and the ground.
There is no self-generated action as there would be for an animate
entity.

On Jan 13, 9:59 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> On 1/13/2012 6:39 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
> > Yes, the difference between an inanimate object and a living organism
> > is that the organism must take action to alter its condition or even
> > maintain the same condition, and an inanimate object takes no action
> > but is only acted upon by external forces, so its "action" is illusory
> > or metaphorical to that taken by living organisms.
> >

> You mean any "self-generated" action is illusory.
>

That a rock generates its own action to fall is illusory -- a kind of
animism imagined for inanimate objects. On the other hand, a plant's,
and any living organism's, actions are self-generated. That is the
difference in a nutshell between the animate and the inanimate -- so
simple that Rand used it as an example for a small child's first
concept formation.

> But nobody
> is claiming that it takes self-generated action,

There is not a single adult on the planet earth who claims an animate
entity's actions are not self-generated, except you. There are stone-
age mystics who are animists who claim some inanimate objects and
forces can be possessed by a spirit to act as animate entities.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/15/2012 7:42 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> No, external force of gravity acts between the rock and the ground.
> There is no self-generated action as there would be for an animate
> entity.

That's fine, Charles. For our purposes(!) here, we
have no dispute about this.

> That a rock generates its own action to fall is illusory -- a kind of
> animism imagined for inanimate objects. On the other hand, a plant's,
> and any living organism's, actions are self-generated. That is the
> difference in a nutshell between the animate and the inanimate -- so
> simple that Rand used it as an example for a small child's first
> concept formation.

Fine. Again, no dispute.

> There is not a single adult on the planet earth who claims an animate
> entity's actions are not self-generated, except you.

But I don't claim it. As I mentioned, this has been acknowledged
since all the way back to the "Binswanger's Errors" threads. Plus,
I reiterated above that we have no dispute.

> There are stone-
> age mystics who are animists who claim some inanimate objects and
> forces can be possessed by a spirit to act as animate entities.

Then take it up with them. And don't bother bringing up cites from
me where I use /your/ usage of "self-generated" to show that rocks
are likewise self-generated.

None of that matters any more. As I hope I've made clear, I fully
acknowledge that both self-generation (as we're now using the concept)
and even particular types of replicative functions (we could pinpoint
those too) are distinguishing attributes of living entities on Earth,
that are not attributes of non-living entities.

Is that clear enough for you...NOW??

So all you've got to do is somehow bring "purpose" or "value"
into it. I don't think you can sensibly do that. You can
/define/ the two concepts as being synonymous with "self-
generative" and/or "replicative," but can you /identify/
anything with it? My position is that you can't, but if
stay on topic and do it, I'm all ears.

If you can't, then I'm sure your new-found pride in your
intellectual honesty will concede that I've been right
all along.

That's all. You've rationally identified that self-generation
and replicative functions are distinguishing attributes of
living entities. Both might take some fine refinishing, of
the sort Rod gave, to make them full distinctions from say,
a car or crystals. But it's reasonable and it can be done.
That is, they have referents for which all presence falls on
the side of life and all absence falls on the side of non-life.

Now stay on topic and stay focused. Let's see you do the same
with "purpose" and "value." You won't be able to do that
sensibly--that is, without just defining your way into the
matter--because both of those, in any sensible meaning, /do/
involve teleology.

Rand's point was that there is a referent of those that do
not involve teleology. And I'm saying that if you remove
the teleology from their reference--their meaning--you will
not be able to come up with a definition such that their
presence always falls on the side of the living and their
absence always falls on the side of the non-living, like you
are able to do with the other two concepts.

Go ahead. Make my day and show that wrong.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/15/2012 9:32 PM, Jim Klein wrote:

> Go ahead. Make my day and show that wrong.

I don't want you to waste time on this, Charles; I
want you to /say/ something. So please don't come
up with the tired "end" thing. If you're just going
to say that "an end for living things means an end
that is self-generated, which it is not for rocks,"
then you've said nothing at all which wasn't contained
in the "self-generated" part. I hope you get that.

If you don't, then we should deal with that first. This
is a big point, at least for you, because it may be the
first time you actually /learn/ that Rand could be wrong
about something. Don't look at it as losing a master;
look at it as gaining a mind!


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/15/2012 7:00 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 12:04 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>> You have not yet addressed my question about where the rules of chess go
>> in my hypothetical when all the chess players die, and then a person
>> comes along and learns the rules from a book (a hypo that you thought of
>> independently!). Or, for that matter, where the "cognitive existents" go
>> when we are asleep.
>
> Gee, I don't know, Gordon.

Well, you better work on it; it's your theory that is sucking wind here.
I have no problem with the rules of chess existing in a book.

> Where does the ownership of my
> land go, if the State collapses?

What "State" has collapsed? The federal government or a state
government? And how did the "State" collapse? Is a new "State" formed
after the collapse? Details matter.

--
Gordon

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/15/2012 4:21 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
> On Jan 15, 12:04 pm, Gordon Sollars<gsoll...@pobox.com> wrote:
>> On 1/15/2012 10:51 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
>> ...
>>
>>> Gordon
>>> has intrinsic "rights" /because/ he defines "rights" as
>>> some existent external to the cognition of the actors, and
>>
>> Just as the rules of chess are "external" to the cognition of the
>> actors.
>
> There are no rules which are external to the cognition of any actor,

There would be if all chess players died and the rules survived only in
a book.
...

> If a moral rule, external to cognition, constrains one nevertheless,
> how?

Because one ought to follow it - assuming it is a proper moral rule. It
constrains the way a property line "constrain". You may have the power
to step over it, but then you are trespassing.

On the other hand, inasmuch as there is no such thing in reality
> any constraint on an obligation not self-imposed there is no conflict

What is the constraint on a *self-imposed* obligation? Here, let me
refresh your memory of an earlier exchange:

> namely that
> obligations are always chosen and if obligations which represent or
> come from moral precepts, such as Rand's right from coercion in an
> obligation of a negative kind, and ARE NOT CHOSEN, we get bad
> consequences -- like Nazis who did not choose that obligation and then
> murdered Jews who still have and always had rights.

To say that the Jews had *rights* to life that were not violated when
they were murdered is to say they had no rights to life at all. It says
they have something of no value whatsoever.

The Nazis *had* the obligation to respect the Jews' rights to life, but
the Nazis did not choose to *act* on that obligation. Consider that
people make promises that they do not keep. Not acting according to
obligation does not mean that there is no obligation; it means that the
obligation was ignored.

> There is no
> (moral) constraint in reality but rather a Nazi who freely chooses or
> does not choose that obligation of a negative kind.

There is no force in reality that makes people act on their obligations.
If Smith promises to meet Jones for lunch, no tractor beam or force
field will drag Smith to the lunch against his will. Nevertheless,
Smith *has* an obligation. Or now do you deny that there are even any
*chosen* obligations?

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 12:01 AM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

>> Where does the ownership of my
>> land go, if the State collapses?
>
> What "State" has collapsed? The federal government or a state
> government? And how did the "State" collapse? Is a new "State" formed
> after the collapse? Details matter.

All of 'em, both, any way you want and no.

So what happened to the ownership of my land?


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 12:10 AM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

>> There are no rules which are external to the cognition of any actor,
>
> There would be if all chess players died and the rules survived only in
> a book.

There you go again; grains of sand. You are attempting to
deny the cognitive necessity of rules, AS RULES. They're
not rules without that cognition; they are denotations or
artifacts of rules.

>> If a moral rule, external to cognition, constrains one nevertheless,
>> how?
>
> Because one ought to follow it - assuming it is a proper moral rule.

Uh huh. And so what, now you're claiming that "proper"
itself can be external to judgment? Or are you further
claiming that even judgment is external to cognition?

> It
> constrains the way a property line "constrain". You may have the power
> to step over it, but then you are trespassing.

Once again you jumble it up. The property line itself
is a physical thing and IT exists whether or not anyone
does. This is DISTINCT from it being a demarcation of
property or OWNership.

You really can't see that distinction?

> On the other hand, inasmuch as there is no such thing in reality
>> any constraint on an obligation not self-imposed there is no conflict
>
> What is the constraint on a *self-imposed* obligation? Here, let me
> refresh your memory of an earlier exchange:
>
> > namely that
> > obligations are always chosen and if obligations which represent or
> > come from moral precepts, such as Rand's right from coercion in an
> > obligation of a negative kind, and ARE NOT CHOSEN, we get bad
> > consequences -- like Nazis who did not choose that obligation and then
> > murdered Jews who still have and always had rights.
>
> To say that the Jews had *rights* to life that were not violated when
> they were murdered is to say they had no rights to life at all.

No it isn't. We can say that they had a right to life because
SOME people exist who recognize the principles behind that.

We can also say that quite obviously, they didn't have any
right to life from the perspective of their murderers. Or
maybe better, that their murders didn't recognize their right
to life that other, more reasonable, people do.

In any event, you don't have any right to life there absent
SOMEBODY'S recognition, and you are clearly saying that there
is such a thing. You are mistaken on this, just as you are
mistaken about meaningful statements.

> It says
> they have something of no value whatsoever.

"Value...to whom and for what." The point isn't that Rand
said it; the point is that value is meaningless in its absence.

Mabye if you get it on this, Charles will get it on plants.

> The Nazis *had* the obligation to respect the Jews' rights to life, but
> the Nazis did not choose to *act* on that obligation.

More of the same. What does that MEAN, to say they
had the "obligation"? Prescott can give you some
help on that, but are you sure you want to go there?

> Consider that
> people make promises that they do not keep. Not acting according to
> obligation does not mean that there is no obligation; it means that the
> obligation was ignored.

No, it means the promise wasn't kept and therefore it
never rose to the level of an obligation. Being creatures
of volition, "having an obligation" technically speaking
means "doing an obligation."

> > There is no
> > (moral) constraint in reality but rather a Nazi who freely chooses or
> > does not choose that obligation of a negative kind.
>
> There is no force in reality that makes people act on their obligations.
> If Smith promises to meet Jones for lunch, no tractor beam or force
> field will drag Smith to the lunch against his will. Nevertheless, Smith
> *has* an obligation. Or now do you deny that there are even any *chosen*
> obligations?

This is not a study of the various ways in which words are
used. This is a study of the nature of an obligation. As
a cognitive state that exists within a person, there can be
no such thing as "an obligation that isn't fulfilled," just
as there's no such thing as a decision that isn't carried out.

Yes, this is technically speaking, but think about it. If it's
not carried out, then it wasn't really a decision, was it? It
was a pretense to a decision, or maybe even a decision that was
changed. Any way you cut it, all the action is going on in the
consciousness of the actor, and so it is with obligation.

Otherwise, as I say, you can just let Jim take over. You seem
willing to acknowledge that there are chosen obligations, so
what could it mean, again technically speaking, to say that one
didn't fulfill a chosen obligation? It would either mean he
didn't take it as an obligation, in which case it wasn't an
obligation technically speaking. Or it would mean he was
physically prevented from fulfilling the obligation, whether
due to illness or death, or someone like Jim being around.

Either way, it was wholly HIS cognition that created the
obligation. This should be completely acceptable to you,
at least in the case of chosen obligations. If it's not,
then you must have a screwy view of "chosen" as well.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 15, 7:04 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> In your lingo, Jim, call it a "promise" or an "oath."

I'm guessing this is intended as an answer to my request
that you attempt to define the word, "obligation" and explain
what it means to "obligate oneself, within one's own mind."

Switching to another another word like promise or oath
doesn't help. Define promise. Promises and oaths are
expressed to others, and they are certainly not obligations,
and they do not even produce obligations unless the behavior
specified in the promise or the oath comes to be expected,
relied upon, and demanded.

> I understand the etymology, but I don't care.

Well, you should. How do you expect to communicate?

> This is a case where historic usage won't help us.

If the usage, the actual meaning of the word, won't help you,
then you should go ahead and suggest another usage, suggest
another meaning. I'm open to any reasonable proposal.

>  Whatever it is, it's an epistemic state within myself

No, it is not. Not "whatever it is," anyway; and, if you can't
define it or describe it, then you don't know what it is, so
I'll tell you. An obligation is a behavior by one human being
that is expected, relied upon and demanded by /other/
human beings, such as paying for that car you've leased.

This is only an "epistemic state within yourself" whenever
you happen to be /aware/ of the obligation and so facing
the choice to fulfill it or not fulfill it. And, obviously, since
you can have many obligations of which you are completely
unaware, it is patently ludicrous to suggest that an obligation
is just some "epistemic state within yourself."

>, and only I can create those.
>  As I say, period.

A period should end a meaningful sentence, Jim. But this
is PURE bullshit. It is a vain hope that mere repetition will
lend credence to an absolutely absurd and utterly baseless
claim. Put down the shovel. I know you can do better!

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[James E. Prescott]

Allow me to help. The Duke of Earl, let's say, represents
the State in the person of the King. The Duke owns all of
Earl, by the King's decree, and the peasants pay him for
the privilege of occupying portions his land. They recognize
the Duke's ownership until one day a revolution far away
ends with the King's head being lopped off and the Duke
fleeing into exile. Now the Duke's ownership of his land has
gone away with him. The peasants decide among them-
selves that from then on each will own the portion of
land that he had previously leased. A new government
is established and, as one of its first laws, it adopts
as enforceable the agreement that those peasants had
reached among themselves. But soon the Duke returns
with an army and destroys the new government, and, with it,
destroys the ownership that had been newly established.

So, the issue is not whether ownership depends
on recognition. Of course it does. Always. The issue
is always and only, /what/ should we be recognizing?

Should we recognize, as binding, a claim to the
the Divine Right of Kings? Or, should we be
recognizing instead the agreements reached
among equals? I say the former is evil and the
latter is good, but in every case, for good or evil,
ownership obviously always depends on the
mutual recognition of /something/.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 6:00 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> So, the issue is not whether ownership depends
> on recognition. Of course it does. Always. The issue
> is always and only, /what/ should we be recognizing?

Yawn.

> Should we recognize, as binding, a claim to the
> the Divine Right of Kings? Or, should we be
> recognizing instead the agreements reached
> among equals? I say the former is evil and the
> latter is good, but in every case, for good or evil,
> ownership obviously always depends on the
> mutual recognition of /something/.

You're talking about estate, which is derivative of
ownership. Ownership is the existential state of,
um, owning; estate is the means of codifying it; title
is the means of denoting that. May we agree on that usage?

Let's start simple. Who owns me? Who owns the
physical/mental entity that is my body and my mind?

Is not myself, owned by me? This would seem indisputable,
unless you're just going to define your way out of it, by
claiming ownership must be a legal recognition. Further,
it seems like a logical way to start.

So what if nobody else, and I mean nobody, recognizes this?
What if I find myself in a society or culture which denies
this, and instead recognizes me only as property of either
some Higher Spirit or maybe some committee they formed...not
so far-fetched these days, eh?

Do I therefore not own myself in this society? You can get
there, but only by /defining/ your way there. If ownership
means something existential--anything existential--then surely
one's ownership of one's, ahem, own self, is the place to start.

Can we get off the starting line?


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 5:25 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

>> In your lingo, Jim, call it a "promise" or an "oath."
>
> I'm guessing this is intended as an answer to my request
> that you attempt to define the word, "obligation" and explain
> what it means to "obligate oneself, within one's own mind."
>
> Switching to another another word like promise or oath
> doesn't help.

Not in your case, it doesn't!

> Define promise. Promises and oaths are
> expressed to others, and they are certainly not obligations,
> and they do not even produce obligations unless the behavior
> specified in the promise or the oath comes to be expected,
> relied upon, and demanded.

Uh huh. So your obligation to intellectual honesty only applies
to those who expect, demand or rely upon it? That's interesting;
do you keep a roster?

>> I understand the etymology, but I don't care.
>
> Well, you should. How do you expect to communicate?

As best I can. Sometimes it's difficult, like with
"morality" itself, which is often taken to be only
about our interaction with others. But we seem able
to get over that hurdle, don't we?

>> This is a case where historic usage won't help us.
>
> If the usage, the actual meaning of the word, won't help you,
> then you should go ahead and suggest another usage, suggest
> another meaning. I'm open to any reasonable proposal.

I /am/ suggesting another meaning, specifically the one that's
correspondent with reality.

>> Whatever it is, it's an epistemic state within myself
>
> No, it is not. Not "whatever it is," anyway; and, if you can't
> define it or describe it, then you don't know what it is,

But I can.

> so I'll tell you. An obligation is a behavior by one human being
> that is expected, relied upon and demanded by /other/
> human beings, such as paying for that car you've leased.

And that does not correctly capture what's going on, intuitive
though it may sound.

> This is only an "epistemic state within yourself" whenever
> you happen to be /aware/ of the obligation and so facing
> the choice to fulfill it or not fulfill it. And, obviously, since
> you can have many obligations of which you are completely
> unaware, it is patently ludicrous to suggest that an obligation
> is just some "epistemic state within yourself."

But you can't have that. An obligation /is/ something
created within yourself /and/ it's conscious.

>> , and only I can create those.
>> As I say, period.
>
> A period should end a meaningful sentence, Jim. But this
> is PURE bullshit. It is a vain hope that mere repetition will
> lend credence to an absolutely absurd and utterly baseless
> claim. Put down the shovel. I know you can do better!

It's only "absurd and utterly baseless" to you because you
aren't willing to look at the facts of the matter.

Look, the act is transitive...one must be obligated /about/
something; one can't just be obligated, period. We agree
about that. If you wish, I'll even say one must be obligated
to another person. I don't think that's really right, since
I can obligate myself to shovel some shit every morning, but
it doesn't matter here. If you want to say an obligation is
necessarily a committed act toward another person, that's alright
with me, at least for now.

None of that is the point. The point is what /creates/ it, and
/that/ is exclusively the person doing the obligating. It is
a species of "thinking" or "deciding" or "engaging volition" or
whatever. And the (wide) genus of it is, "those acts which are
engaged by a human mind." And /those/ are utterly and exclusively
individual, period. To deny this is to assert that some action in
my mind, takes place in other individuals. That's absurd on its face.

You can't define your way into a false-to-fact identification.
There are no such things as false-to-fact identifications. It
doesn't matter how "intuitive" it sounds, and it doesn't matter
what everyone takes the word to mean. What matters is the state
of the referent, and the state of the referent in this case, exists
wholly within individual minds.

In the end, your mistake is the same as Gordon's. By virtue of
our ability to imagine something being a particular way, you
are saying that therefore the thing is that way. That's an invalid
approach and in this case, it is leading you to false conclusions.


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 2:16 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 12:10 AM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>>> There are no rules which are external to the cognition of any actor,
>>
>> There would be if all chess players died and the rules survived only in
>> a book.
>
> There you go again; grains of sand. You are attempting to
> deny the cognitive necessity of rules, AS RULES. They're
> not rules without that cognition; they are denotations or
> artifacts of rules.

OK, they are not "real" rules, that is, not "Klein rules". Of course
when a person is not thinking of the rules, then there are no Klein
rules either. Klein rules bounce into and out of existence as persons
think or stop thinking about them. Where do they come from? Where do
they go? How is it that each time they come back into existence from
nowhere they are the same as they where before? Who knows - blank out!

Why not just say it's magic, Jim? That would explain about as much.
...

>> It
>> constrains the way a property line "constrain". You may have the power
>> to step over it, but then you are trespassing.
>
> Once again you jumble it up.

No, you are taking a point I was making in a reply to Charles (whose
name somehow got dropped from the headers above) and jumbling it up to
suit your purposes. But, here, let's go with it.

> The property line itself
> is a physical thing and IT exists whether or not anyone
> does. This is DISTINCT from it being a demarcation of
> property or OWNership.

You can search the physical area between my land and my neighbor's, and
you will find no physical property line. The whole *point* of a
"property line" is as a "demarcation of property or ownership". The
property line between my property and my neighbors is conceptual, and
relies for its existence on surveying techniques that in turn rely upon
theorems in trigonometry. Where do those theorems exist?

> You really can't see that distinction?

I see that, e.g., a painted line might *represent* a property line,
which itself is more abstract. Are you becoming skeptical about
abstract things you can't see?

>> On the other hand, inasmuch as there is no such thing in reality
>>> any constraint on an obligation not self-imposed there is no conflict
>>
>> What is the constraint on a *self-imposed* obligation? Here, let me
>> refresh your memory of an earlier exchange:
>>
>> > namely that
>> > obligations are always chosen and if obligations which represent or
>> > come from moral precepts, such as Rand's right from coercion in an
>> > obligation of a negative kind, and ARE NOT CHOSEN, we get bad
>> > consequences -- like Nazis who did not choose that obligation and then
>> > murdered Jews who still have and always had rights.
>>
>> To say that the Jews had *rights* to life that were not violated when
>> they were murdered is to say they had no rights to life at all.
>
> No it isn't. We can say that they had a right to life because
> SOME people exist who recognize the principles behind that.

And, therefore, the Jews had rights to life that were violated. But my
point is different: a "right" to life that is not violated by murder is
no right at all. I am not the one relying on any special usage of
"right" here.

> We can also say that quite obviously, they didn't have any
> right to life from the perspective of their murderers.

And the murder's perspective is important here *because*? Please fill
in the blank for me.

> Or
> maybe better, that their murders didn't recognize their right
> to life that other, more reasonable, people do.

And you might fail to recognize the bear in my backyard. So what?

> In any event, you don't have any right to life there absent
> SOMEBODY'S recognition,

Yes, so what?

> and you are clearly saying that there
> is such a thing. You are mistaken on this, just as you are
> mistaken about meaningful statements.

I did say such a thing in this discussion for the first time just a post
back. I introduced the idea of rights as following from a bargaining
game among rational actors. From that perspective, rights are the
logical consequence of an initial set of conditions. I suspect you have
some problem with the ontological status of such consequences, but
surveyors rely upon them all the time. Logical or mathematical models
often fit the real world well enough to be helpful.

>> It says
>> they have something of no value whatsoever.
>
> "Value...to whom and for what." The point isn't that Rand
> said it; the point is that value is meaningless in its absence.

And the importance of the Nazis' valuing the Jews rights is what, exactly?
...

>> The Nazis *had* the obligation to respect the Jews' rights to life, but
>> the Nazis did not choose to *act* on that obligation.
>
> More of the same. What does that MEAN, to say they
> had the "obligation"? Prescott can give you some
> help on that, but are you sure you want to go there?

It means that they ought not to have violated the Jews right to life.
There's no rocket science about this.

>> Consider that
>> people make promises that they do not keep. Not acting according to
>> obligation does not mean that there is no obligation; it means that the
>> obligation was ignored.
>
> No, it means the promise wasn't kept and therefore it
> never rose to the level of an obligation. Being creatures
> of volition, "having an obligation" technically speaking
> means "doing an obligation."

OK, well, perhaps that is the problem. It might "technically" mean that
in Objectivese, but not in English. If you make a promise, you have an
obligation to keep it. Just ask a native speaker who does not speak the
special Objectivist lingo.

When a person breaches a contract, we do not say that because the
promise wasn't actually kept he had no obligation. On the contrary, it
is because he accepted an obligation that he did not fulfill that we say
he *breached* the contract.

It's possible that you folks here spend too much time talking among
yourselves.

>> > There is no
>> > (moral) constraint in reality but rather a Nazi who freely chooses or
>> > does not choose that obligation of a negative kind.
>>
>> There is no force in reality that makes people act on their obligations.
>> If Smith promises to meet Jones for lunch, no tractor beam or force
>> field will drag Smith to the lunch against his will. Nevertheless, Smith
>> *has* an obligation. Or now do you deny that there are even any *chosen*
>> obligations?
>
> This is not a study of the various ways in which words are
> used.

Well, we agree on that.

> This is a study of the nature of an obligation. As
> a cognitive state that exists within a person, there can be
> no such thing as "an obligation that isn't fulfilled," just
> as there's no such thing as a decision that isn't carried out.

Sorry, but this is simply wrong, and the entire structure of contract
law is an example showing that it is wrong. In a pinch, I'm going with
that over your musings about cognitive states.

> Yes, this is technically speaking, but think about it. If it's
> not carried out, then it wasn't really a decision, was it?

No, that's false as well. People make decisions and then... wait for
it... this might surprise you... they CHANGE their minds! It's
remarkable, but true!

> It
> was a pretense to a decision, or maybe even a decision that was
> changed.

So a decision that is changed was not a decision. Yet, you called it a
decision. So I guess you recognize that it was a decision, but not
"technically" a decision? I think you would make more sense if you
dropped this "technical" view - for one that makes more sense.

> Any way you cut it, all the action is going on in the
> consciousness of the actor, and so it is with obligation.

And the above is a paradigm case of "non sequitur".

> Otherwise, as I say, you can just let Jim take over. You seem
> willing to acknowledge that there are chosen obligations, so
> what could it mean, again technically speaking,

You mean the "technical" sense in which contracts are never breached
because the person had no obligation despite the exchange of promises
for consideration?

> to say that one
> didn't fulfill a chosen obligation? It would either mean he
> didn't take it as an obligation, in which case it wasn't an
> obligation technically speaking.

Wrong again. For example, contract law uses an objective theory of
meaning. *He* might have had his fingers crossed or he might have some
special meaning for "marshmallow". Makes no difference whatsoever. The
words gets interpreted as a reasonable person would.

> Or it would mean he was
> physically prevented from fulfilling the obligation, whether
> due to illness or death, or someone like Jim being around.

Or it could mean he decided not to act on the obligation he previously
undertook. A theory that "technically" says there is no obligation in
that case is best described by a technical term in philosophy: it's nuts.

--
Gordon

[Gordon Sollars]

If the federal government collapsed, that would probably make your
ownership even more secure; your ownership rights wouldn't have gone
anywhere. If your state government collapsed, then your ownership would
be based solely upon conventions that are applied to land. This could
result in your ownership rights being more "fuzzy", that is, not being
as clear as they are now.

I don't think that moral theory can do much more than show that persons
have property rights. The exact contour of those rights depends on a
great deal of contingent history. Facts matter.

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 12:48 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> Facts matter.

If we're going to continue, let's get a few things straight.

I believe this sentence of yours is the one thing upon which
we agree, and I believe we're both using "fact" in the so-called
"Objectivese" sense, meaning the state of reality as opposed to
the recognition, integration or consideration of the state of
reality. Is that okay with you?

If so, I agree. Facts matter. And yes, it can get a bit complicated
when the facts in question are themselves "epistemic existents" or
the recognition, integration or consideration of something. But I'm
confident we can both get over that complexity. Agreed?

I am not, nor do I pretend to be, presenting anything about any
"Objectivist" POV. The /facts/ matter, we agree, so the labeling
of any consideration of them is irrelevant. We agree about that
too, yes?

Also, I'm fairly familiar with the legal treatment of these matters.
I know what a contract is, I know what an obligation is, I know the
"reasonable man" principle and I understand how meaning is treated
in a legal context. That too should be irrelevant, since we agree
we're concerned about the /facts/ of the matter.

You may make as much light of what I'm saying as you like, of
course, just as I may make whatever charges I wish of your POV.
But they should both be based on an appeal to the /facts/ since
that's all that matters, we agree. So the fact that I think
academia has led us on a death-march is irrelevant on its own,
just as your appeal to how legal institutions treat these ideas,
and what words it uses to get there, is likewise irrelevant.

If there's anything here you think is wrong, then please let
me know. Yes, my intent is to speak ontologically, even as
the referents themselves may be epistemic. So when I make
an error, just point out the error. Telling me what the
legal lingo is, says nothing, just as my telling you what
some "Objectivese" lingo says, says nothing.

If all that is agreeable to you, I'll tackle your other post.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 12:35 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

>> There you go again; grains of sand. You are attempting to
>> deny the cognitive necessity of rules, AS RULES. They're
>> not rules without that cognition; they are denotations or
>> artifacts of rules.
>
> OK, they are not "real" rules, that is, not "Klein rules". Of course
> when a person is not thinking of the rules, then there are no Klein
> rules either. Klein rules bounce into and out of existence as persons
> think or stop thinking about them. Where do they come from? Where do
> they go? How is it that each time they come back into existence from
> nowhere they are the same as they where before? Who knows - blank out!

I've never denied your cuteness, so I'm not sure why you feel
the need to keep demonstrating it.

This is for rookies, the simple switching back and forth between
different meanings of the same word. If you'd like me to spell
it out in detail, I will. I'm hoping that won't be necessary.

> Why not just say it's magic, Jim? That would explain about as much.

It would be magic, for the referent of one concept to turn into
the referent for another. Would you like this spelled out?

> No, you are taking a point I was making in a reply to Charles (whose
> name somehow got dropped from the headers above) and jumbling it up to
> suit your purposes. But, here, let's go with it.
>
>> The property line itself
>> is a physical thing and IT exists whether or not anyone
>> does. This is DISTINCT from it being a demarcation of
>> property or OWNership.
>
> You can search the physical area between my land and my neighbor's, and
> you will find no physical property line. The whole *point* of a
> "property line" is as a "demarcation of property or ownership". The
> property line between my property and my neighbors is conceptual,

Is this an assertion that you didn't understand what I was
saying? Are you able to figure it out, or would you like
this spelled out in detail too?

I'm trying to be accommodating with you, Gordon, in the hope
that down the line, you might give a moment's thought to what
I'm saying. So can you understand what I meant when I wrote,
"The property line itself is a physical thing..."?

Or do you just want to appeal to legal lingo, pretending that
you don't understand? Do you want me to deal with this too?

> and
> relies for its existence on surveying techniques that in turn rely upon
> theorems in trigonometry.

As always, it depends on the meaning being used. I used one
meaning and you're using another. In this other meaning, what
I wrote looks nonsensical but in the meaning I was clearly using,
fairly reasonable.

Did you know you do this a lot, not just with the meaning of others,
but with your own meanings? This is why your "arguments" fail as
a description of the facts of the matter.

> Where do those theorems exist?

Which meaning? In the normal meaning, in math books. But those
aren't the theorems in the other meaning, are they?

You wanna say, "Yes, they are," as if the denotation of a theorem
is the only meaningful usage of the concept "theorem." Besides
being wrong, this is the incessant problem throughout your POV.

>> You really can't see that distinction?
>
> I see that, e.g., a painted line might *represent* a property line,
> which itself is more abstract. Are you becoming skeptical about abstract
> things you can't see?

Not hardly. It seems you're becoming skeptical of lines that
physically exist, but aren't painted in a different color for you.

>> No it isn't. We can say that they had a right to life because
>> SOME people exist who recognize the principles behind that.
>
> And, therefore, the Jews had rights to life that were violated.

Okay.

> But my
> point is different: a "right" to life that is not violated by murder is
> no right at all. I am not the one relying on any special usage of
> "right" here.

I'm not saying yours is some special usage. Quite obviously, it's
very common. Is that an appeal in support of the fact of the matter?

I'm not relying on /any/ usage, special or not. I'm /identifying/
the object under discussion.

>> We can also say that quite obviously, they didn't have any
>> right to life from the perspective of their murderers.
>
> And the murder's perspective is important here *because*? Please fill in
> the blank for me.

Because understanding that might help you understand the nature
of the thing under discussion. Shall I keep reminding you...facts matter.

>> Or
>> maybe better, that their murders didn't recognize their right
>> to life that other, more reasonable, people do.
>
> And you might fail to recognize the bear in my backyard. So what?

So the bear is an object of physical mass whose presence doesn't
rest a whit on anyone's recognition of it.

This is as distinguished from rights, which themselves are a
recognition of something. Hence not recognizing rights /does/
have something to do with their presence or absence.

I don't get it...are you saying you can't follow this?

>> In any event, you don't have any right to life there absent
>> SOMEBODY'S recognition,
>
> Yes, so what?

For starters, so that baby doesn't have any rights, but you
won't acknowledge that.

Well, once you did, but I think currently you don't. We might
be able to keep better track if you focused more on your own
position rather than mine.

>> and you are clearly saying that there
>> is such a thing. You are mistaken on this, just as you are
>> mistaken about meaningful statements.
>
> I did say such a thing in this discussion for the first time just a post
> back. I introduced the idea of rights as following from a bargaining
> game among rational actors. From that perspective, rights are the
> logical consequence of an initial set of conditions. I suspect you have
> some problem with the ontological status of such consequences, but
> surveyors rely upon them all the time. Logical or mathematical models
> often fit the real world well enough to be helpful.

Sure, but they don't change into anything other than mathematical
models, do they? With rights--and meaning and rules and strategies
and who knows what else--you are implying that once they arise, they
turn into something other than what they were when they arose.

That's how you can reference them in a manner I would call "intrinsically."

>>> It says
>>> they have something of no value whatsoever.
>>
>> "Value...to whom and for what." The point isn't that Rand
>> said it; the point is that value is meaningless in its absence.
>
> And the importance of the Nazis' valuing the Jews rights is what, exactly?

Never mind value...the importance of the Nazi's not RECOGNIZING
those rights--which again just means that which is recognized by
someone else--seems kinda obvious, doesn't it?

>>> The Nazis *had* the obligation to respect the Jews' rights to life, but
>>> the Nazis did not choose to *act* on that obligation.
>>
>> More of the same. What does that MEAN, to say they
>> had the "obligation"? Prescott can give you some
>> help on that, but are you sure you want to go there?
>
> It means that they ought not to have violated the Jews right to life.
> There's no rocket science about this.

Sounds tougher than rocket science, the way you put it. "They
ought not to have..." Where did that come from and what does it mean?

> OK, well, perhaps that is the problem. It might "technically" mean that
> in Objectivese, but not in English. If you make a promise, you have an
> obligation to keep it. Just ask a native speaker who does not speak the
> special Objectivist lingo.
>
> When a person breaches a contract, we do not say that because the
> promise wasn't actually kept he had no obligation. On the contrary, it
> is because he accepted an obligation that he did not fulfill that we say
> he *breached* the contract.
>
> It's possible that you folks here spend too much time talking among
> yourselves.

And then this, with nothing of yours snipped in between...

>> This is not a study of the various ways in which words are
>> used.
>
> Well, we agree on that.

If you agree on that, then what the hell were you just doing?

Here's another unrelated error that you've bought into. Somewhere
along the way, you came to believe that critical thinking is about
judging how others are thinking. While that's admittedly worth
something, actual critical thinking is about judging your own thinking.

>> This is a study of the nature of an obligation. As
>> a cognitive state that exists within a person, there can be
>> no such thing as "an obligation that isn't fulfilled," just
>> as there's no such thing as a decision that isn't carried out.
>
> Sorry, but this is simply wrong, and the entire structure of contract
> law is an example showing that it is wrong. In a pinch, I'm going with
> that over your musings about cognitive states.

Go with it, then. "If the law treats something as X, then that
something is X." Do you do that with all treatments of the law,
or do you pick and choose?

>> Yes, this is technically speaking, but think about it. If it's
>> not carried out, then it wasn't really a decision, was it?
>
> No, that's false as well. People make decisions and then... wait for
> it... this might surprise you... they CHANGE their minds! It's
> remarkable, but true!

That's nice. Now figure out what this directly implies
with regard to the nature of what the decision is. Q.E.D.

Your intrinsic approach would imply that this couldn't happen,
since these things supposedly have existence separate and apart
from the mind that makes them.

>> It
>> was a pretense to a decision, or maybe even a decision that was
>> changed.
>
> So a decision that is changed was not a decision. Yet, you called it a
> decision. So I guess you recognize that it was a decision, but not
> "technically" a decision? I think you would make more sense if you
> dropped this "technical" view - for one that makes more sense.

You tell me---if a man decides to do something and then doesn't
do it, was the thing we call "the decision" precisely a decision?

This is not the big deal it appears. As always with you, there
are two meanings. Forgive me for denoting one as "technical."

In the one meaning, there is the state of mind that the actor
believes is a decision but nonetheless fails to act upon it.

In the other, there is the state of mind that renders it something
other than a decision...precisely speaking. Though I acknowledge
that either one could be taken as "precise." What matters is what's
being referenced, not how it's being referenced.

Another way of saying that is, facts matter.

>> Any way you cut it, all the action is going on in the
>> consciousness of the actor, and so it is with obligation.
>
> And the above is a paradigm case of "non sequitur".

No, yours is a paradigm case of misidentification. You've
got three things...the cognition of the actor, the cognition
of others and the "thing" that's created from the other two.

This last should be rejected out of hand, being /only/ a
conceptualization of the other instances. IOW it has no
separate existence on its own; it's /wholly/ epistemic.

Can you concede that for now? Seems kinda obvious to me,
but if you disagree, then we can go over it. After that,
then maybe we can deal with the ontological status of the
other two.

>> Otherwise, as I say, you can just let Jim take over. You seem
>> willing to acknowledge that there are chosen obligations, so
>> what could it mean, again technically speaking,
>
> You mean the "technical" sense in which contracts are never breached
> because the person had no obligation despite the exchange of promises
> for consideration?

That's all in the legal context, and I've never charged you
or Jim as having a weak understanding of that.

I'm trying to find out whether the legal status matches the
ontological status that it supposedly matches. Facts matter.

>> to say that one
>> didn't fulfill a chosen obligation? It would either mean he
>> didn't take it as an obligation, in which case it wasn't an
>> obligation technically speaking.
>
> Wrong again. For example, contract law uses an objective theory of
> meaning. *He* might have had his fingers crossed or he might have some
> special meaning for "marshmallow". Makes no difference whatsoever. The
> words gets interpreted as a reasonable person would.
>
>> Or it would mean he was
>> physically prevented from fulfilling the obligation, whether
>> due to illness or death, or someone like Jim being around.
>
> Or it could mean he decided not to act on the obligation he previously
> undertook. A theory that "technically" says there is no obligation in
> that case is best described by a technical term in philosophy: it's nuts.

Makes sense---how else could something be rejected out of hand
without even considering whether or not it's true?

To the point, this is just more concept-switching. I know you
don't ever weary of it, but I do.


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 1:31 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
...

> Also, I'm fairly familiar with the legal treatment of these matters.
> I know what a contract is, I know what an obligation is, I know the
> "reasonable man" principle and I understand how meaning is treated
> in a legal context. That too should be irrelevant, since we agree
> we're concerned about the /facts/ of the matter.

The legal use of "obligation" I mentioned is a fact. It is a fact that
shows that your "technical" notion of obligation is bogus.

Here are some facts: People make contracts. Contracts are an extremely
important, if not essential, part of human life. People breach
contracts. The law, following ordinary usage here, says that there is a
legal obligation to complete a contract (unless, perhaps, the other
party has acted improperly). This obligation survives a parties' wish,
desire, decision, or "cognitive state" to the contrary. A sense of the
term "obligation" that fails to account for these facts is wrong,
useless, bogus, etc.

Recondite reasoning that "technically" an obligation only exists if one
carries out the obligation fails to account for an extremely important
usage of the term. We have to ask ourselves what could possibly lead us
to think this was any reasonable way to define "obligation". Further,
if I wanted to discover how "obligation" is used, why would I look not
to actual examples, but instead to some "technical" reasoning apparently
unconnected to centuries of human experience?

Or, another way: if, inside your secret citadel, you are the only one
who knows that "obligation" *really* means - then you don't know what it
*actually* means.

Suppose we adopt the notion that when a person changes his mind about a
promise, he has no further obligation. So now a person takes delivery
of 1000 widgets and then refuses to pay for them. In court, he argues
that he had no obligation to fulfill the contract because he changed his
mind. And the judge says, "I have read Klein on Obligation, and it is
clear that defendant, having changed his mind, was under no *real*
obligation. The application of the law in such a situation shocks the
conscience, and therefore I find the contract unconscionable, and
thereby unenforceable." All other judges are so impressed by "Klein on
Obligation" that they all follow suit. How can they not? The powerful
reasoning in "Klein" is unassailable! To attack it is to say that
things exist that don't *really* exist!

Except for one thing. Now we have no enforceable contracts with those
who change their minds. This, of course, *might* have the effect of
more people changing their minds after they get the goods. And,
thereby, an extremely important way for persons to coordinate their
behavior to create value is lost. But, hey, that so-called "obligation"
just disappeared, so whatever are we to do? I mean, "technically" you
just can't argue with "Klein". A huge part of the economy collapses,
people are starving, but "technically" that's just the way it has to be.
Our hands are tied.

> You may make as much light of what I'm saying as you like, of
> course, just as I may make whatever charges I wish of your POV.

I think I have just made about as much of it as I need to.

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 2:36 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> Further, if
> I wanted to discover how "obligation" is used, why would I look not to
> actual examples, but instead to some "technical" reasoning apparently
> unconnected to centuries of human experience?

I can answer that in three syllables: Jim Prescott.

Snip the rest because it's backwards...speaking of Jim
Prescott! If the goal is to make the supposed identifications
consistent with age-old legal processes, then your case is
more than made.

If the goal is rather to make legal processes--or maybe
even the absence of them--consistent with the ontological
nature of these things, then identifying them is the first step.

If you're just trying "to discover how 'obligation' is used,"
then I have nothing to offer you. I am not challenging your
expertise on that, or the usage of any of the other concepts
that we regularly discuss.

I am challenging their accuracy as a matter of correspondence...
not the correspondence of how they're used, but the correspondence
of what they mean with that which they reference.


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 2:26 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 12:35 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

...

>> OK, they are not "real" rules, that is, not "Klein rules". Of course
>> when a person is not thinking of the rules, then there are no Klein
>> rules either. Klein rules bounce into and out of existence as persons
>> think or stop thinking about them. Where do they come from? Where do
>> they go? How is it that each time they come back into existence from
>> nowhere they are the same as they where before? Who knows - blank out!
>
> I've never denied your cuteness, so I'm not sure why you feel
> the need to keep demonstrating it.
>
> This is for rookies, the simple switching back and forth between
> different meanings of the same word. If you'd like me to spell
> it out in detail, I will. I'm hoping that won't be necessary.

If it's short, please give it a try. Are they two meanings of "rule" in
use here?
...

>> No, you are taking a point I was making in a reply to Charles (whose
>> name somehow got dropped from the headers above) and jumbling it up to
>> suit your purposes. But, here, let's go with it.
>>
>>> The property line itself
>>> is a physical thing and IT exists whether or not anyone
>>> does. This is DISTINCT from it being a demarcation of
>>> property or OWNership.
>>
>> You can search the physical area between my land and my neighbor's, and
>> you will find no physical property line. The whole *point* of a
>> "property line" is as a "demarcation of property or ownership". The
>> property line between my property and my neighbors is conceptual,
>
> Is this an assertion that you didn't understand what I was
> saying? Are you able to figure it out, or would you like
> this spelled out in detail too?
>
> I'm trying to be accommodating with you, Gordon,

And I, you; but this doesn't seem to be working out well for either of
us. ;-)

> in the hope
> that down the line, you might give a moment's thought to what
> I'm saying. So can you understand what I meant when I wrote,
> "The property line itself is a physical thing..."?
>
> Or do you just want to appeal to legal lingo, pretending that
> you don't understand? Do you want me to deal with this too?
>
>
>> and
>> relies for its existence on surveying techniques that in turn rely upon
>> theorems in trigonometry.
>
> As always, it depends on the meaning being used. I used one
> meaning and you're using another. In this other meaning, what
> I wrote looks nonsensical but in the meaning I was clearly using,
> fairly reasonable.

The point of my reply to Charles had nothing to do with a physical line.
If you realized that, then what was the point?

> Did you know you do this a lot, not just with the meaning of others,
> but with your own meanings? This is why your "arguments" fail as
> a description of the facts of the matter.
>
>
> > Where do those theorems exist?
>
> Which meaning? In the normal meaning, in math books. But those
> aren't the theorems in the other meaning, are they?

What "other meaning"? Jim, the point of my example was that we rely
upon abstract stuff like trigonometry theorems to help define property
lines. If your theory cannot accommodate such theorems, it is your
theory that is going to go, not the theorems.

> You wanna say, "Yes, they are," as if the denotation of a theorem
> is the only meaningful usage of the concept "theorem."

You think I'm saying "Yes, they are" what, exactly?

>>> You really can't see that distinction?
>>
>> I see that, e.g., a painted line might *represent* a property line,
>> which itself is more abstract. Are you becoming skeptical about abstract
>> things you can't see?
>
> Not hardly.

Good!

> It seems you're becoming skeptical of lines that
> physically exist, but aren't painted in a different color for you.

How so?

>>> No it isn't. We can say that they had a right to life because
>>> SOME people exist who recognize the principles behind that.
>>
>> And, therefore, the Jews had rights to life that were violated.
>
> Okay.
>
>
>> But my
>> point is different: a "right" to life that is not violated by murder is
>> no right at all. I am not the one relying on any special usage of
>> "right" here.
>
> I'm not saying yours is some special usage. Quite obviously, it's
> very common. Is that an appeal in support of the fact of the matter?

What "fact of the matter"? The fact I see is that it is pointless to
have a theory that says that rights do not have corresponding
obligations. You can construct such a theory, but then "rights" are
pointless.

> I'm not relying on /any/ usage, special or not. I'm /identifying/
> the object under discussion.

You have determined that "rights" refer to "cognitive existents" without
any reliance on usage?

>
>>> We can also say that quite obviously, they didn't have any
>>> right to life from the perspective of their murderers.
>>
>> And the murder's perspective is important here *because*? Please fill in
>> the blank for me.
>
> Because understanding that might help you understand the nature
> of the thing under discussion. Shall I keep reminding you...facts matter.

I was looking for a substantive answer. If you had one, then indeed I
*might* understand better.

>
>
>>> Or
>>> maybe better, that their murders didn't recognize their right
>>> to life that other, more reasonable, people do.
>>
>> And you might fail to recognize the bear in my backyard. So what?
>
> So the bear is an object of physical mass whose presence doesn't
> rest a whit on anyone's recognition of it.

No. But the fact that it is not recognized does not mean that it is not
there. That has been your argument. What you apparently mean to argue
is that the existence of physical objects does not depend on anyone's
recognition, but the existence of non-physical objects depends upon
*everyone's* recognition. Why is that true of non-physical objects?

> This is as distinguished from rights, which themselves are a
> recognition of something. Hence not recognizing rights /does/
> have something to do with their presence or absence.
>
> I don't get it...are you saying you can't follow this?

What I don't get is your hidden premise I just identified.

>
>>> In any event, you don't have any right to life there absent
>>> SOMEBODY'S recognition,
>>
>> Yes, so what?
>
> For starters, so that baby doesn't have any rights, but you
> won't acknowledge that.
>
> Well, once you did, but I think currently you don't. We might
> be able to keep better track if you focused more on your own
> position rather than mine.

I told you that I granted the baby had no rights; my focus was on the
actual Nazis and Jews, not the hypothetical 1000 adults and one baby.
But then we didn't really have an ontological issue to argue over, as
far as I could see. Perhaps I'm wrong about that. Do you want to argue
from the hypothetical baby having no right to life to the actual Jews
having no right to life?

I didn't think you did, so I switched to a hypothetical contract view of
rights, just so your desire to argue ontology would make sense. And do
I get any thanks?

>>> and you are clearly saying that there
>>> is such a thing. You are mistaken on this, just as you are
>>> mistaken about meaningful statements.
>>
>> I did say such a thing in this discussion for the first time just a post
>> back. I introduced the idea of rights as following from a bargaining
>> game among rational actors. From that perspective, rights are the
>> logical consequence of an initial set of conditions. I suspect you have
>> some problem with the ontological status of such consequences, but
>> surveyors rely upon them all the time. Logical or mathematical models
>> often fit the real world well enough to be helpful.
>
> Sure, but they don't change into anything other than mathematical
> models, do they? With rights--and meaning and rules and strategies
> and who knows what else--you are implying that once they arise, they
> turn into something other than what they were when they arose.

No, if I use the hypothetical contract, then the basic moral rights are
like mathematical models. But other moral rights could arise by actual
agreement.

But the startling thing is that I think the mathematical models really
exist!

>>>> It says
>>>> they have something of no value whatsoever.
>>>
>>> "Value...to whom and for what." The point isn't that Rand
>>> said it; the point is that value is meaningless in its absence.
>>
>> And the importance of the Nazis' valuing the Jews rights is what,
>> exactly?
>
> Never mind value...the importance of the Nazi's not RECOGNIZING
> those rights--which again just means that which is recognized by
> someone else--seems kinda obvious, doesn't it?

It seems to account for much of their actions. So what? Agian, people
are wrong all the time.

>>>> The Nazis *had* the obligation to respect the Jews' rights to life, but
>>>> the Nazis did not choose to *act* on that obligation.
>>>
>>> More of the same. What does that MEAN, to say they
>>> had the "obligation"? Prescott can give you some
>>> help on that, but are you sure you want to go there?
>>
>> It means that they ought not to have violated the Jews right to life.
>> There's no rocket science about this.
>
> Sounds tougher than rocket science, the way you put it. "They
> ought not to have..." Where did that come from and what does it mean?

It comes from the Jews having a right to life. That's what having a
right to life means.

>> OK, well, perhaps that is the problem. It might "technically" mean that
>> in Objectivese, but not in English. If you make a promise, you have an
>> obligation to keep it. Just ask a native speaker who does not speak the
>> special Objectivist lingo.
>>
>> When a person breaches a contract, we do not say that because the
>> promise wasn't actually kept he had no obligation. On the contrary, it
>> is because he accepted an obligation that he did not fulfill that we say
>> he *breached* the contract.
>>
>> It's possible that you folks here spend too much time talking among
>> yourselves.
>
> And then this, with nothing of yours snipped in between...
>
>>> This is not a study of the various ways in which words are
>>> used.
>>
>> Well, we agree on that.
>
> If you agree on that, then what the hell were you just doing?

By "this" I mean the discussion in total, not some piece of it. You
appear to mean something different by "obligation" that ordinary English
speakers. I need to address that, or else we will keep talking about
different things under the same label. As it appears we have been doing
for some time.

> Here's another unrelated error that you've bought into. Somewhere
> along the way, you came to believe that critical thinking is about
> judging how others are thinking. While that's admittedly worth
> something, actual critical thinking is about judging your own thinking.

That's what I do here, Jim. I test it right here.

>>> This is a study of the nature of an obligation. As
>>> a cognitive state that exists within a person, there can be
>>> no such thing as "an obligation that isn't fulfilled," just
>>> as there's no such thing as a decision that isn't carried out.
>>
>> Sorry, but this is simply wrong, and the entire structure of contract
>> law is an example showing that it is wrong. In a pinch, I'm going with
>> that over your musings about cognitive states.
>
> Go with it, then. "If the law treats something as X, then that
> something is X." Do you do that with all treatments of the law,
> or do you pick and choose?

That the law treats something as X is evidence that it is X. Far more
persuasive evidence than some "technical" reasoning about "cognitive
states" implying that obligations disappear when teh obligated person
changes his mind.

>
>>> Yes, this is technically speaking, but think about it. If it's
>>> not carried out, then it wasn't really a decision, was it?
>>
>> No, that's false as well. People make decisions and then... wait for
>> it... this might surprise you... they CHANGE their minds! It's
>> remarkable, but true!
>
> That's nice. Now figure out what this directly implies
> with regard to the nature of what the decision is. Q.E.D.

No, Jim, why don't you tell me. I hope that this is not some secret
knowledge that you have been sworn not to reveal.

> Your intrinsic approach would imply that this couldn't happen,
> since these things supposedly have existence separate and apart
> from the mind that makes them.

The obligation exists because it was made. Because it was made, a
person can change his mind and decide not to act on the obligation.
Rather than reason from what you think my "intrinsic appraoch" must
imply, why not deal with what I actually say?

>>> It
>>> was a pretense to a decision, or maybe even a decision that was
>>> changed.
>>
>> So a decision that is changed was not a decision. Yet, you called it a
>> decision. So I guess you recognize that it was a decision, but not
>> "technically" a decision? I think you would make more sense if you
>> dropped this "technical" view - for one that makes more sense.
>
> You tell me---if a man decides to do something and then doesn't
> do it, was the thing we call "the decision" precisely a decision?

Yes, of course.

> This is not the big deal it appears. As always with you, there
> are two meanings. Forgive me for denoting one as "technical."
>
> In the one meaning, there is the state of mind that the actor
> believes is a decision but nonetheless fails to act upon it.
>
> In the other, there is the state of mind that renders it something
> other than a decision...precisely speaking.

What "state of mind" is that? Why why should that state of mind render
something "other than a decision"?

> Though I acknowledge
> that either one could be taken as "precise." What matters is what's
> being referenced, not how it's being referenced.
>
> Another way of saying that is, facts matter.

I have no idea what you are trying to say. People makes decisions and
change their minds all the time. Why should the change of mind affect
whether a decision was made?

>>> Any way you cut it, all the action is going on in the
>>> consciousness of the actor, and so it is with obligation.
>>
>> And the above is a paradigm case of "non sequitur".
>
> No, yours is a paradigm case of misidentification. You've
> got three things...the cognition of the actor, the cognition
> of others and the "thing" that's created from the other two.
>
> This last should be rejected out of hand, being /only/ a
> conceptualization of the other instances. IOW it has no
> separate existence on its own; it's /wholly/ epistemic.

Assuming I can follow any of this, why should the /wholly/ epistemic be
rejected?

> Can you concede that for now?

I have no real idea of what you are talking about, and absolutely no
idea why it would be important.
...

>>> Otherwise, as I say, you can just let Jim take over. You seem
>>> willing to acknowledge that there are chosen obligations, so
>>> what could it mean, again technically speaking,
>>
>> You mean the "technical" sense in which contracts are never breached
>> because the person had no obligation despite the exchange of promises
>> for consideration?
>
> That's all in the legal context, and I've never charged you
> or Jim as having a weak understanding of that.

The legal context is one of the most substantial contexts in which the
term appears. It's one of ways we learn about what an obligation is.

> I'm trying to find out whether the legal status matches the
> ontological status that it supposedly matches. Facts matter.

Why should we care what the ontological status of "obligation" is? Some
facts matter more than others. What would be the problem if we got the
ontological status of "obligation" wrong? When I said that "facts
matter", what I meant was that they matter more than "technical" senses.

>>> to say that one
>>> didn't fulfill a chosen obligation? It would either mean he
>>> didn't take it as an obligation, in which case it wasn't an
>>> obligation technically speaking.
>>
>> Wrong again. For example, contract law uses an objective theory of
>> meaning. *He* might have had his fingers crossed or he might have some
>> special meaning for "marshmallow". Makes no difference whatsoever. The
>> words gets interpreted as a reasonable person would.
>>
>>> Or it would mean he was
>>> physically prevented from fulfilling the obligation, whether
>>> due to illness or death, or someone like Jim being around.
>>
>> Or it could mean he decided not to act on the obligation he previously
>> undertook. A theory that "technically" says there is no obligation in
>> that case is best described by a technical term in philosophy: it's nuts.
>
> Makes sense---how else could something be rejected out of hand
> without even considering whether or not it's true?

So there is a third alternative you did not include? Is that what
"makes sense" is saying? Or what?

>
> To the point, this is just more concept-switching. I know you
> don't ever weary of it, but I do.

What switch? I really have no idea what you are talking about.


--
Gordon

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 3:43 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 2:36 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>> Further, if
>> I wanted to discover how "obligation" is used, why would I look not to
>> actual examples, but instead to some "technical" reasoning apparently
>> unconnected to centuries of human experience?
>
> I can answer that in three syllables: Jim Prescott.
>
> Snip the rest because it's backwards...speaking of Jim
> Prescott! If the goal is to make the supposed identifications
> consistent with age-old legal processes, then your case is
> more than made.

No. The goal is to use the best evidence to figure out what is right.
And "age-old legal processes" are better than a priori reasoning. The
word "obligation" gets its meaning to a great extent from the practice
of the law. The notion that an a priori ontological investigation will
uncover some better understanding of "obligation" than we can get from
the law - or for that matter form just looking at how the term is used
in any large body of writing - is absurd. And that's being polite.

> If the goal is rather to make legal processes--or maybe
> even the absence of them--consistent with the ontological
> nature of these things, then identifying them is the first step.

What in the world could it possibly mean to identify the ontological
nature" of "obligation"? Have you done it? If so, let's see it.

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 4:07 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> And "age-old legal processes" are better than a priori reasoning. The
> word "obligation" gets its meaning to a great extent from the practice
> of the law.

Seems to me that a reliance on "age-old legal processes"
is effectively a priori reasoning, from the current perspective.

> The notion that an a priori ontological investigation will

I confess; I can't even imagine what "a priori ontological
investigation" could possibly mean. In my lingo, if it's an
ontological investigation, it's automatically not a priori.

That is, the phrase sounds oxymoronic to me.

> uncover some better understanding of "obligation" than we can get from
> the law - or for that matter form just looking at how the term is used
> in any large body of writing - is absurd. And that's being polite.

No need to be polite. After all, I think the investigation
of /anything/ based exclusively on a large body of writing,
at least if it's opposed to knowledge gained since the body
of writing was written, is absurd.

I guess that would've been a strong argument against heliocentrism,
though.

> What in the world could it possibly mean to identify the ontological
> nature" of "obligation"?

What does it ever mean to identify the ontological nature of X?


> Have you done it?

In some part, I'd like to think yes. And I'd like to
think that in addition to my thinking yes, it'd be true.

> If so, let's see it.

You mean, "Let me see it." Like everything else we're
talking about, /I/ can't "let" /you/ do anything. If
you genuinely want to see it--that is, if you wish to
create an obligation in yourself to see it, or just
simply want to decide to do that--then look.

I mean, it's not as if it's more likely to be seen if
it's written 1,000 times than if it's written once,
your reliance on ages of books notwithstanding.

It's yet another example of a choice, which is what
we've been discussing all along, at least with regard
to rights.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 3:48 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> That the law treats something as X is evidence that it is X.

Maybe, but extraordinarily weak evidence, I'd say. Indeed,
it would be tough for me to come up with weaker evidence,
including the mere say-so of a single person. That's
because in the absence of opposing evidence, I assume any
single person is being honest. This would be opposed to
"the law," which I assume has motives that don't necessarily
jibe with the nature of the thing under question.

Just an interesting point, for me.

Really, I just want to thank you for the following
paragraph. This was an awfully long post and I wasn't
looking forward to responding point by point, though of
course I was expecting to do just that, as I've done.

But Buddha provides, and then there was this...

> Why should we care what the ontological status of "obligation" is?

Hmm. For me it's because I view us as fundamentally "identifying
machines," whereby our volition is guided by judgments that arise
from identification. But that's me, and I don't need to discuss
this with me...I already understand my position!

> Some facts matter more than others.

Hmm again. I guess I can agree with this, though it reeks
of implication that some facts don't matter, with which I
would strongly disagree. And then here it is...

> What would be the problem if we got the
> ontological status of "obligation" wrong?

That would be for you to figure out for yourself and
thank goodness...unless and until you do, there's no
point in continuing.

If that leaves you hollow, you can always work on why
the hell you would be asking such a question about
something you said you thought had no meaning at all
in the other post.

For me, that's not such a challenge since I think you're
full of contradictions on all of the matters we've been
discussing. More relevantly now, why in the world would
I continue with someone who doesn't want to look, and even
says up front that looking--and its attendant seeing--doesn't
make any difference to him anyway?

If I want to show that snow is white and you don't want
to look at the snow nor see that it's white, and further
declare that you don't care whether it's white or not,
that would bring into question my own sanity for continuing
to try and show it.

I already know you consider me absurd, but I sure 'nuff don't
want to start considering myself insane!


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 8:20 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 4:07 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>> And "age-old legal processes" are better than a priori reasoning. The
>> word "obligation" gets its meaning to a great extent from the practice
>> of the law.
>
> Seems to me that a reliance on "age-old legal processes"
> is effectively a priori reasoning, from the current perspective.

No, "a priori" is reasoning reasoning that is done before, that is,
without regard to experience. Such as the experience of countless human
beings using the law to solve problems.

>> The notion that an a priori ontological investigation will
>
> I confess; I can't even imagine what "a priori ontological
> investigation" could possibly mean. In my lingo, if it's an
> ontological investigation, it's automatically not a priori.

But it relies on one person's introspection, rather than the cumulative
experience of countless others?

>
> That is, the phrase sounds oxymoronic to me.
>
>> uncover some better understanding of "obligation" than we can get from
>> the law - or for that matter form just looking at how the term is used
>> in any large body of writing - is absurd. And that's being polite.
>
> No need to be polite. After all, I think the investigation
> of /anything/ based exclusively on a large body of writing,
> at least if it's opposed to knowledge gained since the body
> of writing was written, is absurd.

And what knowledge has been gained since when exactly? Some knowledge
has been gained that exposes a flaw in the legal - or, for that matter,
the ordinary - use of "obligation"? When did this happen? Yesterday?
A year ago? Someone discovered that obligations don't exist when the
obligor stops thinking about the obligation? Let me assure you that it
frequently stays on the mind of the obligee. But, if he is forgetful,
it might write it down.

> I guess that would've been a strong argument against heliocentrism,
> though.

Another paradigm non sequitur.

>
>> What in the world could it possibly mean to identify the ontological
>> nature" of "obligation"?
>
> What does it ever mean to identify the ontological nature of X?

I asked you first, and my question is easier because it is more
specific. Do you have an answer, or do you want to play Yoda?

>> Have you done it?
>
> In some part, I'd like to think yes. And I'd like to
> think that in addition to my thinking yes, it'd be true.
>
>
>> If so, let's see it.
>
> You mean, "Let me see it."

No, I suspect that others are also looking on. They tend to pop up now
and again, as you did in a reply I made to Charles.

> Like everything else we're
> talking about, /I/ can't "let" /you/ do anything.

You can offer to share such an identification in words. Unless it is a
mystic truth that cannot be written or spoken. Is that it?

> If
> you genuinely want to see it--that is, if you wish to
> create an obligation in yourself to see it,

A "genuine want" is an "obligation"? Jim, I've been trying to explain
to you that whatever you refer to by "obligation" does not seem to be
what other people are referring to. Other people mean a commitment
that, e.g., survives the parties' forgetting about it. If you call a
mushroom a "marshmallow", you have not changed the nature of mushrooms
or marshmallows. And the notion that some deep thinking has led you to
realize that what everyone else calls a mushroom is not *really* a
mushroom or only serves to show the deep thinking was bogus.

> or just
> simply want to decide to do that--then look.

The place I would look to find it is here in a post by you. It's your
identification.

> I mean, it's not as if it's more likely to be seen if
> it's written 1,000 times than if it's written once,
> your reliance on ages of books notwithstanding.

Never mind 1000 times; I would like to see it written just once. What
is an "obligation"? Please identify it. And if it is not what common
English refers to as an "obligation", why should anyone care anymore
than if you had your own special name for mushrooms?

--
Gordon

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/16/2012 8:45 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 3:48 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>> That the law treats something as X is evidence that it is X.
>
> Maybe, but extraordinarily weak evidence, I'd say. Indeed,
> it would be tough for me to come up with weaker evidence,
> including the mere say-so of a single person. That's
> because in the absence of opposing evidence, I assume any
> single person is being honest.

If any single person is being honest, what is not honest about countless
persons?

> This would be opposed to
> "the law," which I assume has motives that don't necessarily
> jibe with the nature of the thing under question.

One "motive" of the law is to have a useful theory of contracts, so
that, among other things, persons can coordinate their economic actions.
Imaging that obligations disappear when the obligor stops thinking
about them would not enable persons to do that. It fails a basic test
of what an obligation is.

> Just an interesting point, for me.
>
> Really, I just want to thank you for the following
> paragraph. This was an awfully long post and I wasn't
> looking forward to responding point by point, though of
> course I was expecting to do just that, as I've done.

?? You skipped most of the post you were reply to.

> But Buddha provides, and then there was this...
>
>
>> Why should we care what the ontological status of "obligation" is?
>
> Hmm. For me it's because I view us as fundamentally "identifying
> machines," whereby our volition is guided by judgments that arise
> from identification. But that's me, and I don't need to discuss
> this with me...I already understand my position!

I think I have identified that an obligation that disappears when the
obligor stops thinking about it is pointless. But obligations, at least
contractual obligations that allow for the coordination of economically
productive behavior, are not pointless.

>> Some facts matter more than others.
>
> Hmm again. I guess I can agree with this, though it reeks
> of implication that some facts don't matter, with which I
> would strongly disagree.

No, the least important fact could still matter a great deal, as long as
others mattered even more.

> And then here it is...
>
>
>> What would be the problem if we got the
>> ontological status of "obligation" wrong?
>
> That would be for you to figure out for yourself and
> thank goodness...unless and until you do, there's no
> point in continuing.

OK, Yoda, I guess there is no point. I'm not going to create both sides
of the argument.

> If that leaves you hollow, you can always work on why
> the hell you would be asking such a question about
> something you said you thought had no meaning at all
> in the other post.

Oh, that's easy. I'm trying whatever I can to figure out what you think
you are saying. I keep hoping that one question or another will unlock
the mystery. I've been going on the assumption that there was some
logic to it.

> For me, that's not such a challenge since I think you're
> full of contradictions on all of the matters we've been
> discussing.

Oh gosh, oh gee.

> More relevantly now, why in the world would
> I continue with someone who doesn't want to look, and even
> says up front that looking--and its attendant seeing--doesn't
> make any difference to him anyway?

Look at what? An "identification" of yours that you haven't put here?

> If I want to show that snow is white and you don't want
> to look at the snow nor see that it's white, and further
> declare that you don't care whether it's white or not,

Now I think you're covering for a busted flush. I've asked you to
provide your identification for "obligation", and all you've got is
protestations of my bad faith.

That snow is white is a property of snow. That snow has properties does
not tell us anything about its ontological status. For example, in the
study of linear algebra we learn that vector spaces have various
properties. But somehow I don't think your view is that snow and vector
spaces have the same ontological status. (Please let me know if I've
got that wrong.) That obligations do not disappear when the obligor
stops thinking about them is a property of obligations. This is true
regardless of their ontological status - unless some status would
somehow allow them to disappear at the obligator's decision. Then we
would know that *that* is one status obligations don't have.

> I already know you consider me absurd,

No, just some of the views you are expressing.

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

On 1/16/2012 10:16 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:

> Never mind 1000 times; I would like to see it written just once. What is
> an "obligation"? Please identify it.

Ask and you shall receive, at least this time. I'll
leave it to you resolve your internal contradiction
that it both matters and doesn't matter.

I'll also leave to you everything else, since it all
reduces to exactly the same error---"I can conceptualize
it as something distinct from the instances; therefore it
exists distinct from the instances." This is the base of
your errors on everything we've discussed, from rights to
rules to meanings.

This is what an obligation is. It is a state of mind, a
willful creation, a decision, an epistemic existent, an
instance of free will. Any of those are the genus.

The species can be qualified in any number of ways, all
of them legitimate as far as I'm concerned. You could
say it's a decision to do something. You could say it's
a commitment, either to a person or to an act. Effectively,
it's nothing more than a decision, but I can see limiting
it to a decision that involves someone else. As I mentioned,
I wouldn't personally limit it that way, but that would be
alright definitionally.

None of that matters to me, because the basic identification
is that it's just a decision. It can have any species you
wish because the important point is that it's a creation of
a single person and exists /only/ in a single person's mind.

So, what of all the other things that "obligation" implies in
normal, standard usage? Now try to follow, because this is
the relevant point. Those are all about /the consideration
of others as to what the obligation implies/. They are about
epistemic events going on in other people pursuant to the
obligation under consideration. That's what all the legal
theories are about---"If A declares an obligation, then what
can (or should) we do about it if he doesn't follow through
on it?"

It's not a great sin to speak of "obligation" as both parts
of that relationship, just like it's not a great sin to speak
of a book of rules. The sin is using such speech as a
replacement for what's actually going on, as a means of
identifying without identifying. This is the sin of all
collectivism and intrinsicism---the treating of something
as if it were there, when it is not.

No human and no power on Earth can create an obligation
within me, except me. Another person can /say/ I have
an obligation. Lord knows Prescott will say it all the
time. But he's just wrong, that's all. He is just saying
that he will /pretend/ that I have an obligation in order
that he might excuse doing what he believes would be just
if I did have an obligation. And as it happens, he's wrong
about that too, but that's rather a separate issue.

-----------------------

Because the concept is most commonly used in reference to
an obligation of one person to another (or several), the
temptation is to treat it as a relationship, like "larger"
or "close," whereby both entities are required for the
concept to have meaning. This is what Prescott is endlessly
on about, yapping about what the other party must have in
order for the obligation to exist. He must "expect, demand
or rely" upon it, supposedly. Indeed, he gets so caught up
in that, that he reduces the obligation to /only/ that and
then yaps some more about how the obligation is adjustable
according to what caused it in the actor himself...whether
it was chosen, imposed, legal, known, unknown and who knows
what other claptrap.

His error is similar to yours on all of the other topics. He
is saying that someone's /consideration/ of the existence of
something, has something to do with the /existence/ of that thing.

There's consideration involved alright, but he's got it in
the wrong actors. A person can make himself obligated, and
/only/ a person can make /himself/ obligated.

The relationship part, the part that requires two parties,
is the /agreement/, which is simply the state of obligation
expressed by both parties. But the obligation itself is,
like all epistemic existents, moral and otherwise, extant
/only/ in the mind of a single individual.

That's your answer, fact-wise. That's the way it is, and
it doesn't matter how many ways you can express it that
seem to deny it. If you have any simple, direct questions,
I'll try to answer, but there's not a chance in hell that
you're going to give up your foundational beliefs, including
the pretension that wording something a particular way creates
a particular state of reality.

And I'm not interested in furthering any discussion about
any of the other stuff, at least not now, with a guy who
actually believes that the utterance of the /word/
"marshmallow" can actually /mean/ marshmallow, when the fact
is easily demonstrable that the utterance meant mushroom,
at least in its utterance. You don't understand where
the meaning is, and you don't understand where the obligation
is. That wouldn't be so bad, except that you obviously
don't want to know.

> And if it is not what common
> English refers to as an "obligation", why should anyone care anymore
> than if you had your own special name for mushrooms?

All of those sins notwithstanding, you'll always be king
of cute around here.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 17, 12:35 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 10:16 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
> > Never mind 1000 times; I would like to see it written just
> > once. What is an "obligation"? Please identify it.
>

> Ask and you shall receive [...].

Finally!

> [...I]t's a decision to do something. [...]. [..I]t's nothing more
> than a decision [...]. [...T]he basic identification is that it's
> just a decision.

That's it? An obligation is just a "decision to do something"?
Well, why didn't you say so!

Jim, do us all a favor. From now on, if just for the sake
of effective communication, please simply drop the word
obligation and start using the word "decision" when you
mean "a decision to do something." It's true that I quarreled
a lot with your saying, "I can't have any obligations that I
don't decide that I have." But that's only because I mis-
understood! I didn't realize you were saying, "I can't decide
to do anything that I don't decide to do." That's different!
You'll get no quarrel from me about that. You win!

> [...T]he important point is that it's a creation of

> a single person and exists /only/ in a single person's
> mind.

Hurray for Jim! A decision is a creation of a single
person and exists only in a single person's mind,
the mind of the deciding person. What a revelation!

Now, Jim, if you will simply do us that single, simple,
kind little favor, there need be no further arguing.

For example...

> No human and no power on Earth can create [a
> decision] within me, except me.  Another person
> can /say/ I have [a decision].  Lord knows Prescott

> will say it all the time.  But he's just wrong, that's all.

I'm sorry! I misunderstood! I thought you were saying
obligation because you used the word obligation, and
I didn't realize you were only saying "a decision to do
something!" I stand corrected!

And I'm positively sheepish. When I quarreled with you,
pointing out that you can have many obligations that you
don't decide to have, and some even that you aren't aware
of, I certainly never meant to suggest that you can make
decisions to do things that you don't decide to do. That
would be absurd, indeed.

So, Jim, help me out here. Just puleeeese stop using
the word obligation when you actually mean "a decision
to do something"! And then we'll get along just fine.

Here's a recap for you. An obligation is a behavior that
is expected, relied upon and demanded by other human
beings. That is the /correct/ identification of the meaning
of the concept obligation.

Your proposed alternative, "An obligation is just a decision
to do something" is a gross /mis-identification/. It's nothing
more than pure, self-indulgent silliness. IOW, bullshit.

You are more than welcome to it, of course! Indulge
yourself. Fantasize. Imagine. But take my advice and
don't try it in court. Seriously, Jim, the judge will not be
amused when you claim that you had no obligation to
obey the law since you "decided" to do otherwise.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/17/2012 12:35 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
> On 1/16/2012 10:16 PM, Gordon Sollars wrote:
>
>> Never mind 1000 times; I would like to see it written just once. What is
>> an "obligation"? Please identify it.
>
> Ask and you shall receive, at least this time. I'll
> leave it to you resolve your internal contradiction
> that it both matters and doesn't matter.

And I'm going to adopt your own view in order to highlight your error in
terms you accept. I'm going to use the legal concept of obligation
because it has some lingo that lets me write more concisely; the
ordinary English term is not any different. Also, I'm skipping
everything else; in particular the stuff relating to Jim P. I have not
been following any of his posts except his replies to me.
...
> None of that [exact genus and species of "obligation]

> matters to me, because the basic identification
> is that it's just a decision. It can have any species you
> wish because the important point is that it's a creation of
> a single person and exists /only/ in a single person's mind.

Wrong. It exists in the mind of at least two persons. One is the
obligor and the other is the obligee. In the case of obligation by
contract, the phrase "meeting of the minds" is typically used,
indicating that two parties have the same thing in their minds.
Furthermore, in the case of contract, the obligation is often the result
of two parties bargaining, not the creation of a single person.

> So, what of all the other things that "obligation" implies in
> normal, standard usage? Now try to follow, because this is
> the relevant point. Those are all about /the consideration
> of others as to what the obligation implies/.

Why is that the case? What rules tell us what is part of the concept
and what is merely implied? Your say so? You need to make an argument,
not hand out ipse dixit.
...

> It's not a great sin to speak of "obligation" as both parts
> of that relationship, just like it's not a great sin to speak
> of a book of rules. The sin is using such speech as a
> replacement for what's actually going on, as a means of
> identifying without identifying.

What's *really* going on involves both the obligor and obligee, and both
have minds to hold the "cognitive existents".

> This is the sin of all
> collectivism and intrinsicism---the treating of something
> as if it were there, when it is not.

And that statement is an example of the sin of flying off the handle
when you are full of it. Adopting your ontological/epistemic views
doesn't change anything in our discussion on rights, unless you *also*
hold the position that, e.g., there is no right to life. Make up your
mind what you think about that.
...

> Because the concept is most commonly used in reference to
> an obligation of one person to another (or several), the
> temptation is to treat it as a relationship, like "larger"
> or "close," whereby both entities are required for the
> concept to have meaning.

Why is it merely a "temptation" to treat obligation as involving the
minds of both obligor and obligee? We can see that two parties are
involved - if we bother to look. You are long on assertion and short on
argument.
...

> The relationship part, the part that requires two parties,
> is the /agreement/, which is simply the state of obligation
> expressed by both parties. But the obligation itself is,
> like all epistemic existents, moral and otherwise, extant
> /only/ in the mind of a single individual.

More assertion without argument.

> That's your answer, fact-wise. That's the way it is, and
> it doesn't matter how many ways you can express it that
> seem to deny it.

No, that's not the "way it is". "Fact-wise" there is both an obligor
and an obligee, both with "cognitive existents".

> If you have any simple, direct questions,
> I'll try to answer, but there's not a chance in hell that
> you're going to give up your foundational beliefs, including
> the pretension that wording something a particular way creates
> a particular state of reality.

My "foundational beliefs" are not involved in any of the above. I've
adopted your lingo. As I've said over and over, I don't care or need to
enter into ontological discussions except where it might be relevant to
the moral argument. The problem is that your ontological/epistemic
views do not, by themselves, get you to the conclusions you assert
without argument and then finish off with a pompous professorial air.
(And I've had plenty of experience identifying *that*. ;-) )

> And I'm not interested in furthering any discussion about
> any of the other stuff, at least not now, with a guy who
> actually believes that the utterance of the /word/
> "marshmallow" can actually /mean/ marshmallow, when the fact
> is easily demonstrable that the utterance meant mushroom,
> at least in its utterance.

On the other hand, I recommend avoiding discussions with guys who tell
you that their use of a word in a contract does not mean what an
ordinary English speaker takes it to mean, especially after they breach
the agreement. But I'm sure that they would find your theory of meaning
very attractive.

--
Gordon

[Jim Klein]

I don't know about any of that, Gordon, but I must've
struck a nerve because suddenly you have a challenger
here for King of Cute in Jim Prescott.

I enjoy the mushroom/marshmallow issue because it's so
simple, so maybe we can take that up in the near future.


jk

[Gordon Sollars]

On 1/17/2012 3:50 PM, Jim Klein wrote:
> I don't know about any of that, Gordon, but I must've

What's not to know? On your own view of where the action is -
"cognitive existents" - the facts say an obligation is not what you
claimed it is.

> struck a nerve because suddenly you have a challenger
> here for King of Cute in Jim Prescott.

As I noted, I'm not following your exchanges with Jim P. I'm afraid
that once again it seems I've run out of time for now. But, like Frosty
the Snowman, "I'll be back again, someday".

> I enjoy the mushroom/marshmallow issue because it's so
> simple, so maybe we can take that up in the near future.

Well, that example is better suited to your (incessant) ontology theme,
rather than trying to shoehorn that theme into an ethical discussion.
Or we could also discuss whether Frosty the Snowman *really* has "an old
silk hat".

--
Gordon

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 16, 12:10 am, Gordon Sollars <gsoll...@pobox.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 4:21 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > On Jan 15, 12:04 pm, Gordon Sollars<gsoll...@pobox.com>  wrote:
> >> On 1/15/2012 10:51 AM, Jim Klein wrote:
> >> ...
>
> >>> Gordon
> >>> has intrinsic "rights" /because/ he defines "rights" as
> >>> some existent external to the cognition of the actors, and
>
> >> Just as the rules of chess are "external" to the cognition of the
> >> actors.
>
> > There are no rules which are external to the cognition of any actor,
>
> There would be if all chess players died and the rules survived only in
> a book.
> ...
>
> > If a moral rule, external to cognition, constrains one nevertheless,
> > how?
>
> Because one ought to follow it -

That is nothing but an useless tautology, and hardly any comfort to
those victimized by violation of moral rules, as if one were wanting
to play chess by the rule but the other does not. If you mean there
is a force in moral judgement, that is one thing, but I have yet to
see you write on anything on the value of moral judgement, per se, and
questions as to your references on there being 'constraint' go
unanswered as to the nature of that 'contraint'

> assuming it is a proper moral rule.  It
> constrains the way a property line "constrain".  You may have the power
> to step over it, but then you are trespassing.
>
>   On the other hand, inasmuch as there is no such thing in reality
>
> > any constraint on an obligation not self-imposed there is no conflict
>
> What is the constraint on a *self-imposed* obligation?  Here, let me
> refresh your memory of an earlier exchange:
>

One's will to do what one has committed oneself. That is called:
personal responsibility, integrity and honesty, goodwill and respect
for others.

>  > namely that
>  > obligations are always chosen and if obligations which represent or
>  > come from moral precepts, such as Rand's right from coercion in an
>  > obligation of a negative kind,  and ARE NOT CHOSEN, we get bad
>  > consequences -- like Nazis who did not choose that obligation and then
>  > murdered Jews who still have and always had rights.
>
> To say that the Jews had *rights* to life that were not violated when
> they were murdered is to say they had no rights to life at all.  It says
> they have something of no value whatsoever.
>

First; I NEVER said 'Jews had *rights* to life that were not violated'
or any words that can be interpreted as such

"Jews who still have and always had rights . . . "

Stop lying.

The Nazis did not choose to morally sanction those rights, and there
is nothing in reality to constrain them to do that, period.

And neither do you take positive moral sanction of any rights. Like
Nazis, if it is written in law and no court strikes it down, you are
silent.

>  > There is no
>  > (moral) constraint in reality but rather a Nazi who freely chooses or
>  > does not choose that obligation of a negative kind.
>
> There is no force in reality that makes people act on their obligations.

And this differs from what I have written repeatedly how?

>   If Smith promises to meet Jones for lunch, no tractor beam or force
> field will drag Smith to the lunch against his will.

Yes. That is all that needs to be said.

>  Nevertheless,
> Smith *has* an obligation.

Already stated and agreed. So what?

If Smith promises to meet Jones for lunch, no tractor beam or force
field will drag Smith to the lunch against his will.

> Or now do you deny that there are even any
> *chosen* obligations?
>

I am the one who agrees with Rand on that, and either you do not or
you choose to lie about what Rand wrote by drawing one sentence out of
context to the entirety of her philosophy.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 15, 9:32 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/15/2012 7:42 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > No, external force of gravity acts between the rock and the ground.
> > There is no self-generated action as there would be for an animate
> > entity.
>
> That's fine, Charles.  For our purposes(!) here, we
> have no dispute about this.
>

So when you wrote that I must have meant:

> That's what I thought. So the rolling rock does indeed
> have the purpose to get to the bottom of the hill.

. . . you were lying?


> So all you've got to do is somehow bring "purpose" or "value"
> into it.  I don't think you can sensibly do that.

If "purpose" and "goal" mean: an end to be attained, and "value" the
thing used to attain that end, then one can quite sensibly and
logically according to the rules of English grammar do that.


> You can
> /define/ the two concepts as being synonymous with "self-
> generative"

No. The three words all mean something different to each other.

> That's all.  You've rationally identified that self-generation
> and replicative functions are distinguishing attributes of
> living entities.

"Living", "replicating" Plus the attribute of self-generated action
towards life-sustaining purpose using beneficial values.

[Jim Klein]

Charles, this is really simple, so stop trying to make
it more complicated than it is.

On 1/18/2012 6:36 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

>>> No, external force of gravity acts between the rock and the ground.
>>> There is no self-generated action as there would be for an animate
>>> entity.
>>
>> That's fine, Charles. For our purposes(!) here, we
>> have no dispute about this.
>>
>
> So when you wrote that I must have meant:
>
>> That's what I thought. So the rolling rock does indeed
>> have the purpose to get to the bottom of the hill.
>
> . . . you were lying?

No...I was saying in /your/ definition it does, to wit...

>> So all you've got to do is somehow bring "purpose" or "value"
>> into it. I don't think you can sensibly do that.
>
> If "purpose" and "goal" mean: an end to be attained, and "value" the
> thing used to attain that end, then one can quite sensibly and
> logically according to the rules of English grammar do that.

See? Without teleology and without self-generation, getting
to the bottom IS "an end to be attained." Don't you get that?

I can ask, "How is it not?" You can ONLY appeal to what's
already established, the self-generation, the replicative
functions or just the general, "It's alive." But that doesn't
say ANYTHING with regard to "attaining an end."

Just watch what you do next...

>> You can
>> /define/ the two concepts as being synonymous with "self-
>> generative"
>
> No. The three words all mean something different to each other.

That's what I would think. Now watch what you do with this...

>> That's all. You've rationally identified that self-generation
>> and replicative functions are distinguishing attributes of
>> living entities.
>
> "Living", "replicating" Plus the attribute of self-generated action
> towards life-sustaining purpose using beneficial values.

Do you seriously not see? You do exactly as I charged in a
recent post---it's not just "attaining an end;" it's "attaining
an end BY SELF-GENERATED ACTION." Well duh, if you're just going
to DEFINE "attaining an end" as meaning "by self-generated action,"
then of course your definition is going to match.

But then you haven't said anything, except how you pick and choose
words. To demonstrate that the living thing "attains an end" and
actually say something, you have to show that it's doing that--attaining
an end--and the rock is not. If you just bring in that it's alive,
which in turn means is self-generated, then you haven't associated
any distinct meaning for "attaining an end." Really, you don't get that?

Meanwhile, the whole bankruptcy of your position is readily shown
by your appeal to "beneficial." We've gone over that before and
if you think you can get to "beneficial" without our conceptualization
of alternatives, values and relative benefits, then you're hopeless.

"life sustaining purpose using beneficial values," and all without
any abstraction, valuing or teleology. Neat trick; no wonder you
can never defend it in a simple and succinct manner.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 18, 10:45 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Charles, this is really simple, so stop trying to make
> it more complicated than it is.
>
> On 1/18/2012 6:36 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> >>> No, external force of gravity acts between the rock and the ground.
> >>> There is no self-generated action as there would be for an animate
> >>> entity.
>
> >> That's fine, Charles.  For our purposes(!) here, we
> >> have no dispute about this.
>
> > So when you wrote that I must have meant:
>
> >> That's what I thought.  So the rolling rock does indeed
> >> have the purpose to get to the bottom of the hill.
>
> > . . . you were lying?
>
> No...I was saying in /your/ definition it does, to wit...
>

No, in definition of what is an inanimate object there can be no self-
genereated action and hence for there to be any end to attain. What
ever happens ALWAYS is the result of an external force acting on the
object.

> >> So all you've got to do is somehow bring "purpose" or "value"
> >> into it.  I don't think you can sensibly do that.
>
> > If "purpose" and "goal" mean: an end to be attained, and "value" the
> > thing used to attain that end, then one can quite sensibly and
> > logically according to the rules of English grammar do that.
>
> See?  Without teleology and without self-generation, getting
> to the bottom IS "an end to be attained."  Don't you get that?
>

It is the *consequence* of physics on an object. In contrast, there
is no physics that explains an animate entity going *up* a hill (to
get food) just as it might go down and hill (to get food) or go
sideways (to get food). The explanation of observations of its actions
is "to get food" -- not the external forces that are acting on it The
rock ends at the bottom of the hill for no reason other than the force
of gravity has acted on it.

> I can ask, "How is it not?"  You can ONLY appeal to what's
> already established, the self-generation, the replicative
> functions or just the general, "It's alive."  But that doesn't
> say ANYTHING with regard to "attaining an end."
>

Again, "alive" alone or "replication" alone or even "capable of self-
generated action" alone does not define the animate. It is all three.
"Capable of self-generated action" needs further explication in that
the action is not just random, as it would be in radioactive decay,
but rather purposive. The problem is that you simply make teleology
to mean just "puposive" and it does not mean just "purposive" but
rather seeks to explain the end result of biologic action in a much
broader way: for example, the "purpose" of color vision was for
tracking of surfaces through subtle changes of light. There is a
backward causation: the need for something caused the thing to happen
-- this is the ususal conundrum posed for evolution to explain and how
it would work to have the handy physical feature to be adapted just in
time when needed. "Purposive" just means "purposive" without having to
carry along telelogic baggage of backward causation or something like
it.

>
> > "Living", "replicating"  Plus the attribute of self-generated action
> > towards life-sustaining purpose using beneficial values.
>
> Do you seriously not see?  You do exactly as I charged in a
> recent post---it's not just "attaining an end;" it's "attaining
> an end BY SELF-GENERATED ACTION."  Well duh, if you're just going
> to DEFINE "attaining an end" as meaning "by self-generated action,"
> then of course your definition is going to match.
>

Self-generated action of radioactive decay and replicating crystals
thus do not qualify for animate nature. They are special cases of
inanimate objects in which forces are not external but also *just
happen* without purpose.

> But then you haven't said anything, except how you pick and choose
> words.  To demonstrate that the living thing "attains an end" and
> actually say something, you have to show that it's doing that--attaining
> an end--and the rock is not.  If you just bring in that it's alive,
> which in turn means is self-generated, then you haven't associated
> any distinct meaning for "attaining an end."  Really, you don't get that?
>

To be "alive" is not sufficient to define "animate" for reasons
already explained. A live human zygote is not an animate human being.

> Meanwhile, the whole bankruptcy of your position is readily shown
> by your appeal to "beneficial."  We've gone over that before and
> if you think you can get to "beneficial" without our conceptualization
> of alternatives, values and relative benefits, then you're hopeless.
>

The alternative to beneficial is detrimental. How is that hard to
conceptualize? [Let's ignore neutral.] And when Rand says that only
the animate has that alternative to remain an animate entity or cease
being an animate entity and the value must be beneficial (to live),
not detrimental (to die).

[Jim Klein]

On 1/18/2012 6:18 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> No, in definition of what is an inanimate object there can be no self-
> genereated action and hence for there to be any end to attain.

I'm a little incredulous that you can't see what you're saying.
"If there's no self-generated action, then there is no end to
attain."

Do you seriously not see that you are just /defining/ "an end
to attain" as "pursuant to self-generated action"?

Hell, you could just as well define "an end to attain" as "pursuant
to anything BUT self-generated action." Voila...suddenly the rock
has an end to attain and the plant doesn't.

You cannot identify anything by definition. You know this.

> What
> ever happens ALWAYS is the result of an external force acting on the
> object.

Fine; this is not under dispute. It's not perfectly accurate as a
distinction, but it's good enough. That, because the plant also
has necessary external forces acting upon it. But no matter, since
it just doesn't matter here. Consider it fully stipulated that the
plant does what it does by self-generated actions and the rock does
what it does wholly due to external forces (also not 100% accurate).

It doesn't help you. You haven't /identified/ what there is about
"an end" that applies to self-generated action and doesn't apply to
non-self-generated action.

C'mon...this is just too simple.

>> See? Without teleology and without self-generation, getting
>> to the bottom IS "an end to be attained." Don't you get that?
>>
>
> It is the *consequence* of physics on an object.

Fine, that's what it is. And with the plant, it's the consequence
of self-generated action. Okay? You get all that conceded.

Now all you have to do is explain why the latter is an "end"
and the former isn't. THAT'S what you're missing and that's
why you devolve into this...

> In contrast, there
> is no physics that explains an animate entity going *up* a hill (to
> get food) just as it might go down and hill (to get food) or go
> sideways (to get food).

This looks like an appeal to your silly determinism trichotomy. But
I see that you save that for later. For now, you've got this...

> The explanation of observations of its actions
> is "to get food" -- not the external forces that are acting on it The
> rock ends at the bottom of the hill for no reason other than the force
> of gravity has acted on it.

Okay, it's "getting food;" that's what living things do...except when
they don't, of course. But again, no matter, because the rock "ends up"
at the bottom of the hill. Yes, one is self-generated basically and one
"ends up" happening exclusively because of external forces. That's all
admitted and stipulated.

Now all you've got to do--still--is explain why "ending up getting
food" is an end, and "ending up at the bottom of the hill" isn't.

You can distinguish them just fine...you just did. But you can't
distinguish them on anything that has to do with end, value or purpose.

Alright, you can distinguish them with "purpose" but ONLY by
bringing teleology into it, which you're saying is not brought in.

This is just too terribly simple, Charles.

>> I can ask, "How is it not?" You can ONLY appeal to what's
>> already established, the self-generation, the replicative
>> functions or just the general, "It's alive." But that doesn't
>> say ANYTHING with regard to "attaining an end."
>>
>
> Again, "alive" alone or "replication" alone or even "capable of self-
> generated action" alone does not define the animate.

Aw, stuff that already. The claim is about the living anyway,
not merely your "animate." You just want to bring that in so you
can start with your crazy tri-determinism shit.

> It is all three.
> "Capable of self-generated action" needs further explication in that
> the action is not just random, as it would be in radioactive decay,

Here we go!


> but rather purposive.

Except that you haven't given any definition of "purposive" in
any non-teleological sense except "action which is self-generated."
The problem there is that it's captured with the concept
<self-generated>; duh. IOW your "purposive" here isn't capturing
ANYTHING about reality except that.

That's why you can't spit out what it means, except to repeat
that it's "self-generated."

> The problem is that you simply make teleology
> to mean just "puposive" and it does not mean just "purposive" but
> rather seeks to explain the end result of biologic action in a much
> broader way:

Exactly! And here's what you fail to admit: it just doesn't, that's
all. It explains absolutely nothing except to outright declare by
definition that it means "self-generated" as we're using it here.

Now this is teleological. It "seeks to explain." And it doesn't.

> for example, the "purpose" of color vision was for
> tracking of surfaces through subtle changes of light.

And the purpose of mouths is to ingest larger portions
of food. So what? This is just anthropomorphizing the
seeming teleology of evolution, as if it were all happening
for a purpose. You know better than this...it happens
because of reproductive distribution. And let's not argue
about that anyway---if you're going to call it a "purpose"
like this, then you're bringing in teleology. But supposedly
you aren't. Which is it?

You're still left with the basic problem--you can't explain
why externally caused events don't lead to an end, but
self-generated ones do...without teleology.

> There is a
> backward causation: the need for something caused the thing to happen
> -- this is the ususal conundrum posed for evolution to explain and how
> it would work to have the handy physical feature to be adapted just in
> time when needed. "Purposive" just means "purposive" without having to
> carry along telelogic baggage of backward causation or something like
> it.

Stop getting off track. The issue is MUCH simpler than this.

> Self-generated action of radioactive decay and replicating crystals
> thus do not qualify for animate nature. They are special cases of
> inanimate objects in which forces are not external but also *just
> happen* without purpose.

WTF are you talking about?

> To be "alive" is not sufficient to define "animate" for reasons
> already explained. A live human zygote is not an animate human being.

Well, we're talking about all living things anyway, since
Rand's claim was about that class, and some bullshit about
a "fundamental alternative" in the universe that applies to
life and life alone. How very special, but it should serve
no purpose as some sort of profound identification. Not at all.

> The alternative to beneficial is detrimental. How is that hard to
> conceptualize?

Pretty tough without abstraction, alternatives and values.
That's rather the point, you see.

You don't buy that? Then use no appeal to human values and
finish this sentence: It is beneficial to live and detrimental
to die, because ________________________________ .

In 5,000 years you won't be able to do that. The only question
is whether you'll realize it within 5,000 years.

> [Let's ignore neutral.] And when Rand says that only
> the animate has that alternative to remain an animate entity or cease
> being an animate entity and the value must be beneficial (to live),
> not detrimental (to die).

Why are you still yapping about animate anyway? The claim is about
all living things, and your wild distinctions of triple determinism
just don't matter for this. Thank goodness.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/18/2012 6:18 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> And when Rand says that only
> the animate has that alternative to remain an animate entity or cease
> being an animate entity and the value must be beneficial (to live),
> not detrimental (to die).

First, it's all living things. And even I'll admit that this is
a very appealing approach. The thing is, ultimately it's built
of what we see as an "animus" or mystical sort of spirit in the
living that's not in the non-living.

Naturally that won't do for atheists or objectivists, so there's
this wild attempt to justify it all in terms of science. There's
just one problem...it ain't there. There's no "end," there's no
"purpose" and there sure as shit is no "value"...at least not
without abstract conceptualization, there isn't.

What of a star that's about to become a supernova, or whatever
happens when a star blows up? It might be noted BTW that in
all relevant respects, a star's functions are also self-generated.

But never mind that. Is it now "beneficial" that it remain a
star, and "detrimental" that it blow up and cease existing as
a star? Why not, if "remaining as [a star] entity is it
"purpose" or "end"? Why isn't that the "fundamental alternative"
in the universe, since it covers oh-so-much more than mere life?

It's gettin' time to yield on this, Charles, and stop with the
huge, intricate rationalizations. Trust me, you'll feel better.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 18, 9:00 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/18/2012 6:18 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > No, in definition of what is an inanimate object there can be no self-
> > genereated action and hence for there to be any end to attain.
>
> I'm a little incredulous that you can't see what you're saying.
> "If there's no self-generated action, then there is no end to
> attain."
>

No, That is not what I stated in the above. There is no self-
generated action for the inanimate. There is self-generated action for
the animate, but that action is not *just because* or random but for
an observable purpose.

> Do you seriously not see that you are just /defining/ "an end
> to attain" as "pursuant to self-generated action"?
>

No, I am defining for the above re-statement "purpose" as an end to
attain.

> Hell, you could just as well define "an end to attain" as "pursuant
> to anything BUT self-generated action."  Voila...suddenly the rock
> has an end to attain and the plant doesn't.
>

The "end to attain" is not "pusuant to anything" as end to a cause,
though it is also that. It is the observable reason for the action.
The end to a cause for an inanimate object, however, is by gravity and
only gravity.

> You cannot identify anything by definition.  You know this.
>
> > What
> > ever happens ALWAYS is the result of an external force acting on the
> > object.
>
> Fine; this is not under dispute.

Apparently it still is by you. There is no "end to attain" for an
inanimate object.

Yes or no?

>  Consider it fully stipulated that the
> plant does what it does by self-generated actions and the rock does
> what it does wholly due to external forces (also not 100% accurate).
>

Actually what happened to the rock is 100% by external forces and not
100% as to the plant -- not even very much. True or false? If false,
show your reasoning.

> It doesn't help you.  You haven't /identified/ what there is about
> "an end" that applies to self-generated action and doesn't apply to
> non-self-generated action.
>

In order to remain alive, the plant must act. The rock does nothing
in order to do anything. It is illusory in seeing the rock roll to the
bottom of the hill as if it is "getting to the bottom". It is a mater,
and only a matter, of external forces acting on the rock. There is no
end to any causation that is not explainable by anything other than
gravity and nonlinear dissipative forces of friction. A plant growing
its root system to the bottom of the hill does happen according to
physical laws but there is a purpose to that growth. It does not
*just happen* as would for a rock in anything that can be observed it
"doing".

> C'mon...this is just too simple.
>
> >> See?  Without teleology and without self-generation, getting
> >> to the bottom IS "an end to be attained."  Don't you get that?
>
> > It is the *consequence* of physics on an object.
>
> Fine, that's what it is.  And with the plant, it's the consequence
> of self-generated action.  Okay?  You get all that conceded.

There is no "end to attain" for an inanimate object.

Yes or no?

> Okay, it's "getting food;" that's what living things do..

There is no "end to attain" for an inanimate object.

Yes or no?

.except when
> they don't, of course.  But again, no matter, because the rock "ends up"
> at the bottom of the hill.  Yes, one is self-generated basically and one
> "ends up" happening exclusively because of external forces.  That's all
> admitted and stipulated.
>

There is no "end to attain" for an inanimate object.

Yes or no?

> Now all you've got to do--still--is explain why "ending up getting
> food" is an end, and "ending up at the bottom of the hill" isn't.
>

The former is a consequence of self-generated action for a purpose,
and the latter is not.

There is no "end to attain" for an inanimate object.

Yes or no

> That's why you can't spit out what it means, except to repeat
> that it's "self-generated."
>

Yes. The animate acts by self-generated action and the inanimate does
not.

> > The problem is that you simply make teleology

> > to mean just "purposive" and it does not mean just "purposive" but

> > rather seeks to explain the end result of biologic action in a much
> > broader way:
>
> Exactly!  And here's what you fail to admit:  it just doesn't, that's
> all.

That's your problem, not mine. I can take "purposive" to be without
human or any sentient consciousness *or* making "purposive"
inseparable from traditional biologic teleological theory.

> It explains absolutely nothing except to outright declare by
> definition that it means "self-generated" as we're using it here.
>

"Self-generated" does not mean "purposive" but rather for the animate
it is purposive. Again, radioactive decay is a kind of self generated
action but one which is random, without purpose.

> Now this is teleological.  It "seeks to explain."  And it doesn't.
>

There is no need at all to introduce teleology into Rand's
discussion.

> > for example, the "purpose" of color vision was for
> > tracking of surfaces through subtle changes of light.
>
> And the purpose of mouths is to ingest larger portions
> of food.  So what?  This is just anthropomorphizing the
> seeming teleology of evolution, as if it were all happening
> for a purpose.

Yes, and none at that need apply here. "So what?" is indeed my
answer to you when you wish to introduce "purposive" as synonymous to
teleological, and it is not.

> if you're going to call it a "purpose"
> like this, then you're bringing in teleology.  But supposedly
> you aren't.  Which is it?
>

Clearly I have not. A purpose = "an end to attain" says nothing on
speculation as to why the means happen to fit the end in some kind of
backward causation.

> You're still left with the basic problem--you can't explain
> why externally caused events don't lead to an end, but
> self-generated ones do...without teleology.
>

I never stated that there was not an "end" to the force of gravity on
a rock, but that there is no end to attain for a rock, and the rock
thus either ceases to be a rock or continues to be a rock, and there
is for a plant whose end -- life or death -- depends on its own
actions.

> > There is a
> > backward causation: the need for something caused the thing to happen
> > -- this is the ususal conundrum posed for evolution to explain and how
> > it would work to have the handy physical feature to be adapted just in
> > time when needed. "Purposive" just means "purposive" without having to

> > carry along teleological baggage of backward causation or something like

> > it.
>
> Stop getting off track.  The issue is MUCH simpler than this.

No it not when one tries to introduce teleology into the discussion as
if it simply means "purposive", which it does not. Rand's discussion
requires none of that and she explicitly states that. "Purposive"
just means "purposive" without having to carry along teleological

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 18, 11:19 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> a star's functions are also self-generated

A star's functions (?) are not self-generated or only in the matter
where there is radioactive decay which is random.

>it now "beneficial" that it remain a
>star

How is it beneficial (promoting or enhancing well-being) to an
inanimate object to remain inanimate object or constituents thereof?
Or are you an animist who believes all things have feelings of well-
being?

> It's gettin' time to yield on this, Charles, and stop with the
> huge, intricate rationalizations.  Trust me, you'll feel better.
>

I haven't a clue as to what you are talking about, and I guess
neither do you.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/19/2012 6:18 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> No, That is not what I stated in the above. There is no self-
> generated action for the inanimate. There is self-generated action for
> the animate, but that action is not *just because* or random but for
> an observable purpose.

Is this an assertion that for the rock, the action is random?

>> Do you seriously not see that you are just /defining/ "an end
>> to attain" as "pursuant to self-generated action"?
>>
>
> No, I am defining for the above re-statement "purpose" as an end to
> attain.
>
>> Hell, you could just as well define "an end to attain" as "pursuant
>> to anything BUT self-generated action." Voila...suddenly the rock
>> has an end to attain and the plant doesn't.
>>
>
> The "end to attain" is not "pusuant to anything" as end to a cause,
> though it is also that. It is the observable reason for the action.

Is this an assertion that some actions, like rocks rolling down
hills, have no "observable reason"?

> The end to a cause for an inanimate object, however, is by gravity and
> only gravity.

Oh, so it's not random and there is an observable reason. So why
did you waste our time by pretending the above were distinctions?

>> You cannot identify anything by definition. You know this.
>>
>>> What
>>> ever happens ALWAYS is the result of an external force acting on the
>>> object.
>>
>> Fine; this is not under dispute.
>
> Apparently it still is by you. There is no "end to attain" for an
> inanimate object.

Well sure, because you're defining "end to attain" as only those
ends which are self-generated. Why don't you define them as
only those ends that happen in Peoria and then the rest of the
country has no purpose?

> Actually what happened to the rock is 100% by external forces and not
> 100% as to the plant -- not even very much. True or false? If false,
> show your reasoning.

True, at least for our purposes here. This was acknowledged at
least twice in the last post, so why are you wasting time?

>> It doesn't help you. You haven't /identified/ what there is about
>> "an end" that applies to self-generated action and doesn't apply to
>> non-self-generated action.
>>
>
> In order to remain alive, the plant must act. The rock does nothing
> in order to do anything.

This is the "self-generated" distinction, which has been acknowledged
for years now.

> It is illusory in seeing the rock roll to the
> bottom of the hill as if it is "getting to the bottom".

Just look at what you're saying now! Now you're saying, quite
explicitly, that it's "illusory in seeing the rock roll to the

bottom of the hill as if it is 'getting to the bottom'."

Oops...not just explicitly, but verbatim. Maybe you should just
flatly retract and write it over. If not, then which is "illusory"---
the rock rolling or it getting to the bottom of the hill?

> It is a mater,
> and only a matter, of external forces acting on the rock.

Since we're pretending for this that there are no internal
sub-atomic and inter-atomic forces going on in the rock,
this is correct, acknowledged and stipulated. So you can
stop wasting time with it.

> There is no
> end to any causation that is not explainable by anything other than
> gravity and nonlinear dissipative forces of friction.

Acknowledged, admitted, conceded and stipulated. Is that good enough?

> A plant growing
> its root system to the bottom of the hill does happen according to
> physical laws

Oh, that's nice. So the rock rolling "does happen according to physical
laws" and the plant's root system "does happen according to physical
laws." Just prima facie, that looks like a major similarity on this
topic. But no, y'all have found a difference...

> but there is a purpose to that growth.

Except that you have NO MEANING AT ALL for this "purpose," since
you're taking teleology out of it.

> It does not
> *just happen* as would for a rock in anything that can be observed it
> "doing".

THEN TELL US WHAT ELSE IS GOING BEYOND "JUST HAPPENING." Is there
something about the "self-generation" that's more than "just
happening"? IF SO, THEN WHAT? You keep SAYING "it's purposeful,"
but you won't give a clue to what that could mean if it's not
teleological. You keep SAYING that "it attains an end," but you
can't distinguish that end from non-living ends except by repeating
that they're the ends of the living.

Well duh; the ends of rocks aren't the ends of clouds.

>> C'mon...this is just too simple.
>>
>>>> See? Without teleology and without self-generation, getting
>>>> to the bottom IS "an end to be attained." Don't you get that?
>>
>>> It is the *consequence* of physics on an object.
>>
>> Fine, that's what it is. And with the plant, it's the consequence
>> of self-generated action. Okay? You get all that conceded.
>
> There is no "end to attain" for an inanimate object.

And you have YET to explain, in what manner there is ANY
non-teleological end for a living one. That is your chore
and you have evaded it forever now.

BTW common sense should tell you that the argument fails, since
it's built of some "fundamental alternative." Step back a moment
and see that if it involves alternatives, then it's teleological.

Snip the rest, since it's just more waste. Either address this
stuff or continue evading. Like I say, it's incredibly simple.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 19, 8:44 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/19/2012 6:18 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > No, That is not what I stated in the above.  There is no self-
> > generated action for the inanimate. There is self-generated action for
> > the animate, but that action is not *just because* or random but for
> > an observable purpose.
>
> Is this an assertion that for the rock, the action is random?
>

No. The assertion for random, purposeless self-generated action in
inanimate objects is for radioactive decay and other special cases.
For the rock, it is simply external forces acting on a rock and there
is no self-generated action. As for the animate, the "end to attain"
is not *only* to be at the bottom of the hill, or at the top of the
hill, or staying put but rather the reason for that action, and a rock
has no reason to be any where.

> >> Do you seriously not see that you are just /defining/ "an end
> >> to attain" as "pursuant to self-generated action"?
>
> > No, I am defining for the above re-statement "purpose" as an end to
> > attain.
>
> >> Hell, you could just as well define "an end to attain" as "pursuant
> >> to anything BUT self-generated action."  Voila...suddenly the rock
> >> has an end to attain and the plant doesn't.
>

Ditto the above reply.

> > The "end to attain" is not "pusuant to anything" as end to a cause,
> > though it is also that. It is the observable reason for the action.
>
> Is this an assertion that some actions, like rocks rolling down
> hills, have no "observable reason"?
>

More or less. Can you give a reason for rock to roll down a hill?
Can I give a reason why the raccoon went down the hill? Yes. It was
running away from Trapper Bob. Again causation (gravity for the rock
versus Trapper Bob for the raccoon) is not at issue, but rather self-
generated action for a purpose. Does a rock roll itself down a hill
for any reason -- not is the falling caused by anything -- ever?

> > The end to a cause for an inanimate object, however, is by gravity and
> > only gravity.
>
> Oh, so it's not random and there is an observable reason.  So why
> did you waste our time by pretending the above were distinctions?
>

See reply above. [The assertion for random, purposeless self-generated
action in inanimate objects is for radioactive decay and other special
cases]

> >> You cannot identify anything by definition.  You know this.
>
> >>> What
> >>> ever happens ALWAYS is the result of an external force acting on the
> >>> object.
>
> >> Fine; this is not under dispute.
>
> > Apparently it still is by you. There is no "end to attain" for an
> > inanimate object.
>
> Well sure, because you're defining "end to attain" as only those
> ends which are self-generated.

Yes. There is no "end to attain" for the rock. Gravity pulls it to
the bottom of the hill. The "end" is just a causal end result, but
not something for the rock to attain as for any purpose (you can
imagine) the rock might have.

> > It is illusory in seeing the rock roll to the
> > bottom of the hill as if it is "getting to the bottom".
>

> Just look at what you're saying now!  Now you're saying, quite
> explicitly, that it's "illusory in seeing the rock roll to the
> bottom of the hill as if it is 'getting to the bottom'."
>

As if for any purpose for the rock to have to be at the bottom. For
the rock. it is simply external forces acting on a rock and there is
no self-generated action. As for the animate, the "end to attain" is
not *only* to be at the bottom of the hill, or at the top of the hill,
or staying put but rather the reason for that action, and a rock has
no reason to be any where.

> Oops...not just explicitly, but verbatim.  Maybe you should just
> flatly retract and write it over.  If not, then which is "illusory"---
> the rock rolling or it getting to the bottom of the hill?
>

It is illusory, and utlimately moronic, for anyone to think the rock
has its purpose for being at the bottom of a hill. The superstitious
or fatalist-determinist might imagine the rock HAS A PURPOSE, as in
some mysterious, mystical reason of the cosmos, but those who think a
rock *participates* in that purpose are some sort of stone-age
animists.

> > A plant growing
> > its root system to the bottom of the hill does happen according to
> > physical laws
>
> Oh, that's nice.  So the rock rolling "does happen according to physical
> laws" and the plant's root system "does happen according to physical
> laws."  Just prima facie, that looks like a major similarity on this
> topic.  But no, y'all have found a difference...
>

The physical laws are not the same. Again, this is not as if to
explain the animate according to mystical "anima" that inhabits it
but not the inanimate.

> > but there is a purpose to that growth.
>
> Except that you have NO MEANING AT ALL for this "purpose," since
> you're taking teleology out of it.
>

The purpose for the plant to have grown the root system when, where,
and how it did was to get water. That's easy. Explain why -- for what
purpose -- a rock does anything.

> Well duh; the ends of rocks aren't the ends of clouds.
>

Again, for what purpose would a rock roll to the bottom of a hill? As
for clouds, the same still holds: for what purpose does water collect
in that fashion? Ultimately -- to wash your car? THAT is introducing
animist teleology in much the same fashion as to say a rock has a
purpose in the workings of the universe to be there just so something
else can happen and then something else can happen and so on. "If it
weren't for that rock, Lincoln would have not given his Gettysburg
Address." That is simply fatalist-determinist nonsense. Whereas, an
animal going to the bottom of a hill and then eating something at the
bottom of the hill provides an tangible fact of the purpose for the
animal to go to the bottom of the hill.

> And you have YET to explain, in what manner there is ANY
> non-teleological end for a living one.  That is your chore
> and you have evaded it forever now.
>

The animal goes to the bottom of the hill for the purpose to eat
something that is at the bottom of the hill.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/20/2012 6:36 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> Can you give a reason for rock to roll down a hill?

Gravity? That's an action that causes things to happen
between two objects of mass.

> Can I give a reason why the raccoon went down the hill? Yes. It was
> running away from Trapper Bob.

Yes. That's an action that living, self-generated entities
engage pursuant to very complex machinations that have
developed over millennia.

The dispute is not that they're different reasons or causes.
Nor is that they are vastly different in complexity. Nor is
it that one is subject to external forces and one involves
self-generation, as least as we're using those terms here.

For our purposes, you have distinguished them adequately and
accurately. What you have haven't distinguished them on, is
any basis that remotely involves ends, purposes or values.

I mean, you do just on the basis of verbiage. You CALL the
raccoon going to the bottom of the hill "an end," but you
don't CALL the rock going to the bottom of the hill "an end."

Why? Because of those OTHER distinctions, which are NOT
distinctions concerning "attaining an end."

> Yes. There is no "end to attain" for the rock. Gravity pulls it to
> the bottom of the hill. The "end" is just a causal end result, but
> not something for the rock to attain as for any purpose (you can
> imagine) the rock might have.

How come you get to imagine that the plant is attaining
the end of turning to the light, but I don't get to imagine
that the rock is attaining the end of getting to the bottom
of the hill?

If we were trying to establish "what does Charles imagine
as an end," that might be relevant. But we're trying to
establish some distinction between the rock and the plant.

Nothing personal, but your imagination is irrelevant to that.
As you make clear here, you have no distinction to point to
in the objects. That would be because there is none, with
regard to this particular distinction. Q.E.D.

Y'know, you could also imagine that the rock is made of molecules,
and the plant isn't. That too would be non-correspondent.

Here's your best shot though...

> The animal goes to the bottom of the hill for the purpose to eat
> something that is at the bottom of the hill.

In all these years, I think that's your best line on this. Yes,
it's going for that purpose, isn't it? Sounds about right.

But it isn't, and even you admit it. Here's how. If it were
going "for the purpose to eat something that is at the bottom
of the hill," that would parse to being aware of the food there
(which obviously it is) AND that its self-generated action
will achieve the end of acquiring that food. That's what a
purpose is, right? And that's sure enough what it looks like,
right? Not too tough to imagine that, right?

Here's your problem in a nutshell--THAT WOULD BE TELEOLOGICAL.
That would involve awareness of what's going to happen when
it does the (admittedly) self-generated action. And as you
yourself admit, there's nothing teleological going on at all.
Supposedly it's a "non-teleological purpose" that attains the
end. And basically that's right, except it's not a purpose
but for the fact that we imagine it as a purpose, as you
yourself also noted above.

Leaving aside potential teleology in higher animals, the plant
IS NOT turning to the Sun for ANY sort of purpose to get the
light. WE just happen to know that this is how it reacts and
we can even couch the explanation in terms of purpose--"It turns
toward the light because it needs it for photosynthesis." But
of course, the plant doesn't know all that and hasn't the foggiest
idea what it's doing or why. It's STRICTLY physical reaction to
STRICTLY physical forces, just like in the case of the rock.

You wanna deny this on the basis of wild randomness, but even
that doesn't address the point. You can have the randomness
just as you can have the self-generation---it STILL won't
distinguish the action on the basis of ANY ends, purposes
or values.

That would be because there is no such distinction, regardless
of anyone's imagination. That's another way you can tell I'm
right on this---my position NEVER yields any contradiction, and
yours (and Rand's) eventually must. Like here.


jk

[David Friedman]

In article
<3961b93a-3cc2-48d2...@k29g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,
"James E. Prescott" <jep...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Does a right exist prior to being recognized as a right? Or does
> its existence depend on recognition?
>
> First, a stipulation. A right is one man's freedom of action that
> other men may not, or must not, or ought not interfere with.
> Deliberate interference with a right is called a "violation," of
> morality at the very least, and of law, generally. Let's all agree
> to at least that much, and see where it leads.
>
> Imagine (here I go again!) two desperately hungry men who
> see a single banana growing in the wild. Neither of them owns
> it. If either of them eats it, the other may well starve to death.

Your example shows, at most, that some rights are created by contract,
not that all rights are. And implicit in your argument is the assumption
that the contract does create a right--hence that there is a preexisting
right to have other people keep the contracts they make with you.

Suppose one of your two men doesn't believe that contracts are binding.
He accordingly makes the agreement and, when he draws the short straw,
grabs the banana and runs for it. Has he violated the other's rights?
Apparently, on your principle, he hasn't, since he never recognized
it--he only pretended to.

--
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/
http://daviddfriedman.blogspot.com/
_Salamander_: http://tinyurl.com/6957y7e
_How to Milk an Almond,..._ http://tinyurl.com/63xg8gx

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 20, 10:31 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/20/2012 6:36 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Can you give a reason for rock to roll down a hill?
>
> Gravity?  That's an action that causes things to happen
> between two objects of mass.
>

No, what would be the rock's reason/purpose/goal? And gravity is not
an "action" and you are using an alternate meaning for "reason" the
rock rolls down a hill. I mean reason=purpose=goal, not the
explanation thereof by a physics equation. Again, the reason/purpose/
goal of a raccoon running down the hill, or running up the hill, is to
escape Trapper Bob. For what does a rock ever need to do anything for
a purpose?

> > Can I give a reason why the raccoon went down the hill? Yes. It was
> > running away from Trapper Bob.
>
> Yes.  That's an action that living, self-generated entities
> engage pursuant to very complex machinations that have
> developed over millennia.
>
> The dispute is not that they're different reasons or causes.

Yes. The dispute exists when you continue to use "reason for" as to
NOT mean "purpose for", and "teleology" to mean "purpose for".

> Nor is that they are vastly different in complexity.

The purpose for the raccoon has nothing whatsoever to do with
"complexity" ? It is is simple observation-deduction.

> Nor is
> it that one is subject to external forces

Yes, The difference is that the rock *only* rolls down the hills due
to external forces, and the raccoon's actions are not from external
forces alone -- but rather due to purposive self-generated action, not
possible for the rock.

> and one involves
> self-generation, as least as we're using those terms here.
>

Yes, The difference is self-generation for the animate but also for a
purpose.

> For our purposes, you have distinguished them adequately and
> accurately.  What you have haven't distinguished them on, is
> any basis that remotely involves ends, purposes or values.
>

According to you: the raccoon would have no purpose in escaping
Trapper Bob, right?

> I mean, you do just on the basis of verbiage.  You CALL the
> raccoon going to the bottom of the hill "an end," but you
> don't CALL the rock going to the bottom of the hill "an end."
>
> Why?  Because of those OTHER distinctions, which are NOT
> distinctions concerning "attaining an end."
>

I do not deny causality and the use of the word "end" as "the result"
and compare the end-result of the rock at the bottom of the hill and
the end-result for the raccoon at the bottom of the hill, but, you are
using the word "end" to mean the same for both, even though the "end"
-- beyond being at the bottom of the hill -- for the raccoon is to
escape Trapper Bob. but according to you: the raccoon would have no
purpose in escaping Trapper Bob, right? and his being at the bottom of
the hill is "just because", right?

> > Yes.  There is no "end to attain" for the rock.  Gravity pulls it to
> > the bottom of the hill.  The "end" is just a causal end result, but
> > not something for the rock to attain as for any purpose (you can
> > imagine) the rock might have.
>
> How come you get to imagine that the plant is attaining
> the end of turning to the light, but I don't get to imagine
> that the rock is attaining the end of getting to the bottom
> of the hill?
>

Go ahead: imagine it. What purpose/attaining an end is there for the
rock to be at the bottom of the hill? Again "reason for" (Gravity plus
other forces) does not here equate to "purpose for" (Escape Trapper
Bob). Is there any "reason for" whatsoever that rock being at the
bottom of the hill other than the fact that gravity has pulled it
there? Go ahead, imagine one.

> If we were trying to establish "what does Charles imagine
> as an end," that might be relevant.  But we're trying to
> establish some distinction between the rock and the plant.
>

It would also be outside your imagination -- on observing Trapper Bob
chasing the raccoon and the raccoon running away from him -- that the
raccoon could have a purpose for being the bottom of the hill?

> Nothing personal, but your imagination is irrelevant to that.

It is called deductive thinking after observation. Go ahead: deduce
why the rock would be at the bottom of the hill, and not that it is
only gravity which pulls it to the bottom. Even better, deduce the
purpose for which gravity pulled the rock down the hill.

> As you make clear here, you have no distinction to point to
> in the objects.  That would be because there is none, with
> regard to this particular distinction.  Q.E.D.
>

The distinction is the even if gravity is an external force applicable
to both the inanimate and the animate, the animate has a purpose that
does not involve gravity, and the most you can imagine, one can
suppose, is that gravity has the same purpose for the rock as it would
be for the raccoon, but that is not the distinction to be made.

> But it isn't, and even you admit it.  Here's how.  If it were
> going "for the purpose to eat something that is at the bottom
> of the hill," that would parse to being aware of the food there
> (which obviously it is) AND that its self-generated action
> will achieve the end of acquiring that food.  That's what a
> purpose is, right?  And that's sure enough what it looks like,
> right?  Not too tough to imagine that, right?
>
> Here's your problem in a nutshell--THAT WOULD BE TELEOLOGICAL.

Teleological does not simply mean "for a purpose" but rather seeks to
explain the end result of biologic action in a much broader way: for

example, the "purpose" of color vision was for tracking of surfaces

through subtle changes of light. There is a backward causation: the
need for something caused the thing to happen -- this is the usual

conundrum posed for evolution to explain and how it would work to have
the handy physical feature to be adapted just in time when needed.
"Purposive" just means "purposive" without having to carry along
teleological baggage of backward causation or something like it.

Traditional biologic teleology does not concern itself at all for the
individual goals of any individual living thing -- that being
irrelevant to the topic.

You have complained: "except that you haven't given any definition of
'purposive' in
any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-generated'"
and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a non-
teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same. I am
not trying to speculate on why an animal has color vision through
evolutionary "purpose" but rather that an animal, having color vision,
would use that vision for a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for
no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose . Teleology's
backward causation uses the reason why an animal might use color
vision to form the basis for its existence by speculative induction.
That has nothing to do with this discussion.

> That would involve awareness of what's going to happen when
> it does the (admittedly) self-generated action.  And as you
> yourself admit, there's nothing teleological going on at all.
> Supposedly it's a "non-teleological purpose" that attains the
> end.  And basically that's right, except it's not a purpose
> but for the fact that we imagine it as a purpose, as you
> yourself also noted above.
>

It is deductive thinking to conclude that Trapper Bob is chasing the
raccoon and that the raccoon has a purpose to escape Trapper Bob by
running down the hill. Are you now wanting to introduce philosophical
scepticism to suggest that it is *impossible* to deduce anything from
observation of Trapper Bob and the raccoon? If scepticism is your
modus operandi, then indeed you would have no more reason to suppose
the raccoon has purpose to go down th hill than a rock. Is that why
you refuse to give a purpose for that rock rolling down the hill? No
one can for either the rock or the raccoon in equal measure of
uncertainty?

I do not deny causality and the use of the word "end" as "the result"
and compare the end-result of the rock at the bottom of the hill and
the end-result for the raccoon at the bottom of the hill, but, you are
using the word "end" to mean the same for both, even though the "end"
-- beyond being at the bottom of the hill -- for the raccoon is to
escape Trapper Bob. but according to you: the raccoon would have no
purpose in escaping Trapper Bob, right? and his being at the bottom of
the hill is "just because", right?

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 21, 12:46 pm, David Friedman <d...@daviddfriedman.nopsam.com>
wrote:
> In article
> <3961b93a-3cc2-48d2-ad5c-9a192f8d1...@k29g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,

>  "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Does a right exist prior to being recognized as a right? Or does
> > its existence depend on recognition?
>
> > First, a stipulation. A right is one man's freedom of action that
> > other men may not, or must not, or ought not interfere with.
> > Deliberate interference with a right is called a "violation," of
> > morality at the very least, and of law, generally. Let's all agree
> > to at least that much, and see where it leads.
>
> > Imagine (here I go again!) two desperately hungry men who
> > see a single banana growing in the wild. Neither of them owns
> > it. If either of them eats it, the other may well starve to death.
>
> Your example shows, at most, that some rights are created by contract,
> not that all rights are.

The brilliant troll makes a brilliant comment on the obvious. Duh,
yes, Prescott claims that there are no rights beyond those that can be
created by agreement.

And so do you, although you are the hedge-fund manager of anarchism,
holding moral sense in reserve.

Robert Anton Wilson, Natural Law and L.A. Rollins, The Myth of Natural
Law.

http://www.spunk.org/texts/intro/faq/sp001547/secF7.html
We should note that these books are written by people associated, to
some degree, with right-libertarianism and, of course, we should point
out that not all right-libertarians subscribe to "natural law"
theories (David Friedman, for example, does not).

http://www.la-articles.org.uk/alice.htm

The major effect of Rand upon libertarians has been to favour the
doctrine of natural rights, though most libertarian writers who do
accept natural rights (Rothbard, Nozick, David Friedman, for example)
adhere to forms of the doctrine which aren't particularly close to
Rand's . . .

[Jim Klein]

On 1/21/2012 7:02 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> Go ahead: imagine it. What purpose/attaining an end is there for the
> rock to be at the bottom of the hill? Again "reason for" (Gravity plus
> other forces) does not here equate to "purpose for" (Escape Trapper
> Bob). Is there any "reason for" whatsoever that rock being at the
> bottom of the hill other than the fact that gravity has pulled it
> there? Go ahead, imagine one.

Your POV is clear enough; why don't you spend a drop of
effort at hearing what you're missing?

Sure we could fantasize a goal for the rock (it wants to
get to the bottom), and obviously that would be a
misidentification. Why? Because the rock has no goals
or purposes, nor any "ends to attain," It just moves--yes,
due wholly external forces--in the manner that all objects
of mass move on Earth.

Now try to follow this, Charles. Try to HEAR it. We can
also fantasize that the plant does what it does because
it "wants" sunlight or water, or that it has "the end to
attain" of staying alive. And in EXACTLY the same fashion,
that would be a misidentification. The plant doesn't want
shit, and it has no "end to attain."

You just keep bringing up the raccoon because it's so much
easier to fantasize the wants and the purposes and the
goals. But the point is still the same---neither are doing
it for any "reason" at all, at least no reason that can be
found within them. The reason, as you know, is because over
the millennia, those organisms which acted like that, had
more offspring than those that didn't.

You also keep bringing up the distinction of "self-generation."
Yes, that's a huge distinction. Living entities are vastly
more complex than rocks, they are self-generated as we are
using the term here, and they can far more easily be imagined
as going after ends.

You wanna say, "The raccoon flees from Trapper Bob because it
wants to stay alive," but that's not precisely accurate. It
has evolved over zillions of years to engage actions that, yes,
end up keeping it alive. And more relevantly, having little
raccoon babies. And the rock is acted upon--yes, externally and
not internally--to get to the bottom of the hill.

There are tons of differences here, self-generation and replication
being but two obvious ones. There are more, but none of them
matter because all that's going on is that you are IMAGINING
a purpose behind it.

This should be obvious to you. As I already mentioned, if it
were like you were saying, then it WOULD be teleological. The
raccoon would be fleeing BECAUSE it somehow knew that its life
depended on it. That right there is enough to defeat your point,
but there's also the fact that we KNOW why the raccoon is running...
because other raccoons that had that PHYSICAL response had
more babies over time than the ones that didn't.

You're not just being a Subjectivist about this; you are
also being a Spiritualist.

> Teleological does not simply mean "for a purpose" but rather seeks to
> explain the end result of biologic action in a much broader way: for
> example, the "purpose" of color vision was for tracking of surfaces
> through subtle changes of light.

Uh, no. The development of color vision happened because
the organisms that had it, had more babies than the ones
that didn't, over time.

You can IMAGINE the purpose of this and yes, that's how
life works...the attributes that cause more reproduction
also cause greater survival. But there's still no PURPOSE
behind it, except for that which you imagine.

You're trying to have your cake and eat it too. You're
asserting that there's such a thing as purpose with no
teleology, and then turning around and explaining that this
purpose has teleology.

Do you really want to claim that "taking this action because
of what is going to happen" is not teleological? Well, that's
what you're claiming with the raccoon...taking this action
means that it'll live and not taking it means that it'll die.

Yes, in a fundamental way, that's "why" it happened---if it
didn't happen that way, there wouldn't have been more baby
raccoons born of this type and the attribute never would've
manifested. And it did---this is the "miracle of life," but
it's neither miraculous nor mystical.

Nor does it involve ANY purpose, goal or value at all, until
some valuer attaches value to it. In this case, that would
be you. I attach value to it too FWIW; what I don't do is
therefore pretend that so does the raccoon.

> There is a backward causation: the
> need for something caused the thing to happen --

There is no need; there's just having more babies.

> this is the usual
> conundrum posed for evolution to explain and how it would work to have
> the handy physical feature to be adapted just in time when needed.

They weren't "adapted just in time when needed." Many of the
organisms died...all of them died of course, but some of them
died before they had as many babies as the others. Eventually,
one genotype spread across the population.

Stop making this more complex than it is. It's simple. It's not
about the details of evolution and it sure as hell isn't about
any wild triple determinism.

It's about attaining ends, having purposes and valuing. ALL of
those are conceptual activities and non-conceptual organisms
simply don't engage them. It's as simple as that and it's only
because you (and others) are trying to deny this that you invent
claptrap like "non-teleological purpose."

The reason that looks so oxymoronic, is because it is.

> You have complained: "except that you haven't given any definition of
> 'purposive' in
> any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-generated'"
> and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a non-
> teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same. I am
> not trying to speculate on why an animal has color vision through
> evolutionary "purpose" but rather that an animal, having color vision,
> would use that vision for a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for
> no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose .

If I were going to couch it in terms of purpose, I'd point
out the reproductive stuff since that's what caused it in
the first place. But that doesn't matter, because even then
there's no purpose...it's the way THOSE physical molecules
act, on Earth. Just like it's the way the rock's physical
molecules likewise act, on Earth

So now you'll spend 10 posts yapping about how living molecules
really "act" and the rocks molecules really don't. That's
bullshit too...molecules are molecules and they act (or don't)
as they do. That one set of molecules form organic self-generating
cells and another set form non-self-generating crystals, really
has nothing to do with it. The point is that NONE of the molecules
are acting with any purpose, and never could.

You can IMAGINE the organism "seeking to stay alive" and I can
IMAGINE the rock "seeking to get to the bottom of the hill,"
but neither are accurate. They are both sets of (vastly different)
molecules just doing what they do.

And maybe they're closer than either of us imagine, since that's
got to be a rock in between your ears.

> It is deductive thinking to conclude that Trapper Bob is chasing the
> raccoon and that the raccoon has a purpose to escape Trapper Bob by
> running down the hill.

No, he doesn't! He just does as raccoons do, and that's one
of the things they do, for the reasons enumerated above.

Really...just go ask the damn raccoon if you don't believe me.

> Are you now wanting to introduce philosophical
> scepticism to suggest that it is *impossible* to deduce anything from
> observation of Trapper Bob and the raccoon?

You ain't deducing shit. You're just making this up out
of whole cloth. You're being an animist, I think it's called.

> If scepticism is your modus operandi,

As you know, it isn't. Antecedent denied, consequent irrelevant.

> I do not deny causality and the use of the word "end" as "the result"
> and compare the end-result of the rock at the bottom of the hill and
> the end-result for the raccoon at the bottom of the hill, but, you are
> using the word "end" to mean the same for both, even though the "end"
> -- beyond being at the bottom of the hill -- for the raccoon is to
> escape Trapper Bob. but according to you: the raccoon would have no
> purpose in escaping Trapper Bob, right? and his being at the bottom of
> the hill is "just because", right?

Aw, give it up already. Even I can explain it in simple terms,
and I'm no geneticist. This isn't some Grand Mystery and there
is no Grand Designer who made all this with some Grand Purpose.

All of that is just you being a Subjectivist, and mystic to boot.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 21, 12:46 pm, David Friedman <d...@daviddfriedman.nopsam.com>
wrote:
> In article
> <3961b93a-3cc2-48d2-ad5c-9a192f8d1...@k29g2000vbl.googlegroups.com>,

>  "James E. Prescott" <jepr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > Does a right exist prior to being recognized as a right? Or does
> > its existence depend on recognition?
>

> > [...]

>
> Your example shows, at most, that some rights are
> created by contract, not that all rights are.

Greetings, David. No, I think the example gets to the
heart of what rights are (to begin with).

> And implicit in your argument is the assumption
> that the contract does create a right--

Yes, but I mean this to be explicit in the full argument.

> hence that there is a preexisting right to have other
> people keep the contracts they make with you.

No, that doesn't follow at all. "Preexisting" would mean
prior to any contract or to any agreement whatsoever,
which I am saying is the proverbial jungle where neither
you nor anyone else has any rights.

> Suppose one of your two men doesn't believe that

> contracts are binding. He accordingly makes the agree-

> ment and, when he draws the short straw, grabs the
> banana and runs for it. Has he violated the other's rights?

Well, I notice you switch from contract in the first sentence,
to agreement in the second. That's excellent! I define
contract as a legally binding agreement. And, I do indeed
regard contract (not mere agreement) as the source of all
"rights" in the full moral-legal meaning of the concept. And,
clearly, the legal status of an agreement is not subject to
just one person's unilateral interpretation. You can't sign a
lease agreement and then plead in court that you all along
had some undisclosed mental reservation about its status
as a binding contract.

However, in this particular case, I was using the idea
of a "moral right," STILL arising from an agreement, but
DEVOID of any legal connotation. This should be obvious
as I was talking about just two men alone in that proverbial
jungle, where law does not exist.

It was with such a "moral right" in mind (not a moral-legal
right) that I anticipated and answered your question a little
further down in the post:

Does such a right's existence depend on
/continued/ recognition? Well, /not/ the other
party's right! Suppose that the man who drew
the short straw violates the agreement by taking
this banana. In that case, he would be both
/violating/ the other's existing right and /forfeiting/
his own right to the /next/ banana!

> Apparently, on your principle, he hasn't, since he
> never recognized it--he only pretended to.

If he pretended to agree then he never actually agreed,
and, in such a case, why would the other man then
pretend to recognize the pretender's right to the next
banana!? Both would be back where they started, only
faced now with just the choice to fight it out, since one
of them has renounced the better option of agreement
and cooperation.

And, this isn't ever a problem, David, when it comes to
moral-legal rights, a.k.a., to rights in the /full/ meaning of
the word. With /full/ rights in mind, we are not talking about
just one agreement between two men alone in a jungle.
There is always, also, a /second/ parallel agreement, namely,
that the other agreement will be legally enforceable. And,
here's the key point: this second agreement is, itself, legally
enforceable! The "agreement to have law" is what I call a
"social contract," and I call it a contract, not just an agree-
ment, because it is enforced just like any other contract
to which it pertains.

To follow through on your example, then, what of a man
who pretends to agree that he gets the next banana while
I get this one, /and/ "pretends" to agree that this agreement
will be enforceable under law?

Such a man would no rights -- obviously no right to the next
banana! But I, on the other hand, would have every right to
appeal to the law for whatever assistance I may need in
denying him access to that next banana. He could say to
a judge, "Sir, I was only pretending," but it wouldn't make
any difference. The judge would reply, "Nothing in the
law gives you the option to 'pretend' to enter into a legally
binding agreement. You either do or you don't, and if you
don't, you must not /say/ that you do. If you say it, or sign
it, the law will enforce it. Dealing with pretenders like you
is one of the reasons we have law in the first place."

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 21, 9:57 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/21/2012 7:02 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Go ahead: imagine it.  What purpose/attaining an end is there for the
> > rock to be at the bottom of the hill? Again "reason for" (Gravity plus
> > other forces) does not here equate to "purpose for"  (Escape Trapper
> > Bob).  Is there any "reason for" whatsoever that rock being at the
> > bottom of the hill other than the fact that gravity has pulled it
> > there?  Go ahead, imagine one.
>
> Your POV is clear enough; why don't you spend a drop of
> effort at hearing what you're missing?
>
> Sure we could fantasize a goal for the rock (it wants to
> get to the bottom), and obviously that would be a
> misidentification.  Why?  Because the rock has no goals
> or purposes, nor any "ends to attain," It just moves--yes,
> due wholly external forces--in the manner that all objects
> of mass move on Earth.
>
> Now try to follow this, Charles.  Try to HEAR it.  We can
> also fantasize that the plant does what it does because
> it "wants" sunlight or water, or that it has "the end to
> attain" of staying alive.  And in EXACTLY the same fashion,
> that would be a misidentification.  The plant doesn't want

[expletive deleted]

> , and it has no "end to attain."
>

That "fantasy" on the plant is deductive logic following on
observation. I'll skip down to your apparent scepticism that such
deductive logic is pointless.

> > It is deductive thinking to conclude that Trapper Bob is chasing the
> > raccoon and that the raccoon has a purpose to escape Trapper Bob by
> > running down the hill.
>
> No, he doesn't!  He just does as raccoons do, and that's one
> of the things they do, for the reasons enumerated above.
>

Therefore any deductive conclusion is pointless? Things, inanimate or
animate, just do "just because" and it is pointless to make any
conclusion as to why and for what reason.

> Really...just go ask the damn raccoon if you don't believe me.
>
> > Are you now wanting to introduce philosophical
> > scepticism to suggest that it is *impossible* to deduce anything from
> > observation of Trapper Bob and the raccoon?
>
> You ain't deducing

[expletive deleted]


Just as I thought.

Q.E.D.

When you lose the argument on the facts and logic you resort to foul
language, ad-homs/insults and rambling, incoherent responses.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 21, 9:57 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/21/2012 7:02 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > You have complained:  "except that you haven't given any definition of
> > 'purposive' in
> > any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-generated'"
> > and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a non-
> > teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same.  I am
> > not trying to speculate on why an animal  has color vision through
> > evolutionary "purpose" but rather that an animal, having color vision,
> > would use that vision for a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for
> > no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose .
>
> If I were going to couch it in terms of purpose, I'd point
> out the reproductive stuff since that's what caused it in
> the first place.  But that doesn't matter, because even then
> there's no purpose...it's the way THOSE physical molecules
> act, on Earth.  Just like it's the way the rock's physical
> molecules likewise act, on Earth
>

The problem is that you simply make teleology to mean just "puposive"

You have complained: "except that you haven't given any definition of
'purposive' in any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-
generated'" and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a

non-teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same.

I am not trying to speculate on why an animal has color vision
through evolutionary "purpose" but rather that an animal, having color
vision, would use that vision for a purpose -- not "just because"
randomly for no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose .

On the other hand. any argument that a raccoon does as a raccoon
does . . .

> No, he doesn't! He just does as raccoons do, and that's one
> of the things they do

. . . couches the action of the raccoon in teleological terms:
evolution (or something pre-determinate) has had a purpose for the
raccoon and therefore the raccoon does it. What I say is the
raccoon's nature has for the raccoon to do what it does by which it
may or may not do. I am not trying to speculate on why an animal
has natural attribute through evolutionary "purpose" but rather that
an animal, having that natural attribute, would use that attribute for

a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for no particular purpose

whatsoever. In broader terms, there is nothing whatsoever pre-
determinate on the raccoon's actions to force it to run away or
approach a human being. Raccoons do both. It has that alternative
which depends on the circumstances. Moreover, the more an animal has
interactions with humans, the more alternatives present themselves.
Some dogs not specifically trained to bark on the approach of a person
or other animal to the house, do so any way because it can be deduced
that it is and has been for a very long time a natural attribute of
dogs to do just that, and it is speculated that wild dogs (wolves)
were adopted into human households for that specific purpose. That
speculation is teleological and interesting only for that reason.
However, any randomly selected dog may or may not bark -- there is no
teleological force at play -- and some dogs can discern a friendly
approach or an unfriendly approach and only bark at the latter. That
is choice exercised regardless of "evolution" or even training for
that specific dog. Because there is no teleological "evolution" at
play does not make the dog's selective barking purpose-less at all and
actually goes to show up specific purpose to that specific dog outside
of any speculative evolutionary teleology.

> It's about attaining ends, having purposes and valuing.
> ALL of those are conceptual activities and non-conceptual
> organisms simply don't engage them. It's as simple as
> that and it's only because you (and others) are trying to
> deny this that you invent claptrap like "non-teleological purpose."

Again, "purpose" can have a simple meaning of "purpose" without
introducing teleology, and it is, in fact, teleology theory which has
to justify its use of "purpose", not that anyone using the word
"purpose" has to justify divorcing the word from "teleology." It is a
hard sell to claim that evolution has a "purpose" for the raccoon
rather than a simple statement that raccoon has natural attributes
which enable it to make certain choices given certain circumstances.
Even with autonomic responses at play there is no pre-determined
outcome on the approach of a human to a raccoon, nor does anyone have
to conjecture that a raccoon needs to form the concept "human being"
in order to make choices.

are acting with any purpose, and never could.
>
> You can IMAGINE the organism "seeking to stay alive" and I can
> IMAGINE the rock "seeking to get to the bottom of the hill,"
> but neither are accurate.  They are both sets of (vastly different)
> molecules just doing what they do.
>

For one thing, the ultimate choice in values towards a goal woud be
different for the animate versus the inanimate because given bad
choices the animate does not remain animate whereas the inanimate
remains inanimate. That simply is a statement on fact, even if there
is dispute over the nature/meaning of "choice", "value" , and "goal"
The animate's existence is conditional, and the inanimate's is not.
Dispute over automatic versus volitional choice does not come into
play in this statement on fact. Conditonal: If a plant does not absorb
water, it becomes inanimate. If a rock does not absorb water (or does
not "do" anything), it remain inanimate. That is indisputable. The
fact that a plant does not (consciously) choose is irrelevant. It
*does* one thing and not the other to remain alive. Rand makes the
case for moral (rational, volitional, conceptual, not range-of-the-
moment) choice for man alone exactly because man does not have
automatic choice of all values "its nature sets it to seek" as for a
plant.

[Jim Klein]

Nothing new here, Charles, so I'll just take your clearest and
most succinct claims and show how they're wrong. Also, in this
age and in this context, "shit" is barely an expletive. There is
a certain level of maturity and understanding presumed such that
using "doo-doo" or "poopy' should not be necessary.

On 1/22/2012 11:31 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> The problem is that you simply make teleology to mean just "puposive"

No, I take it to mean some awareness of the future, with "purposive"
being just an instance.

> You have complained: "except that you haven't given any definition of
> 'purposive' in any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-
> generated'" and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a
> non-teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same.
> I am not trying to speculate on why an animal has color vision
> through evolutionary "purpose"

That's EXACTLY what you do, explicitly. You have claimed that
the raccoon runs from Trapper Bob BECAUSE of what it accomplishes.

> but rather that an animal, having color
> vision, would use that vision for a purpose --

YOU are inventing purpose to it, just as I could invent the
purpose of getting to the bottom of the hill. Just because
your "purpose" of the raccoon is much closer to our purposes,
doesn't make it an identification. That's why it gets so much
tougher for you when it's about plants, and tougher yet when
it's about bacteria or paramecia.

> not "just because"
> randomly for no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose .

Once again, is this an assertion that the rock is acting "randomly"
when the external forces act upon it? If not, then why are you
saying IT does what it does "just because," as if those external
actions were random?

In this particular sense, EVERYTHING does what it does "just
because" because "just because" parses to, "A thing is what it is,"
again at least in this meaning.

> What I say is the
> raccoon's nature has for the raccoon to do what it does by which it
> may or may not do.

Except it doesn't. It is FALSE that the raccoon "may or may not do"
what it does. That would impute free will to the raccoon. As I say,
if you'd stop using the confusing (to you) examples of higher animals
that appear to engage choices, and stuck instead to plants and/or
paramecia--both of which are part of your claim--this might be a ton
easier for you to see.

> I am not trying to speculate on why an animal
> has natural attribute through evolutionary "purpose" but rather that
> an animal, having that natural attribute, would use that attribute for
> a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for no particular purpose
> whatsoever.

Except it DOESN'T use it "for a purpose;" it just does it. The same
raccoon--or the same plant or same paramecium--in the same spot will
ALWAYS act just the same; it will never do otherwise. Once again, you
are thoroughly confused because what WE see as "the same spot" is not
really the same spot. There are trivial (to us) differences that will
cause the raccoon to act differently. It is not deciding, it is not
choosing, it is not considering, it is doing nothing at all abstractly.
It is acting physically--just as the rock--in response to physical
forces that cause it to do as it does.

You're asserting that being "self-generating" as opposed to "only
external" is some huge distinction in this regard. That's wrong
too---it has nothing to do with this distinction. It's the
distinction between "self-generation" and "external forces;" duh.

> In broader terms, there is nothing whatsoever pre-
> determinate on the raccoon's actions to force it to run away or
> approach a human being.

Once again, that's just wrong. It is "forced" in exactly the
same way as the rock is, even though the "forceful actions" are
vastly more complex and most of them are occuring within the object
rather than without the object. That's a difference alright, but
it's NOT a difference that has ANYTHING to do with "ends to attain,"
purposes or values. None whatsoever, since THOSE distinctions require
abstraction to exist.

> Raccoons do both. It has that alternative
> which depends on the circumstances.

No it doesn't...that's just you imagining that it does. PLEASE
stop using the raccoon since it's confusing you terribly. Your
claim applies to plants and paramecia as well. So does a plant
or paramecium have an "alternative which depends on the circumstances"?

Stop evading the question---yes or no. Do they have alternatives,
yes or no? You theory MUST say "yes," since it's built on the
"fundamental alternative of the universe" (LOL) which supposedly
applies to ALL living things. So quit with the raccoon and quit
with the "animate," stop wasting time and let's get to the point.

> Moreover, the more an animal has
> interactions with humans, the more alternatives present themselves.

Gee, why weren't those alternatives there in the first place?
But never mind, because this is just a wild red herring. Yes,
it's easier to imagine a dog choosing than it is a plant choosing.

But since your theory demands that they are similar in this regard--
that they are both facing this "fundamental alternative of the
universe"--then the plant serves as well as the dog. And since
you're utterly confused about the whole thing, it'll serve our
purposes(!) better if you focus on the simpler example.

> Again, "purpose" can have a simple meaning of "purpose" without
> introducing teleology, and it is, in fact, teleology theory which has
> to justify its use of "purpose", not that anyone using the word
> "purpose" has to justify divorcing the word from "teleology."

You're just bringing this full circle. If you're going to demand
such a meaning, that's fine with me. But then the rock has the
"purpose" of getting to the bottom of the hill, just as the plant
has the "purpose" of turning toward the Sun.

That's a weak usage IMO, but it's alright with me. The thing is,
you can't CREATE a distinction in objects just by DECLARING that
you can IMAGINE such a distinction.

The FACT is that there's no such distinction in this usage.

You are flatly declaring that you ARE creating such a distinction
just by SAYING so, and saying that you can imagine it. This is
why the charge of "Subjectivism" applies here.

> It is a
> hard sell to claim that evolution has a "purpose" for the raccoon
> rather than a simple statement that raccoon has natural attributes
> which enable it to make certain choices given certain circumstances.

SPIT IT OUT ALREADY---IS THE PLANT MAKING "CERTAIN CHOICES GIVEN
CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES"??? YES OR NO??

Snip the rest of your red herrings. You're trying to pretend that
this is about raccoons and not living organisms. You're trying to
pretend that this is about the animate and not about the living.

It's about the LIVING and if you deny that this is what it's about,
then make it clear already. Rand's claim is unambiguously about
the living--ALL of the living--and you are supposedly defending
THAT claim.

Now if you're defending a different claim--about the animate or
about determinism or randomness or whatever--then just say so
and we can be done. Your wild theses don't interest me and my
only point is, and has been, that Rand made a very fundamental
error in her derivation of The Objectivist Ethics, one that even
I admit didn't affect the veracity of her ultimate conclusions.

I'm being as clear as I can be, Charles, and I'd appreciate it if
you could try and do the same. If you do, I'm willing to adjust
my language for you, and defer from pointing out just how full
of shit you are about this.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/22/2012 6:11 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:

> However, in this particular case, I was using the idea
> of a "moral right," STILL arising from an agreement, but
> DEVOID of any legal connotation.

I like that one, so I'll stick with it and let David deal
with the more complex set of "rights" that are somehow
popping up in addition to this one. I get too confused.

> It was with such a "moral right" in mind (not a moral-legal
> right) that I anticipated and answered your question a little
> further down in the post:
>
> Does such a right's existence depend on
> /continued/ recognition? Well, /not/ the other
> party's right!

Hey, that's the one I was talking about too!

> Suppose that the man who drew
> the short straw violates the agreement by taking
> this banana. In that case, he would be both
> /violating/ the other's existing right and /forfeiting/
> his own right to the /next/ banana!

Oops. If this particular right is the recognition of the
other person, then how can one's action "forfeit" it?

Wouldn't that depend on the recognition of the other? Aren't
you really saying, "If the other is rational, then this right
would be forfeit in this circumstance"?

If so, then you should say it and not pretend otherwise. That
may not seem terribly important, but it happens to be the very
same mistake you make throughout all your "arguments." You
attribute a particular action to a particular person when that
action is really taking place in another person.

I mean, if your various positions are built of such precision,
then shouldn't you be precise on even this?

> If he pretended to agree then he never actually agreed,
> and, in such a case, why would the other man then
> pretend to recognize the pretender's right to the next
> banana!?

Maybe /he's/ not pretending and maybe /he/ didn't recognize
that the other guy was. I think this happens all the time.

I don't want to distract too much, but it seems that if you
can't even handle these simple things very well, it brings
into question your ability to handle the wildly convoluted
theories you enter for the rest of the stuff.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 22, 12:40 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Nothing new here, Charles, so I'll just take your clearest and
> most succinct claims and show how they're wrong.

One cannot show that the word "purpose" used to mean "purpose" and not
"teleological purposive" is wrong. One cannot show that there is no
purposive self-generated action of a rock merely because one cannot
imagine there one to be or that there is only purposvie self-generated
action of an animale merely because one inagines there to be one.

>
> On 1/22/2012 11:31 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > The problem is that you simply make teleology to mean just "puposive"
>
> No, I take it to mean some awareness of the future, with "purposive"
> being just an instance.
>
> > You have complained:  "except that you haven't given any definition of
> > 'purposive' in any non-teleological sense except 'action which is self-
> > generated'" and I say: yes, I have defined "purposive" exactly in a
> > non-teleological way and because the two words do not mean the same.
> > I am not trying to speculate on why an animal  has color vision
> > through evolutionary "purpose"
>
> That's EXACTLY what you do, explicitly. You have claimed that
> the raccoon runs from Trapper Bob BECAUSE of what it accomplishes.
>
> > but rather that an animal, having color
> > vision, would use that vision for a purpose --
>
> YOU are inventing purpose to it,

No. YOU are claiming that any and all actions and any and all
attributes of the raccoon is random, without directed purpose.

> just as I could invent the
> purpose of getting to the bottom of the hill.

It is because you cannot come up with a single cause to believe that a
rock has a purpose in going the bottom of the hill or to not ever to
go to the top of the hill.

> Just because
> your "purpose" of the raccoon is much closer to our purposes,

Yes, the purpose of staying alive. That is it exactly.

> doesn't make it an identification.

The "identification" comes from observation and deductive logic --
contrary to any logic you could use to believe that a rock has a
purpose to go to the bottom of a hill or not go to the top of a hill.
It is exactly because there is observation and logic that gives
purpose to the raccoon and none at all that gives it to the rock that
you refuse both to satisfy your argument against the efficacy of
observation and logic.

> > not "just because"
> > randomly for no particular purpose whatsoever, as you must suppose .
>
> Once again, is this an assertion that the rock is acting "randomly"
> when the external forces act upon it?

The statement was that the raccoon acts with no purpose. That either
assumes that something externally is forcing the raccoon as gravity
forces the rock, and you stipulated that that is not what you say, or
that the raccoon acts randomly without any purpose of its own.

> If not, then why are you
> saying IT does what it does "just because," as if those external
> actions were random?
>

I am the one saying exactly the opposite: the raccoon does neither but
acts with purpose of it own.

> In this particular sense, EVERYTHING does what it does "just
> because" because "just because" parses to, "A thing is what it is,"
> again at least in this meaning.
>

"Just because" implies either sceptical acceptance for no
understandable explanation or indeterminism of actions. If you do not
claim these and also that the raccoon has no purpose of its own, you
are forcing teleology into the scheme as *something* quite like an
external force is forcing the raccoon to do what it does for a
(higher) purpose not the raccoon's.

> > What I say is the
> > raccoon's nature has for the raccoon to do what it does by which it
> > may or may not do.
>
> Except it doesn't.  It is FALSE that the raccoon "may or may not do"
> what it does.

As I said: predict what an animal will do when a human approaches and
you will never predict with anything like 100% accuracy. Even in
domesticated animals, it is impossible to know 100% what will happen.
Either that means as in the above: scepticism in all things, or all
actions are indeterminate, or that animals with consciousness have
freewill within a range of possible actions.

> That would impute free will to the raccoon.

In the range of possible actions for higher animals freewill exists,
but that does not include freewill of moral choice. It is interesting
to note that chimps and gorillas taught sign language do lie on
occasion, but to imply that the lie is a moral choice would also imply
that the apes know the wrongness of lying, and it is certainly true
that they choose between telling the truth and lying but likely in a
strictly range-of-the-moment, and not moral, choice. [see below]

> As I say,
> if you'd stop using the confusing (to you) examples of higher animals
> that appear to engage choices, and stuck instead to plants and/or
> paramecia--both of which are part of your claim--this might be a ton
> easier for you to see.
>

There is a wide range of possible actions, and the range gets larger
and larger up the evolutionary scale. That range depends on the
degree of automatic functions relative to volitional functions. When
Rand said that morality is only possible to man it is because the
range of volitional functions is so large relative to the range of
automatic functions and that choices made which rationally take in a
universe of conceivable possibilities is different than choices which
are limited to the range of the immediate moment. This is her primary
criticism of pragmatic-utilitarianism and hedonism. one might say
standard-definition "selfishness", because they reduce man to a lower-
leveling thinking animal incapable of thinking beyond the range of the
moment.

> > I am not trying to speculate on why an animal
> > has natural attribute through evolutionary "purpose" but rather that
> > an animal, having that natural attribute, would use that attribute for
> > a purpose -- not "just because" randomly for no particular purpose
> > whatsoever.
>
> Except it DOESN'T use it "for a purpose;" it just does it.

If it just does it, then it is random, and that actually is quite
contrary to evolutionary theory. Is that what you wish to do?
Contradict Darwin? The species would be rewarded by good actions of
its individuals in the aggregate and those actions are what allows the
species to survive over species which do not do those actions. If an
animal had an attribute but never used it or used it randomly without
particular consquence then there would be no lasting evolutionary
effect.

> The same
> raccoon--or the same plant or same paramecium--in the same spot will
> ALWAYS act just the same; it will never do otherwise.

That is a false statement, even at the lower levels. Evolution depends
on different actions to do the same thing even if the ability that
comes up to do different action may be initiated randomly or
telelogically, depending on one's speculative theory on the matter.

> You're asserting that being "self-generating" as opposed to "only
> external" is some huge distinction in this regard.  That's wrong
> too---it has nothing to do with this distinction.  It's the
> distinction between "self-generation" and "external forces;" duh.
>
>  > In broader terms, there is nothing whatsoever pre-
>
> > determinate on the raccoon's actions to force it to run away or
> > approach a human being.
>
> Once again, that's just wrong.  It is "forced" in exactly the
> same way as the rock is,

No, there is no external force on the raccoon. If there is, name
it. What is it called?

> even though the "forceful actions" are
> vastly more complex

"vastly more complex" means that you have no idea of this thing, and
it is just made up in your mind.

> and most of them are occuring within the object
> rather than without the object.

Even automatic functions in plants are not determinate. One cannot
predict with certainty every detail of two plants' growth given
exactly the same conditions.

> That's a difference alright, but
> it's NOT a difference that has ANYTHING to do with "ends to attain,"
> purposes or values.  None whatsoever, since THOSE distinctions require
> abstraction to exist.
>

The "value" is water and the "purpose" is growth and sustained
living. If you cannot accept the plain use of English for those
words, then that is certainly your problem with language.

Webster's;

value = relative worth, utility, or importance

purpose = something as an object or end to attain

Deal with it!

snip> [expletive and ad hom/insult]

[Jim Klein]

On 1/22/2012 5:30 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> As I said: predict what an animal will do when a human approaches and
> you will never predict with anything like 100% accuracy.

Look, Charles...you're getting more upset and you're getting
crazier in your defense. All of this indicates that you have
no defense. But then, I knew that all along.

I can predict what a sunflower will do with 100% accuracy,
naturally leaving out very extreme circumstances, but those
can happen with rocks too.

Every damn day, it's going to turn toward the Sun. It will
NEVER choose otherwise, and there are NO alternatives available
to it. It has no purpose; it's just a damn sunflower.

Now either deal with the issue, or take your random non-random,
chosen non-chosen, teleological non-teleological bullshit
somewhere else.

I didn't even read your whole post; I will sometime later. But
if you can't get on-topic, then go take a leap. And stop saying
what I'm saying---you're having more than enough trouble with
what you're saying.


jk

[James E. Prescott]

On Jan 22, 12:53 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/22/2012 6:11 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> > However, in this particular case, I was using the idea
> > of a "moral right," STILL arising from an agreement, but
> > DEVOID of any legal connotation.
>
> I like that one, so I'll stick with it and let David deal
> with the more complex set of "rights" that are somehow
> popping up in addition to this one.  I get too confused.

I've noticed.

> > It was with such a "moral right" in mind (not a moral-legal
> > right) that I anticipated and answered your question a little
> > further down in the post:
>
> >       Does such a right's existence depend on
> >       /continued/ recognition? Well, /not/ the other
> >       party's right!
>
> Hey, that's the one I was talking about too!
>
> > Suppose that the man who drew
> >       the short straw violates the agreement by taking
> >       this banana. In that case, he would be both
> >       /violating/ the other's existing right and /forfeiting/
> >       his own right to the /next/ banana!
>
> Oops.  If this particular right is the recognition of the
> other person, then how can one's action "forfeit" it?

The right is not "the recognition of the other person." (No
wonder you get confused, Jim! Don't blame me, please.
I never wrote such words.)

Rather, person A's right (person A's freedom to act without
interference from person B) is a consequence of person
B's (/and/ person A's) recognition that they have an agree-
ment, which is to say, person A's right is spelled out in the
agreement, and so, being actualized (i.e., for A actually to
enjoy the freedom that the agreement says he should)
depends on person B's not only recognizing the existence
of the agreement but also fulfilling his part (in anticipation,
of course, that doing so will promote cooperation between
the two men and avoid conflict, which was the motive for
the agreement).

> Wouldn't that depend on the recognition of the other?  Aren't
> you really saying, "If the other is rational, then this right
> would be forfeit in this circumstance"?

Well, yes, of course. If A grabs the banana and runs as both
David and I suggested he might, then B, if he is rational, will
recognize either that they never had an agreement (A was
simply lying) or that they no longer have an agreement (A had
indeed agreed but now has changed his mind and violated the
terms he had agreed to).

Either way, they, now, do not have an agreement.

In other words, when you say that A has violated B's right,
you are either saying, with me, that A has violated the terms
he had agreed to (or said he agreed to), or you are saying,
with Charles, that A has violated some mystically "intrinsic"
attribute of B that A had /never/ agreed to. If you imagine
yourself to be saying something else -- some third alternative
-- try spelling it out by clearly defining your terms and see
where it gets you.

> If so, then you should say it and not pretend otherwise.

> [...].

I'm not pretending, and I said what I meant in the first post:
every right depends on people recognizing the existence of
agreements. It takes at least two to agree, and at least two
people must recognize the agreement in order for the rights
of either to exist. But they are /not/ the /only/ ones able to
recognize the existence of the agreement, even if it is
an agreement between just them. Courts can recognize it,
too.

> > If he pretended to agree then he never actually agreed,
> > and, in such a case, why would the other man then
> > pretend to recognize the pretender's right to the next
> > banana!?
>
> Maybe /he's/ not pretending and maybe /he/ didn't recognize
> that the other guy was.  I think this happens all the time.

It happens often enough that we need courts to
punish pretenders. Otherwise, when agreements
(or pretend agreements) are violated, we'll all be
right back where we started: rightless animals fighting
over bananas instead of reasoning beings doing
cooperation and trade.

> I don't want to distract too much, but it seems that if you
> can't even handle these simple things very well, it brings
> into question your ability to handle the wildly convoluted
> theories you enter for the rest of the stuff.

These things really are very simple, Jim. But it is
you yourself who introduce confusion when you
suggest that a right /is/ "another's recognition of
itself." That doesn't make much sense. A right, yes,
is a /recognized/ freedom to act without interference,
but the scope of that freedom is spelled out in an
agreement, and so it is the terms of the agreement
that one is actually recognizing when one recognizes
a right. Simple.

Best Wishes,
Jim P.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 22, 7:59 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/22/2012 5:30 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
> > As I said: predict what an animal will do when a human approaches and
> > you will never predict with anything like 100% accuracy.
>

snip >[ad hom/ insult]

> I can predict what a sunflower will do with 100% accuracy,

No you can't. You cannot predict which leaf will sprout where on the
stem or how many; you cannot predict the number and direction of each
root tenacle; you cannot predict the size and color shape of the
petals. You cannot predict when the flower or the entire plant will
die.

> naturally leaving out very extreme circumstances, but those
> can happen with rocks too.
>

100% accuracy except a bunch of things, right!

You cannot argue that the word "purpose" cannot be used to mean
"purpose" and not "teleologically purposive action".

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 22, 12:53 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/22/2012 6:11 AM, James E. Prescott wrote:
>
> > However, in this particular case, I was using the idea
> > of a "moral right," STILL arising from an agreement, but
> > DEVOID of any legal connotation.
>
> I like that one, so I'll stick with it and let David deal
> with the more complex set of "rights" that are somehow
> popping up in addition to this one.  I get too confused.
>

You're kidding, right? Friedman believes that insects have the moral
sense to commit suicide if necessary for the good of the species.

>
> Wouldn't that depend on the recognition of the other?

According to you a rock cannot recognize a raccoon just like a raccoon
cannot recognize a rock -- or is it that a rock will automatically not
recognize a raccoon just like a raccoon will not automatically
recognize a rock -- or is it a raccoon will do raccoon things like
automatically not recognize a rock on whose abilty you then can
predict with 100% accuracy a raccoon doing raccoon things because you
have identified a raccoon as a raccoon and that is all that is needed.

> I don't want to distract too much, but it seems that if you
> can't even handle these simple things very well, it brings
> into question your ability to handle the wildly convoluted
> theories you enter for the rest of the stuff.
>

Sure you have properly identified Prescott as Prescott and Prescott
does Prescott things and that it that needs to be said. A rock is a
rock; a raccoon is a raccoon; Prescott is Prescott; and your job is
done.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/23/2012 6:21 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

>> I can predict what a sunflower will do with 100% accuracy,
>
> No you can't. You cannot predict which leaf will sprout where on the
> stem or how many; you cannot predict the number and direction of each
> root tenacle; you cannot predict the size and color shape of the
> petals. You cannot predict when the flower or the entire plant will
> die.

And you can't predict the action of every sub-atomic particle
in the rock. Big deal...the claim isn't that we have differing
levels of knowledge of each object.

YOUR claim is that you have discovered some sort of causative
action that applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't
apply to the molecules of the rock.

But you haven't. All you've "discovered" is that you can let
your mind wander such that there's this sort of "indeterminism"
for the plant and that sort of "determinism" or "near-determinism"
or what-the-fuck-ever for the rock.

And of course, you've discovered no such thing. You just
invented it and because you could invent it, you've concluded
that there is therefore an existential difference between the
molecules, and the action of those molecules, of the two objects.

I'm pretty sure that's called "animism" and I'm damn sure it's
called Subjectivism.


jk

[Rod Nibbe]

On 1/23/2012 7:43 AM, Jim Klein wrote:

> YOUR claim is that you have discovered some sort of causative
> action that applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't
> apply to the molecules of the rock.

> And of course, you've discovered no such thing. You just
> invented it and because you could invent it, you've concluded
> that there is therefore an existential difference between the
> molecules, and the action of those molecules, of the two objects.

Human beings are constituted of nothing but molecules, too.
Yet it is said we are capable of causative action. So there
must be /some/ level or degree of organization of mere
molecules that gives rise to causation. It's not absurd on
its face.

-RKN

[Jim Klein]

On 1/23/2012 12:52 PM, Rod Nibbe wrote:

> Human beings are constituted of nothing but molecules, too.
> Yet it is said we are capable of causative action. So there
> must be /some/ level or degree of organization of mere
> molecules that gives rise to causation. It's not absurd on
> its face.

At this stage of knowledge, it's absurd on its face IMO. It's not
like we have no idea what that "causative action" is in humans.

Free will is only a mystery because it's been a mystery for so
long. We abstract and we can abstract alternatives, and then
we motivate ourselves to action. Yes, like any animal does in
the sense that it's "self-generated." The difference is that we
can abstract /alternatives/. And instead of arguing about whether
or not raccoons and dogs can do that too, we can keep it really
simple and just talk about bacteria or plants.

And it doesn't matter anyway for this, since that's all just a
distraction. Charles can have his silly tri-determinism to
describe the underlying actions in living things. That doesn't
matter, just like it doesn't matter whether the sub-atomic
machinations in the rock are inherently random or not.

The claim is that there is a non-teleological purpose, and
that is plainly oxymoronic. Even if there were some absurd
"near-determinism" going on in living things, it's still just
as it is and there is NO reason to suspect that this near-
determinism or non-determinism or whatever, is engaging for
any sort of purpose. Yes, it CAUSES whatever happens, just
like the atomic interactions in the rock cause it to behave
as it does.

I'm nearly begging you not to distract this, Rod. From last
time, I acknowledged everything you wanted to show about
the difference between the internal functions of living
organisms versus the externally caused functions of inanimate
objects. I still don't think it's as great a distinction as
you do, but I got the point and I stipulate it.

The point here is very, very simple. Living things are different
from non-living things. You can have everything you want, as
far as what those differences are---self-generation, replication,
carbon-based, whatever. What you won't find is any distinction
based on ANY sort of purpose, or ANY sort of "end-attainment,"
or ANY sort of value, or "standard of value." Those ALL have
abstracted referents, and so without us attributing the ends,
purposes or values, they just aren't there...at least not in
any sense for which they're not there for non-living entities too.

I know you know this, Rod, and I know you're just trying to
be an objective devil's advocate. That's alright, but please
stay on point. The alternative view is plain mysticism,
the assertion that there's "something else there" besides the
plain, non-purposeful actions of all objects...except abstacting
beings that can conceptualize alternatives and then choose.
Only with that could there be, "this end to attain instead of
that end to attain." Without it, there's only "this end to
attain," which says nothing at all except, "Things happen."

That's why Charles has to go into all these lengthy convoluted
theories, combining non-teleological purpose with wild ideas
about triple determinism that's somehow distributed perfectly
such that living things have one and non-living things have
the other, and who-knows-what has the third. It's just plain
craziness trying to defend something that's false.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 23, 11:43 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/23/2012 6:21 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> >> I can predict what a sunflower will do with 100% accuracy,
>
> > No you can't. You cannot predict which leaf will sprout where on the
> > stem or how many; you cannot predict the number and direction of each
> > root tenacle; you cannot predict the size and color shape of the
> > petals. You cannot predict when the flower or the entire plant will
> > die.
>
> And you can't predict the action of every sub-atomic particle
> in the rock.

That is not what is suggested by my comment. You made a demonstrably
false statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a
sunflower will do.

> Big deal...the claim isn't that we have differing
> levels of knowledge of each object.
>

The claim is that you are making a false statement that you can
predict with 100% accuracy what a sunflower will do.

> YOUR claim is that you have discovered some sort of causative
> action that applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't
> apply to the molecules of the rock.
>

I am not making any such claim. The "causative action" is that plants
-- from plant to different plant -- make alternate routes to achieve
the same purpose in such ways that it is impossible to predict with
any accuracy on the details what a particular plant will do. On the
other hand, a rock will fall to earth at a predictably 9.8 m/s*2
acceleration, for example.

snip >[expletive]

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 23, 4:28 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/23/2012 12:52 PM, Rod Nibbe wrote:
>
> > Human beings are constituted of nothing but molecules, too.
> > Yet it is said we are capable of causative action. So there
> > must be /some/ level or degree of organization of mere
> > molecules that gives rise to causation. It's not absurd on
> > its face.
>
> At this stage of knowledge, it's absurd on its face IMO.  It's not
> like we have no idea what that "causative action" is in humans.
>

Nibbe's valid point is that you have made a demonstably false --
ludicrous -- statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a
sunflower will do and defend that statement with another demonstrably
false statement that you cannot predict what molecules will do, but we
can predict what molecules will do within a precision of aggregate
statistics, which is called the science of chemistry. That we can
predict what will happen to a (generalized) water molecule once it is
absorbed into a (generalized) plant says nothing on how we can predict
with 100% accuracy how or when a particular plant will do that.
Moreover, such a "defense" would have to include human beings for that
very same reason, and your claim would then be that you can predict
with 100% accuracy how a human being, as a living organism, can do
living-organism things and therefore a human is no different than a
plant. The "degree of organization of mere molecules that gives rise
to causation" is called near-determinism, in contrast to the sort of
determinism in a rock falling at a very predictably 9.8 m/s*2.

> And it doesn't matter anyway for this, since that's all just a
> distraction.  Charles can have his silly tri-determinism to
> describe the underlying actions in living things.  That doesn't
> matter, just like it doesn't matter whether the sub-atomic
> machinations in the rock are inherently random or not.
>

The whole "everything is mostly empty space" and move about randomly
is pseudo-philosophy. Your re-casting the issue as everything is just
random molecules is sophomoric scepticism and is the distraction. My
answer is that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a sunflower
will do is simply a ludicrous statement and disintegration into
scepticism (how can anyone really know anything?) is not a way out of
it.

> The claim is that there is a non-teleological purpose, and
> that is plainly oxymoronic

The claim is that the "purpose" means "purpose" not "teleology."

> The point here is very, very simple.  Living things are different
> from non-living things.

It is not enough to state:"A is different than B." Living, animate
things act with purpose and inanimate objects do not act with
purpose. Breaking everything down to inanimate molecules which act
randomly is beside the point except to a sceptic, but is well-known to
an Objectivist as taking the entire discussion to a different context
with intent to deceive.

> That's why Charles has to go into all these lengthy convoluted
> theories,

Yes, it is SO convoluted to remark that the word "purpose" means
"purpose" and not "teleology."

[Jim Klein]

On 1/26/2012 4:40 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

>> And you can't predict the action of every sub-atomic particle
>> in the rock.
>
> That is not what is suggested by my comment. You made a demonstrably
> false statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a
> sunflower will do.

Ever seen a field of sunflowers? 100% of them turn toward
the Sun.

>> Big deal...the claim isn't that we have differing
>> levels of knowledge of each object.
>>
>
> The claim is that you are making a false statement that you can
> predict with 100% accuracy what a sunflower will do.

With regard to turning toward the Sun, I can. I did put in
a qualifier about "extraordinary circumstances," but that
applies to rocks too.

>> YOUR claim is that you have discovered some sort of causative
>> action that applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't
>> apply to the molecules of the rock.
>>
>
> I am not making any such claim. The "causative action" is that plants
> -- from plant to different plant -- make alternate routes

What the hell does that mean? Somehow it's some huge fact
that I can't predict every action of every cell in every
plant, but it's not a huge fact that you can't predict every
action of every sub-atomic particle of every rock.

No Subjectivism there, right? Lemme guess...one's an
existentially huge fact, and one isn't. Is that it?

> to achieve
> the same purpose in such ways that it is impossible to predict with
> any accuracy on the details what a particular plant will do.

It is perfectly accurate that every Sunflower will turn to the Sun.

> On the
> other hand, a rock will fall to earth at a predictably 9.8 m/s*2
> acceleration, for example.

Is this your concession that they are the same?


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/26/2012 5:13 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> Nibbe's valid point is that you have made a demonstably false --
> ludicrous -- statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a
> sunflower will do and defend that statement with another demonstrably
> false statement that you cannot predict what molecules will do, but we
> can predict what molecules will do within a precision of aggregate
> statistics, which is called the science of chemistry.

I get it. Look inside our minds to determine the nature of the
objects. Isn't there a term for that?

> That we can
> predict what will happen to a (generalized) water molecule once it is
> absorbed into a (generalized) plant says nothing on how we can predict
> with 100% accuracy how or when a particular plant will do that.

Any scientist who cares and with the right equipment can predict
with 100% accuracy at what amount a light the Sunflower will turn
toward the Sun.

I think maybe you're talking about precision. I'll grant you that
there are precision magnitudes that we understand about the rock
that we may not understand about the plant. It would be nice if
you would grant that this is a comment about our knowledge, not
about the rocks and plants themselves.

In any event you don't know doo-doo about the nature of the
sub-atomic actions inside of the rock. You don't even know
if they're random or not. Nor do you you know if the sub-cellular
actions in the plant are random or not.

You're just plainly asserting out of thin air, that you do.

> Moreover, such a "defense" would have to include human beings for that
> very same reason, and your claim would then be that you can predict
> with 100% accuracy how a human being, as a living organism, can do
> living-organism things and therefore a human is no different than a
> plant.

As you should know, I do believe that with sufficient intelligence,
that could be known. Otherwise, the assertion reduces to mysticism.

But the fact is that we /don't/ know and we /do/ abstract in a
context of non-omniscience, not to mention a perspective of
non-omniscience. Rand addressed this plenty in her comments
about the nature of morality, and I think she's right about it.

> The "degree of organization of mere molecules that gives rise
> to causation" is called near-determinism, in contrast to the sort of
> determinism in a rock falling at a very predictably 9.8 m/s*2.

No, YOU call it "near-determinism" and it doesn't matter what you
call it anyway. The relevant point is that you're pulling this out
your ass, even as you admittedly read it in other places, and are
pretending that this therefore tells us something about the object.

Isn't there a term for that?

>> And it doesn't matter anyway for this, since that's all just a
>> distraction. Charles can have his silly tri-determinism to
>> describe the underlying actions in living things. That doesn't
>> matter, just like it doesn't matter whether the sub-atomic
>> machinations in the rock are inherently random or not.
>>
>
> The whole "everything is mostly empty space"

What's that? Who brought that up?

You, that's who. More "what this must mean," right?

> and move about randomly is pseudo-philosophy.

Uh huh. But you pulling wild theories out your ass and asserting
that therefore we have knowledge of the objects...now that's
real philosophy, right?

> Your re-casting the issue as everything is just

> random molecules...

I re-casted nothing of the sort and it's you who constantly
brings up randomness--and determinism and near-determinism--
as some defense of your indefensible position.

I requested that you not speak for what I'm saying. I'm
quite comfortable that I'm making it clear enough on my
own. You OTOH have to write longer and longer, and wilder
and wilder, to defend your silly position. I'd suggest you
work more on that, and let me take care of what I'm saying.

As I've written repeatedly, my position on all this is very,
very simple. I've also repeatedly noted WHY your position
must become ever more complex. That's what happens when
you're defending something that isn't true---the inevitable
contradictions create a necessity for ever more complex
definitions and rationalizations.

Mine doesn't. So just let me take care of my position, and
you work on addressing the simple contradictions of your
position that I keep pointing out.

> is sophomoric scepticism and is the distraction. My
> answer is that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a sunflower
> will do is simply a ludicrous statement and disintegration into
> scepticism (how can anyone really know anything?) is not a way out of
> it.

But I'm claiming nothing like that. That's why you should let
me speak for me; you're having enough trouble speaking for you.

>> The claim is that there is a non-teleological purpose, and
>> that is plainly oxymoronic
>
> The claim is that the "purpose" means "purpose" not "teleology."

Yes, that's the claim. Your problem is that you can't attach any
MEANING to that, at least not any meaning that has a referent in
reality.

>> The point here is very, very simple. Living things are different
>> from non-living things.
>
> It is not enough to state:"A is different than B." Living, animate
> things act with purpose and inanimate objects do not act with
> purpose.

Your problem is that you can't attach any MEANING to that, at least
not any meaning that has a referent in reality.

All you're saying is, "I choose to see a purpose to this, and I
don't choose to see a purpose in that."

Okay already, I'm not disputing that you can see a purpose in
one and you don't see a purpose in another. I also don't
dispute that you see a benefit to a bacterium staying alive
and a detriment to a bacterium dying.

I don't dispute ANYTHING that you say you imagine. I'm disputing
what this tells us about the objects themselves.

Since this is getting boring, maybe you'd like to address why this
is so tough to understand, for someone who calls himself an Objectivist.

> Breaking everything down to inanimate molecules which act
> randomly is beside the point except to a sceptic, but is well-known to
> an Objectivist as taking the entire discussion to a different context
> with intent to deceive.
>
>
>> That's why Charles has to go into all these lengthy convoluted
>> theories,
>
> Yes, it is SO convoluted to remark that the word "purpose" means
> "purpose" and not "teleology."

Your problem, long resolved back in the "Binswanger's Errors" threads,
is that you can't come up with a non-teleological purpose that applies
to living things and doesn't apply to rolling rocks.

That's why you haven't done it.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 12:50 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/26/2012 5:13 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Nibbe's valid point is that you have made a demonstably false --
> > ludicrous -- statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy what a
> > sunflower will do and defend that statement with another demonstrably
> > false statement that you cannot predict what molecules will do, but we
> > can predict what molecules will do within a precision of aggregate
> > statistics, which is called the science of chemistry.
>
> I get it.  Look inside our minds to determine the nature of the
> objects.  Isn't there a term for that?
>

So,. you don't a thing about how O'ist epistemology works, do you?

Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept, the
concept of a single attribute (chronologically, this is not the first
concept that a child would grasp; but it is the simplest one
epistemologically)--for instance, the concept "length." If a child
considers a match, a pencil and a stick, he observes that length is
the attribute they have in common, but their specific lengths differ.
The difference is one of measurement. In order to form the concept
"length," the child's mind retains the attribute and omits its
particular measurements. Or, more precisely, if the process were
identified in words, it would consist of the following: "Length must
exist in some quantity, but may exist in any quantity. I shall
identify as 'length' that attribute of any existent possessing it
which can be quantitatively related to a unit of length, without
specifying the quantity."

The child does not think in such words (he has, as yet, no knowledge
of words), but that is the nature of the process which his mind
performs wordlessly. And that is the principle which his mind follows,
when, having grasped the concept "length" by observing the three
objects, he uses it to identify the attribute of length in a piece of
string, a ribbon, a belt, a corridor or a street

[...]

The role of language (which we shall discuss at length when we discuss
definitions) must be mentioned briefly at this point. The process of
forming a concept is not complete until its constituent units have
been integrated into a single mental unit by means of a specific word.
The first concepts a child forms are concepts of perceptual entities;
the first words he learns are words designating them. Even though a
child does not have to perform the feat of genius performed by some
mind or minds in the prehistorical infancy of the human race: the
invention of language--every child has to perform independently the
feat of grasping the nature of language, the process of symbolizing
concepts by means of words.

Even though a child does not (and need not) originate and form every
concept on his own, by observing every aspect of reality confronting
him, he has to perform the process of differentiating and integrating
perceptual concretes, in order to grasp the meaning of words.

[...]

On the pre-verbal level of awareness, when a child first learns to
differentiate men from the rest of his perceptual field, he observes
distinguishing characteristics which, if translated into words, would
amount to a definition such as: "A thing that moves and makes sounds."
Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition: man,
in fact, does move and make sounds, and this distinguishes him from
the inanimate objects around him.

When the child observes the existence of cats, dogs and automobiles,
his definition ceases to be valid: it is still true that man moves and
makes sounds, but these characteristics do not distinguish him from
other entities in the field of the child's awareness. The child's
(wordless) definition then changes to some equivalent of: "A living
thing that walks on <ioe2_44> two legs and has no fur," with the
characteristics of "moving and making sounds" remaining implicit, but
no longer defining. Again, this definition is valid--within the context
of the child's awareness

> > Moreover, such a "defense" would have to include human beings for that
> > very same reason, and your claim would then be that you can predict
> > with 100% accuracy how a human being, as a living organism, can do
> > living-organism things and therefore a human is no different than a
> > plant.
>
> As you should know, I do believe that with sufficient intelligence,
> that could be known.  Otherwise, the assertion reduces to mysticism.
>

Nibbe's criticism was that your claim can be just as easily applied to
humans as to a sunflower.

<<Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition:
man, in fact, does move and make sounds, and this distinguishes him
from the inanimate objects around him.>>

> But the fact is that we /don't/ know and we /do/ abstract in a
> context of non-omniscience, not to mention a perspective of
> non-omniscience.

This is gibberish.

You don't a thing about how O'ist epistemology works, do you?

> > The "degree of organization of mere molecules that gives rise
> > to causation" is called near-determinism, in contrast to the sort of
> > determinism in a rock falling at a very predictably 9.8 m/s*2.
>
> No, YOU call it "near-determinism"

The term goes back to, at least, the early computing days following
WWII and particlularly by Arthur Burks in his book, /Chance, Cause,
Reason/, in distinction to its approximate synonym, stochastic, which
has has strictly mathematical application in there being one or more
random variable in an otherwise determinable equation: Determinsm,
Near-determinism, and Tychism covers everything and disepnses with
fuzzy terms like hard or soft determininism and indeterminsim in a
causal (not uncaused and random) universe.


snip >[ad-hom/insult, expletive]

> Your problem, long resolved back in the "Binswanger's Errors" threads,
> is that you can't come up with a non-teleological purpose that applies
> to living things and doesn't apply to rolling rocks.
>

"Purpose" means "purpose", not teleology, and your problem is that you
never bothered to read Binswanger's book though you thought you could
comment on it as if you understood one word in it, and the point is:
"purpose" applies to animate action and not inanimate motion. When an
animal hunts for food, there is an obvious purpose for his motion
unrelated to any speculative theory on the food being there as a
(Aristotelean) final cause -- that the Essence of a prey, as a
purpose, acted in backward causation for creation of the predator, but
when a meteorite falls, gravity has not a purpose for its fall, and
the meteorite has no purpose to have gravity act on it *unless* one
applies final causation in the Essences involved, and why would one do
that? Your problem is that your cannot distinguish between the word
"purpose" and "final cause", "finalization" and "teleology" when
"purpose" simply means "purpose."

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 12:24 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/26/2012 4:40 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> > I am not making any such claim. The "causative action" is that plants
> > -- from plant to different plant -- make alternate routes
>
> What the hell does that mean?  Somehow it's some huge fact
> that I can't predict every action of every cell in every
> plant, but it's not a huge fact that you can't predict every
> action of every sub-atomic particle of every rock.
>

A sunflower is a sunflower, and a rock is a rock, but a consitutent
molecule of a sunflower is not a sunflower and a constitutent molecule
of a rock is not a rock. So the "huge fact" one cannot predict the
location and motion of a one molecule in a sunflower or a rock
(Heisenburg prevents that) is not a relevant fact.



x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.

[Jim Klein]

On 1/27/2012 5:37 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> A sunflower is a sunflower, and a rock is a rock, but a consitutent
> molecule of a sunflower is not a sunflower and a constitutent molecule
> of a rock is not a rock. So the "huge fact" one cannot predict the
> location and motion of a one molecule in a sunflower or a rock
> (Heisenburg prevents that) is not a relevant fact.

And yet your position is built upon the fact that it is. You
have nothing else to your position, which is why when pressed,
you inevitably start yapping about your wild tri-determinism theory.

Not true? Then appeal to something else and try to stay consistent.
You haven't and you can't. That's the fact of the matter, Charles,
and the record will readily show that.

Now today, you just appeal to "the obvious meaning of purpose,"
which I'll address momentarily. Your problem there is both that
the meaning YOU'RE using is anything but obvious--non-teleological
purpose hardly being immediately translatable--AND that this non-
obvious meaning can't be pinned down by ANY reference to reality,
at least as you're using it and in a manner that it applies to the
living and doesn't apply to the non-living.


jk

[Jim Klein]

On 1/27/2012 5:21 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

> So,. you don't a thing about how O'ist epistemology works, do you?

It so happens that I do, language development being one of my few
areas of formal expertise, but luckily it doesn't matter for this
anyway. That's because I'm not making any claims whatsoever about
Objectivist epistemology. None, zero, nada...doesn't interest me
for this at the moment, and this is just you trying to distract the
issues. I am speaking EXCLUSIVELY of the distinctions between the
living and the non-living and whether end-attainment, purpose, goal
seeking or valuing have ANYTHING AT ALL to do with that distinction.

My position is plainly that they do not and your position is plainly
that they do. After all this time, you didn't know that?

Is that what you thought this was about...what objectivist epistemology
has to say about it? Why would you even care? Aren't you interested
in what the distinctions ARE? If you're not, then take a hike. If you
are, then we can continue.


> Let us now examine the process of forming the simplest concept...

No, let's not. It's already been established that you believe
the way to discern the distinctions between the living and the
non-living is to look inside our minds, and I believe the way
is to look at the living and the non-living.

So no, I'm not going to let you keep distracting. While there
is a sort of meta-topic that I do indeed believe your
approach is the perfect antithesis of Objectivism, and mine is
consistent with it, this discussion is not about that.

This discussion is EXCLUSIVELY about the distinctions between the
living and the non-living and whether end-attainment, purpose, goal
seeking or valuing have ANYTHING AT ALL to do with that distinction.

Now if you don't want to talk about that any longer, that's fine with
me. We can argue another time about whether your evasion is "according
to Objectivism," or my approach of looking at the objects, is.

If you do, then we can continue. So snip everything you wrote about
concept formation and so on, since analyzing concepts won't help us
with identifying distinctions between the living and non-living.

Though yes, I will acknowledge that to you, it's the only way to
get there. That's the way it is for every Subjectivist on every
topic.

>> As you should know, I do believe that with sufficient intelligence,
>> that could be known. Otherwise, the assertion reduces to mysticism.
>>
>
> Nibbe's criticism was that your claim can be just as easily applied to
> humans as to a sunflower.

Right...that's because Nibbe isn't a nutcase. It was an understandable
point and it was addressed.

> <<Within the context of his awareness, this is a valid definition:
> man, in fact, does move and make sounds, and this distinguishes him
> from the inanimate objects around him.>>

I don't know from where this cite is coming, but it has nothing to
do with anything here. There are many living organisms that /don't/
move or make sounds, so this is not a relevant distinction here
whatsoever.

>> But the fact is that we /don't/ know and we /do/ abstract in a
>> context of non-omniscience, not to mention a perspective of
>> non-omniscience.
>
> This is gibberish.

Yeah? Is this gibberish too...

"Man is neither infallible nor omniscient; if he were, a
discipline such as epistemology--the theory of knowledge--
would not be necessary nor possible: his knowledge would
be automatic, unquestionable and total. But such is not
man's nature. Man is a being of volitional consciousness:
beyond the level of percepts--a level inadequate to the
cognitive requirements of his survival--man has to acquire
knowledge by his own effort, which he may exercise or not,
and by a process of reason, which he may apply correctly or
not."

Rand, Consciousness and Identity in ITOE

Oh look Charles, she added a sentence for you...

"Nature gives him no automatic guarantee of his mental
efficacy; he is capable of error, of evasion, of psychological
distortion."

> You don't a thing about how O'ist epistemology works, do you?

See, that's an example of all three. "How O'ist epistemology
works" has NOTHING to do with the distinctions between the living
and the non-living.

And yet you keep bringing it up. It's an error because I do
know a few things about "how O'ist epistemology works." It's
evasion because it's just a silly way for you to avoid the
actual topic, and it's psychological distortion because you
have nowhere else to go. That's how it always is for a Subjectivist.

Or I should say, you have nowhere else to go that you're willing
to share publicly? Maybe that'll change going forward.

>> No, YOU call it "near-determinism"
>
> The term goes back to, at least, the early computing days following
> WWII and particlularly by Arthur Burks in his book, /Chance, Cause,
> Reason/, in distinction to its approximate synonym, stochastic, which
> has has strictly mathematical application in there being one or more
> random variable in an otherwise determinable equation: Determinsm,
> Near-determinism, and Tychism covers everything and disepnses with
> fuzzy terms like hard or soft determininism and indeterminsim in a
> causal (not uncaused and random) universe.

When we have a discussion about your wild theories of determinism
and their history, feel free to copy and paste this paragraph into
it. Till then, it's nothing but complete evasion on your part.

Complete distraction, really. The topic is not about the history
of deterministic theories. The topic is about the distinctions
between the living and the non-living and whether there is ANY
meaningful distinctions between them that have ANYTHING to do
with ANY kind of purpose, end-attainment, goal-seeking or values.

My position is that there is not; your position is that there is.

And the ONLY way you have managed to get there is, "I choose to
invent a meaning for these terms for which I cannot point to any
correspondent distinction in reality, and then appeal to wild
reasons that my imagination makes the distinction correspondent."

> "Purpose" means "purpose", not teleology,

Being as charitable as I am when it comes to word usage,
I've never quibbled about this. You can use "purpose"
to mean whatever the hell you want it to mean.

And you /choose/ to use it to mean, "that which the living
does (or has) and that which the non-living doesn't." I
acknowledged this years ago and have spent the rest of the
time pointing out that this says NOTHING AT ALL that isn't
contained in the concepts <living> and <non-living>.

What you CAN'T do, what you HAVEN'T done and what you'll NEVER
do, is point to an actual distinction between the living and
non-living that has ANYTHING at all to do with ANY sort of
purpose EXCEPT an appeal to your mind.

You appear not to understand this, so maybe a bit of clarity
is called for. On the point of "self-generation," as we're
using the concept here (really, as Rod had defined it), you
can point to EVERY living organism and say, "See, that object
engages that action" AND you can point to EVERY non-living
object and say, "See, that object doesn't."

That's what an identified distinction is. Yes, it's done with
concepts and classifications, but it's done ABOUT objects. You
could do the same with particular replicative functions, and
even maybe attributes of the molecules involved themselves. All
of these things can be identified IN THE OBJECT.

What you CAN'T do, what you HAVEN'T done and what you'll NEVER
do, is point to an actual distinction between the living and
non-living that has ANYTHING at all to do with ANY sort of
purpose EXCEPT an appeal to your mind.

> and your problem is that you
> never bothered to read Binswanger's book though you thought you could
> comment on it as if you understood one word in it, and the point is:

Doesn't matter, because this isn't about Binswanger's book; it's
about the distinctions between the living and the non-living.

> "purpose" applies to animate action and not inanimate motion.

That's it. That's the whole of your case. There's absolutely
nothing else there except a plain declaration.

> When an
> animal hunts for food, there is an obvious purpose for his motion
> unrelated to any speculative theory on the food being there as a
> (Aristotelean) final cause -- that the Essence of a prey, as a
> purpose, acted in backward causation for creation of the predator, but
> when a meteorite falls, gravity has not a purpose for its fall, and
> the meteorite has no purpose to have gravity act on it *unless* one
> applies final causation in the Essences involved, and why would one do
> that? Your problem is that your cannot distinguish between the word
> "purpose" and "final cause", "finalization" and "teleology" when
> "purpose" simply means "purpose."

Except that when I ask you, "So what is the purpose," your answer
consists ONLY of purposes that YOU attribute to the organism.

"What's the purpose of the raccoon fleeing?" "To get away from
Trapper Bob." But when I say, "Then the purpose of the rock
rolling down the hill is to get to the bottom," your ONLY
retort is to start appealing to teleology without admitting
it, or entering wild theories about triple determinism that
pretend to distinguish them but don't...as if even if they
did, it would have something to do with purpose.

This is all because you CAN'T come up with a legitimate
distinction that has ANYTHING to do with purpose, ends,
goal seeking or valuing. If you could, you would.

That's also why you keep focusing on the raccoon and not
the plant or the bacterium, even though this distinction
supposedly applies to those objects too. You see how
readily absurd that looks and leaves you with no appeal
whatsoever except crazy sub-atomic theories that you don't
know the first thing about anyway.

Doesn't matter, though. If you had a distinction, you'd
point to it in the BACTERIUM or the PARAMECIUM, but you
won't even talk about those. Little wonder, eh?

You're through, Charles, and this position has been wiped
out since the B.E. threads. It was wiped out last year and
it's wiped out now. So you can either end it, start coming
out with the crazy ad homs about how I can't distinguish
the living from the non-living even though I clearly can,
or get to the damn point and start SHOWING some distinction
between the bacterium and the rolling rock that is an ACTUAL
distinction between them that has ANYTHING AT ALL to do
with purpose, end-attainment, goal-seeking or valuing.

You've done more than enough pointing to your wild
imagination; it's time to start pointing to the objects.

Are you ready to move forward or not?


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 12:51 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/27/2012 5:21 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > So,. you don't a thing about how O'ist epistemology works, do you?
>
> It so happens that I do, language development being one of my few
> areas of formal expertise, but luckily it doesn't matter for this
> anyway.

It does when you claim that I claim otherwise as to the role of
concepts, and then you write this gibberish:

> >> But the fact is that we /don't/ know and we /do/ abstract in a
> >> context of non-omniscience, not to mention a perspective of
> >> non-omniscience.
>
> > This is gibberish.
>
> Yeah?  Is this gibberish too...
>
> "Man is neither infallible nor omniscient;

Which has nothing to do with: "But the fact that we don't know. . . "

We *do* know.

On the one hand you imply that concepts are invalid because they are
held as mere concepts (abstract in a context of non-omnscience), but
otherwise acknowledge . . .

>Man is a being of volitional consciousness:
>beyond the level of percepts--a level inadequate to the
>cognitive requirements of his survival--man has to acquire
>knowledge by his own effort, which he may exercise or not,
>and by a process of reason, which he may apply correctly or
>not."

. . . supposing that "acquiring knowledge" is not the same thing as
"to know."

> >> No, YOU call it "near-determinism"
>
> > The term goes back to, at least, the early computing days following
> > WWII and particlularly by Arthur Burks in his book, /Chance, Cause,
> > Reason/, in distinction to its approximate synonym, stochastic, which
> > has has strictly mathematical application in there being one or more
> > random variable in an otherwise determinable equation: Determinsm,
> > Near-determinism, and Tychism covers everything and disepnses with
> > fuzzy terms like hard or soft determininism and indeterminsim in a
> > causal (not uncaused and random) universe.
>
> When we have a discussion about your wild theories of determinism
> and their history, feel free to copy and paste this paragraph into
> it.  Till then, it's nothing but complete evasion on your part.
>

No. How about you read something on the topic before claiming anything
I write on determinism as some crazy notion of my own when I have
never stated one word that has not be well established in science for
6o years even if there is no "consensus" as to opinion.

> Complete distraction, really.  The topic is not about the history
> of deterministic theories.

Yes, it must be. You have made one false statement after another on
"action" and there is no such meaningful discussion of "action"
without establishing ground rules for determinism.

> The topic is about the distinctions
> between the living and the non-living

To the extent there is any such thing as determinism, inanimate
objects follow definable rules according to determinism, and animate
entites do not. Rocks always follow Newtonian laws and animate
entities do not.

> and whether there is ANY
> meaningful distinctions between them that have ANYTHING to do
> with ANY kind of purpose, end-attainment, goal-seeking or values.
>

Any object which follows determinism cannot have purpose. Your claim
that (nonhuman) animate entities follow determinism -- having never a
purpose -- is false. And before you question my authority to discount
your claim please cite a single reference, other than just your say-
so, to counter my claim. As for my own claim, the above cited /
Chance, Cause, Reason/ suffices.

> > "Purpose" means "purpose", not teleology,
>
> Being as charitable as I am when it comes to word usage,
> I've never quibbled about this.  You can use "purpose"
> to mean whatever the hell you want it to mean.
>

Your "charity" does not extend with your repeated phrases such as "non-
teleogical purpose" -- which has as much sense to it as "non-animal
plants." There is never a reason to not just let "purpose" mean
"purpose", and when a predator seeks a prey, it has that purpose.

> And you /choose/ to use it to mean, "that which the living
> does (or has) and that which the non-living doesn't."  I
> acknowledged this years ago and have spent the rest of the
> time pointing out that this says NOTHING AT ALL that isn't
> contained in the concepts <living> and <non-living>.

No, because a single cell (living) to have a "purpose" is to speak of
telelogical purpose and not the same purpose as a predator (animate,
living) seeking a prey. Not only did you not acknowledge that a
raccoon has a purpose of escaping his predator but you clearly stated
that only such a supposed "purpose" could be the same as a rock
rolling down a hill. You have never shifted from that position.

>
> What you CAN'T do, what you HAVEN'T done and what you'll NEVER
> do, is point to an actual distinction between the living and
> non-living that has ANYTHING at all to do with ANY sort of
> purpose EXCEPT an appeal to your mind.
>

The raccoon has the purpose to escape his predator. How is that "in
my mind" and not a valid concept (for predatory purpose) drawn from
observation? How is it "subjective" to say that a raccoon has a goal
to attain to escape his predator? If you say that all such concepts --
the purpose to prey and the purpose to escape a predator -- are
"subjective" and we canot really know one way or another, then we go
back to your two-faced statement on whether we can know or we cannot
know.

> "Man is neither infallible nor omniscient;

Which has nothing to do with: "But the fact that we don't know. . . "
We *do* know. On the one hand you imply that concepts are invalid
because they are held as mere concepts (abstract in a context of non-
omnscience), but otherwise acknowledge . . .

>Man is a being of volitional consciousness:
>beyond the level of percepts--a level inadequate to the
>cognitive requirements of his survival--man has to acquire
>knowledge by his own effort, which he may exercise or not,
>and by a process of reason, which he may apply correctly or
>not."

. . . supposing that "acquiring knowledge" is not the same thing as
"to know."

> You appear not to understand this, so maybe a bit of clarity
> is called for.  On the point of "self-generation," as we're
> using the concept here (really, as Rod had defined it), you
> can point to EVERY living organism and say, "See, that object
> engages that action"

No, a single cell, alive, but not animate, does not. [Unless and until
one enters Binswanger's thesis, and I have not because it is not
useful to demonstrate Rand's fundamental ethics as she argued for it.]

> Doesn't matter, because this isn't about Binswanger's book; it's
> about the distinctions between the living and the non-living.
>

Then why do you constantly bring it up?

> > "purpose" applies to animate action and not inanimate motion.
>
> That's it.  That's the whole of your case.  There's absolutely
> nothing else there except a plain declaration.
>

It's part of the definition -- which is plain declaration and nothing
else. Living, replicating, engaging purposeful self-generated
action. Like Potroast, you want a word to mean what it means at a
time when you want it to mean something or other and deny there can be
any single definiton to a word because it is wrong to state by plain
declaration in definiton but rather must be suitably fuzzy and
elastic.

> > When an
> > animal hunts for food, there is an obvious purpose for his motion
> > unrelated to any speculative theory on the food being there as a
> > (Aristotelean) final cause -- that the Essence of a prey, as a
> > purpose, acted in backward causation for creation of the predator, but
> > when a meteorite falls, gravity has not a purpose for its fall, and
> > the meteorite has no purpose to have gravity act on it *unless* one
> > applies final causation in the Essences involved, and why would one do
> > that?  Your problem is that your cannot distinguish between the word
> > "purpose" and "final cause", "finalization" and "teleology"  when
> > "purpose" simply means "purpose."
>
> Except that when I ask you, "So what is the purpose," your answer
> consists ONLY of purposes that YOU attribute to the organism.
>

Again, to deduce the purpose from observation -- valid or invalid?

> "What's the purpose of the raccoon fleeing?"  "To get away from
> Trapper Bob."  But when I say, "Then the purpose of the rock
> rolling down the hill is to get to the bottom," your ONLY
> retort is to start appealing to teleology without admitting
> it,

No. I have always denied teleology in this context just as Rand does,
and no one is denying causality. You simply mixed causal "ends" of
the two. The "end" of the raccoon at the bottom of the hill is not its
"purpose" though it is a causal "end", and the "end" at the bottom of
the hill for the rock is simply a causal end with no attributable
purpose. This is the third time I have had to say this.

> or entering wild theories about triple determinism that
> pretend to distinguish them but don't...as if even if they
> did, it would have something to do with purpose.
>

> > The term, near-determinism, goes back to, at least, the early computing

> > days following
> > WWII and particlularly by Arthur Burks in his book, /Chance, Cause,
> > Reason/, in distinction to its approximate synonym, stochastic, which
> > has has strictly mathematical application in there being one or more
> > random variable in an otherwise determinable equation: Determinsm,

> > Near-determinism, and Tychism covers everything and dispnses with

> > fuzzy terms like hard or soft determininism and indeterminsim in a
> > causal (not uncaused and random) universe.
>
> When we have a discussion about your wild theories of determinism
> and their history, feel free to copy and paste this paragraph into
> it. Till then, it's nothing but complete evasion on your part.
>

No. How about you read something on the topic before claiming anything
I write on determinism as some crazy notion of my own when I have
never stated one word that has not be well established in science for
6o years even if there is no "consensus" as to opinion.

> Complete distraction, really. The topic is not about the history
> of deterministic theories.

Yes, it must be. You have made one false statement after another on
"action" and there is no such meaningful discussion of "action"
without establishing ground rules for determinism.

> The topic is about the distinctions
> between the living and the non-living

To the extent there is any such thing as determinism, inanimate
objects follow definable rules according to determinism, and animate
entites do not. Rocks always follow Newtonian laws and animate
entities do not.

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 11:51 am, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/27/2012 5:37 AM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > A sunflower is a sunflower, and a rock is a rock, but a consitutent
> > molecule of a sunflower is not a sunflower and a constitutent molecule
> > of a rock is not a rock.  So the "huge fact" one cannot predict the
> > location and motion of a one molecule in a sunflower or a rock
> > (Heisenburg prevents that) is not a relevant  fact.
>
> And yet your position is built upon the fact that it is.

No, it is not. I do not say: one can or cannot predict the actions of
a single molecule and therefore one can or cannot predict the actions
of a sunflower, and you do say that.


JK: And you can't predict the action of every sub-atomic particle in
the rock.

CB: That is not what is suggested by my comment. You made a

demonstrably false statement that you can predict with 100% accuracy
what a sunflower will do.

JK :YOUR claim is that you have discovered some sort of causative
action that applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't apply
to the molecules of the rock

I never made a "discovery of some sort of causative action that
applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't apply to the
moelcules of the rock."

CB: A sunflower is a sunflower, and a rock is a rock, but a

consitutent molecule of a sunflower is not a sunflower and a
constitutent molecule of a rock is not a rock.

> Now today, you just appeal to "the obvious meaning of purpose,"
> which I'll address momentarily.  Your problem there is both that
> the meaning YOU'RE using is anything but obvious--non-teleological
> purpose hardly being immediately translatable--AND that this non-
> obvious meaning can't be pinned down by ANY reference to reality,
> at least as you're using it and in a manner that it applies to the
> living and doesn't apply to the non-living.
>

"Purpose means "purpose" and "teleology" mean "teleology".

[Jim Klein]

On 1/27/2012 6:48 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> I never made a "discovery of some sort of causative action that
> applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't apply to the
> moelcules of the rock."

Oh, because someone else made the discovery? How fucking
low will you go? This is your last line from your last post:

"Rocks always follow Newtonian laws and animate
entities do not."

That is a completely preposterous claim for you to make as
a matter of fact. It may not be crazy to believe, just as
one can believe in God and not be crazy, so that's not the
problem. The problem isn't that you're crazy; the problem
is that you absolutely refuse to focus on the issue, which
is NOT the deterministic nature of the molecules of either
the rock or the bacterium.

You gave me more than enough in the other post with which
to work, and I'll get to it when I have time. But even
this little bit here is enough to blow your case to
smithereens. Unfortunately, since you refuse to focus on
the actual issue, a lot of it is derivative.

To start with, you don't know that "rocks always follow
Newtonian laws and animate entities do not." I know this
because nobody currently knows this.

Next, you're now including bacteria in the "animate" because
we're talking about purpose, ends, goals and values applying
to all living entities and not just a raccoon that you saw
running from Trapper Bob. That's interesting right there.
Just out of curiosity, why do you consider a bacterium
"animate" now?

You do what you always do on this topic, pretend that it has
to do with what you imagine it has to do with. No, it has
to do with what we're talking about--which is NOT your fantasies
about why triple determinism means that bacteria have purposes..

We're talking about whether or not bacteria DO have purposes.
You say yes, and I say no. Now you fairly charge that I have
a problem with distinguishing "purpose" from "teleology." Well
yes, I do, but being the charitable fellow I am, I'm willing to
stipulate any definition to any word you wish. You wanna say
"purpose" means something non-teleological? That's alright by
me. "Purpose means something non-teleological." How's that?

You're so caught up in distracting the whole thing, that you
still fail to make the point. Make "purpose" mean whatever
the hell you want it to mean, and the same with "end," "goal"
and "value."

What you won't be able to do--haven't done and will never do--
is assign them a meaning with reference to reality such that
all living things will have them and all non-living things
will not.

It's that simple, Charles, and it's always going to be that
simple. You can't do it because it's not there. That leaves
you two strategies, both of which you've tried. The first is
to REPLACE the concepts with OTHER concepts, like replication
or self-generation stuff, and say, "See? There's the distinction."

But we already had that distinction and just replacing one word
for another says nothing at all. That having failed, you're off
in the weeds talking about your amazing knowledge of the inherent
stochasticism (or its absence) at the cellular, molecular, atomic
and sub-atomic levels of these objects. Besides the obvious fact
that you DON'T have such knowledge, you don't even realize that
it's still just a rehash of your first failed attempt. You just
run off in those weeds and then declare, "See? THAT'S what
purpose means; THAT'S what 'having goals" means;' THAT'S what a
'standard of value' is." But just as before, that doesn't say
anything at all. It just repeats what something else says
without identifying ANY distinction, and besides in this case
you're talking out your ass anyway.

Yeah, by reading a bunch of books, Charles Bell has discovered
the nature of all matter and action on Earth with regard to
randomness and determinism. That's easy to swallow, especially
when you intimate that there are THREE types. Not 1, 2 or 4,
but exactly 3. What a remarkable bit of knowledge.

You're through, Charles. Your other post, as usual, is little
but misrepresentations of what I say. Still, I'll address the
drop you say about the actual topic itself, when I have a bit
more time.

Your goal in the meanwhile is just simply give a definition of
"purpose," "end attainment," "goal-seeking" and "value" (or
"standard of value") such that they say ANYTHING AT ALL
besides "living" and "not living." Stop already with your
bullshit determinism stuff. Besides the fact that you don't
know doo-doo about it, Rand wasn't talking about that at all
and we're talking about the claim that RAND made...about the
"fundamental alternative" in the universe, about bacteria and
plants having purposes and standards of value, about end
attainment and about goal-seeking.

That's the topic and every time you try to distract or bullshit
away from it, I'm gonna bring you back. I'm doing fine speaking
for myself, so also please stop yapping about what my position
"must mean." At this stage, you should be so overwhelmed trying
to defend your position, that you haven't a moment to speak of mine.


jk

[Jim Klein]

This is so long and off-topic that I don't know when I'll
have the time to read it closely, but for now just one
simple question...

On 1/27/2012 6:38 PM, Charles Bell wrote:

> Any object which follows determinism cannot have purpose.

Why not?

Not don't go writing 50,000 words. In your NON-TELEOLOGICAL
meaning of "purpose," why can't an object which follows
determinism have purpose?

Nice and simple, easy and clear...why not?

You're so through, it's almost sad.


jk

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 10:01 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> This is so long and off-topic that I don't know when I'll
> have the time to read it closely, but for now just one
> simple question...
>
> On 1/27/2012 6:38 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > Any object which follows determinism cannot have purpose.
>
> Why not?
>

An animate entity has the ultimate value in its own life. Without life
it ceases to exist. What ultimate value may a rock have? To be at the
bottom of a hill? To be a fragment in someone's ring? "Ultimate" has
one and only one meaning: being the last and highest degree. You can
conjure up an infinite number of imaginary "ultimate values" for an
inanimate object, all equally valid or invalid, in one's or another's
opinion, but there can be only one ultimate value in the life of a
living thing as a living thing.

> Not don't go writing 50,000 words.  In your NON-TELEOLOGICAL
> meaning of "purpose," why can't an object which follows
> determinism have purpose?
>

"Purpose" means "purpose" and not "teleology"

[Charles Bell]

On Jan 27, 7:25 pm, Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> On 1/27/2012 6:48 PM, Charles Bell wrote:
>
> > I never made a "discovery of some sort of causative action that
> > applies to the molecules of the plant that doesn't apply to the

> > molecules of the rock."
>
>

snip > [expletive, ad-hom/insult]

>  I know this
> because nobody currently knows this.
>

> Now you fairly charge that I have
> a problem with distinguishing "purpose" from "teleology."  Well
> yes, I do,

"Purpose" = something as an object or end to attain.

That's a tough one.

x.
xx.
xxx.
xx.
x.

xx.
xxx.
xx.

[Jim Klein]

Thank you for keeping it short and on-topic.

On 1/28/2012 5:30 AM, Charles Bell wrote:

>>> Any object which follows determinism cannot have purpose.
>>
>> Why not?
>>
>
> An animate entity has the ultimate value in its own life.

Is that supposed to mean something? If so, what? Please
explain what it means to say, "A bacterium has the ultimate

value in its own life."


> Without life it ceases to exist.

WHAT ceases to exist? As a bacterium or a plant? Sure,
that's true. And when the hydraulic press comes down on
the rock, it ceases to exist as a rock. That's true, isn't it?

Could you clarify the distinction please, without merely
appealing to the plant being alive and the rock not, since
that's understood?

> What ultimate value may a rock have? To be at the
> bottom of a hill? To be a fragment in someone's ring? "Ultimate" has
> one and only one meaning: being the last and highest degree. You can
> conjure up an infinite number of imaginary "ultimate values" for an
> inanimate object, all equally valid or invalid, in one's or another's
> opinion, but there can be only one ultimate value in the life of a
> living thing as a living thing.

And my point is that it's conjuring in ALL cases. But maybe
after you tell us the existential nature of this ultimate
value in a bacterium's life, it'll be clearer how it doesn't
rest on our conjuring. Or maybe it'll be a little clearer
that it does.

>> Not don't go writing 50,000 words. In your NON-TELEOLOGICAL
>> meaning of "purpose," why can't an object which follows
>> determinism have purpose?
>>
> "Purpose" means "purpose" and not "teleology"

And all you have to do is come up with a meaning of purpose
that doesn't bring in teleology. Running away from Trapper
Bob for the result of staying alive, does.


jk