Incorrect defenses against disproofs of logic.
User 1DE7
Suppose an argument is constructed that is of a form that is valid according to
the rules of logic, and suppose that this argument has true premises.
Suppose that the conclusion of the above argument is that the rules of logic
are false.
Heretofore I had accepted the criticism of this type of argument that went as
follows: If the conclusion is true, then since the rules of logic are false the
actual argument (having a logical form) is invalid, and thus the conclusion is
not established and we can throw out the argument. The truth of its premises is
irrelevent, as is the validity of its form. The argument can be dismissed
solely on the basis of its conclusion.
In the above, the person who throws out the argument can only do so if he
holds, for a moment, that the rules of logic are false. The key point is that
the person who throws out the argument will tell you that *the argument
itsself* has not established that the rules of logic are false, and that may be
true. But, in order that it be thrown out, or ignored, one must temporarily
assume the rules of logic to be false. This then opens the door for all
arguments to be thrown out as well.
If the defender of logic wants to say "well, the rules of logic are false,
according to your conclusion, so your argument isn't shown" then they must also
concede that NO arguments are valid, even the one they use to discard your
previous argument. For their reasoning goes like:
(1) Assume there is a logical argument A, with a conclusion C that it purports
to show.
(2) If the rules of logic are false, then logical arguments do not establish
their conclusions
(3) The rules of logic are false.
(4) C is not established.
The problem is that any argument could be substituted into A here. So, for the
logic defender to throw out the argument in question, he must throw out all
arguments.
You might notice that even the above argument doesn't follow if its 3rd premise
is true. This is just a repeat of the same thing above. We could go one level
deeper and say that if you want to throw out the argument above, you need to
throw out all arguments once again, etc. In effect we are left in a state of
total nonsense if a logical argument can be produced showing all of the rules
of logic to be false. (and even what I just said doesn't follow, etc).
The point is, now, that the throwing out of such arguments by the logic
defender *on the basis of the conclusion that logic is false* does not work and
seems to send everything spiraling into nonsense. Therefore their correct
defense against arguments purporting to show the rules of logic to be false is
to show either that the argument is of invalid form, or that at least one
premise is false, just like they'd have to do for any other argument.
The situation is similar for arguments, like one I recently made (informaly),
suggesting that the rules of logic are not nessesarily true. I don't say they
are false, just that there is some chance that some or all of them are. Those
who say "if they were false then your argument would not hold, so we can ignore
your argument" run into the problem above.
-User
Gaius Helen Mohiam
formulation of) formal logic. If such a proof can be given, that would
indeed force you to dismiss that particular logical system. However, you may
take heart in the statement that no such proof has ever materialized for any
reasonable logical system, although it is also worth noting that the
opposite, the proof of consistency of important logical systems, has also
remained elusive.
Owl
news:20000930220253...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
>
> Suppose an argument is constructed that is of a form that is valid
according to
> the rules of logic, and suppose that this argument has true premises.
>
> Suppose that the conclusion of the above argument is that the rules of
logic
> are false.
I'm not going to start by supposing something that is logically
impossible.
"Suppose there is a sound argument that P & ~P. Now ..."
The right thing to say to that is, "No, I'm not going to suppose that."
Suppose, instead, there is an argument that follows some accepted
inference pattern, its conclusion is that all inferences are invalid, and
the individual giving the argument asserts that the premises are true.
That's the closest coherent thing to what you want to suppose. Now let's
see what happens.
Since the person giving this argument is asserting that all reasoning is
invalid, he is asserting that his own argument is invalid. He is also, at
the same time, asserting that it is valid, insofar as he gives the
argument. So he is immediately contradicting himself. Of course, if
contradictions don't bother him, then there's not much more we could say
to such a person.
> Heretofore I had accepted the criticism of this type of argument that
went as
> follows: If the conclusion is true, then since the rules of logic are
false the
> actual argument (having a logical form) is invalid, and thus the
conclusion is
> not established and we can throw out the argument. The truth of its
premises is
> irrelevent, as is the validity of its form. The argument can be
dismissed
> solely on the basis of its conclusion.
>
> In the above, the person who throws out the argument can only do so if
he
> holds, for a moment, that the rules of logic are false.
No, the objection is as follows:
*Either* the conclusion is true, *or* it isn't. *If* it is true, then the
argument is unsound, since it is invalid. If it is not true, then the
argument is unsound, since a sound argument can't lead to a false
conclusion. Therefore, the argument is unsound.
> If the defender of logic wants to say "well, the rules of logic are
false,
> according to your conclusion, so your argument isn't shown" then they
must also
> concede that NO arguments are valid, even the one they use to discard
your
> previous argument. For their reasoning goes like:
Again, no. The argument we're discussing is necessarily unsound,
regardless of whether its conclusion is true or false. Of course, the
conclusion is obviously false. That does not contradict anything said in
my previous paragraph, however. The fact that the conclusion is false
does not conflict with (in fact, it entails) the statement that 'if the
conclusion is true, then the argument is unsound.'
> (1) Assume there is a logical argument A, with a conclusion C that it
purports
> to show.
> (2) If the rules of logic are false, then logical arguments do not
establish
> their conclusions
> (3) The rules of logic are false.
> (4) C is not established.
>
> The problem is that any argument could be substituted into A here. So,
for the
> logic defender to throw out the argument in question, he must throw out
all
> arguments.
The logic defender does not assert 3. It is the logic-attacker who
asserts 3, and thereby devolves into nonsense, where he rejects all
arguments, including his own.
> You might notice that even the above argument doesn't follow if its 3rd
premise
> is true. This is just a repeat of the same thing above. We could go one
level
> deeper and say that if you want to throw out the argument above, you
need to
> throw out all arguments once again, etc. In effect we are left in a
state of
> total nonsense if a logical argument can be produced showing all of the
rules
> of logic to be false. (and even what I just said doesn't follow, etc).
Exactly -- which is why the very notion of someone attacking logic in
general is silly. The person who sets out to do such a thing just
devolves into nonsense, and there's nothing to be said to him. I think
we've had this discussion before. Once a person is rejecting logic, you
might as well stop talking to him.
> The point is, now, that the throwing out of such arguments by the logic
> defender *on the basis of the conclusion that logic is false* does not
work and
> seems to send everything spiraling into nonsense. Therefore their
correct
> defense against arguments purporting to show the rules of logic to be
false is
> to show either that the argument is of invalid form, or that at least
one
> premise is false, just like they'd have to do for any other argument.
Which is precisely what I did. If the argument is valid, then it follows
that its conclusion is false; hence, it must have a false premise.
Therefore, either the argument is invalid, or it has a false premise.
Now, to return to the beginning of this message. It is well-known that if
one accepts a contradiction, anything whatever follows. What you tried to
do at the beginning of this message was get us to assume a contradiction:
namely, to assume that there was a valid argument, with true premises,
leading to the conclusion that all laws of logic are false/invalid. But
that is equivalent to assuming that there is a sound argument that (P &
~P) (since "~(P & ~P)" is one of the laws of logic). Which is equivalent
to assuming that (P & ~P). If we give you that assumption, you can say
anything you like after that.
George Dance
User 1DE7 <user...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> Suppose an argument is constructed that is of a form that is valid
according to
> the rules of logic, and suppose that this argument has true premises.
>
> Suppose that the conclusion of the above argument is that the rules of
logic
> are false.
First of all, I don't think that "true" or "false" are the right words
to use here; just as (as you correctly point out elsewhere) they are not
the right words to use to describe moral statements. I would use
"correct"/"incorrect" as general descriptions, while reserving
"true"/"false" as the standard of correctness for propositions. Rules
of logic are methodological rules, for which the standard of correctness
is "reliability". A methodological rule is "reliable" if, when used to
reach true conclusions, it in fact does reach true conclusions (which
can only mean, true as verified by a different method).
So we have (by assumption) a logical argument showing that the rules of
logic are unreliable.
> Heretofore I had accepted the criticism of this type of argument that
went as
> follows: If the conclusion is true, then since the rules of logic are
false the
> actual argument (having a logical form) is invalid, and thus the
> conclusion is
> not established and we can throw out the argument. The truth of its
> premises is irrelevent, as is the validity of its form. The argument
> can be dismissed solely on the basis of its conclusion.
That criticism sounds ineffective, but I think that is because it is
not being made correctly. (It is not how I would make it.) A better
way to make it would be: the truth of the conclusion depends on the
validity of the form, which depends on the reliability of the rules of
logic. But the truth of the conclusion is that the laws of logic are
unreliable, meaning that the validity of the form does not mean the
conclusion is true. The conclusion is true only if the conclusion is
not true; the argument is self-refuting.
> In the above, the person who throws out the argument can only do so if
he
> holds, for a moment, that the rules of logic are false. The key point
is that
> the person who throws out the argument will tell you that *the
argument
> itsself* has not established that the rules of logic are false, and
that may be
> true. But, in order that it be thrown out, or ignored, one must
> temporarily assume the rules of logic to be false.
Well, no. The argument does not establish that the conclusion is true,
because if the conclusion is true, then the argument does not establish
anything. It is the conclusion that mandates throwing out the laws of
logic, not some whim of the defender. That is what it means to say that
the argument is self-refuting; it refutes itself, the same way that a
proposition "This proposition is not true" refutes itself.
> This then opens the door for all
> arguments to be thrown out as well.
Only those that assert that the rules of logic are unreliable, either as
a premise or as a conclusion. For to accept either would mean to reject
the argument form as a way of getting at truth.
> For their reasoning goes like:
>
> (1) Assume there is a logical argument A, with a conclusion C that it
> purports to show.
> (2) If the rules of logic are false, then logical arguments do not
> establish their conclusions
> (3) The rules of logic are false.
> (4) C is not established.
Admittedly, anyone who tried to defend the reliability of logic against
A could not do so by inserting (3) as a premise; because asserting (3)
would not be defending logic's reliability. However, if (3) is a
premise or conclusion of A, the defender would be able to correctly
make this argument:
(1') Assume there is a logical argument A, with a conclusion C that it
purports to show.
(2') If the rules of logic are unreliable, then logical arguments do not
establish the truth of their conclusions
(3') The rules of logic are unreliable, by A.
(4') C is not established by A.
See the difference?
> The problem is that any argument could be substituted into A here. So,
> for the
> logic defender to throw out the argument in question, he must throw
> out all arguments.
Only those for which (3') is either a premise or a conclusion.
> ...The situation is similar for arguments, like one I recently made
> (informally), suggesting that the rules of logic are not nessesarily
> true. I don't say they
> are false, just that there is some chance that some or all of them
> are. Those who say "if they were false then your argument would not
> hold, so we can ignore
> your argument" run into the problem above.
Actually, an argument that asserted only that some rules of logic were
unreliable could be made without self-refutation, as it would not
necessarily establish (3'). Conceivably, one could construct an
argument that did not use Affirming the Antecedent as a method, to show
that Affirming the Antecedent was false.
Such arguments have likely been made successfully in the past, as of the
four possible methods of argument, only two (Affirming the Antecedent
and Denying the Consequent) are considered reliable, while the other two
(Denying the Antecedent and Affirming the Consequent) are considered
unreliable.
--
- 30 -
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Jesus 1DE7
>From: Gaius Helen Mohiam GMo...@bene-gesserith.org
>Date: 10/1/00 11:45 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <KPJB5.9442$bK6.1...@typhoon.nyroc.rr.com>
>What you are talking about is a proof of inconsistency of (a specific
>formulation of) formal logic.
Are you sure? I think my post was more about truth than consistancy. It was
never suggested that the rules of logic were not consistant, but simply that
they were not true.
-User
Jesus 1DE7
>Date: 10/1/00 1:34 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8r8020$hh3$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>
>> Suppose an argument is constructed that is of a form that is valid
>according to
>> the rules of logic, and suppose that this argument has true premises.
>>
>> Suppose that the conclusion of the above argument is that the rules of
>logic
>> are false.
>
>I'm not going to start by supposing something that is logically
>impossible.
Okay, so hopefuly you will be able to identify the false premise, or invalid
argumentative form in my upcoming more formal argument that the rules of logic
are not nessesarily true, since it will be impossible for it not to have one of
those flaws.
>Suppose, instead, there is an argument that follows some accepted
>inference pattern, its conclusion is that all inferences are invalid, and
>the individual giving the argument asserts that the premises are true.
>That's the closest coherent thing to what you want to suppose. Now let's
>see what happens.
>
>Since the person giving this argument is asserting that all reasoning is
>invalid, he is asserting that his own argument is invalid. He is also, at
>the same time, asserting that it is valid, insofar as he gives the
>argument.
I am not sure that he has to do this last part. He may present the argument
which he says has true premises and a valid form according to logic and propose
only that according to the rules of logic it is valid, but that he doesn't
nessesarily think the argument shows anything.
>> Heretofore I had accepted the criticism of this type of argument that
>went as
>> follows: If the conclusion is true, then since the rules of logic are
>false the
>> actual argument (having a logical form) is invalid, and thus the
>conclusion is
>> not established and we can throw out the argument. The truth of its
>premises is
>> irrelevent, as is the validity of its form. The argument can be
>dismissed
>> solely on the basis of its conclusion.
>>
>> In the above, the person who throws out the argument can only do so if
>he
>> holds, for a moment, that the rules of logic are false.
>
>No, the objection is as follows:
>
>*Either* the conclusion is true, *or* it isn't. *If* it is true, then the
>argument is unsound, since it is invalid.
And all other arguments are also unsound.
>If it is not true, then the
>argument is unsound, since a sound argument can't lead to a false
>conclusion. Therefore, the argument is unsound.
But assuming the argument has true premises and a valid form, then calling it
"unsound" would just be a blow to the truth of logic itsself, so, you'd still
seem to need to show some sort of falsity in the premises or invalidity in the
form, no?
>> (1) Assume there is a logical argument A, with a conclusion C that it
>purports
>> to show.
>> (2) If the rules of logic are false, then logical arguments do not
>establish
>> their conclusions
>> (3) The rules of logic are false.
>> (4) C is not established.
>>
>> The problem is that any argument could be substituted into A here. So,
>for the
>> logic defender to throw out the argument in question, he must throw out
>all
>> arguments.
>
>The logic defender does not assert 3. It is the logic-attacker who
>asserts 3, and thereby devolves into nonsense, where he rejects all
>arguments, including his own.
But the logic defender also has to deal with the case in which the conclusion
is true. Up above you had an "if" clause for the conclusion being true, but
then you only restricted yourself to saying that that particular argument would
be unsound, when it seems all arguments would be.
Now that I think about it, saying "If the rules of logic are false, then.. "
cannot really make sense no matter what sort of "then" clause you give, since
in all of them that I can think of, reason or logic would be involved.
>> You might notice that even the above argument doesn't follow if its 3rd
>premise
>> is true. This is just a repeat of the same thing above. We could go one
>level
>> deeper and say that if you want to throw out the argument above, you
>need to
>> throw out all arguments once again, etc. In effect we are left in a
>state of
>> total nonsense if a logical argument can be produced showing all of the
>rules
>> of logic to be false. (and even what I just said doesn't follow, etc).
>
>Exactly -- which is why the very notion of someone attacking logic in
>general is silly. The person who sets out to do such a thing just
>devolves into nonsense, and there's nothing to be said to him.
Right, but I think it is worth it to point out that what you are calling
'nonsense', may not nessesarily be false, as for instance things that a worm
would not be able to concieve of because of its biology are not nessesarily
false. I don't see how one can say that things humans can't understand, or
concieve of, such as the rules of logic being false, are nessesarily false
simply because they are nonsensical to you.
>> The point is, now, that the throwing out of such arguments by the logic
>> defender *on the basis of the conclusion that logic is false* does not
>work and
>> seems to send everything spiraling into nonsense. Therefore their
>correct
>> defense against arguments purporting to show the rules of logic to be
>false is
>> to show either that the argument is of invalid form, or that at least
>one
>> premise is false, just like they'd have to do for any other argument.
>
>Which is precisely what I did. If the argument is valid, then it follows
>that its conclusion is false; hence, it must have a false premise.
>Therefore, either the argument is invalid, or it has a false premise.
Okay, so hopefuly this is how you will critisize my more formal forthcoming
argument. In your earlier response you seemed to be saying that arguments
against logic can be thrown out even without showing their form to be invalid
or showing a premise to be false, but maybe I misunderstood you.
>Now, to return to the beginning of this message. It is well-known that if
>one accepts a contradiction, anything whatever follows. What you tried to
>do at the beginning of this message was get us to assume a contradiction:
>namely, to assume that there was a valid argument, with true premises,
>leading to the conclusion that all laws of logic are false/invalid.
I don't see why one must claim that the argument is valid in order to just put
it forth as an example of why we cant be sure the rules of logic are true. That
conclusion does not come from the conclusion of the argument itsself, but more
beacuse logic would sort of break down if an argument had true premises and
valid form yet its conclusion was inconsistant with it having those things.
-User
Gaius Helen Mohiam
news:20001002194221...@ng-ch1.aol.com...
> Are you sure? I think my post was more about truth than consistancy.
Ahh, I didn't read it that way. But if that is the case, then we are talking
about an entirely different question. Truth is a much more slippery thing
than logical consistency, and your main problem would be to establish the
"truth" of your premises.
Owl
> Okay, so hopefuly you will be able to identify the false premise, or
invalid
> argumentative form in my upcoming more formal argument that the rules of
logic
> are not nessesarily true, since it will be impossible for it not to have
one of
> those flaws.
I'll do my best. So far, I think your false assumption is that you can't
directly see which rules are valid.
> Now that I think about it, saying "If the rules of logic are false,
then.. "
> cannot really make sense no matter what sort of "then" clause you give,
since
> in all of them that I can think of, reason or logic would be involved.
Well, since the antecedent is false (it's false that the rules of logic
are false) any such conditional would be true automatically. On the other
hand, if you assert the antecedent, as in: "The rules of logic are false.
So ..." then your whole argument will not make sense, no matter what fills
in the ellipsis.
> Right, but I think it is worth it to point out that what you are calling
> 'nonsense', may not nessesarily be false, as for instance things that a
worm
> would not be able to concieve of because of its biology are not
nessesarily
> false. I don't see how one can say that things humans can't understand,
or
> concieve of, such as the rules of logic being false, are nessesarily
false
> simply because they are nonsensical to you.
I do not accept any nonsensical sentences. I don't even entertain them.
Neither does anyone, since nonsensical sentences, by definition, can't be
entertained; though it appears you are trying to do so anyway. Apparently
you're saying, "Yes, I can't entertain the nonsense statement ' dpois
pocyto,' but let's consider the possibility that it's true anyway." Stop
trying to talk about things that you say can't be talked about.
> Okay, so hopefuly this is how you will critisize my more formal
forthcoming
> argument. In your earlier response you seemed to be saying that
arguments
> against logic can be thrown out even without showing their form to be
invalid
> or showing a premise to be false, but maybe I misunderstood you.
To refute an argument, it is sufficient to show that either it has a false
premise or it is invalid. It is not necessary to determine which of these
alternatives holds, as long as you know that one of them must hold.
> I don't see why one must claim that the argument is valid in order to
just put
> it forth as an example of why we cant be sure the rules of logic are
true. That
> conclusion does not come from the conclusion of the argument itsself,
but more
> beacuse logic would sort of break down if an argument had true premises
and
> valid form yet its conclusion was inconsistant with it having those
things.
Consider the stuff you said following "because". That is allegedly a
reason, an argument, for why logic would be invalid in a certain
hypothetical situation. Only if *that* reasoning is valid would you
succeed in showing that logic is invalid. The person trying to invalidate
logic must be endorsing *some* way of getting to this conclusion;
otherwise, what's he doing, just making meaningless noises?
We saw this before with the supposed anti-MP argument. Suppose you could
construct the following argument:
(Argument A)
1. P
2. If P, then MP is invalid.
3. :. MP is invalid.
THAT argument, I think we agreed, couldn't show MP is invalid, although
this other one might, assuming MT is valid:
(Argument B)
1. If MP is valid, then argument A could not be constructed.
2. Argument A can be constructed.
3. :. MP is not valid.
User 1DE7
>From: Owl a@a.a
>Message-id: <8rbfmt$k1b$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>
>On the other
>hand, if you assert the antecedent, as in: "The rules of logic are false.
>So ..." then your whole argument will not make sense, no matter what fills
>in the ellipsis.
But how do you conclude that it won't make sense? Logicaly? But the rules of
logic are false, so I don't think you can say anything follows, even that it
won't make sense. (you could say the same about what I just said)
>> Right, but I think it is worth it to point out that what you are calling
>> 'nonsense', may not nessesarily be false, as for instance things that a
>worm
>> would not be able to concieve of because of its biology are not
>nessesarily
>> false. I don't see how one can say that things humans can't understand,
>or
>> concieve of, such as the rules of logic being false, are nessesarily
>false
>> simply because they are nonsensical to you.
>
>I do not accept any nonsensical sentences. I don't even entertain them.
>Neither does anyone, since nonsensical sentences, by definition, can't be
>entertained;
There are two things here.
Thinking of: (1) A scenario in which the rules of logic are false.
Thinking that: (2) There may exist a scenario in which the rules of logic could
be false, but that we cannot concieve of.
Maybe I should not have used 'nonsenseical' either, but rather 'unable to be
concieved of.' (abbreviated UC).
Now, (1) is UC. (2) is not UC, at least not for me.
>"Yes, I can't entertain the nonsense statement ' dpois
>pocyto,' but let's consider the possibility that it's true anyway.
I think that is different, as my UC statement is at least defined. Also,
statement (2), which is sufficient for me to make my argument I think, is not
UC.
>In your earlier response you seemed to be saying that
>arguments
>> against logic can be thrown out even without showing their form to be
>invalid
>> or showing a premise to be false, but maybe I misunderstood you.
>
>To refute an argument, it is sufficient to show that either it has a false
>premise or it is invalid. It is not necessary to determine which of these
>alternatives holds, as long as you know that one of them must hold.
But if it is invalid, then it leaves upon the possiblity that all logical
arguments are invalid. So it would then not be correct according to the rules
of logic to simply throw out the argument and think that it doesn't mean
anything, it seems.
>> I don't see why one must claim that the argument is valid in order to
>just put
>> it forth as an example of why we cant be sure the rules of logic are
>true. That
>> conclusion does not come from the conclusion of the argument itsself,
>but more
>> beacuse logic would sort of break down if an argument had true premises
>and
>> valid form yet its conclusion was inconsistant with it having those
>things.
>
>Consider the stuff you said following "because". That is allegedly a
>reason, an argument, for why logic would be invalid in a certain
>hypothetical situation. Only if *that* reasoning is valid would you
>succeed in showing that logic is invalid. The person trying to invalidate
>logic must be endorsing *some* way of getting to this conclusion;
>otherwise, what's he doing, just making meaningless noises?
>
Okay, it seems like you are focusing unnessesarily on the *showing* of logic to
be incorrect, rather than just it *being* incorrect. As if, if you are unable
to logicaly *show* logic to be incorrect, then it must not be incorrect.
I will elaborate more on this in another post. Looking over this, I notice that
I am probably going to elaborate on most everything else in a deeper way in
other posts, except possibly the part where I label sentences (1) and (2), so,
if you want you could just respond to that here.
-User
-User
robert...@hotmail.com
according to
> the rules of logic, and suppose that this argument has true premises.
>
> Suppose that the conclusion of the above argument is that the rules
of logic
> are false.
It can't happen. If the premises imply a contradiction or a factually
false statement, then either one of the premises is factually false or
the inference was not valid.
A true set of premises can not validly imply a contradiction or a false
statement.
Bob Kolker
Owl
> >On the other
> >hand, if you assert the antecedent, as in: "The rules of logic are
false.
> >So ..." then your whole argument will not make sense, no matter what
fills
> >in the ellipsis.
>
rules of
> logic are false, so I don't think you can say anything follows, even
that it
> won't make sense. (you could say the same about what I just said)
Uh, no, the rules of logic are true, so what you say above, in the
quotation marks, is both false and nonsensical.
> >I do not accept any nonsensical sentences. I don't even entertain
them.
> >Neither does anyone, since nonsensical sentences, by definition, can't
be
> >entertained;
>
> There are two things here.
>
> Thinking of: (1) A scenario in which the rules of logic are false.
>
> Thinking that: (2) There may exist a scenario in which the rules of
logic could
> be false, but that we cannot concieve of.
You're right, those are different things. However, I thought what we were
talking about was yet another thing, namely a person who
Thinks that: (3) The rules of logic are, in fact, false.
The statement that a rule of logic is invalid is logically equivalent to
the statement that it may be invalid, since the 'validity' of an inference
requires it to be truth-preserving in all possible circumstances. Thus,
if you claim modus ponens 'can' be invalid, in some possible situation,
then you are claiming it is invalid. Do you want to do that?
User 1DE7
>From: Owl a@a.a
>Message-id: <8rdu6d$e8b$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net>
>> But how do you conclude that it won't make sense? Logicaly? But the
>rules of
>> logic are false, so I don't think you can say anything follows, even
>that it
>> won't make sense. (you could say the same about what I just said)
>
>Uh, no, the rules of logic are true, so what you say above, in the
>quotation marks, is both false and nonsensical.
Yes, they are quite likely true. What I meant was that in the case you were
considering they were false, as you said something similar to "if they are
false, X" if I recall. I agree that what you just said is probably true,
though.
>> >I do not accept any nonsensical sentences. I don't even entertain
>them.
>> >Neither does anyone, since nonsensical sentences, by definition, can't
>be
>> >entertained;
>>
>> There are two things here.
>>
>> Thinking of: (1) A scenario in which the rules of logic are false.
>>
>> Thinking that: (2) There may exist a scenario in which the rules of
>logic could
>> be false, but that we cannot concieve of.
>
>You're right, those are different things. However, I thought what we were
>talking about was yet another thing, namely a person who
>
>Thinks that: (3) The rules of logic are, in fact, false.
>The statement that a rule of logic is invalid is logically equivalent to
>the statement that it may be invalid, since the 'validity' of an inference
>requires it to be truth-preserving in all possible circumstances. Thus,
>if you claim modus ponens 'can' be invalid, in some possible situation,
>then you are claiming it is invalid. Do you want to do that?
I think there is a misunderstanding. I am not using "situation" here to mean
situation in the sense that I am in a certain situation now, and I will be in
another situation tomorrow. I am meaning situation as in "possible way that
reality is." So, I am saying that the rules of logic are probably true in all
circumstances, but that it is concievable that that isnt the case. I am not
claiming that we can concieve of the particular case where that isnt the case,
but just that we can concieve of there being such a case and that case being
real.
Anyway, we are getting sort of sidetracked. I know we talked about this before
when I wrote upt he argument about the omnipotent being who tricks us to
believing logic is true, etc.
I want to try a new approach to this though. My original point did not depend
on the possiblity of logic being false at all, but only that we do not percieve
its truth directly.
Let us assume just for a moment that we do not percieve the truth of logic
directly. I know you think this is false, but just for argument's sake we'll
pretend it isnt.
We'll assume that humans' reasoning skills are simply the manifestations of
some purely biological/physical process, and that this works because those
humans who acted as if the rules of logic were true were selected for, as they
were evolving.
Now, if this were the case, and we did not percieve truth directly, would you
still say that it is impossible that the rules of logic were false? Or does
this not change anything?
-User
Owl
> Let us assume just for a moment that we do not percieve the truth of
logic
> directly. I know you think this is false, but just for argument's sake
we'll
> pretend it isnt.
Okay. You realize that I'm going to infer that this is a situation in
which we would have no knowledge of logic, and no inferential knowledge.
> We'll assume that humans' reasoning skills are simply the manifestations
of
> some purely biological/physical process, and that this works because
those
> humans who acted as if the rules of logic were true were selected for,
as they
> were evolving.
And here I'm going to infer that we wouldn't know this, since knowing that
would require our making inferences. Still, there's no logical (or
metaphysical) impossibility -- there could be a world in which what you
suppose here was true, and we could even believe that we were in such a
world; we just couldn't know it.
> Now, if this were the case, and we did not percieve truth directly,
would you
> still say that it is impossible that the rules of logic were false? Or
does
> this not change anything?
Do you mean
1. Do I (now) say that in such a world the rules of logic must be true?
2. If I were in that situation, would I (then) say that the rules of logic
must be true?
3. If I *knew* I were in that situation, would I then say that the rules
of logic must be true?
or
4. If I *believed* I were in that situation, would I then say that the
rules of logic must be true?
In answer to
1: Yes, that doesn't change anything. Since the laws of logic are
necessary truths, no contingent proposition could make it so that they
were not necessary. (Btw, it's one of the theorems of modal logic that if
P is necessary, then it's necessary that P is necessary.)
2: That depends on what you stipulate about the situation. If my beliefs
are genetically pre-programmed, and I'm determined to believe that the
rules of logic must be true, then I would say that they were. (But if I
was determined to believe that they were *not* necessarily true, then I
would say that they were not necessarily true.)
3: That's impossible; no one could know such a thing.
4: I would never rationally come to believe such a thing; I would have to
be struck with some sudden irrationality whereby I would come to believe
that scenario. In such a case, who knows what I would say?
User 1DE7
>From: Owl a@a.a
>Message-id: <8ro8ia$lie$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>
>> Let us assume just for a moment that we do not percieve the truth of
>logic
>> directly. I know you think this is false, but just for argument's sake
>we'll
>> pretend it isnt.
>
>Okay. You realize that I'm going to infer that this is a situation in
>which we would have no knowledge of logic, and no inferential knowledge.
If you define knowledge such that my situation rules out knowledge, I suppose.
>> We'll assume that humans' reasoning skills are simply the manifestations
>of
>> some purely biological/physical process, and that this works because
>those
>> humans who acted as if the rules of logic were true were selected for,
>as they
>> were evolving.
>
>And here I'm going to infer that we wouldn't know this, since knowing that
>would require our making inferences.
But we can still make inferences if this is the case. You just probably don't
think they are "justified" and they do not amount to genuine "knowledge"
because of certain notions of what justification is and what knowledge is, that
I think you have.
I asked you before to justify your alleged direct percpetion of truth.. to
establish that it really was truth, but I think you just asked back "you want
me to justify it?" or something. I then commented that your refusal to justify
it made it unjustified, at least as far as I was concerned, and I didn't see a
response from you.
It seems like you think that this "perception of truth," of yours does not need
justification, yet you don't want to call it unjustified even though it has no
justification..?
Anyway, back to your post:
>And here I'm going to infer that we wouldn't know this, since knowing that
>would require our making inferences. Still, there's no logical (or
>metaphysical) impossibility -- there could be a world in which what you
>suppose here was true, and we could even believe that we were in such a
>world; we just couldn't know it.
Could you define "know" for me, in the sense that you are using it?
>> Now, if this were the case, and we did not percieve truth directly,
>would you
>> still say that it is impossible that the rules of logic were false? Or
>does
>> this not change anything?
>
>Do you mean
>1. Do I (now) say that in such a world the rules of logic must be true?
skip to your answer:
>1: Yes, that doesn't change anything. Since the laws of logic are
>necessary truths
Since you still think you have direct knowledge, this seems reasonable.
>2. If I were in that situation, would I (then) say that the rules of logic
>must be true?
I think this question could be improved by focusing more on whether the rules
of logic had to be true or not, rather than what you would SAY about it in that
situation. I know you still have two more interpretations of the question to
answer, but I didn't see anything quite like my version of this question in
your other two.
your answer:
>2: That depends on what you stipulate about the situation. If my beliefs
>are genetically pre-programmed, and I'm determined to believe that the
>rules of logic must be true, then I would say that they were. (But if I
>was determined to believe that they were *not* necessarily true, then I
>would say that they were not necessarily true.)
I guess this is reasonable assuming your interpretation of the question.
However, it would be better to ask:
"2. If we were in that situation, would the rules of logic
nessesarily have to be true?"
Though I guess you would evaluate it from our current perspective, where you
think the rules of logic must be true, and thus say they still would be.
>3. If I *knew* I were in that situation, would I then say that the rules
>of logic must be true?
>3: That's impossible; no one could know such a thing.
I think this is the case that I am in, currntly, that you say is impossible,
unless you mean "know" to mean 100% certainty.
I guess we need that definition of "know" from you to resolve this.
>4. If I *believed* I were in that situation, would I then say that the
>rules of logic must be true?
>4: I would never rationally come to believe such a thing; I would have to
>be struck with some sudden irrationality whereby I would come to believe
>that scenario. In such a case, who knows what I would say?
The scenario in question is simply that our logical knowledge is not some
direct perception of truth, right? Are you really 100% certain that it is? I am
surprised that you think it is so farfetched, almost as if I had asserted the
rules of logic were false.
I think this is your version of my rehrased question 2..
Howabout this: Suppose for a moment that you only establish this direct
connection with truth one time in your entire life, and that from this direct
connection you were able to know that your logical and moral beliefs were not a
result of the direct connection with truth, and it was made clear that you had
never before that time had any direct connection, and that you never will
again.
Suppose this happened right after you read my post. Then would you be certain
that the rules of logic were true?
-User
Owl
> >Okay. You realize that I'm going to infer that this is a situation in
> >which we would have no knowledge of logic, and no inferential
knowledge.
>
> If you define knowledge such that my situation rules out knowledge, I
suppose.
It's not a matter of my choosing to 'define knowledge such that
so-and-so.' Focus on the content of what you're saying, rather than on the
definitions of words -- you're saying there is no justification for
accepting any of the laws of logic. That's a self-undermining position,
regardless of how I use the word "know".
> But we can still make inferences if this is the case. You just probably
don't
> think they are "justified" and they do not amount to genuine "knowledge"
Right.
> I asked you before to justify your alleged direct percpetion of truth..
to
> establish that it really was truth, but I think you just asked back "you
want
> me to justify it?" or something. I then commented that your refusal to
justify
> it made it unjustified, at least as far as I was concerned, and I didn't
see a
> response from you.
What I tried to point out was that you were simply *assuming* (as you do
again here) that there was no such thing as direct awareness. If you
understand the concept of direct awareness, then you understand that
"justify your direct awareness" makes no sense.
What if I asked you to 'justify' your sensory perception?
> It seems like you think that this "perception of truth," of yours does
not need
> justification, yet you don't want to call it unjustified even though it
has no
> justification..?
This is just the argument of the 'prove it' skeptic, that I discussed here
a while back. If you want to adopt the prove-it skeptic position, it will
cut against you as easily as it does against anything else. Your position
now implies that everything whatever (including your own position) is
"unjustified".
> Could you define "know" for me, in the sense that you are using it?
I am using "know" in the ordinary English sense (propositional knowledge,
of course, not know-how type knowledge). The only thing I have been
assuming is that if X is an arbitrary assumption, then we do not 'know' X
is true. How you think you can know things that you, yourself, declare to
be completely arbitrary and unjustified I do not understand.
> "2. If we were in that situation, would the rules of logic
> nessesarily have to be true?"
This is just question 1. The answer is yes, since the rules of logic are
necessary. Thus, no contingent facts about how human beings are
constructed would have any effect on them.
2+2 = 4, and 2+2 would still =4 even if there were no humans around. It
would still =4 even if I didn't know it. And even if I were irrational, or
if I were constantly making mistakes about arithmetic, and so on. That's
because those suppositions are irrelevant to the content of the
proposition that 2+2=4 (which is not a proposition about me, or any other
person).
> >4: I would never rationally come to believe such a thing; I would have
to
> >be struck with some sudden irrationality whereby I would come to
believe
> >that scenario. In such a case, who knows what I would say?
>
> The scenario in question is simply that our logical knowledge is not
some
> direct perception of truth, right? Are you really 100% certain that it
is? I am
> surprised that you think it is so farfetched, almost as if I had
asserted the
> rules of logic were false.
What I am saying, though I'm still not sure you're taking the point
seriously, is that you have an intrinsically self-defeating position --
like that of the subjectivist who says, "Everything is a matter of
opinion; there are no absolutes" or the person who says, "All human beings
are irrational. All philosophical views are mere rationalization", and the
like.
For my part, I am surprised that you think your having direct awareness of
logical truth is so farfetched. I am surprised because I know that you
experience this awareness all the time. For instance, consider the
following two proposition forms:
(A & B)
~(~A v ~B)
Think about the meanings of those ("v" means "or" in the inclusive sense).
What is the logical relation between them? Are they equivalent,
contradictory, one of them impies the other, or completely independent? If
you think about this little problem for a few seconds, you will see the
answer to it. That you would then go on to deny that you saw it amazes me.
That's just as sensible as insisting that you never see physical objects.
> Howabout this: Suppose for a moment that you only establish this direct
> connection with truth one time in your entire life, and that from this
direct
> connection you were able to know that your logical and moral beliefs
were not a
> result of the direct connection with truth, and it was made clear that
you had
> never before that time had any direct connection, and that you never
will
> again.
Well, since in fact I have been directly aware of logical truths many
times in my life, the above is impossible. If you mean: "Suppose I had an
experience in which it seemed to me as if I saw that all my other beliefs
were unrelated to reality", then the only possible rational conclusion
would be that this experience had been a sudden derangement that I
momentarily experienced -- since it contradicted all the direct
perceptions I have already had. I suppose I might then go talk to a
shrink.
Of course, there's no logical space on the other side -- if I decided to
accept this deranged 'perception', then all coherent thinking on my part
would come to an end, since every time I thought anything, I would have to
immediately reject that thought (and then reject my rejection of it, etc.)
Which, of course, is the situation we were talking about earlier with the
person who rejects logic.
User 1DE7
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>User 1DE7 <user...@aol.com> wrote in message
>news:20001008171224...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> > >Okay. You realize that I'm going to infer that this is a situation in
> > >which we would have no knowledge of logic, and no inferential
>knowledge.
> >
> > If you define knowledge such that my situation rules out knowledge, I
>suppose.
>
>It's not a matter of my choosing to 'define knowledge such that
>so-and-so.' Focus on the content of what you're saying, rather than on the
>definitions of words
I think me knowing what you mean by the words you use is fairly important.
>-- you're saying there is no justification for
>accepting any of the laws of logic. That's a self-undermining position,
>regardless of how I use the word "know".
Maybe, but I still think that me knowing what you mean is helpful to the
discussion.
I don't see anything particularly wrong with the position unless you think
that all positions that do not justify the foundation of the beliefs that
make them up in some absolute sense have something wrong with them.
Like I have said earlier, I don't know what you mean by calling something
simply "justified." I understand justification is a relationship between two
things, the thing that is justified and the thing that justifies it (using
'thing' in a broad sense here). I think everyone must then accept something
that is unjustified as a foundation, upon which other things can be said to
be justified or unjustified according to this. So, I think all beliefs have
this
property of being "unjustified" at their foundation. Maybe all beliefs have
something wrong with them, then.
> > But we can still make inferences if this is the case. You just probably
>don't
> > think they are "justified" and they do not amount to genuine "knowledge"
>
>Right.
>
> > I asked you before to justify your alleged direct percpetion of truth..
>to
> > establish that it really was truth, but I think you just asked back "you
>want
> > me to justify it?" or something. I then commented that your refusal to
>justify
> > it made it unjustified, at least as far as I was concerned, and I didn't
>see a
> > response from you.
>
>What I tried to point out was that you were simply *assuming* (as you do
>again here) that there was no such thing as direct awareness. If you
>understand the concept of direct awareness, then you understand that
>"justify your direct awareness" makes no sense.
And would you also say that it makes no sense to call your direct awareness
"justified", as you dont think it makes sense to speak of justifying it?
>
>What if I asked you to 'justify' your sensory perception?
I might say that it is unjustified, and I simply accept it as foundational.
Maybe I could justify it in terms of logic, but my acceptance of logic
truths would not be justified.
> > It seems like you think that this "perception of truth," of yours does
>not need
> > justification, yet you don't want to call it unjustified even though it
>has no
> > justification..?
>
>This is just the argument of the 'prove it' skeptic, that I discussed here
>a while back. If you want to adopt the prove-it skeptic position, it will
>cut against you as easily as it does against anything else. Your position
>now implies that everything whatever (including your own position) is
>"unjustified".
I don't think so. Again going back to my understanding of justification,
lots of things are justified *by* the rules of logic, or *by* the assumption
that our senses allow us to percieve reality more or less directly. My
position is that we can't have an infinite regress of justification, so all
things must start with some unjustified foundation, but I don't see this as
"cutting against me" as I don't think there is a problem with it.
> > Could you define "know" for me, in the sense that you are using it?
>
>I am using "know" in the ordinary English sense (propositional knowledge,
>of course, not know-how type knowledge). The only thing I have been
>assuming is that if X is an arbitrary assumption, then we do not 'know' X
>is true. How you think you can know things that you, yourself, declare to
>be completely arbitrary and unjustified I do not understand.
I guess we have different models of knowledge, then. I don't think that things
have to be justified all the way down to their cores to constitute "knowledge."
Knowledge, to me, would be something like true believes justifed *by*
reason/logic. This goes back to my understanding of justification. So, even if
our acceptance of the correctness of reason is unjustified, we can still have
knowledge, as knowledge just means true beliefs justifed by reason.
>
> > "2. If we were in that situation, would the rules of logic
> > nessesarily have to be true?"
>
>This is just question 1. The answer is yes, since the rules of logic are
>necessary. Thus, no contingent facts about how human beings are
>constructed would have any effect on them.
Right, my fault.
> > >4: I would never rationally come to believe such a thing; I would have
>to
> > >be struck with some sudden irrationality whereby I would come to
>believe
> > >that scenario. In such a case, who knows what I would say?
> >
> > The scenario in question is simply that our logical knowledge is not
>some
> > direct perception of truth, right? Are you really 100% certain that it
>is? I am
> > surprised that you think it is so farfetched, almost as if I had
>asserted the
> > rules of logic were false.
>
>What I am saying, though I'm still not sure you're taking the point
>seriously, is that you have an intrinsically self-defeating position --
>like that of the subjectivist who says, "Everything is a matter of
>opinion; there are no absolutes" or the person who says, "All human beings
>are irrational. All philosophical views are mere rationalization", and the
>like.
And I don't think the reason you call my position "self-defeating" is not
nessesarily a flaw. Nothing that I say implies that my position isn't true(it
implies I am not 100% certain that it is true), and nothing that I say
contradicts my position. You may think that because of my views on
justification I am saying knowledge is impossible (as you view knowledge), but
your standards for knowledge -- that we have some sort of 'absolute
justification', in our case due to some direct perception of truth -- is
unnessesary and sort of whimsical, I think.
>For my part, I am surprised that you think your having direct awareness of
>logical truth is so farfetched.
Well, I allow some chance for it. It sounds like you are 100% certain that we
do percieve logical truths directly. In another post I attempted to assign
probabilities to my beliefs. If I asked you with what probability you believe
you percieve logical truths directly, you would say "1"?
I am surprised because I know that you
>experience this awareness all the time.
I have logical intuitions. It isn't at all obvious where they come from.. if
they are direct or indirect. It takes some thought on the nature of life,
evolution, physical organisms, psychology and such to conclude that it is very
likely not some direct percpetion of truth.
It is certainly possible to have logical intuitions without them being direct
percpetions of truth.
> For instance, consider the
>following two proposition forms:
>
>(A & B)
>~(~A v ~B)
>
>Think about the meanings of those ("v" means "or" in the inclusive sense).
>What is the logical relation between them? Are they equivalent,
>contradictory, one of them impies the other, or completely independent? If
>you think about this little problem for a few seconds, you will see the
>answer to it. That you would then go on to deny that you saw it amazes me.
Right, I have a logical intuition on the matter and I am pretty certain I am
correct. No one is denying my logical intuitions. What I don't see is how you
can be so confident that what I just did, and what you do whenever you think
about logical relations is some direct connection with truth.
Suppose we have a rat in a maze or something. This rat makes decisions in a
logical way, on a basic level. Do you think the rat has sensations that allow
him to determine that his thought of "I just went down that hallway, and there
was no cheese there, therefore I should try another one, assuming the cheese
isnt moving around" is not a direct perception of truth? Do you think in his
head there are simultanious impressions in the rat's mind that make it clear to
the rat that what its thought process is not a direct connection with truth?
That wouldn't really make any sense from a evolutionary perspective. What would
be selected for were rats that believed "reality is like this" with "this"
being some true property of reality. There is an advantage for rats that really
think their logical thoughts are true. Its not much different with humans, just
much more complex.
...Or do you think the rat directly percieves truth as well?
> > Howabout this: Suppose for a moment that you only establish this direct
> > connection with truth one time in your entire life, and that from this
>direct
> > connection you were able to know that your logical and moral beliefs
>were not a
> > result of the direct connection with truth, and it was made clear that
>you had
> > never before that time had any direct connection, and that you never
>will
> > again.
>
>Well, since in fact I have been directly aware of logical truths many
>times in my life, the above is impossible.
You do you differentiate direct and indirect? What specificaly tells you that
your logical intuitions are direct percpetions of truth rather than strong
biological rpedispositions to certain beliefs?
If you mean: "Suppose I had an
>experience in which it seemed to me as if I saw that all my other beliefs
>were unrelated to reality", then the only possible rational conclusion
>would be that this experience had been a sudden derangement that I
>momentarily experienced -- since it contradicted all the direct
>perceptions I have already had. I suppose I might then go talk to a
>shrink.
I was getting at a more convincing experience, that would perhaps inable you to
clearly see how all of your previous logical intuitions were not direct, and
just the result of your biology, etc. Not just a hallucination. You should be
able to think of a scenario that would be convincing. For instance, suppose you
suddenly morphed into some super-being with god-like powers, and everything
became crystal-clear, all the philosophical problems that you've ever had, you
could resolve in just a moment of thinking about them, and this resolution was
very detailed and precise and you could see quite clearly that it was correct.
You could also see that the way in which you saw all these things was direct,
and you saw that what you had previously considred direct was muddled and
indirect in comparison. (not that your old logical beliefs were all false, but
simply that you knew them in indirect ways
. and not nearly as clearly as you knew now). That is more of what I had in
mind, not some hazy hallucination.
By the way, you used the term "all my beliefs were unrelated to reality".. I
certainly did not claim this. I just postulated that you knew that your
previous logical intiotions were not direct.
>Of course, there's no logical space on the other side -- if I decided to
>accept this deranged 'perception', then all coherent thinking on my part
>would come to an end, since every time I thought anything, I would have to
>immediately reject that thought (and then reject my rejection of it, etc.)
I don't see why you would have to reject all of your indirect logical
intuitions. I don't see why you are so opposed to all things indirect.
For instance, I think my logical intuitions are not direct percpetions of
truth, yet I believe I hold a consistant position in which it makes sense not
to reject all of my thoughts on that basis.
There seems to be mixing up of my absense of belief of the 100% correctness of
logic with a positive belief that logic is false, or something.
My views on our logical impressions are similar to what I think are your views
on the senses.
I would not say that sense evidence gives us direct knowledge of the physical
objects that we seem to see, because we can postulate BIV scenarious and such.
In them, our sense impressions are side-effects of scientists prodding our
brains and whatnot. You could still say we are directly aware of reality at
some level, though, as the interaction between the scientists and our brain
would be direct, but, the relationship between our senses and what we seem to
sense I would call indirect.
Even if you label it differently, I think you agree that BIV scenarios have a
probability higher than 0. Yet I think you believe that, in fact, we aren't in
a BIV scenario. Well, if I say logical intuitions are indirect in a similar
way, then why is that so much more of a problem for you?
-User
Owl
I don't have time for a lengthy reply today, but I want to leave you with
something to think about.
I notice that you frequently characterize the beliefs you disagree with as
'whimsical.' You also characterized Wrathbone's belief that Hitler was
evil as being nothing more than something he wanted to believe, in
contrast, presumably, to your own theory which is really true and not just
something you want to believe. For that reason, we were supposed to give
no weight to the 'Hitler is evil' belief in assessing the relative merits
of intuitionism and skepticism, but some weight to your belief that all of
reality must be physical.
As a related point, you also believe that any belief is unjustified unless
there is an argument for it.
Why isn't your belief that all of reality is physical just something you
want to believe, and equally 'whimsical'? As you have produced no positive
argument for it, do you agree that it is completely unjustified, and so no
better than its negation?
It has become fairly clear that fundamentally, your real reason for
rejecting both ethical intuitionism and a priori knowledge in general, is
your sense that these positions are somehow 'whimsical' -- isn't that
right? I.e., the general, unargued sense that they just can't be right.
You spoke of the 'sheer incomprehensibility' of moral realism. Yet it is
clear that you understand what I am saying pretty well. So by
"incomprehensibility" you could only have been referring to your own
internal feeling of resistance to accepting what I am saying, not the
impossibility of comprehending it -- isn't that so?
You went on to say it was almost like (A and ~A). But if you could
demonstrate that moral realism implies a contradiction, or anything
anywhere close to that, I am sure that you would have done so by now.
Therefore, is this comparison anything more than your simply reporting
your own, subjective disinclination to believe?
And if that's right, what position are you in to make fun of Wrathbone's
inclination to believe that Hitler was evil?
User 1DE7
>From: Owl a@a.a
>Message-id: <8s6cou$fi0$1...@slb7.atl.mindspring.net>
>
>I notice that you frequently characterize the beliefs you disagree with as
>'whimsical.' You also characterized Wrathbone's belief that Hitler was
>evil as being nothing more than something he wanted to believe, in
>contrast, presumably, to your own theory which is really true and not just
>something you want to believe. For that reason, we were supposed to give
>no weight to the 'Hitler is evil' belief in assessing the relative merits
>of intuitionism and skepticism, but some weight to your belief that all of
>reality must be physical.
I don't think I said that we ought to give it *no* weight. I am saying that if
we have a certain type fo evidence that consists of simple introspection, and
we are aware of very strong emotional incentives for holding the believe that
is presented, then it is simply weaker than if those emotional incentives were
not present.
>
>As a related point, you also believe that any belief is unjustified unless
>there is an argument for it.
To be more general I would not limit the justification to 'argument,' and
instead allow any form of justification. In other words, something is
unjustified if nothing justifies it.
>Why isn't your belief that all of reality is physical just something you
>want to believe, and equally 'whimsical'? As you have produced no positive
>argument for it, do you agree that it is completely unjustified, and so no
>better than its negation?
Right, at its foundation all of my beliefs are "unjustified", as are everyones,
as I don't think we can have an infinite regress of justification, and don't
know what "justification" means just by itsself.
When I say "X is whimsical" it can be interpreted as shorthard for "X is
whimsical assuming physical reality exists and the rules of logic are true,
etc." In other words, according to other beliefs, X is whimsical.
I don't know what the acceptance of reason or physical reality would be
whimsical according to. I can't really say it is either whimsical or
non-whimsical because I have no standard by which to judge things as such until
I accept the rules of logic and the existance of physical reality (without
justification).
>It has become fairly clear that fundamentally, your real reason for
>rejecting both ethical intuitionism and a priori knowledge in general, is
>your sense that these positions are somehow 'whimsical' -- isn't that
>right?
I use that word a lot, yes. More specificaly the reasons are that evolution
explains such things very well, and that these positions very often don't even
make sense, and have no evidence for them other than introspection, which I
regard as weak because (1) There is a strong emotional incentive to think these
things are true. and (2) This introspection of theirs would be no different in
my model. They cannot point to the fact that it seems to them that they
directly percieve truth because it would also seem this way to them under my
theory. Also, I personaly can introspect and I don't think that the result of
my own introspection is markedly different than yours and wrathbones. And from
my own instrospection I can see how one might think some of the things you
think, but from considering the issues with more seriousness it seems plain
that this does not constitute evidence that morality is real.
It is like we all have paper bag-lunches. And you and wrathbone keep looking in
your bag and telling me that you have an apple in there. Yet, when I look in my
bag I don't see an apple -- or, maybe more accurately, I see something that
could sort of be mistaken as an apple at a very brief and hasty glance, but was
surely not an apple. I then have to think "is it more likely that I simply
don't have an apple and they do -- that their bags are that much different from
mine? Or, could it be that they have something similar to what I have, yet they
mistake it as an apple?
Now this in itsself would not be overwhelming evidence for my position, as I am
speaking only of comparing my and your intuitions. But now suppose I learn that
all people who claim to have an apple in their bags will be allowed free access
to the local massage parlor for as long as they claim they have an apple.
(corresponding to the strong emotional desire). Then, I think the hypothesis
that you guys are mistaking something for an apple, and letting your emotions
cloud your judgement a little more tenable.
Now, add on to that some theory, say, that the contents of all paper bags
evolved from some non-apple, and are still some non-apple, although some of
them look enough like apples that people mistake them for apples if the only
thing they go on is a glance into their bag. Suppose this theory makes a lot of
sense and explains a lot of things and such. Yet, suppose you are wrathbone
still keep insisting that there is an apple in your bag.
Now, with all of these factors, I think I am justified in believing that my
case is quite a bit stronger than yours.
(I made this up just within the last minute or so, but I think it is a very
good analogy. You may see some revised versions of this later, after I think
about it some more.)
>You spoke of the 'sheer incomprehensibility' of moral realism. Yet it is
>clear that you understand what I am saying pretty well.
I understand your moral intuitions, I think. I also understand the fact that
you claim they are objective facts that you percieve. What I have trouble with
is the conception that they actualy are objective facts.
I think the problem is that, when speaking of existance, I automaticaly take
that as a synonym for physical existance, since physical existance is the only
kind of existance that I have ever experienced, if you ask me. If I wanted to
define existance, I would give a definition in terms of spacetime and particles
and energy and such.
It might be like trying to explain a color to someone who has never seen any
colors before. I don't know of any examples of things that exist that are not
physical and I really don't know what it would mean for them to exist. That is
why, when thinking that moral facts exist, I simply think "well, why should we
act according to moral facts?" "you should, by definition.", And this is the
part that I just cannot immagine, that there exist facts that inhabit some
realm of existance that I have never percieved or known in any way. It has no
effect on anything in the realm of my existance as far as I can see, other than
that it claims to make statements about my realm.
You could say that I know what you are talking about on a very abstract level,
but when it comes down to really trying to immagine what you say is true, it
just doesn't make sense.
>So by
>"incomprehensibility" you could only have been referring to your own
>internal feeling of resistance to accepting what I am saying, not the
>impossibility of comprehending it -- isn't that so?
Hopefuly the above gives you a general idea of what I meant.
>
>You went on to say it was almost like (A and ~A). But if you could
>demonstrate that moral realism implies a contradiction, or anything
>anywhere close to that, I am sure that you would have done so by now.
I meant that they were analagous in their difficulty to immagine, though I
think there is at least some chance that I will be able to improve my
conception of moral facts so that I could immagine them existing, but I doubt I
could do so with A and ~A
>Therefore, is this comparison anything more than your simply reporting
>your own, subjective disinclination to believe?
It is my own subjective inability to comprehend how it makes sense.
>And if that's right, what position are you in to make fun of Wrathbone's
>inclination to believe that Hitler was evil?
His position is being attacked with repect to the foundational beliefs that
physical reality exists and that the rules of logic are true, which are based
on my subjective inclination to believe them without justification.
However, as he accepts these beliefs as well, I think, then, that we can argue
about the issue in the context of these unjustified beliefs of ours.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>Like I have said earlier, I don't know what you mean by calling something
>simply "justified." I understand justification is a relationship between two
>things, the thing that is justified and the thing that justifies it (using
>'thing' in a broad sense here). I think everyone must then accept something
>that is unjustified as a foundation, upon which other things can be said to
>be justified or unjustified according to this. So, I think all beliefs have
>this
>property of being "unjustified" at their foundation. Maybe all beliefs have
>something wrong with them, then.
Wittgenstein made an interesting remark: "If the true is what is
grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet false."
(He goes on to say: "If someone asked us 'but is that true?' we might
say 'yes' to him; and if he demanded grounds we might say 'I can't
give you any grounds, but if you learn more you too will think the
same'. If this didn't come about, that would mean that he couldn't
for example learn history.")
Perhaps the same idea applies here. The laws of logic may not be
justified, but that does not mean they are unjustified. It may be
a mistake to apply the terms "justified" and "unjustified" to logic
itself. When you ask someone to justify a claim, you are asking
them to show evidence and reasoning in support of the claim. Logic,
then, is the method of justifying beliefs. A belief supported by
evidence and valid reasoning is justified.
Logic itself is not justified because the term "justified"
and "unjustified" have no meaning or applicability here
(or, if they did, they have a different meaning here).
You said in another post that something that is not justified is
unjustified. That could be like saying that something that is not
hard is soft. Fame is not hard. Therefore, fame is soft. Notions of
hard and soft don't seem to apply to fame (or health, justice, etc.).
Does it seem reasonable that "justify" and "unjustify" does not apply
to logic?
>>What if I asked you to 'justify' your sensory perception?
>
>I might say that it is unjustified, and I simply accept it as foundational.
>Maybe I could justify it in terms of logic, but my acceptance of logic
>truths would not be justified.
A "sensory perception" is not a thing--in the sense that a
proposition is--that can be justified or unjustified. When
you see a tree, there is just you and the tree. There is no
new entity that comes into being that is the sensory perception.
There is nothing to justify here.
"I have a sensory perception of a tree" is just another way
of saying, "a tree is there and I see it." It is situations
like that that give the phrase meaning.
>I don't think so. Again going back to my understanding of justification,
>lots of things are justified *by* the rules of logic, or *by* the assumption
>that our senses allow us to percieve reality more or less directly. My
>position is that we can't have an infinite regress of justification, so all
>things must start with some unjustified foundation, but I don't see this as
>"cutting against me" as I don't think there is a problem with it.
Or, looking at it a the other way, "justification" does not apply
to everything, but this does not mean some things are "unjustified."
>I guess we have different models of knowledge, then. I don't think that things
>have to be justified all the way down to their cores to constitute "knowle
>dge."
>Knowledge, to me, would be something like true believes justifed *by*
>reason/logic.
This has been my line of thinking as of late.
>This goes back to my understanding of justification. So, even if
>our acceptance of the correctness of reason is unjustified, we can still have
>knowledge, as knowledge just means true beliefs justifed by reason.
For something to be justified, it must be possible for it to
be unjustified or justified. Since this is not possible for
reason, it makes no sense to call it unjustified (or justified),
or correct or incorrect.
>And I don't think the reason you call my position "self-defeating" is not
>nessesarily a flaw. Nothing that I say implies that my position isn't true(it
>implies I am not 100% certain that it is true), and nothing that I say
>contradicts my position. You may think that because of my views on
>justification I am saying knowledge is impossible (as you view knowledge), but
>your standards for knowledge -- that we have some sort of 'absolute
>justification', in our case due to some direct perception of truth -- is
>unnessesary and sort of whimsical, I think.
But this is just the nature of language. If you asked Owl what
he means by "direct awareness of the truth of logic" he may say
say something like: "I can't argue against logic without using
logic." That is all he means by direct awareness of the truth
here. (Although he probably disagrees!)
Someone in Sydney might say he was directly aware of Maurice
Green winning the Olympic 100-meter dash. If we asked him what
he means, he might say he saw the race in person and did not
watch it on TV.
There are several shades of meaning for the phrase "directly
aware." It is one of those phrases you have to ask "What do
you mean by that?" when doing philosophy. ("Does so-and-so
exist?" is another one.)
>Suppose we have a rat in a maze or something. This rat makes decisions in a
>logical way, on a basic level. Do you think the rat has sensations that allow
>him to determine that his thought of "I just went down that hallway, and there
>was no cheese there, therefore I should try another one, assuming the cheese
>isnt moving around" is not a direct perception of truth? Do you think in his
>head there are simultanious impressions in the rat's mind that make it cle
>ar to
>the rat that what its thought process is not a direct connection with truth?
>That wouldn't really make any sense from a evolutionary perspective. What
>would
>be selected for were rats that believed "reality is like this" with "this"
>being some true property of reality. There is an advantage for rats that r
>eally
>think their logical thoughts are true. Its not much different with humans,
> just
>much more complex.
Ahem. What would be selected are rats that ACTED in particular ways.
>You do you differentiate direct and indirect? What specificaly tells you that
>your logical intuitions are direct percpetions of truth rather than strong
>biological rpedispositions to certain beliefs?
I don't think logic is a thought or a belief. Logic is the
method by which we establish the truth of thoughts and beliefs.
And we can't be biologically predisposed to believe the Law
of Identity is true because it is not a belief, it is not
something that can be either true or false. It pretty much
defines was true is in regards to beliefs.
>There seems to be mixing up of my absense of belief of the 100% correctness of
>logic with a positive belief that logic is false, or something.
Logic is not something that can be correct or incorrect.
>My views on our logical impressions are similar to what I think are your views
>on the senses.
>
>I would not say that sense evidence gives us direct knowledge of the physical
>objects that we seem to see, because we can postulate BIV scenarious and such.
There is no entity that comes into being--a "sense evidence" that
"gives us knowledge." As you develop your language skills, you are
shown things like baseball bats, chairs, etc. and you are taught that
these things are physical objects. These very things you see and
handle constitute the meaning of the phrase "physical object." Having
knowledge of these things means you can use them in particular ways,
talk about them, etc. There are no additional entities--the "sense
evidence" entities--here. There is just you, baseball bats, chairs,
etc. Saying you have sense evidence is just a way of saying there are
objects and you see them.
That you can postulate a BIV scenario only shows you have acquired
knowledge of how your physical senses work. It doesn't follow from
this that there may be no physical objects or that we may have no
knowledge of them.
>In them, our sense impressions are side-effects of scientists prodding our
>brains and whatnot. You could still say we are directly aware of reality at
>some level, though, as the interaction between the scientists and our brain
>would be direct, but, the relationship between our senses and what we seem to
>sense I would call indirect.
We could say you are directly aware of the states in the simulator.
In fact, you are in an excellent position to observe the workings
of the simulator. I know I'd like to debug my programs by directly
wiring into them!
A brain living in a simulated world is not deceived, but merely
speaks a different language than you, even though the symbols
(the words) are identical. If you asked the brain what it meant
by "apple" it would refer to particular simulator states. The
BIV scenario doesn't show you that reality might be unreal,
or something like that, but that your language has meaning
in the world you live in.
>Even if you label it differently, I think you agree that BIV scenarios have a
>probability higher than 0. Yet I think you believe that, in fact, we aren't in
>a BIV scenario. Well, if I say logical intuitions are indirect in a similar
>way, then why is that so much more of a problem for you?
One situation in which you might assign the BIV scenario a
probability higher than zero is if you worked in a virtual reality
lab with practical jokers. But this doesn't show your knowledge of
virtual reality techniques, computers, practical jokes, etc. is
indirect.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/13/00 6:09 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <6c5fuscob2h8n034p...@4ax.com>
>
>I think everyone must then accept something
>>that is unjustified as a foundation, upon which other things can be said to
>>be justified or unjustified according to this. So, I think all beliefs have
>>this
>>property of being "unjustified" at their foundation. Maybe all beliefs have
>>something wrong with them, then.
>The laws of logic may not be
>justified, but that does not mean they are unjustified. It may be
>a mistake to apply the terms "justified" and "unjustified" to logic
>itself.
Right, that is basicaly my position. Justification is a logical concept, or at
least I use it synonnymously with 'logicaly/reasonably justified', though maybe
it is more general.
When I say something is unjustified, I don't mean not-justified, rather than
dis-justified, if that were a word.
>You said in another post that something that is not justified is
>unjustified. That could be like saying that something that is not
>hard is soft.
No, I am just using "un" as a sort of negation.
>Does it seem reasonable that "justify" and "unjustify" does not apply
>to logic?
>
Yep.
>>>What if I asked you to 'justify' your sensory perception?
>>
>>I might say that it is unjustified, and I simply accept it as foundational.
>>Maybe I could justify it in terms of logic, but my acceptance of logic
>>truths would not be justified.
>
>A "sensory perception" is not a thing--in the sense that a
>proposition is--that can be justified or unjustified.
I think the intended meaning was "Justify your belief in the truth of your
sense percpetions."
>When
>you see a tree, there is just you and the tree. There is no
>new entity that comes into being that is the sensory perception.
Well, the percpetion is a process that occurs. I don't know what it would mean
to call it "new."
>
>For something to be justified, it must be possible for it to
>be unjustified or justified. Since this is not possible for
>reason, it makes no sense to call it unjustified (or justified),
>or correct or incorrect.
I disagree with the last thing you say. If you simply mean logicaly correct or
incorrect, then that is fine. If you mean them more as being true, then I think
it does make sense to talk about whether or not the rules of logic are true.
When I used "correct" above I meant true rather than logicaly correct.
>But this is just the nature of language. If you asked Owl what
>he means by "direct awareness of the truth of logic" he may say
>say something like: "I can't argue against logic without using
>logic." That is all he means by direct awareness of the truth
>here. (Although he probably disagrees!)
I doubt that is what he means.
>There are several shades of meaning for the phrase "directly
>aware." It is one of those phrases you have to ask "What do
>you mean by that?" when doing philosophy. ("Does so-and-so
>exist?" is another one.)
>
Right, and I think Owl means that he is able to access facts about reality
directly, through the use of reason. "Directly" meaning that what he intuits
about logic facts is not simply an interpretation of something.
For instance, using language is not a direct way of communicating ideas, since
the language must be decoded. I can't implant my ideas into your mind, I have
to convert them to language, then you have to convert the language into ideas
of your own in order to understand what I say. This would be called indirect.
>>You do you differentiate direct and indirect? What specificaly tells you
>that
>>your logical intuitions are direct percpetions of truth rather than strong
>>biological rpedispositions to certain beliefs?
>
>I don't think logic is a thought or a belief.
The truth of logic is a belief, or a set of them, and that is what I was
talking about. For instance, A=A is a belief rather than a method. The process
of applying your logical beliefs is a method.
>And we can't be biologically predisposed to believe the Law
>of Identity is true because it is not a belief, it is not
>something that can be either true or false. It pretty much
>defines was true is in regards to beliefs.
I disagree that LEM is not a belief. It is foundational and the basis of most
of our other beliefs, but it still seems to be a belief. We could just have
different definitions of belief.
Since you like 'action' so much, we could say that X believes Y if X acts as if
Y is true, and then we could say A=A is a belief of X, since X acts according
to A=A being true.
>
>Logic is not something that can be correct or incorrect.
>
But, true or false? I think so. There are two different kinds of truth though,
at least. One is the formal type that is defined within systems and such. The
other refers to correspondance with reality. Logic can be true or false in the
second, I think. It could also be true or false in the 3rd if you had some
system by which to evaluate it.
>>I would not say that sense evidence gives us direct knowledge of the
>physical
>>objects that we seem to see, because we can postulate BIV scenarious and
>such.
>
>There is no entity that comes into being--a "sense evidence" that
>"gives us knowledge."
Sense evidence simply refers to data that I get through my senses. "Give" may
be an inprecise term. You could say "is," there.
>That you can postulate a BIV scenario only shows you have acquired
>knowledge of how your physical senses work.
Or, that you can postulate a possible scenario of how they might work.
>It doesn't follow from
>this that there may be no physical objects or that we may have no
>knowledge of them.
I'd agree, just that what we call physical objects may have whatever underlying
cause that you postulate.
>>In them, our sense impressions are side-effects of scientists prodding our
>>brains and whatnot. You could still say we are directly aware of reality at
>>some level, though, as the interaction between the scientists and our brain
>>would be direct, but, the relationship between our senses and what we seem
>to
>>sense I would call indirect.
>
>We could say you are directly aware of the states in the simulator.
I don't think so. Not the "states" in the simulator, but simply the information
that the simulator feeds you. If the simulator feeds you the experience of
being on a sandy beach, then you really don't know anything about the simulator
other than what it is simulating. The simulator could work in a million
different ways and you couldn't tell them apart, all you know is the data it
sends you.
>In fact, you are in an excellent position to observe the workings
>of the simulator. I know I'd like to debug my programs by directly
>wiring into them!
I don't think so, see above.
>A brain living in a simulated world is not deceived, but merely
>speaks a different language than you, even though the symbols
>(the words) are identical. If you asked the brain what it meant
>by "apple" it would refer to particular simulator states.
Well, it wouldn't know the details of the simulator, so I don't think it'd
refer to the simulator states, but rather the result of the states.
>The
>BIV scenario doesn't show you that reality might be unreal,
>or something like that, but that your language has meaning
>in the world you live in.
Or that there is some deeper cause for what you call reality.
>>Even if you label it differently, I think you agree that BIV scenarios have
>a
>>probability higher than 0. Yet I think you believe that, in fact, we aren't
>in
>>a BIV scenario. Well, if I say logical intuitions are indirect in a similar
>>way, then why is that so much more of a problem for you?
>
>One situation in which you might assign the BIV scenario a
>probability higher than zero is if you worked in a virtual reality
>lab with practical jokers.
Well, now I don't think the probability is any higher for those sorts of people
than for anyone else, as virtual reality is extremely crude. But, the
probability is higher than 0 for anyone.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/13/00 6:09 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>>For something to be justified, it must be possible for it to
>>be unjustified or justified. Since this is not possible for
>>reason, it makes no sense to call it unjustified (or justified),
>>or correct or incorrect.
>
>I disagree with the last thing you say. If you simply mean logicaly correct or
>incorrect, then that is fine. If you mean them more as being true, then I
>think
>it does make sense to talk about whether or not the rules of logic are true.
>When I used "correct" above I meant true rather than logicaly correct.
But isn't logic what defines what "true" and "false" mean? Isn't this
one of the purposes of the Law of Identity and Law of Contradiction?
If logic lays down the rules for true and false, then the rules
themselves are neither true nor false.
>>There are several shades of meaning for the phrase "directly
>>aware." It is one of those phrases you have to ask "What do
>>you mean by that?" when doing philosophy. ("Does so-and-so
>>exist?" is another one.)
>
>Right, and I think Owl means that he is able to access facts about reality
>directly, through the use of reason. "Directly" meaning that what he intuits
>about logic facts is not simply an interpretation of something.
>
>For instance, using language is not a direct way of communicating ideas, since
>the language must be decoded. I can't implant my ideas into your mind, I have
>to convert them to language, then you have to convert the language into ideas
>of your own in order to understand what I say. This would be called indirect.
Well, you know I disagree with your view on ideas. You make it sound
like ideas are a personal internal language that you have to translate
into English. There are two things here in this view, the "idea" and
the expression of the idea in language. My view is that there is just
one thing. Our language and the way we use it constitute ideas. The
terms "direct" and "indirect" don't really apply here. But sometimes
people use the word "direct" when talking epistemology to stress or
underline a point. I could say in my view language directly
communicates ideas. I am stressing that language and ideas are the
same thing. But that is misleading because it seems like
"indirectness" is a possibility here when it is not.
>>>You do you differentiate direct and indirect? What specificaly tells you
>>that
>>>your logical intuitions are direct percpetions of truth rather than strong
>>>biological rpedispositions to certain beliefs?
>>
>>I don't think logic is a thought or a belief.
>
>The truth of logic is a belief, or a set of them, and that is what I was
>talking about. For instance, A=A is a belief rather than a method. The process
>of applying your logical beliefs is a method.
If logic defines what is true and false, then it itself is neither
true nor false. A belief is a proposition one holds to be true. I
take that to mean you think the proposition is in accord with the LOI
and is not in contradiction with anything. So a belief presupposes
the laws of logic. The laws of logic then, as I see it, cannot be
beliefs because it makes no sense for them to presuppose themselves.
In other words, it makes no sense to try to step out of the system and
wonder if the LOI is true or not because the LOI is the rule for true,
right?
The laws, by the way, I would consider part of the method of logic.
>>And we can't be biologically predisposed to believe the Law
>>of Identity is true because it is not a belief, it is not
>>something that can be either true or false. It pretty much
>>defines was true is in regards to beliefs.
>
>I disagree that LEM is not a belief. It is foundational and the basis of most
>of our other beliefs, but it still seems to be a belief. We could just have
>different definitions of belief.
It is important not to equivocate and use a different definition of
belief when talking about the laws of logic.
>Since you like 'action' so much, we could say that X believes Y if X acts
>as if
>Y is true, and then we could say A=A is a belief of X, since X acts according
>to A=A being true.
It still seems to me that A=A is defining what true means.
>>Logic is not something that can be correct or incorrect.
>>
>
>But, true or false? I think so. There are two different kinds of truth though,
>at least. One is the formal type that is defined within systems and such. The
>other refers to correspondance with reality. Logic can be true or false in the
>second, I think. It could also be true or false in the 3rd if you had some
>system by which to evaluate it.
"Correspondence" is an interesting term because you make it sound like
logic is like a picture you hold in your hand that may or may not
match something in the world. I am not clear what you are comparing
here.
And again, "A=A" is another way of saying "correspondence", right?
>>We could say you are directly aware of the states in the simulator.
>
>I don't think so. Not the "states" in the simulator, but simply the inform
>ation
>that the simulator feeds you. If the simulator feeds you the experience of
>being on a sandy beach, then you really don't know anything about the simu
>lator
>other than what it is simulating. The simulator could work in a million
>different ways and you couldn't tell them apart, all you know is the data it
>sends you.
What the BIV calls the sandy beach is what you and the evil scientists
call the states of the simulator. And when the BIV describes the
temperature of the sand, the color of the water, the people on the
beach, the clouds in the sky, he is describing the states of the
simulator. He does not describe them the same way the scientists do
but that is only because he is working in a different framework. In
fact, one could make a good case that the BIV patient observes these
states more directly than the scientists who only see 0s and 1s.
Plus, the entire brain and nervous system is dedicated to observing
the simulator. That is quite a bit of attention devoted to one
computer system.
If you take the view that the BIV patient speaks a different language,
then the problems of the BIV go away. Ask the BIV to point out what
"sand" means and he will show you one set of simulator states. Ask
the BIV what computers are and he will show you a different set. In
his language--in his world--sand is not computer states. If you ask
him what deception or an illusion is he will show you yet other
simulator states. What he shows you is what he means by those terms.
He is not being deceived in his world. If you say he is deceived it
is only because you are relating his words to your world. But this
means, of course, that you are not a BIV, or at least, that the BIV is
not an epistemological problem for you.
>>A brain living in a simulated world is not deceived, but merely
>>speaks a different language than you, even though the symbols
>>(the words) are identical. If you asked the brain what it meant
>>by "apple" it would refer to particular simulator states.
>
>Well, it wouldn't know the details of the simulator, so I don't think it'd
>refer to the simulator states, but rather the result of the states.
There is no new thing--the "result" that comes into being here. There
is just the brain and the simulator states.
>>The
>>BIV scenario doesn't show you that reality might be unreal,
>>or something like that, but that your language has meaning
>>in the world you live in.
>
>Or that there is some deeper cause for what you call reality.
Skeptics always think this disqualifies knowledge, but this is the
basis of the whole process of learning. We continually learn that
reality is "deeper" than we once thought. That is progress, not
failure.
>>One situation in which you might assign the BIV scenario a
>>probability higher than zero is if you worked in a virtual reality
>>lab with practical jokers.
>
>Well, now I don't think the probability is any higher for those sorts of p
>eople
>than for anyone else, as virtual reality is extremely crude. But, the
>probability is higher than 0 for anyone.
What evidence do you need to calculate this probability and how did
you find out the evidence?
--
Joe Durnavich
Owl
A few more points. First: I said a couple of times that you had given no
reasons for your theories of logic and morality, so let me elaborate on
that. What you've said included:
- that moral realism and 'logical realism' (let's use that term for my
view of logical knowledge) are whimsical, you can't see how they could be
true, and suchlike. This might be a reason for you to not accept them --
the reason seems to come down to your having the intuition that they're
false. But it's no reason for me or the other moral and logical realists
to reject moral and logical realism, since we don't share your intuition.
- that moral realism makes people special. But this, again, is no reason
for thinking it isn't true. That would be a fallacy, the Appeal to
Humility, just as bad as the fallacy of Appeal to Arrogance.
- you elaborated the first point thus:
> When I say "X is whimsical" it can be interpreted as shorthard for "X is
> whimsical assuming physical reality exists and the rules of logic are
true,
> etc." In other words, according to other beliefs, X is whimsical.
This doesn't tell me what "whimsical" means, however. I assume it means
"improbable." So far, however, you haven't shown how moral realism is
improbable relative to the belief in physical reality. How does the fact
that there is a physical world support the proposition that there aren't
objective moral values? It seems like another non sequitur.
- you said we could explain why people have moral beliefs without assuming
there are moral facts. Maybe we could -- although it would be fair to
point out that you haven't actually given that explanation. To do so, you
would have to show how the theory of evolution predicts the specific
content of the moral beliefs I have. So far, it seems that we have only
your expression of confidence that this could be done.
In addition, since moral realism also explains why people have moral
beliefs, it is so far unclear why you think your explanation *better*.
- you also at one point said we lacked evidence in favor of moral realism.
Again, this isn't a reason in favor of your alternative theory, unless we
*do* have some positive evidence in favor of your theory, which we so far
haven't seen.
- lastly, you said moral realism introduces more kinds of facts than
physicalism. That is obviously true, but so what? The intuitionist knows
he's saying there's another sort of fact that isn't physical. Is that
supposed to convince him that he's wrong?
(Let me know, of course, if I've forgotten any major points.)
So far, then, it seems to me that everything rests upon your intuition
that moral realism is false. And I don't see why that should be given
more weight than my and Wrathbone's intuition that one shouldn't torture
people just for fun.
Second: Concerning your belief that all belief systems are unjustified:
> Right, at its foundation all of my beliefs are "unjustified", as are
everyones,
> as I don't think we can have an infinite regress of justification, and
don't
> know what "justification" means just by itsself.
This is really a sort of bizarre inversion here, though it's hardly unique
to you. Inference is a method of transmitting justification from one
proposition (more evident, more directly known) to another. The whole
reason it exists is to expand our knowledge. The bizarre inversion in our
intellectual culture is that the concept of inference is used to exclude
our having any knowledge at all, to say that we never knew the starting
premises because they weren't inferred. (Of course, in your case, it's "we
know it, even though it's unjustified," which just adds paradox to the
inversion.) It's sort of like a person who gets a horse so he can ride it
into town, and then when someone tries to give him a car, he refuses it
because it would scare the horse.
Be that as it may, do you see any difference between the following
propositions, taken as starting beliefs:
A: Physical reality exists.
B: There is a purple unicorn on Venus.
You already said that A was unjustified, but you accept it anyway. B, I
assume you will agree, is also unjustified. Suppose someone just accepts
B, just as you accept A, and proceeds to deduce consequences from it.
Anything wrong with that? Is your belief system somehow better than his?
In other words, when you said (A) was 'unjustified,' did you mean it's
just as arbitrary as (B)?
> When I say "X is whimsical" it can be interpreted as shorthard for "X is
> whimsical assuming physical reality exists and the rules of logic are
true,
> etc." In other words, according to other beliefs, X is whimsical.
Similarly, suppose someone starts with
C: God exists, and the Bible is His word.
as the basis of his belief system. He then says that your belief system is
extremely whimsical. It is whimsical relative to assumption C. This
would not seem to be a very powerful critique of your belief system, but
of course, it is exactly parallel to your critique of moral realism
(except, perhaps, that his critique is better, because C really does
entail that many of your beliefs are false). So is your critique of moral
realism any better than this Christian's critique of your beliefs?
Suppose that you answered my last four questions, "no, no, yes, no." In
that case, I don't know what point you would see in philosophical
discussion. Since all beliefs would be completely arbitrary no matter what
you do, I don't see what the point is supposed to be. There's no reason
to think that what we're doing would get us to the truth. If all you're
saying is, "Well, I've made certain random assumptions that disconfirm
your theory," I don't see why I'm supposed to care. I may just say that
I've made another set of random assumptions that entail that my theory is
true, and according to you, there'd be nothing wrong with that (or anyway,
nothing any worse than what you've done).
Now, I think this is really a fundamental issue. Because if you can't
accept that *anything* is any more reasonable to believe than anything
else -- well, then *of course* you're not going to accept moral realism.
Of course, I think that's ridiculous, and I think that if the only way to
attack my *meta-ethical* theory is to give some sort of *global*
skepticical argument that undermines all rational belief whatsoever, then
that would really be more of a confirmation of the theory than a serious
reason to doubt it.
Third: concerning biases in philosophical beliefs. I also said that you
seemed to be almost exclusively worried about biases realists might have,
and not at all about biases anti-realists might have.
a)
To begin with, it is far from clear that one gets the sort of payoff from
being a moral realist that you posit. The belief that morality is
objective need not lead to the belief that the believer, himself, is good
or 'special'. Indeed, quite the opposite might be the case. Depending on
the content of the moral beliefs, it very well might be (and often is) the
case that the person winds up thinking he, himself, is not a very good
person. (Though I, of course, am really good. ;)
b)
Second, as Prichard points out (and you yourself, I seem to recall, also
mentioned), many of our moral obligations are rather irksome and can
interfere with getting what we want (again, depending on what moral
beliefs you have -- obviously, this wouldn't happen if you're an ethical
egoist, but most people are not such). We obviously have a motive, then,
for denying that moral obligations really exist. "Just become a moral
skeptic, and you can do whatever you want!" the anti-realist seems to
beckon.
As a more small-scale instance of this motivation, by the way,
consider the question: "Why do Objectivists, and many others, think that
it is morally ok to cause severe pain and death to other animals, for the
sake of entertainment, as long as those animals lack abstract reasoning
abilities?" Is it because there really is nothing wrong with it? Or is it
because they don't want to believe that they have been committing enormous
wrongs? Or don't want to stop eating hamburgers? Surely that's a strong
motivation. I'll bet that if people were natural herbivores, and some
philosopher raised the hypothetical question of whether it would be ok to
eat animals, just for fun, if we could and wanted to, almost everyone
would say no.
On a larger scale, life gets even easier if you deny that you have any
obligations at all.
c)
Political correctness: You may not think you, yourself, are a great
partisan of political correctness. Nevertheless, I submit that moral
realism, today, is politically incorrect.
This is part of a larger trend in our society. *Egalitarianism* is
perhaps the greatest ideological force in our culture. (This arises
because of the nature of democracy, but I won't go into that.) This
egalitarianism is tied together with political correctness, which is tied
up with the at-all-costs effort to avoid giving offense to anyone, or
hurting anyone's feelings. For example, people will get very angry if you
say that Western culture has produced almost all the intellectual advances
in history, and the other cultures got almost all their present scientific
knowledge from us. They will regard it as wrong to say that (they also
think that there's no such thing as wrongness, of course -- but they will
be very offended), regardless of its objective truth, because you would
then be implying that one culture was better than another. You can
probably fill in, on your own, numerous further examples of how
egalitarianism/political correctness is a force for incredible
self-deception.
The general upshot of the PC/intellectual egalitarian movement is
this: Nothing is better than anything else. It's morally wrong to think
that some people are better than others, or some ways of life, or some
beliefs (this is where you get the relativism about truth), or some
cultures. (The problem with saying
it's morally wrong to make moral judgements is pretty apparent, but that's
not our point right now.) If we said there were objective values, then
(i) we'd have to be saying that other people & cultures with different
values are wrong (which might hurt their feelings), and (ii) even worse,
we'd have to say that some people were morally worse than others, since
presumably not everyone would be satisfying the moral standards equally
well (which would *really* hurt people's feelings).
Moral relativism, skepticism, and non-cognitivism have their roots, in
large part, in the cultural relativism that has dominated our culture for
the last few decades, which is originally an effort to avoid being
'chauvinist' and saying we're right and other cultures are wrong. Needless
to say, I think there is no serious intellectual motivation behind any of
this.
d)
Most people believe what the rest of their culture seems to be telling
them. If it's part of your culture that Jesus died on the Cross to save us
from our sins, then you'll almost certainly believe that. If it's part of
your culture that everything is 'subjective,' then you'll probably believe
that too. (Granted, this one is more absurd than the Jesus belief, but not
by much.) Still more so, of course, if your culture says that morality is
'subjective'. (Why do you think there are people who think "truth is
relative"?)
Thus, once the culture of subjectivism gets established, you get lots
of people signing on to it who wouldn't have accepted its original
motivations. You may not think you're one of those people, but don't be
too sure. Just having an immediate sense of "How could that be?" is
symptomatic of cultural brainwashing (unfortunately, it's also symptomatic
of foundational knowledge, so it's tough to tell the difference!)
There is at least as much reason to think that the anti-realist is moved
by bias as the realist.
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/14/00 10:04 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <16tguskkopdnm8bjd...@4ax.com>
>
>>
>>>For something to be justified, it must be possible for it to
>>>be unjustified or justified. Since this is not possible for
>>>reason, it makes no sense to call it unjustified (or justified),
>>>or correct or incorrect.
>>
>>I disagree with the last thing you say. If you simply mean logicaly correct
>or
>>incorrect, then that is fine. If you mean them more as being true, then I
>>think
>>it does make sense to talk about whether or not the rules of logic are true.
>>When I used "correct" above I meant true rather than logicaly correct.
>
>But isn't logic what defines what "true" and "false" mean? Isn't this
>one of the purposes of the Law of Identity and Law of Contradiction?
>If logic lays down the rules for true and false, then the rules
>themselves are neither true nor false.
There are at least two kinds of true. One of them often is an attempt to model
the other. One kind simply means 'the way reality is', the other is the kind
that is defined within, for instance, logical systems.
>>For instance, using language is not a direct way of communicating ideas,
>since
>>the language must be decoded. I can't implant my ideas into your mind, I
>have
>>to convert them to language, then you have to convert the language into
>ideas
>>of your own in order to understand what I say. This would be called
>indirect.
>
>Well, you know I disagree with your view on ideas. You make it sound
>like ideas are a personal internal language that you have to translate
>into English. There are two things here in this view, the "idea" and
>the expression of the idea in language. My view is that there is just
>one thing. Our language and the way we use it constitute ideas. The
>terms "direct" and "indirect" don't really apply here. But sometimes
>people use the word "direct" when talking epistemology to stress or
>underline a point. I could say in my view language directly
>communicates ideas. I am stressing that language and ideas are the
>same thing. But that is misleading because it seems like
>"indirectness" is a possibility here when it is not.
See my recent post to owl about directness, in the evolutionary psychology
thread.
Anything that you percieve is by definition direct. Anything that you must
infer from your perception is indirect. In the case of language, the only thing
you directly percieve are sounds(in the spoken case). You then utilize a
(mostly automatic) process of translating these sounds into something that has
meaning for you. Your arriving at their meaning is not some sort of direct
perception, since all you directly percieved was the sound.
>>>>You do you differentiate direct and indirect? What specificaly tells you
>>>that
>>>>your logical intuitions are direct percpetions of truth rather than strong
>>>>biological rpedispositions to certain beliefs?
>>>
>>>I don't think logic is a thought or a belief.
>>
>>The truth of logic is a belief, or a set of them, and that is what I was
>>talking about. For instance, A=A is a belief rather than a method. The
>process
>>of applying your logical beliefs is a method.
>
>If logic defines what is true and false,
It defined one type of true or false, not all.
>
>In other words, it makes no sense to try to step out of the system and
>wonder if the LOI is true or not because the LOI is the rule for true,
>right?
It makes no sense if you are talking about defined truth. It makes sense if you
are talking about what is real. Actualy you could evaluate statements of
defined truth in the first sense with another system of defined truth.
>
>>>And we can't be biologically predisposed to believe the Law
>>>of Identity is true because it is not a belief, it is not
>>>something that can be either true or false. It pretty much
>>>defines was true is in regards to beliefs.
>>
>>I disagree that LEM is not a belief. It is foundational and the basis of
>most
>>of our other beliefs, but it still seems to be a belief. We could just have
>>different definitions of belief.
>
>It is important not to equivocate and use a different definition of
>belief when talking about the laws of logic.
Right, so the one I propose here shall be our official one, unless there are
valid objections.
>>Since you like 'action' so much, we could say that X believes Y if X acts
>>as if
>>Y is true, and then we could say A=A is a belief of X, since X acts
>according
>>to A=A being true.
>
>It still seems to me that A=A is defining what true means.
One type.
>>>Logic is not something that can be correct or incorrect.
>>>
>>
>>But, true or false? I think so. There are two different kinds of truth
>though,
>>at least. One is the formal type that is defined within systems and such.
>The
>>other refers to correspondance with reality. Logic can be true or false in
>the
>>second, I think. It could also be true or false in the 3rd if you had some
>>system by which to evaluate it.
>
>"Correspondence" is an interesting term because you make it sound like
>logic is like a picture you hold in your hand that may or may not
>match something in the world. I am not clear what you are comparing
>here.
Not quite a picture, a system of rules. Another thing that needs to be
specified is the depth that you refer to when you say "true", see my posts to
G. Sollars and Owl in the Evolutionary Psychology thread.
>And again, "A=A" is another way of saying "correspondence", right?
It is another way of saying that in your logical system A corresponds to
itsself, and possibly asserting that this is also a property of reality.
However whether or not it really is a property of reality (again, dependant on
how "deep" you refer to when you say "reality.") is what I mean by
correspondence here.
>>>We could say you are directly aware of the states in the simulator.
>>
>>I don't think so. Not the "states" in the simulator, but simply the inform
>>ation
>>that the simulator feeds you. If the simulator feeds you the experience of
>>being on a sandy beach, then you really don't know anything about the simu
>>lator
>>other than what it is simulating. The simulator could work in a million
>>different ways and you couldn't tell them apart, all you know is the data it
>>sends you.
>
>What the BIV calls the sandy beach is what you and the evil scientists
>call the states of the simulator.
Not exactly. You fail to distinguish between the states and the effect of the
states.
And when the BIV describes the
>temperature of the sand, the color of the water, the people on the
>beach, the clouds in the sky, he is describing the states of the
>simulator. He does not describe them the same way the scientists do
>but that is only because he is working in a different framework. In
>fact, one could make a good case that the BIV patient observes these
>states more directly
He observes what he refers to as "the beach" more directly. He does not observe
the machine states directly. Different things, though one gives rise to the
other.
than the scientists who only see 0s and 1s.
>Plus, the entire brain and nervous system is dedicated to observing
>the simulator.
Not to observing the simulator, to "observing" the impressions that the
simulator gives it.
That is quite a bit of attention devoted to one
>computer system.
>
>If you take the view that the BIV patient speaks a different language,
>then the problems of the BIV go away. Ask the BIV to point out what
>"sand" means and he will show you one set of simulator states.
No, he doesn't know he's in a simulator, so he can't show you the states
themselves. He'll show you something that simulator states produce.
>
>>>A brain living in a simulated world is not deceived, but merely
>>>speaks a different language than you, even though the symbols
>>>(the words) are identical. If you asked the brain what it meant
>>>by "apple" it would refer to particular simulator states.
>>
>>Well, it wouldn't know the details of the simulator, so I don't think it'd
>>refer to the simulator states, but rather the result of the states.
>
>There is no new thing--the "result" that comes into being here. There
>is just the brain and the simulator states.
Maybe you aren't familiar with the scenario. There is a simulator that
stimulates the brain in various ways. Suppose it uses electricity, and there
are little probes that hook up to the brain that the simulator uses to transmit
these sensations. The internal states of the simulator are not identical with
the data that it transmits to the brain through the probes. For instance,
suppose the simulator is performing some calculation. No data about this
calculation need be sent to the brain.
>>>One situation in which you might assign the BIV scenario a
>>>probability higher than zero is if you worked in a virtual reality
>>>lab with practical jokers.
>>
>>Well, now I don't think the probability is any higher for those sorts of p
>>eople
>>than for anyone else, as virtual reality is extremely crude. But, the
>>probability is higher than 0 for anyone.
>
>What evidence do you need to calculate this probability and how did
>you find out the evidence?
The reason for the > 0 probability is that it is logicaly possible. If it were
the case my experience would be no different than it is right now, and there
would be no contradiction, etc. All things matching that description have a > 0
probability. It may be that the non-contradiction clause is not nessesary,
though.
It is probable for the same reason that you cannot claim 100% certainty that
there is not an invisible unicorn floating above your head.
I can't think of anything off the top of my head that has a probability of
either 0 or 1.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/14/00 10:04 AM Central Daylight Time
>>
>>But isn't logic what defines what "true" and "false" mean? Isn't this
>>one of the purposes of the Law of Identity and Law of Contradiction?
>>If logic lays down the rules for true and false, then the rules
>>themselves are neither true nor false.
>
>There are at least two kinds of true. One of them often is an attempt to model
>the other. One kind simply means 'the way reality is', the other is the kind
>that is defined within, for instance, logical systems.
So, are you trying to find out if logic is synthetically true? Would
running experiments help here? Note that you couldn't interpret the
results of the experiments without resorting to the use of logic.
>Anything that you percieve is by definition direct. Anything that you must
>infer from your perception is indirect.
This sounds good to me. A mechanic might infer that the exhaust
valves are bad in my car from the sounds he hears from the engine and
the vacuum pressures he measures. He can also inspect the valves and
see the fault directly.
>In the case of language, the only thing
>you directly percieve are sounds(in the spoken case). You then utilize a
>(mostly automatic) process of translating these sounds into something that has
>meaning for you. Your arriving at their meaning is not some sort of direct
>perception, since all you directly percieved was the sound.
In this view, sounds themselves are baffling to me, but once I
translate them into another form, they are perfectly understandable.
Translation is a process of converting from one form to another. For
example, I can translate a phrase in English to one in Spanish by
finding the English phrase in a table and then writing down the
corresponding phrase in Spanish. I can translate cartesian
coordinates into polar coordinates by applying a formula. When I
listen to and understand speech, I don't "translate" the sounds into
meanings. A "meaning" is not an entity inside me like the Spanish
phrase. It is not a special language that I internally understand.
I have learned to understand the sounds themselves. I have learned to
apply these sounds in particular ways. Therein lies the meaning.
There is not a second entity--the meaning or something that has
meaning--that is like a shadow of the sound, the sound in a different,
and now understandable form. I work with just the sounds themselves.
The terms "direct" and "indirect" don't apply here.
>>"Correspondence" is an interesting term because you make it sound like
>>logic is like a picture you hold in your hand that may or may not
>>match something in the world. I am not clear what you are comparing
>>here.
>
>Not quite a picture, a system of rules. Another thing that needs to be
>specified is the depth that you refer to when you say "true", see my posts to
>G. Sollars and Owl in the Evolutionary Psychology thread.
It sounds like you are tangled deep in metaphor. You seem to have a
picture in mind where logic is the foundation of the building and you
are wondering what is holding the foundation up. I think this just
shows the metaphor has reached its limit of usefulness.
What are the "system of rules" and what must they correspond to in the
world? If the rules are just ink markings on a paper, then the only
thing that will correspond to them is a photocopy of that paper.
>>And again, "A=A" is another way of saying "correspondence", right?
>
>It is another way of saying that in your logical system A corresponds to
>itsself, and possibly asserting that this is also a property of reality.
>However whether or not it really is a property of reality (again, dependant on
>how "deep" you refer to when you say "reality.") is what I mean by
>correspondence here.
My coffee cup has the properties: Cylindrical. A handle. Black with
gold trim. I don't think "Identity" is a property of it. I believe
the O'ist say that Identity means the cup exists and has the
properties it has.
>>What the BIV calls the sandy beach is what you and the evil scientists
>>call the states of the simulator.
>
>Not exactly. You fail to distinguish between the states and the effect of the
>states.
I disagree that there is a new entity that comes into being here that
is the "effect" of the states. I assume you are suggesting some image
or impression forms before the BIV's Mind's Eye.
You will only begin to understand perception once you stop looking for
these "effects," "results," and "products." There are no such things.
There is just the brain and the simulator.
> And when the BIV describes the
>>temperature of the sand, the color of the water, the people on the
>>beach, the clouds in the sky, he is describing the states of the
>>simulator. He does not describe them the same way the scientists do
>>but that is only because he is working in a different framework. In
>>fact, one could make a good case that the BIV patient observes these
>>states more directly
>
>He observes what he refers to as "the beach" more directly. He does not ob
>serve
>the machine states directly. Different things, though one gives rise to the
>other.
Notice that you have to have knowledge of reality to support your BIV
argument. You have to know what machine states are and what beaches
are and know what the differences are. My thought is that if you have
these things worked out, then the BIV argument is not the problem for
you that you suggest it is.
> than the scientists who only see 0s and 1s.
>>Plus, the entire brain and nervous system is dedicated to observing
>>the simulator.
>
>Not to observing the simulator, to "observing" the impressions that the
>simulator gives it.
Again, there is no "impression" that the brain observes. The brain
observes features of its world just like you do. It gives names to
the features it discriminates just like you do. It notices patterns
and forms beliefs and theories just like you do. It supports its
beliefs by marshaling evidence just like you do.
> That is quite a bit of attention devoted to one
>>computer system.
>>
>>If you take the view that the BIV patient speaks a different language,
>>then the problems of the BIV go away. Ask the BIV to point out what
>>"sand" means and he will show you one set of simulator states.
>
>No, he doesn't know he's in a simulator, so he can't show you the states
>themselves. He'll show you something that simulator states produce.
There is no new entity that comes into being here--"something that
simulator states produce" that is separate and distinct from the
simulator and that the BIV can point to.
There are two frameworks here his and yours. If I ask you to show me
what a simulator is, you might point to your computer. If I ask the
BIV what a simulator is, he will point to a particular simulator state
because that is what simulators are in his language. If simulators
are particular things you point to, then the BIV has the right to call
things he points to simulators. If you want to understand the BIV,
then you need to make the effort to learn his language. If the BIV
said, "The Sun is rising in the east" then in his language he is
describing real features of his world. There are real things in
happending in the simulator that the BIV language "Sun rising in east"
correctly describes.
You suggest that there can be only one meaning for the word
"simulator." You think the meanings of words are absolutes that only
you the skeptic know. Notice that the BIV argument is no problem for
you. You know what simulators are and how they differ from beaches,
yet the intent of the argument is to show that you know nothing.
>>>Well, now I don't think the probability is any higher for those sorts of p
>>>eople
>>>than for anyone else, as virtual reality is extremely crude. But, the
>>>probability is higher than 0 for anyone.
>>
>>What evidence do you need to calculate this probability and how did
>>you find out the evidence?
>
>The reason for the > 0 probability is that it is logicaly possible. If it were
>the case my experience would be no different than it is right now, and there
>would be no contradiction, etc. All things matching that description have
>a > 0
>probability. It may be that the non-contradiction clause is not nessesary,
>though.
You need evidence to conclude that "my experience would be no
different than it is right now." You have to prove that you have
senses and these senses can be fooled in such a way.
>It is probable for the same reason that you cannot claim 100% certainty that
>there is not an invisible unicorn floating above your head.
But this is just the Argument from Ignorance fallacy.
It is amazing to me that you suggest that observation and reason may
not lead to sound conclusions, but that making arbitrary statements
can.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/15/00 2:15 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <b00kusg2q9uc853u6...@4ax.com>
>>There are at least two kinds of true. One of them often is an attempt to
>model
>>the other. One kind simply means 'the way reality is', the other is the kind
>>that is defined within, for instance, logical systems.
>
>So, are you trying to find out if logic is synthetically true? Would
>running experiments help here? Note that you couldn't interpret the
>results of the experiments without resorting to the use of logic.
I would not run experiments. The method is, I think, to show that it is not
logicaly nessesary that logical truth corresponds to reality. Or, to note that
there are no sound arguments showing that logic is nessesarily true, in the
non-defined sense.
>>In the case of language, the only thing
>>you directly percieve are sounds(in the spoken case). You then utilize a
>>(mostly automatic) process of translating these sounds into something that
>has
>>meaning for you. Your arriving at their meaning is not some sort of direct
>>perception, since all you directly percieved was the sound.
>
>In this view, sounds themselves are baffling to me, but once I
>translate them into another form, they are perfectly understandable.
No, no one said sounds were baffeling to you. They'd have to remain
uninterpreted long enough to be baffling, which they generaly don't do because
you almost can't help but to interpret them, the process is pretty automatic.
> I can translate a phrase in English to one in Spanish by
>finding the English phrase in a table and then writing down the
>corresponding phrase in Spanish. I can translate cartesian
>coordinates into polar coordinates by applying a formula. When I
>listen to and understand speech, I don't "translate" the sounds into
>meanings.
Yes, you do. It isn't as explicit as in your examples, though. Your brain
mainly translates automaticaly, since you are fairly good at listening to
english, I presume.
If, as you say, there was absolutely no translation of words into their
meaning, and meaning was just being conveyed directly to you whenever someone
spoke to you, then we wouldn't need language, as we know it now. There would be
no barrier in trying to communicate with a spanish person, since it is not his
ideas that you don't understand, but his language.
>I have learned to understand the sounds themselves. I have learned to
>apply these sounds in particular ways.
What you mean is that you are good at translating so fast and with such little
effort that you don't think about it anymore. It becomes automatic.
>Therein lies the meaning.
>There is not a second entity--the meaning or something that has
>meaning--that is like a shadow of the sound,
This is really amusing, you try to turn every discussion into the same general
theme. Your opponent is always talking about "shadows" and "hidden things",
etc. The fact is, if sound was no different from meaning then everyone would
understand all languages, provided that they were capable of understanding the
meaning of what the other person was saying.
>My coffee cup has the properties: Cylindrical. A handle. Black with
>gold trim. I don't think "Identity" is a property of it.
Your phrase it sort of odd, and that may be your problem. If you don't think
the cup is what it is, then maybe you can object and say that logic does not
correspond to reality.
>>Not exactly. You fail to distinguish between the states and the effect of
>the
>>states.
>
>I disagree that there is a new entity that comes into being here that
>is the "effect" of the states.
Not nessesarily "new", just different from what is referred to by 'the machine
state' although it doesn't have to be completely seperate.
>You will only begin to understand perception once you stop looking for
>these "effects," "results," and "products." There are no such things.
>There is just the brain and the simulator.
I guess you don't think computational processes exist either?
>Notice that you have to have knowledge of reality to support your BIV
>argument. You have to know what machine states are and what beaches
>are and know what the differences are. My thought is that if you have
>these things worked out, then the BIV argument is not the problem for
>you that you suggest it is.
>
I don't know why you think the BIV argument is a problem for me.
>>Not to observing the simulator, to "observing" the impressions that the
>>simulator gives it.
>
>Again, there is no "impression" that the brain observes. The brain
>observes features of its world just like you do.
And these features are fed to it by the machine, but are not identical to the
state of the machine. I don't know why this is hard to understand. I gave an
example before. Suppose that you lock someone in a chamber in your basement,
and occasionaly throw rocks in through a hole at the top of the chamber. Their
'experience' is the rocks coming in, and this is not identical to the "state of
Joe".
Do you not understand how they'd experience rocks being flung at them rather
than your internal state?
>There are two frameworks here his and yours. If I ask you to show me
>what a simulator is, you might point to your computer. If I ask the
>BIV what a simulator is, he will point to a particular simulator state
>because that is what simulators are in his language.
Your main idea is correct in a more general sense, but you seem to have
interpreted it incorrectly and are now going around applying it wrong to all
sorts of things. The thing that it is good that you realize is that, for
instance, if you are a brain in a vat, it doesn't somehow make trees "not
exist", since a tree is simply defined, from your percpetive, to be whatever it
is that you experience as a tree. However you are off base on your failure to
distinguish between experience and cause of experience, as shown above.
>
>>It is probable for the same reason that you cannot claim 100% certainty that
>>there is not an invisible unicorn floating above your head.
>
>But this is just the Argument from Ignorance fallacy.
No, you must be misinterpreting me. I am not saying that this unicorn exists
because we have no evidence that it doesn't. The claim is that the probability
is not 0 that it exists, there is no fallacy there.
>It is amazing to me that you suggest that observation and reason may
>not lead to sound conclusions, but that making arbitrary statements
>can.
You are really making wild and innacurate statements now. When did I ever say
that making arbitrary statements can lead to sound conclusions?
-User