to the is-ought debaters
jposamen
everyone in the is-ought discussion, I thought it'd be best to post
again, just with a new subject header.
This is-ought discussion is not addressing Rand's argument. Too much
of this thread mistakenly focuses on reproduction or evolution.
Please read:
Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
What's wrong with this? I know of no organism that continues to live
without action or fuel.
She goes on to say that--the particular fuel or action of an organism
depends on what type of organism that thing is. You can't feed a cat
marbles and expect her to remain a living cat—wrong fuel. You
can't expect a parrot to fly into an airplane turbine and have him
live to talk about it—wrong action.
By this, all Rand meant was that a living thing has got to do what
it's got to do in order to stay that living thing. If it dies
reproducing, fine. Who cares? It stopped being what it is because it
didn't do what it needed to in order to continue being that thing.
For non-conscious (or hardwired or predispositioned) organisms, no
OUGHT is involved. Ought implies some sort of choice, but where the
“mechanical” organism is concerned, what it IS determines
what it MUST do TO STAY WHAT IT IS. No choice there. Rand viewed
animals as living machines, and who would disagree (given neutral
environment) that what a machine is determines what it's going to
do???
If an organism doesn't do what it MUST to stay that organism, then
it's not going to stay that organism. Such are the cases of the male
mantis or the deer caught in headlights. For these cases we would say
that if the animal is going to keep being that animal, then it must do
such and such.
Most of the evolution/reproduction arguments on this thread attack one
part of Rand's argument, which is clearly flawed: She says that
animals can't act as their own destroyers. Previous posts easily
persuade us of otherwise.
But so what? So preprogrammed animals can kill themselves. That's
not an important point of Rand's argument and certainly doesn't
contradict her--an organism must do what it must do to keep being that
organism.
Noting the self-destruction of organisms, the writers on this thread
then start talking about “ultimate value” and how it can't
be life, but rather reproductive success. Ultimate value of what?
This is a problem of distinguishing contexts. There are two contexts
in this discussion—evolution and life. If we are speaking of
evolution, then life is a means to that end (call that end
“ultimate value” if you want). Meaning, when we ask the
question, “what does it take to evolve?” We then answer
(in part), “life and its reproductive success.” But if we
are speaking of life, then fuel and action are the means to THAT end
(which you are also welcome to call “ultimate value” in
*this* context). Q: “What's it take to live?” A:
“fuel and action.”
In discussing ethics, we are discussing life, not evolution--how to
live, not how to evolve. The only reason Rand brought up any biology
was to say, “look what a living thing does in order to stay a
living thing. Hey! We're living things, we too have to do certain
things to keep living.” And she concluded that survival of an
organism (NOT A SPECIES) depends on fuel and action.
So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
what he must to be an animal? And extending that to humans, isn't it
fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human? Assuming
Free Will, the human's “MUST” turns into an
“OUGHT” so as to imply optional alternatives in her
action. Now what exactly we OUGHT do is still held in question. The
only thing Rand had established thus far in her argument was that we
ought to pursue the fuel and action proper to a human in order to
remain a living human.
At this point, she hadn't talked about which fuel or action a human
needs—that's an entirely different part of her argument.
Reponses?
*Jordan*
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
> what he must to be an animal? And extending that to humans, isn't it
> fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human?
Rand talks about constraints on an organism's staying /alive/. Rand's
critics have pointed out that an organism, in particular, a human, can
stay alive by doing all sorts of things that do not fit what Objectivist
ethics considers moral behavior. For example, Bill Clinton is alive. It
is not hard to argue that Clinton is a bad human, but something of a
stretch to claim that he has not stayed human. Is that what you are
claiming?
Please don't respond by saying that he is not "living as a human should".
That might be true, but not relevant to rebutting this objection to
Rand's argument, since he is still alive.
As it happens, I am quite sympathetic to the view that biological
constraints play an important role in morality, but Rand's use of them is
insufficient to get to her own ethics.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
jposamen
"Rand's critics have pointed out that an organism, in particular, a
human, can stay alive by doing all sorts of things that do not fit
what Objectivist ethics considers moral behavior."
I respond:
First off, the is-ought problem precedes Rand's actual ethics. It's
more the ante-room of her ethics. At this point, she hasn't said what
type of fuel and action a person ought to have, only that he or she
must have them to remain that person.
To take your example, Clinton is alive, so I'm sure Rand would
conclude that he has, at least to some extent, used the action and
fuel proper to a human. She does not say--if you use the wrong fuel
or action, then you're dead. But she would say that the wrong fuel
and action THREATENS one's life and thus is against life or anti-life.
Since life and death are jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive
concepts, folks go one step further than anti-life and say that the
wrong fuel and action fosters *death* (although I tend to avoid that
term, because "death" is usually taken to mean something else, and I
like to avoid confusion).
It's like putting bad gas in your car or making your dog eat
chocolate--It might not die immediately, but its condition is
worsened.
Have I addressed your inquiry?
David Tomlin
> Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
> action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
>
> What's wrong with this? I know of no organism that continues to live
> without action or fuel.
I have pointed out before that bacteria form resting spores to
survive harsh conditions.
There are a number of multi-celled animals that have similar
states of suspended animation, often for surviving seasonal
dryness or freezing. In these cases, however, I am not sure
that there is a cessation of even chemical activity, as there
is in the case of bacterial spores.
> She goes on to say that--the particular fuel or action of an organism
> depends on what type of organism that thing is. You can't feed a cat
> marbles and expect her to remain a living cat;wrong fuel.
Objectivists are a riot.
Yes, I'm sure that's the only reason 99% of America hasn't embraced
Objectivism. We just can't get it through our thick heads that cats
don't eat marbles. If only we could focus our consciousness sufficiently
to grasp that fact of reality, we would all see the light. We would
be chanting A is A, reading Mickey Spillane and trashing Shakespeare.
> In discussing ethics, we are discussing life, not evolution . . .
Rand began by raising fundamental questions like "what is ethics?"
and "what are values?" These are among the issues in dispute. You
can't resolve them by ex cathedra declarations.
> . . . how to
> live, not how to evolve.
You're equivocating between "how to live" and "how to stay alive."
If Rand had hit on that trick, TOE could have been much shorter.
> So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
> what he must to be an animal?
Of course not. Much of the argument has been on that very point,
which I thought you were maintaining to be irrelevant.
> And extending that to humans, isn't it
> fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human?
Same answer.
> The
> only thing Rand had established thus far in her argument was that we
> ought to pursue the fuel and action proper to a human in order to
> remain a living human.
How did she establish that?
David Tomlin
> Noting the self-destruction of organisms, the writers on this thread
> then start talking about "ultimate value" and how it can't
> be life, but rather reproductive success. Ultimate value of what?
I think Rand was clear on what she meant by "ultimate value."
"An _ultimate_ value is that final goal or end to which all
lesser goals are the means - and it sets the standard by which
all lesser goals are _evaluated_." (TOE)
Rand commented, in a footnote, on what she meant by the "goals"
of non-human organisms. "When applied to physical phenomena, such
as the automatic functions of an organism, the term 'goal-directed'
is not to be taken to mean 'purposive' (a concept applicable only
to the actions of a consciousness) and is not to imply the existence
of any teleological principle operating in insentient nature. I use
the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the fact
that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions whose
nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an organism's
life."
Huemer has pointed out that Rand opened the proverbial can of worms
with this little aside. (I suspect he isn't the only critic to have
noticed this.) Are we to say that the "goal" of lightning bolts is
to start forest fires? The nature of their action is such
as to achieve that result. But these problems do not bear directly
on our present discussion.
At this point is should be clear why the Darwinist criticism
of Rand is justified in claiming that "reproductive success"
is the "ultimate value" for organisms generally, as _Rand_
defined "ultimate value."
> This is a problem of distinguishing contexts. There are two contexts
> in this discussion - evolution and life. If we are speaking of
> evolution, then life is a means to that end (call that end
> "ultimate value" if you want).
Some New Agers might speak of life being a means to the end
of evolution. I doubt a single biologist would.
For an individual organism, the "final goal" that it is the
nature of its actions to result in, seems to be reproductive
success. It is not survival of the organism, as Rand thought.
Nor is it promoting evolution itself, or "the good of the
species." Those are popular misunderstandings.
Reproductive success is what corresponds to the "ultimate
value" for living organisms generally, as _Rand_ defined
"ultimate value." Critics point this out to correct her
error. We are not using the term arbitrarily, as you seem
to suggest.
But if we
> are speaking of life, then fuel and action are the means to THAT end
> (which you are also welcome to call "ultimate value" in
> *this* context).
Life, in the sense of "survival", is _not_ an ultimate value as
Rand defined "ultimate value."
Please don't resort to the hoary Objectivist tactic of using
"context" as a buzzword to avoid coming to grips with an issue.
If there is a wider context that is relevant, then identify it
and explain how it is relevant.
> At this point, she hadn't talked about which fuel or action a human
> needs - that's an entirely different part of her argument.
What's the point of this? It seems like a response to something, but
from the post I can't guess what it would be.
Atlas Shrugged
getting a lot of conversion errors (such as "cat—") because you are
sending text in HTML format.
Paul
jposamen
address my points...or maybe they might, but I'm not quite clear on
your responses.
Let's start with your last question: "How does Rand establish that we
ought to pursue the fuel and action proper to a human in order to
remain a living human?"
First, she observes that all organisms need fuel and the action to use
it properly in order to live. The bacterium that you mentioned are no
exception. You said it yourself--"they form spores to **survive**
harsh conditions." (astriks mine). Looks like an action to me, Dave.
And if you're concerned that organisms aren't actually burning off the
fuel they use, fear not--so long as they are using that fuel in a way
proper to an organism (such as going dormant), then they demonstrate
what Rand observed.
As for the cats and marbles example, I'm not trying to sell you (or
the other 99% of America)on Objectivism. Strange that you would think
I was. My example--although silly--just cited one case where improper
fuel leads to harm of an organism. I did not mean to solicit your
sarcasm.
Next, you wrote: "Rand began by raising fundamental questions like
'what is ethics?' and 'what are values?' These are among the issues in
dispute."
Yes, Rand began her discourse with those fundamental questions.
These, however, are meta-ethical issues, and again, say nothing of
what she thinks we ought to do (i.e., her ethics). She's only trying
to establish the meaning and nature of ethical terms, judgments, and
arguments here.
The particular questions you mentioned are NOT the issues in dispute.
this dialogue does not focus on terms such as "value" and
"ethics"--those are incidental. Instead, it focuses on the issue of
whether we can objectively form normative propositions. It deals with
the FORM of inquiry, not content. (you could say that we are
addressing the content of the form, but that gets a little muddled for
me). I would argue that we are (for the most part) discussing a
meta-ethical issue here, not an ethical one.
Onward, you wrote: "You're equivocating between 'how to live' and 'how
to stay alive.'"
I looked back at my posts and tried to find where I used each phrase,
but I could find only the latter. Perhaps you weren't citing a
particular quote of mine. Are you saying that 'how to live' refers to
'how people think we ought to live'--and 'how to stay alive' refers to
physical necessity? You've lost me with this one. It seems irrelevant
to this discussion anyway, but I'm still curious; please explain how I
am equivocating.
Dave, I believe you are mistaken to claim that this thread responds to
my question, which was: "Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
what he must to be an animal?"
Most of this thread has dealt with whether evolutionary facts
undermine Rand's argument. I maintain that the requirements for
evolution differ from the requirements of a life, and Rand's argument
is centered around a life, each life, and not evolution. Thus,
although it was interesting, most of this thread has been irrelevant
to the is-ought discussion. And further, my question addresses only
*one* component of Rand's is-ought argument. We've only scratched the
surface of her alleged facts and observations on human nature.
brendenden
jposamen <jpos...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>I posted this once but threaded it incorrectly. Since I'm addressing
>everyone in the is-ought discussion, I thought it'd be best to post
>again, just with a new subject header.
>
>This is-ought discussion is not addressing Rand's argument. Too much
>of this thread mistakenly focuses on reproduction or evolution.
>Please read:
>
>Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
>action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
I posit a third: A reciprocating organism as to replenish the fuel. To
specify "the action...so as to keep...alive": to transform energies as to be
returned by a symbiote (reciprocator). Thus, mutual relationships are
successful. For example, photosynthetic lifeforms concentrate energy from the
sun forming sugars and oxygen from water and carbon dioxide. Aerobic liforms,
like u n i, move about and do work (transformation of energy) to maintain our
ability to eat and breathe and turn that sugar and oxygen back into fuel for
photosynthesizers to replenish ourselves. Survival apparently is cyclical and
dependent on the existence of co-operative organisms.
>What's wrong with this? I know of no organism that continues to live
>without action or fuel.
This may be incomplete. I know an organism can not continue to live without
using fuel in actions directed at contributing to energy pathways in its
environment which ultimately result in replenishing fuel, without, of course,
introducing a homeostatic risk by maltering the environment. (mal alter,
pronounced like a soda malt-ering)
>She goes on to say that--the particular fuel or action of an organism
>depends on what type of organism that thing is.
>By this, Rand meant was that a living thing has got to do what
>it's got to do in order to stay that living thing.
Yes, an organism acts to procure fuel to progress.
>If it dies
>reproducing, fine. Who cares?
Organisms who feed on its metabolic products.
>It stopped being what it is because it
>didn't do what it needed to in order to continue being that thing.
Consider that life is a process of energetic transformation between at least
two types of organisms (to preserve equilibrium). Consider that energy and
matter in the universe fluctuate approaching physical stability. Living
matter (like us and the trees) who facilitate energy (our food gathering and
their beautifying our trade routes) to
catalyze
a chemical equilibrium (like CO2 + H20 + energy -> (CH2O)x + O2) with
enzymatically complex structures (mitochondria and chloroplasts). Otherwise
(when no life,) the reaction in our example moves extremely slowly. So an
aspect of life accelerates universal stability.
Your It stopped being because its presence somehow hindered total stability.
"What it needed to in order to continue being that thing" was ability to
contribute to the procurement of its fuel without disabling itself or
symbiotes from this job, while concurrently giving stability to the Earth.
Unstable Earth means the destruction of life, because taken simply as a ball
of matter/energy, there's no way to unsettle the whole scheme of things.
>For non-conscious (or hardwired or predispositioned) organisms, no
>OUGHT is involved. Ought implies some sort of choice, but where the
>mechanical organism is concerned, what it IS determines
>what it MUST do TO STAY WHAT IT IS.
The transition from being to choosing action comes when the routine energy
pathways are disrupted by external phenomena. When a lifeform can not do as
it must have done in the past to continue, new behaviour must arise to repair
the functioning of the equilibrium. This literally NEW process isn't yet. An
organism must spontaneously improvise. That humans evolved in a period of
rapid and extreme climatic shifts lends to this idea of an organism being
forced to respond without a "predispositioned" response leads to what ought to
be done. Other things had been done already, so they are or were. When they
can no longer be, to survive we ought to change our action. What it OUGHT
affects what it WILL do TO COPE WITH WHAT BECOMES. In altercation, choice
arises.
>No choice there. Rand viewed
>animals as living machines, and who would disagree (given neutral
>environment) that what a machine is determines what it's going to
>do???
>
I would. You ought to see that machines arent until we've got to do something
requiring force beyond our inherent ability, thus impelling our process of
invention. We encounter a task before a machine's built.
>So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
>what he must to be an animal? And extending that to humans, isn't it
>fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human? Assuming
>Free Will, the human's MUST turns into an
>OUGHT; so as to imply optional alternatives in her
>action. Now what exactly we OUGHT do is still held in question. The
>only thing Rand had established thus far in her argument was that we
>ought to pursue the fuel and action proper to a human in order to
>remain a living human.
When humanity evolved a free will (if we're assuming once in history humans
werent and then became,) our climate was extremely shifting, and our
developing free will (which continues to develop now even tho our economy has
developed ((dont confuse the progress of state with the progress of
humanity))) contributed to our survival by allowing the active perception and
analysis of _natural forces_ with the purpose of helping ourselves by their
manipulation. Our attention wandered from base actions of consuming fuel to
complex, social actions such as cultivation and climate construction (groups
in shelter leading to cities). We began putting our hands to matters in a non
instinctual way. Having developed complex means of communication, we could
_think_ of the course of events. We developed notions of gods (who always, no
matter what, represent some aspect of nature's flow or function) by
personifying aspects of our lives (eg. deities who uncertainly bring fertility
of land or destructive weather.) We developed notions of give and take,
balance, sacrifice, and appeasement between themselves and these fatal gods or
unavoidable circumstances. We created these notions using symbolic language.
_Thinking_ most characteristically as humans, we became conscious of the
cyclical patterns of nature and recognized the inherent virtue of symbiotic
relationship. Free will is like detachment from the cycle of life itself to
view it objectively. If in our thinking we ascertain potential risk to our
survival and recognize actions in our environment that OUGHT to help maintain
our relationship, we WILL invent and carry out a method to adapt ourselves or
our environment.
>At this point, she hadn't talked about which fuel or action a human
>needs; that's an entirely different part of her argument.
>
>Reponses?
I think we have to rethink everything we do. Not to say we must. But in the
foreseeable future, we must encounter the unknown. I think to ease or
actualize the potentiality of my transition into the future. You ought to
consider survival too. Trying randomly with what exists is no longer enough.
We need to keep evolving because things continue to move. Remember evolution
isn't a one-step progression. We continue to gain free will. We're not
completely the masters of our domain. We ought to make transition from what
has been talked about to an entirely different part of this argument.
Brendenden
John Alway
07e1b01...@mail.nji.com>...
> In article <c4e24252.02072...@posting.google.com>, jposamen
> writes...
> ...
> > So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
> > what he must to be an animal? And extending that to humans, isn't it
> > fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human?
> Rand talks about constraints on an organism's staying /alive/. Rand's
> critics have pointed out that an organism, in particular, a human, can
> stay alive by doing all sorts of things that do not fit what Objectivist
> ethics considers moral behavior. For example, Bill Clinton is alive.
Bill Clinton isn't completely irrational. You have to have a
certain level of rationality to survive. Also, it should be clear
that Clinton is from the parasite class. He gets most of the goods he
gets off the backs of the productive, i.e. the people who are more
rational and real world oriented.
In the real world you have to deal with the facts of reality. To
arrange reality in order to improve your life takes a rational mind,
and someone has to do it, or nobody will survive.
The long and the short of it, Gordon, is that you are simply a
contrarian on everything. When you gainsay every position for the
years that you've been posting to this ng, it gets to the point where
it is clear you aren't serious about these issues.
...John
John Alway
376...@posting.google.com>...
> jposamen wrote
> > Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
> > action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
> > What's wrong with this? I know of no organism that continues to live
> > without action or fuel.
> I have pointed out before that bacteria form resting spores to
> survive harsh conditions.
You're using a borderline case here.
It's not "living". It's in a suspended state. Categories like
this require a different identification, because the facts surrounding
them are different than the norm.
If not for the fact that these bacteria reanimate in certain
conditions, they'd be thought to be dead, so you need evidence of
other states to make it clear that the state it is in is an
in-between-state. If the bacteria always were in the suspended state
it wouldn't make any sense to call it living.
I'll let others argue the rest of your posting, since I'm not sure
what the over all point is.
...John
Gordon G. Sollars
And follows it, too.
> It's
> more the ante-room of her ethics. At this point, she hasn't said what
> type of fuel and action a person ought to have, only that he or she
> must have them to remain that person.
Then she hasn't given any content to her ethics at this point. The issue
is whether her argument ever gets around to content.
...
> She does not say--if you use the wrong fuel
> or action, then you're dead. But she would say that the wrong fuel
> and action THREATENS one's life and thus is against life or anti-life.
...
> It's like putting bad gas in your car or making your dog eat
> chocolate--It might not die immediately, but its condition is
> worsened.
>
> Have I addressed your inquiry?
No. Taking a risk that potentially threatens my life might be necessary
to further some value of mine. In fact, this happens all the time.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Rob
> Rand commented, in a footnote, on what she meant by the "goals"
> of non-human organisms. "When applied to physical phenomena, such
> as the automatic functions of an organism, the term 'goal-directed'
> is not to be taken to mean 'purposive' (a concept applicable only
> to the actions of a consciousness) and is not to imply the existence
> of any teleological principle operating in insentient nature. I use
> the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the fact
> that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions whose
> nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an organism's
> life."
>
> Huemer has pointed out that Rand opened the proverbial can of worms
> with this little aside. (I suspect he isn't the only critic to have
> noticed this.) Are we to say that the "goal" of lightning bolts is
> to start forest fires? The nature of their action is such
> as to achieve that result. But these problems do not bear directly
> on our present discussion.
Or, how about the nature of all living organisms is to act in such a
way that (eventually) they _die_. If her definition is right, why
isn't death the ultimate value in terms of which to evaluate
everything else?
The fact is that in trying to derive an ought from an is, whether from
facts about biology or reproduction or life-preservation or anything
else that can be stated without assuming or presupposing the
correctness of some normative judgments, she was trying to do what
can't be done. She can only make it _look_ as if she is succeeding by
adding tacit assumptions to restrict attention to certain areas and
not others -- to get us to pay attention to life-preservation rather
than reproductive success or death, for example, as the important
result. But the assumption that one of these is the important result,
the one to pay attention to in developing an ethical theory is
_already_ a normative conclusion and one that has not been derived
from any non-normative facts.
Rob
David Tomlin
> Let's start with your last question: "How does Rand establish that we
> ought to pursue the fuel and action proper to a human in order to
> remain a living human?"
> First, she observes that all organisms need fuel and the action to use
> it properly in order to live.
Are you using "ought" instrumentally or ethically?
From facts we may infer many instrumental oughts. The problem
is to get to ethical oughts.
> The bacterium that you mentioned are no
> exception. You said it yourself--"they form spores to **survive**
> harsh conditions." (astriks mine). Looks like an action to me, Dave.
Forming the spore is an action. The result of that action is a period
of inaction, which may be quite long.
If the bacterium continued to behave normally instead of forming
the spore, it probably would not survive. If it resumed normal
activity before the unfavorable condition had passed, it probably
would not survive. Its survival depends on its inaction.
> Next, you wrote: "Rand began by raising fundamental questions like
> 'what is ethics?' and 'what are values?' These are among the issues in
> dispute."
> Yes, Rand began her discourse with those fundamental questions.
> These, however, are meta-ethical issues, and again, say nothing of
> what she thinks we ought to do (i.e., her ethics). She's only trying
> to establish the meaning and nature of ethical terms, judgments, and
> arguments here.
> The particular questions you mentioned are NOT the issues in dispute.
> this dialogue does not focus on terms such as "value" and
> "ethics"--those are incidental. Instead, it focuses on the issue of
> whether we can objectively form normative propositions.
Values are incidental to normative propositions? I don't think
so.
> It deals with
> the FORM of inquiry, not content.
Where would you draw the line between form and content?
>(you could say that we are
> addressing the content of the form, but that gets a little muddled for
> me).
I won't say it if you won't. :-)
> I would argue that we are (for the most part) discussing a
> meta-ethical issue here, not an ethical one.
I like the term "meta-ethics". However, it can cause confusion
when discussing Rand, since she did not use the term. For her,
what we are calling "meta-ethics" is a part of ethics, in the
sense of the term that means a science or branch of philosophy.
> Onward, you wrote: "You're equivocating between 'how to live' and
> 'how to stay alive.'"
> I looked back at my posts and tried to find where I used each phrase,
> but I could find only the latter.
"In discussing ethics, we are discussing life, not evolution--how to
live, not how to evolve."
You didn't use "stay alive" in the post to which I was responding.
I was paraphrasing from phrases like "to keep the organism alive."
> Are you saying that 'how to live' refers to
> 'how people think we ought to live'--and 'how to stay alive' refers to
> physical necessity?
From "In discussing ethics, we are discussing . . . how to
live . . .", I thought you meant what "how to live" has
traditionally meant for ethical discussion - how to live the
good life. Ideally, the object of the discussion is what is
actually good, not just what people think. Other than that, my
meaning is as you state.
If I have mistaken your meaning, I apologize.
> It seems irrelevant
> to this discussion anyway, but I'm still curious; please explain how I
> am equivocating.
I hope I have explained to your satisfaction. Again I apologize if I
misinterpreted your meaning.
As with the matter of values and normative propositions, I am puzzled
as to how this could be irrelevant.
> Dave, I believe you are mistaken to claim that this thread responds to
> my question, which was: "Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
> what he must to be an animal?"
I have assumed that "to be an animal" is just a fancy way to say
"survive." Have I misunderstood?
> I maintain that the requirements for
> evolution differ from the requirements of a life, and Rand's argument
> is centered around a life, each life, and not evolution.
If the "requirements for evolution" do not now exist, and evolution
is not now taking place, that would not change the fact that
evolution is the process by which organisms have come to be what
they are. That is what makes evolution relevant.
Darwinism does not claim that organisms are teleologically guided
toward future evolution. That is a popular misunderstanding, popular
especially with New Agers. It is past evolution that is relevant, not
future evolution or the requirements for it.
The Darwinist critique of Rand's meta-ethics, is that evolution has
formed organisms to function and behave _as if_ their "ultimate goal"
was reproductive success. Whether such success leads to more evolution
in the future is irrelevant. It is only past evolution that is
important
to this point.
That the "requirements of a life" and the "requirements for evolution"
are different is also irrelevant. For each life, the evolution that
shaped the organism has already happened, its requirements already
satisfied, or the organism would not be what is.
David Tomlin
> David Tomlin wrote
> > I have pointed out before that bacteria form resting spores to
> > survive harsh conditions.
> It's not "living".
Perhaps not, but it is surviving.
When favorable conditions return, the same bacterium
resumes its activity. The organism has _survived_, and it has
survived by _inactivity_.
Do you think this issue is important to Rand's grounding
of ethics?
David Tomlin
> jposamen wrote:
> >Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
> >action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
> I posit a third: A reciprocating organism as to replenish the fuel.
That's not essential. There are bacteria whose fuel source is
geological.
brendenden
Then not organism. Existing forces as to replenish the fuel. When those
bacteria intake mineral, they expel metabolic products which CANNOT be used as
fuel (try breathing which a grabage bag to see how well you do on yr own
breath). Those products are either reverted by geological forces or by other
ogranisms. Organisms are ideal because they contain catalytic enzymes which
hasten reaction and foster growth and continuity for sometimes, geological
conditions do not permit action, and they rest dormant. When life rests
dormant, the chemical pathways cease to move (without reactants to suppy
reaction). We need constant energy because the maintenance of our structure
depends on energy metabolism (feel the stiffness of your legs after sitting
cross-legged for an hour). Some of those bacteria have evolved to not
_rapidly) decay when not actively tranforming chemicals. If those chemicals
_never_ again become available, eventually thru unavoidable entropic decay
(the action of aeons and aeons of time and flux in surrounding energies), the
bacteria will perish and lose ability to revive their metabolic pathways.
Do you see my reasoning? Without viable, bioavailable, fuel source, life (the
purposive action of complexity) will not continue. All available fuel will be
spent if something doesn't knock it back into its first place. Or did you
mean that geological chemicals auto-self-create, as tho from nowhere?
Analogously, does Earth's mass decrease when we launch material into space?
Could we indefinitely launch our matter into space if something in space
wasn't knocking it back down for use? Your reasoning seems naive from my
biological understanding. Please elaborate.
When I said organism, I meant it OUGHT to be, because then replenishment of
fuel is guaranteed as long as both organisms encounter no unforeseen accident.
I was in err to posit such as absolutely essential. Your agrument seemed
weakly supported anyway. Dont objectivist cases come with exceptions??
Lon
.7f36...@posting.google.com>...
>
>
> Bill Clinton isn't completely irrational. You have to have a
> certain level of rationality to survive.
rationality beyond this level?
> that Clinton is from the parasite class. He gets most of the goods he
> gets off the backs of the productive, i.e. the people who are more
> rational and real world oriented.
>
he can do better by living off of others. Does he have a
duty to sacrifice his well being so as not to be a parasite?
That would seem rather altruistic of him.
> In the real world you have to deal with the facts of reality. To
> arrange reality in order to improve your life takes a rational mind,
> and someone has to do it, or nobody will survive.
>
This is puzzling, don't parasites deal with the facts of
reality? It would seem that they exploit them quite well.
What is so irrational about finding the easiest way to get
what ne needs? It may be true that there need to be some
altruists willing to do the work to support the parasites
but why should that bother the parasites?
Lon
> ...John
brendenden
>>
>>> >Rand argues that an organism needs two things to survive: fuel and the
>>> >action to use that fuel so as to keep the organism alive.
>>
Let's talk about action an organism does to use fuel to continue. Ideal
action conserves an
infinite amount of fuel. This may seem impossible. Not so, when the outcome
of fuel's use,
our action to survive, is fuel's procurement, a cyclical, internally dependent
equilibrium
condition begins to exist, by its own accord. In our case of free will, we
must choose
whether to contribute to the biopsychoequilibrium underneath our higher
hedonistic drives as
we must choose to act on those.
While happiness is our top priority, our bottom priority ought to health, by
which happiness
is afforded. Like Aristotle's principle of continuity. By our human virtue,
we move upward,
but let's encompass the whole way up and not forget both sides of this. We
need healthy bodies
to enjoy mental activity. For happiness, we ought to clean up our environment.
We ought to
care for fellow man and the environment with the purpose of optimising the
bounty of happiness
afforded by a supreme environment. Let's realize two sides of a whole
organism: Chloroplasts
and Mitochondria are aspects of a whole organism because one can not continue
functioning
indefinitely (on Earth) without the other. Plants and animals act with
eachother. We are
eachother's fuel producers and fuel. In this way man ought to contribute to
fellow man and
the planetary lifeforce. We want a supreme equilibrium. One where no
reaction goes to
completion and halts. We want to adjust our environment to tweak the
equilibrium. I refer to
actions modern man now does with natural perogative.
Consider bioengineering. We are naturally selecting those traits in one
organism that will
allow another organism to cope homeostatically in a previously inhospitable
environment. This
is an example of what I mean by our actions perfecting a global equilibrium,
resulting in a
greater variety of fuel and energy pathways which alleviate environmental
strain. I further
posit humanity developed objective reasoning for the purpose of aligning the
forces of nature
within themselves; to settle conflict of energy; to appease Zeus's
overcharging temper and
reduce devastating weather. Biological action (such as providing conditions
thru metabolism
or biodesign for airborne bacteria) to diffuse charge accumulation to
neutralize the sky and
weather to provide fertile crops and thus, Jupiter's jollity with calm gentle
rain and
brilliant sun, adds contextual evidence to my idea that humanity evolved to
seek happiness in
the mutual peace (energetic balance and physical stability) of the universe.
They rightly
personified the natural forces. You are a natural force and I am a natural
force within our
environment. Our environment is the interference or culmination of individual
energies. We
are a part of Earth's energy. We are a part of one another's energy while
apart from one
another. A beautiful, liberating concept. We metabolize energies at such a
grand scale that
we can change the temperature of the globe thru driving to work (ultimately
the transformation
of energy in order to sustain our lives, optimistically). We possess the
ability to perfect
our experience. Why else would we want to learn, to grow, to try new things,
to have love, to
give children to continue perfecting experience? Consider balance between us
rather than
turmoil, and the happiness this provides.
This is not altruism or a form of planetary biological statism. Objectively
we ARE us, a part
of the universe whose interrelative (as between components) stability
maintains our lives.
Our contribution to stability sourcing happiness thru artful pursuit.
Survival.
Brendenden.
How old are you guys?
I'm 17.
Do you want the best for your life? I do.
Don't run out of time.
I want to give you the means for happiness because in pursuit for my own happy
survival i've
realized a greater pool of happiness in the world, allows a greater, grander
leap when we yet
again surpass what levels we have known. I'm in this for perfection and i
feel we're getting
closer all the time. Let's imagine a way.
Then make real of it. Please.
Churl Beck
[...]
> For non-conscious (or hardwired or predispositioned) organisms, no
> OUGHT is involved. Ought implies some sort of choice, but where the
> mechanical organism is concerned, what it IS determines
> what it MUST do TO STAY WHAT IT IS.
[...]
Rand maintained that "oughts" applied to all living organisms. "The fact
that a living entity /is/, determines what it /ought/ to do." [VOS 18] In
fact, in the eight or so paragraphs of her entire "is-ought" argument, she
only mentioned choice once: when she said that "No choice is open to an
organism in this issue..." [VOS 17]
You may be confusing Rand's view of "oughts" with her view of morality,
which applied only to free wills. "A code of values accepted by choice is a
code of morality." [VOS 25] In other words, the difference between a
volitional and a non-volitional entity is that the former is morally
culpable for not doing what it ought to do.
--CHuRL
John Alway
84...@posting.google.com>...
> John Alway <jwa...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<dbb7370e.0207252038
> .7f36...@posting.google.com>...
> >
> >
> > Bill Clinton isn't completely irrational. You have to have a
> > certain level of rationality to survive.
> But if we accept this, why should one ethically value
> rationality beyond this level?
The more rational you are the better you are able to survive.
> > Also, it should be clear
> > that Clinton is from the parasite class. He gets most of the goods he
> > gets off the backs of the productive, i.e. the people who are more
> > rational and real world oriented.
> That seems very clever of him.
In truth, it's enormously short sighted. What was one of the
lessons of Gayle Wynand in the Fountainhead? It was that when you
appease the public to gain power, it is they who control you, not you
them. Your life is not under your control.
> Why should he produce when
> he can do better by living off of others.
Surviving off of others turns you against reality. He has to
constantly lie, cheat and steal to survive, and he must have victims,
being powerless to deal with reality on his own.
> Does he have a
> duty to sacrifice his well being so as not to be a parasite?
He is sacrificing his well being by being a parasite, because the
alternative is so much better.
> That would seem rather altruistic of him.
Clinton is an altruist. That is the fact. Altruism is
parasitical by nature.
> > In the real world you have to deal with the facts of reality. To
> > arrange reality in order to improve your life takes a rational mind,
> > and someone has to do it, or nobody will survive.
> This is puzzling, don't parasites deal with the facts of
> reality?
They are dealing with reality in the same way that a robber does
when he robs a bank. If you were to steal a Lamborghini Diablo, would
you feel that you were really in control of your life? Or, would you
feel as if you had set yourself against reality?
> It would seem that they exploit them quite well.
> What is so irrational about finding the easiest way to get
> what ne needs?
All of the above explains it, and it is not the easiest way. It's
about as hard a life as one could choose. Clinton is known for having
great bouts of depression.
> It may be true that there need to be some
> altruists willing to do the work to support the parasites
> but why should that bother the parasites?
It's the altruists who are the parasites. It is they who demand we
be taxed and regulated to death.
You need to sit down with a paper and pencil and write down the
pros and cons of being a parasite. Think of the long term, and think
about dealing with reality, and the consequences of lying, cheating
and stealing. Contrast this with pursuing a rational life, say the
life of a surgeon, or an engineer.
...John
John Alway
222...@posting.google.com>...
> John Alway wrote
> > David Tomlin wrote
> > > I have pointed out before that bacteria form resting spores to
> > > survive harsh conditions.
> > It's not "living".
> Perhaps not, but it is surviving.
> When favorable conditions return, the same bacterium
> resumes its activity. The organism has _survived_, and it has
> survived by _inactivity_.
But it's not living. It's in stasis. I can see where that would
be a value to humans, because it could allow us to live, but only if
we get to live again would it be valuable. Ted Williams seems to be
on that kick.
> Do you think this issue is important to Rand's grounding
> of ethics?
The alternative of life or death is fundamental, because it's the
key point on which hinges her entire ethical theory, and that
alternative is real, so her ethical theory is unbreakably strong.
...John
David Tomlin
certain point.]
David Tomlin wrote
> John Alway wrote
>
> > David Tomlin wrote
>
> > > I have pointed out before that bacteria form resting spores to
> > > survive harsh conditions.
>
> > It's not "living".
>
> Perhaps not, but it is surviving.
On reflection, I should concede this point.
Josh wrote "I know of no organism that continues to live
without action or fuel." If we agree that the resting spore
is in a state that is neither life nor death (a point I don't
care to argue), then it is not a counter-example to this
statement.
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> The long and the short of it, Gordon, is that you are simply a
> contrarian on everything.
I disagree with that, John.
> When you gainsay every position for the
> years that you've been posting to this ng, it gets to the point where
> it is clear you aren't serious about these issues.
It is true that I disagree with many of the Objectivist, especially
ARIan, posters here. But, on the /contrary/, I think that almost
everyone posting here is serious about these issues. Why do you suppose
that disagreement leads some of us but not others to a charge of "not
serious"?
...
> In the real world you have to deal with the facts of reality. To
> arrange reality in order to improve your life takes a rational mind,
> and someone has to do it, or nobody will survive.
The question is whether Rand's argument provides a good reason for, say,
Clinton, not to be a parasite.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
jposamen
miscommunicating...or maybe I just don't know where to start.
I'll answer a few questions, then make a few comments, but I encourage
you to email me. I would've emailed some of you for further clarity
of discussion, but your email addresses don't work.
About content:
Gordon--in regard to the issue of content, are you saying that the
debate is over which fuel and action organisms need to survive? That
seems to already agree with Rand's is-ought bit. I doubt that's what
you were suggesting, so I must've missed your point.
Now, the line between form and content. Form refers to the METHOD of
deriving normative propositions. Content is the actual normative
proposition. The form in dispute here is: We can form normative
propositions by assessing the nature of an entity and what it needs to
survive.
Dave--"remain that animal" = survive. And I didn't intend "how to
live" to refer to the "good life," only to "survival." I just avoid
that term since some folks start speaking of survival of species, not
individual.
Enough of form and content. Now some miscellaneous Q&A.
Am I using instrumental or ethical ought? Dunno. Would you explain the
difference? I'm not sure what those refer to.
"Value" and "ethics" are certainly important for a discussion of
normative propositions, but "value" typically refers to content, not
form. And I thought that we were, for the sake of argument, accepting
Rand's meaning of ethics. That's why I thought and still think that
"value" and "ethics" shouldn't be the focus of the is-ought
discussion.
**
Some general comments:
Rand wasn't concerned about how and organism got here (evolution), but
with how it was to stay here (survival).
Also, you wouldn’t say that reproduction causes the continuation
of a life (I’m still here and not reproducing), and neither
would you say that self-sustenance of one life causes the continuation
of a species (since not every life reproduces or does so
successfully). Rand was looking for the necessary end of life, that
is--of self-sustenance, and she found that end to be necessarily the
continuation of a living organism.
BTW, Rand would not necessarily universally place the act of
reproduction in the pro-life OR pro-death category. The benefits of
that act vary per species and often per organism.
Last, Perhaps we should to clearly distinguish between
“life” and “living organism.” The former is
the essential action of the latter. I wonder if maybe we're speaking
of different terms.
Anyway, you're more than welcome to email me for clarity.
*Jordan*
George Dance
07e1b01...@mail.nji.com>...
> In article <c4e24252.02072...@posting.google.com>, jposamen
> writes...
> ...
> > So what's the problem? Isn't it fair to say that an animal will do
> > what he must to be an animal? And extending that to humans, isn't it
> > fair to say that a human must do as she must to stay human?
>
> Rand talks about constraints on an organism's staying /alive/. Rand's
> critics have pointed out that an organism, in particular, a human, can
> stay alive by doing all sorts of things that do not fit what Objectivist
> ethics considers moral behavior.
The constraints Rand talked about for a human were reason, purpose,
and self-esteem: valuing oneself, having goals, and being capable of
rationally calculating action from goals. These constraints justify
morality (acting as one should do), but not Objectivist morality per
se. The argument that leads to that is one about the logical
implications of adopting reason as a constraint on one's actions -
starting with, is one constrained to accept logical implication at
all?
> For example, Bill Clinton is alive. It
> is not hard to argue that Clinton is a bad human, but something of a
> stretch to claim that he has not stayed human. Is that what you are
> claiming?
I think Rand would have claimed, as a matter of fact, that Clinton
(just by the fact that he was alive) valued himself, had goals which
he valued, and reasoned out means which he also valued; and therefore
that he had a morality. Her objection to Clinton would be to the
morality he held, which she would have argued was not rationally
consistent.
> Please don't respond by saying that he is not "living as a human should".
> That might be true, but not relevant to rebutting this objection to
> Rand's argument, since he is still alive.
Frankly, I don't see how a critic could advance the above argument,
which is obviously a strawman. There were plenty of Clinton-like, or
worse, personalities of which Rand was aware and wrote about, Hitler
and Stalin being the most notorious. There is no indication in
anything she did write about Hitler or Stalin that she considered
either one anything other than a human being.
> As it happens, I am quite sympathetic to the view that biological
> constraints play an important role in morality, but Rand's use of them is
> insufficient to get to her own ethics.
Rand's important claim was that committing to reason was such a
constraint, in that it allowed one to use biology + logic +(all the
rest that she believed that the commitment to reason implies) to
derive the correct morality.
Helen
.3a9...@posting.google.com>...
> The more rational you are the better you are able to survive.
Says who? Do you have any statistics to back that up? Of course, you
would first have to propose an objective measure of what you mean by
"rationality", which has to be independent of observed fitness for
survival (so that the above is not just a trivial tautology).
> In truth, it's enormously short sighted. What was one of the
> lessons of Gayle Wynand in the Fountainhead? It was that when you
> appease the public to gain power, it is they who control you, not you
> them. Your life is not under your control.
[Laughing] Well, you might notice that so far we have been talking
about reality, and now you come here and counter with a fantasy (and a
rather poor one at that)?
> Surviving off of others turns you against reality. He has to
> constantly lie, cheat and steal to survive, and he must have victims,
> being powerless to deal with reality on his own.
You are fantasizing.
> He is sacrificing his well being by being a parasite, because the
> alternative is so much better.
You know that how, Father John? As far as I can tell, Clinton leads a
very rich life, in every respect. I would be curious in what objective
sense your own life, as an example, is better. Note the "objective"
here. That you fantasize your life being better does count for very
little.
> Clinton is an altruist. That is the fact. Altruism is
> parasitical by nature.
That is complete nonsense, of course. _That_ is a fact.
> They are dealing with reality in the same way that a robber does
> when he robs a bank. If you were to steal a Lamborghini Diablo, would
> you feel that you were really in control of your life? Or, would you
> feel as if you had set yourself against reality?
What silly questions. It all depends on a lot of factors. If I had
stolen one, had sold it for a nice sum on the black market, and walked
away scot free, I might feel very much in control of my life. Much
more so than the poor slob the car originally belonged to, by the way.
> > What is so irrational about finding the easiest way to get
> > what ne needs?
>
> All of the above explains it, and it is not the easiest way. It's
> about as hard a life as one could choose. Clinton is known for having
> great bouts of depression.
So have many other people.
> You need to sit down with a paper and pencil and write down the
> pros and cons of being a parasite. Think of the long term, and think
> about dealing with reality, and the consequences of lying, cheating
> and stealing. Contrast this with pursuing a rational life, say the
> life of a surgeon, or an engineer.
Dream on...
As an aside I note that in biology, many organisms survive perfectly
fine as parasites, and there is nothing wrong with that at all. I also
note that one could argue that, e.g., all herbivores are parasites of
plants, and that only (some) plants truly deserve to not be called
parasites.
John Alway
e9...@posting.google.com>...
> John Alway <jwa...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<dbb7370e.0207262105
> .3a9...@posting.google.com>...
> > The more rational you are the better you are able to survive.
[...]
Thanks, Helen.
...John
Matt Ruff
No, I think the question of whether an organism in stasis should be
considered alive or dead is an irrelevant side-issue. But your other
comments are more interesting and more on point.
-- M. Ruff
David Tomlin
I would've emailed some of you for further clarity
> of discussion, but your email addresses don't work.
You can e-mail me at davt...@hotmail.com
> The form in dispute here is: We can form normative
> propositions by assessing the nature of an entity and what it needs to
> survive.
Thanks. That's a good clarification.
> Dave--"remain that animal" = survive.
OK. Then I am puzzled.
I maintain that animals do not always do what they must to survive.
I thought you had conceded that point. If so, it appears that you
have retracted the concession.
> And I didn't intend "how to
> live" to refer to the "good life," only to "survival." I just avoid
> that term since some folks start speaking of survival of species, not
> individual.
I would never do that.
Darwinian evolution is not teleological. There is no imperative
toward species survival. A sub-population of a species may develop
into another species that competes with the parent species and drives
it to extinction.
David Tomlin
> Am I using instrumental or ethical ought? Dunno. Would you explain the
> difference?
When you wrote "The only thing Rand had established thus far in
her argument was that we ought to pursue the fuel and action proper
to a human in order to remain a living human", did you mean that
she had established survival as a value in a proper code
of ethics, or did you only mean that she had established that humans
will in fact die if they do not take certain actions?
David Tomlin
> "Value" and "ethics" are certainly important for a discussion of
> normative propositions, but "value" typically refers to content, not
> form.
I was referring to form.
> And I thought that we were, for the sake of argument, accepting
> Rand's meaning of ethics.
OK. No problem there.
> That's why I thought and still think that
> "value" and "ethics" shouldn't be the focus of the is-ought
> discussion.
Rand claimed to have identified a concept she called "value."
She argued that, when this concept is properly understood,
it is seen to have certain relationships with the concepts
of "life", "survival", and "fundamental choice." "Life" comes
in because of its relationship to "value."
I am not talking about specific values, but concept of "value."
I don't see how the is-ought discussion can dispense with the
concept.
> Rand wasn't concerned about how an organism got here (evolution), but
> with how it was to stay here (survival).
You have ignored everything I have said on this point. I guess
I haven't been clear enough. The subject interests me, so I'll
have another go.
If I make an error because I overlook point A, saying "I'm not
concerned with point A" doesn't transform error into truth. It
explains why I made the error, but it doesn't make it any less
of an error.
Now you are probably thinking that this is not relevant. That is
why we are at cross purposes. You don't really understand the
Darwinist criticism of Rand's is-ought bridge.
The point is not that Rand made an error about evolution. That
would justify your response - that she wasn't even talking about
evolution.
The point is that Rand made an error about _living organisms_,
and she made this error _because_ she overlooked evolution. You
say she wasn't concerned about evolution, and that certainly
explains why she overlooked it. But reality doesn't go away
because one isn't concerned with it, as Rand would be the
first to say.
Helen
John Alway
95...@posting.google.com>...
> Oh, you're very welcome, Super John.
Thanks. :)
...John
David Tomlin
> Also, you wouldn't say that reproduction causes the continuation
> of a life . . .
Indeed not, and that also undermines Rand's argument, even without
understanding the Darwinian basis for reproductive behaviour.
If you search Subject: "Is-Ought Debate" - Phrase: "resort to Darwinism",
you will find the post in which I support this claim.
> and neither
> would you say that self-sustenance of one life causes the continuation
> of a species (since not every life reproduces or does so
> successfully).
It might be said that self-sustenance of at least one life is
a necessary but not sufficient cause of the continuation of a
species.
"Continuatin of a species" is a red herring in any case.
> Rand was looking for the necessary end of life, that
> is--of self-sustenance, and she found that end to be necessarily the
> continuation of a living organism.
What does "necessary end" mean?
> BTW, Rand would not necessarily universally place the act of
> reproduction in the pro-life OR pro-death category. The benefits of
> that act vary per species and often per organism.
What would be an example of reproduction being pro-life?
David Tomlin
> The alternative of life or death is fundamental, because it's the
> key point on which hinges her entire ethical theory, and that
> alternative is real, so her ethical theory is unbreakably strong.
What differentiates a fundamental alternative from a non-fundamental
one?
David Schwartz
Fundamental:
Of or relating to the foundation or base; elementary: the fundamental
laws of the universe.
Forming or serving as an essential component of a system or structure;
central: an example that was fundamental to the argument.
Of great significance or entailing major change: a book that underwent
fundamental revision.
primary
of central importance
of or relating to essential structure, function, or facts
In this case, a fundamental alternative is one that is the foundation
or base of all altneratives, of central importance, and relating to
essential structure.
DS
John Alway
340c...@posting.google.com>...
I think you mean what differentiates a fundamental from a
non-fundamental point. At least, I'll reword it that way, because it
seems to be what you're asking. :/
It's what would make or break her theory. A fundamental point is
a foundation without which the theory wouldn't stand. A
non-fundamental point would be inconsequential to the theory.
...John
jposamen
haven't figured out how to reconfigure my text.
Dave asks: “What would be an example of reproduction being
pro-life?”
Wolves gain by having offspring because they hunt in packs. More
wolves (to a point) = easier kill. Same with ants.
The offspring of prey animals like antelope offer safety in numbers.
When antelope (or some similar animal) are threatened, they group
together, making it more difficult for a predator to single out prey
without being hurt in counter-attack. Also, grouping means that an
antelope has a better chance of surviving, since a predator usually
just picks off one (maybe two) victims at a time.
Like I said before, Rand files actions into two categories: pro-life
and pro-death. If reproduction kills or harms the organism more than
it helps, then file it under pro-death. Lots of cases of reproduction
should be filed under pro-death, but pro-death action doesn’t
necessarily mean TERMINATION of organism, only THREAT to it.
Oh, and “necessary end” just means necessary cause. I
should’ve been more specific--Rand was looking for a necessary
and sufficient cause for self-sustaining action.
All this talk about animals is interesting and does help to understand
Rand’s argument, but Rand’s argument has to do with
humans, not animals. Animals weren’t intended to fill an
essential premise, only to *illustrate* one (for better or worse).
Most threaders here take Rand’s claims about animals as
essential. I don’t, but maybe I won’t have to push the
issue.
<sigh> Back to Darwin. Responding to your WAY earlier post...
Dave writes: “It is uncontested that organisms act to reproduce
as well as survive.”
I say: Remember, we’re not talking about all organisms;
we’re talking about EACH organism. Not every organism acts to
reproduce, nor does it always act to survive. Does this last
proposition nullify your four possibilities? Well, let me just
address the first one, which you believe is the implicit and false
claim of Rand’s.
“1. Reproduction is a means to survival.” Of an organism?
If an organism reproduces, does that help it survive? Sometimes,
just like I said above—some reproduction falls under pro-life
action. When reproducing harms more than helps, then it’s
pro-death action and so is not of value to that organism.
Reproduction doesn’t always have to lead to life for Rand to be
correct. She accounted for pro-death action, acknowledging implicitly
that some animals have suicidal tendencies.
Hmmm…Maybe we ARE having trouble because of Rand’s
definition of “value”? I hadn’t considered that
before. Lemme know if we are.
Why are we still talking about reproduction?? Please, sometime
(anyone) just list the premises you think constitute Rand’s
argument, then explain your contentions with each.
All for now.
-Jordan-
Tym Parsons
> Or, how about the nature of all living organisms is to act in such a
> way that (eventually) they _die_. If her definition is right, why
> isn't death the ultimate value in terms of which to evaluate
> everything else?
This is inexcusably clueless, and NOT her definition. I suppose if
you tried hard enough, you could trivialise every definition you came
across. "Death" means going out of existence, i.e. a living entity
LOSING its distinctive feature, i.e. being capable of
internally-generated action etc. "Value" presupposes acting in the
face of an alternative, which only happens as long as an entity is
alive. So death can't be an ultimate value.
Tym Parsons
David Tomlin
> David Tomlin wrote
> > John Alway wrote
> > What differentiates a fundamental alternative from a non-fundamental
> > one?
> I think you mean what differentiates a fundamental from a
> non-fundamental point.
No. I understand that this issue is fundamental to Rand's ethical
theory. What I'm looking to clarify is the meaning of "There is only
one fundamental altervative in the universe: existence or
nonexistence - and it pertains to a single class of entities: to
living organisms."
David Tomlin
> In this case, a fundamental alternative is one that is the foundation
> or base of all altneratives, of central importance, and relating to
> essential structure.
OK, I think I've got it.
It's good for living things to select the alternatives that
keep them alive. Staying alive is good because it allows
living things to keep selecting alternatives.
Is that it?
Rob
127.23...@posting.google.com>...
> Rob wrote:
>
> > Or, how about the nature of all living organisms is to act in such a
> > way that (eventually) they _die_. If her definition is right, why
> > isn't death the ultimate value in terms of which to evaluate
> > everything else?
>
> This is inexcusably clueless, and NOT her definition.
Oh, I'm well aware she didn't _want_ to reach that conclusion. But the
question is about what she _said_ and what follows from that. And what
she said, again, is:
"I use the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the
fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions
whose nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an
organism's life."
And the fact is that dying is the result (one result) of the automatic
functions of living organisms. If you want to say that it's not the
important result, or the right one to peg your ethics to, you need
something other than Rand's argument. _Her_ argument is hopelessly
wrong.
Rob
P.S.
> I suppose if
> you tried hard enough, you could trivialise every definition you came
> across. "Death" means going out of existence, i.e. a living entity
> LOSING its distinctive feature, i.e. being capable of
> internally-generated action etc. "Value" presupposes acting in the
> face of an alternative, which only happens as long as an entity is
> alive. So death can't be an ultimate value.
Not that it matters a great deal, but this is wrong, too. The acting
in the face of an alternative can be action that makes a difference to
whether and how soon the organism dies. What's true is that if you
(sincerely) came to the conclusion that (your own) death was the
ultimate value and also were of normal competence, you couldn't pursue
death for very long -- because you'd succeed in ending up dead. That
doesn't mean that you wouldn't be guiding yourself by that value for
the few minutes or whatever that it would take you to end up dead.
George Dance
608...@posting.google.com>...
> Tym Parsons <tym_p...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<5175b75e.0207292
> 127.23...@posting.google.com>...
> > Rob wrote:
> > > Or, how about the nature of all living organisms is to act in such a
> > > way that (eventually) they _die_. If her definition is right, why
> > > isn't death the ultimate value in terms of which to evaluate
> > > everything else?
> >
> > This is inexcusably clueless, and NOT her definition.
>
> Oh, I'm well aware she didn't _want_ to reach that conclusion. But the
> question is about what she _said_ and what follows from that. And what
> she said, again, is:
>
> "I use the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the
> fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions
> whose nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an
> organism's life."
>
> And the fact is that dying is the result (one result) of the automatic
> functions of living organisms.
I'm not sure what you mean by that; are you saying that a living
organism that had no automatic functions would not die? (Something
like David Tomlin's bacillus spores?)
> If you want to say that it's not the
> important result, or the right one to peg your ethics to, you need
> something other than Rand's argument. _Her_ argument is hopelessly
> wrong.
It sonds like you're arguing:
1. Death is the end of living.
2. The purpose of anything is its end.
-------
3. Death is the purpose of living.
That is clearly an equivocal use of the word 'end.'
Tym Parsons
<Rand quote:>
> "I use the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the
> fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions
> whose nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an
> organism's life."
>
> And the fact is that dying is the result (one result) of the automatic
> functions of living organisms. If you want to say that it's not the
> important result,
It isn't.
> or the right one to peg your ethics to,
It isn't.
> you need something other than Rand's argument.
No you don't.
> _Her_ argument is hopelessly wrong.
No, her argument is absolutely correct.
> > I suppose if you tried hard enough, you could trivialise every definition
> > you came across. "Death" means going out of existence, i.e. a living e
> > ntity
> > LOSING its distinctive feature, i.e. being capable of internally-genera
> > ted > > action etc. "Value" presupposes acting in the face of an alter
> > native,
> > which only happens as long as an entity is alive. So death can't be an
> > ultimate value.
>
> Not that it matters a great deal, but this is wrong, too. The acting
> in the face of an alternative can be action that makes a difference to
> whether and how soon the organism dies. What's true is that if you
> (sincerely) came to the conclusion that (your own) death was the
> ultimate value and also were of normal competence, you couldn't pursue
> death for very long -- because you'd succeed in ending up dead. That
> doesn't mean that you wouldn't be guiding yourself by that value for
> the few minutes or whatever that it would take you to end up dead.
You don't NEED to act in order to end up dead; it happens on its own.
In contrast, your remaining in existence DOES require action, i.e.
(rational) values.
Tym Parsons
David Tomlin
> It sounds like you're arguing:
> 1. Death is the end of living.
> 2. The purpose of anything is its end.
> -------
> 3. Death is the purpose of living.
>
> That is clearly an equivocal use of the word 'end.'
The error is Rand's, when she equates "goal" with "result."
Rob is illustrating it by _reductio_.
David Tomlin
> Dave asks: "What would be an example of reproduction being
> pro-life?"
> Wolves gain by having offspring because they hunt in packs. More
> wolves (to a point) = easier kill. Same with ants.
> The offspring of prey animals like antelope offer safety in numbers.
> When antelope (or some similar animal) are threatened, they group
> together, making it more difficult for a predator to single out prey
> without being hurt in counter-attack. Also, grouping means that an
> antelope has a better chance of surviving, since a predator usually
> just picks off one (maybe two) victims at a time.
The ants are a good example, and so are social insects generally. The
sterile casts take care of the queen, so reproducing is in her
survival interest. That's not so for male honeybees, for whom
copulation is fatal.
The mammalian examples are more problematical. Female mammals are
prone to dying in childbirth. Sometimes they put themselves at risk
to protect their young. And, producing milk is costly.
There is also a public good problem. Each individual female bears most
the risks and costs of bearing and raising a litter, while getting a
roughly equal share in the advantages of being part of a larger social
group. It might profit an individual to free ride on the reproduction
of others.
Btw wolves aren't necessarily pack-hunters. It depends on what they are
hunting, which in turn depends on where they live and sometimes the
season of the year. Some wolves may do most or all of their hunting
alone or in pairs.
> Animals weren't intended to fill an
> essential premise, only to *illustrate* one (for better or worse).
This is a crucial point. Of the points Rand made, which were essential
to her argument? Rand was far from making herself clear in that regard.
> Dave writes: "It is uncontested that organisms act to reproduce
> as well as survive."
> I say: Remember, we're not talking about all organisms . . .
A strawman. I never said "all".
> . . . we're talking about EACH organism.
I was talking about _most_ organisms.
I don't know what you mean by "EACH." We are not discussing the
particular characteristics of every organism that has ever existed.
Nor are we discussing the particular characteristics of every member
of some delimited group of organisms, which is what I think would
usually be meant by "talking about each organism."
> Not every organism acts to
> reproduce, nor does it always act to survive. Does this last
> proposition nullify your four possibilities?
No. The strawman is still a strawman.
> Well, let me just
> address the first one, which you believe is the implicit and false
> claim of Rand's.
> "1. Reproduction is a means to survival." Of an organism?
> If an organism reproduces, does that help it survive? Sometimes,
> just like I said above; some reproduction falls under pro-life
> action. When reproducing harms more than helps, then it's
> pro-death action and so is not of value to that organism.
> Reproduction doesn't always have to lead to life for Rand to be
> correct.
For Rand to be correct, reproduction must promote survival as a
general rule, for organisms generally.
> She accounted for pro-death action, acknowledging implicitly
> that some animals have suicidal tendencies.
Would you quote the passage, please?
Rand said that an organism might fail to survive. I don't
think she would agree that any non-volitional organism could
have "suicidal tendencies."
"But so long as it lives, it acts on its knowledge, with
automatic safety and no power of choice, it is unable to
ignore its own good, unable to decide to choose the evil and
act as its own destroyer."
> Hmmm; Maybe we ARE having trouble because of Rand's
> definition of "value"? I hadn't considered that
> before. Lemme know if we are.
Rand explicitly defined "value" as "that which one acts to
gain and/or keep." Later on, she used it to mean "what one
properly acts to gain and/or keep", and "an abstract idea
about what one may properly act to gain and/or keep." She
did not take care to distinguish these senses, but it's not
too hard for a careful reader to do so.
Rand defined an "ultimate value" as something to be gained
or kept for its own sake, not as a means to something else.
She identified the survival of an individual organism as the
only thing that is "metaphysically an end in itself," and
concluded that, therefore, survival of an individual organism
is the only proper ultimate value.
You look at the argument from here on and say it is "about life."
I say it is never "about life." It is always about _value_. After
this point, Rand has much to say about life/survival, because she
has concluded that life/survival bears a crucial relationship to
_value_, and particularly to _ultimate value_.
> Why are we still talking about reproduction??
I am because I don't think we have either resolved the issue
or reached an impasse, and I'm not bored yet.
Why are you still talking about it? Beats me.
> Please, sometime
> (anyone) just list the premises you think constitute Rand's
> argument, then explain your contentions with each.
I'm working on that. I will start a new thread in a day or so.
Why don't you take the first part of the challenge yourself? Critics
of Objectivism have repeatedly asked for an Objectivist to spell out
Rand's argument explicitly. There have been no takers AFAIK.
jposamen
So is your argument this??
1. An ultimate end is the final end/goal to which all lesser
ends/goals are the means.
2. Some animals sometimes risk their lives, and
even sacrifice them outright (as a means to reproduce successfully).
3. So the ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive
success.
If this is your argument, then...
Let me start with premise #2. I think it would be better phrased if we
said that: Sometimes an animal takes a risk that endangers its life,
and sometimes these risks end up with the death of the animal but the
success in its reproductive efforts.
Picky, but phrasing it this way removes any impression that an animal
makes a choice. Animals don't commit suicide, they really just take a
fatal action. If we are just talking about an animal's fatal actions,
then Rand addressed this:
"If an amoeba's protoplasm stops assimilating food...it dies." (TOE,
p.16)
and
"In situations for which [an animal's] knowledge is inadequate, it
perishes." (TOE, p.19)
The former quote speaks to actions of an automatic body; the latter,
an automatic mind. (shrug)
It doesn't matter whether an animal perishes by getting squashed by a
Honda or eaten by a female mantis. Rand would just proclaim, "lack of
knowledge!" and file that fatal action into the pro-death category,
which sorta brings me to your 3rd premise:
"The ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive success."
First, if we say that reproductive success is the ultimate end of an
animal who dies in the reproductive process, then can we say that
roadkill is the ultimate end of an animal who dies under the tires of
a VW?
No. The event that results from a fatal action is not necessarily an
ultimate end. If it were, then we'd have lots of ultimate actions,
since animals die in lots of different ways. And an ultimate value
needs to be the same among similar organisms. I seriously doubt you
were arguing otherwise.
Next, the only action for which Rand was seeking an ultimate value was
the action of life, of surviving:
"Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process of
self-sustaining action. The goal of that [self-sustaining action],
the ultimate value...is the organism's life." (TOE, p.16-17).
(Little note: Rand does use "goal," "value," and "end"
interchangeably. In this particular secion of her essay, I don't see
that as problematic.)
Where does self-sustaining (not self-destroying) action lead? Well,
it must necessarily lead to life, and only to life. If you reproduce
but self-destroy, then Rand would say that such action is not Life.
That a living organism performs self-destroying acts says nothing of
the goals of its self-sustaining actions.
Maybe you were arguing that many or more of an animal's functions are
geared for reproduction before they are geared for life. I don't
object to this.
Perhaps, she should've mentioned that some animals have some
programmed actions that are self-destroying, so those animals don't
always act to their own benefit. It would've been tangential to her
argument, but helpful. What she really wanted to convey was that "[an
animal] cannot CHOOSE the evil and act as its own destroyer." (TOE,
p.19. CAPS, mine). She wanted us to acknowledge that if an animal
dies, it doesn't purposely die. We can choose otherwise.
It surprises me that this is such a hot topic. Upon first glance, it
seems so uncontroversial. I suppose one could say that the
controversy stems from attempting to refute Hume, but I thought we'd
sort of abandoned Hume awhile ago. And if we haven't, his argument
seems somewhat ill-reasoned to me anyway.
*
I'm looking forward to seeing a premise-by-premise argument against
Rand's is-ought formula. I might work out one for it, too.
If you're wondering why I keep posting, it's cause I wonder if perhaps
I've overlooked something in the is-ought argument. I don't wanna go
around with the wrong answers. After awhile, I'd feel pretty silly.
-Jordan-
Helen
28f...@posting.google.com>...
> Dave, This actually addresses a previous post, not your most recent.
> So is your argument this??
>
> 1. An ultimate end is the final end/goal to which all lesser
> ends/goals are the means.
> 2. Some animals sometimes risk their lives, and
> even sacrifice them outright (as a means to reproduce successfully).
> 3. So the ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive
> success.
I would put 2. in a much more succinct (and accurate) form: ALL
animals act in such a way as to put reproduction as a higher "goal"
than mere survival. In order to see that this is so, one need only
observe that giving birth to and raising offspring requires a
significant amount of energy and also poses a substantial risk (at
least for the females). From the point of view of indivual survival,
producing offspring would be a complete waste of resources. What we
see is that _all_ (normal) animals behave in such a way as to optimize
their chances of reproduction, not their chances of survival.
As an aside, since this issue frequently comes up in discussions with
"objectivists": Most animals are not simple pre-programmed automata,
any more than humans are. The description of animals as machines, and
as having no choice, is another one of Rand's idiocies. It may apply
to some lower forms of life (that have no central nervous system), and
plants, but not to higher animals.
Matt Ruff
>
> What differentiates a fundamental alternative from a
> non-fundamental one?
Their religion?
-- M. Ruff
Rob
301522....@posting.google.com>...
> Rob <log...@mailandnews.com> wrote
[....]
> > And the fact is that dying is the result (one result) of the automatic
> > functions of living organisms.
>
> I'm not sure what you mean by that; are you saying that a living
> organism that had no automatic functions would not die? (Something
> like David Tomlin's bacillus spores?)
No, I'm not sure what dying would mean for a being that had no
automatic functions to interrupt. Rather, it is a fact about any being
with automatic functions that eventually it dies.
You can't say, consistently with the Rand quote, which denies that
she's talking about teleological principles in nature, that the
automatic functions are directed at life, or at staying alive, since
that is something that no organism ever achieves. Every organism,
sooner or later, dies. (You might say, since it is something that
comes in and can be achieved in degrees, that the automatic functions
are directed at reproductive success.)
[....]
>
> It sonds like you're arguing:
> 1. Death is the end of living.
> 2. The purpose of anything is its end.
> -------
> 3. Death is the purpose of living.
>
> That is clearly an equivocal use of the word 'end.'
It's not my equivocation; it's Rand's. _She_ is the one who said that
by goal-directedness, she was talking about results. I'm just taking
her at her word.
Rob
David Tomlin
> Dave, This actually addresses a previous post, not your most recent.
> So is your argument this??
No.
> 1. An ultimate end is the final end/goal to which all lesser
> ends/goals are the means.
> 2. Some animals sometimes risk their lives, and
> even sacrifice them outright (as a means to reproduce successfully).
> 3. So the ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive
> success.
3 doesn't follow, because the premises don't rule out the possibility
that reproductive success is is a means to some further goal.
> Let me start with premise #2. I think it would be better phrased if we
> said that: Sometimes an animal takes a risk that endangers its life,
> and sometimes these risks end up with the death of the animal but the
> success in its reproductive efforts.
This omits the most clear-cut case, which is the male honeybee.
When a queen bee mates, she extracts the male's gonads and stores them
in her body. The male loses some other organs in the process, so that
the mating is necessarily fatal. If the male survives, it can only mean
the mating was not successful.
> "In situations for which [an animal's] knowledge is inadequate, it
> perishes." (TOE, p.19)
> It doesn't matter whether an animal perishes by getting squashed by a
> Honda or eaten by a female mantis. Rand would just proclaim, "lack of
> knowledge!" and file that fatal action into the pro-death category,
> which sorta brings me to your 3rd premise:
> "The ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive success."
> First, if we say that reproductive success is the ultimate end of an
> animal who dies in the reproductive process, then can we say that
> roadkill is the ultimate end of an animal who dies under the tires of
> a VW?
First, this is a strawman, since I haven't said that 3 follows from
1 and 2.
Second, the immediate end of the animal's action would be whatever it
wanted on the other side of the road - maybe food, maybe a mate. Either
way, it was lack of knowledge that got it killed. But either way, it
wasn't lack knowledge that made it desire the immediate end. It was its
innate knowledge - knowledge that it needed food to live, or knowledge
that it needed a mate to reproduce.
> Next, the only action for which Rand was seeking an ultimate value was
> the action of life, of surviving:
This is hopelessly muddled.
An entity's ultimate value is the ultimate goal of all its actions.
What you say may be true in the sense that Rand concluded that
survival is the ultimate value, so that all an organism's actions
could be considered as components of the single action of survival.
> "Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process of
> self-sustaining action. The goal of that [self-sustaining action],
> the ultimate value...is the organism's life." (TOE, p.16-17).
> If you reproduce
> but self-destroy, then Rand would say that such action is not Life.
This seems to be saying that, in such a case, the organism ceases to
live in some sense before it does so literally. This seems like a
pointless word game.
jposamen
"ALL animals act in such a way as to put reproduction as a higher
"goal" than mere survival."
I say:
I thought we addressed this. I thought we found instances (ex. ants)
where reproduction increases the chances of the individual's survival.
Also, I thought we mentioned that, if some animals' resources are
depleted, they will abandon or eat or kill their offspring.
If we have established these assertions, then it seems that all you
could really claim thus far is: Some animals act in such a way as to
sometimes put reproduction as a higher "goal" than mere survival.
And even that claim seems to misinterpret Rand's argument. As I said
in my last email--if an animal partakes in self-destructive behavior
that deals with reproduction, then it is anti-life (pro-death)
behavior, and Rand would file that under the "amoeba's protoplasm that
stops assimilating food" or the "deer caught in headlights." Neither
creature knows its doom; one lacks physical efficacy, the other,
knowledge.
So even if one accepts that animals' actions are optimized primarily
for reproductive success, it still doesn't refute Rand's argument,
which is (in brief):
The essence of an organism is its life-action, which means that
without it, it would cease to be what it is. Since a thing acts in
accordance with its nature, organism's must live. If they don't, they
die.
Maybe you're saying that reproduction is the fundamental
characteristic of an organism--that reproductive efficacy is its
(essential) nature. But does it pass the "identity test"? -- without
reproductive efficacy, is the organism still the organism? I would say
yes. An organism can be sterile, at the end of its genetic line, and
still be that organism...because it's still alive. Maybe this isn't
what you're saying. I'm still trying to figure it out.
*
Oh, and I completely agree that we shouldn't view ("higher") animals
as living machines, lest we extend that same view to humans. On that
point, I just didn't wanna make waves. This pool is shaky enough! =)
Acar
> <Rand quote:>
>
> > "I use the term 'goal-directed,' in this context, to designate the
> > fact that the automatic functions of living organisms are actions
> > whose nature is such that they _result_ in the preservation of an
> > organism's life."
> >
> You don't NEED to act in order to end up dead; it happens on its own.
> In contrast, your remaining in existence DOES require action, i.e.
> (rational) values.
Wear and tear of intracellular mechanisms is a *direct* consequence of
actions (functions) that promote survival. The building up and tearing down
cycle, with the cumulative bias in favor of tearing down due to lessened
efficiency becoming progressively lessened, are not goal oriented, although
they have definite effects. Cascades of cause and effect do not reflect
planning. Only humans can look forward to results.
Tym Parsons
> > You don't NEED to act in order to end up dead; it happens on its own.
> > In contrast, your remaining in existence DOES require action, i.e.
> > (rational) values.
>
> Wear and tear of intracellular mechanisms is a *direct* consequence of
> actions (functions) that promote survival. The building up and tearing down
> cycle, with the cumulative bias in favor of tearing down due to lessened
> efficiency becoming progressively lessened, are not goal oriented, although
> they have definite effects. Cascades of cause and effect do not reflect
> planning. Only humans can look forward to results.
This is an incoherent muddle. Care to try again?
Tym Parsons
Acar
> Acar wrote:
>
> > > You don't NEED to act in order to end up dead; it happens on its own.
This suggests that death is more natural than life. It is the spontaneous
path. "Nature takes its course".
The point is to look as life as result of a molecular action, not as a
purpose oriented sequence of events, like "nature struggles against itself".
> > > In contrast, your remaining in existence DOES require action, i.e.
> > > (rational) values.
> >
> > Wear and tear of intracellular mechanisms is a *direct* consequence of
> > actions (functions) that promote survival. The building up and tearing
down
> > cycle, with the cumulative bias in favor of tearing down due to lessened
> > efficiency becoming progressively lessened, are not goal oriented,
although
> > they have definite effects. Cascades of cause and effect do not reflect
> > planning. Only humans can look forward to results.
>
> This is an incoherent muddle. Care to try again?
I will because I believe that yoour comprehension honestly failed.
Let's call this reply an aid to comprehension of what is plainly written:
" The building up and tearing down cycle". You've heard of it. Anabolism and
catabolism.
"...with the cumulative bias in favor of tearing down" Wear and tear.
Physical systems become increasingly less efficient with each use.
"...due to lessened efficiency becoming progressively lessened..." Ditto.
Every time that you use a transmission it's that much closer to eventual
failure. The "goal" is in the driver's head. In the transmission itself
there's just gears in motion, wear and tear. While the goal of the driver is
to to achieve a function, one could facetiously say that the natural "goal"
of the transmission itself is to fail (grinding metal). You even put oil in
it to thwart its natural "goal". But the transmission doesn't have an
anbolic phase, you say. Well, in metabolic systems it works the same way;
they are electrochemical. One step toward life and two steps toward death.
It's called aging. Have you heard of rechargeable batteries. Of course.
Helen
Yes, we did, and I did.
> I thought we found instances (ex. ants)
> where reproduction increases the chances of the individual's survival.
> Also, I thought we mentioned that, if some animals' resources are
> depleted, they will abandon or eat or kill their offspring.
That does not contradict anything I said. In simple mathematical
terms, the behavior of all species is adjusted so as to optimize
reproductive success, but it is in general sub-optimal for mere
survival. The two optima may be very close or even identical in
certain cases, but survival is not normally favored over reproduction.
> If we have established these assertions, then it seems that all you
> could really claim thus far is: Some animals act in such a way as to
> sometimes put reproduction as a higher "goal" than mere survival.
No, I can claim much more. I wrote about this issue at length before,
and according to what you write below this is not central or even
important for your argument anyway, so I'll just leave it at that.
> So even if one accepts that animals' actions are optimized primarily
> for reproductive success, it still doesn't refute Rand's argument,
> which is (in brief):
O.k., let's go down this route...
> The essence of an organism is its life-action, which means that
> without it, it would cease to be what it is.
Strike that sentence. It is either simply wrong, or trivial. An
organism that stops to act in a certain way does not, by
that-nonaction, immediately become a non-organism. While it is true
that in the long run it will probably die, that does not mean that it
is not a living being before that happens. If somebody goes on a
hunger strike, he is still a human being as long as he's alive. If
"without life-action" is simply an elaborate way of saying "dead",
then, yes, but so what?
> Since a thing acts in
> accordance with its nature, organism's must live.
The first half of that sentence is a little bit silly, because nothing
follows from it. It just means a thing is what it is, and that is just
as empty as the infamous A=A...
But yes, an organism, by definition, must live. If it is not alive, we
don't call it an organism.
> If they don't, they die.
You are saying "if they don't live, they die"? Doesn't make much sense
this way.
Or are you saying "If they don't act in accordance with their nature,
they die"? I would first note that in that sentence you are subtly
twisting what you said before. Before, according to what I said above,
"if they don't act in accordance with their nature" was just a way of
saying "if they are not what they are", which makes the statement
again patently silly. But let's grant you your little trick there, and
take the sentence as it is.
Well, then things would depend on what you now mean by "in accordance
with their nature". Certainly an organism can act in very unnatural
ways without necessarily causing its death. But of course, you can
always define "according to their nature" such that the above is a
tautology, but then you would continue to say nothing of interest.
Just like Alissa-in-Wonderland...
> Maybe you're saying that reproduction is the fundamental
> characteristic of an organism--that reproductive efficacy is its
> (essential) nature.
Commonly there is more than one fundamental characteristic that is
considered essential for the definition of life. Both reproduction and
self-sustaining action are essential.
> But does it pass the "identity test"? -- without
> reproductive efficacy, is the organism still the organism? I would say
> yes. An organism can be sterile, at the end of its genetic line, and
> still be that organism...because it's still alive.
An organism can also act in inappropriate ways (as far as its chances
of survival are concerned), and still be alive, even for a long time,
if it is lucky.
Tym Parsons
> > > > You don't NEED to act in order to end up dead; it happens on its own.
>
> This suggests that death is more natural than life.
It suggests no such thing, since life and death are obviously both a
part of nature. I meant no more and no less than what I said. The
distinctive thing about LIFE is that it requires internally-generated
action in the entities that have it, in order for them to continue as
such. Deny?
<snip>
> The point is to look as life as result of a molecular action,
It's not Rand's point.
> not as a purpose oriented sequence of events, like "nature struggles agai
> nst > itself".
Rand doesn't characterise life as a "purpose oriented sequence of
events". This is concept-stealing, since it invokes the concept
"purpose", which is genetically dependent upon the prior notion of a
living entity possessing a conceptual consciousness.
> > > > In contrast, your remaining in existence DOES require action, i.e.
> > > > (rational) values.
<snip obscure reply>
> Every time that you use a transmission it's that much closer to eventual
> failure. The "goal" is in the driver's head. In the transmission itself
> there's just gears in motion, wear and tear. While the goal of the driver is
> to to achieve a function, one could facetiously say that the natural "goal"
> of the transmission itself is to fail (grinding metal).
Facetious indeed, since "transmissions" as such (or the physical
processes that sustain life) aren't literally ends in themselves.
They merely function toward such ends, which only integrated living
entities have. So your point has no bearing on what I say above.
Tym Parsons
jposamen
It seems you and I differ about what characteristic is essential to an
organism.
I say that an organism's essence is its life-action. IMO, that's a
pretty obvious statement, but it's significant to Rand's argument, so
I explicated it for clarity. You take away the action an organism
needs to survive, and it'll die. I think you see the validity of this
claim.
Helen writes: "An organism that stops to act in a certain way does
not, by that-nonaction, immediately become a non-organism."
I write: If that action is life-action (a category subsuming lots of
actions), then the organism dies. As I wrote in a post regarding
causality, the importance of a characteristic is directly proportional
to its influence on an entity's actions. So to say "that a thing acts
in accordance with its nature" is important because action follows
from essence. And aren't we discussion actions here?
At least we agree that an organism must live in order to be an
organism. Heh. Doesn't get us very far, but it's something.
If organisms don't live, they die = if an organism doesn't act in
accordance with its nature, it's no longer that organism.
I disagree that "certainly an organism can act in very unnatural ways
without necessarily causing its death." I don't know what you mean by
"unnatural," but I think you might define it differently than me.
Anything an organism can do is, by definition, natural to that
organism. If it acts unusually, that is probably because a
non-essential (or unusual) characteristic precipitated a non-essential
(or unusual) action.
Helen writes: "An organism can also act in inappropriate ways (as far
as its chances of survival are concerned), and still be alive, even
for a long time,
if it is lucky."
I say: Ain't it the truth! We agree. And we've addressed this
point. It's the deer caught in headlights or the faulty kidney.
I wonder if perhaps we're talking about different "causes" of an
organism. I think I'm talking about the formal cause, and you, about
the efficient or final cause. (I'm a bit rusty on Aristotle's 4
causes). This might make a difference in our discussion. Likewise,
one of us might be epistemology, while the other, metaphysics.
Possibilities. Just trying to make progress. Not trying to hedge
around the issues here.
Speaking of which, I had no intention of word-twisting or trickery.
Your hostility toward folks on this discussion board need not be
directed toward me. My errors are born of honesty and accident; my
intentions, only to get to the bottom of things, not to make you a
crazy cultist.
-Jordan-
George Dance
85c...@posting.google.com>...
> George Dance <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<6312c50b.0207
> 301522....@posting.google.com>...
> > Rob <log...@mailandnews.com> wrote
> [....]
> > > And the fact is that dying is the result (one result) of the automatic
> > > functions of living organisms.
> >
> > I'm not sure what you mean by that; are you saying that a living
> > organism that had no automatic functions would not die? (Something
> > like David Tomlin's bacillus spores?)
>
> No, I'm not sure what dying would mean for a being that had no
> automatic functions to interrupt. Rather, it is a fact about any being
> with automatic functions that eventually it dies.
But dying in no way is an effect of the functions (well, it could be
if the functions were inadequate for the environment; but that was not
something that Rand denied). OTC, immediate (in some cases) and
inevitable (in some cases) death is caused by cessation of some of
those functions.
> You can't say, consistently with the Rand quote, which denies that
> she's talking about teleological principles in nature, that the
> automatic functions are directed at life, or at staying alive, since
> that is something that no organism ever achieves.
Nonsense. We've both managed to stay alive since our last exchange of
messages. And that precisely because of things that we both (as
organisms) have done (at least, I know last bit is true of myself, and
I'm inferring it by analogy for you 8)
> Every organism,
> sooner or later, dies. (You might say, since it is something that
> comes in and can be achieved in degrees, that the automatic functions
> are directed at reproductive success.)
That would be silly. There are some organisms that never reproduce;
some that cannot reproduce; and some that no longer reproduce. Yet
they have internally-generated processes that result in some specific
outcomes rather than others; which would not be the case, if those
processes were dependent on being able to have 'reproductive
success').
David Tomlin
> The
> distinctive thing about LIFE is that it requires internally-generated
> action in the entities that have it, in order for them to continue as
> such. Deny?
Stars go through some spectacular changes when they stop producing
energy by fusion.
George Dance
6dea...@posting.google.com>...
Fair enough. The fusion of a star qualifies as
'internally-generated'; it is a continuing process, the continuance of
which does not depend entirely on the presence of external events.
One can even extend the analogy, to say that the fusion process is
equivalent (necessary and sufficient) to that body's being a star.
The analogy is so strong, that one can even speak of a similar body
without that function as a 'dead star.'
I see nothing wrong with accepting that analogy, as I think it helps
make clear what is meant by an organism's life being equivalent to (at
least some of) the organism's functions.
But there are important differences between the star and the organism:
1) the star's fusion is independent of external events - it consumes
itself; whereas the organism's functions depend on bringing in
external fuel.
2) the organism's functions include the behaviour of bringing in
external fuel, whereas the star - even one that is about to die
because all its fuel is exhausted - has no functions that allow it any
other source of fuel.
I am not sure, off-hand, of the best way to incorporate these two
points into a definition of 'life' so as to draw the relevant
distinction. All I am claiming here, as a certainty, is that the
distinction is real and meaningful.
Helen
b97...@posting.google.com>...
> It seems you and I differ about what characteristic is essential to an
> organism.
Partially so, I guess. I said there is more than one essential
characteristic, you seem to be saying the only thing essential is
"life-action". From what I gather, "life-action" seems to be just a
synonym for "being alive" with you. I'm sure you will correct me if I
got that wrong.
> I say that an organism's essence is its life-action. IMO, that's a
> pretty obvious statement, but it's significant to Rand's argument, so
> I explicated it for clarity. You take away the action an organism
> needs to survive, and it'll die. I think you see the validity of this
> claim.
With "life-action" as defined above, sure. But as I said, that is
simply tautological, so I can't see how that could be relevant to any
argument at all.
> If organisms don't live, they die = if an organism doesn't act in
> accordance with its nature, it's no longer that organism.
Didn't you also claim that anything that exists has to act in
accordance with its nature anyway? In that framework, the above still
says nothing more exciting than "an organism is an organism". While
there is nothing wrong with that, nothing follows from it either.
> I disagree that "certainly an organism can act in very unnatural ways
> without necessarily causing its death." I don't know what you mean by
> "unnatural," but I think you might define it differently than me.
I think I now understand what you mean by acting "unnatural", and yes,
it was not the same I had in mind at that point.
But at this point, you have not made any progress that I can see
towards making any sort of an argument for anything, let alone derive
a basis for a moral theory. I wonder how you are planning to proceed
towards that goal.
John Alway
6dea...@posting.google.com>...
These appear to be different in kind. In the human body there is a
complex network of cells of various kinds which together make life
possible, and those cells are in place because of the fact that they
make life possible. Iows, because of evolution, i.e. survival value,
you have cells arranged in your body the way they are. There is a
sense of *direction* with living things. Flowers act to grow and
bloom and *seek* the food and energy to do so. All of these actions
are non-conscious for flowers, but they're built into the cellular
mechanisms.
A Sun just burns. It doesn't have any direction. It doesn't take
action to burn. It either does or it doesn't.
Bang on.
...John
Rob
> But dying in no way is an effect of the functions
Why not? Show me a being that dies without having those functions.
> > Every organism,
> > sooner or later, dies. (You might say, since it is something that
> > comes in and can be achieved in degrees, that the automatic functions
> > are directed at reproductive success.)
>
> That would be silly. There are some organisms that never reproduce;
> some that cannot reproduce; and some that no longer reproduce. Yet
> they have internally-generated processes that result in some specific
> outcomes rather than others; which would not be the case, if those
> processes were dependent on being able to have 'reproductive
> success').
The fact that some organisms don't reproduce is at most relevant to
whether _their_ automatic functions are directed at reproduction. In
organisms that do reproduce or whose probaility of reproducing is
raised by their automatic functions, those functions can be directed
at successful reproduction. But actually, that's too much of a
concession. The function of a mating call (what it's directed at) may
be to attract a mate -- and that may be true even if it fails to do
so.
With regard to survival, though, no organism ever survives more than
temporarily. So, the function, if judged by actual results (as the
Rand quote said) cannot be (simply) to survive. It is at most to
survive for the time being (and eventually die). Why isn't dying,
then, part of the ultimate value? (I do not mean to be arguing that
dying is or is part of the ultimate value: the point is that if it is
to be excluded, Rand's argument won't get you there. She's making
assumptions about what is important that she's reading back into the
evidence she is supposedly relying upon. Those assumptions aren't
warranted by any argument she has given.)
Rob
Eudaimonus
"Helen" <ghmoh...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:5652a7c5.02080...@posting.google.com...
> Didn't you also claim that anything that exists has to act in
> accordance with its nature anyway? In that framework, the above still
> says nothing more exciting than "an organism is an organism". While
> there is nothing wrong with that, nothing follows from it either.
Am I the only one, who can see in this, just how intricately connected a
philosophy is objectivism?
See how Helen is appealing to the analytic/synthetic dichotomy to discredit
Rand's meta-ethics.
George Dance
bc...@posting.google.com>...
Anyone who has owned a cat or dog (including Rand) can infer that they
are capable of both learning and originating action, and therefore of
thought and voliton, in the same way one can infer it of other humans.
It is equally apparent that human thought or volition is of a
different order of magnitude than feline or canine thought or
volition, and that was the difference Rand wanted to emphasize: that
cats 'act automatically' relative to the way humans act (and insects
'automatically' relative to cats, thus even more 'automatically'
relative to humans, and so on).
Tym Parsons
You honestly don't see any significant difference between this and
living entities? What philosophic relevance does this example have,
especially as regards metaethics?
Tym Parsons
Fred Weiss
"Eudaimonus" <jwsc...@insightbb.com> wrote in message
news:2Ul39.282630$uw.1...@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net...
Amen.
Fred Weiss
jposamen
you seem to be saying the only thing essential is 'life-action'."
I say:
When there is more than one characteristic that distinguishes
something from other things, then one must apply the "rule of
fundamentality" to determine which characteristic constitutes its
nature. Only one of those distinguishing characteristics can be the
one upon which the greatest number of other characteristics depend.
So although reproductive activity is special to living organisms, I
would say that it's not the fundamental characteristic. Life is more
fundamental than reproductive activity; perhaps you would say
otherwise?
Yeah, "life-action" = "being alive." I haven't advanced my argument
far past that, but I contend that something does follow from what I've
said. If we figure out an organism's essence, then we figure out its
actions, i.e., what it takes to continue to be that organism. So if
we figure out a human's essence, we figure out what actions he/she
will take (to keep on being human). Actions are based on essence.
Find out the essence of a human, and you find what a human needs to do
to stay human.
Maybe now you'll ask--"why should ethics be based on the actions it
takes to remain human?"
I'll try to provide a more thorough answer later, but for now, I'll
say that anything other basis would depend on survival action. If you
don't seek survival action before other actions, those lesser actions
will not be met.
I'm still working on a formal argument for an is-ought derivation.
-Jordan-
David Tomlin
> David Tomlin wrote:
> > I don't know
> > exactly what propositions are subsumed under "Rand's
> > account here."
> Her validation and definition of the concepts "life" and "value",
> which you seemed to object to.
I do object to Rand's definition of "life." Rand had little
if any interest in biological science, so it's no surprise
she didn't use a particularly good definition of "life." I've
been discussing that very point on another thread.
"Value", OTOH, is a technical term in ethical philosophy. I
don't object to Rand defining it in any way that she wants,
as long as she uses it consistently.
Does she use "value" consistently? As far as I can discern
at the moment, she does.
I don't mean that she doesn't use the word in different senses.
She does do that, and it can be confusing. However, I think
the sense she intends is always clear upon careful reading.
Jim Klein
> I would put 2. in a much more succinct (and accurate) form: ALL
> animals act in such a way as to put reproduction as a higher "goal"
> than mere survival. In order to see that this is so, one need only
> observe that giving birth to and raising offspring requires a
> significant amount of energy and also poses a substantial risk (at
> least for the females). From the point of view of indivual survival,
> producing offspring would be a complete waste of resources. What we
> see is that _all_ (normal) animals behave in such a way as to optimize
> their chances of reproduction, not their chances of survival.
Correct. This would make sense considering that the distinctive aspect of
the molecular formations which are the apparent bases of all life, is their
tendency toward replication. And more precisely, "tendency toward" should
be read as "manifestation of," in an existential sense.
I wonder why so many so-called Objectivists are loathe to see this
fundamental role of replication in living matter. They even get reduced to
arguing insanities like Dean Sandin once did...that a salmon who swims to
its death in order to spawn is actually furthering its life.
Qua salmon, dontchyaknow. I'd like to see an A that _doesn't_ act qua A!
> As an aside, since this issue frequently comes up in discussions with
> "objectivists": Most animals are not simple pre-programmed automata,
> any more than humans are. The description of animals as machines, and
> as having no choice, is another one of Rand's idiocies. It may apply
> to some lower forms of life (that have no central nervous system), and
> plants, but not to higher animals.
Incorrect. Absent conceptual ability, and particularly the ability to
conceptualize outcomes over time, the concept of <choice> is empty. You can
say that a lower animal responds to this perceptual input or that one, but
that's not really a choice. Choosing is the ability to abstractly
conceptualize at least two options of action and then deciding which one to
take. If you can't conceptualize at all, then you can't conceptualize the
choices. And if you can't conceptualize the choices, you can't pick one of
them.
That the CNS motivates an organism to action, as it admittedly does even in
lower animals, is not sufficient to establish the existence of choices. So
you see, Helen...similarities notwithstanding, you really are different than
a porcupine!
jk
Tym Parsons
> I do object to Rand's definition of "life." Rand had little
> if any interest in biological science, so it's no surprise
> she didn't use a particularly good definition of "life."
What's wrong with her definition? It seems you've ended up agreeing
with me about it so far.
<snip>
> "Value", OTOH, is a technical term in ethical philosophy. I
> don't object to Rand defining it in any way that she wants,
> as long as she uses it consistently.
What about using it with reference to the facts of reality? Isn't
that important too?
Tym Parsons
George Dance
bc...@posting.google.com>...
> jposamen <jpos...@yahoo.com> wrote in message news:<c4e24252.0207311320.7f
> 28f...@posting.google.com>...
> > So is your argument this??
snip
> > 2. Some animals sometimes risk their lives, and
> > even sacrifice them outright (as a means to reproduce successfully).
> > 3. So the ultimate end of these animals' actions is reproductive
> > success.
>
> I would put 2. in a much more succinct (and accurate) form: ALL
> animals act in such a way as to put reproduction as a higher "goal"
> than mere survival.
I'm not sure exactly what your claim means; do all animals always, in
general, or only sometimes act this way?
Nor is it clear what you mean by 'reproduction' and 'survival'. If
you mean 'the animal's own reproduction,' the premise is false if
there are any animals that do not reproduce (unless they 'don't
count,' of course 8).
Using the term 'reproduction' to include things other than an animal's
own reproduction - eg, action that increases the chances of
reproduction for a genetically similar being - would imply using
'survival' in the same way. Yet that is not how you are using
'survival'.
> In order to see that this is so, one need only
> observe that giving birth to and raising offspring requires a
> significant amount of energy and also poses a substantial risk (at
> least for the females).
Some animals do not give birth; many that do do not raise their
offspring;
even those that do both do not do them continuously. It does not seem
logical to say that an animal that is not giving birth or raising
offspring holds either goal as 'higher' than those to which its
behaviour is directed.
> From the point of view of indivual survival,
> producing offspring would be a complete waste of resources.
Not necessarily. There have been some examples given of cases in
which the organism's survival is enhanced by having offspring, and
others could be found. I think you mean that 'producting offspring
*can* be a complete waste of resources'.
> What we
> see is that _all_ (normal) animals behave in such a way as to optimize
> their chances of reproduction, not their chances of survival.
What we see in nature is that there is no normal, optimum, or even
fittest, reproduction strategy for all animals. Instead, there is a
gamut of behaviours that can be put into three general categories:
1) the animal breeds massive numbers of offspring, and does not care
for them.
2) the animal breeds a large (wrt 3) or small (wrt 1) number of
offspring, and cares for them for a limited time.
3) the animal breeds very few offspring, and cares for them at
considerable length.
Obviously, all three cannot be the optimum strategy.
David Tomlin
> What's wrong with her definition?
First, it omits most of the characteristics that biologists
use in defining "life."
See
http://www.garlic.com/~rogers/lifebio1.html
http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/bio99/bio99171.htm
Second, "self-generated action" is problematical. I have
discussed that on the thread titled
"By Steps From Is To Ought." If you don't want to browse
the thread, you can search keywords "self-generated."
We've been discussing essentially the same point, although
you used the phrase "internally generated."
"Goal-directed" is also problematical. I think it makes
sense to describe biological functions as "goal-directed",
but I can't give a precise account of what I mean by that.
Rand got tangled up by trying to, in a footnote.
> > "Value", OTOH, is a technical term in ethical philosophy. I
> > don't object to Rand defining it in any way that she wants,
> > as long as she uses it consistently.
> What about using it with reference to the facts of reality?
> Isn't that important too?
That's an Objectivist catch-phrase. I don't think in such
terms. You may make of that what you will.
Rod Nibbe
> "Helen" <GHMoh...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
> news:1a8f5fe5.02080...@posting.google.com...
>>I would put 2. in a much more succinct (and accurate) form: ALL
>>animals act in such a way as to put reproduction as a higher "goal"
>>than mere survival. In order to see that this is so, one need only
>>observe that giving birth to and raising offspring requires a
>>significant amount of energy and also poses a substantial risk (at
>>least for the females). From the point of view of indivual survival,
>>producing offspring would be a complete waste of resources. What we
>>see is that _all_ (normal) animals behave in such a way as to optimize
>>their chances of reproduction, not their chances of survival.
> Correct. This would make sense considering that the distinctive aspect of
> the molecular formations which are the apparent bases of all life, is their
> tendency toward replication. And more precisely, "tendency toward" should
> be read as "manifestation of," in an existential sense.
I continue to be half miffed and half amused by the quoted words in
this and related threads such as "goal", and "purpose", and "design".
Even more I'm puzzled why someone like you so easily tolerates these
metaphors, particularly when proffered as the supposed explanation of
the goal of all life systems. Gordon was right about this much, in order
to conclude A is subordinate to B in the context of goals, one would
have to observe life forms faced with an alternative (A or B, i.e. one
outcome OR the other) and see them choosing reproduction over survival.
For a number of reasons this is impossible (which accounts for all these
flowery 'as-if' metaphors, IMO), not the least of which is that life
forms, with the exception of human beings, evidently don't choose to
reproduce. It's simply *one* -- albeit a fabulous one -- of the many
things the phenotype does.
-RKN
Beaten Paths Are For Beaten Men
Tym Parsons
> > What's wrong with her definition?
>
> First, it omits most of the characteristics that biologists
> use in defining "life."
>
> See
> http://www.garlic.com/~rogers/lifebio1.html
> http://www.newton.dep.anl.gov/askasci/bio99/bio99171.htm
I went to the latter website, and the criteria were either
nonessential, insufficient, or subsumed by Rand's definition of life.
> Second, "self-generated action" is problematical. I have
> discussed that on the thread titled
> "By Steps From Is To Ought." If you don't want to browse
> the thread, you can search keywords "self-generated."
>
> We've been discussing essentially the same point, although
> you used the phrase "internally generated."
>
> "Goal-directed" is also problematical. I think it makes
> sense to describe biological functions as "goal-directed",
> but I can't give a precise account of what I mean by that.
> Rand got tangled up by trying to, in a footnote.
Now see here. You just got done conceding every one of my points; now
you're acting like all this was never discussed. You're going to have
to do better than that. If there's some aspect of these we haven't
discussed, you're going to have to bring it up here.
> > > "Value", OTOH, is a technical term in ethical philosophy. I
> > > don't object to Rand defining it in any way that she wants,
> > > as long as she uses it consistently.
Ditto.
> > What about using it with reference to the facts of reality?
> > Isn't that important too?
>
> That's an Objectivist catch-phrase.
It's not merely a "catch-phrase". Modern-day philosophers, for
example, could care less about reality, as long as their symbolic
logic propositions are all in a row.
> I don't think in such terms. You may make of that what you will.
You don't think in terms of reality? :-o
Tym Parsons
Jim Klein
news:3D569854...@rknibbe.com...
> > Correct. This would make sense considering that the distinctive aspect
of
> > the molecular formations which are the apparent bases of all life, is
their
> > tendency toward replication. And more precisely, "tendency toward"
> should be read as "manifestation of," in an existential sense.
>
>
> I continue to be half miffed and half amused by the quoted words in
> this and related threads such as "goal", and "purpose", and "design".
> Even more I'm puzzled why someone like you so easily tolerates these
> metaphors, particularly when proffered as the supposed explanation of
> the goal of all life systems.
I don't; that's why I clarified "tendency toward" as really meaning
"'manifestation of' in an existential sense." I intended to thwart exactly
the objection you're offering.
Of course there are no "goals" in any meaningful sense. That was the whole
point of my second paragraph, demonstrating why in the absence of
conceptualization, there's not even such a thing as _choice_. I'd think
it's obvious that the absence of a choice renders any goal likewise absent.
> Gordon was right about this much, in order
> to conclude A is subordinate to B in the context of goals, one would
> have to observe life forms faced with an alternative (A or B, i.e. one
> outcome OR the other) and see them choosing reproduction over survival.
> For a number of reasons this is impossible (which accounts for all these
> flowery 'as-if' metaphors, IMO), not the least of which is that life
> forms, with the exception of human beings, evidently don't choose to
> reproduce. It's simply *one* -- albeit a fabulous one -- of the many
> things the phenotype does.
Absolutely...I don't disagree with a word of this. "Manifestation of," was
my way of putting it. It's still the case that this replicative
manifestation is a--perhaps the--defining aspect of life. That doesn't make
it a goal; it's just what distinguishes it from everything else.
Sorry if I wasn't clear. FYI, it's Greg who has a real problem with what
you're saying, not me. IMHO it's _the_ thing which stops his accurate
rendition of human nature from being a part of a much wider philosophical
presentation. Like Rand, he associates human goal-direction with some sort
of innate goal-direction present in all life. In higher species he calls
this "will," as if it were a sort of causation different from other "types"
of causation. But that's wrong; causation is just _our_ way of organizing
manifested actions into a time-ordered context. In the very, very widest
context, nothing causes anything else by will or by any other design;
everything just is and does what it does. I think this is the point you're
making, right?
We speak of "free will" and of course it is. But that _meaning_ is
contextual; it references a conceptual being conceiving choices and opting
among them, plus motivating its body pursuant to those choices. It's a
wondrous and joyous thing, but it's not outside of the so-called
"deterministic universe," which just references the fact that all existents
are as they are and do as they do. For some reason Greg seems to think that
if he accepts the deterministic nature of the universe as it is, that this
will somehow render our actions either less than fully free or less than
fully God-like in their results. I don't know why he thinks that---even in
a deterministic universe a human is a human and is capable of all the great
things he imagines. The determinism of the universe doesn't affect free
will a bit, and everything about human action is tied up with that. To me,
it's sort of like Greg isn't satisfied being perhaps the most knowledgeable
person about humans on the planet; he's got to have this even wider theory
about "will" being a (second? third?) type of causation present throughout
the universe. It's one of his very few errors IMO.
BTW, the best thread ever on the particular topic of goal-direction was one
several years ago, beginning with "Binswanger's Errors"...in the header.
Vincent Cook was at his masterful best, knocking down every comer--and there
were a bunch of them, not just simple-minded ARIans--with a single punch on
a myriad of rationalizations about why life is "goal-directed." Dorothy was
still alive at the time, and that thread shows why she was a better
philosopher than a whole gaggle of academics. IMO it was one of the classic
threads of hpo, aptly demonstrating how today's so-called Objectivists
simply refuse to think, and will go to any length (or is it depth?) to stick
with a faithfully accepted premise.
So I'm wholly with you, Rod, that on this planet, only humans have goals.
And given the state of the world recently, I think we might have to adjust
that premise so that it includes only _some_ humans!
jk
David Tomlin
> You're going to have
> to do better than that. If there's some aspect of these we haven't
> discussed, you're going to have to bring it up here.
People who aren't signing paychecks for me don't get to tell
me what I have to do.
Helen
101618....@posting.google.com>...
> I'm not sure exactly what your claim means; do all animals always, in
> general, or only sometimes act this way?
In another post I had clarified this further. To reiterate, the
behavior of all species is adjusted so as to optimize reproductive
success (of the species; for individuals this means that they, on
average, act to optimize reproductive success of their genes, or
closely related genes), but it is in general sub-optimal for mere
survival. The two optima may be very close or even identical in
certain cases, but survival is not normally favored over reproduction.
The "normally" in the previous sentence means that a species that
favors survival over reproduction is not stable, as can easily be
shown.
> Nor is it clear what you mean by 'reproduction' and 'survival'. If
> you mean 'the animal's own reproduction,' the premise is false if
> there are any animals that do not reproduce (unless they 'don't
> count,' of course 8).
Of course, I am not talking about the individual animal's
reproduction; the individual phenotype is irrelevant. I am talking
about reproduction of gene systems. Strictly speaking, that is what
reproduces, not any individual animal.
> Using the term 'reproduction' to include things other than an animal's
> own reproduction - eg, action that increases the chances of
> reproduction for a genetically similar being - would imply using
> 'survival' in the same way. Yet that is not how you are using
> 'survival'.
No, it does not imply using "survival" in the same way. It does make
sense to talk about the reproduction of sets of genes, whereas talking
about a single or pair of individuals "reproducing" is more of a
metaphor, see above. In contrast, talking about the survival of
individuals is straightforward.
> Some animals do not give birth; many that do do not raise their
> offspring;
> even those that do both do not do them continuously. It does not seem
> logical to say that an animal that is not giving birth or raising
> offspring holds either goal as 'higher' than those to which its
> behaviour is directed.
If the animal invests any energy at all into an activity that does not
further or endangers (as is true for the males in many species) to
some degree its own survival, then its behavior is sub-optimal with
respect to the goal of surviving.
> Not necessarily. There have been some examples given of cases in
> which the organism's survival is enhanced by having offspring, and
> others could be found. I think you mean that 'producting offspring
> *can* be a complete waste of resources'.
Yes, I would say that it very often is, with some exceptions proving
the rule.
> What we see in nature is that there is no normal, optimum, or even
> fittest, reproduction strategy for all animals.
Well, of course not. I thought it was understood that we are talking
about local optima here. Claiming that any animal has achieved a
global optimum would fly in the face of the obvious evidence, to avoid
saying that it would be simply inane. After all, we do know that there
is more than one species on this planet, don't we?
Helen
tl.mindspring.net>...
> Incorrect. Absent conceptual ability, and particularly the ability to
> conceptualize outcomes over time, the concept of <choice> is empty. You can
> say that a lower animal responds to this perceptual input or that one, but
> that's not really a choice. Choosing is the ability to abstractly
> conceptualize at least two options of action and then deciding which one to
> take. If you can't conceptualize at all, then you can't conceptualize the
> choices. And if you can't conceptualize the choices, you can't pick one of
> them.
Two remarks:
First of all, I think you are redefining "choice" to mean something
quite different (and much more strict) than is commonly understood
under this term. Specifically, let's say a rat has been trained to
pick among a number of boxes with food, that are distinguished by
different colored little lamps that are mounted on top of each of the
boxes. Let's say the rat has learned (or would that be "learned" for
you?) that the box with the red light contains the best food, the one
with the green light contains water. If the rat picks the box with the
red light when she is hungry, and the one with the green light when
she is thirsty, why in the world would you refuse to call that
"choice"? What words would you use to describe her behavior? Finally,
what percentage of cases where humans select among alternative courses
of action do you think will meet your strict requirements for genuine
"choice"?
Second, I think you acknowledge that humans evolved from simpler life
forms. Assume you could go back in biological history, and observe
each of the individual ancestors of modern humans. Can you show me the
individual that first exercised genuine choice? How do you know that
this individual is "choosing", versus whatever else you think you
should name what she is doing when she is not "choosing"?
-- Helen
Helen
.com>...
> I continue to be half miffed and half amused by the quoted words in
> this and related threads such as "goal", and "purpose", and "design".
I guess that is because you are using your very own, private
dictionary of the English language. For the rest of us, these words
fit their purpose in what I and others write quite nicely. It seems,
however, that "objectivists" feel compelled to redefine such common
words in order to be able to deny the parts of reality they don't
like...
Rod Nibbe
> "Rod Nibbe" <r...@rknibbe.com> wrote in message
> news:3D569854...@rknibbe.com...
>> Jim Klein wrote:
>>>Correct. This would make sense considering that the distinctive aspect
>>>of the molecular formations which are the apparent bases of all life, is
>>>their tendency toward replication. And more precisely, "tendency toward
>>>should be read as "manifestation of," in an existential sense.
>> I continue to be half miffed and half amused by the quoted words in
>>this and related threads such as "goal", and "purpose", and "design".
>>Even more I'm puzzled why someone like you so easily tolerates these
>>metaphors, particularly when proffered as the supposed explanation of
>>the goal of all life systems.
> I don't; that's why I clarified "tendency toward" as really meaning
> "'manifestation of' in an existential sense." I intended to thwart exactly
> the objection you're offering.
Guess I got hung up on your first word -- "Correct" -- which sounded
to me like acceptance. Sorry. The cause of my mixed emotion was the fact
that metaphors aren't correct or incorrect, but worse, in the context of
this debate, they're tendentious and misleading.
> Of course there are no "goals" in any meaningful sense. That was the whole
> point of my second paragraph, demonstrating why in the absence of
> conceptualization, there's not even such a thing as _choice_. I'd think
> it's obvious that the absence of a choice renders any goal likewise absent.
You would think so. Though I caution you to beware of the numerous
definitions of conceptualize running loose out there. There are some
people who believe that when they see a life form take one action as
opposed to a different action, a different action that the life form
*could* have just as readily taken, that this then is an instance of a
choice being made by that life form. And since choice implies
conceptualization, therefore animals (at least) can conceptualize to
some extent. So the story goes. Personally, I find that definition of
choice to be far too generous.
>>Gordon was right about this much, in order
>>to conclude A is subordinate to B in the context of goals, one would
>>have to observe life forms faced with an alternative (A or B, i.e. one
>>outcome OR the other) and see them choosing reproduction over survival.
>>For a number of reasons this is impossible (which accounts for all these
>>flowery 'as-if' metaphors, IMO), not the least of which is that life
>>forms, with the exception of human beings, evidently don't choose to
>>reproduce. It's simply *one* -- albeit a fabulous one -- of the many
>>things the phenotype does.
> Absolutely...I don't disagree with a word of this. "Manifestation of," was
> my way of putting it. It's still the case that this replicative
> manifestation is a--perhaps the--defining aspect of life. That doesn't make
> it a goal; it's just what distinguishes it from everything else.
We don't seem to disagree, and I hope you don't mind if I talk
through you for a moment. Of course when you consider the evolution of
all life on this planet, taken in that sense, reproduction is the
defining aspect of life -- no reproduction, no evolution. That much is
beyond debate. What bothers me is this tendentious fixation on the role
of the reproductive cells in the phenotype to the exclusion of all the
others. Most of the cells in an organism don't directly enable the
phenotype's ability to reproduce (sexually or asexually). Take a human
kidney for instance. It's function is to detoxify the body, and do it's
part to keep an organism alive. If you study the physiology of a kidney,
it's truly staggering to comprehend the sheer complication of its
constituent cells and how they work together as an organ. You can
probably think of many similar examples. Examples that are unlike the
uterus, for instance, which does directly enable sexual reproduction.
Okay, most cells don't directly enable reproduction, so what? Well,
for one, if reproduction was the ultimate goal of the phenotype --
again, our incredulity with such metaphors notwithstanding -- why on
earth would organisms have such complicated apparatus to accomplish
replication? Surely if genetic replication was really the "ultimate
goal" in any sense, one wouldn't expect such elaborate phenotypes to
accomplish only that. Why kill and an ant with a cannon, right?
I've read one of the popular answers to that question which I
personally find dissatisfying, as do others, and I expect that since the
answer entails a long drawn out 'as-if' metaphor it would bend your
credulity beyond proportion as well. Suffice it to say it's probably a
question you ought to think about in the context of this thread.
Returning to your point about a defining aspect of life, I think it's
important to distinguish between a single life and all of life that has
evolved since day one, especially when talking about the functions of
elaborate organizations of cells, or the genes that code for those
cells. While it is true that without self replication you and I wouldn't
be here talking, does that in and of itself make self replication worthy
of the importance some people here place on it?
> Sorry if I wasn't clear. FYI, it's Greg who has a real problem with what
> you're saying, not me. IMHO it's _the_ thing which stops his accurate
> rendition of human nature from being a part of a much wider philosophical
> presentation. Like Rand, he associates human goal-direction with some sort
> of innate goal-direction present in all life. In higher species he calls
> this "will," as if it were a sort of causation different from other "types"
> of causation. But that's wrong; causation is just _our_ way of organizing
> manifested actions into a time-ordered context. In the very, very widest
> context, nothing causes anything else by will or by any other design;
> everything just is and does what it does. I think this is the point you're
> making, right?
I'm not prepared to consider all the implications of everything you
said. Suffice it to say I don't see any logical reason why I shouldn't
hold an atheistic view of all of nature. That doesn't mean I'm not
endlessly fascinated with life and its origins, I am, I'm simply
dissatisfied with the impoverished 'as-if' metaphors masquerading as
scientific explanations to account for the myriad behaviors of all life
forms. In a nutshell, I don't believe in the gene-centric view of life.
> So I'm wholly with you, Rod, that on this planet, only humans have goals.
> And given the state of the world recently, I think we might have to adjust
> that premise so that it includes only _some_ humans!
Ah ha! I think I know what (and who) you mean.
Rod Nibbe
> Rod Nibbe <r...@rknibbe.com> wrote in message news:<3D569854.7010204@rknibbe
> .com>...
>> I continue to be half miffed and half amused by the quoted words in
>>this and related threads such as "goal", and "purpose", and "design".
> I guess that is because you are using your very own, private
> dictionary of the English language. For the rest of us, these words
> fit their purpose in what I and others write quite nicely.
There is no purpose, there is no goal,
and there is no design behind living
systems. Come back when you think you
have an explanation based on something
we might all recognize as science.
> It seems,
> however, that "objectivists" feel compelled to redefine such common
> words in order to be able to deny the parts of reality they don't
> like...
For goodness sake, spare me your puerile
rants, dear, I'm no Objectivist.
Rod Nibbe
> Second, I think you acknowledge that humans evolved from simpler life
> forms. Assume you could go back in biological history, and observe
> each of the individual ancestors of modern humans. Can you show me the
> individual that first exercised genuine choice? How do you know that
> this individual is "choosing", versus whatever else you think you
> should name what she is doing when she is not "choosing"?
Uh huh. Can you likewise step back and trace the gradational loss of
modern man's ability to conceptualize his future and his own mortality?
When we will know when we've found an ancestor that could contemplate
tomorrow.
Tym Parsons
No, but your sense of integrity might, if you have any.
TP
Helen
.com>...
> There is no purpose, there is no goal,
> and there is no design behind living
> systems.
Of course not. I never implied any such thing. What I am saying is
that if, say, a tiger follows the trail of some prey, she is pursuing
a goal.
> Come back when you think you
> have an explanation based on something
> we might all recognize as science.
Well, once you can distinguish between what I did and did not say, the
two of us might be able to continue this discussion.
Helen
.com>...
> Uh huh. Can you likewise step back and trace the gradational loss of
> modern man's ability to conceptualize his future and his own mortality?
Very good! Am I to assume that you understood the point I was making?
Helen
.com>...
> There are some
> people who believe that when they see a life form take one action as
> opposed to a different action, a different action that the life form
> *could* have just as readily taken, that this then is an instance of a
> choice being made by that life form.
I would say that there are lots of people who believe that, for good
reason.
> And since choice implies conceptualization,
Says who? Here is what Encyclopaedia Britannica says:
Choice:
in philosophy, a corollary of the proposition of free willi.e., the
ability voluntarily to decide to perform one of several possible acts
or to avoid action entirely.
Encarta simply says:
Choice, ability to select from among a number of alternatives.
I can't find anything about the ability to conceptualize in there. So,
can you give me any reason why I, or anybody else for that matter,
should adopt your personal definition of "choice" at this point?
> therefore animals (at least) can conceptualize to some extent.
For the above reason I would not arrive at that conclusion, nor have I
ever seen that line of argument anywhere (which does not mean that
much, admittedly). Having said that, I would expect that some animals
do have some conceptual capabilities. Those capabilities would have to
be rudimentary compared to our own to be sure, but I am not prepared
to entirely deny the possibility.
> So the story goes. Personally, I find that definition of
> choice to be far too generous.
I noticed. As long as you keep the "personally" in there, that's
perfectly fine with me. Why anybody should care what your personal
feelings in this matter are is not clear, however.
> Okay, most cells don't directly enable reproduction, so what? Well,
> for one, if reproduction was the ultimate goal of the phenotype --
> again, our incredulity with such metaphors notwithstanding -- why on
> earth would organisms have such complicated apparatus to accomplish
> replication? Surely if genetic replication was really the "ultimate
> goal" in any sense, one wouldn't expect such elaborate phenotypes to
> accomplish only that. Why kill and an ant with a cannon, right?
Good Lord, what kind of an argument is that supposed to be? For one,
you are switching context between what the goal of an organism might
be to what the "goal" of evolution might be. Interestingly, you did
the same thing in a post accusing me of attributing goals to
evolution.
Plus, you could ask precisely the same question for any presumed
"ultimate goal" of an organism, and end up not understanding why
evolution ever took place at all.
Bert Clanton
<GHMoh...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> Rod Nibbe <r...@rknibbe.com> wrote in message news:<3D574A10.8080708@rknibbe
> .com>...
> > There are some
> > people who believe that when they see a life form take one action as
> > opposed to a different action, a different action that the life form
> > *could* have just as readily taken, that this then is an instance of a
> > choice being made by that life form.
>
Way back in the days when I wrote computer programs, I used to write a
lot of statements of the form "If <condition> then do <action1> else
<action2>". And lo and behold, if the input met the proposed condition,
then action1 occurred, but if not, then action2 occurred.
I'm even perverse enough to say that the computer made a choice, based
on input conditions. How, in principle, is this different from what any
life-form does?
Best wishes,
Bert
Fred Weiss
"Helen" <ghmoh...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:5652a7c5.02081...@posting.google.com...
> George Dance <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:<6312c50b.0208
> 101618....@posting.google.com>...
> > I'm not sure exactly what your claim means; do all animals always, in
> > general, or only sometimes act this way?
>
> In another post I had clarified this further. To reiterate, the
> behavior of all species is adjusted so as to optimize reproductive
> success...
Why not eating success?
>... (of the species; for individuals this means that they, on
> average, act to optimize reproductive success of their genes, or
> closely related genes), but it is in general sub-optimal for mere
> survival.
It is certainly not sub-optimal for survival *of the species*. In fact it is
essential. Isn't this in fact what the study of evolution has revealed -
that animals develop/evolve to optimize the survival of species?
The fundamental therefore is clearly *survival* for which reproductive
success is essential.
(This applies only to lower life forms, not man. Men clearly are not
primarily geared toward reproductive success and in fact can and do
sometimes clearly choose not to reproduce to promote what they regard as a
better life. In fact we have developed technology, such as birth control
pills, to prevent reproduction. The population of advanced industrial
countries is in fact declining. The Shakers as a group practiced celibacy
and of course eventually died out. But this is a choice men can make.)
>The two optima may be very close or even identical in
> certain cases, but survival is not normally favored over reproduction.
> The "normally" in the previous sentence means that a species that
> favors survival over reproduction is not stable, as can easily be
> shown.
I don't understand this. If a species doesn't act for its survival, it will
not be able to reproduce. What you are apparently looking at are the various
actions creatures will take, at their risk, to defend their young. This is
perfectly appropriate *for the survival of the species*. But when the young
are not involved, all creatures will act for their own survival or the
survival of the group. But the primary goal is survival. (And I agree with
you that "goal" - and possibly even "choice" - is the proper word for this.
There is a marked difference between the actions of living things and
inanimate objects, even apart from rationality, which these and only these
concepts convey.)
I acknowledge that I am not a biologist and certainly no expert on
evolution, so maybe I am missing something here.
Fred Weiss
Greg Swann
<eubi...@charter.net> wrote:
>I'm even perverse enough to say that the computer made a choice, based
>on input conditions.
You as the programmer made the choice. Don't
muddy the waters.
Greg Swann
George Dance
228.4d...@posting.google.com>...
'Sense of integrity'?
What's that?
Jim Klein
news:5652a7c5.02081...@posting.google.com...
>>Incorrect. Absent conceptual ability, and particularly the ability to
>>conceptualize outcomes over time, the concept of <choice> is empty. You
>>can say that a lower animal responds to this perceptual input or that one,
>>but that's not really a choice. Choosing is the ability to abstractly
>>conceptualize at least two options of action and then deciding which one
to
>>take. If you can't conceptualize at all, then you can't conceptualize the
>>choices. And if you can't conceptualize the choices, you can't pick one
of
>>them.
> [I apologize if this appears twice]
>
> Two remarks:
>
> First of all, I think you are redefining "choice" to mean something
> quite different (and much more strict) than is commonly understood
> under this term.
Don't know, don't care. I only care about what it _is_.
>Specifically, let's say a rat has been trained to pick among a number of
>boxes with food, that are distinguished by different colored little lamps
that >are mounted on top of each of the boxes. Let's say the rat has learned
(or >would that be "learned" for you?)
"learned"
> that the box with the red light contains the best food, the one
> with the green light contains water. If the rat picks the box with the
> red light when she is hungry, and the one with the green light when
> she is thirsty, why in the world would you refuse to call that
> "choice"?
Because it doesn't capture the actions which make a choice, a choice.
Specifically, absent conceptualization there is nothing going on there that
isn't going on with a planet orbiting a star or with any other inanimate
action. I guess you could say the action is being motivated pursuant to
perception, which itself is a different action than inanimate objects take,
but everything that any particular object does is particular to that object.
IOW if the results of perceptual response are called choices, then you might
as well go with Bert and say that a computer "chooses" pursuant to its
particular input.
That'd be okay, I suppose, but I use <choice> to delineate a far different
set of actions. Further, I'd say that set is both relatively easy to define
and stands apart from all actions that aren't choices; you can't say that
with the other definition because basically every sequence of a caused event
is a choice under that terminology. E.g., the moon chooses to orbit the
Earth because it didn't "choose" not to. You'll say that's not a choice
because all objects of mass always follow gravitational pull, but that
applies to every other instance of your non-conceptual choice too. A rat so
trained will always opt for the particular color and a computer so
programmed will always respond a certain way to a certain input.
<Choice>, like all concepts, is delineated by a context...and when I use
that word, I mean a particular "subset of reality." And the context here is
the action of a conceptual being, specifically one that can conceptualize
outcomes through time and motivate its body pursuant to choosing a
particular (expected) outcome. That's simply not what's happening with the
rat or the computer and if <choice> is to delineate _anything_, it seems
sort of obvious to me that it delineates that.
And I'll save you the trouble of trapping me into the conclusions that arise
concerning choices in a truly deterministic universe. Those conclusions are
correct; if we were super highly intelligent beings able to completely
understand the actions of each and every molecule in a human's brain and
body, then we would indeed know what action a human would choose, again
given complete knowledge of both the human and the relevant environment.
But we're not, so we don't. In the _context_ of a human, combined with from
the _perspective_ of a human, these are completely unknown things. Hence we
consolidate all of those unknown--albeit existent--details into the concept
of <choice>.
> What words would you use to describe her behavior?
Perceptual response.
>Finally, what percentage of cases where humans select among alternative
>courses of action do you think will meet your strict requirements for
genuine
>"choice"?
Virtually all of them, save reflexes and convulsions.
> Second, I think you acknowledge that humans evolved from simpler life
> forms. Assume you could go back in biological history, and observe
> each of the individual ancestors of modern humans. Can you show me the
> individual that first exercised genuine choice?
Sure, when it was a conscious option. That doesn't mean there had to be
phonemic representations of the concepts, but it does mean there had to be
some abstract symbolization going on in his mind. In this manner, he could
conceptualize (using the word very broadly) two alternatives and opt for one
of them. Now if you want to assert that the rat does the same thing, then I
have no great retort. But just offhand it seems likely to me that the rat
is responding to purely perceptual input...very complex perceptual input and
response, I'll grant, but wholly perceptual nonetheless.
And I concede that's just an assertion, since I haven't a direct source of
data of what's going on in the rat's mind with regard to direct perceptual
storage versus symbolic (which is synonymous with conceptual to me, using
the term very, very broadly) storage. But I work under the assumption that
it's this--the ability to abstractly and representatively store--that
actually sets humans apart from lower animals.
And I'll continue to work under that assumption until I see some genuinely
convincing evidence to the contrary...not just a rat who responds to color
nor some chimp who can press both "rock" and "work" when the word "hard"
flashes in front of his eyes. Quite a brilliant chimp, that one...he knows
more than half the labor force here in Detroit!
>How do you know that this individual is "choosing", versus whatever else
>you think you should name what she is doing when she is not "choosing"?
I also work under the assumption that since volition trumps all other
motivators except so-called reflexive instincts, virtually every action that
a human takes--again except for those reflexes or maybe convulsions--is
motivated by that volition. Which means that it's all a choice.
jk
Jim Klein
news:ulfhrsq...@corp.supernews.com...
> The fundamental therefore is clearly *survival* for which reproductive
> success is essential.
LOL! You must be staring at too many M.C. Escher drawings, Fred.
jk
Bert Clanton
<gsw...@primenet.com> wrote:
Not so. I *designed* the choice, and programmed the computer to *make*
the choice, depending on input.--in somewhat the same way that
"nature", in the form of natural selection, "designed" the choices that
we make, and to some extent, at least, "programmed" us to make one
choice under certain conditions, and another choice under other
conditions.
Best wishes,
Bert
Nomad
Integrity!
--
I am Nomad! I have taken much from the other!
Jim Klein
news:120820021705327859%eubi...@charter.net...
> Not so. I *designed* the choice, and programmed the computer to >*make*
the choice, depending on input.--in somewhat the same way that
> "nature", in the form of natural selection, "designed" the choices that
> we make
You hit the nail on the head...you *designed* the choice and nature
"designed" the choice.
Rarely have two marks conveyed so much meaning.
Of course, that meaning proves your point wrong!
jk
Fred Weiss
"Jim Klein" <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:aj94eh$sb9$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net...
> And I'll save you the trouble of trapping me into the conclusions that
arise
> concerning choices in a truly deterministic universe. Those conclusions
are
> correct; if we were super highly intelligent beings able to completely
> understand the actions of each and every molecule in a human's brain and
> body, then we would indeed know what action a human would choose, again
> given complete knowledge of both the human and the relevant environment.
>
> But we're not, so we don't. In the _context_ of a human, combined with
from
> the _perspective_ of a human, these are completely unknown things. Hence
we
> consolidate all of those unknown--albeit existent--details into the
concept
> of <choice>.
What you are saying is that in fact we are completely determined - in fact
no different from your view of animals as automata. But since we are too
ignorant to know what determines us, it seems like choice, but really isn't.
Does that about sum it up?
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"Jim Klein" <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:aj94ns$59o$1...@slb5.atl.mindspring.net...
Whatever. If you're not ducking questions in one way, there's always others.
Probably more than almost anyone on this list you end up talking (ranting
and rambling?) to yourself. Since you apparently think you are controlled by
the molecules in your brain, I suppose, to you, it doesn't matter - and, on
that view, it wouldn't.
Fred Weiss
Greg Swann
<rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
No, Jim. If you accept his premises, you accept
his conclusions. If 'choice' is the output of a
programmatic mechanism, then your claims are
false.
Either will is at its essence prima causa, ante
qua non, or persuasion is an accidental and
meaningless state. You can have rocks or you can
have persuasion, but you cannot have persuaded
rocks.
Choose--or deny that you can. Either way, you
choose. Thus, either way, I am right.
Greg Swann