Why I am not an objectivist

[Owl]

I've decided to repost this essay of mine, which I refer to periodically.
I'll be glad to respond to questions and objections (it has been discussed
here previously, but maybe some new responses will arise).

------------------------------------------------

WHY I AM NOT AN OBJECTIVIST

CONTENTS:
1. Meaning - Distinction between meaning & reference motivated.

2. Analytic & synthetic - The validity of this distinction.

3. A priori knowledge - why we have it.
3.1. Why logic is a priori.
3.2. Why mathematics is a priori.
3.3. Why ethics is a priori.
3.4. The nature of a priori knowledge - Acquired through the faculty of
reason; knowledge of universals.

4. Universals
4.1. What are they? - "universal" & "particular" defined
4.2. The (real) problem of universals - "nominalism" & "realism" defined;
why these are the only two possible positions.
4.3. Rand the realist - why Rand must be a realist, whether she knows it
or not

5. More on ethics:
5.1. The value of life - the need (and lack) of a proof that life is good
in the Objectivist ethics.
5.2. Rand's derivation (?) of egoism - How not to argue for egoism.
5.3. Is egoism self-evident? - The need for arguments for or against
egoism.
5.3.1. The use of hypothetical examples - why this is a good thing, not
merely an exercise in fantasy.
5.3.2. The case of the objectivist in a hurry - should he kill someone who
gets in his way, to save time?
5.3.3. Egoism vs. rights - why they are incompatible.
5.3.4. Egoism vs. the intrinsic value of the individual - why egoism is
incompatible with individualism.
5.3.5. Are there conflicts of interests among rational people? - all the
time; an example.
5.3.6. The fundamental contradiction of egoism - an individual's life both
is and is not an end in itself.
5.4. My ethics - ethical intuitionism; ethics rests on a basis of
self-evident moral principles.
5.4.1. The argument from disagreement, part 1: How can disagreement
exist? - an objection to intuitionism
5.4.2. The argument from disagreement, part 2: How can we resolve
disagreement? - another objection

6. Free will - why the Objectivist theory doesn't work (problems w/ the
primary choice)
6.1. Definitions - esp., of "free will" and "the law of causality"
6.2. The problem of free will - why it seems to conflict with the law of
causality.
6.3. The Objectivist solution - and how it fails
6.4. What's the answer? - the two main approaches we should look at.

Probably the most controversial parts of Objectivism are these five
claims:
(1) Reality is objective.

(2) One should always follow reason and never think or act contrary to
reason. (I take this to be the meaning of "Reason is absolute.")

(3) Moral principles are also objective and can be known through reason.

(4) Every person should always be selfish.

(5) Capitalism is the only just social system.

It is in holding to these five propositions that Rand's philosophy most
contrasts with the prevailing philosophical attitudes of our culture. Our
current intellectual culture is shot through with collectivism,
irrationalism, and subjectivism.

This is bound to make my disagreement with Objectivism seem small, at
least to most non-Objectivists: I agree with 1, 2, 3, and 5. In fact, I
regard each of those propositions as either self-evident or else provable
beyond any reasonable doubt through philosophical argument and (in the
case of #5) historical evidence. I would even go so far as to say that the
continuing resistance to these facts is due essentially to evasion. And I
regard #1 as so obvious as to be beneath a philosopher to argue.

Thus far the Objectivists and I are in agreement. But that is not enough
to constitute a whole philosophy. And in fact I think Objectivism contains
several definite errors, errors which can be proven to be such:

1. MEANING
When Objectivists say that "the meaning of a concept is all of the
concretes it subsumes, past, present, and future, including ones that we
will never know about," they are failing to distinguish sense and
reference. The need for distinguishing the 'sense' of a word from its
'reference' is shown by examples like this:

Oedipus, famously, wanted to marry Jocaste, and as he did so, he both
believed and knew that he was marrying Jocaste. The following sentence, in
other words, describes what Oedipus both wanted and believed to be the
case:

(J) Oedipus marries Jocaste.

However, Oedipus certainly did not want to marry his mother, and as he did
so, he neither knew nor believed that he was marrying his mother. The
following sentence, then, describes what Oedipus did not want or believe
to be the case:

(M) Oedipus marries Oedipus' mother.

But yet Jocaste just was Oedipus' mother. That is, the word "Jocaste" and
the phrase "Oedipus' mother" both refer to the same person. Therefore, if
the meaning of a word is simply what it refers to, then "Jocaste" and
"Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing. And if that is the case, then (J)
and (M) mean the same thing. But then how could it be that Oedipus could
believe what (J) asserts without believing what (M) asserts, if they
assert the same thing?
Of course, Oedipus did not know that Jocaste was his mother, which
explains why he was not illogical in believing (J) without believing (M).
But that doesn't answer the question above, and in fact it just creates
another problem. If "Jocaste" means the same thing as "Oedipus' mother,"
then "Jocaste is Oedipus' mother" must mean the same thing as "Jocaste is
Jocaste." How could Oedipus fail to know that Jocaste was his mother, when
he certainly was not ignorant that Jocaste was Jocaste, if those mean the
same thing?

Of course they do not mean the same thing. What the example shows is that
(J) and (M) do not express the same thought since Oedipus had the first
thought and did not have the second thought. And the only reason for that
can be that "Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" do not express the same idea
(since the other words in the sentences are the same). So there can be two
different ideas, referring to the same thing.

The thing that the ideas refer to--the person, existing in physical
space--I call the "reference" of the ideas. The reference of a word is the
same as the reference of the idea that the word expresses. The sense of a
word, however, I identify with the idea that the word expresses. Thus,
"Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" have the same reference, but different
sense. That's what we've just shown.

Thus, where Rand says, "a concept means all the concretes it subsumes..."
I say, "a concept refers to all the concretes it subsumes."

So we have to distinguish the sense of a word from its reference. And
furthermore, there is no reason not to make this distinction. The only
reason I can think of why Objectivists refuse to recognize this
distinction, is that they think in declaring the sense of a word to be
something other than the objects the word refers to, that I am saying that
a word refers to something other than the objects it refers to - i.e.,
they just don't understand the distinction.

And most of the time when one speaks of the "meaning" of a word, one means
its sense, not its reference. Thus, for example, I can say that millions
of tourists have come to New York to see the object that the word "the
Empire State Building" refers to; but it is not the case that millions of
tourists have come to New York to see the meaning of the word "the Empire
State Building."

A note on the above: I speak of the sense and reference of a word, not of
an idea. The reason for this is that the sense of a word is the idea
associated with it. Ideas do not have senses; they are senses. For the
same reason, it is incorrect to speak of the meaning of an idea. Mortimer
Adler makes all of this clear in Ten Philosophical Mistakes (see esp.
chapters 1 and 3).

To some this will seem a small, technical objection to Objectivism. But it
has consequences.

2. ANALYTIC & SYNTHETIC
Objectivism's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is based on
the failure to distinguish the sense and the reference of a word. An
analytic statement is defined to be one that is true in virtue of the
meanings of the words involved. Peikoff shows in his article on the
analytic/synthetic distinction (in ITOE) that, from his theory of meaning,
it would follow that no truth can be synthetic. Take an example of a
typical, allegedly synthetic statement:

(A) All bachelors are less than 8 feet tall.

and suppose that it is true. Then, since the meaning of "bachelors"
includes all the bachelors in the world, including all of their
characteristics, including their various heights, including (by
hypothesis) the fact that they are all less than 8 feet, to say that there
is a bachelor more than 8 feet tall would contradict the meaning of
"bachelor". Hence, (A) is analytically true.
Having made the sense/reference distinction, however, we see this is
wrong. (A) is analytic only if it is true in virtue of the senses of the
words involved (not their reference). Of course, every true sentence is
true in virtue of the reference of the subject and the predicate (e.g.,
the object that the subject refers to having the property that the
predicate refers to).

(A) is analytic only if the concept of being less than 8 feet tall is
contained in the concept of a bachelor. And this is not the case, since it
is possible to think of a 9-foot-tall bachelor.

Note that I am not arguing that since you can imagine a 9-foot-tall
bachelor, therefore there might be one. I am not saying this proves
anything about how the external world is. I am only saying it proves
something about our ideas, which is the only thing at issue in deciding
whether a judgement is 'analytic' or 'synthetic': it proves that the idea
of a bachelor doesn't contain the idea of being under 8 feet.

The attempt to deny the analytic/synthetic distinction really is perverse.
There are sentences like "Every rectangle has 4 sides," "Every bachelor is
male," "Every cat is a cat," etc., which certainly appear, prima facie, to
have something in common and to be different in some way from "Every
rectangle is blue," "Every bachelor is a slob," etc. Every philosopher is
able to reliably classify certain specimens of each category and to
produce indefinitely many additional examples each of 'analytic' and
'synthetic' propositions that have never been explicitly discussed by any
other philosopher before ("Every dodecahedron has 12 faces"). Is this not
strong evidence that there is some distinction here? If so-called
'analytic' statements really do not have any characteristic whatsoever in
common and differ from so-called 'synthetic' statements in no way
whatsoever, then the philosophers who claim there is a distinction must
really be classifying statements entirely at random. If this is the case,
what accounts for their intersubjective reliability?

Finally, note that (contrary to Peikoff's presentation), the
analytic/synthetic distinction is not equivalent to the
necessary/contingent, a priori/empirical, or certain/uncertain
distinctions in the minds of contemporary philosophers. I do not say that
analytic = necessary = known a priori = known with certainty; and I do not
say that synthetic = contingent = empirical = uncertain. In contemporary
philosophy, it has been generally recognized that those are four different
distinctions, even though they were sometimes confounded in the past
(especially by Hume).

I have so far said nothing about whether synthetic propositions may be
known with certainty or whether they may be 'contingent'.

3. A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
By an item of "empirical knowledge" I mean something that is known that
either is an observation or else is justified by observations. A priori
knowledge is that which is not empirical - i.e., an item of knowledge
which is not an observation and which is not justified by observations.

Note the word "justified". I do not say that a priori knowledge does not
depend causally on observations. I do not say that the concepts required
to understand it are innate or formed without the aid of experience. I
only maintain that a priori knowledge is not logically based on
observations. In other words, if x is an item of a priori knowledge, then
there is no observation that is evidence for the truth of x - but we still
know x to be true.

This distinction is crucial. Perhaps some experiences have caused us to
form certain concepts. And perhaps having these concepts enables us to
understand the proposition, x. So our ability to understand the
proposition depends on observation. But understanding a proposition is
very different from being justified in believing it. You can understand
something and still not be justified in believing it. For instance, I
understand what it means to say "there is life on Mars" - but I have no
justification for thinking it to be true. The question of whether our
experiences justify a proposition is, therefore, different from the
question whether our experiences enable us to understand it.

What I have offered above is what nearly all philosophers mean by "a
priori knowledge." I take it that Objectivists deny that there is any a
priori knowledge in exactly the sense just defined.

I say that we have a lot of a priori knowledge, to wit:

3.1. LOGIC IS A PRIORI
By "the principles of logic" in this argument, I will mean exclusively
principles of inference: that is, principles stating what is and is not a
valid or cogent argument. For example, "Modus ponens is valid" is a
principle of logic, and it's one that we know. How do we know these
things?

(1) Principles of logic are not observations.

You do not perceive, by the senses, the logical relation between two
propositions. You may be able to perceive that A is true, and you may be
able to perceive that B is true; but what you can not perceive is that B
follows from A. You can also, perhaps, observe by introspection (I take
introspection to be empirical knowledge) that you actually infer B from A.
But again, you do not thereby observe that it was valid to do so.

Validity is not something literally visible, audible, tangible, etc.

(2) The principles of logic can not in general be known by inference.

Some principles of logic might be knowable by inference - if they could be
supported by reference to other principles of logic. But it couldn't be
the case that all principles of logic are known by inference, because this
would require circular reasoning.

The principles of logic say what is and isn't a valid inference. If we
didn't know the principles of logic at least implicitly, then we would not
be in a position to find out anything by inference, since we wouldn't know
which inferences were valid.

For example, to try to infer that modus ponens is valid by using modus
ponens would beg the question. To try to infer it by some other kind of
inference, would just push the question to how we know that other kind of
inference to be valid. And so on. If we are to avoid either circularity or
infinite regress, some principles of logic must be foundational.

Now it follows from (1) and (2) that:

(3) The principles of logic are known a priori.

For they are not observations (1) and they are not inferred from
observations (2), but they are known. This is the definition of a priori
knowledge.

3.2. MATHEMATICS IS A PRIORI
Consider the proposition

(B) 1 + 1 = 2,

which I know to be true. Is this proposition based on any observations? If
so, what observations?
In order to learn the concept '2', I probably had to make some
observations. I might have been shown a pair of oranges and told, "This is
two oranges." I might then have been shown two fingers and told, "Here are
two fingers." And so on. This might have spurred me to form the concept
'two'. And if not for the observations of the oranges, the fingers, etc.,
I might never have been able to form that concept.

I mention this, however, only to explain why it is irrelevant. As I
previously explained, the issue is not whether observations were necessary
in my coming to understand the equation (B) but whether any observation
justifies the proposition, i.e., provides evidence of its truth.

How about this, then: I see one orange, over here. Then I see another
orange, over there. I put the two oranges together. I count them, and get
the result "2". I therefore conclude that 1 orange plus 1 orange = 2
oranges. Perhaps by doing this experiment with a lot of different kinds of
objects, I eventually conclude (inductively) that 1 + 1 = 2, regardless of
what type of objects are being counted. Thus, observation has confirmed
(B). Perhaps by also confirming a lot of other equations, I might also be
able to inductively support the axioms of arithmetic.

This idea, of course, involves a confusion about the nature of addition.
Addition is not a physical operation. It is not the operation of
physically or spatially bringing groups together, and the equation (B)
does not assert that when you physically unite two distinct objects, you
will wind up with two distinct objects at the end. Indeed, if it did, the
equation would be wrong. It is possible, for example, to pour 1 liter of a
substance and 1 liter of another substance together, and wind up with less
than 2 liters total. (This happens because the liquids are partially
miscible.) This does not refute arithmetic.

Addition is solely a mental operation, sc. the mental operation of taking
two groups and considering them as one group. Thus, I can take a group of
ten people, and another group of seven people that I have identified, and
decide to mentally group all of them together. The result is a group of 17
people. That is what it means to say "10 + 7 = 17." I do not physically
alter the people in any way.

The equation "74389 + 1983 = 76372" also does not entail the actual
existence of at least 76,372 objects; it is not false if there are fewer
than that many objects in the world (otherwise, there are almost certainly
some false statements of arithmetic that could be deduced from Peano's
axioms - addition problems with really large numbers. I assume one would
not want to claim that the axioms of arithmetic are false.) It also does
not entail that any person has actually ever held 76,372 objects in mind.
All it means is that a group of 74389 objects and a group of 1983 objects
would be the same thing as a group of 76,372 objects.

An empiricist still might claim that my observation of two oranges might
justify my belief that 1 + 1 = 2. For I might look at each orange, and
then try the 'experiment' of mentally grouping them together, and find
that the result was a group of two. There are two reasons I do not
consider this an empirical justification of the equation:

(1) Because there is no possible experience or sequence of observations
that would have counted against (B). This being the case, no observation
is truly a test of (B).

(2) In general, if p is my reason for believing q, then if p is false, I
don't know q. So if my justification for (B) depends on some observations,
then anything that cast doubt on those observations would cast doubt on my
knowledge of (B).

To be more specific: Assume that my belief that (B) depends for its
justification on my observation of the two oranges. Then if there really
weren't two oranges there, I do not know that 1+1=2.

But this is not the case: Even if my experiences with the oranges, the
fingers, etc., including all the experiences that helped me form the
concepts of '1', '2', and 'addition', were all a long series of
hallucinations, I still know that 1+1=2. (Please do not object that my
experiences were not hallucinations. That is not the point.) This suggests
that the experiences' role was only in giving me an understanding of the
equation, not in justifying it. My knowledge of arithmetic is not put in
jeopardy by the hypothesis that all my previous observations were false
(it survives the brain-in-a-vat scenario, for instance, or Descartes'
dream hypothesis). Therefore, my knowledge of arithmetic is not based on
those observations in the relevant sense, since hypotheses that cast doubt
on my observations do not cast doubt on my knowledge of arithmetic.

Therefore, my knowledge of arithmetic is a priori. The same argument could
be made for any mathematical knowledge.

N.B.: In saying the brain-in-the-vat scenario 'casts doubt on' my
observations, I simply mean that if I were a brain in a vat, none of my
current observations would be knowledge. It is not part of the meaning of
this that the brain-in-the-vat scenario is at all plausible or likely
actually to be true.

3.3. ETHICS IS A PRIORI
That knowledge of moral principles is also a priori follows from the
following two theses:

(1) Moral principles are not observations. The content of every
observation is descriptive.

That is, you do not literally see, touch, hear, etc. moral value.

The only possible objection I can think of would be if one thought that
the sensations of pleasure and pain are literally perceptions of moral
value and evil. I do not think this is the case, though. No doubt, we
generally take things that cause us pleasure to be good, and take things
that cause pain to be bad. But I think this is because the pleasure itself
is good, and the pain itself is bad, not because they are cognitions of
goodness and badness. Pain is just a sensation; it isn't a sensation of
anything (as there is a sensation of heat, or a sensation of pressure).

Only this explains why, when you're about to undergo an operation, you
want an anesthetic (moreover, it is good to have anesthesia). After all,
if it isn't the pain itself that is bad, but the pain only makes you aware
of something bad, then as long as you know the operation is good for you,
the pain involved shouldn't bother you (the pain would then be like a
hallucination of badness - but since you know it's just an illusion, you
realize nothing bad is really happening).

One might reply that although pain is the sensation of badness, serving to
make us aware that what causes it is bad, the pain might also be bad in
itself. While there's no contradiction in this, it appears ad hoc. Once
we've been forced to admit that pleasure is good and pain is bad, the
other account of the relationship between pain and badness appears
superfluous and probably originally a confusion. Moreover, even if we take
this view, we are then forced to the question, How do we know that pain is
bad? Do we also observe this, so that there would have to be a second,
meta- pain, which is caused by the first pain? (Note that for my argument
I only require one evaluative fact to be a priori.)

One final point: In every other case of a sensory experience of a type of
phenomenon (e.g., perception/sensation of heat, of a red car, of a noise),
the occurrence of the sensations/perceptual experiences is explained by
the existence of the phenomenon that the sensory experience is of. For
example, when I see a red car, it is impossible to explain why I have the
sensory experience I am having without mentioning the red car. It is
because the car is there, and because the car is red, that I am having
just this sort of experience.

This is not the case with pain and badness. When I have a sensation of
pain, the fact that I have this sensation may be explained by the fact
that my arm has been cut, or there is a flame under my hand, etc. It is
not necessary to say that the cut on my arm is bad. Its badness adds
nothing to the causal explanation. The cut didn't cause pain in virtue of
its being bad; it caused pain in virtue of plain old, physical
characteristics - just as all sensations are caused by physical phenomena.
How cuts cause pain can be explained purely by descriptive physiology and
physics, without any ethical claims.

I am not denying that most things that cause pain are bad independently of
that. Most things that cause pain are bad in that they threaten our lives
or damage our bodies. This fact, though, is not something known
immediately by perception. It is something partly inferred by induction,
and also inferred partly from our knowledge that death and injury are bad.

(2) Moral principles can not be inferred from descriptive premises. This
principle is just an instance of the general fact that you cannot derive a
conclusion within one subject matter from premises in a different subject
matter. Just as you cannot expect to derive a geometrical conclusion from
premises in economics, or derive a conclusion about birds from premises
that don't say anything about birds, you should not expect to derive a
conclusion about morality from non-moral premises.

More specifically, (2) follows from two sub-premises:

(a) Moral principles can not be deduced from descriptive premises. (This
is 'Hume's Law'.)

(a) is a trivial result in the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism (a
syllogism requires a middle term), as well of the more modern systems of
logic, provided that moral principles are identified with propositions
having only evaluative predicates, and descriptive propositions are
identified as those having no evaluative predicates. For a simple example,
take an argument of the form

x is D.

Hence, x is good.

where D is any descriptive predicate. This argument, to be valid, requires
the assumption that whatever is D is good. And then there will be the
question of how we know that, major premise. To see the truth of Hume's
Law, it is best to examine in particular some attempts to bridge the
is/ought gap and see why they fail. This will best enable the reader to
see how any such attempt should be answered, and therefore to see that all
such attempts must fail:
(i)

Communism causes poverty, makes people miserable, and takes away people's
freedom.

Therefore, communism is bad.

The premise is apparently a descriptive and empirical fact, while the
conclusion is evaluative. Assume the premise is true. My question: Does
the conclusion follow from that alone?
No, the conclusion also depends upon the suppressed premises that poverty
and misery are bad, and freedom is good. No doubt these additional
premises are both true and known to be such, but that does not affect the
point. The point is that the evaluative conclusion of the argument rests
in part on evaluative premises. The argument therefore does not bridge the
is/ought gap.

(ii)

Freedom is necessary to our survival.

Therefore, freedom is good.

Again, assume the premise is true, and ask, Does the conclusion follow
from that alone?
No, because the argument presupposes that survival is good, and that
survival is good is an evaluative premise. If survival is bad, then the
conclusion to draw is that freedom is bad, not good.

(iii)

I want to live.

Eating is necessary to live (and also will not interfere with anything
else I want).

Therefore, I should eat.

This requires the assumption that I ought to act on my desires, and/or
that my desire to live is a morally acceptable one. To see this, compare
the parallel inference, which is of exactly the same form as (iii), "Adolf
Hitler wants to exterminate the Jews. Sending millions of Jews to gas
chambers will increase the likelihood of accomplishing this (while not
interfering with anything else he wants). Therefore, Adolf Hitler should
send millions of Jews to gas chambers." Assume that the premises of that
inference were true. Does the conclusion follow? Keep in mind that we are
not concerned herein with any non-moral sense of "should", if there is any
such thing. The question is, does it follow that it was morally right of
Hitler to send millions of Jews to the gas chambers, given that he wanted
to kill them and sending them to gas chambers effected that end? Obviously
not, since in fact what he did was morally wrong, and therefore he should
not have done it. And the fact that he wanted to exterminate the Jews does
not render the action justified; if anything, it only makes it the more
reprehensible. What this shows is that inferences of the form that (iii)
has require the assumption that the agent's desire is morally acceptable.
Your merely wanting something does not by itself make the thing good.
Again, my aim is not to doubt or deny any of the suppressed premises
involved in these inferences. My aim is only to point out that they exist
and therefore that none of these arguments bridges the is/ought gap.

(iv)

Social cooperation increases our evolutionary fitness.

Therefore, we should cooperate.

This presupposes that evolutionary fitness is good. One could try to prove
this like so:
(v)

The process of evolution tends toward the survival of the fittest.

Therefore, fitness is good.

But this presupposes that survival is good and/or that what evolution
tends towards is good.
Hopefully, the pattern is clear enough by now, so that it is unnecessary
to multiply examples further. If one tries to show that x is good because
it produces y, one must presuppose that y is good. If one tries to show
that some thing, x, is good because it is a y, one must then presuppose
that y's are good. If one tries to show that x is good because it has some
characteristic, F, one presupposes that having F is good, and one will be
called upon to prove that.

Rand tries to give some kind of argument, or explain how one can give
arguments, bridging the is/ought gap in "The Objectivist Ethics". I have
not tried to reproduce that argument here, unless (ii) or (iii) is it,
because I can not understand it clearly, and because expositions of it
that I have heard from Objectivists have varied widely. Most attempts to
derive an 'ought' from an is depend upon either equivocation or suppressed
premises, all depend on some fallacy, and Rand is no exception. I think
that her exposition depends upon the suppressed premise that life, or
existence, is good. This, again, is an evaluative premise, so the is/ought
gap has not been bridged.

One might try to reply by saying you simply choose to live, and then the
other conclusions follow. But this would just be a variation on (iii)
above:

(vi)

I choose to live.

Eating is necessary to live.

Therefore, I should eat.

And this fails because it presupposes that my choice is correct. To see
this, again, compare the parallel inference that begins, "Hitler chooses
to exterminate the Jews . . ." and ends "Hitler ought to send the Jews to
gas chambers," which is invalid. The difference between the two has to be
that your choice to live is a right choice, while Hitler's choice to
exterminate the Jews is a wrong choice.
Note that the problem here is not to show some way in which you might come
to want to follow the principles of ethics. The problem is to explain your
knowledge that the principles of ethics are true, based upon some other
knowledge. If, as the Objectivists and I both accept, moral principles are
genuine items of knowledge, then if they are going to be based on
something else, they must be validly inferred from some other item of
knowledge. It is not enough to show that you could simply choose to follow
the principles of ethics, or make some other choice that commits you to
following the principles of ethics, etc. That would not explain your
knowing the principles to be true, in the manner in which you know
something like the law of gravity. That would just explain your choosing
to follow them. And I take it that it is essential to Objectivism that
moral principles are genuine knowledge. They are not just things that we
choose to believe, in the manner that William James suggested one might
choose to believe that God exists - for that sort of thing does not
constitute knowledge.

(b) Moral principles can not be inductively inferred from descriptive
premises.

The reason for this is simple. Induction is generalizing from experience.
It enables you to know general truths. But you could only be led by
induction to general moral truths, if the premises of the induction were
particular moral truths. If you can not ever recognize a particular good
thing in the first place, then induction will be no help to you either. If
your premises are particular descriptive facts, then your inductive
conclusions are just going to be a bunch of descriptive generalizations.

To take stock, then, we have this argument:

(1) Every observation is descriptive in content.

(2) No evaluative propositions are known on the basis of descriptive
propositions alone, for

(a) No evaluative proposition is deduced from descriptive propositions;
and

(b) No evaluative proposition is induced from descriptive propositions.

(3) Therefore, moral knowledge requires an a priori basis.

3.4. THE NATURE OF A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE
At this point, it will come as no surprise that I think there is a great
deal of other a priori knowledge. Here are some examples:

A cause cannot occur later than its effect.

Time is one-dimensional.

If A and B have different heights, then either A is taller than B or B is
taller than A.

"Inside" is a transitive relation.

It is not possible for something to be created out of nothing.

Now to explain the nature and source of my disagreement with Objectivism,
and also the positive nature of a priori knowledge:
We have four cognitive faculties: the senses, introspection, memory, and
reason. The senses provide us direct awareness of concrete (particular)
things in the external world. Introspection provides direct awareness of
particular phenomena in our own minds. Memory provides us awareness of
anything of which we were previously aware through another faculty. And
what does reason provide us awareness of?

On the empiricist view (which Objectivists share) of reason, reason does
not provide us direct awareness of anything the way the first two
faculties do. Instead, reason only operates on cognitions that are
provided by the other faculties. Reason takes observations (and memories)
as input and then, through a certain process (inference), turns out a
certain output. This output, according to empiricists, can include a huge
amount of knowledge, from my knowledge that the sun will rise tomorrow, to
the most elaborate of scientific theories, but all of it is dependent on
receiving some input from the senses and/or introspection.

I say that reason does not only operate on input provided to it by other
faculties, but is also a faculty of direct awareness of certain things -
namely, all the things listed above. This knowledge that originates in
reason is direct in the same sense that perceptions are direct knowledge.
It is not innate, for the same reason that observations are not innate -
it is acquired only by exercising the faculty (though the faculty is
innate in both cases), and therefore not all the things in principle
knowable by reason are actually known.

It is important to see the contrast between these two views. Inference is
a cognitive process that requires some cognitive input (premises) and
produces some cognitive output (conclusions). I and the empiricists will
agree that the faculty of reason is what performs inferences. They,
however, will say that all of the input is from the senses +
introspection. I say that some of the input is also from reason itself, so
that reason has two functions.

At the beginning of this section (section 3), I defined "a priori
knowledge" only negatively, as that which is not empirical. It is now
possible to provide the positive characterization: A priori knowledge is
the knowledge of pure reason; that is, it is the knowledge whose source is
solely the faculty of reason. Empirical knowledge, by contrast, is the
knowledge whose source is observation. Observation (comprising both
perception and introspection) may be defined as the direct awareness of
particulars (i.e. individual objects or occurrences).

What, then, will we say the objects of pure reason are? Reason's
foundational knowledge is the awareness of facts about universals.

4. UNIVERSALS

4.1. WHAT ARE THEY?
I have here two white pieces of paper. They are not the same piece of
paper, but they have something in common: they are both white. What there
are two of are called "particulars" - the pieces of paper are particulars.
What is or can be common to multiple particulars are called "universals" -
whiteness is a universal. A universal is capable of being present in
multiple instances, as whiteness is present in many different pieces of
paper. A particular doesn't have 'instances' and can only be present in
one place at a time (distinct parts of it can be in different locations
though), and particulars are not 'present in' things.

A universal is a predicable: that is, it is the kind of thing that can be
predicated of something. A particular can not be predicated of anything.
For instance, whiteness can be predicated of things: you can attribute to
things the property of being white (as in "This paper is white"). A piece
of paper can't be predicated of something; you can't attribute the piece
of paper as a property (or action or relation) to something else. The
piece of paper can only be a subject of judgements; it can never be a
predicate. (Incidentally, identity statements of the form "A is identical
to B," where A and B are particulars, are not a counter-example to this. A
and B are (is?) the subject of the judgement; the relation of identity is
the predicate.) The logical subject of a proposition (or sentence or
belief) is what the proposition is about. The logical predicate is what is
asserted about the subject.

Note that this is not the same thing as the grammatical subject. In "It's
raining," for example, the grammatical subject is "it", but the statement
isn't about some entity called 'it'; the statement is about the rain.

One can see, then, that every judgement and so every item of knowledge
involves universals, insofar as every judgement has a predicate. "This is
white" involves the universal, whiteness. Most words in any natural
language refer to universals, and if a language lacked such words, it
would be impossible to say anything. One could name particulars, but one
could not make any statements about the particulars. All knowledge is the
knowledge that something(s) instantiates a certain universal.

Also understand that I don't by a "universal" mean a certain kind of word,
idea or concept. I mean the sort of thing that you attribute to the
objects of your knowledge: Whiteness itself is the universal, not the word
"white" and not the concept 'white'. I do not attribute my concept of
whiteness to the paper - I do not think that the paper has a concept in
it. I attribute whiteness to the paper - i.e., I think the paper is white.
Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have the concept of
whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind (no part of my
mind is actually white). I say this because the confusion between concepts
and their referents is all too common, both inside and outside Objectivist
circles - as, for example, when someone says, "Democracy is a nice concept
. . ." Democracy is not a concept, it is a form of government!

Also notice that, although every universal is a predicable, I did not say
that universals can not be subjects of judgements. A universal can also be
the subject of a judgement, and universals can possess properties of their
own. For example, "White is a color" is a statement in which whiteness is
the subject.

Now I have said that reason gives us direct awareness of facts about
universals: In other words, the knowledge of pure reason is that in which
not only the predicate but also the subject is a universal. Observations,
in contrast, we defined as direct knowledge in which the subject is a
particular (for example, "This paper is white" expresses an observation).

Now the reader can go back and consider the above examples of a priori
knowledge:

1. A rule of inference is a proposition describing a certain form of
inference as valid, or (this is equivalent) describing a certain form of
proposition as bearing a certain relation to another form of proposition.
A 'form of inference,' of course, is not a particular (that's one reason
you'll never bump into a form of inference on the sidewalk); it is a
universal.

2. "1 + 1 = 2" and all the propositions of mathematics are about
universals: In this instance, the subjects are two (the universal) and 1+1
(the universal) and the predicate is identity. ("1+1" means the quantity
that results from grouping a group of 1 together with another group of 1.)
That these are universals is shown by the fact that they can have multiple
instances: a pair of oranges is an instance of two; it's also an instance
of 1 and 1, of course, since those are identical. Every pair of objects is
an instance of the number 2, and every pair of objects is an instance of 1
and 1.

3. Not all moral judgements are about universals, obviously. "Adolf Hitler
was an evil man" is a moral statement about a particular. However, the
suppressed premises we kept running into in the attempts to derive
'oughts' from 'is's are all about universals. When we conclude that Hitler
was evil (in part) because we think that unprovoked hatred is evil and
that killing innocent people is wrong, we rely on general moral principles
that are about universals: In "Killing innocent people is wrong," the
subject is killing innocent people (i.e. a certain type of action), which
is a universal. In "life is good," the subject is life. Etc.

4.2. THE (REAL) PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS
The philosophical questions about universals are

(1) Do universals (as defined above) exist?

(2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (i.e., why do we have all
these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge
apparently about them?)

(3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of
particulars?

The people who answer #1 "Yes" are called "realists", and those who answer
#1 "No" are called "nominalists". The nominalists then have to go on to
answer #2. How they answer it determines what kind of nominalists they
are. The realists have to go on to answer #3. Those who answer #3 "Yes"
are called "immanent realists" (Rand: "moderate realists"), while those
who answer #3 "No" are called "Platonic realists" or "transcendent
realists".

That is why the traditional positions on the problem of universals have
always been considered to be these three: nominalism, immanent realism,
and Platonism. There is no fourth position. This is a simple outcome of
the law of excluded middle. In particular, Ayn Rand can not possibly have
a position on the problem of universals that is neither nominalist nor
realist, unless it is that she either refuses to answer the questions or
contradicts herself. Either universals exist, or they don't. If they
don't, nominalism is true. If they do, realism is true. And that's that.

I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just
obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness,
and that's all I have to say about that. (David Armstrong does a good job
on it though in Nominalism and Realism.)

It also seems clear to me that universals exist in particulars, and so
immanent realism is true. And my primary objection to Rand's theory of
concepts (in ITOE) is that she presents it as an answer to the problem of
universals, and an anti-realist answer, when in fact it is no such thing.

4.3. RAND THE REALIST?
At first it seems as if she is answering question #2, so it seems as if
she is a nominalist. Rand starts out by saying that two individual humans
do not literally have in common any single attribute; it is not that all
people are called "human" because they possess this one quality,
'humanness'. She goes on to explain why it is that we can classify all
these different individuals as members of this same category, 'human'
(this is where it seems as if an answer to #2 is coming): in essence, she
explains that when we group a number of particulars (she calls them
"concretes") together, we do so because these objects each possess a value
along a certain dimension (a 'measurement' is a thing's place on a certain
dimension - as for example "5 feet, 10 inches" is my approximate place on
the dimension of length; you can also think of it as the value of a
variable). They all possess different values on this dimension (e.g.,
every person has a different height), but in forming a concept, we
abstract away from that, i.e. we mentally isolate only the common
characteristic, without paying attention to the specific measurements.

I have no objection to this as a realist theory of how concepts are
formed. I do object to it as a non-realist theory or as an answer to
question #2 above. If a group of concretes are isolated according to a set
of dimensions along which they all vary (each taking different values on
these dimensions), the next question to ask is, what about the dimension,
itself? Example: if one of the common characteristics is 'length', which
all of these objects have different amounts of, what about length itself
(i.e. the dimension of length): Is this not a universal? It appears it
certainly is, for it is predicable of concrete objects, and multiple
distinct particulars all share it. An anti-realist answer to the problem
of universals, therefore, has not yet been produced: the explanation of
how we classify multiple concretes under the same concept must advert to
universals, if not in the first stage (i.e., a universal 'humanness') then
in the second stage (i.e., a set of universals, the common dimensions
along which humans vary).

Furthermore, the specific values that things have along certain dimensions
are also universals, no matter how specific they are. Take a specific
length, like 'exactly 5 feet': that is a universal, not a concrete. You
will never encounter a five-foot length all by itself, lying on the
sidewalk. If you encounter a 5-foot length, you will encounter it only as
the length of some concrete object. It is only another way of stating this
to say that '5 feet long' is a predicable, not an ultimate subject. There
are two tests for a universal:

(1) It can be predicated of concretes.

(2) Multiple things could possess it.

We've just seen that '5 feet long' satisfies #1. It also satisfies #2:
multiple things could be 5 feet long simultaneously. (It does not matter
whether multiple things actually are 5 feet long. In fact, probably
nothing is exactly 5 feet long, unless you count parts of objects like
"the first five feet of the floor." The point is there is no reason in
principle why there couldn't be a 5-foot long object, and if there were
one, there is no reason why there couldn't be two.)

So we see that Rand's theory of concepts adverts to two things that appear
to be universals. She does not attempt to explain these things, in turn,
in terms of anything else. So it seems that Rand is a realist,
specifically an immanent realist, whether she knows it or not.

This is not, per se, a problem with her view. I am a realist too, as I
think every sensible person should be. There is no way of providing the
sort of 'objective basis' for concepts that Rand is trying to provide
without talking about the properties that multiple objects fitting under a
single concept have in common. Rand has just described what they have in
common in a fairly elaborate way. She has not, and could not possibly
without making concepts nothing but arbitrary groupings, done away with
the notion of there being anything in common to multiple objects.

5. MORE ON ETHICS

5.1. THE VALUE OF LIFE
I said earlier that what is wrong with Rand's attempted derivation of
ethics is that it requires the evaluative presupposition that life is
good, which has not been and cannot be inferred purely from observations.
Some Objectivists say that life actually isn't good, but everything which
promotes life is good. I think this (i.e. the first part of that claim) is
obviously false, besides being a distortion of Rand's views, but not to
press that - this view has the same problem as all attempts to bridge the
is/ought gap, i.e., it just raises the question, how do we know that what
promotes life is good?

One way to answer this might be to say that this is just the meaning of
"good", i.e. "good" just means "promotes (my) life."

If you take the Objectivist theory of meaning, however, which rejects the
analytic/synthetic distinction and identifies meaning with reference, then
this sort of answer cannot be legitimate. It cannot ever be legitimate to
answer "How do you know that A is B?" by saying that this is implicit in
the meaning of "A". For on the Objectivist theory of meaning, everything
that is true of A is implied in the meaning of "A", and everything that is
not true of A contradicts the meaning of "A". Therefore, if something's
being implied in the meaning of our words was a sufficient explanation for
how we knew it, we would be omniscient. That is, if we know every fact
that is implied in the meanings of our words (every fact the denial of
which is contradictory), then, if the Objectivist theory of meaning is
also correct, we know every fact. Since this is not the case, the
Objectivist has to say that even the things that are implied in the
meanings of our words need to be proven - specifically, they require
observational evidence. For example, when asked how we know that
gravitational attraction is inversely proportional to the square of the
distance between the bodies, it is not correct to say we know this because
the denial of it is contradictory. The denial of it is contradictory, on
the Objectivist theory, but that does not explain how we know it. To
explain how we know it, one would have to detail certain scientific
experiments and observations of the solar system. For the Objectivist
scientist, to defend a theory by saying the denial of it is contradictory,
is just begging the question. We don't know whether it is contradictory
until we first find out whether it is true.

Thus, it can not be an adequate answer to my question, "How do you know
that what promotes life is good?" to say that the denial of this
proposition is contradictory or that it is implied in the meaning of
"good", if the Objectivist theory of meaning is correct. For such a reply
would simply beg the question - the denial of the proposition in question
is a contradiction, on the Objectivist view, if and only if it is true
that what promotes life is good. We still need an explanation of how we
know it is true - i.e., what observations lead to this conclusion, and
exactly what is the form of the inference by which they lead there. In
other words, even if "good" means "promotes life", on the Objectivist
epistemology and philosophy of language, you still have to prove that this
is what "good" means, by empirical (sensory) evidence. I have never seen
such a proof.

On the other hand, suppose we take up my theory of meaning, in which there
is an analytic/synthetic distinction, and only a small subset of all true
propositions are analytic (i.e., such that their truth is implied in the
meanings of the words involved and such that their denial is
contradictory). In that case, it does not beg the question to say that we
know what serves life is good because this is the meaning of good, because
what the word means can be known immediately, by reflection (without this
leading to omniscience) - at least, you can know what you mean by a word
by reflection, although you need empirical evidence to determine whether
others mean the same thing. However, the reply now faces a different
problem: The claim that "good" means "promotes life" is now simply false,
and it is refuted by Moore's 'Open Question Argument'. That is, given that
we make a distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, we can
repeat the "Jocasta/Oedipus" argument to show that "promotes life" does
not mean the same as "good". Consider a person who decides to commit
suicide. This person believes (let us suppose) that

(G) Ending his life is good.

But he does not believe that
(P) Ending his life promotes his life.

since he knows that ending his life will destroy his life. It is evident,
then, that "good" can not mean the same as "promotes life," for the same
reason that "Jocasta" can not mean the same as "Oedipus' mother." (It
means something more like "worthy of being chosen" - though I would not
claim this is a completely accurate definition either.) It is possible for
a person to not know that what promotes life is good, just as Oedipus did
not know that Jocasta was his mother. Therefore, some explanation is
required of how we find out that what promotes our life is good.

Note that when I say "an explanation of how we know this" is required, I
am not expressing doubt about it. I mean simply what I say: given that we
know it, how do we know it? Do we know it based on observation, or do we
know it a priori? If we do know it, but no observations can be found
sufficient to justify it, then we must conclude it is a priori. That is
the point of the present discussion.

In more general terms, you can see that this sort of appeal to the meaning
of "good" can not be valid, since if it were, it would be a way of
'validating' any claim whatsoever. Any person could take whatever ethical
views he has, and claim that they are true in virtue of the meaning of
good. I might propose to define "good" to mean "promotes the production of
chocolate ice cream," and thence deduce that every person ought to produce
as much chocolate ice cream as he can. This is silly, of course. I can't
simply claim that this is what "good" means. It is not what "good" means,
and if I want to claim that producing chocolate ice cream is good, I need
to give a substantive reason for thinking so. And the same holds no matter
what is substituted for "chocolate ice cream." Claiming that "good" means
"promotes x" is not a way of showing that it is good to promote x.

Similarly, one could use the strategy to validate any descriptive claim.
Suppose I want to show that the sky is red. I say, "Well, 'red' means the
color of the sky during the daytime." That is not what "red" means, and
that does not give a reason for thinking the sky is red. Nor does the
parallel validation work if you substitute "blue" for "red". If asked how
I know the sky is blue, I also can not merely say, "'Blue' means the color
of the sky during the daytime." That isn't the meaning of "blue" either,
and it is not a reason for thinking the sky is blue. The only reason for
thinking the sky is blue consists in going outside and looking up. You
don't define the sky to be blue. You observe its color.

About my proof that everyone should produce chocolate ice cream: an
Objectivist might say that the difference there is that he (the
Objectivist) has given a correct definition, because it really is good to
promote life, whereas the proposed ice-cream definition is not correct.
But this just begs the question - how do you know that your definition is
correct, and not the chocolate-ice-cream definition? Of course, anyone
with any ethical views whatever is going to claim that his views are
correct, and therefore, if the Objectivist strategy is permissible, may
propose a 'definition' of good that makes his theory of ethics necessarily
true, and may respond to all objections in exactly the same manner the
Objectivist can.

5.2. RAND'S DERIVATION (?) OF EGOISM
Similar things might be said about the question, "How do we know that we
ought to do only what furthers our own lives, as opposed to what furthers
the lives of others?" An Objectivist might claim that this too is implicit
in the meaning of "ought", and the above objections apply here too. An
altruist might counter - as in fact, many of them do - that it is implicit
in the meaning of "ought" that we ought to do what promotes the lives of
others. How do we determine who is correct in this dispute?

I say, of course, that both are wrong. Neither conclusion is implied in
the meaning of "ought". It is a synthetic claim that we should promote our
own good, just as it is a synthetic claim that we should promote the good
of others. But even if I am mistaken, and one of the claims is analytic, I
think some argument would be required on the part of one or the other
party, to show that it was his view that was analytically true. As far as
I know, no ethical egoist has ever offered any non-question-begging
argument for the conclusion that we ought only to promote our own
interests, with perhaps the one exception of the quasi-argument to be
considered immediately below. Perhaps they believe this ethical
proposition to be self-evident - a possibility we should return to later.

It is important to discuss one, fallacious reason for thinking ethical
egoism to be analytically true. It goes something like this:

Altruism, as an ethical theory, says that I should sometimes sacrifice my
own good for the sake of something else. This means that I should
sacrifice my own values for the sake of something else. That is, I should
give up something I value, for the sake of something I do not value. That
is, I should give up something I believe to be good, to achieve something
I do not believe to be good. But this is obviously irrational.

Ayn Rand comes close to offering this argument, when she discusses the
meaning of "sacrifice" (in the bad sense of the word). The problem here is
that "my good" does not mean the same as "my values". "My good" means that
which benefits me. "My values" means that which I believe to be good. I
can very well believe what benefits other people but not myself to be
good. The issue between altruism and egoism is not over whether you should
pursue what you value. It is over what you should value. The altruist says
that you should value other people's lives and happiness. The egoist says
that you should value only your own life and happiness (and value others'
lives, then, only as means to promoting your own, and only insofar as they
do promote your own life, just as you would value your car
instrumentally). Both, obviously, hold that you should then proceed to
pursue that which you value: the altruist, that you should promote the
life and happiness of other people, the egoist that you should promote
only your own life and happiness. There is no contradiction involved in
either of these.
Now, one might propose to redefine egoism as just the view that one should
always promote only what one values (or rather, to remove it from the
realm of subjectivism, what one is correct in valuing). In this case,
egoism becomes analytic. However, the other result of this redefinition,
is that no one has ever denied egoism. In particular, the ethics proposed
by Jesus, Kant, the Buddha, Mother Theresa, or any of the other people one
normally thinks of as proponents of altruism, no longer conflict with
'egoism' in the least. None of these people has been so utterly confused
as to say that we should pursue things that we do not correctly hold to be
good. They have just proposed that it is good to give money to the poor,
help to feed the hungry, and so on, spending a large proportion of our
time and resources on these sorts of things. In other words, by thus
making egoism analytic, one trivializes the thesis to the point where any
action whatsoever is potentially consistent with the dictates of egoism
taken just by itself, including all the things we usually call
"altruistic". One can then redefine "altruism" as well, so that those
actions are no longer called 'altruistic', or one can allow that altruism
is consistent with egoism.

As a result, while one thus gets an easy validation for one's ethical
theory, the ethical theory has become useless: it can not be used to
determine whether a given action is right or wrong, because "selfish" will
just mean "promotes whatever is good" - we don't any longer have a
standard of what is good, which we originally thought that egoism was. If
dying to save your community is morally good (or rather, the agent
correctly believes it to be morally good), then that will count as
"selfish", and any ethical theory whatsoever will count as a form of
egoism. And if this is how one is going to use the word, then I certainly
agree with 'egoism'.

One common thread in most discussions of ethics, especially amongst
Objectivists, is the attempt to get something for nothing - i.e., the
attempt to get substantive, action-guiding moral principles, principles
that will tell you some particular action was right or wrong, that some
moral principles advocated by some other philosophers were wrong; out of
nothing more than judicious definitions of words and the manipulation of
language. This attempt is as delusory in ethics as it is in economics. You
can't make a tuna sandwich without any tuna (and it won't help to redefine
the word "tuna"), you can't construct a geometrical system without laying
down any geometrical axioms, and you can't get a moral conclusion out of
an argument without moral premises.

5.3. IS EGOISM SELF-EVIDENT?
If egoism is self-evident, that would be a reason for egoists' not
offering any argument in favor of it. Unfortunately, if this is the case,
there is not much one can say about it - one might be unable to show that
it really is self-evident, to those who do not find it so, or to explain
why it is true; while those who are unable to perceive this truth also may
be unable to explain why they do not see it.

I do not find egoism self-evident. I do not even find it the least bit
plausible prima facie. From what I can tell (based on what they say), few
other people find it plausible, and very few if any find it self-evident.
This does not prove that the Objectivist who considers egoism to be
obvious on its face is wrong (perhaps it is obvious to him, and perhaps he
thereby knows it to be true; and perhaps the other people's mental
faculties are defective), but it seems to leave us in at best some kind of
stalemate, unless one of us can find arguments to settle the issue.

How do we resolve a dispute when one person says that p is self-evident,
and another says that the denial of p is self-evident? (I am not saying an
Objectivist egoist would appeal to self-evidence; I am just considering
the possibility.) One way is to test the principle in specific cases. That
is, by examining certain more concrete examples of the principle, we can
get a better view of what it entails. When we do this, it might no longer
seem evident. Another way would be to draw out the logical relations of
the principle to other principles that we hold. If a general principle
that is in question is shown to conflict with other principles that are
plausible, that is reason to reject it. By the same token, of course, if
it is shown to follow from other, plausible principles, that is reason to
accept it.

Both of these methods may be applied to the issue of egoism. As far as I
know, they are the only ways to test the thesis of ethical egoism.

5.3.1. THE USE OF HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLES
Unfortunately, Objectivists usually object to the use of hypothetical
examples to test moral principles, on the ground that the hypothetical
examples do not represent reality. How, one might ask, can we draw
conclusions about how the world really is from purely hypothetical
premises, i.e., premises about some imagined but not actual situations?

This objection is vaguely felt by many who object to thought experiments
in philosophy in general, but it is a logical error. You can validly
deduce a categorical proposition from hypothetical premises. For example:

A -> (B -> C).

B -> not-C.

Therefore, not-A.

is a valid form of inference, where the "->" stands for the "if ... then"
relation (i.e. "If x were true, y would be true") (N.B. not the so-called
'material conditional' of first-order formal logic). And this form of
inference is relevant to the way hypotheticals are used in philosophy to
test moral principles. The typical form of thought-experiment-based
arguments in moral philosophy is as follows: "If moral theory T were true,
then in situation S, it would be right to do A. But in situation S, it
would surely be wrong to do A. Therefore, T is false." Notice that this
form of argument is perfectly valid: the conclusion deductively follows
from its premises (it's a variant on modus tollens). Notice also that both
premises are hypothetical - i.e., both are about what would be right if
so-and-so were the case. But the conclusion is categorical.
Some Objectivists refuse to even consider statements of the form "if A
then B" where A is known to be false. I'm not sure whether they think that
such statements are never true. If so, this would be another logical
error. The proposition, "If A then B" does not assert A. To say, "If you
lose your mittens, you will get no pie," is not to assert that you will
lose your mittens. Likewise, to assert, "If I were a brain in a vat, I
would have no knowledge of the external world," is not to assert that I am
a brain in a vat; it is not even to suggest that I might be. This is
obvious to anyone who understands the English word "if". In general, to
say, "If A were true, then . . ." does not imply that A is true, it does
not imply that A is likely to be true, and it does not even imply that A
might be true (if anything, with the use of the subjunctive mood, it
implies that A is false). For example, I can say, "If I lived in Alaska, I
would have more clothes than I presently do." This is true. It is true in
spite of the fact that I am not in Alaska, and I know I am not in Alaska.
When I say that, I am not implying that I might really be in Alaska right
now, and not in New Jersey as it appears.

Some will still want to know, reasonably enough, why thought experiments
are useful. Even if they are in principle capable of proving conclusions
about actuality, why are they necessary? Why can we not learn at least as
well through the consideration of actual or at least realistic examples?
Briefly, the reason is that hypothetical thought experiments provide a
means for conceptual controls that often cannot be reproduced in reality.
Or, in other words, they provide a way of mentally isolating a causal,
explanatory, or logical factor for examination on its own which normally,
in the real world, cannot be isolated, and to do so while still discussing
a concrete situation.

Let me give an example to show what I mean. David Hume once came up with
this thought experiment: suppose that in the middle of the night, the
paper money in everyone's wallet, safe, or other stash, suddenly doubled
in quantity - so there is twice as much money, but no other changes are
made. Would the country then suddenly be enormously better off - would we
all be twice as wealthy as we are now? No, in fact we would have exactly
the same amount of wealth as we presently do, for there would be exactly
the same amount of capital around, and the same availability of labor.
(Everyone could then double their prices.) What this shows is that
increases in the money supply do not translate to increased wealth; it can
also be used to explain why increases in the money supply cause inflation.

Of course, such a scenario is impossible: all our money cannot magically
double in quantity. But that is not the point. The reason the thought
experiment is useful is that this way of thinking of it enables you to
mentally isolate just the one factor desired for consideration: the
quantity of money. We imagine just the quantity of money changed and
nothing else. In the real world, one cannot do this. In the real world, it
is not possible to change the money supply uniformly (i.e. increasing
everyone's money, without redistribution) and it is impossible to change
the money supply without affecting the economy in some other way at the
same time. So I cannot cite a historical case in which nothing but the
money supply was altered. This is why thought experiments are useful.

A similar thing is true of thought experiments in moral philosophy. If we
want to examine the significance of one morally relevant factor for the
evaluation of actions, people, or states of affairs, it is useful to be
able to imagine and compare cases which differ only in respect of this one
factor of interest, whereas there may be no actual cases of which this is
true.

A thought experiment, in short, is not an exercise in fantasy but a tool
of logical analysis that is necessitated by the need for conceptual
clarity (sc. distinguishing different relevant factors from one another in
your thought), together with general facts about the nature of reality
(sc. that morally relevant, or otherwise explantorily relevant
characteristics do not come isolated in the real world). It is a way of
concretizing abstract reasoning.

Now, if someone gives an argument against your moral theory in which the
premises are true, and the conclusion follows logically from the premises,
you can not escape from the argument by refusing to entertain his
premises, i.e., refusing to listen to the argument. I am going to give an
argument against egoism which has those characteristics. The premises are
true hypotheticals, i.e. true "if ... then" statements, and the conclusion
that egoism is false logically follows from them. I will not regard the
mere fact that my premises are hypothetical as showing that they must be
irrelevant to (i.e. can not entail) their conclusion, which is
categorical. I have shown above that hypothetical premises can entail a
non-hypothetical conclusion. Nor will I regard the mere fact that the
hypotheticals are counter-factual, i.e., the antecedents are false, and
known to be so, as showing that the whole "if ... then" proposition must
be false. Both of those would be gross logical errors. If, therefore, an
Objectivist wishes to answer my argument, he will have to do more than
point out one of the aforementioned facts, and he will have to do more
than simply refuse to listen to or refuse to think about my premises.

5.3.2. THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST
Suppose that I am in a hurry to get somewhere. I am walking to work, and
if I am late, my boss gets mad at me. Furthermore, I like to get to work
on time, because I have a lot of work that I want to get done. It is in my
interests to get to work on time, but I am running a little bit late this
morning. I presume no Objectivist will object to this so far - i.e.,
surely it will be granted that it is in my interests to get to work on
time. Otherwise, there would be no reason for setting my alarm clock or
walking quickly.

Now as I walk down the street, there are a lot of people in my way,
slowing me down. I just happen to have in my pocket a hand-held
disintegrator ray, though. The gun will quickly disintegrate any person I
aim it at. It is believed that victims of disintegration suffer brief but
horrible agony while being disintegrated, but after that, no trace of them
is left. I hold back on disintegrating the people in my path, though,
because some of them might be potential clients for my business. But then
I see this homeless guy ahead, just wandering down the street. He is not
threatening me, and I could go around him, but that would take a second or
two longer, and I'm in a hurry. So I pull out the gun and disintegrate
him, and then continue on my way.

Assume that I live in a society in which homeless people are so little
respected that my action is both legal and socially acceptable. Homeless
people are regularly beaten up, set on fire, etc., with impunity.
Passers-by even regard it as an amusing entertainment. So I will not be
punished for my action. Assume further that I dislike homeless people and
don't like to see them on the street. So I do not feel bad about seeing
the homeless guy disintegrated. In fact, it amuses me. Nor will my
conscience bother me, because I am an ethical egoist, and so I believe
that my action was morally virtuous. Therefore, after destroying the
homeless guy, I should feel proud, not guilty.

The question is: Was my action morally right? If egoism is true, it was. I
saved some time and mildly entertained myself, just as if I had
disintegrated a pile of trash that was lying on the sidewalk getting in
everyone's way. The other people in my society, who are themselves also
egoists, will thank me for performing this public service, just as they
would thank me for removing any other kind of useless clutter from the
street. On the egoistic view, a person who does not serve my interests
either directly or indirectly is just that - a piece of useless clutter,
getting in my way.

Now it seems to me that this is obviously wrong. It is obvious that it is
morally wrong to kill a person who is posing no threat to you, and that's
not because he might prove useful to you some day. The egoist can respond
to this thought experiment in one of two ways:

(1) Reject the intuition: That is, he could claim that yes, it was morally
permissible and even praiseworthy to disintegrate the homeless guy. If
someone says this, then I have nothing further to say. One who would say
this is either insincere or morally corrupt.

(2) Accommodate the intuition: That is, the egoist could argue that for
some reason, it was really not in my interests to destroy the homeless
person. You never know when a person, presently homeless, might become
useful, after all. Some day in the future, for example, he might get a
job, and then he might possibly work for my company, or be a client, or
otherwise contribute to the economy of my society. Or he might someday be
able to be an organ donor, if not for my destroying his body.

Or, to take another tack, this particular homeless person might happen to
have friends who might come after me to get me back.

What enables egoists to make replies like this is that it is almost
impossible to assess the probabilities of all these possibilities in any
definitive manner. However, what needs to be kept in mind is that, on the
egoist's view, the fact that the other person is a sentient being, with a
life of his own, is not what counts. All that counts is that he has a
potential to serve my life, or to hamper it if I destroy him. Therefore,
how I treat him need not be, in principle, any different from the way I
treat inanimate objects. Sure, if there's a heap of trash lying on the
sidewalk, it's possible that the heap of trash will someday be useful for
something. It's also possible that destroying it will have some negative
effects on me. Some insane trash-lover might get mad at me, though I have
no reason to think that this is so. But none of this would prevent me from
removing a heap of trash that I found on the sidewalk, if it was getting
in my way. You don't save just anything that might be useful. If egoism is
true, I should take exactly the same fundamental attitude towards other
human beings as to inanimate objects: if I decide that the likelihood of
their being useful to me is sufficiently low and the likelihood of my
suffering ill effects of destroying them also sufficiently low, then I
will go ahead and remove them. Every day I throw away objects that have
more likelihood of being useful to me some day than a homeless person on
the street does. Every day I take actions, like crossing the street, that
involve more risk to my person than is involved in destroying the homeless
man in my hypothetical example.

But even if the egoist is able to think of some very plausible harm that I
would be likely to suffer from killing another person, I will just modify
the example to remove it. In other words, I stipulate that the homeless
guy is not a potential client of my company, he is not going to get a job,
he does not have a gang of friends to defend him, the passers-by on the
street will not be angry with me, etc. And the question is, then does it
seem that it's right to kill him?

Many Objectivists misunderstand the way hypothetical counter-examples
work. The point is to test a general principle: "The only thing that ought
to matter to me, is what promotes my own good." One tries to test this by
imagining a specific situation in which an action promotes my own good,
but it goes against some other thing that is often held to be valuable.
The creator of the counter-example gets to stipulate what goes on in the
example. So I get to stipulate, by fiat, that, in the hypothetical
situation, I do not receive reprisals for my action, et cetera. The only
thing that I do not get to stipulate is the verdict on the example, i.e.,
would the action thus described be right or wrong. That is where the
reader or listener is supposed to exercise his own judgement. If the
hypothetical action I describe seems to you to be morally right, then my
argument has failed. If it seems to you to be morally wrong, however, then
it shows that you are not truly an ethical egoist.

I can state my basic argument more abstractly, and also more starkly, like
so:

(1) If egoism is true, then you should perform any action which benefits
you (on balance).

(2) Therefore, if egoism is true, then if A benefits you only ever so
slightly while killing 4 million innocent other people amidst gruesome
agony, you should do A.

(3) You should not kill 4 million people, etc. just to achieve a minor
benefit.

(4) Therefore, egoism is not true. (from 2,3)

#1 follows directly from the definition of egoism. Egoism is the view that
benefit or harm to myself is the sole reason I can have either for or
against any action, i.e. nothing other than my own benefit is ever
relevant to assessing what I should do. It follows directly from this that
for any A, if A benefits me (on balance), I should do A. In particular, if
A benefits me only slightly (on balance), I should do A. It follows from
that, finally, that if A benefits me slightly though it kills 4 million
other people, I should still do A. That I never have been and never will
be presented with such an action does not alter the truth of this
conditional. Because egoism holds that my own benefit is the sole morally
relevant factor for assessing my actions, and the benefit of others is not
at all relevant, it follows that if a situation occurred in which I
obtained a small benefit in spite of enormous harm to others, I should
ignore the harm to others as not even the least bit relevant. This problem
remains unaltered by the supposition that my interests do not actually
conflict with those of others.

#3 I consider a self-evident moral fact (as egoism is not). If someone has
a moral theory which contradicts (3), then I consider that a sufficient
reductio ad absurdum of his theory. I think that some people might say
that they don't agree with (3), but I find it somewhat difficult to
believe that anyone would really mean it, nor to imagine what sort of
moral claim he would aceept if he did. The only way I could see someone
not finding (3) obvious (or claiming not to find it obvious) would be if
he was caught in some theory that he was quite convinced of that he came
to see contradicted (3). If this happens, though, I say it is time to
check your premises. Were they really as certain as (3) itself is? If not,
it is more reasonable to reject the theory than to reject (3).

On the issue of premise-checking, I should point out that I have seen
alleged proofs that 1=0, that pi=2, that motion is impossible, that
knowledge is impossible, and a good number of other absurdities. I think
everyone has seen this sort of thing. They are often extremely difficult
to refute. When you encounter an argument like this, i.e., an argument
with an absurd conclusion, even if you can't explain what is wrong with
it, you do not just accept the conclusion. You say there must be something
wrong with the argument, whether you can see it or not. When you see
Zeno's paradoxes, it would be irrational to conclude that motion is
impossible, even if you can't see what is wrong with his arguments. You
know that his arguments are wrong, because the conclusion is absurd.

But when it comes to philosophy, people are disturbingly reluctant to
reconsider their own arguments - once a person sets down a path of
reasoning, he is inclined to accept all of its logical implications,
however absurd. This is the only explanation for how a person could hold
an ethical theory that contradicts (3). I suggest that it is an adequacy
condition on any moral theory that it should have (3) as a logical
consequence, just as it is an adequacy condition on any complete physics
that it should have the result that rocks exist. If it doesn't get at
least that much right, there's no hope for the theory.

5.3.3. EGOISM VS. RIGHTS
Ethical egoism is inconsistent with the idea that individuals have rights,
for the same reason that utilitarianism is. The reason is that any
principle of rights, properly so called, functions as a moral side
constraint on action, not a moral goal. (The terminology is from Robert
Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.)

A moral goal is some good thing that our actions ought to aim at. Actions
are judged, under a moral goal, by how much of this good they produce (if
it comes in degrees), or by whether they produce the good or not. For
example, the imperative of the hedonist, "Maximize pleasure," expresses a
moral goal. So too the imperative of the utilitarian ("Produce the
greatest happiness for the greatest number").

Rights are not like that. They do not identify a goal to aim at. Instead,
they identify constraints on the permissible ways of pursuing your goals:
"Pursue your goals without violating constraint C."

Thus, for example, "Never kill" would be a side constraint. "Minimize the
number of killings that occur" would be a moral goal. Notice that these
are different: the latter, but not the former, would permit you to
sometimes kill people, if doing so was an efficient means to decreasing
the overall number of killings in the world.

Now let's define "consequentialism" (a technical term from contemporary
moral philosophy) as the view that says that only moral goals exist. That
is, according to consequentialism, the only thing that is ever relevant to
assessing whether an action is right or wrong is how well it promotes
certain goals. Whatever means are most efficient for promoting the
desirable goals are what ought to be done. (Of course, consequentialists
can differ with one another over exactly what goals are legitimate.) This
is the meaning of the slogan, "The ends justify the means." The contrary
view, that the ends don't justify the means, holds that there exist
constraints on the permissible means you can take, even for the pursuit of
legitimate goals.

Egoism is a consequentialist view. It says that the sole factor relevant
to the rightness of an action is how much it benefits the agent. Hence, an
agent ought always to aim at this one goal, and he should do whatever best
promotes it, without qualification.

The principles of individual rights are side constraints - they do not
say, for instance, "Do not steal someone else's property, unless it's in
your interests to do so." They just say, "Do not steal." That is why it is
not an adequate defense, if you are brought on trial for theft, to explain
that you expected to benefit by taking the victim's property. Courts do
not even listen to that kind of 'defense', nor should they. Again, the
non-initiation of force principle does not say, "Exercise force if and
only if you can get some benefit by doing so." Rather, whatever benefits
you are seeking for yourself, you have to do it within the constraints
imposed by other people's rights.

Now, one might maintain that the principles of individual rights are just
like rules of thumb designed for helping you to promote your interests -
the Objectivist says "Don't steal" because he has found, as a general
rule, that stealing hinders one's own interests. This makes it consistent
with consequentialism, but it has the result that such principles are not
absolute: you should violate them whenever, in the particular
circumstances, you find that violating them furthers your interests.
Furthermore, in order to show that you yourself have a right to do A, this
would mean that you have to show that allowing you to do A serves everyone
else's interests. If in a particular case, seizing your property benefits
others, then your right to property is in abeyance, because it no longer
functions as a side constraint, on the present view. Thus, eminent domain
cases are in principle justifiable.

An Objectivist will try to argue that in most or all actual cases, it does
not benefit others to seize my property. I will not take that up now,
since it is very difficult to determine. I will only say that it seems to
me that at this point the basic idea of our having rights has been
abandoned - if my use of my property has to be justified by the usefulness
to others of allowing it, then it is no longer being said that I have a
right to property. This brings us to the next point . . .

5.3.4. EGOISM VS. THE INTRINSIC VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
Egoism is inconsistent with the idea that individuals are ends in
themselves. My saying this will surprise some Objectivists, because they
usually think that egoism either follows from or entails the proposition
that individuals are ends in themselves. Here is why I say this:

If egoism is true, then the sole justification for my doing or refraining
from doing anything is that it serves my interests. By the same token, it
must be said that the sole justification for any other person's doing A or
refraining from A is that it serves his interests.

Now how do rights fit in here? To say that I have a right to A, where A is
something I can either do or have (as in "I have a right to free speech"
or "I have a right to own a gun") is to say that it is morally wrong for
others to forcibly interfere with my doing or having A. It is to say
something about what is morally right for other people to do with respect
to me. (It doesn't constrain my actions; if I have a right to do A, I may
still interfere with my own doing of A.)

Now how can I defend my rights intellectually? How do I show that I have a
right to do something? If egoism is true, in order to show this, I would
have to show that it is in the interests of other people to allow me to do
A! This seems outrageous from an individualist ethics point of view, but
the consequence strictly follows: if egoism is true, the only possible
justification for claiming that other people should do X would be that it
serves their respective interests to do X; so the only justification for
claiming that other people should not interfere with my doing A is that it
is in others' interests not to interfere with my doing A.

Similarly, the only reason why other people should even allow me to live,
is that it is in their interests to allow me to do so. I.e., I have a
right to life because my life serves other people.

Why do Objectivists think that the opposite is the case; why do they think
that egoism coheres with the principle that individuals are ends in
themselves? Well, because they only look at one side of it: they see that
egoism means that the justification of my own actions is always that they
serve myself. My actions do not need to serve others. However, the other
side of the coin is that other people's actions or inactions need take no
account of my good and in fact they should not. So while I get to regard
my existence as an end in itself, and as serving no one and nothing other
than me, other people get to equally legitimately, if egoism is true,
regard my life as merely a potential resource serving them, just as they
should regard everything in the world. That is, from the point of view of
my next door neighbor, my life is only good insofar as it serves my next
door neighbor. From the point of view of Mikhail Gorbachev, my life is
only significant insofar as it furthers Mikhail Gorbachev's interests. And
so on. While this result sounds paradoxical, perhaps even contradictory,
it is justly drawn from the theory. What matters to each person is solely
what serves that person's interests.

5.3.5. ARE THERE CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BETWEEN RATIONAL PEOPLE?
I do not understand how Objectivists are able to maintain that there are
no conflicts of interest in a rational society, but they seem to regard it
as a fundamental point in their ethics. I suspect they so regard it
because they think this principle enables their ethical system to 5.3.4
and 5.3.2.

Suppose I own a store, a small market. Across from the street there is
another store of the same kind, owned by Bill. When a customer comes down
the street, it is in my interests for the customer to enter my store. It
is in Bill's interest for the customer to enter Bill's store. The customer
will not enter both stores; if he goes to my store, he will not go to
Bill's, and if he goes to Bill's store, he will not go to mine - a
conflict of interests, pure and simple.

Since the result that Bill's and my interests have come into conflict
follows from just three propositions, there are only three ways for an
Objectivist to counter this argument. The Objectivist would have to argue:

(1) That it is not in my interests for the customer to enter my store.

But this is highly implausible. If it isn't in a store-owner's interests
for a customer to enter his store, why do they spend money on advertising,
try to offer a wider selection or lower price than competitors, et cetera?

(2) That it is not in Bill's interests for the customer to enter his
store.

This is implausible for the same reason.

(3) That the two prospective events named in #1 and #2 are not in
conflict.

And this is implausible also, on a reasonable construal of "conflict" -
namely, if one occurs, the other does not occur. Normally, a customer will
enter one or another store but not both. Therefore, not both Bill's and my
interests can be satisfied in this case - i.e. they are 'in conflict.'

I do not see how one can hope to avoid this conclusion. Please note that
there are no other possible responses to this argument. Any response to
the argument that does not argue either (1), (2) or (3) above must be
irrelevant, since my conclusion that Bill's and my interests conflict
follows strictly from the three premises that it's in my interests for the
customer to patronize my store, it's in Bill's interests for the customer
to patronize Bill's store, and the customer's patronizing my store
conflicts with his patronizing Bill's store. In particular, to point out
that I recognize Bill as having property rights, that I shouldn't attack
Bill, that it is in my interests to have a free, capitalist society, and
so on, is irrelevant. Nothing along those lines refutes (1), or (2), or
(3).

5.3.6. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONTRADICTION OF EGOISM
G.E. Moore identified the following as the fundamental contradiction of
egoism (Principia Ethica, section 59): The egoist says that each person
ought rationally to hold, "My own happiness is the sole good": "What
egoism holds, therefore, is that each man's happiness is the sole good -
that a number of different things are each of them the only good thing
there is - an absolute contradiction!" (emphasis Moore's).

This is a criticism that still seems to me, as it did when I first read
it, exactly on the mark. Let's look at it more closely, though. The
ethical egoist is one who believes that he ought to aim only at promoting
his own happiness (it does not matter if we substitute "interests" or
anything else for "happiness"). Certainly, then, he thinks that it is good
that he should be happy. What does he think everyone else should do?

He might maintain, "Everyone else also ought to serve my interests," but
this would be implausible. Then he would have to answer "What's so special
about you?" Unless he thinks he himself has some kind of special status,
some characteristics that no one else in the world has, he must grant
that, if his happiness is good, the happiness of others is also good.

Therefore, to maintain the plausibility of his theory, the egoist has to
say that everyone's happiness is good, and that each person ought to aim
at that person's own happiness. But if other people's happiness is also
good, then the egoist must be hard put to explain why he does not aim at
it in the same way he aims at his own. In other words, how can he justify
acting as if his own happiness were the only good thing there is, given
that he grants that every other person's happiness is good in just the
same way that his own happiness is?

We can phrase the conflict another way, in terms of the idea that
individuals are ends in themselves. Let A be an egoist, and let B be the
egoist's next-door neighbor. The egoist regards his own life as an end in
itself, and he says B ought to regard B's life as an end in itself. But,
insofar as A is concerned only for furthering his own life, A can not,
himself, treat B's life as an end in itself. A's sole value is A's life;
therefore, A can value B's life, if at all, only as a means (i.e. if B's
life furthers A's). Similarly, when A recommends to B that B should be an
egoist, he is recommending that B should regard A as being only valuable
as a means. This necessarily follows from the supposition that B should
regard B's life as the sole end in itself, which is the meaning of egoism.
A therefore seems to be caught in a contradiction: A holds that A's own
life is an end in itself, but at the same time A thinks that no one else
ought to recognize A's life as being an end in itself. In a parallel
contradiction, A holds that other people are valuable only as means, but
he holds that other people are correct in regarding themselves as valuable
not merely as means but as ends in themselves. In other words: Each
individual is correct in a belief which directly contradicts what every
other individual correctly believes. A is correct to believe P, but B is
correct to believe not-P. Is this not, in Moore's words, "an absolute
contradiction"?

Notice that here, the Objectivist doctrine that rational people's
interests never conflict, even if it were true, would provide no help.
That the life of my next door neighbor should be valuable as an end in
itself and that also, it should be valuable only as a means to further my
own happiness, is a contradiction, regardless of how well my and my
neighbor's happiness may harmonize.

5.4. MY ETHICS
My moral theory is known as "ethical intuitionism". "Intuition", in
Western philosophy, refers to the kind of direct awareness that reason
provides us - i.e., foundational, a priori knowledge. It does not refer to
a kind of supernatural sixth sense, it does not have anything to do with
"women's intuition", it does not refer to an inarticulate sense of
something caused by one's experience with similar situations. It is a
technical term in epistemology.

In my view, value is a universal, a property that some things have, just
as 'white' or 'length' are (see section 4). The term "good" or "value" can
not be defined. There must be some terms that are indefinable, because
every definition is in terms of simpler concepts, and there can't be an
infinite regress. There is therefore no intrinsic difficulty when I say
that 'good' is one of these indefinable concepts because it is absolutely
simple; it does not have any constituents. In the same way, 'white', which
you also can not define, is a simple concept.

And since, in my view, the faculty of reason allows us to grasp universals
as such and to understand facts about them, it also allows us to
understand the relationships between this universal, goodness, and other
universals, such as 'life' or 'happiness'. Ethics, in my view, is a body
of rational, a priori knowledge, just as mathematics, logic, and
metaphysics are.

If, as I believe, some moral principles are self-evident, then there is no
need to derive ethics from biology, physics, or any other descriptive
facts. This is how my theory resolves the is/ought problem.

5.4.1. THE ARGUMENT FROM DISAGREEMENT, PART 1: HOW CAN DISAGREEMENT EXIST?
One objection to the above is that moral knowledge cannot be self-evident,
since what appears right to some people may not seem right to others. If
intuitionism is true, then how, it may be asked, could differences of
opinion concerning moral issues occur?

I reply in four parts:

(I) Intuitionism does not hold that all true moral principles are
self-evident. Intuitionism holds only that some moral principles are
self-evident. As instances, consider the following:

(1) It is unjust to punish a person for a crime he didn't commit.

(2) Happiness is preferable to suffering.

(3) It is wrong to torture other creatures just for the fun of it.

(4) If it is bad for one person to suffer x, then it is worse for two
people to suffer x.

(5) It is better to have a longer period of pleasure, rather than a
shorter period.

(6) Courage is a virtue, not a vice.

The reader can doubtless extend the list further himself, given these
examples. I have been careful not to put down there any item which is
merely my opinion, such as that capital punishment is just, but only
things which really are self-evident. It is not merely my opinion that
courage is a virtue, so that perhaps a reasonable person might think it to
be a moral vice instead.
Is there really a rational person, who understands each of (1) - (6), who
disagrees with them? (N.B. if even one of the above propositions is
self-evident, my point is made.)

Now it may reasonably be doubted whether more controversial ethical
judgements, such as "abortion is murder" can be derived from moral
propositions which have the degree of self-evidence of the above. This,
however, I do not perceive as an objection to intuitionism. As in all
other fields of study, if it is impossible to derive certain propositions
from self-evident facts, then those propositions simply can not be known
to be true. This is no objection to ethical intuitionism, any more than
the fact that the continuum hypothesis is undecidable is an objection to
set theory. I would caution the reader, however, against drawing any such
conclusion too hastily. At first glance, and perhaps even after
considerable reflection, it is not apparent that the Fundamental Theorem
of Calculus can be derived from the axioms of Peano Arithmetic. Similarly,
we cannot say at first glance what principles might possibly be derived
from ethical axioms.

(II) The argument from disagreement, if valid, would refute nearly all of
philosophy, including nearly all non-intuitionist ethical systems (with
exceptions to be noted). For the fundamental challenge is this: If one
claims that there is a means of knowing p, which is available to any
rational person, then how does one explain the fact that many people,
otherwise apparently rational, do not agree with p? Notice that this
challenge arises regardless of whether the means of knowledge in question
is said to be "intuition", or reasoning, or observation, or anything else.
The only feature of it that is essential to the argument from disagreement
is that it be a means of knowledge available to all (rational) people. If
any such means of knowledge exists, how come everyone has not by now
discovered the truth? And notice also that this question is not specific
to ethics but applies to any controversial subject, including all of
philosophy.

The only (quasi-)philosophical theories that would not be subject to this
objection are those that maintain that some individuals have a special
access to the truth that others lack - such as divine revelation. Those
who hold, for example, that God only chooses certain people, from time to
time, to reveal metaphysical and ethical truths to by direct inspiration,
are able to answer the argument from disagreement thusly: There is
continuing disagreement because not everyone has been subjected to the
necessary revelatory experience. They may use this reply if, and only if,
they claim themselves to be among those who have received divine
inspiration (otherwise, they would have no way of explaining how they know
ethical truths).

If, therefore, the argument from disagreement is valid, then it refutes
Objectivism just as surely as it refutes intuitionism. Not even the moral
skeptic is safe from the objection from disagreement. For in asserting
moral skepticism, he implies that we have some way of knowing moral
skepticism itself to be true. But if this is the case, then how come
(again, barring divine revelation as the requisite means of knowledge) not
all rational people agree with moral skepticism?

The argument from disagreement is thus a double-edged sword - if one uses
it to attack intuitionism, it will cut equally well against one's own
moral theories (including itself).

(III) But the argument from disagreement is not valid, even if we discount
the point previously made in (I) above. The fact that some people fail to
perceive a fact simply does not destroy the possibility that other people
do perceive it. This would be to invoke what I call "the idiot's veto":

The Idiot's Veto: The thesis that any individual has the power to block a
fact from the realm of objectivity or knowledge, merely by persistently
refusing to agree with it, and resisting all efforts to educate him.

This principle would entail, for example, that if there is any person
(perhaps the mentally retarded would fit this description) who fails to
understand that multiplication is commutative, then the Commutativity
Axiom is null and void: i.e., no one can know that multiplication is
commutative.
Needless to say, I do not accept the Idiot's Veto; nor should any
objectivist.

(IV) There are, of course, numerous explanations available for the
existence of disagreement in ethics, none of which is incompatible with
intuitionism:

(a) Different individuals have differing levels of intelligence;

(b) Some have reflected more than others;

(c) Most moral facts are derivative (see point (I) above) and not
self-evident;

(d) Many people have various biases, which ethics is particularly prone to
bring out, since people's personal interests are often very much at stake
in moral issues. In addition, people are prone to be emotional about moral
issues, and it is well-known that emotions often tend to bias one's
judgement. Take the abortion issue as a case in point: This is one of the
most controversial of moral issues. It should be no surprise that it is
also an emotionally charged issue, involving as it does reproduction and
babies. It takes little insight to see that many if not most of the
arguments on abortion are emotional appeals (e.g. images of babies being
killed). I therefore find it difficult to believe that the source of the
continuing disagreements is primarily intellectual in nature.

(e) Many people base their moral beliefs on religion, just as in previous
ages they often based their beliefs about physics, cosmology, and geology
on religion. This led to numerous firmly-held but erroneous beliefs about
those sciences, and it is really no surprise at all that it has led to the
same sort of beliefs about morality. The disagreements due to this cause
do not create an objection to moral intuition, any more than they create
an objection to science. It just means that it is time to stop basing our
beliefs on religion.

(V) Finally, human beings simply are fallible creatures. None of our
mental faculties is exempt from error. Errors in perceptual judgements, in
memory, and even in introspection periodically occur. Science has
frequently made errors. Even attempted mathematical proofs and other
deductive reasoning can go wrong - as in the case of the 'proofs' that
1=0, and other fallacies too numerous to mention. But this does not prove
that we can never know anything. Therefore, the fallibility of moral
intuition does not indicate that it is not a legitimate means of
knowledge.

5.4.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM DISAGREEMENT, PART 2: BUT HOW CAN WE RESOLVE
DISAGREEMENT?
If intuitionism is true, we can resolve disagreements about ethics in the
same way (mutatis mutandis) that we can presently resolve disagreements
about Objectivism if Objectivism is true: namely, try to find other
principles, not in dispute, from which the desired moral conclusion can be
derived. If that doesn't work, i.e., there is no common ground between the
two parties, then the disagreement cannot be resolved, period. This is not
a peculiarity of ethics under the intuitionist theory; this applies to any
claim whatsoever, whether in philosophy or outside it: i.e., if you and
your interlocutor have no intellectual common ground, if he flatly denies
what you take as axiomatic, then your dispute cannot be resolved. So what?
Does that prove that nobody can ever know anything? If an Objectivist is
unable to convince a Kantian to change his mind and become an Objectivist
(and vice versa), does that mean that Objectivism isn't true? No. Does it
mean that we'll never know if Objectivism is true? No. Does it mean that
reason is impotent to discover philosophical truth? No. Then the
possibility of unresolved ethical dispute does not show any of those
things about ethics. It does not show that one of the moral principles in
dispute isn't true, it doesn't show that we can't know which of them is
true, and it doesn't show that intuition is impotent to discover moral
truth. Philosophy does not need to provide a technology for inducing
belief in all true propositions in everyone. Indeed, the hope of such a
method would be delusory.

It is not intuitionism that generates the possibility of unresolvable
dispute. It is the volitional nature of consciousness. If no matter what
you say, your interlocutor refuses to agree, always demanding proof behind
proof behind proof, then there is nothing you can do to make him agree.

Again, however, I would caution the reader against concluding too hastily
as to the unresolvability of a particular ethical (or other) dispute. Both
philosophical thought experiments and derivation from other principles can
have a surprisingly long reach. You cannot conclude that since you have
not yet found a way to convince someone of a moral conclusion, you will
never find one. Most people are not so stubborn as my imagined skeptic who
denies everything, and it is highly unlikely that two people will disagree
about every moral issue (Cf. section 5.4.1, part (I)).

6. FREE WILL

6.1. DEFINITIONS:
1. The free will thesis: The thesis that people have free will.

2. Free will: A person has free will if and only if he sometimes is in
situations in which he can choose between two or more available actions,
and which action he performs is determined by his choice.

3. The law of causality: The thesis that every event has a sufficient
cause.

4. Sufficient cause: A sufficient cause of an effect is a cause that, if
it occurs, renders it impossible that the effect fail to occur. I.e., if
the cause occurs, the effect must occur. (Distinguished from a necessary
cause, in which the reverse is true: i.e., the effect cannot occur unless
the necessary cause occurs.)

5. Indeterminism: The denial of the law of causality, esp. the thesis that
some human actions lack sufficient causes.

6.2. THE PROBLEM OF FREE WILL
Now here's what's so puzzling about free will:

(1) It seems clear that we have it.

The Objectivists and I are in complete agreement about that. Nearly every
voluntary choice that I make is, if any credit is to be given to the data
of introspection and experience, an exercise of free will, i.e., a choice
between two or more available alternatives, in which the alternative that
is actualized depends on my choice.

(2) It seems that free will is incompatible with the law of causality.

For consider any action I perform, A. From the law of causality, we know
that there was a cause of this action, call it B, and given that B
happened, A has to occur. If A has to occur, then no alternatives to A are
truly available, or in other words, I can not fail to do A; so I lack free
will with respect to A.

Now this last conclusion can be avoided if, but only if, it can be
successfully argued that I had a choice about whether B occurred. If I had
no choice about whether B happened, and given that B happened A has to
happen, then I neither have nor ever had any choice about whether A would
occur.

Suppose, then, that I do have a choice about whether B occurs. We know
from the law of causality, again, that there must be another event, call
it C, which was a sufficient cause of B. We can repeat the same argument
above: if I had no choice about C, then I had no choice about B, so I have
no choice about A. And so on.

This series can be iterated indefinitely. We can see now that there are
only three possibilities:

(i) An infinite regress: i.e., there is an infinite series of events
stretching back, and I have a choice about each and every one of them.

But surely this is not the case. At some point, the series is going to go
back to a point before I was born.

(ii) The series of causes traces back, sooner or later, to an event (call
it Z) that I do not have a choice about.

And in that case, I do not have free will. I have no choice about Z;
therefore, I have no choice about whatever events necessarily follow from
Z. Or in other words, I could not have avoided Z (by hypothesis);
therefore, I could not have avoided any of the necessary consequences of
Z.

(iii) At some point in the series the law of causality is violated: either
we have an event that has no cause, or we have an event that has a cause
but the cause is not sufficient for its effect (i.e. the effect could have
failed to follow the cause).

Now it's clear these are the only three logical possibilities, since as
long as the law of causality holds, the series of causes continues to
stretch back; and if it stretches back indefinitely, it either eventually
reaches something I have no choice about, or it is an infinite series of
things I do have a choice about.

Assuming that (i) is not the case (as the Objectivist theory agrees - for
Objectivism holds that there is a primary choice), the only two remaining
possibilities are (ii) I have no free will and (iii) the law of causality
is violated.

At this point, for Objectivists, the paradox is already apparent - for all
Objectivists accept the law of causality. An Objectivist cannot accept
(ii) and he cannot accept (iii).

However, other philosophers who wished to defend free will have sometimes
chosen to accept (iii). To complete the paradox, we turn to:

(3) It seems that free will is incompatible with indeterminism as well.

For suppose that A is an action of mine that has no sufficient cause. In
that case, it would appear that there is no explanation for why A
occurred - it just happened at random. This does not seem to make my
action free, and at any rate, if this is the nature of 'free will,' it
seems that free will is something we would be better off without. F.H.
Bradley pillories the notion of contra-causal freedom (in Ethical
Studies):

[T]he will is not determined to act by anything else; and further, it is
not determined to act by anything at all .... Freedom means chance; you
are free because there is no reason which will account for your particular
acts, because no one in the world, not even yourself, can possibly say
what you will or will not do next.

Contra-causal freedom seems to entail that my actions are unconnected to
my beliefs, desires, or personality traits. Therefore, it means that (for
instance), regardless of the fact that I do not believe in God and that I
have no desire to promote religion or to make a fool of myself, since I
have 'free will,' I might, in the next minute, find myself running outside
yelling about the coming of the Lord. It seems to me that if this is
possible, so far from giving me free will, it means that I do not have
free will, specifically because it means that I do not have control over
my actions.
And now the paradox is complete: We have free will, but free will is
incompatible with determinism, and free will is incompatible with
indeterminism. One of these propositions must be false.

6.3. THE OBJECTIVIST SOLUTION
An Objectivist's options on the free will puzzle are limited. Objectivism
holds the Law of Causality to be a corollary of the Axiom of Identity.
Therefore, the law of causality can have no exceptions whatsoever. I do
not think that one could reject the law of causality and still call
oneself an Objectivist. Nor could one reject the free will thesis and
still call oneself an Objectivist. The Objectivist Ąö8˘ - therefore must
reject (2). And in fact Peikoff is quite explicit on this (in OPAR): Free
will is a kind of causality, not an exception to causality. However, this
is probably the sketchiest part of the Objectivist philosophy, at least
among issues that are of central importance. Endorsement of the free will
thesis is an essential tenet of Objectivism, but the Objectivist account
of free will, i.e. of how it works, seems to me very poorly thought out.

The problems all come down to the 'primary choice'. What Peikoff calls the
'primary choice' is a choice which does not rest on any previous choice,
i.e. it is a choice that is not caused or explained by any other choice,
but which can explain other choices. Now it's clear that there has to be
such a thing, if there are any choices at all, since otherwise there would
be an infinite regress. In the Objectivist theory, the primary choice is
always the choice whether to focus one's consciousness. And this is a
plausible candidate for a primary choice (though I remain noncommittal on
whether there may also be other choices that are primary), for, until one
focuses one's consciousness, one is generally not in a position to
understand and evaluate one's alternatives for action; therefore, it seems
that focusing one's consciousness is a precondition on all (other) choice.

Now the success or failure of the Objectivist theory of free will is
clearly going to turn on the primary choice: if it can be successfully
maintained that the primary choice is free and does not violate the law of
causality, then we might as well grant the rest to Objectivism (i.e. that
all or most of the rest of our actions are free) and consider the problem
of free will solved. But here is the problem: Is the primary choice
caused? That is, suppose I have chosen to focus my consciousness; was
there a cause of my doing this? This question is just an instance of the
question about free will that we started with. Now either the primary
choice is caused, in which case it appears that it is not free, or it is
uncaused, in which case it violates the law of causality. The dilemma can
not be evaded.

To look at the matter more closely, suppose the Objectivist answers yes,
the primary choice is caused. Now by hypothesis, it is not caused by
anything else that I have chosen (that is the import of calling it the
primary choice). Therefore, it is caused by something I have not chosen.
Call this something, whatever it is, "C". By hypothesis, I did not choose
C and could not have avoided C's occurrence, and given that C occurred, it
was necessary that I focus my consciousness at this time (by the nature of
a sufficient cause); therefore, I could not fail to focus my consciousness
at this time, i.e. I was not free to refrain.

Notice that this is exactly the deterministic threat that started the
problem of free will in the first place, now applied to the 'primary
choice' - and Objectivism accepts in the general case that determinism is
incompatible with free will. That is, in general, Objectivists accept that
for me to have free will, my actions have to not be caused by my
environment, my genes, or anything else that is external and outside my
control. So they must accept the validity of the present argument - i.e.,
if the primary choice is caused by external factors, then it is not a free
choice.

We already know that the primary choice, by definition, is not caused by
any other choice of mine. There therefore appears to be but one
alternative left:

Suppose the Objectivist answers no, the primary choice is not caused. Then
he gives up the law of causality, and, if the law of causality is a
corollary of Identity, he gives up the law of identity. It is no good at
this point to protest that choosing freely is part of the nature of man
and therefore not a violation of identity - for what that really amounts
to, on the present view, is this: It is part of the nature of man to
violate the law of causality; i.e., it is part of our identity to violate
the law of identity. No amount of stress on the word "nature" in that
sentence can remove the contradiction.

Of the law of causality, Peikoff writes, with characteristic explicitness:

[A]n entity must act in accordance with its nature. The only alternatives
would be for an entity to act apart from its nature or against it; both of
these are impossible. . . . In any given set of circumstances, therefore,
there is only one action possible to an entity, the action expressive of
its identity. [OPAR, 14; emphasis in original]

Of free will, he writes:

A course of thought or action is 'free,' if it is selected from two or
more courses possible under the circumstances. In such a case, the
difference is made by the individual's decision, which did not have to be
what it is, i.e., which could have been otherwise. [OPAR, 55]

I admire the clarity of writing (this is not a facetious remark) that
makes the contradiction absolutely palpable: the law of causality entails
that an entity always has only one course of action possible in any given
circumstances; free will entails that we sometimes have more than one
course of action possible given our circumstances.
Now perhaps I am being slightly uncharitable. Perhaps I should have read
the first passage with an implicit qualifier, "...except in the case of
free will." That is, perhaps Peikoff would rephrase his description of the
law of causality to say that any entity, except for a consciousness having
free will, always has only one course of action possible to it. In that
case, the formal contradiction is removed.

But this won't work, and not only because it is merely a Pickwickian way
of avoiding the notion of free will as an 'exception' to the law of
causality. The more fundamental problem is the Objectivist doctrine that
the law of causality is a corollary of identity. Look back at the
quotation from Peikoff on causality. The "therefore" in the third sentence
is indicating that the conclusion that there is only one possible course
of action follows from the facts that an entity cannot act apart from its
nature and that an entity cannot act against its nature. If, therefore,
Objectivism maintains that human beings, alone among entities, sometimes
have more than one possible course of action, it is fair to ask the
Objectivist which of those two premises is not true of the human
consciousness: Are we able to act apart from our nature, or are we able to
act against our nature?

It therefore appears that introducing the theory of the primary choice
produces no progress whatsoever on the problem that we started with. We
still have exactly the same apparent conflict between free will and the
law of causality.

How might one respond to the dilemma? One approach might be to deny that
the question of whether it has a cause is applicable to the primary
choice, i.e., to claim that for some reason it doesn't make sense to ask
what caused the primary choice. But this hardly seems defensible. The
primary choice is something that happens, i.e., an event. The Law of
Causality says that every event has a sufficient cause. So either the
primary choice has a sufficient cause, or the primary choice is an
exception to the Law of Causality. If it somehow doesn't make sense to ask
whether the primary choice is caused, then it is an even more stark
exception to the law of causality, because it does make sense to ask about
any other event whether (and by what) it was caused.

A more promising line of approach would be the agent causation approach.
This is the view that a free choice is not caused by any other event, but
it is caused by the agent. In this view, events can be caused not only (or
perhaps not at all) by other events, but also by entities, and one might
go on here to define an 'action' as an event that is caused by an entity.
This enables one to maintain the law of causality as "every event has a
cause" without leading to an infinite regress, since the cause is not
always another event. We might then say that an action is free when it is
caused by the agent, and not free when it is caused by something external
to the agent.

This may be a good way of resolving the problem, but I have doubts about
whether it is an Objectivist way of resolving the problem. If the law of
causality says only that every event has a cause, and the cause may be an
entity, then it says nothing more than that every event is the action of
some entity. In that case, it does not rule out the possibility that an
entity might have two or more courses of action available to it at some
time - which is why this view allows the possibility of free will. But at
the same time, this formulation of the law of causality also allows the
possibility of chance events, such as are contemplated in most
interpretations of quantum mechanics. The radioactive atom is capable of
decaying, or not decaying. Whichever it does will be the action of the
atom, so the law of causality is not violated (whatever happens has a
cause: viz., the atom itself is the cause). So I think that it is
essential to the law of causality that not only is every action caused by
an entity, but the causal factors present (the entity's characteristics,
plus its circumstances) are sufficient to determine which action it
performs - something like that is what is required to rule out random
events.

Objectivism, as Peikoff expounds it (and I am here assuming, perhaps
mistakenly, that Peikoff is being an accurate exponent), wants to hold on
to all three of the following claims:

(1) Free will is not an exception to the law of causality.

(2) The law of causality entails, for all entities other than beings
having free will, that they only ever have one course of action possible
to them.

(3) Beings having free will often have more than one course of action
possible to them.

If (2) is true, I do not see how it can be said that (3) does not form an
exception to the law of causality.

6.4. WHAT'S THE ANSWER?
Finally, as to how I would propose to resolve the problem: I don't claim
to know the answer to the problem of free will, but I will just outline
the two possible routes that I see:

On the one hand, we could deny that the Law of Causality is a corollary of
Identity, and say instead that it's just an empirical generalization
formed by the observation of inanimate nature. The observation
(introspection) of our own consciousness, however, suggests that it is an
exception to this law; or in other words, that the law doesn't extend to
consciousness. Though this approach is inconsistent with Objectivism, I
don't see compelling reason for rejecting it, as I have never been able to
see causality as a corollary of identity. As to Peikoff's argument (quoted
above): I do not see why there could not be two courses of action that are
both equally consistent with an entity's nature. In that case, the
conclusion that there's only every one course of action possible simply
doesn't follow from the (apparently tautological) premise that an entity
has to act in accordance with its nature. And no argument has been given
to show that there can only ever be one action that accords with an
entity's nature.

Alternately, one could argue that the argument in section 6.2, (2)
involves an equivocation on the modal notions like "can" and "must". (N.B.
modal notions are those that have to do with 'possibility'.) This is what
the so-called 'compatibilists' do. According to this tack, there is one
sense in which an entity has only one 'possible' action (this is the sense
employed in the law of causality), but there is another sense of
"possible" (the sense relevant to free will) in which people do often have
more than one action 'possible' to them. This is not implausible prima
facie, as multiple kinds of modality are already known (among professional
philosophers) to exist. As to what the two senses are, here's a crude
first pass: perhaps the first sense of possibility is to be explained in
terms of consistency with the laws of nature and the present state of the
world. Perhaps the second sense of possibility is to be explained in terms
of what one would be able to do if one tried (i.e., you 'can' do A = you
would do A if you tried to do A). Or perhaps, as Hobbes suggested, the
modality relevant to free will should be explained in terms of the absence
of external impediments to motion. Also, one might want to bring in things
that our faculties were designed for doing. (E.g., you can do A only if
(1) A is the kind of thing that your faculties are naturally adapted for
doing; (2) there are no external obstacles interfering with your doing A;
and (3) if you tried to do A, you would succeed.) My purpose here,
however, is not to give a complete theory of free will, but just to point
out how one should approach the issue, in contrast to how Peikoff
approaches it in OPAR. Now notice that under my last description of what
is necessary for A to be 'possible' in the sense relevant to free will,
this is different from the first sense of "possible" (consistency with the
laws of nature + initial conditions). Therefore, the argument I initially
gave to show that free will is incompatible with the law of causality
fails: it is based on an equivocation.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

Great, this will give you a chance to answer all those devastating arguments
against parts of your essay that you didn't get around to last time.

In article <7lku0o$bnd$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
  Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
 
> Again, I don't see what this has to do with my argument.  My argument was
> deductively valid and had 3 premises:

  Your argument is not valid, and the reasons have been given. You simply
evade the reasons.  

> P1: If Objectivism is true, then [that O marries his mother] is the same
> thing as [that O marries Jocaste].

  "Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste. You are unable to deny this and evade the
fact that you are so unable.  

> P2: No one can both believe a thing and not believe that same thing at the
> same time.

  As was already said, even though you evaded it, if the failure to believe
is contingent upon different words than the success in belief, it is
possible. I'll give the same example again, both because it's easy and
because it highlights the fact that you simply evade this point. You might
correctly believe, for example, that Navy submarines are propelled by
engines, while at the same time failing to believe that they are propelled by
steam turbines. But in the Navy, "engine" means "steam turbine." Your failure
to believe is contingent upon the use of the different words, "steam
turbine," while your success is contingent upon the use of the word "engine."
This example explains while you're totally wrong, although you evaded the
example last time.   Similarly, Oedipus believes he married Jocaste while not
believing that he married his mother.  

> Which one of these premises are you trying to challenge?

  The one that was challenged before. You simply evaded the challenge. Your
posts depend upon your evading the things that refute them.   In article
<7lnh3f$96i$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,   Owl <a@a.a> wrote:  

> If the word "a" and the word "b" refer to the same thing, then if
> a sentence containing "a" is true, you should be able to substitute "b" for
> "a" and still have a true sentence.  Why doesn't this work on the oedipal
> sentences:
>
> 1. O believes that O is marrying Jocaste.
> 2. O believes that O is marrying O's mother.

  Because sentence 1 does not completely and correctly express what Oedipus
believes, of course. Oedipus believes that Oedipus is marrying (Jocaste who
is not his mother). When you try to substitute (his mother) for (Jocaste who
is not his mother), it's easy to see that the error is in sentence 1.
Sentence 1 lacks context. You are claiming that sentence 1 represents what
Oedipus believes, but it only represents part of what he believes. Examining
everything Oedipus believes illuminates your error.   When you properly
examine the things that Oedipus believes:   x) I married Jocaste y) I did not
marry my mother   ... it's easy to see that "my mother" means Jocaste. If it
didn't, x and y wouldn't contradict when they clearly do.   Of course, this
has been pointed out already. You simply evade this point. Admittedly, the
above that you wrote is a new strategem, but it's a new strategem that relies
on the same evasion. We could whimsically call it "squirming."  

> The problem with Objectivism, then, is that it ignores this second dimension
> of how language works: that people refer to things *via* senses.

  The problem with your argument, then, is that it ignores a dimension of how
language works: that people refer to things with words and can be mistaken
about what those words mean. Already pointed out and evaded by you.

In article <7lnh3f$96i$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
  Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
 
> Here's another formulation of the problem (common in phil. of language):
> Everyone accepts Leibniz' law: If a=b, then any characteristic of a is a
> characteristic of b.
 
Characteristic of a, you say here. Let's remember that: characteristic of a.
 
>  Now, that seems to imply the following principle about
> sentences: If the word "a" and the word "b" refer to the same thing, then if
> a sentence containing "a" is true, you should be able to substitute "b" for
> "a" and still have a true sentence.

  No, it doesn't seem to imply this. Words are not necessarily
characteristics of a. Here comes the amusing part.  

>  Why doesn't this work on the oedipal
> sentences:
>
> 1. O believes that O is marrying Jocaste.
> 2. O believes that O is marrying O's mother.

  You would have the reader believe that a is Jocaste and b is Oedipus'
mother, and that there is an x that is a characteristic of a and should be a
characteristic of b. And the characteristic of Jocaste that you here cite?
That Oedipus believes something about her. You are trying to say that
Oedipus' beliefs are a characteristic of Jocaste.   Well, that's absurd. This
argument of yours isn't very well thought out.

In article <7lkvfs$c83$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
  Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
 
> >I have explained it quite clearly, and you fail to respond except by
> >blustering.
>
> As soon as you read my explanation of what "the principles of logic" are, I
> will stop my insufferable blustering.

  As I have already said, your explanation is merely an *assertion* and isn't
*shown*. In order for your "proof" to be formally valid, the steps would have
to be shown. You haven't shown them, however, and have only asserted them, as
was already said several times now. Again, you don't even attempt to show
that "inference depends upon the principles of logic," but merely assert it.
  Really, at this point you're not even managing to assert it, much less
attempting to show it. Perhaps that's because when you merely assert it
there's someone who points out that that's all you've done.   In article
<7l46kg$rag$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,   Owl <a@a.a> wrote:  

> >No, that's not egoism. That's subjective morality.
> >
 
> I did explain at some length in the essay why I think the egoist would
> distintegrate the homeless guy.

  No, you explained why a person would disintegrate a homeless guy and then
*claimed* that that person was an egoist. As was just said, you have latched
onto subjective morality rather than egoism.

-- at no extra charge

Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.

[Stephen Speicher]

In many other threads Owl has exhibited such an ignorance of
Objectivism (and science too), while simultaneously criticizing
the philosophy, that I have pretty much stopped reading what he
writes. That such distortions of fact are presented by an
academic philosopher is truly beyond belief.

In "THE CASE OF THE HURRIED OBJECTIVIST", if instead of the
homeless guy the disintegrator was used on an academic
philosopher, then that could almost justify murder as an egoistic
act. :)

Stephen
s...@compbio.caltech.edu

Save the photons--don't look!

Printed using 100% recycled electrons.
-------------------------------------

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <Pine.LNX.4.05.99102...@mattcom.speicher.com>,
Stephen Speicher <s...@speicher.com> wrote:

> That such distortions of fact are presented by an
> academic philosopher is truly beyond belief.

I think what happens in some cases is that a person works and works on some
large essay or thesis, and then because of the time invested, that person is
reluctant to concede any errors, even obvious ones. Whether that applies in
this case must be left for Owl to conclude.

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>> P1: If Objectivism is true, then [that O marries his mother] is the
>> same thing as [that O marries Jocaste].

db...@tampatrib.com wrote:
>   "Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste. You are unable to deny this and
> evade the fact that you are so unable.

Also undeniable is that "Jocaste" means Jocaste.

[...biggish snip to get from the above to the below...]

>   Similarly, Oedipus believes he married Jocaste while not
> believing that he married his mother.  

If Oedipus can believe that he married Jocaste, and not believe that he
married his mother, even tho' "he married Jocaste" and "he married his
[Oedipus'] mother" mean the same thing, then it must be because Oedipus
is ignorant of or mistaken about the meaning of "Jocaste" or "Oedipus'
mother".

Can he possibly be mistaken about the meaning of Jocaste? If meaning
is reference, then he could be---but only if he thinks that "Jocaste"
refers to someone who isn't Jocaste. But in the story he is perfectly
able to recognize Jocaste *as* Jocaste. He simply does not recognize
her *as his mother*. Therefore, Oedipus is correct about the *meaning*
of "Jocaste". Therefore, Oedipus must be ignorant of or mistaken about
the meaning of "Oedipus' mother".

>> 1. O believes that O is marrying Jocaste.
>> 2. O believes that O is marrying O's mother.

>   Because sentence 1 does not completely and correctly express what
> Oedipus believes, of course. Oedipus believes that Oedipus is
> marrying (Jocaste who is not his mother). When you try to
> substitute (his mother) for (Jocaste who is not his mother), it's
> easy to see that the error is in sentence 1.

> Sentence 1 lacks context. You are claiming that sentence 1
> represents what Oedipus believes, but it only represents part of
> what he believes.

[...]

>   The problem with your argument, then, is that it ignores a
> dimension of how language works: that people refer to things with

> words and can be mistaken about what those words mean. [...]

Oedipus knows the meaning of the word "Jocaste"---it's the woman he is
marrying. He is merely ignorant of some of her characteristics---
most importantly, that she is his mother---and this leads him to a
false belief *about her*---namely, that she is NOT his mother.

If the problem is meaning, then it is in sentence 2: since Oedipus
doesn't know who his mother is, he is unable to properly understand
it (to take its meaning). THAT is what "meaning is reference" implies.

...mark young

[Owl]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7v9oj2$uga$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> Can he possibly be mistaken about the meaning of Jocaste? If meaning
> is reference, then he could be---but only if he thinks that "Jocaste"
> refers to someone who isn't Jocaste. But in the story he is perfectly
> able to recognize Jocaste *as* Jocaste. He simply does not recognize
> her *as his mother*. Therefore, Oedipus is correct about the *meaning*
> of "Jocaste". Therefore, Oedipus must be ignorant of or mistaken about
> the meaning of "Oedipus' mother".

1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"? He knows
who Oedipus is, he knows what "mother" means, and he knows how the
apostrophe functions. It would seem that this would be enough to figure
out what the expression means.

2) This issue, anyway, is irrelevant. Whether Oedipus knows what the
expression "Jocaste" means, or what the expression "Oedipus' mother" means
has no effect at all on my argument. In fact, Oedipus was a Greek, so he
probably didn't speak English, so he wouldn't have known what "mother"
meant. But that has nothing to do with whether he believes he's marrying
his mother. Not knowing what "mother" means doesn't prevent someone from
having beliefs about their mother.
My argument was like this:

1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as "O's
mother".
2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries Jocaste]
is the same proposition as [that O marries his mother]. (follows from 1)
3. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, he who believes [that O
marries Jocaste] believes [that O marries his mother]. (follows from 2)
4. O believed [that O marries Jocaste]. (premise)
5. O did not believe [that O marries his mother]. (premise)
6. The objectivist theory is not true. (follows from 3, 4, 5)

Exactly where are you trying to question this argument? Exactly which
step in it do you claim is false? (other than #6) The answer,
apparently, is "none." Which is why what you said, even if true, is
irrelevant.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7va7si$ad9$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

> 1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"?

Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.

> My argument was like this:
>
> 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as "O's
> mother".

According to the story, actually.

> 2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries Jocaste]

> is the same proposition as [that O marries his mother]. (follows from 1)

Indeed.

> 3. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, he who believes [that O

> marries Jocaste] believes [that O marries his mother]. (follows from 2)

False. Oedipus' beliefs are not a characteristic of either what is mean by
"Jocaste" or what is meant by "Oedipus' mother." Oedipus' beliefs are a
characteristic of Oedipus.

It's true that, if "Jocaste" and "Oedipus' mother" mean the same thing, and
Objectivism says they do, then any characteristic of one is a characteristic
of the other. But Oedipus' beliefs are not a characteristic of either.

I have to warn whoever is reading, "Owl" has no answer to this point. It's
been made many times before, but "Owl" must run from the discussion at each
instance.

[Arnold Broese-van-Groenou]

From: Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au>
Subject: Re: Why I am not an objectivist
Date: Thursday, 28 October 1999 11:09

<db...@tampatrib.com> wrote in message
news:7v7eun$9tl$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> In article <7lnh3f$96i$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> > Here's another formulation of the problem (common in phil. of
language):
> > Everyone accepts Leibniz' law: If a=b, then any characteristic of
a is a
> > characteristic of b.
>
> Characteristic of a, you say here. Let's remember that:
characteristic of a.
>
> > Now, that seems to imply the following principle about
> > sentences: If the word "a" and the word "b" refer to the same
thing, then if
> > a sentence containing "a" is true, you should be able to
substitute "b" for
> > "a" and still have a true sentence.
>
> No, it doesn't seem to imply this. Words are not necessarily
> characteristics of a. Here comes the amusing part.

I shudder everytime someone starts to put arguments into algebraic
form.
As your example above shows, the translation is the source of much
error.
It results in strange answers, which commonsense should point out,
must entail an error somewhere. The error is seldom in the logic, but
most often in the translation to symbology in my opinion.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.

Cheerio till next time, Arn.
bro...@ozemail.com.au

[Arnold Broese-van-Groenou]

Owl <a@a.a> wrote in message
news:7va7si$ad9$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net...

> 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as
"O's
> mother".

'O' didn't think so. What she was, had no _meaning_ to 'O' beyond the
fact she was his wife.
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vahqa$icl$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...

> In article <7va7si$ad9$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> > 1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"?
>
> Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.

I think this nicely illustrates the gulf between Objectivist and other
notions of meaning. The Objectivist simply does not care if the idea of
meaning he defends is largely unrelated to a non-Objectivist's idea of
meaning. Philosophers, at least contemporary ones, are concerned that
their detailed explications of a term (such as "meaning") match to a
large extent some pre-theoretical (or "common sense") view of the term
they are working with. The idea of a explicating a term is to try to
eliminate vagueness or ambiguity while retaining a meaning that is close
in some sense to actual usage. Otherwise the philosopher is simply
engaged in stipulation.

Thus it seems obvious to such philosophers that Oedipus /must/ know the
meaning of "Oedipus' mother". Oedipus knows what a mother is; he knows
that he must have had a mother; and he can reasonably converse with
others about what a mother is and what it would mean for a person to have
such a relation to him. This is sufficient to know the meaning, based on
what meaning /is/.

Apparently, however, none of this matters to an Objectivist, since
Oedipus does not, in fact, know who is mother is. It does no good for
such a philosopher to point out that on the Objectivist view, children
put up for adoption at an early age who appear to use the term "my
mother" correctly are not /really/ communicating with others because they
do not in fact know who their mother is. It does no good for the non-
Objectivist to claim that the only reason the Objectivist has for
including this condition as part of knowing the meaning of "Oedipus'
mother" is because his theory requires it. For the Objectivist is quite
willing to embrace these conclusions. After all, that's what meaning
/is/.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com>:

>> Can he possibly be mistaken about the meaning of Jocaste? If
>> meaning is reference, then he could be---but only if he thinks that
>> "Jocaste" refers to someone who isn't Jocaste. But in the story he
>> is perfectly able to recognize Jocaste *as* Jocaste. He simply
>> does not recognize her *as his mother*. Therefore, Oedipus is
>> correct about the *meaning* of "Jocaste". Therefore, Oedipus must

>> be ignorant of or mistaken about the meaning of "Oedipus' mother".

Owl:

> 1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"? He

> knows who Oedipus is, he knows what "mother" means, and he knows how

> the apostrophe functions. It would seem that this would be enough to
> figure out what the expression means.

I agree.

> 2) This issue, anyway, is irrelevant. Whether Oedipus knows what
> the expression "Jocaste" means, or what the expression "Oedipus'
> mother" means has no effect at all on my argument.

Ah, but I wasn't responding to *your* argument; I was responding to
dbuel's.

> In fact, Oedipus was a Greek, so he probably didn't speak English,

Do we know that Oedipus was, in fact, an historical figure? I just
assume we're discussing an invented character---that way the story
counts as "true", and we don't get mixed up in historical detail (like
which language he actually spoke).

> My argument was like this:
>

> 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as
> "O's mother".

> 2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries

> Jocaste] is the same proposition as [that O marries his mother].
> (follows from 1)

> 3. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, he who believes

> [that O marries Jocaste] believes [that O marries his mother].
> (follows from 2[...]

and an unstated premise: that the things we believe are propositions.
dbuel as much as denied this when he argued that words can confuse
the issue of what is believed.

If beliefs are something other than propositions, then 3 does not
follow from 2. (This is my position---the conclusion of step 2 is
true: [that O marries Jocaste] *is* the same proposition as [that O
marries his mother]. Ergo, that proposition is inadequate to model
Oedipus' beliefs.)

> 4. O believed [that O marries Jocaste]. (premise)
> 5. O did not believe [that O marries his mother]. (premise)

> 6. The objectivist theory is not true. (follows from 3, 4, 5[...]

and the premise that dbuel denied by implication.

> Exactly where are you trying to question this argument?

I wasn't trying to question it. I *do* question it, but that isn't
what I was doing in that post. I was telling dbuel where his argument
must take him---namely, to the conclusion that Oedipus doesn't know
what the phrase "Oedipus' mother" means. I think that sounds so
ridiculous that even an Objectivist would have to deny it.

...mark young

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vcf24$t0o$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> I was telling dbuel where his argument
> must take him---namely, to the conclusion that Oedipus doesn't know
> what the phrase "Oedipus' mother" means. I think that sounds so
> ridiculous that even an Objectivist would have to deny it.

So you might think, but no. See dbuel's post nearby where he makes just
this claim (because Oedipus can not identify the person who is his
mother), and my response to it.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.1282d311ca...@mail.nji.com>,

Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> Apparently, however, none of this matters to an Objectivist, since
> Oedipus does not, in fact, know who is mother is. It does no good for
> such a philosopher to point out that on the Objectivist view, children
> put up for adoption at an early age who appear to use the term "my

> mother" correctly are not /really/ communicating with others --

I have seen mere straw men; this is a golem, some 12 feet tall.

> -- because they

> do not in fact know who their mother is.

What does "not communicating with others" mean? You know, if I start talking
about the curve of binding energy with you, just because you don't know what
that is doesn't mean I'm not communicating with you. You know, just because a
small child doesn't know who his mother is doesn't mean he's not
communicating with you. Now run a lap.

> It does no good for the non-
> Objectivist to claim that the only reason the Objectivist has for

> including this condition as part of knowing the meaning of "Oedipus'

> mother" is because his theory requires it.

That's right, it does no good to claim that.

> For the Objectivist is quite
> willing to embrace these conclusions. After all, that's what meaning
> /is/.

What's "what meaning is"?

Does a word mean it's definition?

If by "cowardice" you mean valor, does "cowardice" mean "valor"?

If we call a dog's tail a leg, how many legs does a dog have?

-- at no extra charge

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vcf24$t0o$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
mark_anth...@my-deja.com wrote:

> I was telling dbuel where his argument
> must take him---namely, to the conclusion that Oedipus doesn't know
> what the phrase "Oedipus' mother" means.

No, that Oedipus doesn't know *who* the phrase "Oedipus' mother" means. Uh,
that's kinda the point of the story, you know.

> I think that sounds so
> ridiculous that even an Objectivist would have to deny it.

That's because you think of "Oedipus' mother" as merely a "what" when she is
a "who."

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vcmqv$39e$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...

> In article <MPG.1282d311ca...@mail.nji.com>,
> Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

...

> > -- because they
> > do not in fact know who their mother is.
>
> What does "not communicating with others" mean? You know, if I start talking
> about the curve of binding energy with you, just because you don't know what
> that is doesn't mean I'm not communicating with you.

Actually, I think it /does/ mean that you are not communicating with me.

> You know, just because a
> small child doesn't know who his mother is doesn't mean he's not
> communicating with you.

That's /my/ point. An adopted child can can communicate with others
regarding the meaning of "my mother" even though he is, in fact, mistaken
about who his mother is. Or so Owl, mark_anthony_young (who disagrees
with Owl in other respects), and I claim. I think that we claim this (I
know I do) because we can't see any reason to adopt the Objectivist view
here (assuming we have the Objectivist view here ;-)) that is stronger
than the reason to reject the absurdity of denying the child knows the
meaning.

> Now run a lap.

Stick to argument; you are somewhat better at it than you are at quips or
wit.

> > It does no good for the non-
> > Objectivist to claim that the only reason the Objectivist has for
> > including this condition as part of knowing the meaning of "Oedipus'
> > mother" is because his theory requires it.
>
> That's right, it does no good to claim that.

My point again. Note the new name I gave to this thread.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Owl]

Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
news:005S3.146$YE2...@ozemail.com.au...

> I shudder everytime someone starts to put arguments into algebraic
> form.
> As your example above shows, the translation is the source of much
> error.
> It results in strange answers, which commonsense should point out,
> must entail an error somewhere. The error is seldom in the logic, but
> most often in the translation to symbology in my opinion.

If you think I've made such an error, let me know what it is. For my
part, I think that translating into symbolism is very easy, and people who
have studied logic seriously almost never make any mistakes with it.

Of course, the claims that get translated are often themselves in error.

[Owl]

Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message

news:%%4S3.145$YE2...@ozemail.com.au...

> > 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as
> "O's
> > mother".
>

> 'O' didn't think so. What she was, had no _meaning_ to 'O' beyond the
> fact she was his wife.

First, what O thinks, on the objectivist theory, would seem to be
irrelevant. According to Rand & Peikoff, a word can 'mean' a certain
class of things, regardless of whether we know about those things or not.
(E.g., the word "man" 'means' all of the men, past, present, and future,
*including* the ones of which you and I have no awareness.)

Second, I'm not sure how to interpret your second sentence. What can have
meaning is words. I don't know how to interpret "what she was had no
meaning..."

[Owl]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vcf24$t0o$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> Ah, but I wasn't responding to *your* argument; I was responding to
> dbuel's.

Sorry, I misunderstood.

> Do we know that Oedipus was, in fact, an historical figure? I just
> assume we're discussing an invented character---that way the story
> counts as "true", and we don't get mixed up in historical detail (like
> which language he actually spoke).

I don't think he was an actual person. But what I meant was, the original
play was written by a Greek, about Greek characters. Oedipus didn't
really speak any language, but *according to the story*, he was a Greek
man (I think), so he would have spoken Greek. (if he existed)

> > 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as
> > "O's mother".

> > 2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries
> > Jocaste] is the same proposition as [that O marries his mother].
> > (follows from 1)
> > 3. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, he who believes
> > [that O marries Jocaste] believes [that O marries his mother].
> > (follows from 2[...]
>
> and an unstated premise: that the things we believe are propositions.

True. To be perfectly correct, I would have to have stated (3) as "If the
objectivist theory is true, then he who believes the proposition that O
marries Jocaste, believes the proposition that O marries his mother." I
assumed implicitly that "that O marries Jocaste" automatically refers to a
proposition.

> If beliefs are something other than propositions, then 3 does not
> follow from 2. (This is my position---the conclusion of step 2 is
> true: [that O marries Jocaste] *is* the same proposition as [that O
> marries his mother]. Ergo, that proposition is inadequate to model
> Oedipus' beliefs.)

That is the most interesting response I've yet heard. What do you think
is the object of a belief, and how does it differ from a proposition?

By the way, let me just make explicit my beliefs about beliefs &
propositions:

I think that 'believing' is standing in a relation to a proposition. That
is, when a belief exists, there are two things involved: a person (the
believer), and a thing that he believes (the 'object of belief'). That
thing is a proposition. Thus, in my view, a proposition is not the same
thing as a belief; it is, rather, a thing that a belief is *about* or
directed at.

To invoke some symbolic logic (which will set Arnold on edge): "I believe
that the sky is blue" has the logical form: B(i,p), where "B" is the
believing relation, "i" stands for me, and "p" is the proposition that the
sky is blue.

It follows from all this that if I believe the proposition that O is
marrying Jocaste, and that is identical to the propositoin that O is
marrying O's mother, then I believe the proposition that O is marrying
Jocaste. For: if I stand in a relation to a certain thing, x, and x is y,
then it obviously follows that I stand in that relation to y.

So now that that's made explicit, do you disagree with this view of
belief?

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.1283b7baae...@mail.nji.com>,

Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > What does "not communicating with others" mean? You know, if I start ta
> > lking
> > about the curve of binding energy with you, just because you don't know
> > what
> > that is doesn't mean I'm not communicating with you.
>
> Actually, I think it /does/ mean that you are not communicating with me.

OK, so when I asked you, "What does 'not communicating with others' mean?"
your answer seems to be that to communicate, both people understand what is
meant. That's reasonable. In light of that, forget the binding energy thing.

> > You know, just because a
> > small child doesn't know who his mother is doesn't mean he's not
> > communicating with you.
>
> That's /my/ point. An adopted child can can communicate with others
> regarding the meaning of "my mother" even though he is, in fact, mistaken
> about who his mother is.

Well? Objectivism does not say otherwise. A person who does not know who his
mother is can indeed communicate with others regarding the meaning of "my
mother."

What is said instead is that "my mother" is like a math problem with the
answer not filled in. The solution of it is "Jocaste." Oedipus can
communicate the essentials of the problem without knowing the solution. How
can you have an objection to that? Try it at home. Just pronounce a math
problem. Are you then going to say that that the problem doesn't mean its
answer? Are you going to say that "10 times 10" doesn't mean 100? And you can
certainly pronounce a math problem for which you don't know the answer. And
the answer is still the answer.

Clearly, Oedipus does not know who his mother is because that is the point of
the story. One obstacle, perhaps, is that you or whoever else keep asking,
"What does 'Oedipus' mother' mean?" Wrong question. I have a little diction
puzzle for you. Circle the correct word to be used in this sentence:

"Oedipus' mother is the one (who, that) gave me this message."

If you don't like that one, simply tell me what pronoun substitutes for
"Oedipus' mother."

"Oedipus' mother" means a certain woman. The question is and always should
be, "Who does 'Oedipus' mother' mean?" Who is meant?

> > Now run a lap.
>
> Stick to argument; you are somewhat better at it than you are at quips or
> wit.

When it comes to advice, how about if you stick to "knowing your role."

> > > It does no good for the non-
> > > Objectivist to claim that the only reason the Objectivist has for
> > > including this condition as part of knowing the meaning of "Oedipus'
> > > mother" is because his theory requires it.
> >
> > That's right, it does no good to claim that.
>
> My point again.

Does that mean it's your serve? HAHAHA sorry

> Note the new name I gave to this thread.

There could be another reason "it does no good to claim that." I was giving
you the chance to figure it out on your own.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vd08n$q02$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

> To be perfectly correct, I would have to have stated (3) as "If the
> objectivist theory is true, then he who believes the proposition that O
> marries Jocaste, believes the proposition that O marries his mother."

False. The thinker's beliefs are not a characteristic of either what is meant
by "Oedipus marries Jocaste" or what is meant by "Oedipus marries his
mother." The thinker's beliefs are a characteristic of the thinker.

It's true that, if "Oedipus marries Jocaste" and "Oedipus marries his mother"
mean the same thing, and Objectivism says they do, then any characteristic of
one is a characteristic of the other. But the thinker's beliefs are not a
characteristic of either.

I have to warn whoever is reading, "Owl" has no answer to this point. It's
been made many times before, but "Owl" must run from the discussion at each
instance.

This may sound familiar at this point.

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vd7vd$gfq$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> Well? Objectivism does not say otherwise. A person who does not know who his
> mother is can indeed communicate with others regarding the meaning of "my
> mother."
>
> What is said instead is that "my mother" is like a math problem with the
> answer not filled in. The solution of it is "Jocaste." Oedipus can
> communicate the essentials of the problem without knowing the solution. How
> can you have an objection to that?

I'm not sure that I do. What you said earlier was:

> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> > 1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"?
>
> Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.

Here you seem to be saying that Oedipus is ignorant of (i.e., does not
know) the meaning /because/ he does not know the referent. But everyone
on the "other side" agrees that he does not know the referent. For a
garden-variety, non-Objectivist theory of meaning, not knowing what the
referent is does not imply not knowing the meaning. Hence my new name
for this thread.

A standard example is "Morning Star" and "Evening Star". A person could
know the meaning of both of these terms without knowing that they both
refer to the same thing.

Now, as it happens, broad-minded person that I am, I have no problem if
you want to advance a theory that says that knowing the meaning implies
knowing the referent. I might even cheer you along, /provided/ you
supply some argument for /why/ anyone should think of meaning in this way
(since right now I don't), i.e., for why your theory is any good. Simply
saying something like, "Well that's what meaning is all about" is hardly
convincing to someone who disagrees. Self-consistent theories are a dime
a dozen.
...

> > > Now run a lap.
> >
> > Stick to argument; you are somewhat better at it than you are at quips or
> > wit.
>
> When it comes to advice, how about if you stick to "knowing your role."

But my role /is/ giving advice. ;-)

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Arnold Broese-van-Groenou]

Owl <a@a.a> wrote in message

news:7vcvk9$pbl$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net...

> Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message
> news:%%4S3.145$YE2...@ozemail.com.au...

> > > 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same
as
> > "O's
> > > mother".
> >

> > 'O' didn't think so. What she was, had no _meaning_ to 'O' beyond
the
> > fact she was his wife.
>
> First, what O thinks, on the objectivist theory, would seem to be
> irrelevant. According to Rand & Peikoff, a word can 'mean' a
certain
> class of things, regardless of whether we know about those things or
not.
> (E.g., the word "man" 'means' all of the men, past, present, and
future,
> *including* the ones of which you and I have no awareness.)

If what 'O' thinks is irrelevent, then why do you mention it. Your
whole point here depends on what 'O' thinks.
Your 'meaning,' bounces between what is, and what 'O' thinks.
Even I can follow dbuel here, so how do you miss his point?
--
A.Broese-van-Groenou.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.12841339d1...@mail.nji.com>,

Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.
>
> Here you seem to be saying that Oedipus is ignorant of (i.e., does not
> know) the meaning /because/ he does not know the referent.

Exactly. Surely you've seen something of this sort said on this list before.
But hey, be fair to Oedipus -- he's not totally ignorant of the meaning. He
clearly does not know who is meant. But, he knows that "my mother" is some
woman. Somewhere. He's simply ignorant of who is meant.

> A standard example is "Morning Star" and "Evening Star". A person could
> know the meaning of both of these terms without knowing that they both
> refer to the same thing.

You know, if a person thinks the Evening Star is a star, he's at least
ignorant of something. Don't you see that?

> Now, as it happens, broad-minded person that I am, I have no problem if
> you want to advance a theory that says that knowing the meaning implies
> knowing the referent. I might even cheer you along, /provided/ you
> supply some argument for /why/ anyone should think of meaning in this way
> (since right now I don't), i.e., for why your theory is any good.

Right, I would certainly grant that you have to decide for yourself if
Objectivism is the case.

But observe. Take a look at the following sentences.

1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.

2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.

Do these sentences contradict each other?

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vdnvm$r0d$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...

> In article <MPG.12841339d1...@mail.nji.com>,
> Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:
>
> > > Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.
> >
> > Here you seem to be saying that Oedipus is ignorant of (i.e., does not
> > know) the meaning /because/ he does not know the referent.
>
> Exactly. Surely you've seen something of this sort said on this list before.

Yes, and I think it is a confusing view.

> But hey, be fair to Oedipus -- he's not totally ignorant of the meaning. He
> clearly does not know who is meant. But, he knows that "my mother" is some
> woman. Somewhere. He's simply ignorant of who is meant.

The non-Objectivist gets at this by using the notions of sense and
reference (as Owl explains - please note that I am not necessarily
endorsing any argument of Owl's). Oedipus knows the sense or meaning of
"my mother" - it is the woman who actually gave birth to him, whoever
that may be. He is ignorant of whom "my mother" /refers/ to, since he
does not know he was adopted.

As far as I can see, taking reference to be a part of sense leads to
confusion. Why Objectivists want to do it is a bit of a puzzle. More on
that below.

> > A standard example is "Morning Star" and "Evening Star". A person could
> > know the meaning of both of these terms without knowing that they both
> > refer to the same thing.
>
> You know, if a person thinks the Evening Star is a star, he's at least
> ignorant of something. Don't you see that?

We can assume that any given person is ignorant of many things; the
question is, what things are relevant? "Evening Star" simply means
"bright object in the evening sky never more than 45 degrees from the
Sun" - or so the story goes. If you like, make the example "Evening
Planet" and "Morning Planet". A person could know the meaning of both of
these terms and not know that they referred to the same planet.

...

> Right, I would certainly grant that you have to decide for yourself if
> Objectivism is the case.

This is the issue, and one that I haven't seen the argument for. There
is often much frothing in this group over, e.g., whether something is or
is not said by Rand in ITOE, but the more fundamental issue is "why adopt
Rand's approach at all?". The answer that one might typically give in
support of his theory is that it provides a good account of how people
actually use terms, while clearing up some (hopefully, all)
inconsistencies (or ambiguities or vaguenesses) in common usage.

But the Objectivist account seems quite at odds with normal usage, so
that doesn't seem to be the justification. I sometimes see it said that
using Rand's theory helps people to think better, the implication being
that people /ought/ to adopt it. Well, maybe it does help some people,
but a great deal of very powerful thinking has gone on without regard to
Objectivist epistemology, so it is certainly not necessary to good
thinking. One approach would be to argue that all successful thinking
/really/ uses Objectivist epistemology, if only implicitly. That would
be an interesting argument, but I haven't seen it.

> But observe. Take a look at the following sentences.
>
> 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
>
> 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
>
> Do these sentences contradict each other?

No. What next?

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Owl]

Arnold Broese-van-Groenou <bro...@ozemail.com.au> wrote in message

news:%AtS3.2500$YE2....@ozemail.com.au...

> If what 'O' thinks is irrelevent, then why do you mention it. Your
> whole point here depends on what 'O' thinks.

What I meant was that, according to the objectivist theory, what O thinks
about his mother does not determine what "O's mother" means.

Of course, what O thinks is, in actual fact, relevant to something else --
namely, to constructing my argument to see whether the objectivist theory
is true. The objectivist theory would imply that O must think he is
marrying his mother, which in fact he does not.

I don't see any conflict here.

> Your 'meaning,' bounces between what is, and what 'O' thinks.

I'm not sure what you mean by that. In my view, the meaning of a term
depends wholly on what goes on in the minds of speakers who use it. On
the other hand, I also have a notion called 'reference', which is
different from 'meaning'. The 'reference' of a term is (normally) a thing
in the external world, which is independent of the mind.

In my view, O knows the meaning of "O's mother", not because he has
correct beliefs about who his mother is, but because he has the concept of
motherhood and he has the concept of himself. You have to distinguish
those two things from each other, and not lump them both together under
the category "what O thinks".

[Owl]

Owl <a@a.a> wrote in message news:7vd08n$q02$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net...

> It follows from all this that if I believe the proposition that O is
> marrying Jocaste, and that is identical to the propositoin that O is

> marrying O's mother, then I believe the proposition that O is marrying
> Jocaste.

Oops, that should have said, "... then I believe the proposition that O is
marrying O's mother."

[andrew...@my-deja.com]

I will infer from your (50-pg.) post that longer posts are not
objectionable to you.

I have taken your segment "Universals" (4) as our jumping off point,
because it is a subject of interest to me, and your take is interesting
as well. I should point out that I, unlike most posters to newsgroups,
am not here to "win" or "prove" anything. My interest is in the profit
from and perfection of argument itself, and such dialogue can (although
rarely does) serve this purpose. The point that this idea is abandoned
is usually the point that I disengage from the discussion. This should
not be taken as a request to pull punches, however. If my ideas are
idiotic, please say so just be able to say why. Since I cannot seem
to get my mailreader to work quite right, I must break slightly with
news convention. I have pasted into Word, added my comment, and pasted
it back into the "respond" box. This is the reason for the look of my
post.

Owl:

>4. UNIVERSALS

4.1. WHAT ARE THEY?

One can see, then, that every judgement and so every item of knowledge
involves universals, insofar as every judgement has a predicate. "This
is white" involves the universal, whiteness. Most words in any natural
language refer to universals, and if a language lacked such words, it
would be impossible to say anything. One could name particulars, but
one could not make any statements about the particulars. All knowledge
is the knowledge that something(s) instantiates a certain universal.

Also understand that I don't by a "universal" mean a certain kind of
word, idea or concept. I mean the sort of thing that you attribute to
the objects of your knowledge: Whiteness itself is the universal, not
the word "white" and not the concept 'white'. I do not attribute my
concept of whiteness to the paper - I do not think that the paper has a
concept in it. I attribute whiteness to the paper - i.e., I think the
paper is white. Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have
the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind
(no part of my mind is actually white). <

Andrew:
This depends on a knowable "essence of whiteness." It is not at all
shown by a simple denial of this type that a universal is not merely a
certain kind of word. Indeed, it has been argued that "essence" is
simply a shadow cast by the nominal, and that, even if there were (is)
an essence, we can only know the nominal. (Locke, for instance, argued
thus.) The thing you would need to demonstrate here, in order to make
this point in the argument compelling, is that to the question "is this
a so and so?" there can be an antecedently correct answer. In keeping
with your own example, have you ever seen how many different "whites"
you can choose from when having your business cards printed? It is not
that they all have some "essential" something in common, but that we
keep our definition of the term sufficiently loose to allow ANY
particular into the class. What is the line between white and
eggshell, or more disturbingly, between white and gray or gray and
black? The answer is not a reference to "essential whiteness" but more
a function of our need/use for precision and distinctness.

Owl:
>Also notice that, although every universal is a predicable, I did not
say that universals can not be subjects of judgements. A universal can
also be the subject of a judgement, and universals can possess
properties of their own. For example, "White is a color" is a statement
in which whiteness is the subject. <

Andrew:
Which of course converts universals to particulars and requires a third
order type of "meta-universal." The problem with this is that this
leads to infinite regress, as in Aristotle's Third Man Argument.
Taking your example, "color" is the "meta-universal" which includes not
only white, but also every other color. At this point, we can link
color with such sensible qualities as "shape," "weight", etc, which
requires a "meta-meta-universal" incorporating all such sensible
universals, each of which entails its particulars themselves
universals, ad infinitum. This is problematic because, at the end of
such a consideration, everything but this particular object before me
is both a universal and a particular. To wit, you haven't said
anything.

Owl:
>1. A rule of inference is a proposition describing a certain form of
inference as valid, or (this is equivalent) describing a certain form
of proposition as bearing a certain relation to another form of
proposition. A 'form of inference,' of course, is not a particular
(that's one reason you'll never bump into a form of inference on the
sidewalk); it is a universal. <

Andrew:
These can also be wrong. Prior to Hume, it never occurred to anyone
that it was not valid to reason from a description to a prescription.
How are we to know which "forms of inference" are universal? More
importantly, how are we to know any of them are? Is there a set of
false universals? If so, I can accept this. They would constitute
something like philosophical "wrong way" signs.

Owl:
>2. "1 + 1 = 2" and all the propositions of mathematics are about
universals: In this instance, the subjects are two (the universal) and
1+1 (the universal) and the predicate is identity. ("1+1" means the
quantity that results from grouping a group of 1 together with another
group of 1.) That these are universals is shown by the fact that they
can have multiple instances: a pair of oranges is an instance of two;
it's also an instance of 1 and 1, of course, since those are identical.
Every pair of objects is an instance of the number 2, and every pair of
objects is an instance of 1 and 1. <

Andrew:
I can agree with this to a point. The problem I have is that when we
remove the particulars, we remove the significance and are left with
Wittgenstein's "talk about talk." The garage owner would say that
there are two cars in his garage. The mechanic would say that there is
a Ford and there is a Chevy. My point is that "pairs of things" are
not examples of `2' instantiated, except by an intentional relaxation
of definition. If one can accept this, then ungrounded or "pure"
mathematics becomes a world of universals for which there are
necessarily no particulars. It could be argued, then, that we have an
internally consistent system that is only as meaningful as it obeys its
own definitions. It is thus reducible to a tautology, which itself
says nothing. For example, if I define a liberal is anyone who is not
conservative, and a conservative not liberal, I cannot ever be wrong,
but I also cannot derive anything of value. Calling this "a priori" is
going too far, however.

Owl:
>4.2. THE (REAL) PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS
The philosophical questions about universals are

(1) Do universals (as defined above) exist?

(2) If not, why does it seem as if they do? (I.e., why do we have all
these words and ideas apparently referring to them and knowledge
apparently about them?)

(3) If they do, does their existence depend on the existence of
particulars? <

Andrew:
I would add to this list: (1)a: what is the meaning, presupposition,
contradiction and entailment of answering this question either way.
This is, after all, a metaphysical question.

Owl:
>--Either universals exist, or they don't. If they don't, nominalism is
true. If they do, realism is true. And that's that.

I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just
obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness,
and that's all I have to say about that. (David Armstrong does a good
job on it though in Nominalism and Realism.)<

Andrew:
This is the segment of your argument that bothered me most. You argue
against a "Straw Man" here. The nominalist does not deny that
similarities exist or even that universals exist. To set up the
nominalist position in this way is to create a futile class with no
members. The distinction between the positions is that of universal
ante rem, universal in re, and universal post rem. The question is
then, does the tribe give birth to its members, does the tribe exist in
its members, or is the tribe merely a name for its members? You'd have
to do more than discount the third as "obviously false." Your (above
4.1) statement that you "attribute" the universal to the particular is
reason enough to explore the idea that the universal is in no way
present in the particular, but in the mind alone. Such a consideration
would not be a denial of similarity, but a possible counter argument to
the realists contention that the particulars somehow "contain"
mysterious, non-verbal "essences".

Owl:
>4.3. RAND THE REALIST?

There are two tests for a universal:

(1) It can be predicated of concretes.

(2) Multiple things could possess it.

We've just seen that '5 feet long' satisfies #1. It also satisfies #2:
multiple things could be 5 feet long simultaneously. (It does not
matter whether multiple things actually are 5 feet long. In fact,
probably nothing is exactly 5 feet long, unless you count parts of
objects like "the first five feet of the floor." The point is there is
no reason in principle why there couldn't be a 5-foot long object, and
if there were one, there is no reason why there couldn't be two.)<

Andrew:
Yes, there is a reason, in principle, why nothing could be 5 feet
long. We would, at some point, need to relax our standard to allow
this or that particular object to "count." We have no reason to stop
along a continuum of "exactness" (precision). This very possibility is
a pointer to the argument that universals do not exist in the
particulars, but in the definitions of the words used to name them.
Incidentally, in this passage you seem to revert from immanent to
transcendentalism. As such, existence itself would be a predicate,
thus relegating every conceivable object or idea to the realm of
universals (which opens up a can of worms that I'd prefer not to go
into at this point.)

I don't pretend to know how or if any of this applies to your extended
argument. As I said, I am interested in argument for its own sake, and
so would like to discuss this particular aspect..

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vfl4j$a6o$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>Of course, what O thinks is, in actual fact, relevant to something else --
>namely, to constructing my argument to see whether the objectivist theory
>is true. The objectivist theory would imply that O must think he is
>marrying his mother, which in fact he does not.

No...the objectivist theory doesn't imply that O must think he is marrying
(the person who is his mother); it implies that O must think he is marrying
the person (who is his mother), which in fact he does.

The person _is_ his mother; that is the relevant fact and the "meaning" of
Jocaste. His awareness is irrelevant to this, notwithstanding the fact that
in common usage "meaning" is used differently.

>In my view, the meaning of a term depends wholly on what goes on in the
>minds of speakers who use it.

That's why your view sucks IMO...you _completely_ sunder what you call the
"reference" from what you call the "sense" with the word "wholly" here.
It's almost as if it's random happenstance that our concepts refer to
anything external at all, assuming that you think they do.

That's wrong...there's a causal chain of events which leads from the
occurence of the referent in reality to the existence of the concept in our
minds. Just because we have abstract thought which can conceptualize ideas
which _aren't_ existents doesn't affect the importance of this overiding
function. We conceptualize _in order to_ integrate the reality about us.

>On the other hand, I also have a notion called 'reference', which is
>different from 'meaning'. The 'reference' of a term is (normally) a thing
>in the external world, which is independent of the mind.

Speaking for myself, I don't think it's a great crime to distinguish between
"that which is" and "what (or more precisely, how) we conceptualize." And
technically, it's only semantics which one "meaning" refers to. The great
crime happens when it's pretended that these are two distinct items with no
existential relationship between them. IMO, that's a critical error which
(intentionally, it appears) opens the door for the POV that there's no
relationship between what is and what we conceptualize. That's just plainly
wrong...we conceptualize what we do _because_ of what exists.

>In my view, O knows the meaning of "O's mother", not because he has
>correct beliefs about who his mother is, but because he has the concept of
>motherhood and he has the concept of himself. You have to distinguish
>those two things from each other, and not lump them both together under
>the category "what O thinks".

But the goal isn't to figure out what O thinks; it's to figure out what is.
Okay, you might say an epistemologist is concerned with what O thinks, but
then he has an obligation to _begin_ with what is, since that's the
origination of what O thinks.

It might be an interesting tidbit that O doesn't know one aspect of "what
is" concerning J, but it's not what he _doesn't know_ that creates the
essence of the concept...it's what he does. It's _that_ which is the crux
of the "meaning," because it's that (that which is) which gave rise to the
concept in the first place. [Of course most Objectivists would deny that
this is a concept at all, but they're just wrong about that.]

Just because there is more to the meaning than that of which he's aware is
irrelevant to this point. The reason Peikoff's A-S Dichotomy essay is so
important isn't because he dictated a new usage for the word "meaning;"
it's because he correctly identified that your "sense" wouldn't exist but
for the existence of your "reference." The chain of events is
unidirectional, and "meaning" ought to be used for that which is more
primary IMO. If you simply insist on sticking with the word, I'd suggest
"meaning" and "imagined meaning"...even that does a better job than just
pretending that meaning is the sense.

And yes...it's true that two different speakers will often "mean" two
different things with the same utterance. But that's because the _referent_
is different, not merely the "sense." That's why I think Fred's approach is
so great...taken to its complete end, it would be an exact map of all
existents and relationships between existents in the universe. That way,
when someone wanted to express what they "mean," they could point to a spot
on the map which represents _exactly_ what they mean...their idiosyncratic
usage would be irrelevant. Obviously this can't be actually accomplished in
the absence of omniscience, but the principle is still valid.

The reason Fred's "conceptual dictionary" is such a great idea is because it
doesn't just _say_ that our concepts are related to reality; it _shows_
that they are. Offhand, this would seem to be a wondrous and worthwhile
goal for Objectivists; notice what the reaction of so many of them are.

And notice _which_ Objectivists are the most repelled. I suppose Luther had
a rough time too; I guess Churches are like that.

[I may be out of it for a while...if you want me to see it, EMail it.]

jk
Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes.
"But who will guard the guards themselves?"--Juvenal

[Owl]

<andrew...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vhoj7$crp$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> I have taken your segment "Universals" (4) as our jumping off point,
> because it is a subject of interest to me, and your take is interesting
> as well. I should point out that I, unlike most posters to newsgroups,

Good. Surprisingly enough, I don't think anyone has responded to that
section before. Thanks for your thoughtful response. I'll try to clarify
a few things below.

Me:

> paper is white. Whiteness is not a concept; it is a color. When I have
> the concept of whiteness in my mind, I do not have whiteness in my mind
> (no part of my mind is actually white). <

> Andrew:
> This depends on a knowable "essence of whiteness." It is not at all
> shown by a simple denial of this type that a universal is not merely a
> certain kind of word. Indeed, it has been argued that "essence" is
> simply a shadow cast by the nominal, and that, even if there were (is)
> an essence, we can only know the nominal. (Locke, for instance, argued

We'd better pause for a moment and talk about "essences." I don't think I
used the term in that section, and I suspect that you're driving at a
different issue.

In traditional metaphysics, there's a distinction between 'essential'
properties and 'accidental' ones. Accidental properties are ones that an
object could exist without. (Ex.: 'being a philosopher' is one of my
accidental properties, because although I am actually a philosopher, I
could exist without being one. 'being human' would usually be considered
essential, because I couldn't exist and not be human.)

Rand, on the other hand, regarded the 'essential' properties of a type of
thing (note: type, not a particular) as being the properties that served
to explain most of the other properties. Essentialness was a matter of
the epistemological significance of the properties, for the sake of our
understanding -- as opposed to the earlier notion of a *metaphysical*
distinction between the essential and the accidental.

I mention this only to say that I was not intending to address that
issue -- i.e., I wasn't addressing whether there are 'essential'
properties, whether that's an epistemological or a metaphysical category,
or what that might mean. My issue was broader -- it concerned the
existence and nature of properties as such.

Now, you said I hadn't shown that a universal isn't just a certain kind of
word. Well, I take that to be true by definition. I said that whiteness
was a universal. Clearly, whiteness isn't a word (although "whiteness"
is) -- to say it is would just be a use/mention error.

Perhaps what you meant to suggest was, rather, that there aren't any
universals, but that instead, there are just particulars and words that
refer to them. And so far, I hadn't addressed that view.

> thus.) The thing you would need to demonstrate here, in order to make
> this point in the argument compelling, is that to the question "is this
> a so and so?" there can be an antecedently correct answer. In keeping

I'm not sure what you mean by "antecedently correct answer". Antecedent
to what?

> with your own example, have you ever seen how many different "whites"
> you can choose from when having your business cards printed? It is not
> that they all have some "essential" something in common, but that we
> keep our definition of the term sufficiently loose to allow ANY
> particular into the class.

This last certainly isn't the case -- I mean, I have lots of objects here
that cannot possibly be considered white.

Now, it's true enough that color terms encompass a certain finite range of
shades -- a color term does not identify a completely precise, determinate
color. That's perfectly compatible with what I'm saying. It's still true
that all the white things have something in common -- namely, that they
all fall within that range of shades. Or, in other words, that they're
all white!

> What is the line between white and
> eggshell, or more disturbingly, between white and gray or gray and
> black? The answer is not a reference to "essential whiteness" but more
> a function of our need/use for precision and distinctness.

I'm not sure what you're getting at. There is vagueness in our color
words, as in most other words. As a result, there is no determinate
answer to a question like, "Where EXACTLY is the line between white and
grey (as in, specify the exact absorption spectrum)?" But I'm not sure
what this shows about the existence of universals. There's still a
question as to what it is that white things have in common, and I don't
see how mention of our need for precision will obviate the need for an
answer to that.

I should here try to avert a possible misunderstanding. It is certainly
not my view that there is a single 'correct' way to divide up the color
spectrum. There are, in fact, infinitely many colors. Our actual color
terms happen to identify only a few of the colors that could be
identified. Thus, there also exist many colors that we don't have words
for, whose boundaries are in different places along the wavelength
spectrum.

All of which is consistent with my view of universals.

> Owl:
> >Also notice that, although every universal is a predicable, I did not
> say that universals can not be subjects of judgements. A universal can
> also be the subject of a judgement, and universals can possess
> properties of their own. For example, "White is a color" is a statement
> in which whiteness is the subject. <
>
> Andrew:
> Which of course converts universals to particulars and requires a third
> order type of "meta-universal." The problem with this is that this

What I was saying above was precisely that this does not convert the
universals to particulars. The reason is that a universal is NOT defined
as "that which cannot be the subject of a judgement." Rather, a universal
is that which CAN be the predicate of a judgement.

White can be the predicate of a judgement; therefore, it is a universal.
It happens that it can also be the subject of an(other) judgement, but
that's irrelevant.

> leads to infinite regress, as in Aristotle's Third Man Argument.

I don't see any regress. You could call a property like white a 1st-order
universal, since it applies to particulars, and then you could call the
property of being a color a second-order universal, since it can be
predicated of first-order universals. Similarly, there could also be
third-order universals, and so on. Is there any limit to how high-order
universals you can get? I don't see why there should be. And I also
don't see any problem here.

> universals, ad infinitum. This is problematic because, at the end of
> such a consideration, everything but this particular object before me
> is both a universal and a particular. To wit, you haven't said
> anything.

Again, not so. Everything is either a particular or a universal, not
both. Remember: if x can be predicated of something (anything), then x is
a universal. If x cannot be predicated of anything, then x is a
particular. End of story. Notice that this is a mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive pair of categories.

The particular object in front of you is a particular. This computer I'm
typing on, these fingers, this pencil, and so on, are all particulars.
White, being a color, being sensible, and so on, are all universals.

> Owl:
> >1. A rule of inference is a proposition describing a certain form of
> inference as valid, or (this is equivalent) describing a certain form
> of proposition as bearing a certain relation to another form of
> proposition. A 'form of inference,' of course, is not a particular
> (that's one reason you'll never bump into a form of inference on the
> sidewalk); it is a universal. <
>
> Andrew:
> These can also be wrong. Prior to Hume, it never occurred to anyone
> that it was not valid to reason from a description to a prescription.

I'm not sure what "these" refers to. People can, obviously, be mistaken
about what are the correct rules of inference.

> How are we to know which "forms of inference" are universal? More
> importantly, how are we to know any of them are? Is there a set of
> false universals? If so, I can accept this. They would constitute
> something like philosophical "wrong way" signs.

Note that a universal cannot be 'true' or 'false' all by itself. You need
a complete proposition in order to have truth or falsity. E.g., "white"
is neither true nor false, but "x is white" might be (when x is filled in
with a referring expression).

I'm not sure what you meant by a form of inference being 'universal'. A
form of inference is automatically a universal, since it is something that
can be predicated of an inference. If you meant, how do we know any forms
of inference are *valid*, I think there is no better answer than to cite
examples.

"(A & B). Therefore, A." is a valid form of inference. I think anyone
can see that.

"All A are B. All B are C. Therefore, all A are C." is valid.

> Owl:
> >2. "1 + 1 = 2" and all the propositions of mathematics are about
> universals: In this instance, the subjects are two (the universal) and
> 1+1 (the universal) and the predicate is identity. ("1+1" means the
> quantity that results from grouping a group of 1 together with another
> group of 1.) That these are universals is shown by the fact that they
> can have multiple instances: a pair of oranges is an instance of two;
> it's also an instance of 1 and 1, of course, since those are identical.
> Every pair of objects is an instance of the number 2, and every pair of
> objects is an instance of 1 and 1. <
>
> Andrew:
> I can agree with this to a point. The problem I have is that when we
> remove the particulars, we remove the significance and are left with
> Wittgenstein's "talk about talk." The garage owner would say that
> there are two cars in his garage. The mechanic would say that there is
> a Ford and there is a Chevy. My point is that "pairs of things" are
> not examples of `2' instantiated, except by an intentional relaxation
> of definition. If one can accept this, then ungrounded or "pure"

I'm not sure I'm following you there. I should note that, in my view, a
number is a special kind of universal. It is, itself, a relation between
a particular and another universal. For instance, suppose you put a heap
of sand on a table. Referring to that heap of sand, you ask, "How many is
that?" Well, I might say, "that depends what *unit* you want me to count
in terms of. It is maybe 10,000 grains of sand, it is also 1 heap, it is
also about 10^23 molecules, etc." The different numbers in this case
describe how the particular (the heap of sand) *relates to* different
*units*. A unit is itself a universal (it is a *type* of thing). So
"10,000" describes the relation between the heap and the unit 'grain of
sand'.

> mathematics becomes a world of universals for which there are
> necessarily no particulars. It could be argued, then, that we have an

I hope you can see from my above remark why I reject that conclusion, at
least as regards arithmetic.

> Owl:

> I am not going to try to refute nominalism here, because it is just
> obviously false. It is obvious that there is such a thing as whiteness,
> and that's all I have to say about that. (David Armstrong does a good
> job on it though in Nominalism and Realism.)<
>
> Andrew:
> This is the segment of your argument that bothered me most. You argue
> against a "Straw Man" here. The nominalist does not deny that
> similarities exist or even that universals exist. To set up the
> nominalist position in this way is to create a futile class with no
> members.

I think the class has plenty of members. Surely Quine is one, Hume and
Berkeley were probably more nominalists (although they were confused
enough that they might have simultaneously been realists). Of course, you
have to define "universal" in the proper way in order for nominalism to be
the view that "there are no universals." Perhaps you're defining
"universal" differently from the definition I gave.

> The distinction between the positions is that of universal
> ante rem, universal in re, and universal post rem. The question is
> then, does the tribe give birth to its members, does the tribe exist in
> its members, or is the tribe merely a name for its members? You'd have

I actually do not think this is the question at all. The tribe is an
*aggregate*, not a universal. What you want to look at is things that can
be properties of other things (or relations between things, or actions of
things, etc.). The tribe isn't a property of anything. The property of
*being a tribe* is a universal, of course, but one, particular tribe
isn't. To put that another way, the tribe is not the sort of thing that
can be the predicate of a judgement, but only a subject.

By the way, this of course does not mean that I think the tribe exists
independently of its members, and I haven't said anything about the answer
to the question you raised about the tribe.

> to do more than discount the third as "obviously false." Your (above
> 4.1) statement that you "attribute" the universal to the particular is
> reason enough to explore the idea that the universal is in no way
> present in the particular, but in the mind alone. Such a consideration

I don't see how the fact that we attribute universals to particulars could
be a reason to explore the idea that the universal isn't in hte
particular. That sounds like saying, "The fact that we say X is reason
enough to explore the idea that ~X." Although I suppose that reason for
exploring an idea is not necessarily reason for favoring the idea, so that
may not be as illogical as it sounds.

Anyway, here's what I was saying was obviously false. If someone declares
that there is no such thing as whiteness, or squareness, or any other
colors, that there aren't any shapes, sizes, weights, nor any other
properties, relationships, or actions -- well, that's absurd. I observe
properties, relationships, and actions all the time. In short, there is
the following argument for realism and against nominalism:

1. There is whiteness.
Support: direct observation. We see lots of things to be white;
therefore, there is whiteness.

2. Whiteness is a universal.
Support: Whiteness can be predicated of things. Also, more than one
object can be white.

3. Therefore, there is at least one universal.
Follows from 1+2.

> would not be a denial of similarity, but a possible counter argument to
> the realists contention that the particulars somehow "contain"
> mysterious, non-verbal "essences".

I don't think anything "somehow 'contains'" anything "mysterious". I just
think that things have properties.

By the way, what exactly is similarity? That's a relationship, right? So
it's another universal.

> We've just seen that '5 feet long' satisfies #1. It also satisfies #2:
> multiple things could be 5 feet long simultaneously. (It does not
> matter whether multiple things actually are 5 feet long. In fact,
> probably nothing is exactly 5 feet long, unless you count parts of
> objects like "the first five feet of the floor." The point is there is
> no reason in principle why there couldn't be a 5-foot long object, and
> if there were one, there is no reason why there couldn't be two.)<
>
> Andrew:
> Yes, there is a reason, in principle, why nothing could be 5 feet
> long. We would, at some point, need to relax our standard to allow
> this or that particular object to "count."

I don't get this.

> We have no reason to stop
> along a continuum of "exactness" (precision). This very possibility is

I think what you're assuming is that nothing could be exactly 5 feet long,
and therefore, we would have to relax our meaning of "5 feet long." But
that's precisely begging the question. Why couldn't a thing be just
exactly 5 feet long?

> a pointer to the argument that universals do not exist in the
> particulars, but in the definitions of the words used to name them.

Wait a minute. Whiteness is an example of a universal. Are you telling
me that wall in front of me isn't white; that it's just the definition of
some word that is white? How can a definition be white (without making
any use/mention errors)?

> Incidentally, in this passage you seem to revert from immanent to
> transcendentalism.

I don't see how.
Universals exist, but they depend for their existence on the particulars
to which they apply.

> As such, existence itself would be a predicate,
> thus relegating every conceivable object or idea to the realm of
> universals (which opens up a can of worms that I'd prefer not to go
> into at this point.)

I don't know whether existence is a predicate. I suppose it is. However,
I don't see where you're getting the conclusion that "every conceivable
object" is a universal.

Existence would be a predicate that applies to every extant object (but
not everything conceivable exists). But the objects to which it applies
are not themselves predicates.

I think you need to distinguish *the things that exist* from the
'property' of existing.

[Robert J. Kolker]

Jim Klein wrote:

>
> The person _is_ his mother; that is the relevant fact and the "meaning" of
> Jocaste. His awareness is irrelevant to this, notwithstanding the fact that
> in common usage "meaning" is used differently.
>

Let me ask you a question. Do you think the following phrases:

"The morning star" and "The evening star" mean the same thing?
They * refer * to the same thing (i.e. the planet venus in inferior
conjunction with the Earth ). But I ask do they * mean * the same
thing?

Bob Kolker

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

Owl:

>>> 1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same
>>> as "O's mother".

>>> 2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries
>>> Jocaste] is the same proposition as [that O marries his
>>> mother].
>>> (follows from 1)
>>> 3. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, he who believes
>>> [that O marries Jocaste] believes [that O marries his mother].
>>> (follows from 2[...]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com>:

>> and an unstated premise: that the things we believe are
>> propositions.

Owl:
> True. To be perfectly correct, I would have to have stated (3) as

> "If the objectivist theory is true, then he who believes the
> proposition that O marries Jocaste, believes the proposition that O

> marries his mother." I assumed implicitly that "that O marries
> Jocaste" automatically refers to a proposition.

>> If beliefs are something other than propositions, then 3 does not
>> follow from 2. (This is my position---the conclusion of step 2 is
>> true: [that O marries Jocaste] *is* the same proposition as [that O
>> marries his mother]. Ergo, that proposition is inadequate to model
>> Oedipus' beliefs.)

> That is the most interesting response I've yet heard. What do you
> think is the object of a belief, and how does it differ from a
> proposition?

Beliefs are representations of reality. When the representation is
faulty (as it is with Oedipus), it becomes extremely difficult to
match beliefs to propositions (which are supposed to be formed from
bits and pieces of reality---so maybe we have no propositions here at
all!).

> By the way, let me just make explicit my beliefs about beliefs &
> propositions:
>
> I think that 'believing' is standing in a relation to a proposition.
> That is, when a belief exists, there are two things involved: a
> person (the believer), and a thing that he believes (the 'object of
> belief'). That thing is a proposition. Thus, in my view, a
> proposition is not the same thing as a belief; it is, rather, a
> thing that a belief is *about* or directed at.

As I understand it, propositions involve referents---that's why
[that O married J] and [that O married O's mother] are the same
proposition (if they are a proposition at all---O and J don't really
refer). Beliefs involve mental units. O has two distinct mental units
for Jocaste/his mother (even tho' they are the same person).

Since for Oedipus the beliefs expressed by "I married Jocaste" and "I
married my mother" involve (are composed of) distinct mental units,
they are different beliefs. This in spite of the fact that we,
outside the story, can tell that the truth conditions for both
statements are identical.

> To invoke some symbolic logic (which will set Arnold on edge): "I
> believe that the sky is blue" has the logical form: B(i,p), where
> "B" is the believing relation, "i" stands for me, and "p" is the
> proposition that the sky is blue.

We typically say that multiple people can have the same beliefs (they
can have beliefs in common, share beliefs, even have mutual beliefs).
The "belief" in B(i,p) should, by the way we speak, be the p. The
B(i,p) is an "instance of believing" (something only a philosopher
would come up with).

Furthermore, I think believing is just a special case of a more
general relationship---a person centred way of representing the world.
We have our attitudes toward the world and its bits and pieces. Some
of these attitudes are classified as "objective", which means that
they are independent of our (or anyone else's) attitudes. Such
attitudes are labeled beliefs. The representation of tastes (such as
"Chocolate ice cream is delicious") is another category of these
relationships.

> It follows from all this that if I believe the proposition that O is
> marrying Jocaste, and that is identical to the propositoin that O is
> marrying O's mother, then I believe the proposition that O is marrying

> Jocaste. For: if I stand in a relation to a certain thing, x, and x
> is y, then it obviously follows that I stand in that relation to y.
>
> So now that that's made explicit, do you disagree with this view of
> belief?

Yes. In order to properly deal with mistaken beliefs (especially
mis-identifications) we must invoke a more expressive model than
propositions allow. And if we wish to model disputes between
realists and anti-realists, we must again use a more powerful
representation (you are a moral realist (I believe), and I am a
moral anti-realist; if you insist on representing my moral attitudes
as propositions, then you can't accurately represent what those
attitudes are, and you are doomed to making false statements about
them---as has been fairly common in debates between these two poles).

It seems as tho, in order for you to be consistent, you would have to
say that [that O married J] and [that O married O's mother] are two
different propositions (otherwise, when combined with the notion that
the objects of beliefs are propositions, the Oedipus story would
describe an impossible situation: someone who believes and does not
believe the same proposition (B(o,p) & ~B(o,p), where p in the first
comes from "I married Jocaste" and p in the second comes from "I
married my mother")). So what do you think a proposition is?

...mark young

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

[Owl asked:
>>>> How can Oedipus be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"?

db...@tampatrib.com:

>>> Because he doesn't know who that is. So you've been told.

Gordon G. Sollars:

>> Here you seem to be saying that Oedipus is ignorant of (i.e., does
>> not know) the meaning /because/ he does not know the referent.

db...@tampatrib.com:

> Exactly. Surely you've seen something of this sort said on this list

> before. But hey, be fair to Oedipus -- he's not totally ignorant of

> the meaning. He clearly does not know who is meant. But, he knows
> that "my mother" is some woman. Somewhere. He's simply ignorant of
> who is meant.

Right. Oedipus gets some information from the phrase "my mother"
even tho' he doesn't know who his mother is. He gets that the
referent gave birth to him and (thus?) that she is a woman. The
information any competent speaker of the language gets from a phrase
is what's called the sense of that phrase.

Most people who've thought about these matters consider the sense of a
phrase to be part of its meaning. And part of the reason for that is
the tendency for people to say things like "he's not totally ignorant
of the meaning" even when he has no idea *who* the phrase refers to.
He doesn't know *who* the phrase means, but he knows *what* the phrase
means---he is "not totally ignorant of the meaning" because he knows
the sense of the phrase.

Now you would argue, I guess, that he is "not totally ignorant of the
meaning" because he knows some stuff about the referent---that she is
a woman, for instance. But here you're entering a minefield. The
referent *is* Jocaste, and he knows *lots* of stuff about her! If you
insist that the meaning is a who and not a what, then Oedipus knows
lots of stuff about his mother---he can even recognize her and call
her by name.

So here's the nub: if the meaning of "Oedipus' mother" is a who, then
Oedipus is not ignorant of its meaning at all. The meaning must be a
"referring" (a what) rather than a "referent" (a who). And if the
meaning is a referring, then there must be some way that that
referring is encoded---something akin to ostension, perhaps, in the
case of a known referent, but by some other means for unknown
referents. Why not by its sense?---the information we get out of the
phrase in ignorance of its referent.

[Jim Klein]

In article <381D665D...@usa.net>,

"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@usa.net> wrote:

>Let me ask you a question. Do you think the following phrases:
>
>"The morning star" and "The evening star" mean the same thing?
>They * refer * to the same thing (i.e. the planet venus in inferior
>conjunction with the Earth ). But I ask do they * mean * the same
>thing?

The answer is irrelevant because it's just a discussion of the meaning of
"meaning." I don't seek imprisonment for those who use the word to refer to
what they mean by "sense," nor for those who use it to refer to "reference."

The important point IMO is to recognize what it is that gives rise to either
of the concepts (or phrases, if you prefer). And the answer to that is
_Venus_ and Venus alone. That's why personally I'd say they mean the same
thing, at least technically.

Sure, the retort is that it's also because of what we are and what we do
that gives rise to the phrases; hence it's claimed that the "sense" is just
as primary as the referent and so meaning can just as defensibly be used for
that.

I think that's a lousy approach. Obviously there'd be no cognition at all
if we didn't have a cognitive faculty, nor identification nor any of that.
So to me that's a trivial claim, one which is more properly addressed in a
discussion about _us_, not about Venus. Here, the question is about the
Evening Star and the Morning Star _as opposed to other concepts and
existents_; it's not about how we come to see or know Venus. Hence I think
the focus should be on the referent, since that's why we have _that_ concept
(phrase). If you just associate meaning with the internal workings of our
minds, you are ignoring the connection between those workings and the
integration of external reality...which after all is the reason for the
workings in the first place.

And look at your original question..."Do they *mean* the same thing?" What
would you have us believe...that they mean different *things*???

jk

[John Timbrell]

I need some help.

Owl writes:

>The reference of a word is the same as the
>reference of the idea that the word expresses.

Let me translate this to a way that helps me to understand it. I take
"is the same as" to be equivalent to "equal". Translated: "The reference
of a word equals the reference of the idea that the word expresses."

Owl again:

>The sense of a word, however, I identify with the
>idea that the word expresses.

I take "identify with" to be equivalent to "equals." Translating: "The
sense of a word equals the idea that the word expresses."

If I understand: The referents of a word are all the things that it
refers to. The trees in my back yard are referents of the word "tree."
The sense of this word would be something like, "large woody plant."
Were there to be a plague that killed all trees, the meaning of the word
"tree" would still have a sense, but there would be no referents. Is
that about what you mean?

JTJ

GO DAWGS!!!

JTJ

[Owl]

Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:7vj8gf$2vi$1...@nntp4.atl.mindspring.net...

> >is true. The objectivist theory would imply that O must think he is
> >marrying his mother, which in fact he does not.
>
> No...the objectivist theory doesn't imply that O must think he is
marrying
> (the person who is his mother); it implies that O must think he is
marrying
> the person (who is his mother), which in fact he does.

I don't see how, on the objectivist theory, "(the person who is his
mother)" would be different from "the person (who is his mother)". Both
expressions refer to the same thing; therefore, they mean the same thing;
i.e., they are synonymous. So what you said was analogous to say, "That
isn't an unmarried man; it's a bachelor."

> >In my view, the meaning of a term depends wholly on what goes on in the
> >minds of speakers who use it.
>
> That's why your view sucks IMO...you _completely_ sunder what you call
the
> "reference" from what you call the "sense" with the word "wholly" here.
> It's almost as if it's random happenstance that our concepts refer to
> anything external at all, assuming that you think they do.

I don't see how you draw that conclusion. That would follow if and only
if I thought that what goes on in the minds of people was completely
random and unaffected by the external world. But of course, I don't think
any such silly thing.

The meanings of our words (wholly) depend on our thoughts, ideas, etc.
("depend" in a constitutive sense). Our thoughts, ideas, etc., of course,
also (partly) depend on events in the external world ("depend" in a causal
sense).

> That's wrong...there's a causal chain of events which leads from the
> occurence of the referent in reality to the existence of the concept in
our
> minds. Just because we have abstract thought which can conceptualize

Of course there is, in normal cases. I don't deny it.

> Speaking for myself, I don't think it's a great crime to distinguish
between
> "that which is" and "what (or more precisely, how) we conceptualize."
And
> technically, it's only semantics which one "meaning" refers to. The
great
> crime happens when it's pretended that these are two distinct items with
no
> existential relationship between them. IMO, that's a critical error
which
> (intentionally, it appears) opens the door for the POV that there's no
> relationship between what is and what we conceptualize. That's just
plainly

I think one would only get to the last POV by some imprecise and vague
thinking. To think clearly, in the way a philosopher should think, we
need to specify exactly what kind of relationships we think do and do not
exist between meanings and referents. To ask whether they are "connected"
or "severed" is just too vague a question to be answered. The more
precise questions, which might have different answers, include --
a) Do referents *cause* meanings, or vice versa?
b) Are meanings *identical with* referents?
c) Are meanings *parts of* referents, or vice versa?
d) Do meanings *represent* referents?
...

You can see that these are all quite different relations here. If one
lumps them all together with a word like "related" or "connected," well
then one's going to run into big trouble.

> Just because there is more to the meaning than that of which he's aware
is
> irrelevant to this point. The reason Peikoff's A-S Dichotomy essay is
so
> important isn't because he dictated a new usage for the word "meaning;"
> it's because he correctly identified that your "sense" wouldn't exist
but
> for the existence of your "reference." The chain of events is
> unidirectional, and "meaning" ought to be used for that which is more
> primary IMO. If you simply insist on sticking with the word, I'd
suggest
> "meaning" and "imagined meaning"...even that does a better job than just
> pretending that meaning is the sense.

I simply propose to use the word in its ordinary sense. In the ordinary
sense of "mean", if two expressions "mean the same", then you can
substitute one for the other in any sentence without changing the truth
value of the sentence. As an example, in the ordinary sense of "mean",
"bachelor" means "unmarried man."

What Peikoff claimed was that there is no coherent distinction between
analytic and synthetic. If you grant me a distinction between sense and
reference (or whatever you want to call those two things), then it is
easily possible to make the analytic-synthetic distinction. That, in
fact, is why I make a big deal about sense-reference.

[snip bit about Fred. I'm afraid I haven't followed that.]

[Owl]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vkclt$5nb$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> Beliefs are representations of reality. When the representation is
> faulty (as it is with Oedipus), it becomes extremely difficult to
> match beliefs to propositions (which are supposed to be formed from
> bits and pieces of reality---so maybe we have no propositions here at
> all!).

Ok, I'll say more about propositions below.

> As I understand it, propositions involve referents---that's why
> [that O married J] and [that O married O's mother] are the same
> proposition (if they are a proposition at all---O and J don't really
> refer). Beliefs involve mental units. O has two distinct mental units
> for Jocaste/his mother (even tho' they are the same person).

More below.

> Since for Oedipus the beliefs expressed by "I married Jocaste" and "I
> married my mother" involve (are composed of) distinct mental units,
> they are different beliefs. This in spite of the fact that we,
> outside the story, can tell that the truth conditions for both
> statements are identical.

My view is that they are different beliefs because they are attitudes to
distinct propositions. Also, I don't think they have the same truth
conditions, exactly. "I married Jocaste" requires (roughly) that there be
a person he married whose given name was "Jocaste", who is the same as the
person whom he has encountered, spoken to, etc. and associated with that
name. "I married my mother" requires that there be a person he married
who also bore him. Those are different conditions.

> We typically say that multiple people can have the same beliefs (they
> can have beliefs in common, share beliefs, even have mutual beliefs).
> The "belief" in B(i,p) should, by the way we speak, be the p. The
> B(i,p) is an "instance of believing" (something only a philosopher
> would come up with).

Actually, I think "belief" is ambiguous. Sometimes "belief" means "thing
believed to be so" and sometimes it refers to the mental state of
believing.

By the way, here's a nice illustration. Consider the following inference,
which is certainly valid:

1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.

This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions. The
"something" referred to in (3) is a proposition. It also illustrates that
there can be multiple instances of believing, for the same proposition.
John believes what Sally believes, but there is an obvious sense in which
John's belief is not Sally's belief -- I mean John's belief is in his
head, while Sally's is in hers. John's belief could cease while Sally's
went on.

> Furthermore, I think believing is just a special case of a more
> general relationship---a person centred way of representing the world.

I think I agree. I think of belief as a species of a more general type,
'apprehension', where apprehensions encompass beliefs, perceptual
experiences, concepts, and perhaps other things.

> We have our attitudes toward the world and its bits and pieces. Some
> of these attitudes are classified as "objective", which means that
> they are independent of our (or anyone else's) attitudes. Such

I'm a bit confused by that. How can an attitude of mine be "independent"
of my own attitudes? Doesn't that mean it's independent of itself, and
isn't that a contradiction?

> propositions allow. And if we wish to model disputes between
> realists and anti-realists, we must again use a more powerful
> representation (you are a moral realist (I believe), and I am a
> moral anti-realist; if you insist on representing my moral attitudes
> as propositions, then you can't accurately represent what those
> attitudes are, and you are doomed to making false statements about
> them---as has been fairly common in debates between these two poles).

I don't see the problem yet. As an anti-realist, my guess is that you
believe a proposition something like this: that there do not exist
objective moral truths. Or: that there are no propositions of the form "x
is good" or "x is right" (etc.) that are both true and independent of
observers.

> It seems as tho, in order for you to be consistent, you would have to
> say that [that O married J] and [that O married O's mother] are two
> different propositions (otherwise, when combined with the notion that

Yes, exactly.

> married my mother")). So what do you think a proposition is?

Here we get to the important part, I think. Your objection from the top
was that my view couldn't account for beliefs about non-existent things,
because I wouldn't be able to find any appropriate proposition that a
person would believe. Ex.: Suppose someone believes that Santa Claus
exists. But there is no Santa Claus, so there is no one for that belief
to be about. Seemingly, that means there is no proposition for the person
to be believing.

But actually no. *In the objectivist theory*, I think that conclusion
would follow. That is, if you identify meaning w/ reference, then "Santa
Claus" has to be meaningless, and so there's nothing for the poor kid to
believe. Also, if you thought that propositions had to be constructed out
of actual entities, then you have the same problem. You'll also have the
problem that the proposition that O marries J will be identical with the
proposition that O marries his mom.

For me, a proposition is not constructed out of actual entities. A
proposition is any way the world might be. There isn't actually any Santa
Claus, but there at least could have been a jolly fat man who drove around
a sleigh full of presents on Christmas Eve, etc. Anyway, that is a way
for things to be. The proposition 'exists' (in the sense that abstract
objects ever exist) independent of the existence of an actual Santa Claus.

Here's another helpful point about propositions: they are individuated by
truth-conditions. What that means is that if two expressions have the
same truth conditions (the same circumstances would make them true) then
they express the same proposition; and otherwise, they don't. But note
that I treat truth-conditions carefully: the truth conditions for "O
marries Jocaste" are NOT identical with the truth conditions for "O
marries his mother", despite that Jocaste is identical with O's mother.
The reason is that the latter sentence, but not the former, has as part of
its truth-conditions *that the woman he marries have borne him*. It is
true that Jocaste originally bore Oedipus, but that fact isn't part of the
truth conditions for "O marries Jocaste": it isn't part of what makes that
sentence true. That's why we have different propositions here.

I hope that helps some.

[Owl]

John Timbrell <isam...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:21004-38...@storefull-627.iap.bryant.webtv.net...

> Let me translate this to a way that helps me to understand it. I take
> "is the same as" to be equivalent to "equal". Translated: "The reference
> of a word equals the reference of the idea that the word expresses."

Yep.

> I take "identify with" to be equivalent to "equals." Translating: "The
> sense of a word equals the idea that the word expresses."

Yep.

> If I understand: The referents of a word are all the things that it
> refers to. The trees in my back yard are referents of the word "tree."
> The sense of this word would be something like, "large woody plant."
> Were there to be a plague that killed all trees, the meaning of the word
> "tree" would still have a sense, but there would be no referents. Is
> that about what you mean?

Yeah, except the second to last sentence should have said, "...the word
'tree' would still have a sense," not "...the meaning of the word 'tree'
would still have a sense." Alternately, "...the meaning of the word
'tree' would still exist." (The meaning of the word 'tree' = its sense;
that's why your expression is a redundancy.)

This is actually one of my arguments in favor of the distinction -- i.e.
that if all the trees in the world disappeared, "tree" would still be a
meaningful word, even though its referents no longer existed.

[Bert Clanton]

In article <21004-38...@storefull-627.iap.bryant.webtv.net>, John
Timbrell <isam...@webtv.net> wrote:

> If I understand: The referents of a word are all the things that it
> refers to. The trees in my back yard are referents of the word "tree."
> The sense of this word would be something like, "large woody plant."
> Were there to be a plague that killed all trees, the meaning of the word
> "tree" would still have a sense, but there would be no referents. Is
> that about what you mean?
>

By George, I think he's got it!

Except I'd avoid the word "meaning" here. I'd say "Were there a plague
that killed all trees, the word 'tree' would still have a sense (<large
woody plant>), but the word "tree" would then have no referents."

Okay, all you Objectivists. What's wrong with John's analysis? I don't see
*anything* wrong with it. But it seems to directly contradict "the
Objectivist epistemology", which claims that the "referent"/"sense"
distinction is unreal.

Best wishes,
Bert

[Bert Clanton]

In article <7vl1rp$v9n$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>, Jim Klein
<rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> In article <381D665D...@usa.net>,
> "Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@usa.net> wrote:
>
> >Let me ask you a question. Do you think the following phrases:
> >
> >"The morning star" and "The evening star" mean the same thing?
> >They * refer * to the same thing (i.e. the planet venus in inferior
> >conjunction with the Earth ). But I ask do they * mean * the same
> >thing?
>

[snip]

Klein:

> The important point IMO is to recognize what it is that gives rise to either
> of the concepts (or phrases, if you prefer). And the answer to that is
> _Venus_ and Venus alone. That's why personally I'd say they mean the same
> thing, at least technically.
>

Then of course you're using the term "meaning" as a synomym for the term
"reference". Which is fine, except that if you then also use it as a
synonym for the term "sense", you invite confusion and conflation and
equivocation--which the Objectivists seem only to eager to supply.

> Sure, the retort is that it's also because of what we are and what we do
> that gives rise to the phrases; hence it's claimed that the "sense" is just
> as primary as the referent and so meaning can just as defensibly be used for
> that.
>

Not only *can* be used for that. *Is* used for that.

I personally don't care *what* terms you use instead of the conventional
term "referent" and the conventional term "sense". But I think that you
promote all kinds of confusion if you refuse to distinguish in your
terminology between "the items that a term refers to" and "the idea evoked
in someone's mind when they interpret a term". The two are simply not at
all the same.

[snip]

>If you just associate meaning with the internal workings of our
> minds, you are ignoring the connection between those workings and the
> integration of external reality...which after all is the reason for the
> workings in the first place.
>

But nobody here "just associates meaning with the internal workings of our
minds", or "ignores the connection between these workings and the
integration of external reality". This is simply a straw man erected by
"the Objectivist epistemologists".

It seems to me that it is the Objectivists themselves who are making the
error. They associate the "meaning" of a term with its *referents only*,
so *they* are the ones who "completely ignore the connection between [the
internal workings of our minds] and the integration of external reality",
when they insist on ignoring "sense" as a component of meaning.

> And look at your original question..."Do they *mean* the same thing?" What
> would you have us believe...that they mean different *things*???
>

They have different *senses*: they evoke different ideas in the
consciousnesses of their interpreters. They have the same *referent*: they
denote the same external object, i.e., the external object which is the
second planet from our Sun. The Objectivists seem to want to ignore the
fact that they evoke different ideas in the consciousnesses of their
interpreters. But the rest of us *don't* make the converse error: we
*don't* ignore the fact that they refer to the same external object--in
fact, we *insist* on that.

Best wishes,
Bert

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vlacp$n01$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>This is actually one of my arguments in favor of the distinction -- i.e.
>that if all the trees in the world disappeared, "tree" would still be a
>meaningful word, even though its referents no longer existed.

So what? "The Soviet Union" is meaningful too, though it doesn't exist. In
both cases, the terms are meaningful because they refer to something which
_did_ exist, not because we have the term in our head.

And even in cases where it never existed--like "unicorn"--it's still the
case that the concept can be reduced to lower-level concepts which refer to
things which _do_ exist.

You are explicitly implying(!) here that a concept can gain meaning
exclusively by occuring in our minds, as if they just pop up out of nowhere.
What's that...conceptual spontaneous generation or something? That's deadly
wrong---there are _causes_ for concepts occuring, and ultimately they can be
traced to existents in external reality.

A brain in a vat wouldn't have human-type concepts at all, and that's so
even if they _appeared_ to be human-type concepts. Now if you want to argue
that such is precisely the case--we just _think_ we have concepts which
arise pursuant to the cognitive integration of percepts, but really we
don't--then go ahead. I think there's sufficient evidence to see that we
conceptualize as a means of integrating reality following our perception of
it; if you don't, that's cool.

Don't get me wrong...I can see the advantages. One wouldn't have to worry
about bullets (e.g.) at all, because the existence or non-existence of
bullets would be metaphysically equivalent...even as they're flying toward
you. Trouble is, you'll wake up dead.

jk

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vl7ib$dts$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
>news:7vj8gf$2vi$1...@nntp4.atl.mindspring.net...
>

>>No...the objectivist theory doesn't imply that O must think he is
>>marrying (the person who is his mother); it implies that O must think he
>>is marrying the person (who is his mother), which in fact he does.
>

>I don't see how, on the objectivist theory, "(the person who is his
>mother)" would be different from "the person (who is his mother)". Both
>expressions refer to the same thing; therefore, they mean the same thing;
>i.e., they are synonymous. So what you said was analogous to say, "That
>isn't an unmarried man; it's a bachelor."

I'm flattered that this is your response. The predicate is "think" not
"is." Thinking of a person who you know is your mother is not synonymous
with thinking of a person who unknown to you is your mother.

_Being_ the person who you know is your mother and _being_ the person who
unknown to you is your mother, is indeed synonymous. Does that help?

jk

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vl9sr$otv$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>By the way, here's a nice illustration. Consider the following inference,
>which is certainly valid:
>
>1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
>2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
>3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.
>
>This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions. The
>"something" referred to in (3) is a proposition. It also illustrates that
>there can be multiple instances of believing, for the same proposition.

Oh...so now all of a sudden the "meaning" is captured in the referent and
not in the sense, eh? That's what you've said here, you know. You say it's
the "same proposition". Parsed carefully, that says that the statement
"It's going to rain tomorrow" means what it does, totally independently from
whoever believes it or not.

Yet with the word "rock," we supposedly can't discern its meaning without
taking into account all of the thoughts, ideas and whatever other claptrap
might be going on in the minds of those who hold the concept.

Are you sure you're not a Big-O Objectivist?

jk

[Jim Klein]

In article <bert-01119...@d47.pm8.sonic.net>,
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote:

>But it seems to directly contradict "the Objectivist epistemology", which
>claims that the "referent"/"sense" distinction is unreal.

I doubt that this is a claim of Objectivist epistemology. If I think the
Earth is 13,000 miles in circumference and it's actually 25,000 miles, I be
incredulous that Rand would've said this proves that 13,000 equals 25,000.

Though I admit that judging by some Objectivists, we really can't tell for
sure!

I think the point, at least in non-technical terms, is more along the lines
that it's the _referent_ which gives rise to the existence of the concept,
rather than your "sense" alone. Obviously we wouldn't have concepts at all
were it not for the functions that give rise to your "sense;" but any
_particular_ concept occurs because of what exists in external reality
(including those concepts which reference non-existent referents).

I don't think the conclusion is intended to be that therefore maps are
territories. I think it's more akin to the idea that the essence of a map
is the territory it represents, not the ink and paper which comprise it.
The reference is the former and the sense is the latter. Me, I'd say the
essential meaning of the map is the territory; apparently you guys would
say it's either just the ink and paper, or both.

jk

[Jim Klein]

In article <bert-01119...@d52.pm.sonic.net>,
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote:

>Then of course you're using the term "meaning" as a synomym for the term
>"reference". Which is fine, except that if you then also use it as a
>synonym for the term "sense", you invite confusion and conflation and
>equivocation--which the Objectivists seem only to eager to supply.

You won't catch me defending Objectivists as folks who never equivocate.
But I'll add that you're one to talk, Mr. "Systems as Moral Agents!"

>>Sure, the retort is that it's also because of what we are and what we do
>>that gives rise to the phrases; hence it's claimed that the "sense" is
>>just as primary as the referent and so meaning can just as defensibly be
>>used for that.
>>
>
>Not only *can* be used for that. *Is* used for that.

Big deal. "Thuggery" is also used for "justice," as you well know. And
those disgusting troops all over the world are "peacekeepers."

>I personally don't care *what* terms you use instead of the conventional
>term "referent" and the conventional term "sense".

Neither do I. I'm all for freedom in speech usage; what's important is
what's being said. Relevantly, only the referent is that, since no two
people can fully share a sense.

>But I think that you promote all kinds of confusion if you refuse to
>distinguish in your terminology between "the items that a term refers to"
>and "the idea evoked in someone's mind when they interpret a term". The two
>are simply not at all the same.

Again, big deal. Are you saying that because there are some idiot
Objectivists who don't recognize this that it's a topic worthy of
discussion?

See, you want it both ways. You want to include those Objectivists who
pretend that concepts are referents as "Objectivist epistemologists," yet
you don't want to concede that there exist Subjectivists who pretend that
the sense is the referent. That's rather blind IMO for a man who proposes
that any sort of system can be an agent of morality.

>But nobody here "just associates meaning with the internal workings of our
>minds", or "ignores the connection between these workings and the
>integration of external reality". This is simply a straw man erected by
>"the Objectivist epistemologists".

Oh. So why are all of the science bookshelves filled with books about the
revelations of "inherent randomness"?

>It seems to me that it is the Objectivists themselves who are making the
>error. They associate the "meaning" of a term with its *referents only*,
>so *they* are the ones who "completely ignore the connection between [the
>internal workings of our minds] and the integration of external reality",
>when they insist on ignoring "sense" as a component of meaning.

Nor am I the guy to defend Objectivese as the dialect of clarity. Still
it's the case that there's a worthwhile point the Objectivists are making,
and it's a point besides the semantic one.

>They have different *senses*: they evoke different ideas in the
>consciousnesses of their interpreters. They have the same *referent*: they
>denote the same external object, i.e., the external object which is the
>second planet from our Sun. The Objectivists seem to want to ignore the
>fact that they evoke different ideas in the consciousnesses of their
>interpreters.

You would too, if you sought to be an automaton!

>But the rest of us *don't* make the converse error: we *don't* ignore the
>fact that they refer to the same external object--in fact, we *insist* on
>that.

You _say_ you insist on it, so that when you come out with the "systems as
moral agents" theory you may pretend that it has something to do with
reality. Hell, I guess you could even say honestly that it makes a lot of
SENSE, eh?

Problem is, it's got no referent.

jk

[Joseph J. Durnavich]

Bert Clanton writes:

>Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>> And look at your original question..."Do they *mean* the same thing?" What
>> would you have us believe...that they mean different *things*???
>

>They have different *senses*: they evoke different ideas in the
>consciousnesses of their interpreters. They have the same *referent*: they
>denote the same external object, i.e., the external object which is the
>second planet from our Sun. The Objectivists seem to want to ignore the
>fact that they evoke different ideas in the consciousnesses of their

>interpreters. But the rest of us *don't* make the converse error: we

>*don't* ignore the fact that they refer to the same external object--in
>fact, we *insist* on that.

The same referent by itself would not typically evoke different
ideas. The context that we learn and use the phrases "the Morning
Star," "the Evening Star," and "the planet Venus" are different.
At the very least, one would see the "Morning Star" after the
sun has risen and one would see the "Evening Star" after the sun
has set. The context is one of looking up at a light in the
sky. When we talk about "the planet Venus," the context is
that of the solar system--the objects comprising it, their
behavior, etc.

So, what at first looks like merely "different ideas in the
consciousness of their interpreters" is really different
contexts. These contexts involve both us and the world.
The sense/reference distinction arises from a comparison
of these contexts.

This, to me, is the spirit of Objectivist epistemology where
one takes into account all real factors including the conscious
agent and the world he lives in.

--
Joe Durnavich

[Bert Clanton]

In article <7vmrbl$qb9$1...@nntp8.atl.mindspring.net>, Jim Klein
<rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> In article <bert-01119...@d52.pm.sonic.net>,
> Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote:
>
> >Then of course you're using the term "meaning" as a synomym for the term
> >"reference". Which is fine, except that if you then also use it as a
> >synonym for the term "sense", you invite confusion and conflation and
> >equivocation--which the Objectivists seem only to eager to supply.
>
> You won't catch me defending Objectivists as folks who never equivocate.
> But I'll add that you're one to talk, Mr. "Systems as Moral Agents!"
>

Even if I'm dead wrong about "systems as moral agents", that doesn't
vitiate my point about "sense versus reference". The notion of "systems as
moral agents" is worth another posting, which I may submit some day.

Are you committing an "ad hominem" argument? Shame.

>
> >>Sure, the retort is that it's also because of what we are and what we do
> >>that gives rise to the phrases; hence it's claimed that the "sense" is
> >>just as primary as the referent and so meaning can just as defensibly be
> >>used for that.
> >>
> >
> >Not only *can* be used for that. *Is* used for that.
>
> Big deal. "Thuggery" is also used for "justice," as you well know. And
> those disgusting troops all over the world are "peacekeepers."
>

Big deal back atcha.

Another ad hominem.

>
> >I personally don't care *what* terms you use instead of the conventional
> >term "referent" and the conventional term "sense".
>
> Neither do I. I'm all for freedom in speech usage; what's important is
> what's being said. Relevantly, only the referent is that, since no two
> people can fully share a sense.
>

But "what's being said" is linked to the *sense*. "What's being said" when
you utter "Jocasta" is *not* the same as "what's being said" when you
utter "the mother of Oedipus", even though the *referent* of the two
utterances is the same.

>
> >But I think that you promote all kinds of confusion if you refuse to
> >distinguish in your terminology between "the items that a term refers to"
> >and "the idea evoked in someone's mind when they interpret a term". The two
> >are simply not at all the same.
>
> Again, big deal. Are you saying that because there are some idiot
> Objectivists who don't recognize this that it's a topic worthy of
> discussion?
>

Not exactly. I'm participating in an interesting pre-existing discussion
in which some of the participants fail to make a crucial distinction, and
I'm enjoying trying to show them that they are mistaken. Color me
"masochist".

> See, you want it both ways. You want to include those Objectivists who
> pretend that concepts are referents as "Objectivist epistemologists," yet
> you don't want to concede that there exist Subjectivists who pretend that
> the sense is the referent. That's rather blind IMO for a man who proposes
> that any sort of system can be an agent of morality.
>

But I haven't said a word about Subjectivists, or even about
subjectivists. In fact, you are attributing to me a belief which I don't
hold and haven't stated.

And you're committing *another* ad hominem.

>
> >But nobody here "just associates meaning with the internal workings of our
> >minds", or "ignores the connection between these workings and the
> >integration of external reality". This is simply a straw man erected by
> >"the Objectivist epistemologists".
>
> Oh. So why are all of the science bookshelves filled with books about the
> revelations of "inherent randomness"?
>

What is the relevance of this question to the point under discussion?

>
> >It seems to me that it is the Objectivists themselves who are making the
> >error. They associate the "meaning" of a term with its *referents only*,
> >so *they* are the ones who "completely ignore the connection between [the
> >internal workings of our minds] and the integration of external reality",
> >when they insist on ignoring "sense" as a component of meaning.
>
> Nor am I the guy to defend Objectivese as the dialect of clarity. Still
> it's the case that there's a worthwhile point the Objectivists are making,
> and it's a point besides the semantic one.
>

But they make their point by insisting on an erroneous view of the
relationship among "term", "sense", and "reference". And *nobody here
denies* that the referent of a term is a crucial aspect of its use.

>
> >They have different *senses*: they evoke different ideas in the
> >consciousnesses of their interpreters. They have the same *referent*: they
> >denote the same external object, i.e., the external object which is the
> >second planet from our Sun. The Objectivists seem to want to ignore the
> >fact that they evoke different ideas in the consciousnesses of their
> >interpreters.
>

> You would too, if you sought to be an automaton!
>

Hmm. I thought that you believe that I *am* an automaton!

>
> >But the rest of us *don't* make the converse error: we *don't* ignore the
> >fact that they refer to the same external object--in fact, we *insist* on
> >that.
>

> You _say_ you insist on it, so that when you come out with the "systems as
> moral agents" theory you may pretend that it has something to do with
> reality. Hell, I guess you could even say honestly that it makes a lot of
> SENSE, eh?
>
> Problem is, it's got no referent.
>

Do the orchestrated actions of the members of a corporation have effects
in the real world? I think so. Do the orchestrated actions of the cells of
Jim Klein's body have effects in the real world? I think so. Does it make
sense to talk about "the actions of General Electric"? I think so,
provided that you keep in mind, as we *both* do, that you're referring to
the orchestrated actions of many distinct individual persons. Does it make
sense to talk about "the actions of Jim Klein"? I think so, provided that
you keep in mind, as at least *I* do, that you're referring to the
orchestrated actions of many distinct individual cells (or molecules, or
atoms, ...).

Does the term "the Medellin cartel" have a referent? I think so, given the
proviso which I state above. Does it make sense to say "What the Medellin
cartel did, when it supplied drugs to the US market, was morally wrong"? I
think so. So does it make sense to think of the Medellin cartel as a moral
agent, whose actions (as a system) are properly subject to moral
evaluation? I think so. If it makes sense to say that "corporation" is
*legally* equivalent to "person", why doesn't it make sense to propose
that "corporation" is *morally* equivalent to "person"?

Best wishes,
Bert

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com>:

>> Since for Oedipus the beliefs expressed by "I married Jocaste" and
>> "I married my mother" involve (are composed of) distinct mental
>> units, they are different beliefs. This in spite of the fact that
>> we, outside the story, can tell that the truth conditions for both
>> statements are identical.

Owl:

> My view is that they are different beliefs because they are
> attitudes to distinct propositions.

OK, that's not what I learned about propositions---but then it does
seem that Owl-propositions are much more useful things than Mark-
propositions.

>> We typically say that multiple people can have the same beliefs
>> (they can have beliefs in common, share beliefs, even have mutual
>> beliefs). The "belief" in B(i,p) should, by the way we speak, be
>> the p. The B(i,p) is an "instance of believing" (something only a
>> philosopher would come up with).

> Actually, I think "belief" is ambiguous. Sometimes "belief" means
> "thing believed to be so" and sometimes it refers to the mental
> state of believing.

> By the way, here's a nice illustration. Consider the following
> inference, which is certainly valid:
>
> 1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> 2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> 3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.
>
> This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions.

Well, it actually doesn't. The something is a belief---we're
debating whether it's also a proposition.

> It also illustrates that
> there can be multiple instances of believing, for the same
> proposition. John believes what Sally believes, but there is an
> obvious sense in which John's belief is not Sally's belief -- I
> mean John's belief is in his head, while Sally's is in hers.
> John's belief could cease while Sally's went on.

Belief-tokens of the same belief-type, perhaps? But the notion of
beliefs ceasing does support the claim that "belief" is ambiguous.

>> Furthermore, I think believing is just a special case of a more
>> general relationship---a person centred way of representing the
>> world.

> I think I agree. I think of belief as a species of a more general
> type, 'apprehension', where apprehensions encompass beliefs,
> perceptual experiences, concepts, and perhaps other things.

>> We have our attitudes toward the world and its bits and pieces.

>> Some of these attitudes are classified as "objective", [...]

> I'm a bit confused by that. How can an attitude of mine be
> "independent" of my own attitudes?

Sorry. It's the content of the attitude that's classified as
objective---the content is something more general than a proposition;
classifying it as objective makes it count as a proposition to the
attitude holder, and the attitude to count as a belief to them as
well.

>> propositions allow. And if we wish to model disputes between
>> realists and anti-realists, we must again use a more powerful
>> representation (you are a moral realist (I believe), and I am a
>> moral anti-realist; if you insist on representing my moral attitudes
>> as propositions, then you can't accurately represent what those
>> attitudes are, and you are doomed to making false statements about
>> them---as has been fairly common in debates between these two
>> poles).

> I don't see the problem yet. As an anti-realist, my guess is that
> you believe a proposition something like this: that there do not
> exist objective moral truths.

Yes, that much is fine. It's when you try to model my moral attitudes
with propositions that the errors arise. The tendency is to use the
same representation for my moral attitudes and yours, and then to
draw conclusions about what my attitudes entail based on treating them
as propositions.

I guess "doomed" was the wrong word---it might work with propositions
(Owl-variety), but I'm not sure.

Suppose we are modeling the attitudes of a taste-realist---someone
who believes that taste is objective and anyone who, for example,
thinks that chocolate ice cream is not delicious has a defective
taster. (I assume that you are not one of these.) Does this person
have a *belief* that chocolate ice cream ...? If so, then we have a
belief with a non-proposition as its object. Can we represent
that he has a belief that he has a belief that chocolate etc? We
should be able to do that (he does, after all, have that belief). But
then we've just buried the non-propositional belief one level deeper.
Is that OK?

How do we represent this person's attitudes using just propositions?

> Or: that there are no propositions
> of the form "x is good" or "x is right" (etc.) that are both true
> and independent of observers.

Erm...problems with propositions again. Aren't propositions always
independent of observers? Below you say that propositions are "any
way the world might be"---that can't vary from observer to observer,
can it? Replace the word 'proposition' with a term for the more
general things we "apprehend".

>> So what do you think a proposition is?

> Here we get to the important part, I think. Your objection from
> the top was that my view couldn't account for beliefs about

> non-existent things[....]
>
> But actually no. [...]

>
> For me, a proposition is not constructed out of actual entities. A

> proposition is any way the world might be. [...]

>
> I hope that helps some.

I'm not sure your propositions can do justice to

[Owl]

Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message

news:7vmppk$vrb$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net...

> I don't think the conclusion is intended to be that therefore maps are
> territories. I think it's more akin to the idea that the essence of a
map
> is the territory it represents, not the ink and paper which comprise it.
> The reference is the former and the sense is the latter. Me, I'd say
the
> essential meaning of the map is the territory; apparently you guys
would
> say it's either just the ink and paper, or both.

What's the map, in this metaphor? The word?
Words, like maps, have lots of incidental properties, properties that
don't have anything to do, with their representational capacities. E.g.,
the kind of ink with which the word is written is irrelevant to its
representational capacity. So those properties I wouldn't describe as
part of the meaning. Ultimately, the only thing that's really directly
relevant to the meaning of a word is what idea it is associated with in
our minds. In your map metaphor, I think meaning is more like a function
from shapes on the map to possible phenomena in the world that they
purport to represent, rather than just ink and paper.

[andrew...@my-deja.com]

In article <7viru4$csv$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,

Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> <andrew...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
> news:7vhoj7$crp$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

Owl:
Same newsreader problem my end, so another unconventional-looking
post. For the sake of brevity I either concede or take as answered
elsewhere anything to which I do not explicitly respond (more often the
former).

Owl:

>We'd better pause for a moment and talk about "essences." I don't
think I used the term in that section, and I suspect that you're
driving at a different issue. In traditional metaphysics, there's a
distinction between 'essential' properties and 'accidental' ones.<

Andrew:
Actually, what I was getting at here was the distinction between
definitional, empirical, normative and theological essences which, as I
understand it, is required to make discussion of universals of any type
make sense. The limits of the medium (or my limitation in using it)
gives the impression that I am responding to only this phrase where I
interject, when, in fact, I assume an assertion you actually make later
in your argument: that universals exist (as opposed to being "just a
type of word"). Thus, my comment on "essential whiteness" was an
implication (or better for the realm of metaphysics, an entailment).
Namely, that in order to maintain a realist position as you defined it
(universals exist, and are not just a type of word) you must presuppose
the existence, beyond simple terminology, of some kind of actual
"essence of whiteness" somewhere other than in the mind of the
speaker/observer, etc.

Owl:
>Rand, on the other hand, regarded the 'essential' properties--<

Andrew:
Please don't think I'm arguing for Rand here. If it is a polemic you
ultimately want, I am wasting your time and you should let me know.

Owl:

>Now, you said I hadn't shown that a universal isn't just a certain
kind of word. Well, I take that to be true by definition. I said that
whiteness was a universal. Clearly, whiteness isn't a word (although
"whiteness" is) -- to say it is would just be a use/mention error.<

Andrew:
This is not clear at all. This is an unsupported assertion. I'll take
another example which may demonstrate my point. At this point you
assert "whiteness" as a universal because it can be a predicate. I
concede this. You further seem to assert (unless I'm mistaken) that
whiteness, as such, exists. "This is a work of art." is a statement
similar to your "This paper is white." Would you seriously maintain
that "work of art" is something clearly existent outside of language
use? To fend off a likely objection, I'm not suggesting anything about
consensus or agreement. What I mean is that "work of art" is a
predicate only insofar as some agent attributes (used as a verb,
originating in the agent) such a quality to an object. "Whiteness," in
my view, is the same. Incidentally, how can you say that something
exists "by definition" and then say that it's not nominal? (This
question should not be taken as rhetorical, but as a call for
clarification).

Owl:

>Perhaps what you meant to suggest was, rather, that there aren't any
universals, but that instead, there are just particulars and words that
refer to them. And so far, I hadn't addressed that view.<

Andrew:
No, I meant that universals might simply be part of the grammar. A
possibility you seemed to rule out by dismissal rather than refutation.

>>Andrew: The thing you would need to demonstrate here, in order to

make > this point in the argument compelling, is that to the question
"is this > a so and so?" there can be an antecedently correct answer.
In keeping

Owl:>I'm not sure what you mean by "antecedently correct answer".
Antecedent to what?<

Andrew:
Antecedent to asking the question. It's a reference to the "essence"
discussion. Some idea of the class must exist prior to assigning a
particular to it. As such, for the question "Is this a horse" to make
sense, we must have some idea of what the class "horse" entails. If we
have that, the question "is this thing in front of me" a horse would
have an answer prior to its being asked.

Owl:
>--finite range of shades -- a color term does not identify a completely

precise, determinate color. That's perfectly compatible with what I'm
saying. It's still true that all the white things have something in
common -- namely, that they all fall within that range of shades. Or,
in other words, that they're all white!<

Andrew:
This fits your universals as predicates thesis, which, incidentally, I
concede. It doesn't however, quite square with the idea of universals
apart from language. I think the confusion arises from the lack of an
"essence" distinction in the argument. Ambiguousness between
definitional and empirical essence (or outright confounding of the two)
allows for easy shifting from a nominalist to a realist position and
back. I realize that you didn't assert anything about essences. I
maintain that the assertion is implicit in your argument. Indeed, it
is necessary for any talk of universals to make sense.

Owl:

>What I was saying above was precisely that this does not convert the
universals to particulars. The reason is that a universal is NOT
defined as "that which cannot be the subject of a judgement." Rather, a
universal is that which CAN be the predicate of a judgement. White can
be the predicate of a judgement; therefore, it is a universal. It
happens that it can also be the subject of an(other) judgement, but
that's irrelevant<

Andrew:
This is a shift back to the definitional type of essence. It (your
above) stands completely distinct from (please note: I didn't say
"opposed to" I said "distinct from") your clearly empirical: "--I said
that whiteness was a universal. Clearly, whiteness isn't a word--a color
term does not identify a completely precise, determinate color-- they're
all white!" A distinction has to be made here. I realize this isn't
terribly clear. Charity, I beseech you. Remember, my aim is not to
"prove someone wrong" or "win" but to help perfect argument.

Owl:

>Similarly, there could also be third-order universals, and so on. Is
there any limit to how high-order universals you can get? I don't see
why there should be. And I also don't see any problem here.<

Andrew:
The problem is, you are maintaining that all of these things exist
independent of language. If I understand correctly, that we "discover"
them rather than "creating" them. The coach is in the living room. A
living room is part of a house. A house is part of a neighborhood. A
neighborhood is part of a city. A city is part of a country------existent
outside of language, all, if I understand your argument correctly.

Owl:

>Again, not so. Everything is either a particular or a universal, not
both. Remember: if x can be predicated of something (anything), then x
is a universal. If x cannot be predicated of anything, then x is a
particular. End of story.<

Andrew:
Presupposes definitional essence. Entails nominal view of universals.
Or perhaps the "brat" in the assertion "My little sister is a brat" is
something other than a linguistic predicate? Again, I don't have a
problem with the predication aspect of your argument. It's the
existence claims that don't sit well with me. Did "bratness" exist
prior to language and we invented a word for it when we discovered it?

Owl:

>The property of *being a tribe* is a universal, of course, but one,
particular tribe isn't. To put that another way, the tribe is not the
sort of thing that can be the predicate of a judgement, but only a
subject<

Andrew:
Sure it can. "this man is Cherokee" is exactly the same form as "this
paper is white." Anyway, the tribe example was an effort to ensure
that any other readers who might be following along understood the
difference between ante rem, in re, and post rem. I hope that after
all my commentary on "essences" you see why I regard this as important.

Owl:
>. By the way, this of course does not mean that I think the tribe

exists independently of its members, and I haven't said anything about
the answer to the question you raised about the tribe<

Andrew:
You maintain the immanent realist standpoint. As such, I concede that
you wouldn't assert that the tribe exists independently of members. I
didn't mean to imply that you do.

Owl:

>If someone declares that there is no such thing as whiteness, or
squareness, or any other colors, that there aren't any shapes, sizes,
weights, nor any other properties, relationships, or actions -- well,
that's absurd. I observe properties, relationships, and actions all the
time. In short, there is the following argument for realism and against
nominalism: 1. There is whiteness. Support: direct observation. We see
lots of things to be white; therefore, there is whiteness. 2.
Whiteness is a universal. Support: Whiteness can be predicated of
things. Also, more than one object can be white. 3. Therefore, there
is at least one universal. Follows from 1+2<

Andrew:
Presupposes empirical conception of essence. Entails realist
position. It doesn't, however, quite square with your
"predication=universal" thesis, because it does not account for the
wealth of possible predicates, which would then, by definition, be
universals, but cannot be observed in the way your above examples can.
For example, the predicate "mine" in the assertion that any particular
thing in my wallet is mine. How might we observe "mine-ness"? I won't
beat a dead horse, here. I hope that my call for a distinction on the
question of essences is clear. (even if, ultimately, wrong).

[Owl]

Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message

news:7vlg4d$e08$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net...

> >1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> >2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> >3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.
> >
> >This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions. The
> >"something" referred to in (3) is a proposition. It also illustrates
that
> >there can be multiple instances of believing, for the same proposition.
>

> Oh...so now all of a sudden the "meaning" is captured in the referent
and
> not in the sense, eh? That's what you've said here, you know. You say
it's

Huh?

> the "same proposition". Parsed carefully, that says that the statement
> "It's going to rain tomorrow" means what it does, totally independently
from
> whoever believes it or not.

Huh?
Note that I didn't say anything about statements above. I said something
about propositions, which are quite a different thing. Propositions are
the objects of beliefs, not statements. And all I said above was that two
people can believe the same proposition.

As to the statement, "it's going to rain tomorrow": what it means depends
upon the meanings of each of the component words (which, of course,
depends on the ideas with which they are associated), together with the
rules for combining those words in English. It does not depend upon
whether we *believe* that it's going to rain tomorrow -- you're right
about that.

> Yet with the word "rock," we supposedly can't discern its meaning
without
> taking into account all of the thoughts, ideas and whatever other
claptrap
> might be going on in the minds of those who hold the concept.

I'm not sure why you think that thoughts and ideas are "claptrap," but
note that we don't have to take account of all the thoughts, ideas, and
whatever other 'claptrap' you have in mind. Rather, we simply have to
take account of the idea that is associated with the word "rock" in the
minds of the people who use that word. Notice how at the end you mention
"...those who hold the concept." WHAT concept? Well, the concept that is
conventionally associated with (and expressed by) the word "rock". If we
conventionally associated the word "rock" with the idea of the sun, do you
deny that in that case "rock" would have a different meaning?

>
> Are you sure you're not a Big-O Objectivist?

Heh heh. Quite sure.

[Owl]

Mark,

Thanks for another thoughtful reply:

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vn8s6$8ve$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> > 1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> > 2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
> > 3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.
> >
> > This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions.
>
> Well, it actually doesn't. The something is a belief---we're
> debating whether it's also a proposition.

Is that a semantic question -- i.e., do we want to call this item a
"proposition"? Or is it something like this: should we take the grammar
of 3 at face value, i.e., (3) asserts something of the form
(Ex)(Bjx & Sjx).

If you think that's not really the form of (3), then we have a substantive
dispute. If you think that is the form of three, but you don't want to
call the things that are in the range of x 'propositions', that seems to
be semantic.

By the way, you can give a series of other examples of compelling
inferences that seem to show that the form of these sentences about
beliefs are as I say (i.e., believing is standing in a relation to a
special kind of object). Such as:

"Everything John thinks is true.
John thinks that it is going to rain tomorrow.
Therefore, it is true that it is going to rain tomorrow."

which appears to be of the form:

(x)(Bjx -> Tx)
Bjp
Tp.

> Yes, that much is fine. It's when you try to model my moral attitudes
> with propositions that the errors arise. The tendency is to use the
> same representation for my moral attitudes and yours, and then to
> draw conclusions about what my attitudes entail based on treating them
> as propositions.

Oh, ok. You mean, when you sincerely assert, "Stealing is wrong," how do
I describe your belief? I might just take whatever you think about the
meaning of "wrong" and substitute that for "wrong." I don't know what
that is so far, but let's suppose you hold a simple theory, like "x is
wrong" just reports the speaker's disapproval of x. Then I say: Oh, so
what you believe is that you disapprove of stealing.

That's not difficult. The difficult part is for you to account for what I
think when I sincerely say, "stealing is wrong". Which is like the
problem you raise below:

> Suppose we are modeling the attitudes of a taste-realist---someone
> who believes that taste is objective and anyone who, for example,
> thinks that chocolate ice cream is not delicious has a defective
> taster. (I assume that you are not one of these.) Does this person
> have a *belief* that chocolate ice cream ...? If so, then we have a
> belief with a non-proposition as its object. Can we represent

This is a good question. I wonder how you, or an objectivist (I can't
tell so far if you consider yourself one) would answer it. It seems like
a really tough problem for objectivists, since they have nothing to work
with but the referents in reality, and there is no such property as the
sort of deliciousness the taste-realist believes in.

As a first try, how about this: First, suppose my view of "delicious" is
that "x is delicious" means, "x is disposed to cause pleasurable taste
sensations upon being eaten." Then I will say of the taste realist:
He believes that there is a property, F, such that F is objective, F is
the ground for the disposition that some foods have to cause pleasurable
taste sensations upon being eaten, F is the referent of the word
"delicious" in English, and chocolate ice cream has F.

I don't have to believe there is any property satisfying the description
following the "such that" in order to attribute this belief to the person.

> > Or: that there are no propositions
> > of the form "x is good" or "x is right" (etc.) that are both true
> > and independent of observers.
>
> Erm...problems with propositions again. Aren't propositions always
> independent of observers? Below you say that propositions are "any
> way the world might be"---that can't vary from observer to observer,
> can it? Replace the word 'proposition' with a term for the more

Yeah. What I meant to say was "... that are true and whose truth is
independent of observers." Proposition always exist independent of
observers, but whether a proposition is true or not might depend upon
certain attitudes that observers have. For instance, the proposition that
chocolate is delicious exists independent of us, but whether it is true or
not depends upon what kind of sensations we have when we eat chocolate.

> I'm not sure your propositions can do justice to
> ...mark young

Either you're not sure my propositions can do justice to you, or the end
of your message got cut off.

--o

[John Timbrell]

The referent of "Jocaste" is (among many other things): the woman who
married Oedipus.

The sense of "Jocaste" is (very broadly): a woman.

The referent of "Oedipus' mother" is: That particular woman who gave
birth to Oedipus.

The sense of "Oedipus' mother" is: ? I'm lost. Does the sense differ in
this case from the referent? Does a word always have referents and a
sense that are distinguishable?

JTJ

GO DAWGS!!!

JTJ

[Owl]

Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message

news:7vlg31$dds$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net...

> I'm flattered that this is your response. The predicate is "think" not
> "is."

I don't see what's flattering, but anyway, obviously "think" is not
identical to "is", but that's irrelevant.

> Thinking of a person who you know is your mother is not synonymous
> with thinking of a person who unknown to you is your mother.
> _Being_ the person who you know is your mother and _being_ the person
who
> unknown to you is your mother, is indeed synonymous. Does that help?

The problem is that this is contradictory. If "A" is synonymous with "B",
then "C is A" will be synonymous with "C is B", but also (the point you're
ignoring) "O thinks C is A" is synonymous with "O thinks C is B" for
exactly the same reason. Substitution of synonymous words into a
sentence, without changing any of the context, gives synonymous sentences.

In other words, if *what* is thought in both cases is the same, then the
thoughts are the same. You want to say that p is the same as q, but
thinking p is different from thinking q. That's contradictory.

[Robert J. Kolker]

John Timbrell wrote:

> The referent of "Jocaste" is (among many other things): the woman who
> married Oedipus.
>
> The sense of "Jocaste" is (very broadly): a woman.
>
> The referent of "Oedipus' mother" is: That particular woman who gave
> birth to Oedipus.

You got it backwards. "The woman who gave birth to O" is the sense of
"The mother of O". Now if you point to the very woman you have the
referent of "The mother of O"

The sense of a name or description is what it means. The referent is
what it is.

Another example. "The capital city of France". It used to be Lyon. Now it
is Paris.

Bob Kolker

[Kwag7693]

Owl:

>1) How could he be ignorant of the meaning of "Oedipus' mother"?

He is ignorant of the referent of oedipus' mother. His knowledge of his mother
is null. He expects that he had one, I am sure. How can he know he is not
marrying his mother in your example? Why would O'ism necessitate that he so
believes?

>1. According to the objectivist theory, "Jocaste" means the same as "O's
>mother".

Why is this true? You consistently use Oedipus' mom as an empty placeholder,
simply a concept of Oedipus' having some mother. Jocaste has a much richer
meaning to Oedipus who is making the claim. What in Objectivism implies that a
person cannot make faulty assumptions or errors in judgement? He assumes that
Jocaste is not his Mom. This is not a rational judgement; it is clearly not an
analytic one either.

>2. Therefore, if the objectivist theory is true, [that O marries Jocaste]
>is the same proposition as [that O marries his mother]. (follows from 1)

Sure it does. One is false, though.

Kevin

[Dean M. Sandin]

John Timbrell <isam...@webtv.net> wrote
on Mon, 01 November 1999 06:05 PM EST

>If I understand: The referents of a word are all the things that it
>refers to. The trees in my back yard are referents of the word "tree."
>The sense of this word would be something like, "large woody plant."
>Were there to be a plague that killed all trees, the meaning of the word
>"tree" would still have a sense, but there would be no referents. Is
>that about what you mean?

The meaning of a word is the concept it names. The concept
"tree" integrates our grasp of every tree. This concept is
formed from the instances of trees we have become aware of, but
has room for every tree, past, present, and future, which may not
exist any more or yet, but for which we may someday encounter
evidence. So the demise of all trees on Earth would change
nothing epistemologically. The concept would remain, as valid as
ever. Likewise for the definition of the concept, since it is
nothing but the particular feature(s) of the concept's units that
serve as the concept's forming principle and standard of
admission.

When you think about it a little, the idea that the loss of all
trees on Earth would have the consequence of changing the concept
"tree" in some non-trivial way is bizarre. Consider that we have
the perfectly valid concept "trilobite", which would not change
simply because a living one came to light.

--- Dean

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

Owl:

>>> 1) John believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
>>> 2) Sally believes that it's going to rain tomorrow.
>>> 3) So there is something that John and Sally both believe.
>>>
>>> This illustrates, first of all, that there are propositions.

Mark:

>> Well, it actually doesn't. The something is a belief---we're
>> debating whether it's also a proposition.

Owl:

> Is that a semantic question -- i.e., do we want to call this item a
> "proposition"? Or is it something like this: should we take the
> grammar of 3 at face value, i.e., (3) asserts something of the form
> (Ex)(Bjx & Sjx).

I took 3 to mean (Ex)(B(J,x) & B(S,x)). You said that that illustrated
(Ex)P(x); while I said it merely illustrated (Ex)B(x) and left it
undecided whether (x)(B(x) -> P(x)).

> If you think that is the form of three, but you don't want to
> call the things that are in the range of x 'propositions', that seems
> to be semantic.

Well, you said what you thot a proposition was, and I was trying to
say that I'm still not sure that the objects of our beliefs are that
kind of a thing.

You said that a proposition is a way the world could be. By saying
that the objects of beliefs are propositions, then, you are saying
that no one can believe something that is not a way the world could
be.

Let N be some non-proposition---some way the world cannot be. Suppose
further that John claims to believe the world *is* that way. Now by
your explanation we cannot say B(J,N), because (x)(B(J,x) -> P(x)) and
we already know ~P(N).

So John is lying or mistaken. Let's assume, tho, that he is, in fact,
sincere in his assertion. Then we have B(J,B(J,N))---John believes
that he believes N. But now the object of John's belief is B(J,N),
which we already said could not be---it can't be because N is not a
proposition. Again, we have a non-proposition as the object of a
belief. (If we say that B(J,N) is a way the world *could* be, then
we lose the formula (x)(B(J,x) -> P(x)), which is what you are trying
to defend.)

(Actually this should probably be re-cast in terms of entailments,
but that seems like too much work now I've got it written as
theorems.)

(That's what the taste-realist example was supposed to show, but you
allowed [that chocolate ice cream is delicious] as a proposition.)

>> Yes, that much is fine. It's when you try to model my moral
>> attitudes with propositions that the errors arise. The tendency is
>> to use the same representation for my moral attitudes and yours,
>> and then to draw conclusions about what my attitudes entail based
>> on treating them as propositions.

> Oh, ok. You mean, when you sincerely assert, "Stealing is wrong,"

> how do I describe your belief?

I'm still trying to figure out what can and cannot be a proposition.
You threw me by allowing propositions to be subjective (true for one
person and not true for another). It was bad enough when I had to
change meanings midstream to allow non-existents....

> I might just take whatever you think about the
> meaning of "wrong" and substitute that for "wrong." I don't know
> what that is so far, but let's suppose you hold a simple theory,
> like "x is wrong" just reports the speaker's disapproval of x. Then
> I say: Oh, so what you believe is that you disapprove of stealing.

The argument then typically goes on to show why I *can't* mean that
(not that that *is* what I mean, but in general....). It's the
argument that follows that falls into errors of mis-representation.

> That's not difficult. The difficult part is for you to account for
> what I think when I sincerely say, "stealing is wrong".

Also not a problem. You believe that stealing is wrong regardless of
who believes it (if anyone); plus you happen to believe it.

> Which is like the problem you raise below:

>> Suppose we are modeling the attitudes of a taste-realist---someone

>> who believes that taste is objective and anyone who, for example,
>> thinks that chocolate ice cream is not delicious has a defective
>> taster. (I assume that you are not one of these.) Does this person
>> have a *belief* that chocolate ice cream ...? If so, then we have a
>> belief with a non-proposition as its object. Can we represent

> This is a good question. I wonder how you, or an objectivist (I

> can't tell so far if you consider yourself one)

I don't (which makes it a little odd that we'd be having this debate
on this group).

> would answer it. [...]

> As a first try, how about this: First, suppose my view of
> "delicious" is that "x is delicious" means, "x is disposed to cause
> pleasurable taste sensations upon being eaten." Then I will say of
> the taste realist:
> He believes that there is a property, F, such that F is objective, F
> is the ground for the disposition that some foods have to cause
> pleasurable taste sensations upon being eaten, F is the referent of
> the word "delicious" in English, and chocolate ice cream has F.

And the anti-realist's beliefs would be different how? Would there
be an F involved at all?

I want to say that the realist and anti-realist have the same attitude
toward chocolate ice cream (namely, that it is delicious), but that
the realist thinks deliciousness is objective while the anti-realist
takes it to be subjective (O(D) would introduce the F you use above).

What belief-propositions do your realist and anti-realist have in
common when they both find ice cream delicious? Anything?

> I don't have to believe there is any property satisfying the
> description following the "such that" in order to attribute this
> belief to the person.

The lack of such a property was one of my reasons to reject
propositions-as-pieces-of-reality.

>>> Or: that there are no propositions
>>> of the form "x is good" or "x is right" (etc.) that are both true
>>> and independent of observers.

>> Erm...problems with propositions again. Aren't propositions always
>> independent of observers? Below you say that propositions are "any
>> way the world might be"---that can't vary from observer to observer,
>> can it? Replace the word 'proposition' with a term for the more

> Yeah. What I meant to say was "... that are true and whose truth is

> independent of observers." Proposition always exist independent of
> observers, but whether a proposition is true or not might depend upon
> certain attitudes that observers have.

You misunderstand my objection. You had said that a proposition was a
way the world could be. How is it that a person's attitudes could
change the way the world could be. Your defintion of 'proposition' is
slipping.

> For instance, the proposition that
> chocolate is delicious exists independent of us, but whether it is
> true or not depends upon what kind of sensations we have when we eat
> chocolate.

Let's stick to a proposition being a way the world could be for a
moment.

If someone takes [that chocolate is delicious] to be a *true*
proposition, then they would take the world to be such that chocolate
*is* delicious. Since that's the way the world *is*, anyone who
thinks otherwise is wrong.

On the other hand, if someone merely assents to the *notion* [that
chocolate is delicious], then a person who thinks otherwise simply has
a different notion---they apprehend the world differently.

There are propositions that go with the notions ([that Sally
apprehends chocolate to be delicious] goes with Sally's notion [that
chocolate is delicious], for example), but I have them as definitely
different things.

>> I'm not sure your propositions can do justice to
>> ...mark young

> Either you're not sure my propositions can do justice to you, or

> the end of your message got cut off.

Proof-reading error: the paragraph started out at the bottom and got
moved up---except a piece of it got left behind. This was the

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vnndu$3cr$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>>Thinking of a person who you know is your mother is not synonymous
>>with thinking of a person who unknown to you is your mother.
>>_Being_ the person who you know is your mother and _being_ the person
>>who unknown to you is your mother, is indeed synonymous. Does that help?
>
>The problem is that this is contradictory.

No it isn't, and this is why academic philosophy has done you a disservice.
My statement is neither unintelligible nor false. I've got nothing against
turning it into a brain teaser to discover the "catch" or something, but
what you're doing here is turning words into things...which IMO is the
entire thrust of your essay in the first place.

Thinking of X with knowledge of X's attribute A is different than thinking
of X without knowledge of attribute A. This is so even though X hasn't
changed and is the same in both cases. After defending that "sense" is such
an intrinsic part of "meaning," suddenly you want to ignore it when it
actually applies. And it applies here because the predicate is _thinking_;
hence what's known is indeed an integral part of what's being thought. But
you want to say that it's just "person P" that's being thought, regardless
of any known or unknown attributes. Well sorry, that's not what thinking
consists of; an understanding that concepts ultimately derive from
perceptual input would render such a claim as literal nonsense.

>If "A" is synonymous with "B", then "C is A" will be synonymous with "C is
>B", but also (the point you're ignoring) "O thinks C is A" is synonymous
>with "O thinks C is B" for exactly the same reason.

Except here, A _isn't_ synonymous with B because of the predicate
"thinking." Thinking of person P not known to be your mother is not
synonymous with thinking of P' who is known to be your mother. In the
former case, "being my mother" is not part of the concept; in the latter it
is. We think concepts, not referents; it's _of_ referents that we think.

Now with regard to the predicate "being," then the knowledge of the
attributes by any person is irrelevant; the thing is as it is. So _being_
Jocaste is synonymous with _being_ O's mother, because being is not affected
by people's thoughts (unlesss you're talking about the object being the
thoughts themselves).

>Substitution of synonymous words into a sentence, without changing any of
>the context, gives synonymous sentences.

That's true of course, but you're ignoring _why_ it's true. I'm not going
to get side-tracked with that now, but suffice it to say that I think both
your response to my opening claim above, as well as your entire essay (from
what I've seen, which is not in great detail) consists of the fundamental
error of confusing words with things.

What drives me bonkers about this is that to the degree words _do_ refer to
things, you want to deny it and say that our knowledge has no necessary
causal relationship to that which exists. But when the words (or ideas or
concepts or thoughts) _are_ to be considered as just words or ideas or...,
then suddenly you want to make them real things and use the words to prove
something about the things.

It's like it's all exactly backwards. In your lingo...when the sense is
operative you make the meaning the referent, and when the referent is
operative you make the meaning the sense. This makes me remember (some of)
the reasons I left school; if any of this really made sense, then so would
jumping off the bell tower.

>In other words, if *what* is thought in both cases is the same, then the
>thoughts are the same.

What a great example...the "what" here is the referent, even though the
thinking part is supposedly the sense and you're dealing explicitly with the
thought and not the referent. But if I talk about the attributes of "that
rock over there," suddenly everything comes into question because we don't
know all of my thoughts (and preceding perceptions) that gave rise to the
statement, even though I'm explicitly referring to the rock.

So we can't know anything certainly about rocks because we don't know every
little detail that went into our conceptualization of them, but we know that
Sally's proposition that "It will rain tomorrow" is exactly the same as
John's proposition that "It will rain tomorrow" in a case where we know
nothing of the existential status of the referent.

>You want to say that p is the same as q, but thinking p is different from
>thinking q. That's contradictory.

Bullshit. "p" and "q" in the first case, if they are the same, refer to a
single entity. In the second case, they refer to thoughts; one thought of
entity E is not necessarily the same as another thought of entity E. I
would think you'd be all in favor of this, as weighty as you say the "sense"
is. "The thought of p" is not equal to "p"...your setup here is invalid.

Here, answer these two questions. IS the Evening Star the same ENTITY as
the Morning Star? That's a yes or a no. Is THINKING of the Evening Star
the same as THINKING of the Morning Star? That's also a yes or a no.

jk

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vkgvi$972$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
mark_anth...@my-deja.com wrote:

> So here's the nub: if the meaning of "Oedipus' mother" is a who, then
> Oedipus is not ignorant of its meaning at all.

The place in the story being discussed is the place before Oedipus finds out
that Jocaste is his mother. We're not talking about the conclusion of the
story, where Oedipus knows that Jocaste is his mother. We, including Owl in
his essay, are talking about the story before that point.

> The meaning must be a
> "referring" (a what) rather than a "referent" (a who). And if the
> meaning is a referring, then there must be some way that that
> referring is encoded---something akin to ostension, perhaps, in the
> case of a known referent, but by some other means for unknown
> referents. Why not by its sense?---the information we get out of the
> phrase in ignorance of its referent.

You make it sound like the "sense" and the "reference" are one and the same,
or that one is part of the other, or that one does the job of the other. But
that's not what "Owl" and those like him are saying. They are saying that the
"sense" and the "reference" are a dichotomy.

-- at no extra charge

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.1284d2753d...@mail.nji.com>,
Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> Oedipus knows the sense or meaning of
> "my mother" - it is the woman who actually gave birth to him, whoever
> that may be. He is ignorant of whom "my mother" /refers/ to, since he
> does not know he was adopted.

Look at the two sentences you just wrote. You just said that the meaning is
the woman who actually gave birth to him. So -- there you go. "Oedipus'
mother" is two words, and those two words mean a certain person. The phrase
isn't "anyone's mother."

> > > A standard example is "Morning Star" and "Evening Star". A person could
> > > know the meaning of both of these terms without knowing that they both
> > > refer to the same thing.
> >
> > You know, if a person thinks the Evening Star is a star, he's at least
> > ignorant of something. Don't you see that?
>
> We can assume that any given person is ignorant of many things; the
> question is, what things are relevant? "Evening Star" simply means
> "bright object in the evening sky never more than 45 degrees from the
> Sun" - or so the story goes.

No, it means that exact bright object in the sky. Not any such bright object,
but that exact one. If you didn't know what object was meant, you would not
really know what "Evening Star" means.

> If you like, make the example "Evening
> Planet" and "Morning Planet". A person could know the meaning of both of
> these terms and not know that they referred to the same planet.

Then, how would the person have known to say "planet" in the first place?

"Evening Planet" means which planet again?

> > Right, I would certainly grant that you have to decide for yourself if
> > Objectivism is the case.
>
> This is the issue, and one that I haven't seen the argument for.

No, this is not the issue, and you are not going to see the argument for it.
I'm supposed to argue that you should decide this or that for yourself? No.
I'd rather argue whether Objectivism is the case. You see, if Objectivism is
the case, and you won't decide it for yourself that it is the case even when
it is, then what in the world could I do for you?

It only matters whether Objectivism is the case. Your acceptance of things
that are the case is your problem.

> But the Objectivist account seems quite at odds with normal usage, so
> that doesn't seem to be the justification.

If you want to see the justification, where "the sense/reference dichotomy"
is concerned, keep going.

> > Take a look at the following sentences.
> >
> > 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
> >
> > 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
> >
> > Do these sentences contradict each other?
>
> No. What next?

How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying "no"?

[Owl]

<andrew...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vnl49$inp$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> Actually, what I was getting at here was the distinction between
> definitional, empirical, normative and theological essences which, as I
> understand it, is required to make discussion of universals of any type
> make sense. The limits of the medium (or my limitation in using it)

I don't follow all this. Perhaps you could explain what you mean by
"essence", and then what all those different kinds of essences are.

I mentioned my understanding of "essential properties" in my last message,
but it seems you mean something different.

> Namely, that in order to maintain a realist position as you defined it
> (universals exist, and are not just a type of word) you must presuppose
> the existence, beyond simple terminology, of some kind of actual
> "essence of whiteness" somewhere other than in the mind of the
> speaker/observer, etc.

I'm not sure if this is true, because I'm not sure what "essence of
whiteness" means. So it is hard for me to respond to that.

> Please don't think I'm arguing for Rand here. If it is a polemic you
> ultimately want, I am wasting your time and you should let me know.

That's alright; I do not restrict my conversations to Objectivists by any
means. What I'm trying to do is just make the issues, and especially my
position, perfectly clear. Whereupon I think one will be able to see the
truth.

> Owl:
> >Now, you said I hadn't shown that a universal isn't just a certain
> kind of word. Well, I take that to be true by definition. I said that
> whiteness was a universal. Clearly, whiteness isn't a word (although
> "whiteness" is) -- to say it is would just be a use/mention error.<
>
> Andrew:
> This is not clear at all. This is an unsupported assertion. I'll take

If you really believe what you seem to be saying, then I don't have any
argument against it (though I still think it's clearly false). But let's
try to clarify the issue, and see if you're really saying what you seem to
be saying.

I say that there is a difference between whiteness and "whiteness". This
is associated with the 'use/mention' distinction. Here's an example of
the use/mention distinction:

1) A cat is on the bed.
2) "Cat" has 3 letters.

Sentence (1) uses the word "cat"; sentence (2) *mentions* it. In sentence
1, we're talking about, well, a cat. In 2, we're talking about the word,
i.e., just that sequence of letters.

Now, the use/mention distinction applies just as well to "white" as to
"cat", e.g.:

3) "White" has 5 letters.
4) White has 5 letters.

Sentence 3 is true; 4 is nonsensical, though.

Now, what you seem to be saying is that actually, there is no distinction
between use and mention. A cat is the same as "cat", and "white" is the
same as white. As I say, I don't have an argument to give against that,
but I think you must mean something else.

(Amusing aside: Suppose I ask the waiter to bring me a glass of wine. He
comes back with a piece of paper on which the words "glass of wine" are
printed. I think I would have cause to complain.)

> another example which may demonstrate my point. At this point you
> assert "whiteness" as a universal because it can be a predicate. I
> concede this. You further seem to assert (unless I'm mistaken) that

Sorry to be pedantic, but it's whiteness, not "whiteness", that is a
universal. Yes, I assert that whiteness exists.

> whiteness, as such, exists. "This is a work of art." is a statement
> similar to your "This paper is white." Would you seriously maintain
> that "work of art" is something clearly existent outside of language
> use? To fend off a likely objection, I'm not suggesting anything about

I'm not sure what you mean here. I'll take the most obvious, literal
interpretation, and answer yes, of course I think that. There are lots of
works of art in museums around the country. They don't just exist when
people are using language. If we all stop talking, they won't vanish. So
yes, they exist outside of language use.

I'm not trying to be flippant here. I'm just showing you why I find it
hard to interpret your question. Perhaps you mean, could there be works
of art, even if we lacked the expression "work of art"? Then again I will
answer, yes of course. There are many non-English-speaking societies that
have art, and they don't have the expression "work of art".

Maybe you mean: could there be works of art, even if there were no
language at all? Well, I don't see why not. Consider the cave paintings
made by cave men. They probably had language, but let's suppose they
didn't. I don't see why they couldn't still have made those paintings,
and I don't see why they couldn't be works of art.

By the way, let me clarify another thing about my view. What I was trying
to show was that there are at least some universals. In fact, I contented
myself with saying there's at least one. If you don't think being a work
of art is one, then just pick another property. I don't want to get into
special questions peculiar to philosophy of art here.

> consensus or agreement. What I mean is that "work of art" is a
> predicate only insofar as some agent attributes (used as a verb,
> originating in the agent) such a quality to an object. "Whiteness," in
> my view, is the same. Incidentally, how can you say that something
> exists "by definition" and then say that it's not nominal? (This
> question should not be taken as rhetorical, but as a call for
> clarification).

Nothing exists by definition (except maybe existence itself). What I say
is that by definition, universals aren't words.

It's a contingent fact that whiteness exists. (If all the white objects
in the world vanished, then there would no longer be whiteness.) It's a
necessary truth that whiteness is a universal. So, overall, it is
contingent that a universal exists.

> >>Andrew: The thing you would need to demonstrate here, in order to
> make > this point in the argument compelling, is that to the question
> "is this > a so and so?" there can be an antecedently correct answer.
> In keeping
> Owl:>I'm not sure what you mean by "antecedently correct answer".
> Antecedent to what?<
>
> Andrew:
> Antecedent to asking the question. It's a reference to the "essence"
> discussion. Some idea of the class must exist prior to assigning a
> particular to it. As such, for the question "Is this a horse" to make

I'm not sure if any question could have an answer antecedent to the asking
of the question. Well, I suppose you could say the fact that becomes the
answer to the question existed before the question was asked. In that
sense, then, I would say that "Is this an X?" had an answer prior to the
asking of the question. I mean, for instance, the sun was yellow before
anyone asked "Is the sun yellow?" It's been yellow for a long time --
longer even than humans have existed, and certainly longer than the
English language has.

Suppose I ask you this: Do you think that, before the word "Earth"
existed, the Earth existed? (Corollary questions: How old is the Earth?
How old is the word "Earth"?)

Of course, the Earth is a particular, not a universal. But if you don't
even think particulars exist independently of words, you certainly won't
think universals do. And in that case, we have a much more fundamental
disagreement.

> sense, we must have some idea of what the class "horse" entails. If we
> have that, the question "is this thing in front of me" a horse would
> have an answer prior to its being asked.

Of course, in order for you to answer a question, you have to understand
the question. In this case, that means you would have to know what
"horse" means. No argument there. And certainly my position doesn't
contain so absurd a thesis as that people can know things even when they
don't have the concepts required for understanding those things. But it
seems like you might be confusing that with the innocuous thesis that
things can have properties independent of our awareness of them.

> Owl:
> >--finite range of shades -- a color term does not identify a completely
> precise, determinate color. That's perfectly compatible with what I'm
> saying. It's still true that all the white things have something in
> common -- namely, that they all fall within that range of shades. Or,
> in other words, that they're all white!<
>
> Andrew:
> This fits your universals as predicates thesis, which, incidentally, I
> concede. It doesn't however, quite square with the idea of universals
> apart from language. I think the confusion arises from the lack of an

I'm afraid I don't see the problem.

> "essence" distinction in the argument. Ambiguousness between
> definitional and empirical essence (or outright confounding of the two)
> allows for easy shifting from a nominalist to a realist position and
> back. I realize that you didn't assert anything about essences. I
> maintain that the assertion is implicit in your argument. Indeed, it
> is necessary for any talk of universals to make sense.

Again, you'll have to explain to me more about 'essence', etc. for me to
understand this.

> The problem is, you are maintaining that all of these things exist
> independent of language. If I understand correctly, that we "discover"
> them rather than "creating" them. The coach is in the living room. A
> living room is part of a house. A house is part of a neighborhood. A
> neighborhood is part of a city. A city is part of a
country------existent
> outside of language, all, if I understand your argument correctly.

Well, it would be better if you took examples of universals (the coach,
the living room, etc., are all particulars). But yes, I am maintaining
that they exist independent of language. But why is this a problem?

> Presupposes definitional essence. Entails nominal view of universals.
> Or perhaps the "brat" in the assertion "My little sister is a brat" is
> something other than a linguistic predicate? Again, I don't have a

Well, "brat" is a linguistic predicate. But the brat isn't; she's a
person. And her brattiness is one of her characteristics.

> problem with the predication aspect of your argument. It's the
> existence claims that don't sit well with me. Did "bratness" exist
> prior to language and we invented a word for it when we discovered it?

I don't get the alternative picture you're putting forward.

I would say that, after a lot of experience with different people, we
noticed a certain character trait that some people have, together with
certain behaviors that stem from it, a trait which happens to be very
common in children. As with all other things in the world that we have
names for, it was convenient to have a name for this character trait,
after we noticed it recurring over and over. We happen to have the word
"brat".

As far as I can tell, the alternative view is something like this: There
are a bunch of people out there, including a bunch of children. (All
particulars.) We pick out a group of them completely arbitrarily (they
have no properties in common so far), and then we make up this word,
"brat", and apply it to them -- for no reason. Henceforth, however, those
people are now brats.

> Owl:
> >The property of *being a tribe* is a universal, of course, but one,
> particular tribe isn't. To put that another way, the tribe is not the
> sort of thing that can be the predicate of a judgement, but only a
> subject<
>
> Andrew:
> Sure it can. "this man is Cherokee" is exactly the same form as "this
> paper is white." Anyway, the tribe example was an effort to ensure

Yes, but "is Cherokee" is not identical to "the Cherokee tribe". "The
Cherokee tribe" refers to that group of individuals, as in, "The Cherokee
live in South Dakota" (or wherever). "is Cherokee" refers to the relation
of being a member of that tribe.

> that any other readers who might be following along understood the
> difference between ante rem, in re, and post rem. I hope that after
> all my commentary on "essences" you see why I regard this as important.

Actually, I don't get what "post rem" is.

> Presupposes empirical conception of essence. Entails realist
> position. It doesn't, however, quite square with your
> "predication=universal" thesis, because it does not account for the
> wealth of possible predicates, which would then, by definition, be
> universals, but cannot be observed in the way your above examples can.
> For example, the predicate "mine" in the assertion that any particular
> thing in my wallet is mine. How might we observe "mine-ness"? I won't

I'm not saying that all universals are observable, only that some are.
Since at least some are observable, we *at least* know that those
universals exist.

Hope this helped.

--o

[Owl]

Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message

news:7vq49t$7km$1...@nntp5.atl.mindspring.net...

> Here, answer these two questions. IS the Evening Star the same ENTITY
as
> the Morning Star? That's a yes or a no. Is THINKING of the Evening
Star
> the same as THINKING of the Morning Star? That's also a yes or a no.

1) Yes.
2) That depends on what aspect you're thinking of it under -- and sorry,
but some "yes/no" questions can't be answered yes or no. (Have you
stopped beating your wife?) The whole point of view I'm putting forward
is that there are different *ways* of thinking of something, what are
sometimes called 'modes of presentation'. You always think of a thing
under a certain aspect, and the expressions "morning star" and "evening
star" connote different aspects of the same thing. So thinking of the
Morning Star *under the "Morning Star" aspect* is different from thinking
of it *under the "Evening Star" aspect*. But thinking of the Morning star
under its "morning star" aspect is the same as thinking of the evening
star under it's "morning star" aspect.

[Owl]

John Timbrell <isam...@webtv.net> wrote in message
news:6916-381...@storefull-625.iap.bryant.webtv.net...

>
>
> The referent of "Jocaste" is (among many other things): the woman who
> married Oedipus.
>
> The sense of "Jocaste" is (very broadly): a woman.
>
>
> The referent of "Oedipus' mother" is: That particular woman who gave
> birth to Oedipus.
>

> The sense of "Oedipus' mother" is: ? I'm lost. Does the sense differ in
> this case from the referent? Does a word always have referents and a
> sense that are distinguishable?

We're getting something like a use/mention error here. The sense of
"Jocaste" is an idea, not a woman. (Of course, it's an idea of a woman.)
Likewise, the sense of "O's mother" is another idea, the idea of a person

who gave birth to Oedipus.

Here's something that will maybe help. Think of senses as being like
offices. The office of President of the United States happens to be
filled by Bill Clinton. If things had gone differently, it might have
been filled by Bob Dole. So you can distinguish the President of the
United States (Clinton) from the *office* of President of the United
States. Similarly, you can distinguish the woman who gave birth to
Oedipus from, so to speak, the office of (woman who gave birth to
Oedipus).

The idea (woman who gave birth to Oedipus) has that office as its content,
and the actual person who fills the office as its referent.

[Owl]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vpnc4$21f$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> > Is that a semantic question -- i.e., do we want to call this item a
> > "proposition"? Or is it something like this: should we take the
> > grammar of 3 at face value, i.e., (3) asserts something of the form
> > (Ex)(Bjx & Sjx).
>
> I took 3 to mean (Ex)(B(J,x) & B(S,x)). You said that that illustrated
> (Ex)P(x); while I said it merely illustrated (Ex)B(x) and left it
> undecided whether (x)(B(x) -> P(x)).

By the way, what I said includes a typo. "Sjx" was supposed bo be "Bsx".

Anyway, the example is supposed to show that we should take believing as a
relation between a believer and an object of belief. I guess what you're
hesitant about is whether all of the things I said about propositions are
true of some one kind of thing. Thus:

> You said that a proposition is a way the world could be. By saying
> that the objects of beliefs are propositions, then, you are saying
> that no one can believe something that is not a way the world could
> be.
>
> Let N be some non-proposition---some way the world cannot be. Suppose
> further that John claims to believe the world *is* that way. Now by
> your explanation we cannot say B(J,N), because (x)(B(J,x) -> P(x)) and
> we already know ~P(N).

What would be an example of this? Suppose one of my students announces
that he believes objectivity. Objectivity isn't a proposition; it's just
a predicate. So I know it makes no sense to say he believes it. How do I
interpret his statement, then? I might interpret it to mean he believes
that objectivity is important, or valuable, or that it exists.

Or maybe you have in mind self-contradictory propositions. Suppose the
student, next, says he believes murder is worse than rape, but it's not
the case that rape is not as bad as murder. (I have heard this example
from a professor.) Well, I might just say he has two contradictory
beliefs simultaneously, and leave it at that.

The "might" in "ways the world might be" is not to be taken too strongly.
It is just to give you an idea of the sort of things I'm talking about.
If you are tempted to say, "Oh, so there aren't any contradictory
propositions, since the world can't be contradictory!" you are taking it
too strictly. If you can construct something out of propositions (using
appropriate operations, such as conjunction or conditionals), then the
constructed thing is also a proposition.

> So John is lying or mistaken. Let's assume, tho, that he is, in fact,
> sincere in his assertion. Then we have B(J,B(J,N))---John believes
> that he believes N. But now the object of John's belief is B(J,N),
> which we already said could not be---it can't be because N is not a
> proposition. Again, we have a non-proposition as the object of a

If n isn't a proposition, it doesn't follow that B(j,n) isn't a
proposition. A very confused person might think that they stand in the
believing relation to something non-propositional.

I would need a specific example in order to say what the right analysis
is. It might be that John believes there is a proposition satisfying a
certain description, which he believes, when in fact there is no such
proposition; or he might incorrectly believe that a certain sequence of
words expresses a proposition that it does not in fact express; or he
might be in a state of confusion where there is no determinate fact about
what he believes; or he might believe two different things that he
confuses with each other. All of those possibilities seem compatible with
your description of the situation so far.

> I'm still trying to figure out what can and cannot be a proposition.
> You threw me by allowing propositions to be subjective (true for one
> person and not true for another). It was bad enough when I had to
> change meanings midstream to allow non-existents....

Propositions aren't true for one person and false for another; sentences
are. The mapping from sentences onto propositions varies from one person
to another. "I am hungry", when said by me, expresses a different
proposition from "I am hungry" when said by you. For that I am hungry is
a different proposition from that you are hungry. (Note: because they
have different truth conditions.) "This is delicious" works similarly.

> > like "x is wrong" just reports the speaker's disapproval of x. Then
> > I say: Oh, so what you believe is that you disapprove of stealing.
>
> The argument then typically goes on to show why I *can't* mean that
> (not that that *is* what I mean, but in general....). It's the
> argument that follows that falls into errors of mis-representation.

You're right; the anti-realist will have to also mean more than "I
disapprove of stealing," if he has the sort of intuitions that the realist
appeals to. (E.g., if he has the intuition that "If I approved of
stealing, stealing still wouldn't be right" is true.)

Well, the realist, if he thinks that realism is necessarily true, is going
to have to ascribe contradictory beliefs to the anti-realist. Thus, the
anti-realist will have to believe that stealing is wrong, but that there
is no such thing as wrongness (that is, this is the realist's description
of what the anti-realist believes). Of course, the anti-realist won't
describe his own views that way, but that is because the anti-realist is
confused about the meaning of "wrong."

I do not see what alternative view can account for this situation better.
Maybe what you need is something even more fine-grained than propositions.

> > That's not difficult. The difficult part is for you to account for
> > what I think when I sincerely say, "stealing is wrong".
>
> Also not a problem. You believe that stealing is wrong regardless of
> who believes it (if anyone); plus you happen to believe it.

Yeah, but if you stick your analysis of what "is wrong" means into that
sentence, you'll get something that is definitely not what I believe.
E.g., I certainly don't merely believe that I disapprove of stealing
regardless of who believes that I disapprove of stealing. (Ditto for
whatever other anti-realist theory you want to put in.)

The best strategy for this, as I tried to suggest for the taste-realist,
is to identify the role that the posited objective properties are supposed
to play. For instance, with the taste-realist, I say he posits an
objective property that explains and corresponds to his pleasurable taste
sensations. What he's doing can then be described without us (the
describers) committing ourselves to the existence of such a property.
This, by the way, is similar to how Ramsey proposed to eliminate
theoretical terms.

> > He believes that there is a property, F, such that F is objective, F
> > is the ground for the disposition that some foods have to cause
> > pleasurable taste sensations upon being eaten, F is the referent of
> > the word "delicious" in English, and chocolate ice cream has F.
>
> And the anti-realist's beliefs would be different how? Would there
> be an F involved at all?

For us anti-taste realists, we don't need to use variables, since we can
just say chocolate ice cream has a tendency to cause pleasurable taste
sensations in us. The difference is that for the realist, the
'deliciousness' is an objective property that *explains and corresponds
to* our taste sensations. Perhaps we should add another clause into the
above statement: "... pleasurable taste sensations are representations of
F ..." or something like that.

> I want to say that the realist and anti-realist have the same attitude
> toward chocolate ice cream (namely, that it is delicious), but that
> the realist thinks deliciousness is objective while the anti-realist
> takes it to be subjective (O(D) would introduce the F you use above).

Yeah, but there's still a problem, because if you substitute the (alleged)
true meaning of "delicious" into the sentence, "The realist thinks choc.
is delicious", you get something that is not what he thinks. Therefore,
doesn't that show that the allegedly true meaning is not what "delicious"
means, at least not when the realist says it?

> What belief-propositions do your realist and anti-realist have in
> common when they both find ice cream delicious? Anything?

Sure, the realist believes all the (positive) things the anti-realist
believes, about dispositions to cause pleasurable sensations, and the
like. He just believes something else in addition.

> > Yeah. What I meant to say was "... that are true and whose truth is
> > independent of observers." Proposition always exist independent of
> > observers, but whether a proposition is true or not might depend upon
> > certain attitudes that observers have.
>
> You misunderstand my objection. You had said that a proposition was a
> way the world could be. How is it that a person's attitudes could
> change the way the world could be. Your defintion of 'proposition' is
> slipping.

Well, one of the ways the world can be is it can contain observers with
certain attitudes. If you change your attitudes, you ipso facto change
the way the world is (in that respect). Maybe I'm still missing your
point.

> If someone takes [that chocolate is delicious] to be a *true*
> proposition, then they would take the world to be such that chocolate
> *is* delicious. Since that's the way the world *is*, anyone who
> thinks otherwise is wrong.

True, but note that chocolate might be delicious for one person and not
for another. Compare: [that I am hungry] is a proposition. If it's a
true proposition, then anyone who thinks I'm not hungry is wrong. But of
course, that doesn't mean that if someone else says, "I'm not hungry"
they're wrong.

o

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vqc1i$hmd$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> Look at the two sentences you just wrote. You just said that the meaning is
> the woman who actually gave birth to him.

If I did, then I was wrong. I was trying to give you an example of the
difference between sense and reference. Are you claiming that there is
no difference?

> So -- there you go. "Oedipus'
> mother" is two words, and those two words mean a certain person.

They /refer/ to a certain person. You can call that "meaning" a certain
person without doing any violence to common usage if you wish, but that's
not the point. The point is that we can make sense of words or phrases
without knowing to what they refer. So there are two different ideas
here. Didn't you yourself give an equation as an example? We can
explain things about an equation without having solved it, indeed,
without being able to solve it. So we can know its /sense/ without
knowing its /reference/.

...

> > We can assume that any given person is ignorant of many things; the
> > question is, what things are relevant? "Evening Star" simply means
> > "bright object in the evening sky never more than 45 degrees from the
> > Sun" - or so the story goes.
>
> No, it means that exact bright object in the sky. Not any such bright object,
> but that exact one. If you didn't know what object was meant, you would not
> really know what "Evening Star" means.

Look, I used that phrase because I didn't have a way of actually pointing
to the Evening Star as part of this post. Suppose I am blind, and
someone carefully describes to me the characteristics of the Evening Star
- its apparent magnitude, its position in the evening sky at various
times of the year, etc. You are saying that I would not know the meaning
of the "Evening Star"?

> > If you like, make the example "Evening
> > Planet" and "Morning Planet". A person could know the meaning of both of
> > these terms and not know that they referred to the same planet.
>
> Then, how would the person have known to say "planet" in the first place?

Because "planet" means "wonderer", that is, a celestial body that moves
relative to the stars. So there could be two such planets or (as is the
case) one planet that sometimes appears in the morning and sometimes in
the evening sky.

> "Evening Planet" means which planet again?

The planet that appears in the evening, right about (are you following
where I am pointing?) /there/ this time of year and of the day.

> > > Right, I would certainly grant that you have to decide for yourself if
> > > Objectivism is the case.
> >
> > This is the issue, and one that I haven't seen the argument for.
>
> No, this is not the issue, and you are not going to see the argument for it.

I think you misunderstood me. I was referring to my previous comment,
that I had not seen an argument, that is, good reasons, to reject the
sense/reference distinction and to use Objectivist terminology instead.
Without such an argument, why would there be any reason to use
Objectivist terminology?

...

>
> > > Take a look at the following sentences.
> > >
> > > 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
> > >
> > > 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
> > >
> > > Do these sentences contradict each other?
> >
> > No. What next?
>
> How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying "no"?

Because I know that "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same person.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vqob4$78o$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

>Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
>news:7vq49t$7km$1...@nntp5.atl.mindspring.net...

>>Here, answer these two questions. IS the Evening Star the same ENTITY
>>as the Morning Star? That's a yes or a no. Is THINKING of the Evening
>>Star the same as THINKING of the Morning Star? That's also a yes or a no.
>

>1) Yes.

We agree on something...I guess "A is A" is a decent axiom!

>2) That depends on what aspect you're thinking of it under -- and sorry,
>but some "yes/no" questions can't be answered yes or no. (Have you
>stopped beating your wife?)

Feh. That brings with it an implicit assumption...that I beat my wife.
There is no corresponding false assumption in my question.

>The whole point of view I'm putting forward
>is that there are different *ways* of thinking of something, what are
>sometimes called 'modes of presentation'. You always think of a thing
>under a certain aspect, and the expressions "morning star" and "evening
>star" connote different aspects of the same thing. So thinking of the
>Morning Star *under the "Morning Star" aspect* is different from thinking
>of it *under the "Evening Star" aspect*. But thinking of the Morning star
>under its "morning star" aspect is the same as thinking of the evening
>star under it's "morning star" aspect.

Wow...all of that? Now you're saying that the aspects of thought somehow
transfer to the object, and The Evening Star has a morning star aspect.
What aspects does Venus have in the mid-afternoon when nobody sees it...both
of them?

Never mind; don't trouble yourself to explain. I think you're saying that
if I think of the Morning Star _as merely Venus_ and likewise the Evening
Star, then I'm thinking of the same thing. Is that close?

If so, that's nice but it's a dodge IMO. All you're saying is that the
referent of "Morning Star" is Venus---that's true but it doesn't encapsulate
what's being thought of with "Morning Star." Part of that thought is that
it occurs in the morning; otherwise you're just saying that we're giving an
alternative proper name to Venus. Clearly, that's not my intent with the
question---I'm talking about thoughts, not names.

Maybe it'd be better if I didn't capitalize..."morning star" MEANS that it's
something which is viewed in the morning, and "evening star" MEANS that it's
viewed in the evening.

So call it what you will...the fact is that thinking of Venus seen in the
morning is different from thinking of Venus seen in the evening, even though
Venus is the same entity throughout. Likewise thinking of Jocaste knowing
that she's your mother is different than thinking of her not knowing, even
though she's the same lady throughout.

You want to call the first of these the "sense" and the latter the
"referent." Like I said, that's no great crime because what goes on in our
heads is different than what it refers to and it's essential to denote the
difference. What you're missing IMO is the connection between the two, and
the fact that the only reason there's a sense at all is as a byproduct of
there being a referent and identifier. The whole _purpose_ of cognition in
the first place is to identify the referents, not create senses. As I see
it, when you say that the sense is part of the meaning, you remove the focus
from the referent and lose sight of the fact that identifying the referent
is the whole reason there's any sense at all.

For most people, the "sense" of "the evening star" is that it's a star, even
though it's a planet. So do you think it's better to say that the meaning
of "the evening star" is as a star, or a planet?

Should a dictionary define it as "an object seen in the evening sky whose
perception is caused by the reflection of the sun's light by Venus but is
commonly interpreted by most people as a star" or should it contain only the
first clause before the "but"? I say the latter because how it's
interpreted by most people is irrelevant to the meaning of the term.

One of the byproducts of your approach is that it suddenly becomes
meaningful to say things like "Freedom is Slavery." After all, the _sense_
of "freedom" among most people includes numerous actions which amount to
slavery. According to you, the "meaning" of freedom is such that it
includes some amount of slavery. Ergo, it's sensible to say that freedom is
slavery and we can point to the meaning of the words to defend the claim.
If one takes the "referent is meaning" approach OTOH, such claims can be
immediately identified for the hogwash they are; there is no "aspect" of
freedom which amounts to slavery.

All that bullshit coming from Washington isn't written by laborers, y'know.
Why would a nice guy like you want to further the process which creates it?

jk

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com>:

>> I took 3 to mean (Ex)(B(J,x) & B(S,x)). You said that that
>> illustrated (Ex)P(x); while I said it merely illustrated (Ex)B(x)
>> and left it undecided whether (x)(B(x) -> P(x)).

Owl:

> I guess what you're hesitant about is whether all of the things I
> said about propositions are true of some one kind of thing.

You haven't said much about propositions per se; but yes.

> Thus:
>
>> You said that a proposition is a way the world could be. By saying
>> that the objects of beliefs are propositions, then, you are saying
>> that no one can believe something that is not a way the world could
>> be.

>> Let N be some non-proposition---some way the world cannot be.
>> Suppose further that John claims to believe the world *is* that
>> way. Now by your explanation we cannot say B(J,N), because
>> (x)(B(J,x) -> P(x)) and we already know ~P(N).

> What would be an example of this?

Pick anything that you do not count as a proposition. The example I
came up with was *Hooray*.

John thinks that *Hooray*. He deduces from this that *All Right* and
not *Damn*. John is sincere in his belief. He is not a hypocrite, he
is merely insane (but logical!).

[...]

> If you are tempted to say, "Oh, so there aren't any contradictory
> propositions, since the world can't be contradictory!"

I'm not taking it that way. The world might be one way; it might be
another and incompatible way. So (Possibly(x) & Possibly(~x)) is not
a problem for me.

[...]

>> So John is lying or mistaken. Let's assume, tho, that he is, in
>> fact, sincere in his assertion. Then we have B(J,B(J,N))---John
>> believes that he believes N. But now the object of John's belief
>> is B(J,N), which we already said could not be---it can't be because
>> N is not a proposition. Again, we have a non-proposition as the
>> object of a

> If n isn't a proposition, it doesn't follow that B(j,n) isn't a
> proposition.

But if B(J,N) is a proposition---and assuming that propositions are
a way the world could be---then the world is such that someone can
have a belief that has a non-proposition as its object. Ergo, thus
and therefore the object of a belief is not necessarily a proposition.

If Possibly(~x), then ~Necessarily(x). Here x is (all objects of
belief are propositions), so ~x is (some object of some belief is not
a proposition).

To get past this you have to allow propositions to be things that are
not "ways the world could be". Can you give me any examples of
propositions that are not ways the world could be?

>> I'm still trying to figure out what can and cannot be a proposition.
>> You threw me by allowing propositions to be subjective (true for one
>> person and not true for another). It was bad enough when I had to
>> change meanings midstream to allow non-existents....

> Propositions aren't true for one person and false for another;
> sentences are. The mapping from sentences onto propositions varies
> from one person to another. "I am hungry", when said by me,
> expresses a different proposition from "I am hungry" when said by
> you.

That sentence may express different propositions when uttered by two
different people, but it expresses only one attitude, and it has only
one sense.

I want [that I am hungry] to be the meaning of the sentence, and [that
Owl is hungry] and [that Mark is hungry] to be two of the propositions
that sentence could be used to express. Note that the meaning is NOT
a proposition; it is something less.

> For that I am hungry is a different proposition from that you
> are hungry. (Note: because they have different truth conditions.)
> "This is delicious" works similarly.

Here I want [that this is delicious] to be the meaning and [that Owl
finds chocolate ice cream delicious] and [that Mark finds dutch apple
pie delicious] to be two propositions the sentence could be used to
express. When I say that [that chocolate is delicious] is a
proposition, I mean it to describe a way the world might be, not
simply a way that someone might perceive the world to be.

(Come to think of it, I don't want them to be propositions; I want
them to be *fluents*---things that can be true at one time and false
at another; propositions should be eternal.)

Owl:

>>> like "x is wrong" just reports the speaker's disapproval of x.
>>> Then I say: Oh, so what you believe is that you disapprove of
>>> stealing.

>> The argument then typically goes on to show why I *can't* mean that
>> (not that that *is* what I mean, but in general....). It's the
>> argument that follows that falls into errors of mis-representation.

> You're right; the anti-realist will have to also mean more than "I
> disapprove of stealing," if he has the sort of intuitions that the
> realist appeals to. (E.g., if he has the intuition that "If I
> approved of stealing, stealing still wouldn't be right" is true.)

And if he doesn't? The arguments are phrased as "But people say...."

> Well, the realist, if he thinks that realism is necessarily true, is
> going to have to ascribe contradictory beliefs to the anti-realist.

This is my problem. I want to be able to say that someone else has
internally consistent beliefs even if they believe something that I
believe to be false.

> Thus, the anti-realist will have to believe that stealing is wrong,
> but that there is no such thing as wrongness (that is, this is the
> realist's description of what the anti-realist believes).

An incorrect representation of the anti-realist's beliefs. The
realist should be able to represent the entire (higher-order) logic
of the situation, which would be something like:

B(AR,W(S) & ~O(W)) & B(i,W(S) & O(W)).

> Of course, the anti-realist won't describe his own views that way,
> but that is because the anti-realist is confused about the meaning
> of "wrong."

No, the realist and anti-realist disagree about the nature of
wrongness / deliciousness.

> I do not see what alternative view can account for this situation
> better.

One that allows people to avoid attributing beliefs that the
attributee doesn't have. By what you just said, your way doesn't
cut it.

> Maybe what you need is something even more fine-grained than
> propositions.

HEY! That's what *I* said!

>>> That's not difficult. The difficult part is for you to account
>>> for what I think when I sincerely say, "stealing is wrong".

>> Also not a problem. You believe that stealing is wrong regardless
>> of who believes it (if anyone); plus you happen to believe it.

> Yeah, but if you stick your analysis of what "is wrong" means into
> that sentence, you'll get something that is definitely not what I
> believe.

That's right. That's why "is wrong" should be taken as a primitive
of the representation and its analysis represented separately. Then
I can represent you as a moral realist and infer that you will have
other beliefs that follow from your instances of "is wrong"---beliefs
that I can separately reject in spite of having the same instances.

The sentence "Stealing is wrong" means [that stealing is wrong] and
nothing more. You want to imbue it with all sorts of extra
information about the nature of wrongness---to make its meaning a
proposition (propositions stand in relations to each other outside
any observer). That's fine if you're only interested in what people
*should* believe, but not at all acceptable if you're interested in
what people *do* believe. And it unnecessarily complicates
communication because people do base their communications on what they
*do* believe, not on what they *should*.

> E.g., I certainly don't merely believe that I disapprove of stealing
> regardless of who believes that I disapprove of stealing. (Ditto for
> whatever other anti-realist theory you want to put in.)

Of course not. But I got that; meanwhile you have me believing that
stealing is wrong AND that there is no such thing as wrongness. YOU
have exported your analysis of wrongness into my head, and so got a
wrong picture of my beliefs.

>> I want to say that the realist and anti-realist have the same
>> attitude toward chocolate ice cream (namely, that it is delicious),
>> but that the realist thinks deliciousness is objective while the
>> anti-realist takes it to be subjective (O(D) would introduce the F
>> you use above).

> Yeah, but there's still a problem, because if you substitute the
> (alleged) true meaning of "delicious" into the sentence, "The
> realist thinks choc. is delicious", you get something that is not
> what he thinks.

No. You only get that if you insist on changing "chocolate ice cream
is delicious" into a proposition that includes a bunch of information
about how the term is to be analysed. Use simpler representations of
the meaning and more complicated representations of the person doing
the meaning.

> Therefore, doesn't that show that the allegedly true meaning is not
> what "delicious" means, at least not when the realist says it?

If the realist means something *different* by "delicious" than the
anti-realist, then they are BOTH RIGHT. The realist is talking about
REAL-delicious (which is real) and the anti-realist is talking about
ANTIREAL-delicious (which is not real). The ONLY WAY that they can
be having a real disagreement is if they're talking about the same
thing (deliciousness simple).

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128ac7b6e0...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> If I did, then I was wrong. I was trying to give you an example of the
> difference between sense and reference. Are you claiming that there is
> no difference?

Not precisely. You use "sense" to mean part of what words mean, and
"reference" to mean another part. My point is more precisely that words mean
she to whom they refer i.e. "Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste. I am saying that
the split is contrived and artificial, not that it hasn't been presented.

It's as if you think, like this cowardly "Owl," that "Oedipus' mother" is
some sort of "office" that can be held by different people, and that the
"sense" is the "office" while the "reference" is the person. But only one
person can be Oedipus' mother -- she who is. "Oedipus' mother" does not mean
someone else's mother, and does not mean Oedipus' "something else." It means
who it means.

> The point is that we can make sense of words or phrases
> without knowing to what they refer.

So? Obviously you can make sense of words without knowing everything about
whom or what they mean. Obviously you can make sense out of "Oedipus' mother"
without knowing whom those words mean. But they mean Jocaste whether you know
it.

As another example, you can make sense out of "Secretary of the Interior"
even if you don't know who is meant. Big deal.

> We can
> explain things about an equation without having solved it, indeed,
> without being able to solve it.

Actually, it wasn't precisely equations we were talking about, but rather
unsolved problems. Sure, you can explain things about 2 + 2 without solving
it, and even without being able to. But this doesn't change one whit about
the fact that 2 + 2 means 4.

> Suppose I am blind, and
> someone carefully describes to me the characteristics of the Evening Star
> - its apparent magnitude, its position in the evening sky at various
> times of the year, etc. You are saying that I would not know the meaning
> of the "Evening Star"?

On the contrary, it is you who is saying that the meaning of "Evening Star"
is somehow only its appearance. So, who knows whether you would say that a
blind person can know the meaning of "Evening Star"? It seems that by your
reckoning, a blind person means something different by "Evening Star" than a
sighted person. If "Evening Star" only means that manifestation of light in
the sky and doesn't mean Venus, aren't you the one saying that a blind person
would not know the meaning of "Evening Star"?

Observe: I say that a blind person can indeed know the meaning of "Evening
Star" because it means Venus.

Now you begin to see what I'm saying.

Did I make it sound otherwise? I must have messed up something.

> > Then, how would the person have known to say "planet" in the first place?
>
> Because "planet" means "wonderer", that is, a celestial body that moves

> relative to the stars. So there could be two such planets --

What do you mean, there "could be" two such planets? No there couldn't,
because the one planet that's there already causes both sightings. Are you
saying that your fantasy about how there "could be" two planets impacts the
fact that there's one?

> -- or (as is the

> case) one planet that sometimes appears in the morning and sometimes in
> the evening sky.
>
> > "Evening Planet" means which planet again?
>
> The planet that appears in the evening, right about (are you following
> where I am pointing?) /there/ this time of year and of the day.

And which planet is that?

> I think you misunderstood me. I was referring to my previous comment,
> that I had not seen an argument, that is, good reasons, to reject the
> sense/reference distinction and to use Objectivist terminology instead.

As I said, you'll have to press on.

Of course, the above about the blind person should already have made the
point.

> > How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying "no"?
>
> Because I know that "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same person.

And how do you know this?

-- at no extra charge

[Owl]

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com> wrote in message
news:7vshof$3p6$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...

> Pick anything that you do not count as a proposition. The example I
> came up with was *Hooray*.
>
> John thinks that *Hooray*. He deduces from this that *All Right* and
> not *Damn*. John is sincere in his belief. He is not a hypocrite, he
> is merely insane (but logical!).

Well, I just don't think this situation makes any sense. I don't know
what "John thinks that hooray" means, so I don't see that I have to come
up with a way of describing that (non-)situation. Maybe John might think
that things are going well, and he might also mistakenly think that
"hooray" is a complete sentence which asserts that things are going well.

> > You're right; the anti-realist will have to also mean more than "I
> > disapprove of stealing," if he has the sort of intuitions that the
> > realist appeals to. (E.g., if he has the intuition that "If I
> > approved of stealing, stealing still wouldn't be right" is true.)
>
> And if he doesn't? The arguments are phrased as "But people say...."

Well, then he has different meanings than other people do.

> > Well, the realist, if he thinks that realism is necessarily true, is
> > going to have to ascribe contradictory beliefs to the anti-realist.
>
> This is my problem. I want to be able to say that someone else has
> internally consistent beliefs even if they believe something that I
> believe to be false.

Even necessarily false?

Either the realist view allows a possibility that anti-realism be true (so
realism is contingent), or it doesn't. In the first case, your problem
would not arise, since we can represent the anti-realist as believing in
that possibility. In the latter case, the realist holds that anti-realism
is impossible, in which case I don't see why it's so bad to represent the
anti-realist as holding inconsistent beliefs.

> An incorrect representation of the anti-realist's beliefs. The
> realist should be able to represent the entire (higher-order) logic
> of the situation, which would be something like:
>
> B(AR,W(S) & ~O(W)) & B(i,W(S) & O(W)).

I don't see why I couldn't count that thing, as well as all the things in
it that are the objects of beliefs, as propositions.

The only objection I can see is this: assume the realist account of the
meaning of "wrong" is such that it is logically impossible that wrongness
not be objective; then "~O(W)" is contradictory, and so not a way the
world could be. But if that was your objection, I don't see how you would
propose to avoid it.

> > Of course, the anti-realist won't describe his own views that way,
> > but that is because the anti-realist is confused about the meaning
> > of "wrong."
>
> No, the realist and anti-realist disagree about the nature of
> wrongness / deliciousness.

Well, it's often hard to distinguish a disagreement about 'the nature of
x' from a disagreement about the meaning of "x".

> > Yeah, but if you stick your analysis of what "is wrong" means into
> > that sentence, you'll get something that is definitely not what I
> > believe.
>
> That's right. That's why "is wrong" should be taken as a primitive
> of the representation and its analysis represented separately. Then
> I can represent you as a moral realist and infer that you will have
> other beliefs that follow from your instances of "is wrong"---beliefs
> that I can separately reject in spite of having the same instances.

Wait a minute. If your analysis of "is wrong" is *correct*, then why
would it not be correct to substitute that in wherever you see "is wrong"?
Why should "is wrong" be taken as a 'primitive' -- unless you're now
coming over to the intuitionist view that "wrong" is, after all,
indefinable? Put another way: if some analysis of "wrong" is correct,
then "wrong" is NOT a primitive term, so why should you treat it as such?
I don't get it.

> The sentence "Stealing is wrong" means [that stealing is wrong] and
> nothing more. You want to imbue it with all sorts of extra
> information about the nature of wrongness---to make its meaning a
> proposition (propositions stand in relations to each other outside
> any observer). That's fine if you're only interested in what people

Well, I don't think of that stuff as extra information. Suppose I tell
you that I have a friend, Hank, who believes that the sun is green.
Unlike us, I tell you, Hank just happens to have a lot of mistaken beliefs
about the nature of the sun. For instance, he doesn't think that the sun
is a round thing that you see in the sky that gives off light and heat; he
happens to believe it is a certain kind of plant tha the has in his living
room. There's something wrong with this story; you'd probably want to
say, "That doesn't sound like beliefs about *the sun*; that sounds like
beliefs about the plant in his living room." The point: in order for one
to have beliefs about x at all, one has to get some basic things about x
right. You can't completely divorce my beliefs about 'the nature of x'
from my representation of x in the first place. A concept of x
automatically has information about the nature of x built into it.

> If the realist means something *different* by "delicious" than the
> anti-realist, then they are BOTH RIGHT. The realist is talking about
> REAL-delicious (which is real) and the anti-realist is talking about
> ANTIREAL-delicious (which is not real). The ONLY WAY that they can
> be having a real disagreement is if they're talking about the same
> thing (deliciousness simple).

We're agreed there.

So to sum up, there's 2 things I'm not getting about your objection.

First, about the thing that you say represents the realist's & the
anti-realist's beliefs: I don't see why holding that propositions are the
objects of beliefs prevents one from accepting that thing as a correct
representation.

Second, I don't get why it would not be legitimate to substitute, into
that representation, the correct analysis of "wrong" for "wrong".

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vr37r$dqd$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

> One of the byproducts of your approach is that it suddenly becomes
> meaningful to say things like "Freedom is Slavery." After all, the _sense_
> of "freedom" among most people includes numerous actions which amount to
> slavery. According to you, the "meaning" of freedom is such that it
> includes some amount of slavery.

That is totally devastating.

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vsnuk$8qv$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> Not precisely. You use "sense" to mean part of what words mean, and
> "reference" to mean another part. My point is more precisely that words mean
> she to whom they refer i.e. "Oedipus' mother" means Jocaste.

From what you say here, you simply have a theory of reference. Whenever
you say "means", you are saying no more than "refers". Is that correct?

> I am saying that
> the split is contrived and artificial, not that it hasn't been presented.

OK, but, of course, I see the two ideas of sense and reference as
straightforward and natural.

> It's as if you think, like this cowardly "Owl," that "Oedipus' mother" is
> some sort of "office" that can be held by different people, and that the
> "sense" is the "office" while the "reference" is the person.

Almost. But no one is saying that it can be different people at
different times or several persons at once. We are simply saying that
you can know the sense of "Oedipus's mother" without knowing to whom it
refers.

> But only one
> person can be Oedipus' mother -- she who is. "Oedipus' mother" does not mean
> someone else's mother, and does not mean Oedipus' "something else." It means
> who it means.

It has /what/ sense it has and it refers to a /whom/.

> > The point is that we can make sense of words or phrases
> > without knowing to what they refer.
>
> So? Obviously you can make sense of words without knowing everything about
> whom or what they mean. Obviously you can make sense out of "Oedipus' mother"
> without knowing whom those words mean.

"whom the words /refer to/".

> But they mean Jocaste whether you know
> it.

You are simply substituting "mean" for "refer to". Perhaps we should
just let it go at that. Or do you have something else packed into "mean"
besides "refers to"?

> As another example, you can make sense out of "Secretary of the Interior"
> even if you don't know who is meant. Big deal.

Precisely.

> Actually, it wasn't precisely equations we were talking about, but rather
> unsolved problems.

Right. We can make sense of x**7+x**5+x**3+x+1=0 without knowing what
values x actually has.

> > Suppose I am blind, and
> > someone carefully describes to me the characteristics of the Evening Star
> > - its apparent magnitude, its position in the evening sky at various
> > times of the year, etc. You are saying that I would not know the meaning
> > of the "Evening Star"?
>
> On the contrary, it is you who is saying that the meaning of "Evening Star"
> is somehow only its appearance.

I didn't say "only its appearance". The blind person knows that it is a
very bright object, hence worthy of a special name, that appears in the
evening sky relatively close to the Sun.
...

> It seems that by your
> reckoning, a blind person means something different by "Evening Star" than a
> sighted person. If "Evening Star" only means that manifestation of light in
> the sky and doesn't mean Venus, aren't you the one saying that a blind person
> would not know the meaning of "Evening Star"?

No. Because I have a notion of sense as well as reference. There is no
way of "pointing out" the object to a blind person, so that method of
fixing the reference is ruled out. But he still can know the sense of
the term. Of course, he could also be /told/ that "Evening Star" refers
to Venus.

...

> > Because "planet" means "wonderer", that is, a celestial body that moves
> > relative to the stars. So there could be two such planets --
>
> What do you mean, there "could be" two such planets? No there couldn't,
> because the one planet that's there already causes both sightings. Are you
> saying that your fantasy about how there "could be" two planets impacts the
> fact that there's one?

Spare me. I've read Peikoff's "The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy". I am
saying that it had to be discovered that "Evening Star" and "Morning
Star" refer to the same planet. Before this discovery there was no
particular reason to think that they did, since the two terms have
different senses. I take it that you do not think that people before
this discovery knew the meaning of "Evening Star", even though they used
the term, since if they had known the /meaning/ (on your view) they would
also have to have known it was the same object as the Morning Star.

...

> > > "Evening Planet" means which planet again?
> >
> > The planet that appears in the evening, right about (are you following
> > where I am pointing?) /there/ this time of year and of the day.
>
> And which planet is that?

Next time you are in New Jersey, let me know. I'll arrange to meet you
and point out which one it is.
...

> > > How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying "no"?
> >
> > Because I know that "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same person.
>
> And how do you know this?

Because I occupy a position outside of the story. I have been told that
they refer to the same person; Oedipus was not.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

Sorry if this is a re-post; Deja choked on the first try.

----------
You cut out my proof that the objects of belief are not necessarily
propositions. Since that was my main point (other stuff was just
argumentation in support), I'd appreciate a critique (or concession).

Owl:
]> If n isn't a proposition, it doesn't follow that B(j,n) isn't a
]> proposition.

Mark:
] But if B(J,N) is a proposition---and assuming that propositions are
] a way the world could be---then the world is such that someone can

] have a belief that has a non-proposition as its object. Ergo, thus
] and therefore the object of a belief is not necessarily a
] proposition.
]
] If Possibly(~x), then ~Necessarily(x). Here x is (all objects of
] belief are propositions), so ~x is (some object of some belief is
] not a proposition).
]
] To get past this you have to allow propositions to be things that
] are not "ways the world could be". Can you give me any examples of
] propositions that are not ways the world could be?

----------

<mark_anth...@my-deja.com>:

>> Pick anything that you do not count as a proposition. The example I
>> came up with was *Hooray*.
>>
>> John thinks that *Hooray*. He deduces from this that *All Right*
>> and not *Damn*. John is sincere in his belief. He is not a
>> hypocrite, he is merely insane (but logical!).

Owl:

> Well, I just don't think this situation makes any sense.

I didn't say John made sense; I said he was sincere. Whether it makes
sense to believe *Hooray* or not, he does believe that he believes it.

> I don't
> know what "John thinks that hooray" means, so I don't see that I
> have to come up with a way of describing that (non-)situation.

You don't have to describe *that* situation (namely, *Hooray*); you
have to describe John believing *Hooray* (or, alternatively, John
believing that he believes *Hooray*).

> Maybe John might think that things are going well, and he might also
> mistakenly think that "hooray" is a complete sentence which asserts
> that things are going well.

And maybe he does, maybe he doesn't---but you just don't KNOW, do you?

Owl:

>>> Well, the realist, if he thinks that realism is necessarily true,
>>> is going to have to ascribe contradictory beliefs to the
>>> anti-realist.

>> This is my problem. I want to be able to say that someone else has
>> internally consistent beliefs even if they believe something that I
>> believe to be false.

> Even necessarily false?

Even necessarily false. Do you believe everything that's (*really*)
necessary? What do you think of Goldbach's Conjecture?

> Either the realist view allows a possibility that anti-realism be
> true (so realism is contingent), or it doesn't. In the first case,
> your problem would not arise, since we can represent the anti-realist
> as believing in that possibility.

OK.

> In the latter case, the realist holds that anti-realism
> is impossible, in which case I don't see why it's so bad to
> represent the anti-realist as holding inconsistent beliefs.

It's bad because the anti-realist does not believe that anti-realism
is impossible, in spite of its (so-called) necessity. The confirmed
realist is unable to represent something that really exists---a person
who is not a realist. You don't think that's bad?

>>> Of course, the anti-realist won't describe his own views that way,
>>> but that is because the anti-realist is confused about the meaning
>>> of "wrong."

>> No, the realist and anti-realist disagree about the nature of
>> wrongness / deliciousness.

> Well, it's often hard to distinguish a disagreement about 'the nature
> of x' from a disagreement about the meaning of "x".

Yes, especially if you insist on treating the meaning as a proposition.
If the meaning is [that there exists something which properties so-and-
so], then disagreements about properties are disagreements about
meanings. But if the meaning is merely something that represents a
(possibly non-existent) referent, then disagreements about properties
are no longer disagreements about meaning (tho' there still may be
confusion in determining the referent it stands for).

One of the things that I find completely incomprehensible is the
"God" of the philosophers. Was it Russel that said "'God' means
there exists a being which is omniscient, omnipotent, ..."? Well,
whoever it was, they weren't talking about the God I learned about in
Sunday School. 'God' refers to some (possibly non-existent) being,
who, it is alleged, created the universe, spoke to Abraham and Moses
(among others), and who is alleged to be omniscient and omnipotent and
who knows what else. (BTW, the Sunday School didn't put in the
"(possibly non-existent)" bit; I added that later on my own.)

>>> Yeah, but if you stick your analysis of what "is wrong" means into
>>> that sentence, you'll get something that is definitely not what I
>>> believe.

>> That's right. That's why "is wrong" should be taken as a primitive
>> of the representation and its analysis represented separately. Then
>> I can represent you as a moral realist and infer that you will have
>> other beliefs that follow from your instances of "is wrong"---

>> beliefs that I can separately reject in spite of having the same
>> instances.

> Wait a minute. If your analysis of "is wrong" is *correct*, then
> why would it not be correct to substitute that in wherever you see
> "is wrong"?

It would be correct to substitute my analysis in for every utterance
of "is wrong" only if my analysis is agreed to by everyone who utters
"is wrong". Anyone who does not agree with my analysis of "is wrong"
(who, per hypothesis, would be *mistaken*) would not come to the same
conclusions as I do (based on my analysis); thus substituting *my*
analysis for *their* use of "is wrong" would lead to incorrect
inferences---and would thus my analysis would be *mistaken*. The
upshot is that my analysis can only be correct if everyone agrees with
it. Damn! Subjectivism rules.

> Why should "is wrong" be taken as a 'primitive' -- unless you're now
> coming over to the intuitionist view that "wrong" is, after all,
> indefinable?

It's only undefinable in a "we can all agree that..." sense. We take
it as primitive to ensure that everyone who uses the term is referring
to the same thing. Note: I did not say it was a primitive predicate;
it's a primitive representation.

> Put another way: if some analysis of "wrong" is
> correct, then "wrong" is NOT a primitive term, so why should you
> treat it as such? I don't get it.

Do you have an analysis of "wrong" that everyone agrees to? Then you
don't have a correct analysis of "wrong".

>> The sentence "Stealing is wrong" means [that stealing is wrong] and
>> nothing more. You want to imbue it with all sorts of extra
>> information about the nature of wrongness---to make its meaning a
>> proposition (propositions stand in relations to each other outside
>> any observer). That's fine if you're only interested in what people

> Well, I don't think of that stuff as extra information.

No, because you think that everyone *should* (and somehow *does*) mean
that when they use the term. That's why you're stuck mis-representing
your opponents' beliefs.

> Suppose I tell
> you that I have a friend, Hank, who believes that the sun is green.
> Unlike us, I tell you, Hank just happens to have a lot of mistaken
> beliefs about the nature of the sun. For instance, he doesn't think
> that the sun is a round thing that you see in the sky that gives off
> light and heat; he happens to believe it is a certain kind of plant
> tha the has in his living room. There's something wrong with this
> story;

I don't see anything wrong with this story. I see something wrong with
Hank, but that's something different (different referent, different
sense).

> you'd probably want to say, "That doesn't sound like beliefs
> about *the sun*; that sounds like beliefs about the plant in his
> living room." The point: in order for one to have beliefs about x
> at all, one has to get some basic things about x right. You can't
> completely divorce my beliefs about 'the nature of x' from my
> representation of x in the first place.

They *are* beliefs about the plant in his living room. But *he*
believes they are beliefs about the sun. I can represent that; you
(apparently) can't.

> A concept of x
> automatically has information about the nature of x built into it.

Each concept-token may have stuff built into it, but the token I have
for the concept-type need not. I can have my own private sun-concept-
token, which stands for that bright yellow ball in the sky, and a
separate Hank's-sun-concept-token-token, which stands for Hank's sun
concept token (which, in turn, stands for the plant in Hank's living
room). I can represent that what the my sun-concept-token and Hank's
Hank's-sun-concept-token have in common is a "meaning of the word
'sun'" property. What they don't have in common is being sun-concept-
types; mine is, Hank's isn't.

> So to sum up, there's 2 things I'm not getting about your objection.
>
> First, about the thing that you say represents the realist's & the
> anti-realist's beliefs: I don't see why holding that propositions
> are the objects of beliefs prevents one from accepting that thing as
> a correct representation.

OK, I'm not getting what you're not getting. Holding that propositions
are the (only possible) objects of belief is contradicted by the
existence of crazy people. Using propositions as the objects of belief
also causes trouble if the proposition the (anti-)realist uses implies
that their opponent has beliefs that they do not, in fact, have.

> Second, I don't get why it would not be legitimate to substitute,
> into that representation, the correct analysis of "wrong" for
> "wrong".

Depends on what counts as "correct". If everyone agrees, then no
errors of attribution will arise from substituting an analysis (even
possibly an incorrect one). If not causing errors is the sine qua
non of being correct, then it would be legitimate to substitute; but
then there would also be no disagreement about the substitution.

[mark_anth...@my-deja.com]

mark_anth...@my-deja.com:

>> So here's the nub: if the meaning of "Oedipus' mother" is a who,
>> then Oedipus is not ignorant of its meaning at all.

db...@tampatrib.com:

> The place in the story being discussed is the place before Oedipus
> finds out that Jocaste is his mother. We're not talking about the
> conclusion of the story, where Oedipus knows that Jocaste is his
> mother. We, including Owl in his essay, are talking about the story
> before that point.

I got that. You said that Oedipus was "not totally ignorant of the
meaning" because he knew that she was a woman. But you also say that
the meaning is Jocaste. If knowing something *about the referent*
counts as knowing something about the meaning, then Oedipus knows a
LOT about the meaning (who is, remember, Jocaste, his wife---he knows
a LOT about her).

Oedipus is totally ignorant of who "Oedipus' mother" refers to; by
insisting that meaning is reference, you must insist that he is also
totally ignorant of its meaning; or you must insist that everything
he knows about Jocaste he knows about his mother (which, in one sense,
he does). The only other alternative is to admit that meaning is not
just reference, but something like "a mode of referring". Oedipus
refers to Jocaste two ways; one knowingly (when he calls her his wife)
and one unknowingly (when he calls her his mother).

>> The meaning must be a
>> "referring" (a what) rather than a "referent" (a who). And if the
>> meaning is a referring, then there must be some way that that
>> referring is encoded---something akin to ostension, perhaps, in the
>> case of a known referent, but by some other means for unknown
>> referents. Why not by its sense?---the information we get out of
>> the phrase in ignorance of its referent.

> You make it sound like the "sense" and the "reference" are one and
> the same, or that one is part of the other, or that one does the job
> of the other. But that's not what "Owl" and those like him are
> saying. They are saying that the "sense" and the "reference" are a
> dichotomy.

I am saying that sense and reference are inter-twined; as Owl will if
you ask him. The sense of a word or phrase is the information it
carries about its referent. If Oedipus did not know the sense of
"Oedipus' mother", it would not have provoked him so when he learned
that his wife was his mother.

Think about it. When I say "This is Diane, my wife", I'm not just
giving you two ways to refer to the woman I'm married to; I'm telling
you two things about a person---her name and the fact that she is
married to me. If "my wife" had no meaning other than its referent,
then you would not be getting information about a person when I
introduced you; you'd be getting information about the phrase.

[Robert J. Kolker]

mark_anth...@my-deja.com wrote:

>
> Think about it. When I say "This is Diane, my wife", I'm not just
> giving you two ways to refer to the woman I'm married to; I'm telling
> you two things about a person---her name and the fact that she is
> married to me. If "my wife" had no meaning other than its referent,
> then you would not be getting information about a person when I
> introduced you; you'd be getting information about the phrase.
>

If you refer to your wife, you are referring to the only woman who
is your spouse (assuming monogamy and heterosexual marriage).
Alas this description while it applies to at most one person, does
not tell us who that person is. Thus, if you do not tell me more
such as name, rank and serial number, I could not identify your
wife in a multitude of women. But I understand the meaning
of the phrase "your (my) wife" very well. This is the distinction
between meaning and reference I have been trying to express in
other postings on this matter.

Bob Kolker

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128c4201ed...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > It's as if you think, like this cowardly "Owl," that "Oedipus' mother" is
> > some sort of "office" that can be held by different people, and that the
> > "sense" is the "office" while the "reference" is the person.
>
> Almost. But no one is saying that it can be different people at
> different times or several persons at once.

On the contrary, you are saying that, metaphysically, things "could be" or
"could have been" different from what they are. Actually, though, things
cannot be other than what they are. This has to do with what "are" means.

> > But they mean Jocaste whether you know
> > it.
>
> You are simply substituting "mean" for "refer to".

I'm not substituting anything.

> > Actually, it wasn't precisely equations we were talking about, but rather
> > unsolved problems.
>
> Right. We can make sense of x**7+x**5+x**3+x+1=0 without knowing what
> values x actually has.

You keep avoiding the important part. Are you going to "come out" and say
that 2 + 2 doesn't mean 4?

> > On the contrary, it is you who is saying that the meaning of "Evening Star"
> > is somehow only its appearance.
>
> I didn't say "only its appearance". The blind person knows that it is a
> very bright object, hence worthy of a special name, that appears in the
> evening sky relatively close to the Sun.

But a person blind from birth has never seen brightness. Are you saying that
"Evening Star" has the same meaning for a blind person as a sighted person? I
say it does, because Venus is meant. Now, either you're saying that "Evening
Star" has the same meaning for a blind person as a sighted person or you
aren't. Which is it?

> > What do you mean, there "could be" two such planets? No there couldn't,
> > because the one planet that's there already causes both sightings. Are you
> > saying that your fantasy about how there "could be" two planets impacts the
> > fact that there's one?
>
> Spare me.

Then answer the question.

> I've read Peikoff's "The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy". I am
> saying that it had to be discovered that "Evening Star" and "Morning
> Star" refer to the same planet.

You have it backward. You say that it "could be" that the Evening Star and
the Morning Star are two planets when it cannot be, since they are one. You
say that it "had to" be discovered that "Evening Star" and "Morning Star"
refer to the same planet, when actually a person could discover *first* that
those are names for Venus and *second* that they appear in the sky in a
certain way. Modern people do that all the time. You have arrived at the
opposite conclusion from the truth on both counts.

This is the result of your entirely confused notion that words somehow don't
mean to what they refer. It is metaphysically given that the Evening Star and
the Morning Star are the same planet, and those words do not mean "not the
way things are metaphysically." There is nothing about those words that does
not mean Venus.

> I take it that you do not think that people before
> this discovery knew the meaning of "Evening Star", even though they used
> the term, since if they had known the /meaning/ (on your view) they would
> also have to have known it was the same object as the Morning Star.

They didn't know that those words had to mean Venus, that's for sure. They
knew something about what they meant.

> > And which planet is that?
>
> Next time you are in New Jersey, let me know. I'll arrange to meet you
> and point out which one it is.

Quit evading the issue -- are there nine planets, or does the Evening Star
make 10? You know the names of the planets -- which planet is what you
euphemistically called the "Evening Planet"?

> > > > How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying "no"?
> > >
> > > Because I know that "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same person.
> >
> > And how do you know this?
>
> Because I occupy a position outside of the story. I have been told that
> they refer to the same person; Oedipus was not.

But the two sentences:

1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.

2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.

Are entirely different. So what if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the
same person? How do you get from "Jocaste" and "his mother" referring to the
same person to the conclusion that these two sentences don't contradict?
What's the intermediate step?

-- at no extra charge

[Owl]

Robert J. Kolker <bobk...@usa.net> wrote in message
news:38232D60...@usa.net...

Both of these posts were spot on.
I thought I'd add another repetitive remark: I think my analogy to the
distinction between the President of the United States (the person) and
(the office of) President of the United States is a good way to explain
sense/reference. The President is the person who fills that office, but
the office isn't the same as the person.

Something similar exists for all other referring expressions -- there's an
'office' that a thing has to fill in order to be the referent of the
expression, and one shouldn't confuse the thing with the office it fills.
Furthermore, it might turn out that a thing fills more than one office
(e.g., it could happen that the Ambassador to Cambodia simultaneously
fills the office of Senator from South Dakota). One still shouldn't
confuse those two offices with each other.

That's what's going on in the Oedipus case. One person fills the
"Jocaste" office, and also fills the "O's mother" office.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vv5jv$bf$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
mark_anth...@my-deja.com wrote:

> Oedipus is totally ignorant of who "Oedipus' mother" refers to;

We just got done saying, no, he isn't, he knows it refers to a woman. This
would mean that he knows it doesn't refer to Zeus, or to his father, or to
himself; he isn't totally ignorant of to whom it refers. He's somewhat
ignorant of whom. Why, he even knows it doesn't refer to any woman younger
than him. So, he is only somewhat ignorant of to whom it refers.

> ... by

> insisting that meaning is reference, you must insist that he is also
> totally ignorant of its meaning;

Not at all, as above.

> ... or you must insist that everything

> he knows about Jocaste he knows about his mother (which, in one sense,
> he does).

Everything he knows about the words, or everything he knows about the woman?
You equivocate.

> Oedipus
> refers to Jocaste two ways;

You equivocate here as well. Oedipus could refer to Jocaste as "honey," and
this doesn't make Jocaste honey. It might make her "Honey," but not honey.
"He refers to her as this" and "This word refers to that" are two different
uses of "refers." There's a third use: I could refer you to a doctor. You're
mixing up the uses of the word "refers" carelessly.

Maybe that's the problem. You think that "Oedipus' mother" doesn't mean
Jocaste because you're talking about how Oedipus "refers" to things. But
that's not the issue. The issue is, what -- who, actually -- does "Oedipus'
mother" mean in our language, the language you and I are using right now.

> ... one knowingly (when he calls her his wife)

> and one unknowingly (when he calls her his mother).

> I am saying that sense and reference are inter-twined; as Owl will if

> you ask him. The sense of a word or phrase is the information it
> carries about its referent.

No, you say that the "sense" of a word or phrase is the information INTENDED
to be carried. Not the information carried. Clearly, when the story talks
about Oedipus' mother, the information carried is that this is Jocaste. Your
"sense" is that information in the mind of the speaker at the time, and
you're saying that "Oedipus' mother" doesn't mean Jocaste because Jocaste
wasn't what Oedipus was thinking when he says "my mother." But words don't
mean only that information in the mind of the speaker at the time. People
discuss concepts. You would have us believe that people only discuss
thoughts.

That's why you, "Owl" and whomever else are totally wrong about what words
mean. If words only meant what you were thinking, by "submarine" you wouldn't
mean its components.

> Think about it. When I say "This is Diane, my wife", I'm not just
> giving you two ways to refer to the woman I'm married to;

I know what you mean here, but as you've seen me say by now, the way you
refer to someone and to what words refer are two different uses of "refer."

> ... I'm telling

> you two things about a person---her name and the fact that she is
> married to me.

But the fact that you intend to tell me two different things doesn't cause
"Diane" and "my wife" to not be interchangable. If they weren't
interchangable, why did you punctuate that sentence as though "my wife" were
an appositive?

In that sentence, you act as though I don't know "my wife" means "Diane."
(That's perfectly reasonable, of course.) But that's not the same as saying
it doesn't. You're merely acting as though I don't know it does. If you
really wanted to act as though "my wife" didn't mean "Diane," you might have
said, "This is Diane. This is also my wife." But you wouldn't say that
because "Diane" and "my wife" are interchangable for you.

> If "my wife" had no meaning other than its referent,
> then you would not be getting information about a person when I
> introduced you; you'd be getting information about the phrase.

It's stunning how silly the defenses of the sense/reference dichotomy always
become. How does your assumption about my knowledge of what "my wife" means
-- when you say it -- change what it means?

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <7vvata$4d5$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...

> In article <MPG.128c4201ed...@mail.nji.com>,
> "Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:
>
> > > It's as if you think, like this cowardly "Owl," that "Oedipus' mother" is
> > > some sort of "office" that can be held by different people, and that the
> > > "sense" is the "office" while the "reference" is the person.
> >
> > Almost. But no one is saying that it can be different people at
> > different times or several persons at once.
>
> On the contrary, you are saying that, metaphysically, things "could be" or
> "could have been" different from what they are.

That is not the point I am making, and, you will note, my sentence above
does not use "could be" or "could have been". However, as a separate
point, unrelated to how we think about meaning, I /do/ believe that a
variety of things could have been different from what they are.

> Actually, though, things
> cannot be other than what they are. This has to do with what "are" means.

It is quite true that things can not be other than they are. This says
nothing whatever about whether they /could/ not have been different from
what they are. You need more than the law of identify to prove a strong
determinism. And, of course, as a "student of Objectivism" you wouldn't
want to apply determinism to things that are the outcome of human action,
anyway.

> > > But they mean Jocaste whether you know
> > > it.
> >
> > You are simply substituting "mean" for "refer to".
>
> I'm not substituting anything.

Then tell me what, beyond reference, are you claiming is a part of
meaning?

> > > Actually, it wasn't precisely equations we were talking about, but rather
> > > unsolved problems.
> >
> > Right. We can make sense of x**7+x**5+x**3+x+1=0 without knowing what
> > values x actually has.
>
> You keep avoiding the important part. Are you going to "come out" and say
> that 2 + 2 doesn't mean 4?

It refers to 4; the sense of "2 + 2" is to take 2 and add 2 to it. We
happen to know that that yields 4. The sense of "x**7+x**5+x**3+x+1" is
to perform a series of operations on some unknown number, and we don't
know what that refers to until the unknown is given.

> > > On the contrary, it is you who is saying that the meaning of "Evening
> > > Star"
> > > is somehow only its appearance.
> >
> > I didn't say "only its appearance". The blind person knows that it is a
> > very bright object, hence worthy of a special name, that appears in the
> > evening sky relatively close to the Sun.
>
> But a person blind from birth has never seen brightness. Are you saying that
> "Evening Star" has the same meaning for a blind person as a sighted person?

Yes. It is probably harder for a blind person to know the meaning of
"Evening Star" than for a sighted person, since more has to be explained.

> I
> say it does, because Venus is meant.

And I say that Venus is the object being referred to.

...

> > I've read Peikoff's "The Analytic/Synthetic Dichotomy". I am
> > saying that it had to be discovered that "Evening Star" and "Morning
> > Star" refer to the same planet.
>
> You have it backward. You say that it "could be" that the Evening Star and
> the Morning Star are two planets when it cannot be, since they are one.

Look at what I wrote. It had to be discovered that "Evening Star" and
"Morning Star" referred to the same planet. I am not saying that there
are two planets. But simply seeing the Evening Star and later seeing the
Morning Star does not, by itself, /establish/ that there is only one
object being referred to. Today (and for a long time), of course, we
know that there is only one object, and that there has been only one such
object, all along. But no one is justified in asserting this (even
though it is and always has been true) simply because they knew what was
/meant/ by Morning Star and Evening Star. Unless, of course, you want to
claim, that /no/ /one/ knew what these terms "really" meant until after
it was discovered that they referred to the same planet. That seems to
be what your view comes to, even though persons could have been talking
about the Morning and Evening Stars intelligently for years before the
discovery was made.

...

> It is metaphysically given that the Evening Star and
> the Morning Star are the same planet, and those words do not mean "not the
> way things are metaphysically." There is nothing about those words that does
> not mean Venus.

There is nothing about them that does not refer to Venus. However,
nothing in the sense of "Evening Star" means "Venus".

> > I take it that you do not think that people before
> > this discovery knew the meaning of "Evening Star", even though they used
> > the term, since if they had known the /meaning/ (on your view) they would
> > also have to have known it was the same object as the Morning Star.
>
> They didn't know that those words had to mean Venus, that's for sure. They
> knew something about what they meant.

Up to now, everything you have said is consistent with the idea that
knowing the meaning is just knowing what is referred to. Here you are
saying that they can know "something" of the meaning without knowing they
are referring to the same thing. I call that something the "sense" of
the term, and what they did not know the "reference". All I am doing is
making precise what is for your view a "something".

...

> Quit evading the issue -- are there nine planets, or does the Evening Star
> make 10? You know the names of the planets -- which planet is what you
> euphemistically called the "Evening Planet"?

What issue? Of course the planet that "Evening Star" /refers/ to is
Venus.

> > > > > How is it that they do not contradict? On what do you base saying
> > > > > "no"?
> > > >
> > > > Because I know that "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same pe
> > > > rson.
> > >
> > > And how do you know this?
> >
> > Because I occupy a position outside of the story. I have been told that
> > they refer to the same person; Oedipus was not.
>
> But the two sentences:
>
> 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
>
> 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
>
> Are entirely different. So what if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the
> same person? How do you get from "Jocaste" and "his mother" referring to the
> same person to the conclusion that these two sentences don't contradict?
> What's the intermediate step?

I told you: because /I/ know to whom the terms refer. (1) says that
Oedipus married only one person; (2) says that Oedipus married only one
person. Thus (1) and (2) are consistent if it was the /same/ person. I,
unlike Oedipus at the time of the marriage, know that it /was/ the same
person, since I know that Jocaste and Oedipus's mother refer to the same
person. If I did not know this, I would not be able to tell if (1) and
(2) are consistent.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Jim Klein]

In article <7vtesd$pp4$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
db...@tampatrib.com wrote:

>In article <7vr37r$dqd$1...@nntp2.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Jim Klein <rum...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:

[to Owl...]

>>One of the byproducts of your approach is that it suddenly becomes
>>meaningful to say things like "Freedom is Slavery." After all, the
>>_sense_ of "freedom" among most people includes numerous actions which
>>amount to slavery. According to you, the "meaning" of freedom is such
>>that it includes some amount of slavery.
>
>That is totally devastating.

Could you clarify this comment, please?

jk

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <7vvjft$ik$1...@nntp3.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:

> Both of these posts were spot on.

It's a good thing for you, then, given that opinion of yours, that those two
other people aren't too cowardly to respond.

Too bad that by the time you read this, their remarks will have been refuted.

> I thought I'd add another repetitive remark: I think my analogy to the
> distinction between the President of the United States (the person) and
> (the office of) President of the United States is a good way to explain
> sense/reference. The President is the person who fills that office, but
> the office isn't the same as the person.

But the president of the United States is a person, not an object, and Bill
Clinton is the same person (insert joke here). Calling the president of the
United States an office doesn't make him one.

Now, the presidency, that's an office and a thing. The presidency, indeed,
does not precisely mean the person.

Lucky for me this argument's so devastating that you have nothing to say.
Just nod your head.

[Christopher Roberson]

db...@tampatrib.com wrote:

> But the president of the United States is a person, not an object, and Bill
> Clinton is the same person (insert joke here). Calling the president of the
> United States an office doesn't make him one.

> Now, the presidency, that's an office and a thing. The presidency, indeed,
> does not precisely mean the person.

But the phrase "the President of the United States" refers to different
people at different times, though never more than one person at once.

> Lucky for me this argument's so devastating that you have nothing to say.
> Just nod your head.

God, you're stupid.

--
Christopher Roberson

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128d2d7af4...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > On the contrary, you are saying that, metaphysically, things "could be" or
> > "could have been" different from what they are.
>
> That is not the point I am making, and, you will note, my sentence above
> does not use "could be" or "could have been".

You did say "could be" before, though. You said the Evening Star and the
Morning Star "could be" two planets. No, they could not. That part of your
argument has fallen by the wayside, trampled on by some sort of large mammal
and squished into a pulp.

> > > You are simply substituting "mean" for "refer to".
> >
> > I'm not substituting anything.
>
> Then tell me what, beyond reference, are you claiming is a part of
> meaning?

I'm not substituting anything. I am explaining how you are in denial about
who "Oedipus' mother" means. You are disagreeing. There's no "substituting"
going on.

> > You keep avoiding the important part. Are you going to "come out" and say
> > that 2 + 2 doesn't mean 4?
>
> It refers to 4;

Are you going to say it doesn't mean 4 or aren't you? Yes or no, does 2 + 2
not mean 4?

> -- the sense of "2 + 2" is to take 2 and add 2 to it. We

> happen to know that that yields 4.

> > But a person blind from birth has never seen brightness. Are you saying

> > that
> > "Evening Star" has the same meaning for a blind person as a sighted person?
>
> Yes. It is probably harder for a blind person to know the meaning of
> "Evening Star" than for a sighted person, since more has to be explained.

And how is it that "Evening Star" can have the same meaning for a blind
person as for a sighted person if "Evening Star" only means what the sighted
person intends, and what he intends is what he sees?

Or are you changing your tune now and saying that "Evening Star" means its
definition?

> Look at what I wrote. It had to be discovered that "Evening Star" and
> "Morning Star" referred to the same planet.

No, you look at what I wrote. You erased it -- here it is again.

"You
say that it 'had to' be discovered that 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star'

refer to the same planet, when actually a person could discover *first* that
those are names for Venus and *second* that they appear in the sky in a
certain way. Modern people do that all the time."

> Today (and for a long time), of course, we

> know that there is only one object, and that there has been only one such
> object, all along. But no one is justified in asserting this (even
> though it is and always has been true) simply because they knew what was
> /meant/ by Morning Star and Evening Star.

If someone knew that "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" meant Venus, he'd be
perfectly justified in saying that Venus is one planet. You're simply
conflating the invention of the terms with the meaning of the terms. The
terms mean what they mean, regardless of how they were invented.

> There is nothing about them that does not refer to Venus. However,
> nothing in the sense of "Evening Star" means "Venus".

Does "Evening Star" not mean Venus, yes or no?

> Here you are
> saying that they can know "something" of the meaning without knowing they
> are referring to the same thing. I call that something the "sense" of
> the term, and what they did not know the "reference". All I am doing is
> making precise what is for your view a "something".

But this right here that you're saying would be a concession that the full
meaning of a word is that to which it refers. You'd be saying that the
"sense" is what is known but that the "reference" is what is meant. This
doesn't match what you say elsewhere.

> Of course the planet that "Evening Star" /refers/ to is
> Venus.

"Evening Planet" was your phrase. It means which planet again?

> > But the two sentences:
> >
> > 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
> >
> > 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
> >
> > Are entirely different. So what if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the
> > same person? How do you get from "Jocaste" and "his mother" referring t
> > o the
> > same person to the conclusion that these two sentences don't contradict?
> > What's the intermediate step?
>
> I told you: because /I/ know to whom the terms refer. (1) says that
> Oedipus married only one person; (2) says that Oedipus married only one
> person.
> Thus (1) and (2) are consistent if it was the /same/ person.

You still don't want to enumerate the intermediate step. How is it that the
two sentences are consistent if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same
person? What's the connection between *words* referring to the same person
and *sentences* not contradicting?

[Bert Clanton]

The Morning Star is the planet Venus. So the term "Morning Star" *refers
to* the planet Venus. The *sense* of the term "Morning Star" is something
like "a very bright planet that appears in the morning sky".

The Evening Star is the planet Venus. So the term "Evening Star" *refers
to* the planet Venus. The *sense* of the term "Evening Star" is something
like "a very bright planet that appears in the evening sky".

So the term "Morning Star" and the term "Evening Star" *refer to* the same
object, namely the planet Venus.

But the *sense* "a very bright planet that appears in the morning sky" and
the *sense* "a very bright planet that appears in the evening sky" are
obviously not the same *sense*.

So the reference of a term and the sense of a term are two distinct
things. If our terminology doesn't reflect this distinction, we easily get
all confused. Now the terminology used by Orthodox Objectivists denies
this distinction, as a matter of principle. Hence Orthodox Objectivists
easily get all confused.

Orthodox Objectivists insist on using the word "meaning" to refer only to
the *reference* of a term. Others of us use the term "meaning" to refer
only to the *sense* of the term. Most people's usage of the term "meaning"
is pretty sloppy: they use the term "meaning" to refer sometimes to the
reference of the term and sometimes to the sense of the term, thus causing
no end of confusion: e.g., the content of this thread.

I think it would be way cool if we all just completely discarded the term
"meaning" as a technical term in semiotics, and always used either the
term "reference" or the term "sense" instead.

Best wishes,
Bert

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <800a0d$q95$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> You did say "could be" before, though. You said the Evening Star and the
> Morning Star "could be" two planets. No, they could not. That part of your
> argument has fallen by the wayside, trampled on by some sort of large mammal
> and squished into a pulp.

I am beginning to wonder if Christopher Roberson's evaluation isn't
correct. I tried to deal with this misunderstanding before; I'll try
again. I said that there /is/ only one planet. I also said that merely
having seen the Morning Star and the Evening Star does not /justify/ one
to say, that is, to /know/, that there is only one planet involved.
That, as I said, had to be discovered. So, /as far as was known/ (until
the discovery), there could have been two planets. I am not making a
claim about how many planets there are, but about what was known.

> > > > You are simply substituting "mean" for "refer to".
> > >
> > > I'm not substituting anything.
> >
> > Then tell me what, beyond reference, are you claiming is a part of
> > meaning?
>
> I'm not substituting anything. I am explaining how you are in denial about
> who "Oedipus' mother" means. You are disagreeing. There's no "substituting"
> going on.

OK, fine. Now, then, please, "tell me what, beyond reference, are you
claiming is a part of meaning"? (Note I left "substituting" out of it.)

> Are you going to say it doesn't mean 4 or aren't you? Yes or no, does 2 + 2
> not mean 4?

OK. No, it does not "mean" 4. It refers to 4; the sense of "2 + 2" is
to take 2 and add 2 to it; that operation /yields/ 4; it /equals/ 4; but
it does not "mean" 4, since I take the sense to be the meaning. I do
this fully recognizing that people often use "mean" and, probably more
often, use "meant", to say what a thing /refers/ to, rather than its
sense; at other times they use "mean" as "sense". So, for clarity, I
prefer to use both "sense" and "refers" rather than simply say "mean".

...

> And how is it that "Evening Star" can have the same meaning for a blind
> person as for a sighted person if "Evening Star" only means what the sighted
> person intends, and what he intends is what he sees?
>
> Or are you changing your tune now and saying that "Evening Star" means its
> definition?

I don't think you've been listening long enough to know what the tune is;
so far I haven't said anything about intentions or definitions. I said
that the meaning of Evening Star was "bright object that appears in the
evening sky near the Sun". Perhaps the sighted person "intends" that
when he says "Evening Star" and perhaps he does not.

...

> "You
> say that it 'had to' be discovered that 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star'
> refer to the same planet, when actually a person could discover *first* that
> those are names for Venus and *second* that they appear in the sky in a
> certain way. Modern people do that all the time."

And only modern people can do it, because we already know that these are
really just different names for Venus. You are projecting our current
state of knowledge into the past. Your case doesn't change the situation
before the discovery, so I didn't bother with it.

> > Today (and for a long time), of course, we
> > know that there is only one object, and that there has been only one such
> > object, all along. But no one is justified in asserting this (even
> > though it is and always has been true) simply because they knew what was
> > /meant/ by Morning Star and Evening Star.
>
> If someone knew that "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" meant Venus, he'd be
> perfectly justified in saying that Venus is one planet.

No argument about that; my point is that one could know the sense (or
"meaning") of "Morning Star" without knowing it referred to Venus.

> You're simply
> conflating the invention of the terms with the meaning of the terms. The
> terms mean what they mean, regardless of how they were invented.

And you continue to use "mean" where I would say "refer". Let's try
again. Before the discovery, before the time that anyone knew that
"Morning Star" and "Evening Star" referred to the same planet, did anyone
know the meaning of "Morning Star" and "Evening Star"? Or did knowing
the meaning have to wait until it was discovered that they were both
names for the same planet?

> > There is nothing about them that does not refer to Venus. However,
> > nothing in the sense of "Evening Star" means "Venus".
>
> Does "Evening Star" not mean Venus, yes or no?

No. It refers to Venus.

> > Here you are
> > saying that they can know "something" of the meaning without knowing they
> > are referring to the same thing. I call that something the "sense" of
> > the term, and what they did not know the "reference". All I am doing is
> > making precise what is for your view a "something".
>
> But this right here that you're saying would be a concession that the full
> meaning of a word is that to which it refers.

No, I am saying that there are two things, meaning (or sense) and
reference. Since you only use the one term "meaning", you have to pack
reference into it. What is a "full" meaning? How do we know when we
have a "full" one, rather than, say, 7/16ths of one?

> You'd be saying that the
> "sense" is what is known but that the "reference" is what is meant. This
> doesn't match what you say elsewhere.

It matches what I say, because I have a different sense of "meaning" than
you do. Your sense of "meaning" includes reference, apparently. What
else it includes I have been trying to find out, but without much success
so far.

> > Of course the planet that "Evening Star" /refers/ to is
> > Venus.
>
> "Evening Planet" was your phrase. It means which planet again?

It refers to Venus; it means "bright object that appears in the evening
sky near the Sun".

> > > But the two sentences:
> > >
> > > 1) Oedipus married Jocaste and no one else.
> > >
> > > 2) Oedipus married his mother and no one else.
> > >
> > > Are entirely different. So what if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer t
> > > o the
> > > same person? How do you get from "Jocaste" and "his mother" referring t
> > > o the
> > > same person to the conclusion that these two sentences don't contradict?
> > > What's the intermediate step?
> >
> > I told you: because /I/ know to whom the terms refer. (1) says that
> > Oedipus married only one person; (2) says that Oedipus married only one
> > person.
> > Thus (1) and (2) are consistent if it was the /same/ person.
>
> You still don't want to enumerate the intermediate step.

No, I simply have no idea (yet) of what you are talking about.

> How is it that the
> two sentences are consistent if "Jocaste" and "his mother" refer to the same
> person?

Because they are both true at the same time under that condition. That's
consistency.

> What's the connection between *words* referring to the same person
> and *sentences* not contradicting?

The two *sentences* use *words* such that if the condition is met, they
are both true and hence do not contradict.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <8003it$q5v$1...@eve.enteract.com>,
Christopher Roberson <robch...@my-deja.com> wrote:

> > But the president of the United States is a person, not an object, and Bill
> > Clinton is the same person (insert joke here). Calling the president of the
> > United States an office doesn't make him one.

> But the phrase "the President of the United States" refers to different

> people at different times, though never more than one person at once.

That's true, but it's interesting to note that it in no way remotely begins
to refute or even disagree with the above.

> God, you're stupid.

The part of "Owl's courage" will be played by Christopher Roberson.

A talent search for the part of "Christopher Roberson's effectiveness" begins
shortly.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128e0e6fc5...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> OK, fine. Now, then, please, "tell me what, beyond reference, are you
> claiming is a part of meaning"? (Note I left "substituting" out of it.)

The meaning of a word is that to which it refers. That's what "language" is,
the representation of things, including ideas, by concretes such as symbols
or words. I suppose that means the answer to your question is "nothing."

You would have people believe that the meaning of a symbol isn't what it
stands for, even though that's what symbols do, stand for things. Hmm. I
wonder if the fallacy of the sense/reference dichotomy (I know, you don't
think it's a fallacy, that's understood) is more easily overcome by someone
who writes in a language like Chinese or Japanese, where some symbols stand
for entire words?

If a character stands for justice, how does it not mean justice? That's what
"standing for" is.

> > Are you going to say it doesn't mean 4 or aren't you? Yes or no, does 2 + 2
> > not mean 4?
>
> OK. No, it does not "mean" 4.

Well, I consider that absurd, and that is where we disagree. Anyone trying to
use 2 + 2 in any of several contexts would have to understand that it means
4. That seems obvious to me; apparently it seems false to you.

> I don't think you've been listening long enough to know what the tune is;
> so far I haven't said anything about intentions or definitions. I said
> that the meaning of Evening Star was "bright object that appears in the
> evening sky near the Sun".

Hang on a second -- isn't that the meaning, by your standard, precisely
because that's what you intend? You're saying that that's the meaning because
that's how *you* know to find the thing, right? So, this meaning is what you
intend, no?

> > "You
> > say that it 'had to' be discovered that 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star'
> > refer to the same planet, when actually a person could discover *first*
> > that
> > those are names for Venus and *second* that they appear in the sky in a
> > certain way. Modern people do that all the time."
>
> And only modern people can do it, because we already know that these are
> really just different names for Venus.

So, continue that realization. If a person who knows nothing of astronomy
learns the nine planets, and *then* is told, "Venus is sometimes called the
'Evening Star' and sometimes called the 'Morning Star' because it was seen in
these ways," clearly this person *first* knows that these are words for Venus
and *second* knows your definition. This is inescapable. Given that, what
does "Evening Star" now "mean to that person"?

Isn't it becoming clear that you're saying meaning is subjective?

> What is a "full" meaning? How do we know when we
> have a "full" one, rather than, say, 7/16ths of one?

How do we know we know enough about something? Exact same question.

> > What's the connection between *words* referring to the same person
> > and *sentences* not contradicting?
>
> The two *sentences* use *words* such that if the condition is met, they
> are both true and hence do not contradict.

The connection is this: Sentences cannot contradict when they both have the
same meaning, and these two sentences have the same meaning because their
words refer to all the exact same things in the exact same way, and the words
are used in identical relationships to one another.

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <bert-06119...@d37.pm.sonic.net>,
Bert Clanton <be...@sonic.net> wrote:

> I think it would be way cool if we all just completely discarded the term
> "meaning" as a technical term in semiotics, and always used either the
> term "reference" or the term "sense" instead.

But of course you do, because you're here trying to advance the idea that
meaning can be split in two.

However, take a look at your own writing: " What I mean by an 'egocentric'
goal is a goal related only to Y's own personal 'flourishing,' e.g., making a
lot of money, listening to a beautiful musical composition, earning a PhD,
... You get the drift."

So, clearly, when you say, "Others of us use the term 'meaning' to refer only
to the *sense* of the term," you are full of _merde_, because you in fact use
"meaning" to indicate to what you are referring.

"e.g.," Bert, it's a sense/reference dichotomy killer. You should stay away
from it.

[Dawgdit...@webtv.net]

Trying to clarify my thoughts on Sense and
Referents:

(1) The sense of the word life includes all living
beings real or imaginary, alive, dead, or extinct.

(2) Among the referents of life are plants and
animals.

(3) Both plant and animal have senses that are
included within the sense of life, but are mutually
exclusive of each other. No plant is an animal and no
animal is a plant.

(4) Among the referents of animal are echinoderm
and mammal.

(5) The sense of mammal is included within the
sense of animal, but excludes echinoderm.

(6) Among the referents of mammal are ape and
man.

(7) The sense of man is included within mammal
and excludes ape.

(8) Among the referents of man are John Timbrell
and Robert Kolker.

(9) The sense of John Timbrell is included within
man and excludes Robert Kolker.

And this is where I have trouble comprehending. I
can define a mammal (I ask biologists to forgive
me): A mammal is a warm - blooded animal with fur
and mammary glands. Any animal meeting this
definition that exists, has existed, or might exist; is,
was, or might be a mammal. In this case, the sense
of John Timbrell derives reflexively from man,
primate, mammal, vertebrate, and etc. but this in no
way differentiates him from Robert Kolker. There is
no individual sense of John Timbrell that is
systematic, definitional. Owl wrote:

>The sense of "Jocaste" is an idea, not a woman. (Of
>course, it's an idea of a woman.)

This is the reflexive meaning that I was speaking of:
It is derived from the broader context of "woman," of
which Jocaste is one particular referent.

In every case from life to man, each referent is a
definitional subset of a larger definitional group.
John Timbrell and Robert Kolker are unique. Other
than being a man and possessing human DNA,
what is it that defines John Timbrell and makes it
possible for him to have referents? My individual
DNA, organs, bum knee, life experiences, and etc.
are me. They are not referents of me in the same
way that I am a referent of "man." Had I never been
born, man would still exist. Had my organs never
formed, there would be no John Timbrell. Had I
been born in Spain, there would be a Juan Timbrell,
but that would not be the me that is. I don't think
that any person has a referent other than those
referents that derive reflexively.

When Owl writes:

>Likewise, the sense of "O's mother" is another idea,
>the idea of a person who gave birth to Oedipus.

That sounds to me like "O,s mother" is "O,s mother." It's true, but I
don't see how it tells me anything.

When Bob Kolker writes:

>Here's something that will maybe help. Think of

>senses as being like offices. The office of President

>of the United States happens to be filled by Bill
>Clinton. If things had gone differently, it might have

>been filled by Bob Dole. So you can distinguish the
>President of the United States (Clinton) from the

>*office* of President of the United States. Similarly,
>you can distinguish the woman who gave birth to
>Oedipus from, so to speak, the office of (woman
>who gave birth to Oedipus).

I can distinguish Clinton from Dole (Bill has more fun), but I don't see
how I can distinguish O's mom from O's mom. The office of the president
can be filled by different men. I don't see how the office of O's mom
can be filled by anyone but O's mom.

TJT

GO DAWGS!!!

TJT

>"That might even be sacriligious --- If God
>didn't want them to be sheared, he
>wouldn't have made them sheep." -- Eli
>Wallach to Yul Brynner in "The Magnificent
>Seven."

TJ

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <80222u$u4n$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> If a character stands for justice, how does it not mean justice? That's what
> "standing for" is.

Because the "character" or word may have pre-existing associations.
...

> > OK. No, it does not "mean" 4.
>
> Well, I consider that absurd, and that is where we disagree. Anyone trying to
> use 2 + 2 in any of several contexts would have to understand that it means
> 4. That seems obvious to me; apparently it seems false to you.

Yes, because I would say that a person using "2 + 2" in any of several
contexts would have to understand that it /refers/ to 4. It is "false to
me" that it /means/ 4, because I do not identify reference with meaning.

> > I don't think you've been listening long enough to know what the tune is;
> > so far I haven't said anything about intentions or definitions. I said
> > that the meaning of Evening Star was "bright object that appears in the
> > evening sky near the Sun".
>
> Hang on a second -- isn't that the meaning, by your standard, precisely
> because that's what you intend? You're saying that that's the meaning because
> that's how *you* know to find the thing, right? So, this meaning is what you
> intend, no?

It is not /precisely/ (or /only/) a matter of what I intend. The phrase
"Evening Star" does not occur in a private language designed to match my
intentions, but in a public language with many speakers. I did not say
(or at any rate, did not mean to say ;-) ) that the meaning is what it is
because of how I find the thing. The meaning of "Evening Star" has to do
with the meaning of "evening" and "star". I could say "Evening Star"
while pointing to a bright object in the evening sky that is, in fact,
the planet Venus. On the assumption that I do not know that it is Venus,
I would know that I was referring to a particular object - the one I was
pointing to - even thought I did not know that it is the same object I
might point to when I say "Morning Star".

Let's try this. Suppose, instead of the term "Evening Star", we had the
term "First Star". This means the first object to appear in the evening
sky. Now, to what does this term refer? Well, when Venus is in the
evening sky, it refers to Venus. But when Venus is not visible, the
first object that will appear in the evening sky is Sirius, in the
constellation of Orion. (I am ignoring the other planets; I don't
remember their apparent magnitudes. Assume the visible ones are below
the horizon.)

Now on my theory, I say that "First Star" /means/ the first object that
appears in the evening sky, and that it can refer to either Venus or
Sirius depending upon the time of year. On your theory, you have to
say that you do not know what "First Star" /means/ until you know what
time of year it is. But an ordinary person, unencumbered by your theory,
will say he knows the meaning of "First Star" whether he knows the
position of Venus or not.

Or consider the science of genetics just before the discovery of DNA. A
scientist did not know that a gene referred to a segment of DNA, yet it
does. Not knowing to what it referred, do you really want to say that
the scientist did not know the meaning of "gene"? That's what comes of
identifying meaning with reference.
...

> So, continue that realization. If a person who knows nothing of astronomy
> learns the nine planets, and *then* is told, "Venus is sometimes called the
> 'Evening Star' and sometimes called the 'Morning Star' because it was seen in
> these ways," clearly this person *first* knows that these are words for Venus
> and *second* knows your definition. This is inescapable. Given that, what
> does "Evening Star" now "mean to that person"?

If such a person did not parse "Evening Star" into its components, it
would have no more meaning than my name, "Gordon", does. But "Gordon" is
used to refer to me, and "Evening Star" can be used by such a person to
refer to Venus.

> Isn't it becoming clear that you're saying meaning is subjective?

Meaning (as opposed to reference) is subjective in the sense that
individual speakers of a language might understand slightly different
things by some terms, especially abstract ones. But there can't be too
much of that, or communication breaks down. So there is an objective
component as well. With regard to most words, most of the time, this
objective component clearly dominates. When it fails, you are likely to
get arguments over, e.g., what "anarcho-captialism" means.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128e0e6fc5...@mail.nji.com>,
"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> No, I am saying that there are two things, meaning (or sense) and
> reference. Since you only use the one term "meaning", you have to pack
> reference into it.

You know, I'm going about this all wrong. I've just had a sudden realization.

Let's take a look at what you say here:

"We can assume that any given person is ignorant of many things; the
question is, what things are relevant? 'Evening Star' simply means

'bright object in the evening sky never more than 45 degrees from the

Sun' - or so the story goes."

OK. Here, you explain that "meaning" means "the sense" of a word or phrase.
The meaning of a phrase, for you, and the sense of the phrase, are the same.

Now, given that that's your stated view, do you mind explaining why, when it
came time to note what "sense" meant, you said that it meant to what it
referred? The "sense" of "Evening Star" refers to a phrase. You just said so.
And the "sense" is the meaning, according to you -- so, the meaning of
"sense" is to what it refers!

Why is that you go around saying that the meaning of a word is merely its
"sense," but then blank out the fact that your explanation of what "sense"
means always notes to what "sense" refers?

I can't believe I didn't see this earlier. Let's call it "The Reference
Trap." There is no way to show that the meaning of words is other than to
what they refer.

The Reference Trap works like this. Let's pretend the meaning of a word is
not to what it refers but rather its "sense." Then, what does "sense" mean?
You cannot say that it means to what it refers -- you must say instead that
the meaning of "sense" is not to what "sense" refers but rather "the sense of
'sense.' "

And what does that mean? Eventually, you will have to say that what is meant
is a thing to which you're referring, or concede you never will say what is
meant. Either you must give up and grant that meaning is to what is referred,
or you must give up the idea of ever referring "sense" to anything.

The short form: What does "sense" mean without saying to what it refers? Good
luck.

File before "Tantility."

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128e6cba5...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> Now on my theory, I say that "First Star" /means/ the first object that
> appears in the evening sky, and that it can refer to either Venus or
> Sirius depending upon the time of year. On your theory, you have to
> say that you do not know what "First Star" /means/ until you know what
> time of year it is.

Again, I would say that you could know something about what it means without
knowing everything about what it means. You could know that it means the
first star to become visible and not know that it means Sirius. I would add,
and I think you knew I would, that it means Sirius on those occasions where
Sirius is the first one.

This thread has forked; the other fork seems way more important to me now.
I'd rather not repeat what I said in the other post unless it becomes
necessary for some reason.

> Not knowing to what it referred, do you really want to say that
> the scientist did not know the meaning of "gene"?

You probably know what I will say now.

> > Isn't it becoming clear that you're saying meaning is subjective?
>
> Meaning (as opposed to reference) is subjective in the sense that
> individual speakers of a language might understand slightly different
> things by some terms, especially abstract ones. But there can't be too
> much of that, or communication breaks down.

If there mustn't be too much subjectivity, how is this different from saying
that there mustn't be too much "taking meaning to be something other than to
what is referred"? They're the same.

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <802c8b$545$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...

> In article <MPG.128e6cba5...@mail.nji.com>,
> "Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:
>
> > Now on my theory, I say that "First Star" /means/ the first object that
> > appears in the evening sky, and that it can refer to either Venus or
> > Sirius depending upon the time of year. On your theory, you have to
> > say that you do not know what "First Star" /means/ until you know what
> > time of year it is.
>
> Again, I would say that you could know something about what it means without
> knowing everything about what it means.

But you have (finally) said that there is nothing to meaning that isn't
reference. Since you don't know what "First Star" refers to, you can
not, using just your theory, know what it means. How can you know
something about what /it/ (a single thing) refers to without knowing what
it refers to?

> You could know that it means the
> first star to become visible and not know that it means Sirius.

Indeed; because it does not /mean/ Sirius - it means the first object
that appears in the sky. It can, of course, refer to Sirius.

> I would add,
> and I think you knew I would, that it means Sirius on those occasions where
> Sirius is the first one.

So the term /means/ two very different things and we might not know
which? You can add what you like, but it isn't "adding up" to a
reasonable theory of meaning.

> This thread has forked; the other fork seems way more important to me now.
> I'd rather not repeat what I said in the other post unless it becomes
> necessary for some reason.

Please! I like the title of this thread. I'll take a look, but I'm not
promising anything.

> > Not knowing to what it referred, do you really want to say that
> > the scientist did not know the meaning of "gene"?
>
> You probably know what I will say now.

Will you say that he knew something of what "gene" referred to? Which
part was than? The left half or the right half? The top or the bottom?
...

> > Meaning (as opposed to reference) is subjective in the sense that
> > individual speakers of a language might understand slightly different
> > things by some terms, especially abstract ones. But there can't be too
> > much of that, or communication breaks down.
>
> If there mustn't be too much subjectivity, how is this different from saying
> that there mustn't be too much "taking meaning to be something other than to
> what is referred"? They're the same.

Because the limited subjectivity that results from slightly different
understandings needn't affect reference at all. And because the
objective component (you cut that part) can remain consistent among
speakers of the language even if none of them know the referent of a
particular term.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <8028n0$2pk$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
> In article <MPG.128e0e6fc5...@mail.nji.com>,

> "Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:
>

> > No, I am saying that there are two things, meaning (or sense) and
> > reference. Since you only use the one term "meaning", you have to pack
> > reference into it.
>
> You know, I'm going about this all wrong.

You know, maybe I have been, too. We'll just have to see.

...

> Now, given that that's your stated view, do you mind explaining why, when it
> came time to note what "sense" meant, you said that it meant to what it
> referred? The "sense" of "Evening Star" refers to a phrase.

No, the sense of "Evening Star" /is/ a phrase: bright object in the
evening sky near the Sun. Or, for those who prefer, the idea expressed
by the phrase.

> You just said so.

Where? If so, then I was wrong.
...

> Why is that you go around saying that the meaning of a word is merely its
> "sense," but then blank out the fact that your explanation of what "sense"
> means always notes to what "sense" refers?

"notes to"? Help me out here.

> I can't believe I didn't see this earlier. Let's call it "The Reference
> Trap." There is no way to show that the meaning of words is other than to
> what they refer.

I have already shown that with my example of "First Star". Unless, of
course, you wish to simply posit that meaning /is/ reference, and live
with the (rather strange) consequences. This usage might confuse others
(or yourself), but I'll make a note of it. I'm pretty broad minded about
what definitions people use.

> The Reference Trap works like this. Let's pretend the meaning of a word is
> not to what it refers but rather its "sense." Then, what does "sense" mean?

I have said that "sense" and "meaning" are synonymous. So it means what
means means. ;-)

> You cannot say that it means to what it refers -- you must say instead that
> the meaning of "sense" is not to what "sense" refers but rather "the sense of
> 'sense.' "

Right. But please don't put the period mark inside the single quotes.
Typographic conventions should not get in the way of the use/mention
distinction. It's much more important than mere appearance; as important
as sense/reference.

> And what does that mean? Eventually, you will have to say that what is meant
> is a thing to which you're referring, or concede you never will say what is
> meant. Either you must give up and grant that meaning is to what is referred,
> or you must give up the idea of ever referring "sense" to anything.
>
> The short form: What does "sense" mean without saying to what it refers? Good
> luck.

The sense of a term is the notion it expresses. I think that Owl dealt
with this in his original post. A sense /is/ an idea. An idea does not
refer to a meaning, it /is/ a meaning.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128e8e9033...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > Again, I would say that you could know something about what it means wi
> > thout
> > knowing everything about what it means.
>
> But you have (finally) said that there is nothing to meaning that isn't

> reference. Since you don't know what "First Star" refers to --

But we do know, because we know it refers to the first celestial object
visible in the night sky, and we know that that would be Venus, unless it's
obscured, in which case it's Sirius, and so on. What do you mean we don't
know what it refers to? You were kind enough to say, even.

> -- you can

> not, using just your theory, know what it means.

I think the above clears that up.

> How can you know
> something about what /it/ (a single thing) refers to without knowing what
> it refers to?

What "it" are you talking about? Are you calling the phrase "First Star" an
"it"? That's fine. As I said, we certainly do know what it refers to, you
even told us in case we didn't.

> > I would add,
> > and I think you knew I would, that it means Sirius on those occasions where
> > Sirius is the first one.
>
> So the term /means/ two very different things and we might not know
> which?

Not exactly. It means a set. A set is one thing, but has different members.

> > This thread has forked; the other fork seems way more important to me now.
> > I'd rather not repeat what I said in the other post unless it becomes
> > necessary for some reason.
>
> Please! I like the title of this thread. I'll take a look, but I'm not
> promising anything.

It's the same thread, why wouldn't you see it? It's just a fork in the thread.

> > > Not knowing to what it referred, do you really want to say that
> > > the scientist did not know the meaning of "gene"?
> >
> > You probably know what I will say now.
>
> Will you say that he knew something of what "gene" referred to? Which
> part was than?

Which part was that? The "behavior of genes" part, of course.

> > If there mustn't be too much subjectivity, how is this different from s
> > aying
> > that there mustn't be too much "taking meaning to be something other th
> > an to
> > what is referred"? They're the same.
>
> Because the limited subjectivity that results from slightly different
> understandings needn't affect reference at all.

So, when you communicate, you avoid subjectivity because reference is what
counts? Is that what you're saying?

> And because the
> objective component (you cut that part) can remain consistent among
> speakers of the language even if none of them know the referent of a
> particular term.

In other words, even if the "sense" of a word is grounded in useless
subjectivity, the objective "component" is what allows communication between
speakers of a language?

What this says is that it's to what words refer that is communicated, i.e.
meant.

[Jim Klein]

In article <MPG.128e8e9033...@mail.nji.com>,
"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

>Because the limited subjectivity that results from slightly different
>understandings needn't affect reference at all.

Obviously...that's why there's communicative language. It rests upon what
you call reference, not sense. Every utterance is idiosyncratic after all.

>And because the objective component (you cut that part) can remain
>consistent among speakers of the language even if none of them know the
>referent of a particular term.

No, this is wrong because it carries "meaning" literally with the word.
Maybe I've misunderstood you; sorry if so.

It _all_ takes place within the minds of individuals; dictionaries for
example are just the summation of common usage. It's the _concepts_ which
represent the referents, not the words; the words just denote the concepts
technically. Hence if I utter something for which I have no corresponding
concept and therefore no corresponding referent, it is misleading to say
that the reference of that utterance is what the reference would be for
other speakers. In that case, the reference is the null set because I
haven't denoted an actual concept.

The real reason the "objective component" remains consistent among speakers
of a language is because the Objectivist epistemology is largely correct.
The referents gave rise to the concepts and the concepts gave rise to the
words. It's because the referents are immutable that the meanings of the
words (concepts that the words denote, strictly) can be consistent across
multiple speakers. If what you call the "sense" was the controlling factor,
then there'd hardly be any communication at all.

Ironically, this is why it's so difficult to discuss anything with certain
self-imagined Objectivists...they have attached so much philosophical excess
to the concepts they form that they've lost sight of the actual referents.
IOW, they are perhaps the best examples of your "sense-reference" dichotomy
even as they yap that it's meaningless. [How droll they are!] A simple
example is their refusal to acknowledge that a child knows that a thing is
present even before he knows a table is there. A more complex example is
their inability to understand a single statement that David Friedman writes,
which has rendered their supposed counter-arguments totally empty.
[Personally I think there are counter-arguments but they don't take the
form, "David's statement is false."]

Yes, there's a difference between what we think there is and what there is;
that's a trivial observation which amounts to, "We aren't omniscient." What
you seem to overlook, at least IMO, is that we think there is what we think
there is _because_ of what there is, not because we think. We think and
conceptualize _pursuant_ to external reality imparting sensations and
perceptions, not prior to it. That's why there's no metaphysical
distinction between universal laws and accidental generalizations...if all
As are B, then all As are B; it is irrelevant what the sizes of the sets
are or how important they are to us. It's also why there's no such thing as
"analytic knowledge;" _all_ knowledge, strictly speaking, arises ultimately
from the conceptual integration of received perceptions.

jk

[db...@tampatrib.com]

In article <MPG.128e9b91dc...@mail.nji.com>,

"Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

> > Now, given that that's your stated view, do you mind explaining why, wh
> > en it
> > came time to note what "sense" meant, you said that it meant to what it
> > referred? The "sense" of "Evening Star" refers to a phrase.
>
> No, the sense of "Evening Star" /is/ a phrase: bright object in the
> evening sky near the Sun.

And that's The Reference Trap -- if the sense of "Evening Star" /is/ a
phrase, as you're so kind to state, "the sense of 'Evening Star' " then
refers to that phrase. The phrase "bright object in the evening sky near the
Sun" substitutes one-for-one the phrase "the sense of 'Evening Star.' " You
just said so when you said /is/.

What, pray tell, does the phrase "The sense of 'Evening Star' " mean? You'll
have to grant that it means to what it refers, or you'll have to begin an
infinite regression that will never refer you to reality.

> > Why is that you go around saying that the meaning of a word is merely its
> > "sense," but then blank out the fact that your explanation of what "sense"
> > means always notes to what "sense" refers?
>
> "notes to"? Help me out here.

Hmm. Bad writing. Let me try again. Why is it that you go around saying that

the meaning of a word is merely its "sense," but then blank out the fact that

your explanation of what "sense" means in fact notes the following -- to what
"sense" refers?

> > I can't believe I didn't see this earlier. Let's call it "The Reference
> > Trap." There is no way to show that the meaning of words is other than to
> > what they refer.
>
> I have already shown that with my example of "First Star".

I was merely foreshadowing what I was about to say.

> > The Reference Trap works like this. Let's pretend the meaning of a word is
> > not to what it refers but rather its "sense." Then, what does "sense" mean?
>
> I have said that "sense" and "meaning" are synonymous. So it means what
> means means. ;-)

Sure, this is assumed by the argument ad absurdem.

> > You cannot say that it means to what it refers -- you must say instead that
> > the meaning of "sense" is not to what "sense" refers but rather "the se
> > nse of
> > 'sense.' "
>
> Right. But please don't put the period mark inside the single quotes.

Oh, come on, you know what's being said. I'm not going to deliberately
punctuate incorrectly.

> > And what does that mean? Eventually, you will have to say that what is
> > meant
> > is a thing to which you're referring, or concede you never will say what is
> > meant. Either you must give up and grant that meaning is to what is ref
> > erred,
> > or you must give up the idea of ever referring "sense" to anything.

And there we are.

> > The short form: What does "sense" mean without saying to what it refers
> > ? Good
> > luck.
>
> The sense of a term is the notion it expresses. I think that Owl dealt
> with this in his original post. A sense /is/ an idea.

See? In saying what "sense" means, you are saying to what the word "sense"
refers. You're not defining it -- rather, you are saying that "sense" means
"an idea" -- this despite the fact that "an idea" is to what "sense" refers!

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <802lb9$b01$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>, writes...
...

> But we do know, because we know it refers to the first celestial object
> visible in the night sky, and we know that that would be Venus, unless it's
> obscured, in which case it's Sirius, and so on. What do you mean we don't
> know what it refers to? You were kind enough to say, even.

No. We know it /means/ "first celestial object..." I was assuming that
that is where our astronomical knowledge ended, just as I focused on the
time before it was discovered that Venus is both the Morning and Evening
Stars. We do not /know/ that that First Star "would be Venus, unless..."
So on your theory, we do not know at this point the meaning of First
Star, because we do not know if we are referring to Venus or Sirius. But
it seems clear that we /do/ know the meaning of "First Star".
...

> > So the term /means/ two very different things and we might not know
> > which?
>
> Not exactly. It means a set. A set is one thing, but has different members.

Well now we are getting somewhere; I may have to change the name of this
thread. So the meaning can be a set, rather than just a simple element.
This is a little messy, of course. What is the ontology of sets? Do
they exist in the same way that their elements exist? Do terms always
refer to a set, perhaps with only one element, or do they refer to sets
sometimes and elements other times? But let's press on - it's a start.

I say the term "First Star" /refers/ to a set. And, using my theory, I
can tell you what constructs the set - it is the sense or meaning of
"First Star" that does so. This meaning or sense is invariant, whereas
if a star appears as a supernova tomorrow, the reference will change.
What, in your theory, constructs the set?
...

> > Please! I like the title of this thread. I'll take a look, but I'm not
> > promising anything.
>
> It's the same thread, why wouldn't you see it? It's just a fork in the th
> read.

I was being facetious - but you didn't get the /sense/ of my remark. ;-)

...

> > Because the limited subjectivity that results from slightly different
> > understandings needn't affect reference at all.
>

> So, when you communicate, you avoid subjectivity because reference is what
> counts? Is that what you're saying?

No.
...

> In other words, even if the "sense" of a word is grounded in useless
> subjectivity, the objective "component" is what allows communication between
> speakers of a language?
>
> What this says is that it's to what words refer that is communicated, i.e.
> meant.

No, because the senses of terms /are/ sufficiently shared (most of the
time) so that communication is possible.

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[isambard]

(Reposting to correct an error of attribution)

etc. are me. They are not referents of me in the same way that I am a

referent of "man." Had I never been born, man would still exist. Had my
organs never formed, there would be no John Timbrell. Had I been born
in Spain, there would be a Juan Timbrell, but that would not be the me
that is. I don't think that any person has a referent other than those
referents that derive reflexively.

When Owl writes:

>Likewise, the sense of "O's mother" is another idea, the
>idea of a person who gave birth to Oedipus.

That sounds to me like "O,s mother" is "O,s mother." It's
true, but I don't see how it tells me anything.

When Owl writes (I had earlier attributed this to Bob
Kolker):

>Here's something that will maybe help. Think of senses as
>being like offices. The office of President of the United
>States happens to be filled by Bill Clinton. If things had
>gone differently, it might have been filled by Bob Dole.
>So you can distinguish the President of the United States
>(Clinton) from the *office* of President of the United
>States. Similarly, you can distinguish the woman who gave
>birth to Oedipus from, so to speak, the office of (woman
>who gave birth to Oedipus).

I can distinguish Clinton from Dole (Bill has more fun),
but I don't see how I can distinguish O's mom from O's
mom. The office of the president can be filled by
different men. I don't see how the office of O's mom can
be filled by anyone but O's mom.

TJT

GO DAWGS!!!

TJT

"That might even be sacriligious --- If God didn't want them to be
sheared, he
wouldn't have made them sheep." -- Eli
Wallach to Yul Brynner in "The Magnificent Seven."
TJ

* Sent from RemarQ http://www.remarq.com The Internet's Discussion Network *
The fastest and easiest way to search and participate in Usenet - Free!

[Gordon G. Sollars]

In article <802lnj$s68$1...@nntp1.atl.mindspring.net>, writes...
> In article <MPG.128e8e9033...@mail.nji.com>,

> "Gordon G. Sollars" <sol...@nji.com> wrote:

...

> >And because the objective component (you cut that part) can remain
> >consistent among speakers of the language even if none of them know the
> >referent of a particular term.
>
> No, this is wrong because it carries "meaning" literally with the word.
> Maybe I've misunderstood you; sorry if so.

What is the referent of "sake"? What things (existents) do you point to
fix its "meaning" (in the Objectivist sense? ;-) ). How central are
they to understanding the term? (BTW, I am not claiming that sense or
meaning is "more important" than reference, whatever that claim might
mean - only that it is different.)
...

> The real reason the "objective component" remains consistent among speakers
> of a language is because the Objectivist epistemology is largely correct.
> The referents gave rise to the concepts and the concepts gave rise to the
> words. It's because the referents are immutable

Immutable? Such as love or a good breakfast?

Jim, rather than pursue this at this point, I'm just going to suggest
this post of yours to your critics as evidence that you are a "real"
Objectivist and let it go at that. OK?

--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com

[isambard]

What is a use/mention error?