Deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'
Owl
'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of a few
attempts to do so. (Note: these are posted purely for entertainment
purposes; none of them actually provides a rational basis for an ethical
system.)
The first attempt is from Searle (pretty famous; this is about 30 years
old). Searle's example went:
1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
dollars."
2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (from 1)
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith $5.
(from 2)
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
Re 1: Additional conditions must hold in order for Jones' utterance in
(1) to count as a promise; e.g., that Jones wasn't play acting, that he was
talking to Smith, etc.; but these conditions are all descriptive.
Re 3: Searle says that one can't understand the concept of 'promising'
without invoking this notion of accepting obligations; promising is not, for
instance, merely telling someone (predicting) that you will do something.
Second derivation:
1. Everything God says is true.
2. God says that killing is wrong.
3. Therefore, killing is wrong.
3 is clearly evaluative, and 1 and 2 appear to be descriptive. 2 isn't
itself an evaluation; it just reports God's evaluation (if I say, "Bert
thinks that socialism is good" I'm not endorsing socialism). 1 appears also
to be descriptive, provided "true" is a descriptive predicate.
Some people think that "true" is an evaluative predicate. In this case,
1 would be evaluative. For those people, then, I give the following
alternative derivation:
4. The only thing God has said is that snow is white.
5. Snow is white. Therefore:
1. Everything God says is true.
4 and 5 are descriptive; if 1 is evaluative, then I just derived an
evaluative proposition from descriptive propositions. If 1 is descriptive,
then the first derivation (1+2 -> 3) derived an evaluative proposition from
descriptive ones.
Third derivation: Suppose there's this cultural relativist. He thinks that
for a thing to be 'wrong' is for society to disapprove of it. Thus, he
accepts the *material conditional*, "if society disapproves of x, then x is
wrong." Is this an evaluative proposition? First, assume it is descriptive.
Then the following derives an evaluative prop. from descriptive ones:
1. If society disapproves of killing, then killing is wrong.
2. Society disapproves of killing.
3. Killing is wrong.
But now assume 1 is evaluative. Then the above does not derive an evaluative
prop. from descriptive ones, but the following argument does:
4. Society doesn't disapprove of killing.
5. Therefore, if society disapproves of killing, then killing is wrong.
Fourth attempt:
Assume we have an ethical naturalist around (Gordo will like this one). He
thinks that evaluative properties can be reduced to descriptive ones. Let's
say he holds a particularly simple form of reductionism: He thinks the
property of being good is (reduces to) the property of increasing the
aggregate amount of pleasure among sentient beings in the universe. Consider
the following derivation:
1. x increases the aggregate pleasure in the universe.
2. The property of being good = the property of increasing the aggregate
pleasure in the universe.
3. Therefore, x is good.
1 is descriptive and 3 is paradigmatically evaluative. Is 2 evaluative?
Maybe, but note that 2 is a meta-ethical theory, just as various
anti-naturalist theories are. It would seem that those who think goodness is
reducible and those who think it is not ought to be making at least the same
*kind* of statements, i.e., if one is making a 'factual' claim, the other is
too. In that case, if 2 is evaluative, so is the denial of (2). In that
case, a moral skeptic must either accept an evaluative proposition (the
denial of 2), or else have no disagreement with Gordo.
Alternate formulation of this argument:
1. x increases the aggregate pleasure in the universe.
2. "is good" refers to the property of increasing the aggregate pleasure in
the universe.
3. Therefore, x is good.
Here, it more clearly seems that 2 is a descriptive, 'factual' claim.
Fifth attempt. User will like this one. Suppose there is this moral skeptic,
who believes that positive moral statements are false. It seems that he can
construct the following derivation:
1. "Murder is wrong" is false.
2. It is not the case that murder is wrong. (from 1)
3. It isn't wrong to murder. (from 2)
4. Murder is permissible. (from 3)
4 seems to be evaluative; maybe 1 is also evaluative, but in that case,
moral skepticism is incoherent.
Similarly, our skeptic can argue:
1. "Life is good" is false.
2. "Life is bad" is false.
3. Life is neither good nor bad. (from 1,2)
4. Life is morally neutral. (from 3)
4 seems to be evaluative again. If you don't think so yet, continue to:
5. Death is equally good as life. (follows from 3)
I welcome any further examples of is-ought derivations.
Gordon G. Sollars
> User and Gordo have been arguing about whether you can derive an
> 'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of a few
> attempts to do so.
Nice work, Owl. Are all of these but the first your own examples?
> (Note: these are posted purely for entertainment
> purposes; none of them actually provides a rational basis for an ethical
> system.)
>
> The first attempt is from Searle (pretty famous; this is about 30 years
> old).
BTW, I think it is almost 40 years old - it was appearing in collections
by 1970.
I have always liked this argument by Searle, at any rate, a great deal
more than the anti-AI argument he makes. I take it that you have a
problem with it?
...
> Fourth attempt:
> Assume we have an ethical naturalist around (Gordo will like this one). He
> thinks that evaluative properties can be reduced to descriptive ones. Let's
> say he holds a particularly simple form of reductionism: He thinks the
> property of being good is (reduces to) the property of increasing the
> aggregate amount of pleasure among sentient beings in the universe.
I do like this one, although, following Daniel Dennett (Searle's great
opponent!) I eschew "simple" or "greedy" reductionism. If 'table' names
a "property" which we struggle to give necessary and sufficient
conditions for, I am hardly surprised that 'good' poses a difficult
challenge as well.
I have no examples to add, for entertainment or otherwise. As I believe
I said, I am suspicious of the evaluative/descriptive distinction, but I
doubt that I will succeed where Searle has failed - if he has failed.
Maintaining the distinction seems to me to be closely connected to
logical positivists's discredited notion that some sort of "observation
language" is sufficient for science.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Bert Clanton
1. No evaluative predicate (e.g., "good") is equivalent in sense to any
descriptive predicate or conjunction of descriptive predicates (e.g.,
"maximizes preference-satisfaction over the set of all human beings").
2. Hence no evaluative utterance (e.g., "An equal distribution of
wealth is good") is equivalent in sense to any descriptive statement
(e.g., "An equal distribution of wealth would maximize
preference-satisfaction over the set of all human beings")
Bert Clanton
Clanton <bertc...@mindspring.com> wrote:
> I regard the following seven statements as true:
>
[followed by 2 statements]
Oops. I must have clicked on the SEND button by mistake. I'll try again.
Best wishes,
Bert
Bert Clanton
I regard the following seven statements as true:
1. No evaluative predicate (e.g., "good") is equivalent in sense to any
Bert Clanton
Bert Clanton
Fourth try:
Mark Sieving
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
>
> The first attempt is from Searle (pretty famous; this is about 30
> years old). Searle's example went:
>
> 1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
> dollars."
> 2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (from 1)
> 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith
> $5. (from 2)
> 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
> 5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
Here's another example, following the same pattern of reasoning.
1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise you, my girlfriend, that I
will kill Smith for insulting your hairdo."
2. Jones promised to kill Smith.
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to kill Smith.
4. Jones is under an obligation to kill Smith.
5. Jones ought to kill Smith.
I think most people here would disagree with this conclusion. There is
a missing assumption in the argument, namely, that what Smith promised
to do is morally permissable. But that kind of begs the question.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
Tym Parsons
> User and Gordo have been arguing about whether you can derive an
> 'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of
> a few attempts to do so. (Note: these are posted purely for
> entertainment purposes; none of them actually provides a rational
> basis for an ethical system.)
<snip>
> I welcome any further examples of is-ought derivations.
"If your goal is to remain in reality, you ought to think". And yes it
actually provides a rational basis for an ethical system.
Since this topic has been done to death on HPO already, I'm just posting
this for the benefit of newbies.
Tym Parsons
Kwag7693
>1. No evaluative predicate (e.g., "good") is equivalent in sense to any
>descriptive predicate or conjunction of descriptive predicates (e.g.,
>"maximizes preference-satisfaction over the set of all human beings").
>
>2. Hence no evaluative utterance (e.g., "An equal distribution of
>wealth is good") is equivalent in sense to any descriptive statement
>(e.g., "An equal distribution of wealth would maximize
>preference-satisfaction over the set of all human beings")
I am not sure about one and two, but three through seven are completely
unobjectionable.
Would "I like it," meet your idea of a descriptive predicate?
Kevin
David Schwartz
> > The first attempt is from Searle (pretty famous; this is about 30
> > years old). Searle's example went:
> > 1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
> > dollars."
> > 2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (from 1)
> > 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith
> > $5. (from 2)
> > 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
> > 5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
> Here's another example, following the same pattern of reasoning.
> 1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise you, my girlfriend, that I
> will kill Smith for insulting your hairdo."
> 2. Jones promised to kill Smith.
> 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to kill Smith.
> 4. Jones is under an obligation to kill Smith.
> 5. Jones ought to kill Smith.
> I think most people here would disagree with this conclusion. There is
> a missing assumption in the argument, namely, that what Smith promised
> to do is morally permissable. But that kind of begs the question.
Whether or not the action is morally permissible, the fact that Jones
promised to do it weight in favor of it being what he ought to do.
This isn't a counter-argument to the proposed argument. Even in the
counter-example, the promise weighs in favor of the conclusion. It
simply isn't sufficient to establish the conclusion. If Jones, Smith,
and the $5 were the only factors involved, the conclusion would be true.
The counter-example creates a case where there are other conditions that
weigh against the conclusion. Nevertheless, this doesn't refute the
claim made, which is that 'ought' statements can be derived from 'is'
statements. Jones "ought" to kill Smith because he promised to kill
Smith, but perhaps he "ought not" to kill Smith for other reasons. All
of these possible "oughts" and "ought nots" (some are all derived from
'is' statements in this pattern) are weighed in a complex manner to find
the conclusion.
DS
Owl
news:MPG.146fd467b7...@mail.nji.com...
> Nice work, Owl. Are all of these but the first your own examples?
Thanks. ;) The second one ("God says killing is wrong", etc.) isn't exactly
mine. Lots of people think that's a sound argument (though the "everything
God says is true" is usually left implicit). The rest I thought up, but I
don't promise that someone else hasn't also done so before me.
> BTW, I think it is almost 40 years old - it was appearing in collections
> by 1970.
>
> I have always liked this argument by Searle, at any rate, a great deal
> more than the anti-AI argument he makes. I take it that you have a
> problem with it?
Briefly, I think "undertake" is equivocal between a success-verb sense and a
non-success-verb sense.
> I do like this one, although, following Daniel Dennett (Searle's great
> opponent!) I eschew "simple" or "greedy" reductionism. If 'table' names
> a "property" which we struggle to give necessary and sufficient
> conditions for, I am hardly surprised that 'good' poses a difficult
> challenge as well.
That's reasonable. Obviously, I don't think that "table" is hard to define
for quite the same reasons that "good" is -- or rather, I think the latter
is hard to define for an additional reason.
> I have no examples to add, for entertainment or otherwise. As I believe
> I said, I am suspicious of the evaluative/descriptive distinction, but I
> doubt that I will succeed where Searle has failed - if he has failed.
> Maintaining the distinction seems to me to be closely connected to
> logical positivists's discredited notion that some sort of "observation
> language" is sufficient for science.
Hm. If it's tied to illogical positivism, that's strong evidence against it,
but still not conclusive.
Owl
news:051120002056410031%bertc...@mindspring.com...
We all want to hear the other 5. Next time, maybe if you try starting at 3
you'll get 3 and 4 through.
Btw, Gordon may want to point out that from 1 and 2, so far, it doesn't
follow that a descriptive statement can't entail an evaluative one.
Owl
news:3A07AAD7...@webmaster.com...
> > 1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise you, my girlfriend, that I
> > will kill Smith for insulting your hairdo."
> > 2. Jones promised to kill Smith.
> > 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to kill Smith.
> > 4. Jones is under an obligation to kill Smith.
> > 5. Jones ought to kill Smith.
> Whether or not the action is morally permissible, the fact that Jones
> promised to do it weight in favor of it being what he ought to do.
Exactly. In the original article, Searle allowed that 5 only follows 'other
things being equal.' Jones has an obligation to kill Smith arising from his
promise, so, in the absence of any other conflicting obligations, he ought
to do it. Of course, if he also has an obligation, in general, not to commit
murder, then that would override the obligation to keep the promise, and so
he shouldn't commit the murder.
This 'ceteris paribus' concession doesn't give any comfort to the moral
skeptic, however, since *he* is committed to that ceteris paribus clause
automatically being satisfied (i.e., the skeptic thinks it's automatically
true that there are no other obligations), so the skeptic would have to
admit that 5 follows legitimately.
Bert Clanton
<kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
>
> Would "I like it," meet your idea of a descriptive predicate?
>
Yes. It asserts a factual relationship between "I" and "it". Although
"liking" is subjective, there is a fact of the matter about whether I
like it.
Best wishes,
Bert
Bert Clanton
> "Bert Clanton" <bertc...@mindspring.com> wrote in message
> news:051120002056410031%bertc...@mindspring.com...
> > I regard the following seven statements as true:
> >
[first 2 posted]
> We all want to hear the other 5. Next time, maybe if you try starting at 3
> you'll get 3 and 4 through.
>
> Btw, Gordon may want to point out that from 1 and 2, so far, it doesn't
> follow that a descriptive statement can't entail an evaluative one.
Actually, what I'm going to do is either to post my complete article as
a reply to someone else's, or to post it as a new article. But I'll
have to do this after I watch the election returns this afternoon and
tonight.
I agree that it doesn't follow from the *non-equivalence* of
descriptive and evaluative utterances that a descriptive statement
can't *entail* an evaluative utterance. Even so, it seems clear to me
that a set of purely descriptive statements *can't* entail an
evaluative utterance--as I assert in later statements. An example
sometimes used to illustrate this point is that from a set of
statements purely about porcupines, together with modus ponens, you
can't validly infer a statement which is not about porcupines.
Best wishes,
Bert
Mark Sieving
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> "David Schwartz" <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote in message
> news:3A07AAD7...@webmaster.com...
> > Whether or not the action is morally permissible, the fact that
> > Jones promised to do it weight in favor of it being what he ought
> > to do.
Giving weight in favor of Jones doing X is a good long ways from saying
that Jones ought to do X.
> Exactly. In the original article, Searle allowed that 5 only
> follows 'other things being equal.' Jones has an obligation to kill
> Smith arising from his promise, so, in the absence of any other
> conflicting obligations, he ought to do it. Of course, if he also has
> an obligation, in general, not to commit murder, then that would
> override the obligation to keep the promise, and so he shouldn't
> commit the murder.
Well, it looks like Searle made explicit the assumption that I said was
implicit in your argument, namely, that what Jones promised to do was
morally permissable (or in your words, that Jones had no obligation not
to do what he promised to do). I still think that's begging the
question. To say that Jones ought to do X entails that it is not the
case that Jones ought not to do X. You can't use the latter as a
premise in proving the former.
>
> This 'ceteris paribus' concession doesn't give any comfort to the
moral
> skeptic, however, since *he* is committed to that ceteris paribus
clause
> automatically being satisfied (i.e., the skeptic thinks it's
automatically
> true that there are no other obligations), so the skeptic would have
to
> admit that 5 follows legitimately.
>
>
David Schwartz
Mark Sieving wrote:
>
> In article <8u8f9n$a7d$1...@nntp9.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> > "David Schwartz" <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote in message
> > news:3A07AAD7...@webmaster.com...
>
> > > Whether or not the action is morally permissible, the fact that
> > > Jones promised to do it weight in favor of it being what he ought
> > > to do.
>
> Giving weight in favor of Jones doing X is a good long ways from saying
> that Jones ought to do X.
I'm not saying it weighs in favor of Jones doing X, I'm saying it
weighs in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X. Other
factors may also weight for or against this conclusion. Nevertheless, it
clearly demonstrates one way of going from 'is' to 'ought'. There may be
other methods, which may weigh one way or another. In the end, all the
'ought' conclusions get weighed.
So you have to refute this particular bridge if you want to maintain
that the gap can't be bridged.
In fact, you have to assume the gap is bridged to counterargue this in
the manner suggeseted. Otherwise, you get some really insane results.
(For example, that I really should murder someone if I've promised to do
so.)
DS
Mark Sieving
David Schwartz <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote:
>
> Mark Sieving wrote:
> >
> > Giving weight in favor of Jones doing X is a good long ways from
> > saying that Jones ought to do X.
>
> I'm not saying it weighs in favor of Jones doing X, I'm saying it
> weighs in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X.
Ok, I was careless in what I said. What I should have said is that
giving weight in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X is a
good long ways from concluding that Jones ought to do X.
> So you have to refute this particular bridge if you want to maintain
> that the gap can't be bridged.
I don't claim that the gap can't be bridged. But in order to bridge the
gap, you have to assume that it is morally permissable for Jones to do
X.
>
> In fact, you have to assume the gap is bridged to counterargue this in
> the manner suggeseted. Otherwise, you get some really insane results.
> (For example, that I really should murder someone if I've promised to
> do so.)
The insane results come from the original argument, unless you beg the
question by assuming that it is morally permissable for Jones to do
what he promised. That's why I don't think the original argument is
very good. That's not to say that I reject the idea that you can
derive an "ought" from an "is", it's just that I don't think this is
the way to go about it.
Kwag7693
>"liking" is subjective, there is a fact of the matter about whether I
>like it.
Then I disagree with 1. The claim that something is good boils down to one
liking whatever of which we are speaking.
David Schwartz
Mark Sieving wrote:
>
> In article <3A0900D3...@webmaster.com>,
> David Schwartz <dav...@webmaster.com> wrote:
> >
> > Mark Sieving wrote:
> > >
> > > saying that Jones ought to do X.
> >
> > I'm not saying it weighs in favor of Jones doing X, I'm saying it
> > weighs in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X.
>
> good long ways from concluding that Jones ought to do X.
I really don't think that's true. Suppose I had argued that you can
determine where objects are by using your eyes. You counterargued by
showing that in every situation where I determined where an object was
using my eyes extraneous circumstances not detectable by eyes can mean
the object is elsewhere. Does this refute the original claim?
> > So you have to refute this particular bridge if you want to maintain
> > that the gap can't be bridged.
>
> I don't claim that the gap can't be bridged. But in order to bridge the
> gap, you have to assume that it is morally permissable for Jones to do
> X.
So then this argument demonstrates an 'ought' provided no
counter-demonstration shows that the action is prohibited. That's still
deriving an 'ought' from an 'is'.
> > In fact, you have to assume the gap is bridged to counterargue this in
> > the manner suggeseted. Otherwise, you get some really insane results.
> > (For example, that I really should murder someone if I've promised to
> > do so.)
>
> The insane results come from the original argument, unless you beg the
> question by assuming that it is morally permissable for Jones to do
> what he promised. That's why I don't think the original argument is
> very good. That's not to say that I reject the idea that you can
> derive an "ought" from an "is", it's just that I don't think this is
> the way to go about it.
Any argument outside of formal logic can be refuted in this manner.
DS
Bert Clanton
<kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
That's one approach to defining "good"--the "emotivist" approach. It's
far from the only possible understanding of what "good" means. It's not
my own view, in fact.
In my view, there are *three* legitimate usages of "good" in value
theory. There's an *expressive* usage, in which "X is good" is intended
to *express* the utterer's positive valuation of X, without *asserting*
that approval. There's a *preciative* usage, in which "X is good" is
intended to *evoke* positive valuation of X in the addressee. And
there's a *judgmental* usage, in which "X is good" has the sense of "X
satisfies the criteria for worthiness-to-be-valued embodied in value
system V". The first two usages are *evaluative*, and the third is
*descriptive*.
In my view, the two *evaluative*usages of "X is good" do not assert
that any state of affairs is the case: that X has some property, or is
a member of some category, or participates in some relationship. So in
these usages, "X is good" can be neither true nor false, and cannot
function either as premise or conclusion in any deductive argument. I
think that your usage of "good" is like this.
The *judgmental* usage *does* assert that some state of affairs is the
case, namely, that there is a relation of "satisfaction" which obtains
between item X and the criteria for worthiness-to-be-valued embodied in
value-system V.(So this usage is always *relative* to the criteria of
some particular value-system.)
Am I then a value-relativist? No, because I believe that there can be
good reasons for adopting one value-system rather than another. But
that's a subject for another article--or another thread.
Best wishes,
Bert
Owl
> > Giving weight in favor of Jones doing X is a good long ways from saying
> > that Jones ought to do X.
>
> I'm not saying it weighs in favor of Jones doing X, I'm saying it
> weighs in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X. Other
> factors may also weight for or against this conclusion. Nevertheless, it
> clearly demonstrates one way of going from 'is' to 'ought'. There may be
I think David is right here. The Searle argument, allegedly, adduces a
descriptive fact as *prima facie* evidence for an evaluative conclusion.
That means that in the event that no *other* facts appear that go against
that conclusion, the conclusion would be genuinely established.
The proponents of the is-ought gap cannot accept that. They can't accept
that a descriptive premise might even *prima facie* support an evaluative
conclusion. For, if they did, they would also have to accept either
a) That that conclusion is also ultima facie established (that is, is
actually established), or
b) That some other evaluative fact can be established so as to refute the
prima facie conclusion.
Either way, they would have to accept that evaluative conclusions can be
really established (and not merely prima facie). I.e., once you accept that
a normative conclusion can be prima facie established, you then must accept
that a normative conclusion can be established, period.
Owl
> > Giving weight in favor of Jones doing X is a good long ways from saying
> > that Jones ought to do X.
>
> I'm not saying it weighs in favor of Jones doing X, I'm saying it
> weighs in favor of the conclusion that Jones ought to do X. Other
> factors may also weight for or against this conclusion. Nevertheless, it
> clearly demonstrates one way of going from 'is' to 'ought'. There may be
I think David is right here. The Searle argument, allegedly, adduces a
David Schwartz
Owl wrote:
> I think David is right here. The Searle argument, allegedly, adduces a
> descriptive fact as *prima facie* evidence for an evaluative conclusion.
> That means that in the event that no *other* facts appear that go against
> that conclusion, the conclusion would be genuinely established.
Wow, you and I agree on something!
IMO, the strongest attack on the Searle argument is as follows:
This is the Searle argument:
1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
dollars."
2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (from 1)
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith $5.
(from 2)
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
The problem is, why '5' can arguably just as well be "Jones ought not
to pay Smith $5". After all, to derive 5 from 4, you need some tenet
like 'people ought to do what they are obligated to do'. And that tenet
is an is-ought gap bridger itself.
I think that problem is fixable, but when you fix it, you are left with
a very different argument from Searle's.
DS
Owl
> Wow, you and I agree on something!
I haven't been keeping notes, but I am sure there are lots of things we
agree on.
> IMO, the strongest attack on the Searle argument is as follows:
...
> 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
> 5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
>
> The problem is, why '5' can arguably just as well be "Jones ought not
> to pay Smith $5". After all, to derive 5 from 4, you need some tenet
> like 'people ought to do what they are obligated to do'. And that tenet
> is an is-ought gap bridger itself.
I don't find that a strong objection. The logical connection between
"obligation" and "ought" seems pretty obvious.
In fact, the best objection is one I mentioned earlier. "Undertook" is
equivocal between a success-verb reading and a non-succuess-verb reading.
David Schwartz
Owl wrote:
> I don't find that a strong objection. The logical connection between
> "obligation" and "ought" seems pretty obvious.
> In fact, the best objection is one I mentioned earlier. "Undertook" is
> equivocal between a success-verb reading and a non-succuess-verb reading.
They're the same objection. If you assume that an obligation
automatically becomes an 'ought', then the question of whether or not
people really have obligations becomes important.
DS
David Schwartz
Owl wrote:
> I don't find that a strong objection. The logical connection between
> "obligation" and "ought" seems pretty obvious.
>
> In fact, the best objection is one I mentioned earlier. "Undertook" is
> equivocal between a success-verb reading and a non-succuess-verb reading.
The two objections are identical. If "obligation" didn't imply "ought"
then there'd be no question about whether an obligation had been
undertaken successfully.
DS
George Dance
> 'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of
> a few attempts to do so. (Note: these are posted purely for
> entertainment
> purposes; none of them actually provides a rational basis for an
> ethical system.)
If the examples are to prove instructive as well as entertaining, it is
a good idea to place them in the context of the discussion, which is
that of moral realism vs. anti-realism. Moral realists claim that moral
statements are propositions, which can be either true or false; and that
some moral propositions are true. By "true" they mean (following the
correspondence theory of truth) that there is a fact (something that is)
to which every true moral statement (a statement about what ought to be)
corresponds.
If A makes a moral statement such as "killing is wrong," he is obviously
expressing a fact: the fact that "A believes killing is wrong." But
this fact does not show that "killing is wrong" is true (except in the
purely descriptive, relativist sense that one can say that "killing is
wrong for A"). Rather, the realist claim is that "killing is wrong"
is true or false on the basis of a belief-independent fact or facts -
just as the truth of propositions like "a square has four sides" or "Mt.
Everest is the world's highest mountain" are not dependent on
whether anyone believes them.
The is-ought gap is a theory that conclusions about what ought to be
('evaluative statements,' in Owl's term) cannot be logically derived
solely from premises about what is ('descriptive' statements or
propositions). If both the theory of the gap, and the correspondence
theory of truth, are true, then there cannot be such things as "true"
moral statements. Believing in both the is-ought gap, and in moral
realism, is contradictory.
> The first attempt is from Searle (pretty famous; this is about 30
years
> old). Searle's example went:
>
> 1. Jones uttered the words "I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five
> dollars."
> 2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (from 1)
> 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith
> $5. (from 2)
> 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
> 5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
>
> Re 1 [actually, re 2 - gd]: Additional conditions must hold in
> order for Jones' utterance in
> (1) to count as a promise; e.g., that Jones wasn't play acting, that
> he was talking to Smith, etc.;
plus, less trivially, the condition that Jones was not under duress -
that he made the promise freely.
> but these conditions are all descriptive.
The question is, what are they describing? All of them can be expressed
by the hidden premise that (1b) "Jones believed that he was promising to
pay Smith $5." This premise seems both necessary and sufficient in
order to derive 2 from 1.
> Re 3: Searle says that one can't understand the concept of
> 'promising' without invoking this notion of accepting obligations;
> promising is not, for
> instance, merely telling someone (predicting) that you will do
> something.
Precisely; it is not enough that Jones understand (or believe) that he
is making a promise; for him to be obligated, he also has to understand
(believe) that a promise entails an obligation. IOW, for 3 to follow
from 2, it is both necessary and sufficient that the argument contain a
further premise, that (2b) "Jones believes that his (freely given)
promises obligate him."
So Searle's argument can be reconstructed as follows:
1. Jones (freely, or volitionally) uttered the words "I hereby promise
to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
1b. Jones believed that he was promising to pay Smith $5.
2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (1, 1b)
2b. Jones believes that his (freely given) promises obligate him.
3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith $5.
(2, 2b)
4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
It is clear that the truth of 4 and 5 is solely dependent on that of
both 2 and three, which are in turn dependent on the truth of 1b and 2b
- that is, on nothing more than facts about Jones's beliefs. As noted
above, these are not the facts that the moral realist is alleging, and
that the anti-realist is denying.
In fact, for Searle to assert the truth of 4 (and .`. 5) at all, he has
to rely on a further hidden premise: (3b) "If a person believes himself
under an obligation, then he is under that obligation." Yet this is
something the moral realist must assert is false. No moral realist
would claim that, simply because I believe that I am obligated to, say,
assassinate the Prime Minister of Canada, does not make me obligated to
do so (no matter how many promises I make to do it, or to whom). So no
moral realist can, without contradiction, assert the same proposition
here.
<snip - tbc>
--
- 30 -
George Dance
> Owl wrote:
> <snip>
> > I welcome any further examples of is-ought derivations.
>
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> "If your goal is to remain in reality, you ought to think". And yes
> it actually provides a rational basis for an ethical system.
Perhaps it does the latter. However, it does not derive a moral
ought-statement from purely descriptive is-statements, any more than "if
you wish your car to go faster, you ought to depress the gas pedal"
does. Rather, it attempts to derive an ought from an is plus a want -
which is to my mind the correct derivation for normative statements, but
not what those who deny the is-ought gap are claiming, at all.
> Since this topic has been done to death on HPO already, I'm just
> posting this for the benefit of newbies.
Obviously the topic could benefit from some more "doing." 8)
George Dance
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> User and Gordo have been arguing about whether you can derive an
> 'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of
a few
> attempts to do so. (Note: these are posted purely for entertainment
ethical
> system.)
Why these examples are important, as I previously noted, is that if just
one of them is a sound argument, then the is-ought theory is incorrect.
The importance of this latter point is its significance for moral
theory: If there is an is-ought gap (and the correspondence theory of
truth is correct), then moral realism is false. As most moral theories
are based on a variant of moral realism, then, if the gap exists, most
moral theories are thereby false.
The moral realist needs just one counterexample to disprove the gap: one
example in which a normative conclusion can be shown to be true by being
validly inferred from true descriptive premises. What that requires is
a sound argument, not simply a valid one. It is a fairly easy matter to
construct a valid argument concluding anything; however, if the premises
are false or meaningless, then the argument does not show the conclusion
to be anything but false or meaningless.
That appears to be the problem with Owl's second attempt at a
derivation:
<snip>
> Second derivation:
>
> 1. Everything God says is true.
> 2. God says that killing is wrong.
> 3. Therefore, killing is wrong.
>
> 3 is clearly evaluative, and 1 and 2 appear to be descriptive. 2 isn't
> itself an evaluation; it just reports God's evaluation (if I say,
"Bert
> thinks that socialism is good" I'm not endorsing socialism). 1 appears
also
> to be descriptive, provided "true" is a descriptive predicate.
This clearly looks like a valid argument, containing only descriptive
("is") premises and a normative ("ought") conclusion. In
addition, unlike Searle's example discussed previously, the truth
of both premises looks completely independent of human beliefs about
them. So if the premises are true, then the argument is sound, and the
theory of the is-ought gap is refuted.
But are the premises true? Assuming that the God being discussed is the
God of the Bible, then 2 is true: God clearly says at one point that
"You shall not kill." (Ex. 20:13), IOW that killing is wrong. However,
it is equally true that God says, elsewhere, that killing humans is not
wrong. God declares at times that he will kill humans (eg, Gen 7:7),
and at other times tells humans to kill each other (eg, Lev. 20). So
2 is not a complete truth, as it needs to be qualified by the further
premise (2b) "God also says that killing is not wrong." So premise 1
has to be false, as the argument, to be sound, should read:
1. Everything God says is true.
2. God says that killing is wrong.
2b. God also says that killing is not wrong.
3. Therefore, killing is wrong. (1,2)
3b. Therefore, killing is not wrong. (1,2b)
But killing cannot be both wrong and not wrong, by the LNC. Therefore,
premise 1 has to be false.
In fact, the anti-realist can reply at this point, it cannot be
the case that both 1 and 2 are true. For, by his argument, a statement
can be true or false only if it is a descriptive proposition, and not
everything the God of the Bible says is such a proposition. One could
prove premise 1 by stipulating that the God being discussed is a
different God - one that made only true statements. But that would be,
by definition, a God that said only propositions. Therefore, by
definition, such a God would never make a non-descriptive statement such
as "killing is wrong", meaning that premise 2 is false. 1 can be true
only if 2 is false, and vice versa.
This difficulty is shown well by Owl's attempt to dispose of a side
issue:
> Some people think that "true" is an evaluative predicate. In this
case,
> 1 would be evaluative. For those people, then, I give the following
> alternative derivation:
> 4. The only thing God has said is that snow is white.
> 5. Snow is white. Therefore:
> 1. Everything God says is true.
>
> 4 and 5 are descriptive; if 1 is evaluative, then I just derived an
> evaluative proposition from descriptive propositions. If 1 is
> descriptive, then the first derivation (1+2 -> 3) derived an
> evaluative proposition from descriptive ones.
Owl again manages to construct a valid argument, but fails utterly at
constructing a sound one. For the argument as a whole now reads:
1. Everything God says is true. (4,5)
2. God says that killing is wrong.
3. Therefore, killing is wrong. (1,2)
4. The only thing God has said is that snow is white.
5. Snow is white.
The truth of the conclusion (3) now depends on the truth of the new
premises, which in turn depends on the truth of 4 and 5. 3 is true only
if 4 is true. But 3 and 4 are contradictory, unless "snow is white" and
"killing is wrong" mean exactly the same thing, in which case the
argument is viciously circular (as 3 has already been asserted as 5).
If it is the case that God has said nothing more than that snow is
white, it cannot be the case that God has said that killing is wrong.
So if 4 is true, then 3 is not true. 3 is true only if 3 is also
not true; therefore 3 cannot not be true.
So this "second derivation" turns out to be not a sound argument at all,
but rather an incoherent one.
George Dance
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> User and Gordo have been arguing about whether you can derive an
> 'evaluative' statement from 'descriptive' statements. Here's a list of
a few
This segment will be (I hope) briefer, because most of the points it
brings up have been raised previously. However, it is worth commenting
on, as it illuminates the point I made to Gord in a different thread:
It is not always possible to distinguish between descriptive and
evaluative statements in this type of argument, as those making them
often rely on ambiguity and equivocation precisely to blur the
distinction.
<snip>
> Third derivation: Suppose there's this cultural relativist. He thinks
that
> for a thing to be 'wrong' is for society to disapprove of it. Thus, he
> accepts the *material conditional*, "if society disapproves of x, then
x is
> wrong." Is this an evaluative proposition?
It would be an evaluative proposition, if "wrong" were being used as an
evaluation - eg, if "X is wrong" means the same thing in it as "one
should not do X." The cultural relativist may mean this - that neither
he nor anyone else should do anything that society disapproves of.
However, he may be using "wrong" in a purely descriptive sense here,
asserting that "wrong" in this context is synonymous with "what society
disapproves of".
> First, assume it is descriptive.
In that case, "wrong" is not being used evaluatively - as a synonym for
"something that should not be" - but descriptively, to describe
something that is - in this case, as an apparent synonym for "something
that society disapproves of." Unless the word is being used
descriptively, 1 cannot be descriptive.
> Then the following derives an evaluative prop. from descriptive ones:
> 1. If society disapproves of killing, then killing is wrong.
> 2. Society disapproves of killing.
> 3. Killing is wrong.
But if "wrong" is being used descriptively, 3 is also a descriptive
proposition. It may mean no more than "society disapproves of killing",
which has already been stipulated as descriptive. It certainly means no
more than "killing is wrong" does in 1, which is also (in this case)
descriptive.
The only case in which 1 could be descriptive and 3 evaluative would be
if the same words, "killing is wrong" - were being used in 1 and 3 to
mean two different things. If the argument "derives an evaluative
[statement] from descriptive ones, it does so only by pure
equivocation.
> But now assume 1 is evaluative. Then the above does not derive an
> evaluative prop. from descriptive ones, but the following argument
> does:
> 4. Society doesn't disapprove of killing.
> 5. Therefore, if society disapproves of killing, then killing is
> wrong.
It is hard to know what to make of this. If 4 + 5 is meant as a
separate, self-contained argument, then it is sufficeient to note that 5
is not entailed by 4 - the argument is a non sequitur. If, OTOH, by
"the following argument" Owl means 1-5, it is sufficient to note that 2
and 4 are contradictory - the argument is incoherent.
<snip>
> I welcome any further examples of is-ought derivations.
For my part, I am unsure whether there is any point commenting on Owl's
further examples. OT1H, there is always the possibility that any one of
them is the definitive refutation of the is-ought gap. OTOH, a casual
reading of them gives no reason to think so.
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> However, it does not derive a moral
> ought-statement from purely descriptive is-statements, any more than
"if
> you wish your car to go faster, you ought to depress the gas pedal"
> does.
But that does. It derives one of two paired oughts from an is. To go
faster, you ought to depress the pedal -- to not go faster, you ought
not to.
"Oughts" are derived in pairs, just as square roots are. Objectivism
understands this -- and those who bleat that there's an "is-ought
mystery" do not. One might as well say that you can't derive a positive
square root because "Where does the distinction from the negative one
come from?"
-- at no extra charge
George Dance
Before I reply to this (at length), let me make a few points as context;
I will try to keep them in mind while writing, and you try to keep them
in mind while reading:
(1) I understand what you and Tym Parsons are saying:
(2) I agree that it is a correct interpretation of Objectivist ethics;
(3) I agree that it provides the apparently correct foundation of
ethics.
Despite that, I believe that the is-ought gap exists - that it is not a
'mystery' but a real fact - and that one can make a rational,
non-bleating case for it. I think the only reason that you, Tym, and
other Objectivists refuse to acknowledge the gap, is because it is not a
problem for Objectivism - not because Objectivism denies its reality,
but because Objectivism has (whether consciously on Rand's part, or not)
been built on a foundation that acknowledges the gap's existence, and
(unlike traditional morality) allows for it.
Virtually all traditional (pre-Hume) morality, and all deontological
(both pre- and post-Hume) morality, is absolutist - what mainstream
philosophers call 'objectivist,' and what Objectivists call
'intrinsicist.' The central claim of this type of morality is that
there are moral or normative truths - truths about what should be - just
as there are physical or descriptive truths - truths about what is.
What is, is a matter of fact, and truth is correspondence with those
physical facts - what you believe about what is, is a matter of opinion
- in determining what is, facts trump opinion, meaning that the truth
trumps your beliefs. The kind of being you are, and the kind of actions
you are capable of taking, do not depend on your opinion, but on the
truth. The moral intrinsicist claims that what should be is similarly
a matter of (normative) fact, and moral truths correspond to those
normative facts. Moral truth therefore trumps your beliefs: what should
occur in the future, and what actions you take to make that possible,
are no more subject to your beliefs than is the kind of being you are.
A possible objection to this idea of morality is that it is repugnant -
that following such an absolutise morality means subordinating one's own
judgement, beliefs, and choices. However, this is not a telling
objection, as the intrinsicist can simply reply: so what? You have no
choice about whether to obey the law of gravity - it simply is, whether
you believe in it or not - and if your judgement tells you to ignore it,
then your judgement is wrong. In exactly the same way, you have no
choice about whether to obey true moral laws or not - they exist,
whether you believe in them or not - and if your judgement tells you to
ignore them, your judgement is wrong.
A more telling objection is that we cannot directly access any such
normative facts. We cannot perceive what should be - therefore we
cannot observe it - therefore we cannot have any empirical knowledge of
it. Without k nowledge of those facts, we cannot distinguish true
belief from mere belief - and the claims of intrinsicist morality then
reduce to simply the (unjustified) claim that we should follow others'
beliefs rather than our own. A viable ethics, then, requires a viable
epistemology - a viable explanation of where moral knowledge comes from,
and how we can know it (as opposed to merely believing it).
There are, in general, two possible solutions. One (which actually
comprises a number of diverse theories) is the method of mysticism or
supernaturalism - we can receive moral knowledge directly from some
source, such as God, that does know what should be. The other is the
method of rationalism - we can reason from what is to what should be.
If our premises are true (that is, if they all correspond to facts), and
if our reasoning is valid, then our conclusions will be true. We cannot
have direct knowledge of what should be, but we can discover it, by
logical inference, from our knowledge of what is. It is precisely this
latter method of "rational intrinsicism." that the theory of the
is-ought gap declares impossible.
There is nothing mysterious about the theory of the is-ought gap; it is
a simple proposition that normative conclusions cannot be reached, by
valid argument, from descriptive premises alone. The word "alone" is
the key; the theory does not deny that factual premises play a part in
normative; just that they are not the key.
Consider the case of non-moral normative reasoning that I referred to
earlier: that of the gas pedal on your car. It is a fact that the
gas pedal exists; that you operate it with your right foot; and that
depressing it makes the car speed up, easing up on it makes the car slow
down, and maintaining a constant pressure makes the car move at a
constant speed. But none of these facts, or any additional facts, by
themselves tell you whether to push the pedal, ease up on it, or hold it
in place.
Imagine you are out for a drive, exploring the countryside, when you
come to a winding road on a mountainside. Immediately you ease up on
your gas pedal, to lower your speed. If you think about your action
consciously at all, you probably think only: "This road looks
dangerous. I'd better slow down." You would consider your decision
rational. So on what reasoning process was it based?
Well, you probably reasoned (unconsciously or 'intuitively'):
11. If I drive too fast on this road, I could have an accident.
12. I should not have an accident.
13. Therefore I should slow down. (11,12)
14. To slow down, I should ease up on the gas pedal.
15. Therefore I should ease up on the gas pedal. (13,14)
Your premise 14 is a matter of fact, one of which you have direct
knowledge. 13, however, is not factual at all, but a conclusion based
on other unconscious reasoning (11 and 12) which are in turn
conclusions. 11 is a completely factual conclusion, the reasoning of
which could be traced back through other factual premises, such as:
9. This is a road with many sharp turns
10. Drivers who take sharp turns too fast are more likely to have
accidents.
11. (9,10)
and so on, back through a set of other premises and conclusions, all of
them purely factual.
But where does 12 come from? 12 is not a statement of fact at all.
Like 13, it is a normative claim, which could be simply a premise, but
more likely (like 11) was a product of prior, similarly unconscious,
reasoning:
7. If I have an accident, I could kill or injure myself, or destroy my
car.
8. I should not kill or injure myself, or destroy my car.
12. (7,8)
That in turn could be traced back to prior reasoning:
5. If I kill or injure myself, or destroy my car, I will not be able to
safely complete my journey;
6. I should safely complete my journey
8. (5,6)
And so on. The point being that, every normative conclusion you reach
(6, 8, 12) is always the product, in part, of a normative premise.
Each such premise can be itself supported by prior reasoning (which is
why the argument begins at step 6) - but each such step in the reasoning
process itself must, to reach the normative conclusion, contain a prior
normative premise. At no time do you reach a normative conclusion based
on factual or descriptive premises alone.
Exactly the same holds for moral reasoning. As moral conclusions are
normative - conclusions about what should be, how one should act - none
of them can be based, if the is-ought gap is exists, on factual premises
alone. If the theory of the gap is true, then rational moral
intrinsicism is false.
So what is true? Is it true that morality cannot be rationally derived
at all? Does one have to reject using reason as a guide to morality,
and declare that it is all matter of feelings (as Hume did)? Not
necessarily; there is a third option.
Let's return to you in your car. Your decision to ease the pressure on
your gas pedalm when you came to the winding road, was entirely
rational, based on a process of "intuitive reasoning" or "rational
calculation."; even if you did not consciously think through the steps
of the argument, you can go back and consciously identify each step
later, and so confirm that you were acting rationally. It was also
based on your knowledge of the facts. However, it was not entirely
based on facts. What else, then, was it based on?
For it had to be based on something: you cannot trace this chain of
normative premises and conclusions back to infinity. There has to be a
first "should", which is either an arbitrary premise, or based on
something else.
What your initial "should' came from was a want. You may have decided:
4. I do not want to kill or injure myself, or destroy my car.
Therefore:
8. I should not kill or injure myself, or destroy my car.
or perhaps:
3. I want to successfully complete my journey. Therefore:
6. I should successfully complete my journey.
Of course, to get from 4 to 8, or 3 to 6, you also need a further
premise:
2. I should do what I want to do.
but this in turn is founded on no more than that:
1. I want to do what I want to do.
which is analytically, or tautologically, true - it does not itself
require proof.
Absolutist moralists freely concede that this type of reasoning (based
on what Kant called "Hypothetical Imperatives") is a valid way to reach
non-moral conclusions (like your decision to slow down); if your action
does not involve any moral questions, they have no objection to your
basing your normative conclusions on your wants. But it is quite
otherwise when it comes to morality. For how can one have morality -
how can one have any standards of conduct at all - if each person
decides for himself what he should do, based on nothing more than (the
facts as he sees them and) what he wants to do? If morality means
anything, it means that persons should /not/ do, and should not be
allowed to do, just what they want. So what morality requires is a set
of absolute rules (or what Kant called "Categorical Imperatives") which
people must do /whether they want to or not./
But these absolute rules (as we saw above) can come only from some
mystical or supernatural source of knowledge (which no one has any
reason to believe, unless he has his own access to that source of
knowledge, in which case he has no need of the moralist), or from pure
is-ought reasoning, which is, by the above argument, impossible.
Ayn Rand's solution to this dilemma (in brief) was to found her moral
theory on nothing but Hypothetical Imperatives (exactly as both you and
Tym have stated them). Objectivist moral theory consists of moral rules
that are no more than hypotheticals: of the form: "If you want X, you
must do Y." This nicely circumvents the is-ought gap nicely, by
founding normative rules on something other than descriptive facts, on
wants. (A want is admittedly a type of fact - if you want something, it
is a fact that you want it - but your wants are not objective, or
mind-independent, facts to you; unlike physical or objective facts, a
want is a fact that you made up or created, and you know that you have
that want simply by believing you have it.)
How does one get from this foundation to a set of moral rules? It is an
interesting question; but it's not the one we're discussing here; this
essay is too long as it is; and I suspect that you know the answer
anyway. So it is best to leave that question for another time.
As always, I would appreciate any and all feedback.
--
- 30 -
--
- 30 -
Tym Parsons
> Objectivist moral theory consists of moral rules that are no more than
> hypotheticals: of the form: "If you want X, you must do Y."
No they're not hypotheticals. You may want to do heroin and evade the
negative consequences, but that doesn't mean there's a way of
accomplishing it.
> This nicely circumvents the is-ought gap nicely, by founding normative
> rules on something other than descriptive facts, on wants. (A want is
> admittedly a type of fact - if you want something, it is a fact that
> you want it - but your wants are not objective, or mind-independent,
> facts to you;
I disagree. Wants are objective if they correspond to reality, i.e. are
consistent with life as the standard of value.
> unlike physical or objective facts, a want is a fact that you made up
> or created, and you know that you have that want simply by believing
> you have it.)
This isn't a meaningful account of "want". Fundamentally want is a
matter of volition, and volition is a fact. You choose to abide by life
as the standard of value, or not. You can want to not do that, but
you're not free to evade the consequences.
The only people that have an "is/ought gap" are people that choose to
evade reality, evade facts.
Tym Parsons
George Dance
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
>
> > Objectivist moral theory consists of moral rules that are no more
than
> > hypotheticals: of the form: "If you want X, you must do Y."
>
> negative consequences, but that doesn't mean there's a way of
> accomplishing it.
So wants have to be coherent (consistent, or at least
non-contradictory) with each other. That's an important point, but it's
one that I not only agree with but have made myself. (I don't see how
one could even try to base a theory of ethics on want without
incorportating this point, BTW).
But this does not mean that moral rules are not hypothetical - which
means only that "what you ought to do" is contingent on something else,
in my argument on "what you want to do". Suppose it were a real fact
that I cannot both "do heroin and evade the negative consequences"
(which it might be; you'd have to explain what you mean before I could
agree.) That fact alone gives you me two hypothetical "oughts":
1) If I want to do heroin more than I want to evade the negative
consequences, then I should do heroin;
2) If I want to evade the negative consequences, more than I want to do
heroin, then I should not do heroin.
All that the fact has given me is two possible shoulds, which are not
only compatible but contradictory. The facts alone, in this case, tell
me only that "Either I should do heroin or I should not do heroin" -
which, I hope you'll agree, is not much of a moral rule.
> > This nicely circumvents the is-ought gap [...], by founding
normative
> > rules on something other than descriptive facts, on wants. (A want
is
> > admittedly a type of fact - if you want something, it is a fact that
> > you want it - but your wants are not objective, or mind-independent,
> > facts to you;
>
> I disagree. Wants are objective if they correspond to reality, i.e.
> are consistent with life as the standard of value.
What the hell does "life as the standard of value" mean except having
the want, "I want to live," with which you _want_ all your other wants
to be consistent? What is "objective," or independent of what you
think, about whether you want to live?
Whether all your other wants are consistent with your wanting to live,
is a question to be decided by facts, or "reality". Whether you really
want to eat those mushrooms, for example, depends on whether the
mushrooms are poisonous as well as on whether you want to live).
How you should act (whether you should eat the mushrooms) is
logically entailed by two things: "reality" (whether the mushrooms are
poisonous) and your "standard of value" (whether wanting to live is the
most important value to you). Those are two different things, and you
are simply confusing them.
> > unlike physical or objective facts, a want is a fact that you made
> > up
> > or created, and you know that you have that want simply by believing
> > you have it.)
>
> This isn't a meaningful account of "want". Fundamentally want is a
> matter of volition, and volition is a fact. You choose to abide by
> life as the standard of value, or not.
Is "life is your standard of value" an objective (mind-independent) fact
about you? Then you do not choose it. Do you choose it? Then it is
a "fact" that you made up. You can't have it both ways.
> You can want to not do that,
> but you're not free to evade the consequences.
So "you're not free to evade the consequences". Who said you were? Why
is this even important? I say it is important because you either want
the consequences or do not want the consequences. What are you saying?
> The only people that have an "is/ought gap" are people that choose to
> evade reality, evade facts.
What facts am I evading? Please give one example, from anything that I
have written on this topic.
Kwag7693
>All that the fact has given me is two possible shoulds, which are not
>only compatible but contradictory. The facts alone, in this case, tell
>me only that "Either I should do heroin or I should not do heroin" -
>which, I hope you'll agree, is not much of a moral rule.
Wouldn't one more fact be the actual recognition of how much you desired to
avoid the ill effects of heroin vs. your desire for its good effects?
>How you should act (whether you should eat the mushrooms) is
>logically entailed by two things: "reality" (whether the mushrooms are
>poisonous) and your "standard of value" (whether wanting to live is the
>most important value to you).
Isn't the Objectivist position that wanting to eat the mushroom, knowing that
it is poisonous but not wishing to die, i.e. choosing to eat it on a whim, is
irrational? If you want something that precludes attaining any other wants, in
order for you to be rational, wouldn't the want have to be so great that it
outweighed all other desires?
Kevin
George Dance
Kwag7693 <kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
> George Dance wrote:
>
> >All that the fact has given me is two possible shoulds, which are not
> >only compatible but contradictory. The facts alone, in this case,
tell
> >me only that "Either I should do heroin or I should not do heroin" -
> >which, I hope you'll agree, is not much of a moral rule.
>
desired to
> avoid the ill effects of heroin vs. your desire for its good effects?
YES!!! The needed premise, for you to be able to rationally conclude
that you should not do heroin, is that your action be consistent with
your heirarchy of values; ie, you need a "want" as well as an "is."
>
> >How you should act (whether you should eat the mushrooms) is
> >logically entailed by two things: "reality" (whether the mushrooms
are
> >poisonous) and your "standard of value" (whether wanting to live is
the
> >most important value to you).
>
> Isn't the Objectivist position that wanting to eat the mushroom,
knowing that
> it is poisonous but not wishing to die, i.e. choosing to eat it on a
whim, is
> irrational? If you want something that precludes attaining any other
wants, in
> order for you to be rational, wouldn't the want have to be so great
that it
> outweighed all other desires?
YES!! You choose to live (ie, you want to live), and to act contrary to
that is irrational. The fact that you choose to live is shown by the
fact that you continue to live, for which it is necessary that you act
to live, for which it is necessary that you want to live.
So why be rational? Because you also choose to be rational. That is
also shown by the fact that you continue to live, meaning that you
necessarily act to live; as your actions depend on rational calculation:
1. I want q
2. If p, then q
3. p (1,2)
4. q (2,3)
You choose to be rational, and therefore your wants must be coherent
(consistent with each other) as well as realistic (corresponding to
facts of reality). Moral judgements must be rational.
But all of this follows from, and none of it denies, that your
norms of conduct are derived from your wants, not from facts alone.
>
> Kevin
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> (1) I understand what you and Tym Parsons are saying:
> (2) I agree that it is a correct interpretation of Objectivist ethics;
Good, I already feel like this will be an enjoyable discussion, then.
> I think the only reason that you, Tym, and
> other Objectivists refuse to acknowledge the gap, is because it is
not a
> problem for Objectivism - not because Objectivism denies its reality,
> but because Objectivism has (whether consciously on Rand's part, or
not)
> been built on a foundation that acknowledges the gap's existence, and
> (unlike traditional morality) allows for it.
Of course, I've read what you say below before writing this -- rather
than rearrange the paragraphs, let me say here that I understand where
you're coming from. I would agree (with anyone) that Objectivism does
not and cannot prove per se, or derive, that you (a person) ought to
want to live. Rather, Objectivism says "To live, you ought to do
certain things, and to not live, you ought not do them."
As I said before, this means there is no "gap" per se because each
"is," or the fundamental "is" of existence, yields opposing "oughts."
It doesn't fail to yield a derivable "ought" -- rather, opposing
"oughts" may be derived.
It seems that you are calling the choice between "oughts" the "gap."
But that isn't what others mean by the "gap." They mean you can't
derive any "ought" at all. They are of course wrong.
> Virtually all traditional (pre-Hume) morality, and all deontological
> (both pre- and post-Hume) morality, is absolutist - what mainstream
> philosophers call 'objectivist,' and what Objectivists call
> 'intrinsicist.' The central claim of this type of morality is that
> there are moral or normative truths - truths about what should be -
just
> as there are physical or descriptive truths - truths about what is.
Hmm, that's not what Objectivism means in the word "intrinsicism."
"Intrinsicism" in Objectivist terms is acceptance of "universals" i.e.
that "chairness" exists independent of the concept of chairs.
> What is, is a matter of fact, and truth is correspondence with those
> physical facts - what you believe about what is, is a matter of
opinion
> - in determining what is, facts trump opinion, meaning that the truth
> trumps your beliefs.
That's Objectivist, indeed. Again, I want to note that that is not what
Objectivism refers to as "intrinsicism."
Let me add that what you believe is not a matter of opinion when you're
right and know it!
> Well, you probably reasoned (unconsciously or 'intuitively'):
>
> 11. If I drive too fast on this road, I could have an accident.
> 12. I should not have an accident.
> 13. Therefore I should slow down. (11,12)
> 14. To slow down, I should ease up on the gas pedal.
> 15. Therefore I should ease up on the gas pedal. (13,14)
> But where does 12 come from? 12 is not a statement of fact at all.
But it comes from wanting to live, of course. Isn't "I want to live"
really the statement you want to address here? "I should not have an
accident" simply follows from "I want to live," so the latter is the
thing at issue.
> And so on. The point being that, every normative conclusion you reach
> (6, 8, 12) is always the product, in part, of a normative premise.
I agree, but because I say that the premise at the root is "I want to
live."
> At no time do you reach a normative conclusion based
> on factual or descriptive premises alone.
In a technical sense, I don't agree -- "I want to live" is still a
fact. I think what you are really thinking is that you can't derive "I
want to live" in the same way that you can 2 + 2 = 4. The former is
normative -- it is still a fact, however. You note this below.
> However, it was not entirely
> based on facts. What else, then, was it based on?
> For it had to be based on something: you cannot trace this chain of
> normative premises and conclusions back to infinity. There has to
be a
> first "should", which is either an arbitrary premise, or based on
> something else.
It's hardly arbitrary. :)
> What your initial "should' came from was a want.
As you see, I agree!
> 2. I should do what I want to do.
There's been a wrong turn somewhere, because the argument about the car
makes definite assumptions about what has been wanted here rather than
simply traces back to "wanting something." The argument surely seems to
assume "I want to live."
> Ayn Rand's solution to this dilemma (in brief) was to found her moral
> theory on nothing but Hypothetical Imperatives (exactly as both you
and
> Tym have stated them). Objectivist moral theory consists of moral
rules
> that are no more than hypotheticals: of the form: "If you want X, you
> must do Y." This nicely circumvents the is-ought gap nicely, by
> founding normative rules on something other than descriptive facts, on
> wants. (A want is admittedly a type of fact - if you want something,
it
> is a fact that you want it - but your wants are not objective, or
> mind-independent, facts to you; unlike physical or objective facts, a
> want is a fact that you made up or created, and you know that you have
> that want simply by believing you have it.)
Yes, but there are fundamentally two, "I want to live" and "I don't
want to live." The fact that either is "made up" doesn't change what
follows from either and doesn't change the fact that specific things
follow from either.
If you were to say that there is a "want to live gap" and that
"Objectivism can't tell me to want to live," that's true. Objectivism
notes that *if* you want to live you must do certain things. It can't
tell you to want to live -- how can it when your life might be
unpleasant or something? But this is not the "is-ought gap" described
by others. They mean that "oughts" do not follow from "ises" at all.
Yes, they do -- in pairs.
-- at no extra charge
Kwag7693
>> Wouldn't one more fact be the actual recognition of how much you
>desired to
>> avoid the ill effects of heroin vs. your desire for its good effects?
>
>YES!!! The needed premise, for you to be able to rationally conclude
>that you should not do heroin, is that your action be consistent with
>your heirarchy of values; ie, you need a "want" as well as an "is."
I disagree. "I want X" is a fact. I might be wrong about my want, e.g., in
full light of the effects of some act I might wish in retrospect that I hadn't
done it. But I don't see how a want points to some special type of occurrence
that differs from any other fact.
>YES!! You choose to live (ie, you want to live), and to act contrary to
>that is irrational. The fact that you choose to live is shown by the
>fact that you continue to live, for which it is necessary that you act
>to live, for which it is necessary that you want to live.
Sounds good to me.
>So why be rational? Because you also choose to be rational. That is
>also shown by the fact that you continue to live, meaning that you
>necessarily act to live; as your actions depend on rational calculation:
People choose to be rational because they learn pretty quickly that reality is
intractable to their will. I don't think they choose to desire to live. If
you aren't rational you don't achieve what you value, but you don't appear to
have much choice about the most basic values.
>1. I want q
>2. If p, then q
>3. p (1,2)
>4. q (2,3)
No arguments here.
>But all of this follows from, and none of it denies, that your
>norms of conduct are derived from your wants, not from facts alone.
Why is a desire not a fact? I really like turkey and would like to have some
soon. If true, that sounds like a fact to me.
Kevin
Tym Parsons
> So wants have to be coherent (consistent, or at least
> non-contradictory) with each other.
I.e. rational.
> That's an important point, but it's one that I not only agree with but
> have made myself. (I don't see how one could even try to base a theory
> of ethics on want without incorportating this point, BTW).
Hedonism tries to.
<snip>
> Suppose it were a real fact that I cannot both "do heroin and evade
> the negative consequences" (which it might be; you'd have to explain
> what you mean before I could agree.)
Oh I think you already know what I mean; just will yourself to grasp it
;-)
> That fact alone gives you me two hypothetical "oughts":
>
> 1) If I want to do heroin more than I want to evade the negative
> consequences, then I should do heroin;
No, you shouldn't do heroin, because it's not consistent with life as
the standard of value. If life is NOT your standard of value, i.e. if
you choose NOT to live, the whole point of "shoulds" is moot; and it's
meaningless to say that you should do heroin. Life, in particular one's
own life, is the only thing in nature that can be seen to be an end in
itself. It is only "life" that gives "should" meaning. The sole
alternative, death, requires no action in order to realise: you need do
nothing. So there are no "shoulds" involved there.
> 2) If I want to evade the negative consequences, more than I want to
> do heroin, then I should not do heroin.
No, you shouldn't do heroin, because it's not consistent with life as
the standard of value <etc>.
> All that the fact has given me is two possible shoulds, which are not
> only compatible but contradictory. The facts alone, in this case,
> tell me only that "Either I should do heroin or I should not do
> heroin" - which, I hope you'll agree, is not much of a moral rule.
Agreed; which is why this isn't the Objectivist account of why there
isn't an is/ought gap ;-)
The error is in not adducing an additional fact: that life is the
standard of value.
<snip>
> > > Is "life is your standard of value" an objective
> > > (mind-independent) fact about you? Then you do not choose it. Do
> > > you choose it? Then it is a "fact" that you made up. You can't
> > > have it both ways.
> >
> > You can want to not do that, but you're not free to evade the
> > consequences.
>
> So "you're not free to evade the consequences". Who said you were?
Primacy of consciousness types. People who implicitly or explicitly
hold that consciousness creates its own reality. E.g. hedonists.
> Why is this even important?
It's important because some people don't hold rationality as a virtue.
> I say it is important because you either want the consequences or do
> not want the consequences. What are you saying?
I'm saying it's important to be rational i.e. consistent with reality,
because that's the only way you can gain/keep life, the ultimate value
and standard of value.
> > The only people that have an "is/ought gap" are people that choose
> > to evade reality, evade facts.
>
> What facts am I evading? Please give one example, from anything that
> I have written on this topic.
I'm not saying that _you're_ evading :)
What I said above is in reference to what I said before: you choose to
abide by life as the standard of value, or not. You can want to not do
that, but you're not free to evade the consequences.
That's all I meant.
Tym Parsons
George Dance
Kwag7693 <kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
> ... "I want X" is a fact. I might be wrong about my want, e.g., in
> full light of the effects of some act I might wish in retrospect that
> I hadn't
> done it. But I don't see how a want points to some special type of
> occurrence that differs from any other fact.
I think you are making a "category error" here; it may be a fact that
you want something, but that something is not itself a fact.
Suppose I believed that (S) "the sun revolves around the earth." It
would be a certain, indisputable fact that (S') "I believe S", but S'
does not be itself establish the truth of S. S is true or false only by
reference to another fact, the fact of whether the sun actually revolves
around the earth or not. It is not true by reference to S'. S' may
derive only from (S") "I want the sun to revolve around the earth", but
S" has nothing to do with the truth of S. While S" may be indubitably,
it does not follow in any way, from the truth of S", that S is true.
Similarly, suppose I believed that (T) "I should eat turkey this
Sunday." It would similarly be a certain, indisputable fact that (T')
"I believe I should eat turkey this Sunday," which in this case seems to
be the same thing as (T") "I want to eat turkey this Sunday." So T' and
T" are apparently true, as they correspond to facts about me; but T is
not true by reference to them, any more than S is true by reference to
S' and S". The truth of T is established (just as the truth of S is
established) by reference to some objective fact - whether I should in
reality eat turkey or not. And, unlike the fact that proves the truth
of S, there is no apparent fact that proves the truth of T.
> People choose to be rational because they learn pretty quickly that
reality is
> intractable to their will. I don't think they choose to desire to
live. If
> you aren't rational you don't achieve what you value, but you don't
> appear to have much choice about the most basic values.
This sounds wrong. I cannot imagine any more basic value than wanting
to live; yet lots of people choose not to live. I am sure that someone
in the world is committing suicide as I type this.
> >1. I want q
> >2. If p, then q
> >3. p (1,2)
> >4. q (2,3)
>
> No arguments here.
Thank you. You might have accused me of making a "category error" here;
instead you apparently made the effort to understand what I meant.
>
> Why is a desire not a fact? I really like turkey and would like to
have some
> soon. If true, that sounds like a fact to me.
I have shown one difference between a want and a fact, above. Here is
another. Consider the statements:
(T1) "I had turkey last Thanksgiving."
(T2) "I should have turkey next Thanksgiving."
T1 refers to something that happened in the past. That is why T1 is a
proposition, or a statement that is either true or false. What
happened last Thanksgiving, happened; there is a fact of the matter,
which does not depend on what I believe happened last Thanksgiving. I
can establish, by memory, testimony, and even observation of physical
evidence (eg, a shopping receipt showing that I purchased a turkey),
whether T1 is true or not.
T2, OTOH, refers to an imagined future. It does not refer to anything
in the past - therefore it does not refer to anything that existed or
occurred - therefore it does not refer to any facts. There is no way to
establish whether T2 is true or false; even if I get no turkey next
Thanksgiving, I can still believe that "I should have." As T2 does not
refer to the real past (or present), it does not correspond to any
facts.
Why is this unclear? Probably only because "should" is seldom used in
this purely normative sense. In particular, T2 can be confused with a
different statement:
(T3) I will eat turkey next Thanksgiving.
which is a proposition, one that can be verified as true or false the
day after next Thanksgiving. Like T2, T3 also seems to refer to an
imagined future; but T3 can be established (tentatively) as true or
false before Thanksgiving as well. However, those facts are not (just
as they were not for T1) what I want or believe; rather they are things
that have existed or occurred, in the past. For example, if I have
arranged to eat at a friend's house on Thanksgiving, and was told that
turkey would be served (both past events), I would have good reason to
believe that T3 was true. If neither were the case, but I always dined
at that friend's house on Thanksgiving, and he always served turkey
(past events, again), I would still have (weaker) grounds for believing
that T3 was true. What I mean, by T3, is that there are past or present
facts, or states of affairs, that I believe are sufficient for a further
state of affairs (that I eat turkey on Thanksgiving) to obtain in the
real (not just the imagined) future.
T3 is purely factual (although the facts are incomplete), and has
nothing to do with the normative, or moral, question of whether I should
eat turkey next Thanksgiving or not. That is what T2 is discussing,
which is not a factual question at all. Once T2 is properly
distinguished from T3, that becomes obvious.
Kwag7693
>Sunday."
Perhaps I should or perhaps I shouldn't, but the fact that I want to is a
given. I am not confused that human belief in a fact makes it true.
>The truth of T is established (just as the truth of S is
>established) by reference to some objective fact - whether I should in
>reality eat turkey or not. And, unlike the fact that proves the truth
>of S, there is no apparent fact that proves the truth of T.
I believe there is. If I want to, and would continue to want to in light of
knowledge of the effects of doing so, then it is a fact that I should. I tend
to figure out what I should do by reference to what I want to occur. There
isn't anything but factual data involved in that, excepting my attempts at
guessing what will happen when I do something and whether or not achieving the
results I desire will satisfy me. Are you a non-naturalist? What do you think
shoulds and oughts correspond to if not human desire?
Kevin
Kwag7693
>If life is NOT your standard of value, i.e. if
>you choose NOT to live, the whole point of "shoulds" is moot; and it's
>meaningless to say that you should do heroin.
People do choose to end their life, and apparently do so within a value
framework. How is this consistent with life as the penultimate standard of
value? If people choose to end their life, there must be some standard of
value governing their life which can allow them to decide it is time to end it.
Kevin
George Dance
db...@tampatrib.com wrote:
> Of course, I've read what you say below before writing this -- rather
> than rearrange the paragraphs, let me say here that I understand where
> you're coming from. I would agree (with anyone) that Objectivism does
> not and cannot prove per se, or derive, that you (a person) ought to
> want to live. Rather, Objectivism says "To live, you ought to do
> certain things, and to not live, you ought not do them."
No quarrel here - except that what you have derived here is not a moral
statement, but a proposition (or descriptive statement) about a causal
relation, of the form "If X, then Y", or "For Y to occur, X must occur".
It is not a normative statement, which is an imperative of the form:
"(You ought to) do X." Rather, it says only that you ought to do X or
you ought not to do X, depending on something else than the
proposition's truth.
> As I said before, this means there is no "gap" per se because each
> "is," or the fundamental "is" of existence, yields opposing "oughts."
> It doesn't fail to yield a derivable "ought" -- rather, opposing
> "oughts" may be derived.
The statement "You ought to do X or you ought not to do X" is not a
moral or "ought" statement, despite the presence of the word in there.
Rather, an "ought" statement is a statement of the form "You ought to do
X, and you ought not to not do X." You cannot derive the latter from
the former alone.
> It seems that you are calling the choice between "oughts" the "gap."
> But that isn't what others mean by the "gap." They mean you can't
> derive any "ought" at all. They are of course wrong.
That may be what Hume (if you count him as one of the others) implied
by, or inferred from, his own argument, but not what his argument
proved. What Hume examined was the question "whether it be possible
from reason alone, to distinguish between moral good and evil, or
whether there must concur some other principles to enable us to make
that distinction" (THN, II:III, "Of Morals;"). All that his evidence of
the "gap" showed was that the former was not the case, and that those
"other principles" (which, we both appear to be agreeing, are wants)
were needed.
> "Intrinsicism" in Objectivist terms is acceptance of "universals" i.e.
> that "chairness" exists independent of the concept of chairs.
"Goodness" and "badness," to a moral intrinsicist, are such universals.
To an intrinsicist, a particular item is a "chair" if and only if it
corresponds to the aprioristically known universal of "chairness."
Similarly, particular actions or events are "good" if and only if they
correspond to the similarly aprioristically known universal of
"goodness."
> > What is, is a matter of fact, and truth is correspondence with those
> > physical facts - what you believe about what is, is a matter of
> opinion
> > - in determining what is, facts trump opinion, meaning that the
> > truth trumps your beliefs.
>
> That's Objectivist, indeed. Again, I want to note that that is not
> what Objectivism refers to as "intrinsicism."
That is what "truth" means, by the correspondence theory. Both
"intrisicists" and Objectivists believe they know such truth about
physical reality; however, moral intrinsicists believe that they also
know such truths about "moral reality" (the facts about what should be)
as well.
> Let me add that what you believe is not a matter of opinion when
> you're right and know it!
"You're right" does not have to mean "what you believe is true." I am
not arguing that there can be no normative standards of right and wrong,
just that they have nothing to do with moral "truth", meaning simple
correspondence with "moral facts."
<snip>
> Isn't "I want to live"
> really the statement you want to address here? "I should not have an
> accident" simply follows from "I want to live," so the latter is the
> thing at issue....
> I agree, but because I say that the premise at the root is "I want to
> live."
Agreed. You are deriving the normative statement "I should not have an
accident" from "If I have an accident, I might die" (a proposition about
causality) and "I should live" (a normative statement that itself comes
from "I want to live.")
> > At no time do you reach a normative conclusion based
> > on factual or descriptive premises alone.
>
> In a technical sense, I don't agree -- "I want to live" is still a
> fact. I think what you are really thinking is that you can't derive "I
> want to live" in the same way that you can 2 + 2 = 4. The former is
> normative -- it is still a fact, however. You note this below.
But "I should live" is not a fact (as I note in my reply to Kwag); and
"I want to live" is not an objective fact (as I noted below).
<snip>
> > What your initial "should' came from was a want.
>
> As you see, I agree!
Yep.
>
> > 2. I should do what I want to do.
>
> There's been a wrong turn somewhere, because the argument about the
car
> makes definite assumptions about what has been wanted here rather than
> simply traces back to "wanting something." The argument surely seems
> to assume "I want to live."
But it derives "I should live" from both "I want to live" and from 2.
I am not saying that one must interpret 2 as meaning "I should do
anything and everything I want to do", BTW - I can imagine cases where I
might want to do something - I see something in a store which I cannot
afford, but can easily shoplift, eg - but realize that I should not do
that particular thing. All that 2 means is that this "should" that
seemingly contradicts my want, must itself be based on some other want
of mine.
<snip>
> > (A want is admittedly a type of fact - if you want something, it
> > is a fact that you want it - but your wants are not objective, or
> > mind-independent, facts to you; unlike physical or objective facts,
a
> > want is a fact that you made up or created, and you know that you
have
> > that want simply by believing you have it.)
>
> Yes, but there are fundamentally two, "I want to live" and "I don't
> want to live." The fact that either is "made up" doesn't change what
> follows from either and doesn't change the fact that specific things
> follow from either.
Completely agreed. Choosing either fundamental want means choosing
an end that in turn necessitates choosing other actions as means; the
choice of means is a matter of objective facts as well as of the choice
of ends.
> If you were to say that there is a "want to live gap" and that
> "Objectivism can't tell me to want to live," that's true. Objectivism
> notes that *if* you want to live you must do certain things. It can't
> tell you to want to live -- how can it when your life might be
> unpleasant or something? But this is not the "is-ought gap" described
> by others. They mean that "oughts" do not follow from "ises" at all.
> Yes, they do -- in pairs.
But these pairs are not moral "oughts". Suppose you were to ask me,
"How do I get to Alaska?", and I were to reply, "Either you should go
north or you should not go north," you would not agree that I were
giving you accurate directions. That is because I know what your want
is (to go to Alaska). If I did not know that - if you had only asked
me, "In which direction should I travel?", then I could not give you, on
that basis alone, more explicit directions. The same with your paired
"oughts" - real oughts, or prescribed norms of action, can be inferred
from them alone, but only in combination with wants. And that, I think,
is exactly what those who claim that there is an "is-ought gap" are
saying.
--
- 30 -
George Dance
> bert writes:
>
> >1. No evaluative predicate (e.g., "good") is equivalent in sense to
any
> >descriptive predicate or conjunction of descriptive predicates (e.g.,
> >"maximizes preference-satisfaction over the set of all human
beings").
<snip>
> Would "I like it," meet your idea of a descriptive predicate?
Actually "I like X" is a descriptive proposition. "X is something I
like" is a proposition with a descriptive predicate ("something I
like"). Both propositions are, as you note, descriptive.
Notice, though, that what they describe is something about you. Neither
of them are descriptive propositions about X, in the way that "X is
large", "X is red", or "X is made of wood" are. While both of the
latter depend on how you perceive X, they both purport to give
information about X, not just reports about your perceptions,
Similarly, "X is good" purports to give information about X itself,
rather than just a report on your emotional reaction to it. "X is good"
may follow from "I like X", just as "X is red" follows from "I see
redness in X", but these are not meant as equivalent statements; the
first two are about X, while the second two are about you.
Similarly, all of the equivalents to "X is good"
"X is right"
"X is wonderful"
"X is great"
"X is awesome"
"X is radical"
"X is the cat's pyjamas" etc.
are meant as statements about X, yet none of them give any facts about
X. One cannot show any of them to be true or false by reference to X
alone, as one can do by "X is red" etc. That is what it means to say
the former are not descriptive propositions - they are statements about
X, but none of them actually describes X.
(BTW, if you ever hear someone say that "Double chocolate ice cream is
the cat's pyjamas," do NOT interpret that as a descriptive proposition
and attempt to put ice cream on a sleeping cat. Not a pretty sight 8)
Kwag7693
>of them are descriptive propositions about X, in the way that "X is
>large", "X is red", or "X is made of wood" are.
I disagree that 'X is red' is more descriptive of X than 'I find X likeable'.
I have to find X red as well or I would be able to make the claim. 'Wooden' is
just as relational a concept as 'red' or 'good' or 'sweet'.
>While both of the
>latter depend on how you perceive X, they both purport to give
>information about X, not just reports about your perceptions
They do? Red inheres in the object? How odd of one to make factual claims
about what one cannot perceive.
>"X is good"
>may follow from "I like X", just as "X is red" follows from "I see
>redness in X", but these are not meant as equivalent statements; the
>first two are about X, while the second two are about you.
If they are made as some kind of a priori claims, then they beggar
justification. If they are a posteriori, I don't see your point.
>are meant as statements about X, yet none of them give any facts about
>X. One cannot show any of them to be true or false by reference to X
>alone, as one can do by "X is red" etc.
How can you figure out X is red by referencing it alone and not your perception
of it?
Kevin
Bert Clanton
utterances, etc.:
1. The emotivists are correct, in my view, when they say that the sense of
"X is good" is essentially a sentiment of positive regard toward X, rather
than a supposition about some fact of the matter involving X. (By the
"sense" of a predicate or utterance, *I* mean essentially "the subjective
experience which the utterer intends that predicate or utterance to evoke in
the addressee".)
2. If I am correct in this supposition, then an utterance like "X is good"
asserts nothing about X, but simply expresses the sentiment of some valuer
with respect to X, or is intended to evoke such a sentiment in its
addressee. Hence such a valuative utterance can be neither true nor false,
any more than "Hooray for X!" can be true or false.
3. Hence a valuative utterance cannot be a valid conclusion in any
deductive argument all of whose premises are true descriptive statements.
For if such a valuative utterance were the valid conclusion of such an
argument,that valuative utterance would have to have the truth-value "true".
But no valuative utterance has truth-value "true". So in colloquial terms,
no "is" can logically imply any "good": there really is an "is/good" gap.
4. Moreover, in my view, the sense of a motivative statement such as "You
ought to perform act Y" or "Act Y is right" is an inclination on the part of
the addressee to perform act Y, not a supposition about some fact of the
matter about Y. Hence such a motivative utterance can be neither true nor
false, any more than "Do Y!" can be true or false.
5. So as with valuative utterances, no motivative utterance can be a valid
conclusion in any deductive argument all of whose premises are true
descriptive statements. For if the motivative utterance were the valid
conclusion of such an argument, it would have to have the truth-value
"true". But no motivative utterance has truth-value "true". So again, in
colloquial terms, no "is" can logically imply any "ought": there really is
an "is/ought" gap.
6. For simplicity, assume a value-system V with one item or state of affairs
X which is assumed without argument to be worthy of approval, i.e., one
"axiomatic desideratum" X. Assume the single value axiom "X is worthy of
approval (under value-system V)". Assume the following (consequentialist)
rule of derivation:
a. If W is an item or state of affairs which is a means to item or state of
affairs X, and X is worthy of approval under value-system V, then Y is
worthy of approval under V.
b. If Z is an act which is a means to item or state of affairs X, and X is
worthy of approval under value-system V, then Z is performanceworthy under
V.
Note that "worthy of approval under V" and "performanceworthy under V" are
*descriptive* predicates, not respectively *valuative* and *motivative*
predicates; and that "X is worthy of approval under V" and "Z is
performanceworthy under V" are *descriptive* statements, not respectively
valuative and motivative statements. While there is no fact of the matter
about whether X is "good" or one "ought to so" Z, there is a fact of the
matter about whether X meets the criteria for approvalworthiness embodied in
value-system V, or whether Z meets the criteria for performanceworthiness
embodied in V.
7. Assume the following consequentialist "warrants" for valuative and
motivative utterances:
a. Ceteris paribus, the valuative utterance "W is good" is justified under
value-system V if and only if W is approvalworthy under V, i.e., if and only
if W is either identical to, or a means to, the axiomatic desideratum X.
b. Ceteris paribus, the motivative utterance "Act Z ought to be performed"
is justified under value-system V if and only if act Z is a means to the
axiomatic desideratum X.
Note that warrant a. does not *equate* the valuative utterance "W is good"
to the descriptive statement "W is approvalworthy under V", but rather
*justifies* "W is good" under the principle that if W is worthy of approval,
then an utterance is justified which is intended to express or evoke a
sentiment of positive regard toward W. Note further that warrant b. does not
*equate* the motivative utterance "You ought to do Z" to the descriptive
statement "W is performanceworthy under V", but rather *justifies* "You
ought to do Z" under the principle that if act Z is worthy of being
performed, then an utterance is justified which is intended to evoke an
inclination in its addressee to perform act Z. So in neither case has the
"Naturalistic Fallacy" been committed.
Best wishes,
Bert
George Dance
Kwag7693 <kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
> >Similarly, suppose I believed that (T) "I should eat turkey this
> >Sunday."
>
> is a given.
Agreed.
> I am not confused that human belief in a fact makes it true.
I am confused by this sentence. Believing that you have a want does
create the fact that you have the want.
> >The truth of T is established (just as the truth of S is
> >established) by reference to some objective fact - whether I should
in
> >reality eat turkey or not. And, unlike the fact that proves the
truth
> >of S, there is no apparent fact that proves the truth of T.
>
> I believe there is. If I want to, and would continue to want to in
light of
> knowledge of the effects of doing so, then it is a fact that I should.
So you simply create a "fact", by believing it, and that "fact" gives
you a true belief? I actually consider that to be a reasonable account
of how people actually make moral judgements; but I hope you see how
easily it can be challenged. (Not that I would 8)
> I tend
> to figure out what I should do by reference to what I want to occur.
> There
> isn't anything but factual data involved in that, excepting my
> attempts at
> guessing what will happen when I do something and whether or not
> achieving the results I desire will satisfy me.
"What I want to occur" and "the results I desire" are facts only because
you believe they are. They are not objective facts of reality.
> Are you a non-naturalist? What do you think
> shoulds and oughts correspond to if not human desire?
I certainly think they are logically derived from desires. I would have
hoped that this at least was clear from what I had written.
>
> Kevin
George Dance
Kwag7693 <kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
> >Notice, though, that what they describe is something about you.
Neither
> >of them are descriptive propositions about X, in the way that "X is
> >large", "X is red", or "X is made of wood" are.
>
> I disagree that 'X is red' is more descriptive of X than 'I find X
> likeable'.
> I have to find X red as well or I would be able to make the claim.
> 'Wooden' is just as relational a concept as 'red' or 'good' or
> 'sweet'.
I think I see what you are saying: that "X is red" means only "I see
redness in X," and "Y is wooden" means only "it appears to me that Y is
made of wood." But while those rephrasings make it clear that we are
talking only about our perceptions, they still show equally clearly that
we are talking about the objects themselves; both sentences are
meant to convey information about X and Y in themselves. Whereas it has
not been shown that "Z is good" says anything about Z in itself.
> >While both of the
> >latter depend on how you perceive X, they both purport to give
> >information about X, not just reports about your perceptions
>
> They do? Red inheres in the object? How odd of one to make factual
> claims about what one cannot perceive.
There is something inherent in the object that gives rise to the
perception. My cigarette package remains red without any action on my
part, except that of looking in its direction. Whereas I don't perceive
any "goodness" from it, or any other object. (It could be the case that
I perceive "goodness" through some "moral sense", which would of course
make "goodness" a property of the object, and my "liking" it just the
way I experience the perception. But there's no evidence of that.)
> >"X is good"
> >may follow from "I like X", just as "X is red" follows from "I see
> >redness in X", but these are not meant as equivalent statements; the
> >first two are about X, while the second two are about you.
>
> If they are made as some kind of a priori claims, then they beggar
> justification. If they are a posteriori, I don't see your point.
I think that:
(1) There is a fact of the matter about color. Grass is green: people
who say it is orange are lying or halluncinating; people who see it as
grey are color-blind. This fact does not depend on my perceptions
although (in the case of grass) it matches them; I can imagine cases in
which my perception could be wrong about a color.
(2) There are no such independent facts of the matter about morality.
Whether I see something as good or bad, depends primarily on me.
That is the distinction I am trying to show, which is the point. To deny
it means either to deny (1) (and say color is subjective) or deny (2)
(and claim morality is objective). (I still am not sure which one you
are denying, BTW.)
> >are meant as statements about X, yet none of them give any facts
about
> >X. One cannot show any of them to be true or false by reference to X
> >alone, as one can do by "X is red" etc.
>
> How can you figure out X is red by referencing it alone and not your
> perception of it?
Testimony is one way. Another would be to measure the light being
reflected off X. While both those methods rely on perception, too, they
are not my visual perception of X; they are independent sources of data,
which can confirm or even refute my perception.
I see nothing similar for morality.
Tym Parsons
> People do choose to end their life, and apparently do so within a
> value framework. How is this consistent with life as the penultimate
> standard of value? If people choose to end their life, there must be
> some standard of value governing their life which can allow them to
> decide it is time to end it.
Yes there is. The standard is still life i.e. a flourishing existence.
Ending your life is appropriate if flourishing isn't possible.
Tym Parsons
Kwag7693
>Ending your life is appropriate if flourishing isn't possible.
So flourishing is the overarching standard by which one would value or disvalue
a life. Fine, that was Aristotle's view too. How neat that the Greeks got it
right so long ago. How odd though that you cling to life as the standard when
you just mentioned the criterion by which you would evaluate a given life. If
there can be such a thing as non-flourishing life, and I think there can, you
too would find it reasonable to suicide. Don't you see some tension between
calling life the STANDARD of value and then subdividing it into preferable and
non-preferable kinds?
Kevin
Kwag7693
>
>I am confused by this sentence. Believing that you have a want does
>create the fact that you have the want.
No, I was responding to your apparent assertion that I was confusing knowing I
had a want with knowing fulfilling that want would achieve my ultimate goals.
>So you simply create a "fact", by believing it, and that "fact" gives
>you a true belief? I actually consider that to be a reasonable account
>of how people actually make moral judgements; but I hope you see how
>easily it can be challenged. (Not that I would 8)
My preferences are facts, and so are my ultimate preferences. I am not sure
how one would challenge this. If someone persisted in claiming that he found
murder so pleasant that he would do it even when threatened with being killed,
and if he did in fact find it pleasant and coherent with the rest of value
system, and if his value system did happen to lead him to happy life then I
would be hard pressed to say he made the wrong decision in committing murder.
Of course I would still advocate locking him up. I find eating cows to be
great and while I have bumped off none I think I could. Now a cow probably
finds this to be a terrible view for me to have. However, since a cow's
greatest value to me is as a steak and a maker of milk, tough. If it so
happened that cows were rational, they would, one, be a big threat to ranchers,
thus mitigating their food value, and, two, have other value to me than food,
and probably be a greater value to me than food. Say that something needs to
eat whole humans to live. Well it wants to live, so eating people is good.
The human standard of value is not its own. This is a fact and I don't see how
it might be challenged. It is absolutely right in the context of its own life
to value eating folks.
>"What I want to occur" and "the results I desire" are facts only because
>you believe they are. They are not objective facts of reality.
What does this mean? Independent of your belief, I do want them to occur. My
value system can't be independent of my own consciousness. How is this an
indcitment? Are you claiming that consciousness is non-objective? Not even
the idealists do that. Consciousness exists, and whatever state of
consciousness does exist is objectively there. My pleasure at living is not
really an option for me. I cannot on a whim decide to enjoy pain. It hurts
and hurting is something I don't like.
>I certainly think they are logically derived from desires. I would have
>hoped that this at least was clear from what I had written.
I guess so, but then I don't get what you mean by a given desire of mine not
being an objective fact. Having a given desire, for me, is contingent only on
being aware and thinking the desire is coherent with my basic desire (that is,
that if I knew that fulfilling any given desire would truly result in me being
happy). That's a fact. I like being happy and I have no choice about it.
Kevin
Kwag7693
>any more than "Hooray for X!" can be true or false.
What if I think Boo for X but say Hurrah? Is it true or false then? X makes
me happy can be true or false. How does X is good differ from X makes me
happy?
>Moreover, in my view, the sense of a motivative statement such as "You
>ought to perform act Y" or "Act Y is right" is an inclination on the part of
>the addressee to perform act Y, not a supposition about some fact of the
>matter about Y. Hence such a motivative utterance can be neither true nor
>false, any more than "Do Y!" can be true or false.
How about claiming that if the addressee did Y it would make them happy? Why
would one commend an action in the first place? If I say "try the ice cream;
it is good," I mean "Try the ice cream; it makes me happy and I expect you will
feel similarly." Why would a purely motivative view of "good" be of ethical
import?
Kevin
Bert Clanton
<kwag...@aol.com> wrote:
>>Hence such a valuative utterance can be neither true nor false,
>>any more than "Hooray for X!" can be true or false.
>
> What if I think Boo for X but say Hurrah? Is it true or false then? X makes
> me happy can be true or false. How does X is good differ from X makes me
> happy?
>
If you think "Boo for X!" and you say "Hooray for X", then you are making an
utterance which, if your addressee assents to your utterance, will probably
have the result of inducing him to feel toward X a feeling opposite to the
feeling that you have toward X. But this doesn't imply that *either feeling*
about X represents any *fact* involving X.
In my view, "X is good" is a valuative utterance, an utterance which is
intended by its utterer to evoke in its addressee a positive feeling toward
X, but does not propose that X has any particular property ("X is yellow"),
or has membership in any particular category ("X is an aardvark"), or
participates in any particular relation ("X is older than Y"). Insofar as "X
is good" is a valuative utterance, it is neither true nor false.
On the other hand, "X makes me happy" is a descriptive statement, not a
valuative utterance. It states a fact involving a relationship between you
and X."
>>Moreover, in my view, the sense of a motivative statement such as "You
>>ought to perform act Y" or "Act Y is right" is an inclination on the part of
>>the addressee to perform act Y, not a supposition about some fact of the
>>matter about Y. Hence such a motivative utterance can be neither true nor
>>false, any more than "Do Y!" can be true or false.
>
> How about claiming that if the addressee did Y it would make them happy? Why
> would one commend an action in the first place? If I say "try the ice cream;
> it is good," I mean "Try the ice cream; it makes me happy and I expect you
will
> feel similarly." Why would a purely motivative view of "good" be of ethical
> import?
>
If I claimed that if the addressee did Y it would make him happy, I'd be
using a *descriptive statement* to assert a *fact* about Y and the addressee
and happiness, not using a *valuative utterance* to evoke positive feeling
toward act Y, or a *motivative utterance* to induce an inclination in
someone to commit act* Y.
I believe that one would commend an action Y in order to induce in someone
an inclination to do Y. Such a commendation is precisely what I describe as
a motivative utterance. Such a commendation is not a statement of fact about
Y.
If I say "Try the ice cream", I'm uttering a motivative statement to induce
you to try the ice cream; I'm not stating a fact about ice cream. If I say
"It's good", I'm uttering a valuative statement to evoke in you a feeling of
positive regard toward ice cream, not stating a fact about ice cream. If I
say, "It (ice cream) makes me happy", I'm stating a fact involving me and
ice cream, not trying to induce anybody to like ice cream. If I say "I
expect that you would like ice cream if you tried it", I'd be making a
factual statement about what I expect, not a factual statement or valuative
utterance about ice cream.
In my view, a purely valuative usage of "good" and a purely motivative usage
of "ought" are quite sufficient for ethical purposes, *provided* that
a. you get to use the valuative term "good" if and only if what you label
"good" meets the *descriptive* criteria for approvalworthiness embodied in
the value-system which you adhere to; and
b. you get to use the motivative term "ought" if and only if what you say
"ought to be done" meets the *descriptive* criteria for
performanceworthiness embodied in that value-system.
Best wishes,
Bert
Tym Parsons
> >The standard is still life i.e. a flourishing existence.
> >Ending your life is appropriate if flourishing isn't possible.
>
> So flourishing is the overarching standard by which one would value or
> disvalue a life.
No. Life is the standard. Life = existence + flourishing.
<snip>
> Don't you see some tension between calling life the STANDARD of value
> and then subdividing it into preferable and non-preferable kinds?
I don't do that; see above.
Kwag7693
eubio...@home.com writes:
> If you think "Boo for X!" and you say "Hooray for X", then you are making an
> utterance which, if your addressee assents to your utterance, will probably
> have the result of inducing him to feel toward X a feeling opposite to the
> feeling that you have toward X. But this doesn't imply that *either feeling*
> about X represents any *fact* involving X.
Well, I am lying in my example. I think hurrah indicates my feelings and that
is an objective fact about me.
> In my view, "X is good" is a valuative utterance, an utterance which is
> intended by its utterer to evoke in its addressee a positive feeling toward
> X, but does not propose that X has any particular property ("X is yellow"),
> or has membership in any particular category ("X is an aardvark"), or
> participates in any particular relation ("X is older than Y"). Insofar as "X
> is good" is a valuative utterance, it is neither true nor false.
I don't think X is yellow indicates any particular property in the sense you
appear to mean. No given thing is really yellow any more than it is really
good. It is all context dependent. The context of color includes my eyes and
the quality of light and the object I look at. The context of good includes a
valuer, a valuata and some relationship there between. X is good can assert
that X is in the category of things I deem to make me happy. Good can be used
in many ways. Are you proposing that your use is a prescriptive or a
descriptive definition? Are you reforming the use of the word or are you
certain that no one means anything but commendation by using the word "good"?
> On the other hand, "X makes me happy" is a descriptive statement, not a
> valuative utterance. It states a fact involving a relationship between you
> and X."
Perhaps happiness is a form of commendation. If you claim X will make A happy
aren't you commending X to A? Being happy does describe a state of being, but
it also describes a desirable state of being. Having been happy I can say it
is what I seek to be again. Happiness is good. See, I am commending it to
you.
> > How about claiming that if the addressee did Y it would make them happy?
> Why
> > would one commend an action in the first place? If I say "try the ice
> cream;
> > it is good," I mean "Try the ice cream; it makes me happy and I expect you
> will
> > feel similarly." Why would a purely motivative view of "good" be of
> ethical
> > import?
> If I claimed that if the addressee did Y it would make him happy, I'd be
> using a *descriptive statement* to assert a *fact* about Y and the addressee
> and happiness, not using a *valuative utterance* to evoke positive feeling
> toward act Y, or a *motivative utterance* to induce an inclination in
> someone to commit act* Y.
Who says happiness is really a commendation but R.M. Hare? I need to know if
you think your definition of good is the only correct one and why. I think
telling someone that act Y will make them happy is indeed a motivative
utterance, and can't see why you wouldn't. People desire to be happy. When I
say "if you touch that it'll burn" I am pretty clearly trying to motivate you
not to touch it. People desire to avoid pain.
> I believe that one would commend an action Y in order to induce in someone
> an inclination to do Y. Such a commendation is precisely what I describe as
> a motivative utterance. Such a commendation is not a statement of fact about
> Y.
Perhaps, but I don't find this to be a very useful take on human actions and
ethical theory. Why would someone commend an act in the first place?
> If I say "Try the ice cream", I'm uttering a motivative statement to induce
> you to try the ice cream; I'm not stating a fact about ice cream. If I say
> "It's good", I'm uttering a valuative statement to evoke in you a feeling of
> positive regard toward ice cream, not stating a fact about ice cream.
When I say "It's good!" I really do mean that I like it and almost always say
it in the context of attempting to get someone else to eat it. Rarely if ever
do I command them to eat it first.
If I
> say, "It (ice cream) makes me happy", I'm stating a fact involving me and
> ice cream, not trying to induce anybody to like ice cream.
So?
If I say "I
> expect that you would like ice cream if you tried it", I'd be making a
> factual statement about what I expect, not a factual statement or valuative
> utterance about ice cream.
I think I am evaluating ice cream in that instance. I value it to be likeable
to you. I am also attempting to motivate you to try it. The sentence itself
is a simple conditional. Liking things is a commendation for people.
> In my view, a purely valuative usage of "good" and a purely motivative usage
> of "ought" are quite sufficient for ethical purposes, *provided* that
>
> a. you get to use the valuative term "good" if and only if what you label
> "good" meets the *descriptive* criteria for approvalworthiness embodied in
> the value-system which you adhere to; and
What then does good mean exactly? It is a commendation, but to what does it
refer? Is it just the sound we make to indicate that we approve of something?
What would motivate us to approve in the first place?
> b. you get to use the motivative term "ought" if and only if what you say
> "ought to be done" meets the *descriptive* criteria for
> performanceworthiness embodied in that value-system.
Then why use good and ought at all? Why not stick to the descriptive criteria?
And how would one evaluate those criteria? I think the fruitfulness of your
view really lacks when applied to metaethics.
This is a very strictly analytic approach, I can see. What I don't see is what
exactly it is attempting to achieve. Good is a commendation. Great. But what
things are good and why? Saying that it is all dependent on some value schema
really begs all the important questions of ethics to me. The exact way people
do use 'good' or should use 'good' means less to me than knowing what I will be
happiest doing next and how to determine that.
Kevin
Kwag7693
>> disvalue a life.
>
>No. Life is the standard. Life = existence + flourishing.
Well, you have certainly reformed the definition of life. So when I am not
flourishing I am dead, right? Since life as you define it is the conjunction
of being and flourishing, removing either would not be life.
This is an esoteric use of the word life; I don't think it is standard at all.
You aren't dead till you're dead, and flourishing or not if you breathe and
think you live (purposely avoiding whether or not it would be proper to say
'you' live if you stop being able to think).
>> Don't you see some tension between calling life the STANDARD of value
>> and then subdividing it into preferable and non-preferable kinds?
>
>I don't do that; see above.
No, apparently you mutate the meaning of life into such a tight spot that you
can no longer use it in reference to living people who wish to die because they
find life unpleasant. I guess you could use this language coherently but it
seems a far sight easier to simply stop using life as the standard of value and
use flourishing or happiness instead. Otherwise you are in the currently
uncomfortable linguistic position of calling functioning, thinking beings dead.
Kevin
Kwag7693
>redness in X," and "Y is wooden" means only "it appears to me that Y is
>made of wood." But while those rephrasings make it clear that we are
>talking only about our perceptions, they still show equally clearly that
>we are talking about the objects themselves; both sentences are
>meant to convey information about X and Y in themselves. Whereas it has
>not been shown that "Z is good" says anything about Z in itself.
In themselves meaning what? I reject intrinsicism quite thoroughly. Red is as
'me' dependent as likeability. The object doesn't look red without an observer
and it can't inspire happiness without one either. If you want to say the
object is red, fine. I do. I just know (most of the time) that I am only
talking about how I encounter the world and happiness is simply one more way I
react to the things in the world.
>There is something inherent in the object that gives rise to the
>perception.
So too with fuzzy kittens making me so happy. Downy softness is apparently
inherently likeable!
>My cigarette package remains red without any action on my
>part, except that of looking in its direction.
Pound your thumb with a hammer but instead of swearing with pain, find it an
exquisitely pleasurable sensation. If you can't, I suspect that pain "inheres"
in the hammer just like red does.
>(It could be the case that
>I perceive "goodness" through some "moral sense", which would of course
>make "goodness" a property of the object, and my "liking" it just the
>way I experience the perception. But there's no evidence of that.)
None at all.
>(1) There is a fact of the matter about color. Grass is green: people
>who say it is orange are lying or halluncinating; people who see it as
>grey are color-blind.
When is grass green? Is it green when it looks blue? This is pretty sloppy
linguistically. I have seen red grass. When it is dying it turns brown.
>This fact does not depend on my perceptions
>although (in the case of grass) it matches them; I can imagine cases in
>which my perception could be wrong about a color.
I don't think I can. I can imagine cases in which I would confuse my
imagination with a perception of the world about me, e.g. a hallucination.
>(2) There are no such independent facts of the matter about morality.
>Whether I see something as good or bad, depends primarily on me.
Much as seeing red depends on your eyes, the object involved and the lighting.
>That is the distinction I am trying to show, which is the point. To deny
>it means either to deny (1) (and say color is subjective) or deny (2)
>(and claim morality is objective). (I still am not sure which one you
>are denying, BTW.)
>
I think I am denying your attempted dichotomy, though if you have any further
insight you can tell me. I think color is viewer, but not belief dependent. I
think morality is moral agent but not belief dependent.
>Testimony is one way.
But then red would mean nothing to you.
>Another would be to measure the light being
>reflected off X.
Then red would only mean some number on a readout.
>While both those methods rely on perception, too, they
>are not my visual perception of X; they are independent sources of data,
>which can confirm or even refute my perception.
Neither of which is an experience of red though.
>I see nothing similar for morality.
>
I think the similar test for morality is this: if you would do it, you think
it moral. Regardless of what you claim to find good or bad, what you do is
what you really do think is moral. Sometimes you think an act will achieve
some fundamental goal of yours, but it doesn't. This might confuse you into
thinking you can knowingly act immorally. You can't. At the time, you thought
you would achieve your goals. You were wrong.
Kevin
Tym Parsons
> > Life is the standard. Life = existence + flourishing.
>
> Well, you have certainly reformed the definition of life.
No I haven't. When I speak of "life" I mean in the superlative,
optimal, Aristotelian sense, of fulfilling all potentialities of the
organism that possesses it, e.g. the greenest grass, the glossiest fur
coat on a dog. In Peikoff's words this is "a state of unimpaired
vitality".
> So when I am not flourishing I am dead, right? Since life as you
> define it is the conjunction of being and flourishing, removing either
> would not be life.
>
> This is an esoteric use of the word life; I don't think it is standard
> at all. You aren't dead till you're dead, and flourishing or not if
> you breathe and think you live (purposely avoiding whether or not it
> would be proper to say 'you' live if you stop being able to think).
What is your purpose in avoiding this? I rather think that's the key
right there. If you're permanently comatose, you'd certainly be
"alive", but not in any sense that's significant to ethics OR biology.
It would be a borderline case. Of course living entities can function
for long periods of time with varying degrees of impairment, but
impairment is hardly the essential characteristic of life.
> >> Don't you see some tension between calling life the STANDARD of
> >> value and then subdividing it into preferable and non-preferable
> >> kinds?
> >
> >I don't do that; see above.
>
> No, apparently you mutate the meaning of life into such a tight spot
> that you can no longer use it in reference to living people who wish
> to die because they find life unpleasant.
"Tight spot"? I use it in reference to the vast majority of people who
in principle can lead flourishing existences, even if they may not
actually happen to. Rather it would seem that you're the one mutating
the definition, such that borderline cases take on a significance they
don't deserve, so that the definition no longer conveys any fundamental
characteristics about the majority of concretes. The definition no
longer explains the greatest number of facts.
> I guess you could use this language coherently but it seems a far
> sight easier to simply stop using life as the standard of value and
> use flourishing or happiness instead.
Actually that's what hedonism does, and in the process divorces the
"existence" part of the equation. If pleasure or flourishing or
happiness serve as the sole standard of value, why not do heroin, and
tomorrow be damned? Whereas life, i.e. flourishing existence, specifies
that the flourishing is over the _span_ of your life.
> Otherwise you are in the currently uncomfortable linguistic position
> of calling functioning, thinking beings dead.
No, I use a borderline category called "living death".
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> > As I said before, this means there is no "gap" per se because each
> > "is," or the fundamental "is" of existence, yields opposing
"oughts."
> > It doesn't fail to yield a derivable "ought" -- rather, opposing
> > "oughts" may be derived.
>
> The statement "You ought to do X or you ought not to do X" is not a
> moral or "ought" statement, despite the presence of the word in there.
But that's one thing different about Objectivism -- Objectivism says
that the above is indeed a moral statement. "To live you ought to do X
and to not live you ought not to" is the essence of Objectivist
morality. That's one of the revolutionary elements of Objectivism that
is in contrast to the status quo view of what morality is.
> > "Intrinsicism" in Objectivist terms is acceptance of "universals"
i.e.
> > that "chairness" exists independent of the concept of chairs.
>
> "Goodness" and "badness," to a moral intrinsicist, are such
universals.
Right, but Objectivism rejects "goodness as a universal." "Goodness" is
not a universal. It does not exist independently of your concepts.
> But "I should live" is not a fact (as I note in my reply to Kwag); and
> "I want to live" is not an objective fact (as I noted below).
Facts are facts. The issue is *why* someone wants to live -- that he
wants to is either a fact or not. If it is a fact, it is the only sort
of fact -- a fact. Your issue is rightly "whether this fact is
derivable," not "whether this fact is 'objective.'" "Fact" presupposes
"objective."
> The same with your paired
> "oughts" - real oughts, or prescribed norms of action, can be inferred
> from them alone, but only in combination with wants. And that, I
think,
> is exactly what those who claim that there is an "is-ought gap" are
> saying.
Is it? I think they're saying that you can't derive an "ought" from an
"is" whatsoever.
-- at no extra charge
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> I am confused by this sentence. Believing that you have a want does
> create the fact that you have the want.
Doesn't "want" presuppose "belief"?
-- at no extra charge
Kwag7693
>"alive", but not in any sense that's significant to ethics OR biology.
>It would be a borderline case.
It is a borderline case I found irrelevant to the discussion at hand.
>Of course living entities can function
>for long periods of time with varying degrees of impairment, but
>impairment is hardly the essential characteristic of life.
The only essential characteristic of life is that the thing still functions qua
living being. That is why we have adjectives like well and poorly to qualify
living.
I understand that your are using life in some superlative sense. I don't think
that is coherent with common usage, though. It makes more sense to qualify
life rather than presuming life is a superlative.
>"Tight spot"? I use it in reference to the vast majority of people who
>in principle can lead flourishing existences, even if they may not
>actually happen to. Rather it would seem that you're the one mutating
>the definition, such that borderline cases take on a significance they
>don't deserve, so that the definition no longer conveys any fundamental
>characteristics about the majority of concretes.
Eh? Living beings don't die? Dying isn't part and parcel of the deal? Look
here, if you want to say that someone who is technically still alive in the
important to ethics senses, they survive without much help and are still aware,
can be called dead, fine. I just think it is a circuitous route and far more
stilted than simply saying that person is living poorly.
>The definition no
>longer explains the greatest number of facts.
This is the icing on the cake. What are the greatest number of facts in your
estimation? I think using life broadly encompasses gobs more instances than in
using it as a superlative only to describe a particular kind of life, namely
the flourishing and fully realized one. My use encompasses any number of
lives, given one particular, namely that the living being still possesses life
as a whole unit. And you accuse me of enshrining the borderline cases?
>Actually that's what hedonism does, and in the process divorces the
>"existence" part of the equation.
You can seek happiness with existing?
>If pleasure or flourishing or
>happiness serve as the sole standard of value, why not do heroin, and
>tomorrow be damned?
Because I expect that the aggregate of tomorrows will be a lot more pleasurable
than one blowout with heroin. As it has been described to me, heroin isn't
that pleasurable at all. It dulls your awareness, which isn't much like being
happy. Were I in terminal condition and very great pain I think heroin would
be a fine way to go.
>Whereas life, i.e. flourishing existence, specifies
>that the flourishing is over the _span_ of your life.
As I said, drugged out hazes don't sound like overly happy experiences to me.
From my experiences with alcohol, I can definitely say that being happy and
fully aware is much better than being barely conscious.
Kevin
George Dance
db...@tampatrib.com wrote:
> In article <8vs9rc$k5u$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > create the fact that you have the want.
>
Well, yes. I don't see a want as being any different from a belief.
What confuses me is Kwag's apparent insistence that a want is no
different from an objective fact.
>
> -- at no extra charge
>
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> Well, yes. I don't see a want as being any different from a belief.
> What confuses me is Kwag's apparent insistence that a want is no
> different from an objective fact.
What is a "nonobjective fact"?
George Dance
db...@tampatrib.com wrote:
> In article <904esl$3dq$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > Well, yes. I don't see a want as being any different from a belief.
> > What confuses me is Kwag's apparent insistence that a want is no
> > different from an objective fact.
>
> What is a "nonobjective fact"?
An intersubjective fact, or "agreement-fact": something that can be
taken for granted or appealed to within a discourse. For example, it is
a fact to me that Columbus landed in America in 1492, although all my
evidence of the fact is purely testomonial.
--
- 30 -
David Schwartz
George Dance wrote:
> An intersubjective fact, or "agreement-fact": something that can be
> taken for granted or appealed to within a discourse. For example, it is
> a fact to me that Columbus landed in America in 1492, although all my
> evidence of the fact is purely testomonial.
There aren't fundmentally different categories of evidence. Evidence is
evidence.
DS
db...@tampatrib.com
George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
> For example, it is
> a fact to me --
Not to sound like a broken record, but what is "a fact to me"?
George Dance
db...@tampatrib.com wrote:
> In article <906kil$s1e$1...@nnrp1.deja.com>,
> George Dance <georg...@my-deja.com> wrote:
>
> > For example, it is
> > a fact to me --
>
> Not to sound like a broken record, but what is "a fact to me"?
It is a fact, IMO; I believe it is a fact (although a stronger word than
"believe" is probably called for).
--
- 30 -
Tym Parsons
> >Of course living entities can function for long periods of time with
> >varying degrees of impairment, but impairment is hardly the essential
> >characteristic of life.
>
> The only essential characteristic of life is that the thing still
> functions qua living being.
This is rationalistic. A living thing functions as the SORT of living
thing it is. It has a specific way of taking in and using fuel,
developing, reproducing, etc. i.e. FLOURISHING.
> That is why we have adjectives like well and poorly to qualify
> living.
This is an appeal to semantics. There are different senses of the term.
> I understand that your are using life in some superlative sense. I
> don't think that is coherent with common usage, though. It makes more
> sense to qualify life rather than presuming life is a superlative.
Same thing; just a different way of expressing the same idea.
> >"Tight spot"? I use it in reference to the vast majority of people
> >who in principle can lead flourishing existences, even if they may
> >not actually happen to. Rather it would seem that you're the one
> >mutating the definition, such that borderline cases take on a
> >significance they don't deserve, so that the definition no longer
> >conveys any fundamental characteristics about the majority of
> >concretes.
>
> Eh? Living beings don't die? Dying isn't part and parcel of the
> deal?
Obviously we need a narrowly clinical, physiological sense of "living"
that we distinguish from the irreversible cessation of autonomic
activity. But that doesn't work in the wider biologic and moral sense
that we're talking about here.
> Look here, if you want to say that someone who is technically still
> alive in the important to ethics senses, they survive without much
> help and are still aware, can be called dead, fine.
No I call them "living dead", a borderline category, as I said.
> I just think it is a circuitous route and far more stilted than simply
> saying that person is living poorly.
Not just "poorly". "Living death" is where there's no hope of living
without significant impairment.
> >The definition no longer explains the greatest number of facts.
>
> This is the icing on the cake. What are the greatest number of facts
> in your estimation? I think using life broadly encompasses gobs more
> instances than in using it as a superlative only to describe a
> particular kind of life, namely the flourishing and fully realized
> one. My use encompasses any number of lives, given one particular,
> namely that the living being still possesses life as a whole unit.
Then you're not making warranted distinctions. Like I said this is only
useful in the narrow physiological sense.
> And you accuse me of enshrining the borderline cases?
By implication, yes.
> >Actually that's what hedonism does, and in the process divorces the
> >"existence" part of the equation.
>
> You can seek happiness with existing?
Of course not. The point I was making is that hedonism says that the
_duration_ of pleasure is unimportant, only the relative _intensity_ of
it is, at any given time. Therefore, hedonism says, it's more important
to experience the greatest pleasure possible, even if at the expense of
the span of your life.
<snip>
> As it has been described to me, heroin isn't that pleasurable at all.
> It dulls your awareness, which isn't much like being happy.
Over time I agree that heroin would get pretty boring. But at any given
moment, it can produce some of the greatest physiological sensation of
pleasure possible. That's _why_ it's such a trap: the pleasure
conflicts with one's fundamental need for cognition.
> Were I in terminal condition and very great pain I think heroin would
> be a fine way to go.
Me too, but that's neither here nor there.
Kwag7693
>thing it is.
What?
It has a specific way of taking in and using fuel,
>developing, reproducing, etc. i.e. FLOURISHING.
Dying, going through senesence, decrepitude, i.e. not flourishing but
continuing to live. I am not by any means focusing on the down side of life, I
am pointing out that it is a part of life that is best not ignored. Atrophy is
not fun, but it can only happen to something that lives. This isn't blind
rationalism. It is simple refusal to ignore the spectrum of health and not
health that can exist within a given life.
>> That is why we have adjectives like well and poorly to qualify
>> living.
>
>This is an appeal to semantics. There are different senses of the term.
Oh BS. I am appealing to nothing but the common sense embedded in our everyday
speech. As I said if you want to call someone who is still alive, dead, go
ahead. However, I thought Rand favored not embracing jargon and obscuring
one's ideas but instead making one's position plain and clear.
>Same thing; just a different way of expressing the same idea.
Yes, but since they are different, they aren't equal. I don't see the
advantage to obscuring the fact that people can have crappy lives, or that they
can choose to end life because it isn't making them happy anymore.
>Obviously we need a narrowly clinical, physiological sense of "living"
>that we distinguish from the irreversible cessation of autonomic
>activity. But that doesn't work in the wider biologic and moral sense
>that we're talking about here.
Why not, because you don't like the implication of hedonism? I think it just
has a bad rap. I think that "narrow" definition of life works fine, because it
explains why people can rationally choose suicide, whereas the language would
get quite funky your way.
>No I call them "living dead", a borderline category, as I said.
As I said pretty funky. If you need an oxymoron to make sense out of your
linguistic preferences, I think better modes of expression are in order.
>Not just "poorly". "Living death" is where there's no hope of living
>without significant impairment.
Okay, then how about "having a terminal disease" or "living but having to cope
with constant chronic and severe pain"?
>Then you're not making warranted distinctions. Like I said this is only
>useful in the narrow physiological sense.
Why? I do make those distinctions by qualifying life. His life is a poor one
wracked with pain. How did I ignore the meat and potatoes? He lives and he
isn't flourishing. In any case, your position is tantamount to hedonism.
Refusing to use happiness as the standard of value and instead smuggling it in
with life, doesn't change your central position which is hedonistic.
>Of course not. The point I was making is that hedonism says that the
>_duration_ of pleasure is unimportant, only the relative _intensity_ of
>it is, at any given time.
Perhaps irrational hedonists do. Five seconds of intense pleasure don't seem
worth 50 years of pain, in my book.
>Therefore, hedonism says, it's more important
>to experience the greatest pleasure possible, even if at the expense of
>the span of your life.
Well, I can see that living a life without pleasure wouldn't be great.
Flourishing life is preferable to non-flourishing life and humans do takes
risks in order to flourish. I don't think Rand would have indicated otherwise.
She said go give the dirtiest smokestack a kiss because it adds years to the
average human lifespan. I don't think she didn't know it was still a
potentially harmful thing. In general, don't you agree that you do take risks
in order to achieve a more pleasurable life (or as you'd have it to really
"live")?
>Over time I agree that heroin would get pretty boring. But at any given
>moment, it can produce some of the greatest physiological sensation of
>pleasure possible. That's _why_ it's such a trap: the pleasure
>conflicts with one's fundamental need for cognition.
Well the pain and bother and risk associated with it seem to outweigh what it
does promise. I don't know how good it really is and don't care. My
experience with intoxicating substances leads me to conclude, I can have more
fun without.
Kevin
Tym Parsons
> >Same thing; just a different way of expressing the same idea.
>
> Yes, but since they are different, they aren't equal.
It's an optional matter. You're quibbling about semantics.
> I don't see the advantage to obscuring the fact that people can have
> crappy lives, or that they can choose to end life because it isn't
> making them happy anymore.
I don't either, and that's not what I'm doing.
> >Obviously we need a narrowly clinical, physiological sense of
> >"living" that we distinguish from the irreversible cessation of
> >autonomic activity. But that doesn't work in the wider biologic and
> >moral sense that we're talking about here.
>
> Why not,
I already mentioned why not.
> because you don't like the implication of hedonism?
That's an additional, altho minor point.
> I think [hedonism] just has a bad rap.
I don't, for the reasons I mentioned.
<snip>
> >No I call them "living dead", a borderline category, as I said.
>
> As I said pretty funky. If you need an oxymoron to make sense out of
> your linguistic preferences, I think better modes of expression are in
> order.
It's not an oxymoron, any more than "grey" is because it's intermediate
between black and white.
> >Not just "poorly". "Living death" is where there's no hope of living
> >without significant impairment.
>
> Okay, then how about "having a terminal disease" or "living but having
> to cope with constant chronic and severe pain"?
Those are fine too, as descriptive phrases. But they're not a _concept_
as "living death" is.
> >Then you're not making warranted distinctions. Like I said
> >[(clinically) alive] is only useful in the narrow physiological
> >sense.
>
> Why? I do make those distinctions by qualifying life. His life is a
> poor one wracked with pain. How did I ignore the meat and potatoes?
> He lives and he isn't flourishing.
Those are fine too. But again they're descriptive phrases, and don't
have the elegant simplicity and utility of concepts.
> In any case, your position is tantamount to hedonism. Refusing to use
> happiness as the standard of value and instead smuggling it in
> with life, doesn't change your central position which is hedonistic.
No it isn't.
> >Of course not. The point I was making is that hedonism says that the
> >_duration_ of pleasure is unimportant, only the relative _intensity_
> >of it is, at any given time.
>
> Perhaps irrational hedonists do. Five seconds of intense pleasure
> don't seem worth 50 years of pain, in my book.
That's not an accurate characterisation of hedonism. Hedonism simply
says to maximise pleasure, irrespective of lifespan.
> >Therefore, hedonism says, it's more important to experience the
> >greatest pleasure possible, even if at the expense of the span of
> >your life.
>
> Well, I can see that living a life without pleasure wouldn't be great.
> Flourishing life is preferable to non-flourishing life and humans do
> takes risks in order to flourish. I don't think Rand would have
> indicated otherwise.
No of course not.
> She said go give the dirtiest smokestack a kiss because it adds years
> to the average human lifespan. I don't think she didn't know it was
> still a potentially harmful thing. In general, don't you agree that
> you do take risks in order to achieve a more pleasurable life (or as
> you'd have it to really "live")?
Within reason, yes.
Gordon G. Sollars
> In article <8u32v4$dq7$1...@slb1.atl.mindspring.net>,
> Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
...
> > Re 3: Searle says that one can't understand the concept of
> > 'promising' without invoking this notion of accepting obligations;
> > promising is not, for
> > instance, merely telling someone (predicting) that you will do
> > something.
>
> Precisely; it is not enough that Jones understand (or believe) that he
> is making a promise; for him to be obligated, he also has to understand
> (believe) that a promise entails an obligation.
Please look at Owl's explanation of Searle's position again. If Jones
understands the concept of 'promising' then he understands that an
obligation is involved. It is indeed enough that he makes the promise,
assuming he understands what a promise is. If he does not understand,
then he is just making noises - but that doesn't count against moral
realism.
> IOW, for 3 to follow
> from 2, it is both necessary and sufficient that the argument contain a
> further premise, that (2b) "Jones believes that his (freely given)
> promises obligate him."
No. It is only necessary that Jones understand the concept of promising.
> So Searle's argument can be reconstructed as follows:
>
> 1. Jones (freely, or volitionally) uttered the words "I hereby promise
> to pay you, Smith, five dollars."
> 1b. Jones believed that he was promising to pay Smith $5.
> 2. Jones promised to pay Smith $5. (1, 1b)
> 2b. Jones believes that his (freely given) promises obligate him.
> 3. Jones placed himself under (undertook) an obligation to pay Smith $5.
> (2, 2b)
> 4. Jones is under an obligation to pay Smith $5. (from 3)
> 5. Jones ought to pay Smith $5. (from 4)
>
> It is clear that the truth of 4 and 5 is solely dependent on that of
> both 2 and three, which are in turn dependent on the truth of 1b and 2b
> - that is, on nothing more than facts about Jones's beliefs. As noted
> above, these are not the facts that the moral realist is alleging, and
> that the anti-realist is denying.
I disagree. The moral realist is saying that moral statements can be
true (or false). That is what is being alleged. You have confusingly
switched from talking about "understanding" to "belief". If human beings
did not understand the concept of promising, then there would be no
promises. But the concept of promising does not depend on any particular
belief of Jones's.
> In fact, for Searle to assert the truth of 4 (and .`. 5) at all, he has
> to rely on a further hidden premise: (3b) "If a person believes himself
> under an obligation, then he is under that obligation."
You keep claiming that additional premises are needed. I have shown why
that is not the case for your previous additions, but I can not do so
here, because I can't see that you have given any reason for thinking
this premise must be added.
> Yet this is
> something the moral realist must assert is false. No moral realist
> would claim that, simply because I believe that I am obligated to, say,
> assassinate the Prime Minister of Canada, does not make me obligated to
> do so (no matter how many promises I make to do it, or to whom).
This is handled by the "other things being equal" clause of Searle's,
which Owl mentioned before. If it were not the case that assassination
were wrong, then you would be obligated, if you had promised.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
George Dance
> > Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> ...
> > > Re 3: Searle says that one can't understand the concept of
> > > 'promising' without invoking this notion of accepting obligations;
> > > promising is not, for
> > > instance, merely telling someone (predicting) that you will do
> > > something.
> >
George Dance writes...
> > Precisely; it is not enough that Jones understand (or believe) that
he
> > is making a promise; for him to be obligated, he also has to
understand
> > (believe) that a promise entails an obligation.
>
gsol...@pobox.com wrote:
> Please look at Owl's explanation of Searle's position again. If Jones
> understands the concept of 'promising' then he understands that an
> obligation is involved. It is indeed enough that he makes the
promise, assuming he understands what a promise is.
Even in Owl's explanation (which I am sure matches Searles'), Jones'
promise-making and his understanding are both necessary, but not jointly
sufficient. It is also necessary that Jones mean the promise: that he
is not just speaking the lines in a play, e.g. And, IMO, it is also
necessary that Jones freely make the promise: that he does not make the
promise with a gun to his head, e.g.
> If he does not understand,
> then he is just making noises - but that doesn't count against moral
> realism.
If Jones does not understand the nature of the promise, he is not
obligated by it. It does not follow that, if Jones does understand, he
is obligated.
> > IOW, for 3 to follow
> > from 2, it is both necessary and sufficient that the argument
contain a
> > further premise, that (2b) "Jones believes that his (freely given)
> > promises obligate him."
>
> No. It is only necessary that Jones understand the concept of
promising.
You are confusing necessary with sufficient conditions. If Jones
understands the promise but does not agree with (="believe in") the
obligation, at the time he makes it - say, if he makes it just to stop
Smith from beating him up - then he is not obligated. OTOH, Jones's
agreement is apparently sufficient to obligate him.
By the concept of "promising," I think you are referring to a convention
in our society, and (presumably, since we have not specified otherwise)
in Jones's, that certain promises are both morally and legally
enforceable. (Other societies may have different conventions). Of
course this convention would exist even if Jones did not agree with it.
Yet it is difficult to see how Jones could be obligated by a convention
he did not agree with. The only case I could see would be if Jones
received some consideration from Smith - that is, if Smith had also been
obligated - in which case Smith's agreement is just as important.
> > In fact, for Searle to assert the truth of 4 (and .`. 5) at all, he
has
> > to rely on a further hidden premise: (3b) "If a person believes
himself
> > under an obligation, then he is under that obligation."
>
> You keep claiming that additional premises are needed. I have shown
> why that is not the case for your previous additions,
Not really. You have merely repeated Searles' claim that they are
necessary background conditions for his argument to follow, and could
therefore have remained hidden. Which only shows that his derivation of
2 from 1, 3 from 2, and 4 from 3 depends on them, and therefore why they
should not remain hidden.
> but I can not do so
> here, because I can't see that you have given any reason for thinking
> this premise must be added.
The reason is that all the argument proves without it (even granting all
the other hidden premises) is that Jones has agreed to pay Smith; this
final hidden premise is necessary to conclude that Jones is in fact
obligated to pay Smith.
It was a convention in Nazi Germany that men without foreskins would be
killed. Many men agreed with that convention, including some without
foreskins; yet it does not follow that the latter were obligated to
surrender themselves for killing.
> > Yet this is
> > something the moral realist must assert is false. No moral realist
> > would claim that, simply because I believe that I am obligated to,
say,
> > assassinate the Prime Minister of Canada, does not make me obligated
to
> > do so (no matter how many promises I make to do it, or to whom).
>
> This is handled by the "other things being equal" clause of Searle's,
> which Owl mentioned before. If it were not the case that
assassination
> were wrong, then you would be obligated, if you had promised.
"Other things being equal" of course covers a whole host of background
conditions, which it is possible to identify as hidden premises ("Jones
is not a parrot," e.g.) but probably not necessary. However, it should
not be interpreted as allowing premises that depend on what the argument
is meant to prove (that moral rules such as "assassination is wrong" are
matters of fact, or of "the case"), if cirularity is to be avoided.
--
- 30 -
kevin_wa...@my-deja.com
Tym Parsons <tym_p...@my-deja.com> wrote:
Sorry it took so long to reply. AOL didn't
manage to display your rep[ly for whatever reason.
> Kwag7693 wrote:
>
> > >Same thing; just a different way of
expressing the same idea.
> >
> > Yes, but since they are different, they
aren't equal.
>
> It's an optional matter. You're quibbling
about semantics.
?? Ok, then let's, for clarity's sake, stop
using your preference. Mine has the advantage of
avoiding oxymorons and not limiting life to one
kind of what we recognize colloquially as life.
> > I don't see the advantage to obscuring the
fact that people can have
> > crappy lives, or that they can choose to end
life because it isn't
> > making them happy anymore.
>
> I don't either, and that's not what I'm doing.
You refuse to call what they are doing 'life'.
Now you can nail me for semantics, but what the
hell is this? I am arguing that my method of
expressing the most basic value of human being is
more consistent both with typically spoken
English and human experience.
> > >Obviously we need a narrowly clinical,
physiological sense of
> > >"living" that we distinguish from the
irreversible cessation of
> > >autonomic activity. But that doesn't work
in the wider biologic and
> > >moral sense that we're talking about here.
> >
> > Why not,
>
> I already mentioned why not.
I guess I could simply write 'I disagree,' but
that wouldn't be helpful.
> > because you don't like the implication of
hedonism?
>
> That's an additional, altho minor point.
What is the major point? Hedonism is internally
consistent. What other objection to happiness as
a central value did you cite?
> It's not an oxymoron, any more than "grey" is
because it's intermediate
> between black and white.
Your analogy is odd. I don't know what it means
for grey to be intermediate; it is a distinct
experience. Is green intermediate between blue
and yellow? Is 'squarish circle' oxymoronic? I
think 'living dead' falls into much the same
category. Are you just going to respond "No, it
doesn't," or do you have some reason that
modifying the noun 'dead' with its contradictory
opposite is not an oxymoron?
> > >Not just "poorly". "Living death" is where
there's no hope of living
> > >without significant impairment.
> >
> > Okay, then how about "having a terminal
disease" or "living but having
> > to cope with constant chronic and severe
pain"?
>
> Those are fine too, as descriptive phrases.
But they're not a _concept_
> as "living death" is.
Oh, I disagree. 'Terminal disease' is definitely
a concept.
> > >Then you're not making warranted
distinctions. Like I said
> > >[(clinically) alive] is only useful in the
narrow physiological
> > >sense.
> >
> > Why? I do make those distinctions by
qualifying life. His life is a
> > poor one wracked with pain. How did I ignore
the meat and potatoes?
> > He lives and he isn't flourishing.
>
> Those are fine too. But again they're
descriptive phrases, and don't
> have the elegant simplicity and utility of
concepts.
Well, I guess in a semantic quibble elegance is
king. My main beef is this: flourishing is a
species of life. It is not typical in English to
start from an extreme position and then remodify
it to baseline and then below the baseline. We
start from the broadest category and modify from
there. Isn't that whole genus, species deal a
hallmark of Western thought?
> > In any case, your position is tantamount to
hedonism. Refusing to use
> > happiness as the standard of value and
instead smuggling it in
> > with life, doesn't change your central
position which is hedonistic.
>
> No it isn't.
Yes it is. How's that? I can say why I think so
too. Your standard of value is a specific type
of life only. It is the happy life.
> > Perhaps irrational hedonists do. Five
seconds of intense pleasure
> > don't seem worth 50 years of pain, in my book.
>
> That's not an accurate characterisation of
hedonism. Hedonism simply
> says to maximise pleasure, irrespective of
lifespan.
You are the arbiter of what counts as hedonism
and what doesn't? This is a Procrustean box you
are fitting me for, or perhaps it is just a straw
man. If you see fit to call my position
hedonist, as you did, don't turn around and tell
me I'm not really espousing hedonism. Call my
position 'brand X' for all I care; I just
articulated a reason that I think maximizing
pleasure regardless of my life span isn't really
maximizing my pleasure. Can you respond to that
other than to tell me I don't know my own value
system?
> > >Therefore, hedonism says, it's more
important to experience the
> > >greatest pleasure possible, even if at the
expense of the span of
> > >your life.
> >
> > Well, I can see that living a life without
pleasure wouldn't be great.
> > Flourishing life is preferable to non-
flourishing life and humans do
> > takes risks in order to flourish. I don't
think Rand would have
> > indicated otherwise.
>
> No of course not.
Then perhaps Rand's position isn't inconsistent
with your articulation of hedonism. My point was
that people do risk injury and death to achieve
greater pleasure.
> > She said go give the dirtiest smokestack a
kiss because it adds years
> > to the average human lifespan. I don't think
she didn't know it was
> > still a potentially harmful thing. In
general, don't you agree that
> > you do take risks in order to achieve a more
pleasurable life (or as
> > you'd have it to really "live")?
> Within reason, yes.
Okay, then I am having a hard time seeing why you
characterized my position as hedonist, or why you
then rejected hedonism as irrational. Either
way, the only way you CAN seek to maximize your
pleasure is within the context of your life. I
don't know or care if other people who called
themselves hedonists favored 5 seconds of extreme
but lethal pleasure. I wouldn't, because once I
am dead, all my pleasure ceases. (I also suspect
OD'ing hurts.) Pleasure is still my standard of
value, and I don't think that offing myself to be
happy is a good or even feasible idea; though I
will risk some injury to be happy.
Either 'hedonism' is consistent with your take on
Rand or your own position has some features you
haven't chosen to relate.
Kevin
Tym Parsons
<philosophic definition of "life">
> > It's an optional matter. You're quibbling
> about semantics.
>
> ?? Ok, then let's, for clarity's sake, stop using your preference.
No. If you're unable or unwilling to see my argument, I can't go any
further 8-{)
<snip>
> > > >Not just "poorly". "Living death" is where there's no hope of
> > > >living without significant impairment.
> > >
> > > Okay, then how about "having a terminal disease" or "living but
> > > having to cope with constant chronic and severe pain"?
> >
> > Those are fine too, as descriptive phrases. But they're not a
> > _concept_ as "living death" is.
>
> Oh, I disagree. 'Terminal disease' is definitely a concept.
Of course. When you limit it to one or two words, it becomes a concept,
one synonmous with mine. This is hairsplitting 8-{)
<snip>
> My main beef is this: flourishing is a species of life.
That's one way of putting it, but not an exhaustively meaningful one.
> It is not typical in English to start from an extreme position and
> then remodify it to baseline and then below the baseline. We start
> from the broadest category and modify from there. Isn't that whole
> genus, species deal a hallmark of Western thought?
You're too narrowly, literally, obsessively focused on one SENSE of the
word "life". There are different senses, each of which can bring out a
different meaning, and each of which has its own genus-species
distinction. Christ look in the dictionary.
<snip>
> Your standard of value is a specific type of life only. It is the
> happy life.
In the philosophic (NOT clinical) sense in which I'm using the term
"life", "happy life" amounts to a redundancy.
> > Hedonism simply says to maximise pleasure, irrespective of
> > lifespan.
>
> You are the arbiter of what counts as hedonism and what doesn't?
I'm not being arbitrary. It's the only meaningful use of the term, as
distinguished from Rand's concept of "life for man qua man".
<snip>
> > > In general, don't you agree that you do take risks in order to
> > > achieve a more pleasurable life (or as you'd have it to really
> > > "live")?
>
> > Within reason, yes.
>
> Okay, then I am having a hard time seeing why you characterized my
> position as hedonist, or why you then rejected hedonism as irrational.
> Either way, the only way you CAN seek to maximize your pleasure is
> within the context of your life. I don't know or care if other people
> who called themselves hedonists favored 5 seconds of extreme but
> lethal pleasure. I wouldn't, because once I am dead, all my pleasure
> ceases. (I also suspect OD'ing hurts.) Pleasure is still my standard
> of value, and I don't think that offing myself to be happy is a good
> or even feasible idea; though I will risk some injury to be happy.
> Either 'hedonism' is consistent with your take on Rand or your own
> position has some features you haven't chosen to relate.
Neither. Hedonism is all about "live for today": that is how the term
is _typically understood_. In contrast Rand's view is about the
long-term. If you disagree with this characterisation of hedonism, you
run the risk of package-dealing the former with the latter. If you want
to claim "hedonism" exclusively for Rand's philosophy, you'll need to
promote another term for the former view. Lotsa luck.
I would suggest that YOU'RE the one who's using exotic definitions here.
Tym Parsons
Kwag7693
>> about semantics.
>>
>> ?? Ok, then let's, for clarity's sake, stop using your preference.
>
>No. If you're unable or unwilling to see my argument, I can't go any
>further 8-{)
Hahaha. So it is a quibble on semantics that you nevertheless find absolutely
fundamental?
>> > > Okay, then how about "having a terminal disease" or "living but
>> > > having to cope with constant chronic and severe pain"?
>> >
>> > Those are fine too, as descriptive phrases. But they're not a
>> > _concept_ as "living death" is.
>>
>> Oh, I disagree. 'Terminal disease' is definitely a concept.
>
>Of course. When you limit it to one or two words, it becomes a concept,
>one synonmous with mine. This is hairsplitting 8-{)
??? To express your view you wouldn't have to write "He is in a state of
living death."? I don't see your point, here. 'Terminal disease' is as much a
concept as 'living death' and it isn't oxymoronic to boot.
>> My main beef is this: flourishing is a species of life.
>
>That's one way of putting it, but not an exhaustively meaningful one.
Okay...?
>You're too narrowly, literally, obsessively focused on one SENSE of the
>word "life".
Ugh. Can you even see how I might feel similarly about your position? Seeing
that you are restricting your use of 'life' to a completely idiosyncratic usage
only relevant to a limited context? I am honestly baffled that you would find
my position more limiting and narrow.
>There are different senses, each of which can bring out a
>different meaning, and each of which has its own genus-species
>distinction. Christ look in the dictionary.
"life
t noun (PL. lives) 1 [MASS NOUN] the condition that distinguishes animals and
plants from inorganic matter, including the capacity for growth, reproduction,
functional activity, and continual change preceding death: the origins of
life."
Yes I have looked in the dictionary. It is the dictionary that is making your
position seem so odd to me. This is a tactic not unfamiliar to Rand; she was
very willing to tromp right off to the dictionary to point out how her
opposition was limiting a term so much that it no longer reflected its typical
meaning, e.g. "selfishness".
>In the philosophic (NOT clinical) sense in which I'm using the term
>"life", "happy life" amounts to a redundancy.
See the dictionary. Life is simply the state preceding death.
In the philosophic sense that altruists use 'selfish', they mean 'evil'. I
don't see a more compelling reason to accept their usage than you are offering.
>I'm not being arbitrary. It's the only meaningful use of the term, as
>distinguished from Rand's concept of "life for man qua man".
I fall we are quibbling about is literally what to call our ethics, I can't see
that it makes much difference with the exception that if you are correct that
traditionally hedonists have made the argument you do on their behalf, then
calling myself one might lead someone to think on a cursory examination of my
views that I endorsed dying ASAP but happily.
>Neither. Hedonism is all about "live for today": that is how the term
>is _typically understood_.
Well, I take the position that tradition be damned because it is
misrepresenting a very clear view (again just like Rand objected to the slander
of selfishness).
>I would suggest that YOU'RE the one who's using exotic definitions here.
hedonism
t noun [MASS NOUN] the pursuit of pleasure; sensual self-indulgence.
n the ethical theory that pleasure (in the sense of the satisfaction of
desires) is the highest good and proper aim of human life.
Kevin
Tym Parsons
> >> > It's an optional matter. You're quibbling
> >> about semantics.
> >>
> >> ?? Ok, then let's, for clarity's sake, stop using your preference.
> >
> >No. If you're unable or unwilling to see my argument, I can't go any
> >further 8-{)
>
> Hahaha. So it is a quibble on semantics that you nevertheless find
> absolutely fundamental?
What I'm saying is that you're unjustified in demanding that I stop using
my "preference" of words. I've already validated my use of terms.
<snip>
> >Neither. Hedonism is all about "live for today": that is how the term
> >is _typically understood_.
>
> Well, I take the position that tradition be damned because it is
> misrepresenting a very clear view
No it isn't clear.
> (again just like Rand objected to the slander of selfishness).
Not the same situation at all.
> >I would suggest that YOU'RE the one who's using exotic definitions
> >here.
>
> hedonism
>
> t noun [MASS NOUN] the pursuit of pleasure; sensual self-indulgence.
>
> n the ethical theory that pleasure (in the sense of the satisfaction of
> desires) is the highest good and proper aim of human life.
Notice that this definition makes no distinction between rational or
irrational desires. The sole criterion is that it need only BE a desire.
According to this view, if you desire heroin, go for it. The point is
not that heroin and its like ultimately cause great pain, such that there
is a net deficit of pleasure over the long-term. Even IF you could find
a way of experiencing ecstatic, short-term pleasure that would cause your
premature death without any messy complications or net suffering, Rand
would STILL be against it.
In other words, there is a position which says that the _intensity_ of
pleasure is all that is important; this view is often ambiguously held or
package-dealt with Rand's life-MQM formula, and is called "hedonism".
In contrast Rand is saying that _duration_ is equally important,
necessarily the duration of one's natural lifespan. Rand's view might be
characterised as defining life-MQM as the area under the curve of
pleasure-intensity as a function of duration.
Accordingly all those rock stars that choose to blow their wad all at
once, and burn out and fade away prematurely, or go out with a bang by
overdosing on thrills, drugs, and fast living, are understood to be
"hedonists". It's a coherent albeit irrational view, one from which Rand
took great pains to distinguish HER view.
Does any of this make the distinction clear to you now?
Kwag7693
>my "preference" of words. I've already validated my use of terms.
Sure I was. The reason I was unjustified was the reason you were unjustified
for claiming it was simply a semantic quibble. If you aren't willing to change
the words you're using, then you don't think all we are discussing is what
symbol to use.
>> Well, I take the position that tradition be damned because it is
>> misrepresenting a very clear view
>
>No it isn't clear.
I even concluded my post with a dictionary defintion of it.
>> (again just like Rand objected to the slander of selfishness).
>
>Not the same situation at all.
Naysaying is uncool.
>Notice that this definition makes no distinction between rational or
>irrational desires.
Notice that it frames pleasure within the context of human life. HA! :-)
>The sole criterion is that it need only BE a desire.
>According to this view, if you desire heroin, go for it.
By doing so you run the risk of being a dead human, which all things equal,
even by that simple one sentence definition of hedonism, is a bad thing.
>The point is
>not that heroin and its like ultimately cause great pain, such that there
>is a net deficit of pleasure over the long-term.
Well, looking back to the definition, if pleasure is not going to be maximized
by an act, another act which gained you more pleasure would be better.
>Even IF you could find
>a way of experiencing ecstatic, short-term pleasure that would cause your
>premature death without any messy complications or net suffering, Rand
>would STILL be against it.
You were the one who started out by calling me a hedonist. I too would be
against it, and I even think it doesn't meet the criterion of a good action
given the definition from the OED.
>In other words, there is a position which says that the _intensity_ of
>pleasure is all that is important
I don't see that in the definition, though I do see a recommendation for the
aim of a proper human life.
>In contrast Rand is saying that _duration_ is equally important,
>necessarily the duration of one's natural lifespan.
Did she actually say this and if so where? Was she opposed to euthanasia?
Kevin
Tym Parsons
Kwag7693 wrote:
> >In contrast Rand is saying that _duration_ is equally important,
> >necessarily the duration of one's natural lifespan.
>
> Did she actually say this and if so where?
She mentions this in her essay "The Objectivist Ethics".
> Was she opposed to euthanasia?
No, if what you mean by that is voluntary assisted suicide.
Kwag7693
>> >necessarily the duration of one's natural lifespan.
>>
>> Did she actually say this and if so where?
>
>She mentions this in her essay "The Objectivist Ethics
This was in regards to the duration of pleasure, right? Well then do oyu have
some reason why this view is debarred fomr hedonists?
Kevin