Evolution: no room for moral truth (was Intuitionalism vs Ev...)
User 1DE7
This isn't a point that I have elaborated enough on in the past.
I'll try to (briefly) show how, looking at things from an evolutionary
perspective, we have reason to think our sense data is correct, but not our
moral sensations.
Whether organisms pass on their genes or not seems to be a purely physical
matter. Whether the organism is alive or dead, reproducing or not, is dependent
simply on physical factors, it seems.
If an organism's sensory data was inaccurate, or did not reflect truth, but
simply its subjective feelings, you'd expect it to die. It might mistake a
larger carnivorous organism for a piece of food, or something. Or it may walk
off of a cliff, etc. It wouldn't pass on its genes too well. However, the
situation is entirely different for moral sensations.
Suppose that it was some objective fact that certain behaviors were wrong, and
others were right. We might wonder, why would organisms develop some faculty to
perceive this? How would it help their reproductive success to be able to
perceive moral truths? We would expect that they would evolve to behave in ways
that maximized their reproductive success only, and it would be irrelevant what
was objectively right or wrong, since reproductive success is a purely physical
matter. Even if organisms did perceive this, why would the ones who took it
seriously be selected for, rather than ones who just ignored it and went about
acting in ways that furthered their reproductive success? You'd think that
unless moral reality matched what was nesesary to achieve reproductive success,
that organism's would just take the attitude "oh, that sensation that I have,
that's just some silly moral fact, whether I act according to it or not won't
effect my reproductive success, so I can dismiss it."
So, even if moral facts are somehow real, there seems to be no reason why any
physical organism, being selected for according to its reproductive success,
would ever know about it, let alone want to act according to these moral facts.
This is in sharp contrast to sensory data, for which it seems like having
correct sensory data and acting on it would have a big positive effect on
reproductive success.
Therefore, true sensory data would be selected for. "True" moral data, if it
even existed, wouldn't be selected for (unless you hold that our moral faculty
is the means by which creatures motivate themselves to further their genes).
So, from an evolutionary perspective, it hardly seems plausbile that our moral
compulsions are somehow "true."
-User
Owl
1. You're not factoring into your argument the fact that moral knowledge
comes from the faculty of reason. You're hypothesizing that it's some
completely separate thing -- in which case I would agree that one would
not expect it to evolve.
2. You can't justify the theory of evolution unless you assume your
perception is accurate. Therefore, you cannot use the theory of evolution
to support your perception.
3. It appears to be a prediction of your theory -- if anything is -- that
no one feels morally 'compelled' (to use your term) to do anything that
goes against his reproductive success. This does not appear to be true (to
say the least); at any rate, if it is, it would require lots more showing.
Thus, it seems that your own theory has no empirical support, and instead
is disconfirmed by the only obviously relevant empirical evidence. (Though
I grant that you might explain Objectivist-type egoist/'serve-my-life'
ethics by appeal to their genes; so much the worse for the Objectivists.)
User 1DE7 <user...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20001023233758...@ng-fi1.aol.com...
> (adapted from an e-mail to someone)
>
> This isn't a point that I have elaborated enough on in the past.
>
> I'll try to (briefly) show how, looking at things from an evolutionary
> perspective, we have reason to think our sense data is correct, but not
our
> moral sensations.
...
Joe Durnavich
>(adapted from an e-mail to someone)
>
>This isn't a point that I have elaborated enough on in the past.
>
>I'll try to (briefly) show how, looking at things from an evolutionary
>perspective, we have reason to think our sense data is correct, but not our
>moral sensations.
>
>Whether organisms pass on their genes or not seems to be a purely physical
>matter. Whether the organism is alive or dead, reproducing or not, is depe
>ndent
>simply on physical factors, it seems.
>
>If an organism's sensory data was inaccurate, or did not reflect truth,
Your sensory "data" are the things in the environment around you.
That lamp, that chair, that table, etc. These things are neither true
nor false by themselves, nor do they "reflect" any truth.
>but
>simply its subjective feelings, you'd expect it to die. It might mistake a
>larger carnivorous organism for a piece of food, or something.
A larger carnivorous organism is a piece of food. You just need the
skills to bring it down. There probably were instances of a solitary
velociraptor bringing down a T-rex. (Or a virus bringing down an
elephant!)
Many organisms have automatic fear responses. If a rabbit is at a
water hole and a fox appears, the rabbit may freeze. This is an
automatic response that may minimize the chance of it being seen.
Because of the dangerous encounter, the rabbit may be conditioned to
avoid to the water hole. These are not a system of beliefs that the
rabbit acts on. The fear response mechanisms of the body are
beginning to be understood and are quite similar in most organisms.
As a human, you have a similar fear mechanism. You will automatically
startle at a loud noise. You may freeze, jump, or run if somebody
jumps out at you unexpectedly. You also have a rational faculty with
which you can learn about the actual dangers. You may be startled
when somebody yells "Boo!" and immediately gain control of yourself
and start laughing because you realize it is a friend playing a prank
on you. Unlike the rabbit, you may learn that the fox is no longer a
threat at the water hole and go back to it, even though you may feel
uneasy being there. You may also be clever enough to erect a fence
around the water hole to keep the fox out. Your rational faculty can
provide you an advantage. But you have to develop the skills to use
it. That is what morality is for.
>Or it may walk
>off of a cliff, etc. It wouldn't pass on its genes too well. However, the
>situation is entirely different for moral sensations.
There are no such things as moral sensations. Fear is not a sensation
that makes you afraid in its presence. You do not run because you are
afraid; you are afraid because you run. Running, freezing, the
startle reflex, quickened breathing and heart rate, and heightened
awareness are what fear is. You are not afraid of a sensation, you
are afraid of the bear. Nature has designed the rabbit to run from
the fox and not from something inside itself.
This may or may not be the optimal response. A rabbit has no choice.
We, on the other hand, can learn better ways to react in the
situation. As such we have different requirements than the rabbit.
Because reason is not automatic, we have to go through a long process
of study and practice to learn how to act. The study of these ways of
acting are called "morality." The ways themselves are called the
"good" the "right," etc.
>Suppose that it was some objective fact that certain behaviors were wrong, and
>others were right. We might wonder, why would organisms develop some facul
>ty to
>perceive this? How would it help their reproductive success to be able to
>perceive moral truths? We would expect that they would evolve to behave in
> ways
>that maximized their reproductive success only, and it would be irrelevant
> what
>was objectively right or wrong, since reproductive success is a purely phy
>sical
>matter.
Don't buy into the notion that there is a physical world and a
moral world. The moral world is just an aspect of the physical
world. It is rational beings using observation and reason to act
to maintain their lives. There is nothing more physical than
life and death.
>Even if organisms did perceive this, why would the ones who took it
>seriously be selected for, rather than ones who just ignored it and went about
>acting in ways that furthered their reproductive success? You'd think that
>unless moral reality matched what was nesesary to achieve reproductive suc
>cess,
>that organism's would just take the attitude "oh, that sensation that I have,
>that's just some silly moral fact, whether I act according to it or not won't
>effect my reproductive success, so I can dismiss it."
>
>So, even if moral facts are somehow real, there seems to be no reason why any
>physical organism, being selected for according to its reproductive success,
>would ever know about it, let alone want to act according to these moral f
>acts.
>This is in sharp contrast to sensory data, for which it seems like having
>correct sensory data and acting on it would have a big positive effect on
>reproductive success.
By each person working to improve their life, they are improving
the survival chances of the species.
>Therefore, true sensory data would be selected for.
There is no such thing as sensory data as you mean it. Nature
selects those organisms that stay alive and pass their genes. Staying
alive is an action and it is the ultimate truth.
>"True" moral data, if it
>even existed, wouldn't be selected for (unless you hold that our moral faculty
>is the means by which creatures motivate themselves to further their genes).
>So, from an evolutionary perspective, it hardly seems plausbile that our moral
>compulsions are somehow "true."
If you take morality as trying to discover ways to stay alive with an
economical expenditure of energy, then the verification of moral truth
is that you are still alive, still living your life well, and have
good prospects for the future.
In short, User, keep in mind that reason is not automatic like the
startle response. We have to learn everything and then apply the
knowledge. Thus, we have a need for morality--discovering those ways
to act that further our lives.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
In article <8t3bvl$coo$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>,
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Three brief points about this.
>
> 1. You're not factoring into your argument the fact that moral knowledge
> comes from the faculty of reason. You're hypothesizing that it's some
> completely separate thing -- in which case I would agree that one would
> not expect it to evolve.
Okay, I suppose my argument may work better against those who don't think that
moral knowledge comes from reason. Maybe I shouldn't say "better" but instead
"with less trouble", because I think that your conception of what reason
actualy is is incorrect. You seem to be a kind of dualist, so let me ask a few
things.
Do you think our faculty of reason is anything other than something that
evolved, physicaly, to help us cope with reality?
This sort of reduces to 'is our faculty of reason entirely physical'? And then
'is our mind entirely physical'? I think you'll say "no" to both of these, but
it seems that the root of our differences on the morality issue is here. So:
If the mind, including our faculty of reason, was entirely physical and evolved
like everything else about us, would you stick to your first objection?
It seems that you shouldn't, because your first objection seems to imply that
our faculty of reason is more powerful, or more nessesarily correct, or somehow
more majestic than it would be if the mind were physical. For instance, if the
mind evolved physicaly, then you could still say "ah, but see, moral knowledge
comes from our faculty of reason, therefore it is justified." But, since our
faculty of reason evolved, and it evolved in such a way that its skill in
discerning moral truth was not selected for, then why would you expect that
just because this faculty tells you something moral that it is true? There
would be no reason to think that reason, which evolved so that we could deal
with the physical world, would have some power to percieve moral facts in a
correct manner.
For instance, it would be like expecting Michael Jordan to be good at Bridge,
because you associate excellence (at basketball) with him. He was conditioned,
and developed his skills for the purpose of basketball. I don't we would then
expect him to have any exceptional skill in Bridge, which his skills were not
developed for.
In a similar way, reason evolved for physical reality. So, while maybe we can
use it to try to percieve moral facts, why would we expect it to be any good at
it? You might say that since everyone has the same moral attitudes, they must
all be correct. It could also simply be that because of how our faculty of
reason evolved to handle physical things, it give more or less consistant moral
sensations, but this would not imply that they are objective. I don't just mean
that it isn't logicaly nessesary that our moral sensations be objective, but I
don't think that this is very plausble.
I should note that I don't think our moral sensations come from our rational
faculty, though. The above is just postulating if they did.
> 2. You can't justify the theory of evolution unless you assume your
> perception is accurate. Therefore, you cannot use the theory of evolution
> to support your perception.
Right, I realize it is sort of circular as some sort of justification, but I
wasn't really trying to justify it, but rather provide a logicaly consistant
way that it could be, and that it would make sense. And then point out that
this couldn't be done for moral perceptions. (again this sort of depends on
'reason' being physical and evolving like the rest of us).
So it was more like "assuming our perceptions are more or less correct, here is
an explaination of why they are so."
> 3. It appears to be a prediction of your theory -- if anything is -- that
> no one feels morally 'compelled' (to use your term) to do anything that
> goes against his reproductive success. This does not appear to be true (to
> say the least); at any rate, if it is, it would require lots more showing.
If we did not socialize, then I think this may be a good objection. However I
think that when dealing with social organisms, the only thing being selected
for is not short term individual reproductive success. So, you could have a
sort of meta-selection among groups, where groups of people who were good to
eachother survived better than those who weren't, etc.
Also, the social settings itsself can be considered part of the organisms
environment that it must adapt to and whatnot. So not only does it have to
adapt to nature, but organisms that don't 'follow the rules' of their group may
be expelled or killed by the group, so that they aren't selected for.
So, what we feel moraly compelled to do wouldn't nessesarily have to benefit
us, individualy, but maybe the larger group.
For instance, suppose there is a group of organisms, and 25% of their offspring
are extreme altruists, performing some function that won't really benefit them,
but benefits the group a good deal. Then the gene that produces those sorts of
offspring will be selected for, no?
I am not expert on evolution, but your critique here I don't think is very
strong. I just don't think it is nessesary that only compulsions that benefit
the individual are selected for. Look at various communal insects They
certainly don't behave egoisticly. Yet, something compells them to act however
they act. It might be some chemical in them, or something, but the means isn't
important -- what is important is that some sort of compellation was selected
for that wasn't in their individual interests.
> Thus, it seems that your own theory has no empirical support, and instead
> is disconfirmed by the only obviously relevant empirical evidence. (Though
> I grant that you might explain Objectivist-type egoist/'serve-my-life'
> ethics by appeal to their genes; so much the worse for the Objectivists.)
I'd point you to all sort of animals, if you want empirical support of how
groups of them could evolve to act in ways that doesn't nessesarily benefit
them the most, individualy, but benefits the group more than if they just
benefited themselves. For instance, do you think the slower gazells try to
attack other gazells -- maybe break their legs -- so that they increase their
chances of escaping in the event of a lion-attack? I doubt that they do. Is
this only explainable by saying gazells percieve moral facts? Or could it be
explained by evolution?
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <n6ibvs800opav0vbr...@4ax.com>
>>If an organism's sensory data was inaccurate, or did not reflect truth,
>
>Your sensory "data" are the things in the environment around you.
>That lamp, that chair, that table, etc.
Not exactly. Except in the case of touch, and maybe smell and sight. Otherwise
your data consists of reflected light and vibrations in the air.
>These things are neither true
>nor false by themselves, nor do they "reflect" any truth.
To be more precise I would have said "If an organism's interpretation of their
sensory data did not match up very well with the cause of their sensations..."
>>but
>>simply its subjective feelings, you'd expect it to die. It might mistake a
>>larger carnivorous organism for a piece of food, or something.
>
>A larger carnivorous organism is a piece of food.
I meant a small readily-edible piece of food, obviously.
>As a human, you have a similar fear mechanism. You will automatically
>startle at a loud noise. You may freeze, jump, or run if somebody
>jumps out at you unexpectedly.
Nope, not me.
>>Or it may walk
>>off of a cliff, etc. It wouldn't pass on its genes too well. However, the
>>situation is entirely different for moral sensations.
>
>There are no such things as moral sensations.
Sure there are. I have them all the time. You know how you feel compelled not
to kill people, even if doing so would benefit you? (maybe you don't feel this
compulsion). They are not objective, but they exist in most people.
>Fear is not a sensation
>that makes you afraid in its presence.
Well, what you're saying doesn't really make sense, so I'd agree. Fear is what
you are said to have when you are afraid. There is no cause/effect relationship
between fear and being afraid.
>You do not run because you are
>afraid; you are afraid because you run.
Wrong. People can run without being afraid. The act of running would be caused
by fear. Fear refers to a more internal process consisting of, perhaps, some
internal sense of extreme uneasiness and discomfort and other things that you
will mention.
>Running, freezing, the
>startle reflex, quickened breathing and heart rate, and heightened
>awareness are what fear is.
Almost. All except for the first. "Running" is not what is meant by fear, by
english speakers. Again I refer you to a dictionary. Fear refers to internal
processes. Fear causes you to run.
>You are not afraid of a sensation, you
>are afraid of the bear.
No one said anyone was afraid of any sensations.
>Nature has designed the rabbit to run from
>the fox and not from something inside itself.
Nature has designed the rabbit to run *because* of something inside itsself,
namely fear, that was triggered by the perception of a bear. I suggest clearer
thinking.
>We, on the other hand, can learn better ways to react in the
>situation. As such we have different requirements than the rabbit.
>Because reason is not automatic, we have to go through a long process
>of study and practice to learn how to act. The study of these ways of
>acting are called "morality." The ways themselves are called the
>"good" the "right," etc.
I don't know how many times I must tell you that moraliy is supposed to be
proscriptive, by definition.
> We would expect that they would evolve to behave in
>> ways
>>that maximized their reproductive success only, and it would be irrelevant
>> what
>>was objectively right or wrong, since reproductive success is a purely phy
>>sical
>>matter.
>
>Don't buy into the notion that there is a physical world and a
>moral world.
If you think I am buying into this, you ought to re-read the thread a few
times.
> The moral world is just an aspect of the physical
>world. It is rational beings using observation and reason to act
>to maintain their lives.
Again, generaly morality refers to something that proscribes. Your conception
doesn't do that.
>>Therefore, true sensory data would be selected for.
>
>There is no such thing as sensory data as you mean it.
Sensory data means sensations.
>Nature
>selects those organisms that stay alive and pass their genes. Staying
>alive is an action and it is the ultimate truth.
>
I have no clue what you mean by calling an action a 'truth', let alone an
'ultimate truth.'
>>"True" moral data, if it
>>even existed, wouldn't be selected for (unless you hold that our moral
>faculty
>>is the means by which creatures motivate themselves to further their genes).
>>So, from an evolutionary perspective, it hardly seems plausbile that our
>moral
>>compulsions are somehow "true."
>
>If you take morality as trying to discover ways to stay alive with an
>economical expenditure of energy
Which no one does except objectivists and perhaps a few other types of egoists.
Remember, morality implies proscription. I suggest coming up with a new term,
you'd confuse yourselves less.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <n6ibvs800opav0vbr...@4ax.com>
>>If an organism's sensory data was inaccurate, or did not reflect truth,
>
>Your sensory "data" are the things in the environment around you.
>That lamp, that chair, that table, etc
Not how sensory data is generaly defined. I mean sensory data as 'sensations.'
So, certainly not how I am using the term.
>These things are neither true
>nor false by themselves, nor do they "reflect" any truth.
To be more precise: sensations being true means that your 'automatic'
interpretation of your sensations corresponds to reality.
>>but
>>simply its subjective feelings, you'd expect it to die. It might mistake a
>>larger carnivorous organism for a piece of food, or something.
>
>A larger carnivorous organism is a piece of food.
I obviously meant a small ready-to-eat piece of food.
>You will automatically
>startle at a loud noise. You may freeze, jump, or run if somebody
>jumps out at you unexpectedly.
Nope, not me.
>>Or it may walk
>>off of a cliff, etc. It wouldn't pass on its genes too well. However, the
>>situation is entirely different for moral sensations.
>
>There are no such things as moral sensations.
Of couse there is. I have them. Owl has them. You probably have them. They
aren't objective, though.
>Fear is not a sensation
>that makes you afraid in its presence.
No one said it was. In fact what you say makes no sense. Having fear is just
another name for being afraid. There is no causal link betweent the two.
>You do not run because you are
>afraid; you are afraid because you run.
False. I can run as much as I want without it causing me to be afraid. It is
correct to say that running is sometimes *caused* by fear, which is an internal
process.
>Running, freezing, the
>startle reflex, quickened breathing and heart rate, and heightened
>awareness are what fear is.
All except for running.
>You are not afraid of a sensation,
No one said you were, this makes no sense.
>Nature has designed the rabbit to run from
>the fox and not from something inside itself.
More correct to say: nature has "designed" the rabbit to run beause of its fear
which was caused by the perception of a fox.
>As such we have different requirements than the rabbit.
>Because reason is not automatic, we have to go through a long process
>of study and practice to learn how to act. The study of these ways of
>acting are called "morality." The ways themselves are called the
>"good" the "right," etc.
I will remind you that morality is proscriptive. If you want to talk about
non-proscriptive things, find another term.
>Don't buy into the notion that there is a physical world and a
>moral world.
If you think I am "buying" this you need to read the thread a few more times.
>There is no such thing as sensory data as you mean it.
I mean sensations. There are sensations.
>Staying
>alive is an action and it is the ultimate truth.
No clue what you mean. An action is a truth? Maybe you typed this accidentaly.
>>"True" moral data, if it
>>even existed, wouldn't be selected for (unless you hold that our moral
>faculty
>>is the means by which creatures motivate themselves to further their genes).
>>So, from an evolutionary perspective, it hardly seems plausbile that our
>moral
>>compulsions are somehow "true."
>
>If you take morality as trying to discover ways to stay alive with an
>economical expenditure of energy
Which no one but objectivists and perhaps various other egoists do. I suggest
finding a new term, you'll confuse yourself less.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>>You do not run because you are
>>afraid; you are afraid because you run.
>
>Wrong. People can run without being afraid. The act of running would be caused
>by fear. Fear refers to a more internal process consisting of, perhaps, some
>internal sense of extreme uneasiness and discomfort and other things that you
>will mention.
I'm reading a book right now called "The Emotional Brain." It is by a
neuroscientist working out the low level brain mechanisms behind fear.
It is all quite mechanical, of course. The organism does not have
time to have "a general sense of easiness" come over it and then react
to it by running. These mechanisms when triggered set off reactions
all over the body to prepare the organism to immediately deal with the
threat. This may include running, etc. and the other stuff. Because
we have nerves all over our body, we can sense in various ways the
high heart rate, the adrenaline, the tightening of the muscles, etc.
This complex of reactions is that general sense of uneasiness. So,
you are feeling yourself react. You are not reacting to the feeling.
>>Running, freezing, the
>>startle reflex, quickened breathing and heart rate, and heightened
>>awareness are what fear is.
>
>Almost. All except for the first. "Running" is not what is meant by fear, by
>english speakers. Again I refer you to a dictionary. Fear refers to internal
>processes. Fear causes you to run.
This is not what modern brain science concludes. And if you think
about it, it doesn't make any evolutionary sense. Primitive organisms
react automatically, and the reaction is one that will protect it such
as being alerted to the danger, running, or freezing, attacking, etc.
>>You are not afraid of a sensation, you
>>are afraid of the bear.
>
>No one said anyone was afraid of any sensations.
>
>>Nature has designed the rabbit to run from
>>the fox and not from something inside itself.
>
>Nature has designed the rabbit to run *because* of something inside itsself,
>namely fear, that was triggered by the perception of a bear. I suggest clearer
>thinking.
You always tell me to look at the low-level stuff happening in the
brain, and now that I am doing that, you are rejecting it.
Your explanation of how fear works is one of those philosophical
explanations that are not an explanation at all. Why would an
organism run because of a feeling inside itself? If the organism can
run because of something it senses, why not just have it run from the
fox? If it had to react to the feeling of fear, there would need to
be a second set of reaction mechanisms, and such additional processing
would waste precious time.
>>We, on the other hand, can learn better ways to react in the
>>situation. As such we have different requirements than the rabbit.
>>Because reason is not automatic, we have to go through a long process
>>of study and practice to learn how to act. The study of these ways of
>>acting are called "morality." The ways themselves are called the
>>"good" the "right," etc.
>
>I don't know how many times I must tell you that moraliy is supposed to be
>proscriptive, by definition.
You have been attacking the notion that there can be no moral truth.
I am addressing THAT issue.
>> The moral world is just an aspect of the physical
>>world. It is rational beings using observation and reason to act
>>to maintain their lives.
>
>Again, generaly morality refers to something that proscribes. Your conception
>doesn't do that.
I gave plenty of examples in the "Little House on the Prairie" example
of how families had to spend their entire days working to just to
maintain a basic standard of life.
>>Nature
>>selects those organisms that stay alive and pass their genes. Staying
>>alive is an action and it is the ultimate truth.
>>
>
>I have no clue what you mean by calling an action a 'truth', let alone an
>'ultimate truth.'
You know how you are always looking to justify something, to find it's
"correspondence to reality"? In the realm of human action, think of
your life as the equivalent of reality. It is the ultimate value or
standard.
>>>"True" moral data, if it
>>>even existed, wouldn't be selected for (unless you hold that our moral
>>faculty
>>>is the means by which creatures motivate themselves to further their genes).
>>>So, from an evolutionary perspective, it hardly seems plausbile that our
>>moral
>>>compulsions are somehow "true."
>>
>>If you take morality as trying to discover ways to stay alive with an
>>economical expenditure of energy
>
>Which no one does except objectivists and perhaps a few other types of ego
>ists.
>Remember, morality implies proscription. I suggest coming up with a new term,
>you'd confuse yourselves less.
Before we start analyzing proscriptions, I thought it would be best to
look at the field morality is played in. After all, you brought up
the evolution to set a context in which you hoped to show there can be
no moral truths. I am using pretty much that same context to show
that morality functions in only in such a context.
So, do you have a problem with people pursuing their own life, with
them holding their life as the standard of value and then proscribing
action in terms of that? What problem could there be if they are
wrong about this, and why would this be a problem?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>Subject: Re: Evolution: no room for moral truth (was Intuitionalism vs Ev...)
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>>Message-id: <n6ibvs800opav0vbr...@4ax.com>
>
>>>Or it may walk
>>>off of a cliff, etc. It wouldn't pass on its genes too well. However, the
>>>situation is entirely different for moral sensations.
>>
>>There are no such things as moral sensations.
>
>Sure there are. I have them all the time. You know how you feel compelled not
>to kill people, even if doing so would benefit you? (maybe you don't feel this
>compulsion). They are not objective, but they exist in most people.
Ok.
It seems to me many species don't hunt members of their own kind. I
can see where organisms, including ourselves, may have emotional
mechanisms that repel them from killing their own kind (those
selfish-genes!).
But assume somebody says, "You shouldn't take the expressway today
because it is under construction and you will never make it to work
ontime." That moral proscription is not based on feelings because one
can't discover that the expressway is under construction and its
effect on driving time just from feelings alone. It seems that we
would find the word "should" used quite often in these types of
situations.
--
Joe Durnavich
Owl
> Do you think our faculty of reason is anything other than something that
> evolved, physicaly, to help us cope with reality?
>
> This sort of reduces to 'is our faculty of reason entirely physical'?
And then
> 'is our mind entirely physical'? I think you'll say "no" to both of
these, but
> it seems that the root of our differences on the morality issue is here.
So:
You are asking two different questions here.
1. Is the mind physical? No. It's certainly not some kind of physical
object (it's not the brain).
2. Is the mind the product of evolution? Of course it is: human beings
evolved, and (as far as we know) there aren't any minds except those of
humans and other animals (which also evolved).
> If the mind, including our faculty of reason, was entirely physical and
evolved
> like everything else about us, would you stick to your first objection?
Although I think it's impossible that the mind be physical (that sounds
like a contradiction to me), I'll answer this yes.
> It seems that you shouldn't, because your first objection seems to imply
that
> our faculty of reason is more powerful, or more nessesarily correct, or
somehow
> more majestic than it would be if the mind were physical.
I don't see that.
> There
> would be no reason to think that reason, which evolved so that we could
deal
> with the physical world, would have some power to percieve moral facts
in a
> correct manner.
>
> For instance, it would be like expecting Michael Jordan to be good at
Bridge,
> because you associate excellence (at basketball) with him. He was
conditioned,
> and developed his skills for the purpose of basketball. I don't we would
then
> expect him to have any exceptional skill in Bridge, which his skills
were not
> developed for.
I see it more like this. Someone has built an automobile to take him to
work. Then you come along and say, "Why would you expect that a device
which was designed to drive *to work* would be capable of driving to the
movies? The movies aren't work!"
> If we did not socialize, then I think this may be a good objection.
However I
> think that when dealing with social organisms, the only thing being
selected
> for is not short term individual reproductive success. So, you could
have a
> sort of meta-selection among groups, where groups of people who were
good to
> eachother survived better than those who weren't, etc.
Your second sentence is correct, but the last is not.
Individual reproductive success is not the only thing selected for. In
fact, as Dawkins explains very well, success of the individual *gene* is
the only thing that is really selected for. Thus, an animal may be
prepared to sacrifice its life to save, say, two offspring, for: each
offspring has 1/2 of the parent's genes, thus a gene that caused such
behavior would destroy one copy of itself but also save 0, 1, or 2 copies
of itself (with the expected value being 1). Thus, over the long term,
such a gene would be stable in the population. This is why there is 'kin
selection'.
However, the group-selection theory is just not right. No gene survives in
a population by encouraging the reproduction of other genes (or of
individuals with those other genes).
> Also, the social settings itsself can be considered part of the
organisms
> environment that it must adapt to and whatnot. So not only does it have
to
> adapt to nature, but organisms that don't 'follow the rules' of their
group may
> be expelled or killed by the group, so that they aren't selected for.
>
> So, what we feel moraly compelled to do wouldn't nessesarily have to
benefit
> us, individualy, but maybe the larger group.
This sounds purely speculative. There are free rider problems with
enforcing 'the rules,' plus you haven't given an account of how the rules
get formed to begin with or what their content should be.
I can't show that no such account is possible, but you haven't shown that
there is such an account either. So so far it seems that your attempt to
undermine morality rests on mere speculation.
> For instance, suppose there is a group of organisms, and 25% of their
offspring
> are extreme altruists, performing some function that won't really
benefit them,
> but benefits the group a good deal. Then the gene that produces those
sorts of
> offspring will be selected for, no?
I think not -- not unless (1) the altruists have some way of distributing
the benefits only to those who also possess this 'altruism' gene, and not
to others. Without the ability to perceive others' gene sequences, this is
difficult. (2) The altruists are able to give greater benefits to those
they serve than the costs they incur by their altruistic behavior. This
latter might work; we'd have to look at more specific scenarios to say
more.
In the absence of conditions 1 and 2, the individuals in the population
who lack this gene would derive greater benefit, on average, than the
individuals having the gene. Hence, they would 'outcompete' the latter,
and so would come to dominate the population.
> I am not expert on evolution, but your critique here I don't think is
very
> strong. I just don't think it is nessesary that only compulsions that
benefit
> the individual are selected for. Look at various communal insects They
> certainly don't behave egoisticly. Yet, something compells them to act
however
> they act. It might be some chemical in them, or something, but the means
isn't
> important -- what is important is that some sort of compellation was
selected
> for that wasn't in their individual interests.
That is a great example. What is important -- really important -- about
the communal insects is that the majority of the insects *cannot
reproduce*. Only the queen can reproduce. A drone can only produce more
copies of its genes through enabling the queen to reproduce more. Hence,
the entire hive serves the queen. Btw, I assume you're aware of Dawkins
well-known and very good book, _The Selfish Gene_. I know I've been
recommending more books than you could read, but anyway, that's a good
thing to read about evolution.
> I'd point you to all sort of animals, if you want empirical support of
how
> groups of them could evolve to act in ways that doesn't nessesarily
benefit
> them the most, individualy, but benefits the group more than if they
just
> benefited themselves. For instance, do you think the slower gazells try
to
> attack other gazells -- maybe break their legs -- so that they increase
their
> chances of escaping in the event of a lion-attack? I doubt that they do.
Is
> this only explainable by saying gazells percieve moral facts? Or could
it be
> explained by evolution?
First, how would a gazelle break other gazelles' legs? With his horns?
So imagine this. You're a gazelle. A lion suddenly appears and charges at
your herd. You're running away. You're one of the weaker and therefore
slower gazelles, however. But then you see, next to you, a gazelle that is
stronger than you, and so is getting ahead of you. Do you (a) just as it
is pulling away, try to attack it and so start a fight while the lion
approaches to eat you both, (b) keep running, or (c) turn around and run
towards the lion, in order to slow it down and prevent it from hurting
your buddies?
Answer (c) if you believe in the group selectionist model. Answer (b) if
you believe in the individual selectionist model.
(c) never happens. No matter what the potential costs and benefits to the
group, the individual gazelle will always try to save its own hide.
Dawkins gives some other, even better examples in his _River out of Eden_.
For instance, he points out that if all the trees in the forest could just
agree to some modest height, they could all live just as well, using less
energy and with less chance of falling over and such. However, nature
doesn't work that way; group selection does not happen. Every tree tries
to get above its neighbors to take more of the light, and so they all wind
up growing to ridiculous heights. The individual tree, sad to say, does
not work for the good of the forest.
Owl
news:7rocvs4p4kuhqslpq...@4ax.com...
> It seems to me many species don't hunt members of their own kind. I
> can see where organisms, including ourselves, may have emotional
> mechanisms that repel them from killing their own kind (those
> selfish-genes!).
Animals don't hunt members of their own species, because in order for a
predator to be successful, it must be larger than, and moreover, have
sharper teeth and claws than the prey.
user...@my-deja.com
Joe Durnavich <jo...@mcs.net> wrote:
> User 1DE7 writes:
>
> >>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
> >>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
> >
> >>You do not run because you are
> >>afraid; you are afraid because you run.
> >
> >Wrong. People can run without being afraid. The act of running would
be caused
> >by fear. Fear refers to a more internal process consisting of,
perhaps, some
> >internal sense of extreme uneasiness and discomfort and other things
that you
> >will mention.
>
> I'm reading a book right now called "The Emotional Brain." It is by a
> neuroscientist working out the low level brain mechanisms behind fear.
> It is all quite mechanical, of course. The organism does not have
react
> to it by running.
Unless you think it takes zero time for some organism to run after it
percieved a threat, then there is "enough time." Howabout when people
watch scary movies? They sit there in their seats, feeling dread or
whatever, yet they aren't running. How is it that they have enough time
for this?
These mechanisms when triggered set off reactions
> all over the body to prepare the organism to immediately deal with the
> threat. This may include running, etc. and the other stuff.
The problem is that 'running' is too far down the chain of reactions to
be considered 'fear' itsself, according to normal english. Sure,
running isn't qualatively different than your heart speeding up. They
are both ways in which your body reacts, but running is set about by
the former, or by some uneasiness in your stomache or something. In
english, 'fear' refers to the more basic and internal processes.
Because
> we have nerves all over our body, we can sense in various ways the
> high heart rate, the adrenaline, the tightening of the muscles, etc.
> This complex of reactions is that general sense of uneasiness. So,
> you are feeling yourself react. You are not reacting to the feeling.
Running would be a 'reaction' to the feeling. A hightened heartbeat
would likely simply be considered 'the feeling' itsself, since it is
more primary and there is a causal relationship between it and running.
So, seeing an attacker sets off a complex chain of events in your body,
and it often manifests itsself in some sort of physical action like
running, but it isn't accurate to say running 'is' part of what
constitutes fear. Running is neither nessesary nor sufficient, nor a
nessesary part of anything else that is nessesary or sufficient for
fear.
>
> >>Running, freezing, the
> >>startle reflex, quickened breathing and heart rate, and heightened
> >>awareness are what fear is.
> >
> >Almost. All except for the first. "Running" is not what is meant by
fear, by
> >english speakers. Again I refer you to a dictionary. Fear refers to
internal
> >processes. Fear causes you to run.
>
> This is not what modern brain science concludes.
Really? Provide some evidence.
And if you think
> about it, it doesn't make any evolutionary sense. Primitive organisms
> react automatically, and the reaction is one that will protect it such
> as being alerted to the danger, running, or freezing, attacking, etc.
Your point? This is what my theory says.
>
> >>You are not afraid of a sensation, you
> >>are afraid of the bear.
> >
> >No one said anyone was afraid of any sensations.
> >
> >>Nature has designed the rabbit to run from
> >>the fox and not from something inside itself.
> >
> >Nature has designed the rabbit to run *because* of something inside
itsself,
> >namely fear, that was triggered by the perception of a bear. I
suggest clearer
> >thinking.
>
> You always tell me to look at the low-level stuff happening in the
> brain, and now that I am doing that, you are rejecting it.
No, you're just confusing some of the higher level stuff (running) with
some of the lower level stuff. Fear is used to refer to the more
primary processes, and not the latter physical actions that the chain
of reactions produces.
> Your explanation of how fear works is one of those philosophical
> explanations that are not an explanation at all. Why would an
> organism run because of a feeling inside itself? If the organism can
> run because of something it senses, why not just have it run from the
> fox?
It does, indirectly. The feeling is better considered the *means* by
which the animal has evolved to react. I will again point out that
there is no sharp distinction between the internal feelings and the
running, but that the running is sufficiently later in the chain of
events that it isn't exactly what is being referred to by 'fear.' Again
it is neither nessesary nor sufficient.
I have to go, I may respond to the rest of your post later.
-User
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/25/00 2:05 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <8t60ik$gb4$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>
>> This sort of reduces to 'is our faculty of reason entirely physical'?
>And then
>> 'is our mind entirely physical'? I think you'll say "no" to both of
>these, but
>> it seems that the root of our differences on the morality issue is here.
>So:
>
>You are asking two different questions here.
>
>1. Is the mind physical? No. It's certainly not some kind of physical
>object (it's not the brain).
It doesn't have to literaly *be* the brain, but rather be the physical
*process* that the brain carries out. Sort of like how a computational process
is not literaly the computer.
>> If the mind, including our faculty of reason, was entirely physical and
>evolved
>> like everything else about us, would you stick to your first objection?
>
>Although I think it's impossible that the mind be physical (that sounds
>like a contradiction to me), I'll answer this yes.
You mean to assign a probability of 0 to the mind being physical? Or are you
just being casual with the word? From what you say it seems that you think it
is more likely that physical reality doesn't exist than that the mind is
physical. Could you try to assign a probability to the mind being physical, if
you don't really think it is 0?
>> There
>> would be no reason to think that reason, which evolved so that we could
>deal
>> with the physical world, would have some power to percieve moral facts
>in a
>> correct manner.
>>
>> For instance, it would be like expecting Michael Jordan to be good at
>Bridge,
>> because you associate excellence (at basketball) with him. He was
>conditioned,
>> and developed his skills for the purpose of basketball. I don't we would
>then
>> expect him to have any exceptional skill in Bridge, which his skills
>were not
>> developed for.
>
>I see it more like this. Someone has built an automobile to take him to
>work. Then you come along and say, "Why would you expect that a device
>which was designed to drive *to work* would be capable of driving to the
>movies? The movies aren't work!"
I strongly disagree with the analogy. There is no real qualative difference
between the movies and work, in where your car can go, assuming they are both
near roads designed for general automotive travel.
Let's look at a difference between using your rational faculty to deal with the
physical world, and using it to deal with the moral. At first I was going to
say that since the physical and moral worlds are nessesarily qualatively
different, then there you go, that counts as a big difference. But, then I
noticed that we use logic in more or less the same way in each. Rules of
inference that we use with physical premises we use with moral premises too.
Then I noticed that you are actualy claiming that moral facts are known by way
of reason, rather than simply rules of inference and such. Sometimes I forget
this difference between your and Friedman's theories and get them sort of mixed
up. He treats moral perceptions as analogous to sense perceptions, but the
physical analogy to what you are saying about moral perceptions strikes me as
startlingly odd.
It would be as if you claimed that we can know that grass is green through the
use of reason alone. That seems to be the analagous physical knowledge to the
moral knowledge that you postulate.
So, for instance, suppose you say you use reason to pecieve that murder is
wrong. That isn't nessesarily in a logical sense. There is no contradiction in
murder not being wrong. What you are really claiming to percieve is some
descriptive moral fact, but why would you think that *reason* can yield
descriptive facts of any type, moral or physical? It is totaly unparalleled in
physical reality. Can we figure out that there is a gravitational force through
reason alone? Can we figure out that momentum is conserved in physical
interactions just by using reason? Can we figure out that the sky is blue?
The answer to all of the above, I think, is "obviously not." I don't know why I
never realized this peculiar aspect of your theory before, or how wildly
different it asserted reason to be in the case of morality than in the case of
our physical world.
So, in light of this, I don't think your analogy with driving a car to work or
the movies works. And, not only do I think that my points here spoil your
analogy, but they seem to cause severe troubles for your entire theory. I think
that this point, taken all by itsself, is enough to invalidate your theory that
our moral 'perceptions' come from reason.
However, I've only realized what I see to be this major flaw in your theory
recently, so maybe you have some reason why it isn't a problem. It seems pretty
devastating to me now, though.
>> If we did not socialize, then I think this may be a good objection.
>However I
>> think that when dealing with social organisms, the only thing being
>selected
>> for is not short term individual reproductive success. So, you could
>have a
>> sort of meta-selection among groups, where groups of people who were
>good to
>> eachother survived better than those who weren't, etc.
>
>Your second sentence is correct, but the last is not.
>
>Individual reproductive success is not the only thing selected for. In
>fact, as Dawkins explains very well, success of the individual *gene* is
>the only thing that is really selected for. Thus, an animal may be
>prepared to sacrifice its life to save, say, two offspring, for: each
>offspring has 1/2 of the parent's genes, thus a gene that caused such
>behavior would destroy one copy of itself but also save 0, 1, or 2 copies
>of itself (with the expected value being 1). Thus, over the long term,
>such a gene would be stable in the population. This is why there is 'kin
>selection'.
>
>However, the group-selection theory is just not right. No gene survives in
>a population by encouraging the reproduction of other genes (or of
>individuals with those other genes).
Sounds good, so the encouragement would have to be fairly localized. Maybe the
compulsions are strongest with your immediate family, and get less strong after
that. So, this way they'd benefit those who actualy had your genes the most.
This seems consistant with racism. Those who are most geneticly different to,
tradiationaly, people have not seemed to have as strong of compulsions to do
what are considered good things for them.
And, the preference for one's family actualy does seem to be one where not only
emotional ties are stronger, but *moral compulsions* are actualy stronger. For
instance, lots of people will tell you it is "right" in the same way that they
say other moral things are right, to treat your parents with respect. To help
out your siblings in times of need, etc. However, they wouldn't say that it is
some moral obligation to do the same things for unrelated people.
>> Also, the social settings itsself can be considered part of the
>organisms
>> environment that it must adapt to and whatnot. So not only does it have
>to
>> adapt to nature, but organisms that don't 'follow the rules' of their
>group may
>> be expelled or killed by the group, so that they aren't selected for.
>>
>> So, what we feel moraly compelled to do wouldn't nessesarily have to
>benefit
>> us, individualy, but maybe the larger group.
>
>This sounds purely speculative. There are free rider problems with
>enforcing 'the rules,'
What do you mean? Enforcing 'the rules' would seem to get rid of the free rider
problems.
>plus you haven't given an account of how the rules
>get formed to begin with or what their content should be.
The rules could be formed out of pure self-interest of the parties involved. It
might be a sort of publig goods problem. If no one acts kindly to anyone else,
and everyone is always stealing and murdering and such, then it harms everyone.
If groups of organisms band together and agree to cooperate by not killing and
stealing from eachother, then they all benefit. This group could then expand,
as more people sought its protection.
I haven't developled my this too well, I am sort of speculating, as you allude
to. What I should say is that from the little bit I know about evolution, I
would tentatively expect that current human compulsions could, and likely
would, arise without any sort of moral reality. The thing I write about
families, and racism and such, seems to indicate the sort of stronger positive
compulsions the more similar others are to you, and weaker the less similar
they are to you, etc, that you'd expect, taking a very broad view at it.
However I will look into it more, I could be wrong. It could be wildly
improbable for our compulsions to have evolved to their current state if we
were just physical organisms and moral reality did not exist. I just don't see
any reason to suspect it now
>I can't show that no such account is possible, but you haven't shown that
>there is such an account either. So so far it seems that your attempt to
>undermine morality rests on mere speculation.
Yep, so far (well, except for my point about how you claim that reason yeilds
actual facts, which I think undermines it pretty well), but I will look into
the evolutionary argument a little more in order to establish a postitive
theory of how our current compulsions could evolve, in addition to undermining
yours.
>> For instance, suppose there is a group of organisms, and 25% of their
>offspring
>> are extreme altruists, performing some function that won't really
>benefit them,
>> but benefits the group a good deal. Then the gene that produces those
>sorts of
>> offspring will be selected for, no?
>
>I think not -- not unless (1) the altruists have some way of distributing
>the benefits only to those who also possess this 'altruism' gene, and not
>to others. Without the ability to perceive others' gene sequences, this is
>difficult.
Sounds good. See above. I postulate that our compulsions are strongest with our
families, then next strongest to those very similar to us, and thinning out
from there. It seems that this way, it would benefit those who posess the genes
the most, followed by those who posess a lot of the genes, but not all, or
maybe very similar genes.
>> I am not expert on evolution, but your critique here I don't think is
>very
>> strong. I just don't think it is nessesary that only compulsions that
>benefit
>> the individual are selected for. Look at various communal insects They
>> certainly don't behave egoisticly. Yet, something compells them to act
>however
>> they act. It might be some chemical in them, or something, but the means
>isn't
>> important -- what is important is that some sort of compellation was
>selected
>> for that wasn't in their individual interests.
>
>That is a great example. What is important -- really important -- about
>the communal insects is that the majority of the insects *cannot
>reproduce*. Only the queen can reproduce. A drone can only produce more
>copies of its genes through enabling the queen to reproduce more. Hence,
>the entire hive serves the queen.
Yes, I thought of that as I was posting it. I originaly had ants as my example,
but I was fairly certain that only their queen could reproduce, so I thought
that I would try to think of communal-type insects where they can individualy
produce, but as I could not think of any at the moment I changed my argument to
a more general one, where I don't specify the type until I thought of one --
something that hasn't happened yet -- unfortunately I am not an expert on
insects -- so I thought up the gazelle one.
>Btw, I assume you're aware of Dawkins
>well-known and very good book, _The Selfish Gene_. I know I've been
>recommending more books than you could read, but anyway, that's a good
>thing to read about evolution.
I have heard of it. I was actualy going to try to start reading more about
biology and evolution and such anyway, since most of my philosophical theories
seem to rely heavily on them. I'll look at it next time I'm at the bookstore.
>
>> I'd point you to all sort of animals, if you want empirical support of
>how
>> groups of them could evolve to act in ways that doesn't nessesarily
>benefit
>> them the most, individualy, but benefits the group more than if they
>just
>> benefited themselves. For instance, do you think the slower gazells try
>to
>> attack other gazells -- maybe break their legs -- so that they increase
>their
>> chances of escaping in the event of a lion-attack? I doubt that they do.
>Is
>> this only explainable by saying gazells percieve moral facts? Or could
>it be
>> explained by evolution?
>
>First, how would a gazelle break other gazelles' legs? With his horns?
Kicking them when they slept? I suspect gazelles' can kick fairly hard.
>So imagine this. You're a gazelle. A lion suddenly appears and charges at
>your herd. You're running away. You're one of the weaker and therefore
>slower gazelles, however. But then you see, next to you, a gazelle that is
>stronger than you, and so is getting ahead of you. Do you (a) just as it
>is pulling away, try to attack it and so start a fight while the lion
>approaches to eat you both,
I wasn't thinking this. That probably wouldn't be too effective. I was thinking
that they would attack them *before* the lion ever came. This seems to be a
much better strategy.
>(b) keep running,
Once the lion attacks, that seems to be the best strategy.
>(c) turn around and run
>towards the lion, in order to slow it down and prevent it from hurting
>your buddies?
>
>Answer (c) if you believe in the group selectionist model.
I've sort of revised my model, but even in its original form, I don't think I
was postulating anything quite like that. The action in (c) doesn't really
benefit the group in total, because you are part of the group also. One gazell
is likely going to die, at most, if one lion is attacking. So there is no
overall benefit to your group of organisms with similar genes if one gazelle
dies by choice instead of the slowest being caught. In fact (c) would be
detrimental, overall, to the group, since speed would no longer really be
selected for, and lion attacks would be successful far more often. Both beacuse
gazelles' are sacraficing themselves when they may have all escaped, and
beacuse on net your herd gets slower. Also, figuring out which gazelle is going
to sacrafice itsself might be a problem. You might have several running toward
the lion and dying instead of just one, as would likely happen if you made it
chase all the gazelles'.
Anyway, the above anaysis may be off, since again I am not expert on how
evolution works, but it seems to make sense.
>Answer (b) if
>you believe in the individual selectionist model
(b) also benefits the group, over the long run, so behaviors that benefit
everyone have somehow been selected for.
The option of the gazelle harming its fellow gazelles' would seem to be the
most benefitial to the gazelle though, but, I suspect that since it harms the
overall group so much, that if any group had genes within it that caused such
behavior, that they'd survive as a group less well than gazelles' acting as in
(b).
-User
Jesus 1DE7
>>well-known and very good book, _The Selfish Gene_. I know I've been
>>recommending more books than you could read, but anyway, that's a good
>>thing to read about evolution.
>
>I have heard of it. I was actualy going to try to start reading more about
>biology and evolution and such anyway, since most of my philosophical
>theories
>seem to rely heavily on them. I'll look at it next time I'm at the bookstore.
>
I actualy stopped at the bookstore this evening and read the first few chapters
of the book. It seems good so far. However from my initial impression it seems
that Dawkins is a rabid supporter of my theory that current human behavior can
be entirely explained by physical genes being selected for and such. He keeps
saying things like "humans are just robots" and "humans are just vessels for
the furtherance of their genes."(not direct quotes) He also makes a sort of
negative comment about philosophy and the humanities in general, about how they
seem to operate as if evolution hadn't been discovered yet, or something. I'd
be surprised if he thought he needed moral truth to explain human behavior from
what I have read so far. We'll see what I think when I finish it though.
-User
User 1DE7
>> >>We, on the other hand, can learn better ways to react in the
>> >>situation. As such we have different requirements than the rabbit.
>> >>Because reason is not automatic, we have to go through a long
>process
>> >>of study and practice to learn how to act. The study of these ways
>of
>> >>acting are called "morality." The ways themselves are called the
>> >>"good" the "right," etc.
>> >
>> >I don't know how many times I must tell you that moraliy is supposed
>to be
>> >proscriptive, by definition.
>>
>> You have been attacking the notion that there can be no moral truth.
>> I am addressing THAT issue.
Addressing it by redefining it, as I pointed out. I use the standard definition
of morality, call it X. I say that there can be no X. You then tell me "there
is Y!" as if that is relevent to whether or not there is X.
>> >Again, generaly morality refers to something that proscribes. Your
>conception
>> >doesn't do that.
>>
>> I gave plenty of examples in the "Little House on the Prairie" example
>> of how families had to spend their entire days working to just to
>> maintain a basic standard of life.
>>
I haven't read your prairie exaample, but I am fairly confident that you did
not establish any sensical view of objective proscription. What you say above
could be rephrased in the form "It was nessesary for families to do X, for them
to achieve Y."
Do you not see that this isn't proscriptive? It was nessesary for Hitler to
villify jews in order to achieve [his populous more or less accepting his
mistreatment of them]. Do you think it follows that he objectively ought to
villify jews and then carry out his plan?
You seem to make the same error over and over. Have you read Owl's papers yet?
Doesn't look like it. Can you ever state for me what "Hume's law" is? You show
no awareness of it from your posts.
>> >I have no clue what you mean by calling an action a 'truth', let
>alone an
>> >'ultimate truth.'
>>
>> You know how you are always looking to justify something, to find it's
>> "correspondence to reality"? In the realm of human action, think of
>> your life as the equivalent of reality.
What, so actions have to correspond to my life? What does that even mean? How
could my action not correspond to my life? If I go on a murderous rampage that
surely corresponds with me life, since it is literaly a part of my life. If you
mean "the furtherance of my lognevity" then your analogy is really getting
strained and you'd do better to drop it and simply assert some moral
proposition, as you do now.
>[your life] is the ultimate value or
>> standard.
First, if you use Rand's definition of value, of that which one acts to gain or
keep, then even assuming it is true it is not proscriptive at all. Hitler acted
to gain power, so that he could do certain deeds, it doesn't follow that he
should have done that.
There is also the ambiguity of "life" in your sentance. Longevity? There are
many meanings. However, this is just a side issue.
Let me re-iterate that I am not interested in demonstrating for you how
objectivist ethics are not proscriptive, or really talking about it at all
unless you have something new to bring. Before you type something, ask yourself
"is this something that Ayn Rand failed to cover? Am I further developing her
theory with my insight?" If not, then I suggest you not bother posting it, as I
know very well that Rand's derivation of ethics is logical rubbish.
>> >Which no one does except objectivists and perhaps a few other types
>of ego
>> >ists.
>> >Remember, morality implies proscription. I suggest coming up with a
>new term,
>> >you'd confuse yourselves less.
>>
>> Before we start analyzing proscriptions, I thought it would be best to
>> look at the field morality is played in. After all, you brought up
>> the evolution to set a context in which you hoped to show there can be
>> no moral truths. I am using pretty much that same context to show
>> that morality functions in only in such a context.
If it is something new, and you really think you can establish some objective
theory proscribing action, then be my guest. Try to cut out the frills, and get
to the logic of your argument, though. Preferably, you should write it out in
premise-conclusion format, with well defined terms and such.
>> So, do you have a problem with people pursuing their own life, with
>> them holding their life as the standard of value and then proscribing
>> action in terms of that?
If they keep to themselves I don't mind so much. However, I realize that what
they think their theory proscribes is not actualy proscribed in any objective
way, and if they think it is that they are mistaken. But, I wouldn't say I have
a "problem" with them, though maybe the world would be a better place if people
had more logical skill than that.
> What problem could there be if they are
>> wrong about this, and why would this be a problem?
If they confine themselves to views about how they should produce vigorously
and not initiate force against anyone, then maybe it is actualy beneficial to
society that they hold these mistaken beliefs. Who knows. The point is that
they are wrong if they think what they do is justified by some sort of
objective proscriptive theory.
How can this evolve into a problem? First, logicaly objectivism does not imply
non-initiation of force. Second, when people have certain irrational beliefs,
where they think they know the objective truth and everyone who disagrees with
them is evil, and in fact these people are quite wrong, then there is a
potential for problems, I think, supposing these people attained any
significant power.
Of course, this is all irrevelent. Even if the world would turn into some sort
of paradise if everyone was an objectivist, it wouldn't change the fact that
their ethical beliefs were wrong.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <7rocvs4p4kuhqslpq...@4ax.com>
>>Sure there are. I have them all the time. You know how you feel compelled
>not
>>to kill people, even if doing so would benefit you? (maybe you don't feel
>this
>>compulsion). They are not objective, but they exist in most people.
>
>Ok.
>
>It seems to me many species don't hunt members of their own kind. I
>can see where organisms, including ourselves, may have emotional
>mechanisms that repel them from killing their own kind (those
>selfish-genes!).
>
>But assume somebody says, "You shouldn't take the expressway today
>because it is under construction and you will never make it to work
>ontime." That moral proscription is not based on feelings because one
>can't discover that the expressway is under construction and its
>effect on driving time just from feelings alone.
The moral proscription gets its weight from feelings(or compulsions), using
"feeling" in a broad sense.
The moral proscription can be generalized out of this particular instance, and
is something like "It would be bad for you to do something that will make you
late to work, assuming you don't want to be late." That is a certain feeling,
or impression. The fact that taking the expressway is one such act is
irrelevent to the underlying proscriptive part of the statement here.
>It seems that we
>would find the word "should" used quite often in these types of
>situations.
The "should" doesn't come about because of the expressway, or any other
descriptive fact.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/25/00 11:21 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <20001026002128...@ng-ch1.aol.com>
I came across some Dawkins quotes on the subject. It seems my initial
impression of his ethical views being quite similar to mine was right.
"Skeptic: But then isn't what we ought to do (as David Hume argued long ago)
just a matter of preference and choice, custom and habit?
Dawkins: I think that's very likely true. [..]"
"The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there
is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind
pitiless indifference. "
"There is no spirit-driven life force, no throbbing, heaving, pullulating,
protoplasmic, mystic jelly. Life is just bytes and bytes and bytes or digital
information. "
"This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit that
things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply
callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose. "
Well, that concludes my appeal to authority on the issue, for now :)
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>> >>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>>
>>> So, do you have a problem with people pursuing their own life, with
>>> them holding their life as the standard of value and then proscribing
>>> action in terms of that?
>
>If they keep to themselves I don't mind so much. However, I realize that what
>they think their theory proscribes is not actualy proscribed in any objective
>way, and if they think it is that they are mistaken. But, I wouldn't say I
> have
>a "problem" with them, though maybe the world would be a better place if p
>eople
>had more logical skill than that.
What do you mean the world will be a "better" place.
What makes something "better"?
Why does logical skill have anything to do with "better"?
>> What problem could there be if they are
>>> wrong about this, and why would this be a problem?
>
>If they confine themselves to views about how they should produce vigorously
>and not initiate force against anyone, then maybe it is actualy beneficial to
>society that they hold these mistaken beliefs. Who knows. The point is that
>they are wrong if they think what they do is justified by some sort of
>objective proscriptive theory.
Calling them "wrong", then, has no significance. By your account,
being wrong shouldn't matter to anybody. It would be just an academic
point. Something you get marked wrong on a test.
>How can this evolve into a problem? First, logicaly objectivism does not imply
>non-initiation of force. Second, when people have certain irrational beliefs,
>where they think they know the objective truth and everyone who disagrees with
>them is evil, and in fact these people are quite wrong, then there is a
>potential for problems, I think, supposing these people attained any
>significant power.
Yeah, but so what? If morality is not objective, there cannot be any
real problems for people.
>Of course, this is all irrevelent. Even if the world would turn into some sort
>of paradise if everyone was an objectivist, it wouldn't change the fact that
>their ethical beliefs were wrong.
It shouldn't matter to you whether their ethical beliefs are right or
wrong.
For the record, I would be terrified if Objectivists came to power! I
don't see these guys living by their own principles. (And I would
gladly hide you in my attic while they swept the area.)
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/26/00 7:51 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <o9khvs4m148ler1vd...@4ax.com>
>>If they keep to themselves I don't mind so much. However, I realize that
>what
>>they think their theory proscribes is not actualy proscribed in any
>objective
>>way, and if they think it is that they are mistaken. But, I wouldn't say I
>> have
>>a "problem" with them, though maybe the world would be a better place if p
>>eople
>>had more logical skill than that.
>
>What do you mean the world will be a "better" place.
I mean that I would prefer it.
>What makes something "better"?
Often if a person prefers X over Y, he will say that X is "better" than Y.
>>> What problem could there be if they are
>>>> wrong about this, and why would this be a problem?
>>
>>If they confine themselves to views about how they should produce vigorously
>>and not initiate force against anyone, then maybe it is actualy beneficial
>to
>>society that they hold these mistaken beliefs. Who knows. The point is that
>>they are wrong if they think what they do is justified by some sort of
>>objective proscriptive theory.
>
>Calling them "wrong", then, has no significance. By your account,
>being wrong shouldn't matter to anybody.
What do you mean "shouldn't"? You're making some sort of proscriptive claim.
The fact is that being wrong does matter to people. People have an desire to be
right. It may not be rational, or jutsified in some absoute sense, but they
have it.
>It would be just an academic
>point. Something you get marked wrong on a test.
If people had no preferences, maybe. However it matters quite a bit to people
if they are wrong or right (or at least if they think they are wrong or right).
>>How can this evolve into a problem? First, logicaly objectivism does not
>imply
>>non-initiation of force. Second, when people have certain irrational
>beliefs,
>>where they think they know the objective truth and everyone who disagrees
>with
>>them is evil, and in fact these people are quite wrong, then there is a
>>potential for problems, I think, supposing these people attained any
>>significant power.
>
>Yeah, but so what? If morality is not objective, there cannot be any
>real problems for people.
Depends on how you define "problems." I'd say a person has a problem if a goal
of theirs is frustrated.
>For the record, I would be terrified if Objectivists came to power! I
>don't see these guys living by their own principles. (And I would
>gladly hide you in my attic while they swept the area.)
>
So you just consider yourself a small "o" objectivist?
-User
Owl
> So, for instance, suppose you say you use reason to pecieve that murder
is
> wrong. That isn't nessesarily in a logical sense. There is no
contradiction in
> murder not being wrong. What you are really claiming to percieve is some
> descriptive moral fact, but why would you think that *reason* can yield
> descriptive facts of any type, moral or physical? It is totaly
unparalleled in
> physical reality. Can we figure out that there is a gravitational force
through
> reason alone? Can we figure out that momentum is conserved in physical
> interactions just by using reason? Can we figure out that the sky is
blue?
>
> The answer to all of the above, I think, is "obviously not." I don't
know why I
> never realized this peculiar aspect of your theory before, or how wildly
> different it asserted reason to be in the case of morality than in the
case of
> our physical world.
You seem to be saying there is no a priori knowledge. However, there is
lots of it. Can we figure out that 2+2=4 through reason alone? Can we
figure out that nothing can be completely red and completely blue? Can we
figure out that identity is transitive?
The answer to all of *these* (and indefinitely many more) is obviously
yes.
A lot has been written on a priori knowledge, which I don't intend to go
into here. There's some discussion in my why-i'm-not-an-objectivist essay,
and a more thorough discussion in BonJour's recent book, _In Defense of
Pure Reason_ (and of course, in Kant).
> Sounds good, so the encouragement would have to be fairly localized.
Maybe the
> compulsions are strongest with your immediate family, and get less
strong after
> that. So, this way they'd benefit those who actualy had your genes the
most.
> This seems consistant with racism. Those who are most geneticly
different to,
That's right. That's probably why people in earlier times had racist
beliefs. But we now know that racism is wrong -- you see, moral progress.
It is indeed easy to see ways in which people have had false beliefs over
the ages that have probably been caused by biases, caused by instinctive
desires. But one can also see that those beliefs are just wrong -- and
furthermore, one can see how over time, and particularly with serious
study (as in moral philosophy), humanity has progressed towards more
rational, and more universalistic moral beliefs. Similar to how humanity
has progressed away from religious and superstitious beliefs at the same
time.
> Kicking them when they slept? I suspect gazelles' can kick fairly hard.
I don't think gazelle have that much foresight.
And why wouldn't the other gazelles fight back?
And how will the gazelle know when the lion is going to be coming soon?
Lions eat live food. Will this renegade gazelle therefore kick another one
every day? What is his probability of getting eaten by the lion (in a herd
of 200 gazelle?), versus his probability of being injured by the other
gazelle(s)?
> >(c) turn around and run
> >towards the lion, in order to slow it down and prevent it from hurting
> >your buddies?
> >
> >Answer (c) if you believe in the group selectionist model.
>
> I've sort of revised my model, but even in its original form, I don't
think I
> was postulating anything quite like that. The action in (c) doesn't
really
> benefit the group in total, because you are part of the group also. One
gazell
> is likely going to die, at most, if one lion is attacking. So there is
no
Suppose two are attacking?
> overall benefit to your group of organisms with similar genes if one
gazelle
> dies by choice instead of the slowest being caught. In fact (c) would be
Right, so why doesn't the slowest one run back, or perhaps run obliquely,
to draw the lions off?
...
> beacuse on net your herd gets slower. Also, figuring out which gazelle
is going
> to sacrafice itsself might be a problem. You might have several running
toward
> the lion and dying instead of just one, as would likely happen if you
made it
> chase all the gazelles'.
Even better, why don't the gazelle get together and decide to fight off
the lions? 10 gazelles should be able to kill 1 lion. I bet the lions
would stop attacking after that.
> The option of the gazelle harming its fellow gazelles' would seem to be
the
> most benefitial to the gazelle though, but, I suspect that since it
harms the
> overall group so much, that if any group had genes within it that caused
such
> behavior, that they'd survive as a group less well than gazelles' acting
as in
> (b).
Unfortunately, this really doesn't work. There are lots and lots of animal
behaviors and plant traits (like the tree heights) that are detrimental to
the group. You know what happens? The group suffers, that's all. Why?
Because: what if you had a bunch of cows who are putting the welfare of
the group before themselves, and then you have in the population just a
single instance of a gene for putting one's own welfare before that of the
group? What will happen to this population? A: the selfish cows will, over
time, dominate the population. By definition, they place their own welfare
before that of the group, while the other cows do the reverse; so by
definition, the selfish cows succeed better than the rest of the group.
Will this cause the whole species of cows to go extinct? Doubtful, but it
might. Even so, the group-evolution you're hypothesizing won't take place,
because every single species is going to be subject to the same logic, and
so *every* species is going to be dominated by the selfish animals. Except
for things like the social insects, where the hive has only one
reproducer -- however, note that even in that case, there is no action
'for the good of the species'. Ants only act for the good of *their own
hive*; they will not do a thing for another hive.
Owl
news:20001026002128...@ng-ch1.aol.com...
> I actualy stopped at the bookstore this evening and read the first few
chapters
> of the book. It seems good so far. However from my initial impression it
seems
> that Dawkins is a rabid supporter of my theory that current human
behavior can
> be entirely explained by physical genes being selected for and such. He
keeps
> saying things like "humans are just robots" and "humans are just vessels
for
> the furtherance of their genes."(not direct quotes) He also makes a sort
of
Sounds a bit extreme, but I take it that you'll be enjoying Dawkins.
I also seem to recall a sentence something like this: If you want to draw
a lesson out of this book, it is this: let us try to *teach* altruism,
because we are born selfish. (not a direct quotation)
Your other message contains some quotations from River out of Eden, if I
recall correctly. I use that chapter to explain the 'problem of evil'.
Joe Durnavich
>>>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>> >>Date: 10/24/00 12:41 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>I haven't read your prairie exaample, but I am fairly confident that you did
>not establish any sensical view of objective proscription. What you say above
>could be rephrased in the form "It was nessesary for families to do X, for
> them
>to achieve Y."
Yep. We humans need to figure out how to live life. Some people,
apparently, prefer to feel their way around. I think it is better to
turn on the light and see the way.
>Do you not see that this isn't proscriptive? It was nessesary for Hitler to
>villify jews in order to achieve [his populous more or less accepting his
>mistreatment of them]. Do you think it follows that he objectively ought to
>villify jews and then carry out his plan?
This is narrow, short range thinking. Step back and look at the big
picture. Each person works to maintain a long, happy, successful
life. We all share the same planet, so we have to figure out the
optimal limitations of our actions so that we allow ourselves the best
chance to pursue our life without interfering with that same objective
of others. Hitler stepped over the bounds. He was wrong.
And look what became of Hitler and Nazi Germany. One of the most
productive nations on the planet was reduced to shambles in 6 years. I
bet THAT wasn't in his plans! I don't recall him expecting to have to
blow his brains out while hiding in a bunker.
The purpose of morality is to be able to avoid such a scenario as best
as possible. We are just animals. Nothing physically prevents us all
from living like Hitler, if we so choose. But just look at pictures
of Berlin in April of 1945. Is that rubble really the type of
environment life flourishes in?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>You seem to make the same error over and over. Have you read Owl's papers yet?
>Doesn't look like it. Can you ever state for me what "Hume's law" is? You show
>no awareness of it from your posts.
Let's see. Hume is the fellow who doesn't know if the sun is going to
come out tomorrow. Yeah, that is somebody I want to take advice
from...
Yes, I have read Owl's paper. I don't believe in a priori knowledge.
I think all language and knowledge has to be learned. Thus, many of
his arguments don't mean much to me at this time. (I don't think he
is way off base. Philosophical axioms do seem to be different than
other propositions. I just haven't developed my thoughts yet on the
matter.) But I am glad to see you starting to accept Owl's views
enough that you are recommending them to others.
That we are alive and that we have to act in particular ways to stay
alive can be readily discovered. I did not think this was so
controversial, but I guess you skeptic's are prepared to doubt
everything.
As for justifying life as the ultimate goal, I suppose this is as
illogical as trying to justify logic. Remember Wittgenstein's quote:
"If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet
false." Aristotle would say that life is a final end, meaning we
pursue it as an end in itself and not as a means to some other end.
One might suppose that pleasing God is the final end because we burn
in hell if we don't and enjoy the splendor of the Kingdom of Heaven if
we do. But notice that this still points to life as that standard,
e.g., the burning and the enjoyment. There is just the supposition
that life continues after death in some spiritual fashion.
I still can't understand why you moral skeptics care about morality.
Morality belongs to the rational. It consists of using reason and
observation to discover techniques to live as successfully as one is
capable of.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Jesus 1DE7 jesu...@aol.com
>>Date: 10/25/00 11:21 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>I came across some Dawkins quotes on the subject. It seems my initial
>impression of his ethical views being quite similar to mine was right.
>
>"Skeptic: But then isn't what we ought to do (as David Hume argued long ago)
>just a matter of preference and choice, custom and habit?
>
>Dawkins: I think that's very likely true. [..]"
>
>
>"The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if
>there
>is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but blind
>pitiless indifference. "
>
>"There is no spirit-driven life force, no throbbing, heaving, pullulating,
>protoplasmic, mystic jelly. Life is just bytes and bytes and bytes or digital
>information. "
>
>"This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit that
>things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply
>callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose. "
Dawkins makes some excellent points. The universe itself has no
need for morality. It is indestructible. It doesn't have to
make choices to stay alive. We humans, on the other hand, do need to
figure out how to stay alive and we have to act in particular ways to
stay alive. It is a mistake to say that good and evil apply to
anything other than that context.
Just like ideas aren't things inside of you, good
and evil are not things or forces inside of objects.
A couple doesn't buy a house because a spirit of goodness
is embedded in the structure, but because it enables them
to maintain their lives. They have a place to raise a
family and hopefully when they retire, the house will be
paid off freeing them from the financial burden of mortgage
or rent payments.
I know you object to such an analysis, but that is a
typical example of where people use the words "should"
and "good." We should buy a house for these reasons.
It will be good for us in the long run.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/26/00 7:51 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>>>If they keep to themselves I don't mind so much. However, I realize that
>>what
>>>they think their theory proscribes is not actualy proscribed in any
>>objective
>>>way, and if they think it is that they are mistaken. But, I wouldn't say I
>>> have
>>>a "problem" with them, though maybe the world would be a better place if p
>>>eople
>>>had more logical skill than that.
>>
>>What do you mean the world will be a "better" place.
>
>I mean that I would prefer it.
>
>>What makes something "better"?
>
>Often if a person prefers X over Y, he will say that X is "better" than Y.
Ok. So, if people are able to do what they prefer, their lives will
be a better. Does that sound about right?
>>>> What problem could there be if they are
>>>>> wrong about this, and why would this be a problem?
>>>
>>>If they confine themselves to views about how they should produce vigorously
>>>and not initiate force against anyone, then maybe it is actualy beneficial
>>to
>>>society that they hold these mistaken beliefs. Who knows. The point is that
>>>they are wrong if they think what they do is justified by some sort of
>>>objective proscriptive theory.
>>
>>Calling them "wrong", then, has no significance. By your account,
>>being wrong shouldn't matter to anybody.
>
>What do you mean "shouldn't"? You're making some sort of proscriptive claim.
>The fact is that being wrong does matter to people. People have an desire
>to be
>right. It may not be rational, or jutsified in some absoute sense, but they
>have it.
Desiring to be right and yet being wrong would not be a real problem,
by your account. If there is no objectivity in the realm of
human action, then there can be no "real" problems. Things can't
"really" matter to people. They are just blowing hot air when
they say that, right?
>>It would be just an academic
>>point. Something you get marked wrong on a test.
>
>If people had no preferences, maybe. However it matters quite a bit to people
>if they are wrong or right (or at least if they think they are wrong or ri
>ght).
Is "mattering" just saying it matters? Then, big deal.
>>>How can this evolve into a problem? First, logicaly objectivism does not
>>imply
>>>non-initiation of force. Second, when people have certain irrational
>>beliefs,
>>>where they think they know the objective truth and everyone who disagrees
>>with
>>>them is evil, and in fact these people are quite wrong, then there is a
>>>potential for problems, I think, supposing these people attained any
>>>significant power.
>>
>>Yeah, but so what? If morality is not objective, there cannot be any
>>real problems for people.
>
>Depends on how you define "problems." I'd say a person has a problem if a goal
>of theirs is frustrated.
Ok.
So people have preferences, and if goals of theirs are frustrated it
is a problem.
Say someone prefers to graduate and he must pass a trigonometry class
to do so. But he does NOT prefer to take trig. He despises it and
will dread every moment in class. If he does what he prefers, which
is not take the trig class, than this frustrates his goal and
preference of graduating. This is a problem according to you. If he
takes the trig class and sweats it out, then he is acting against his
preferences which is morally wrong by your account of morals being
based on preferences, etc.
Is there any way to resolve the dilemma in your scheme of preferences?
>>For the record, I would be terrified if Objectivists came to power! I
>>don't see these guys living by their own principles. (And I would
>>gladly hide you in my attic while they swept the area.)
>>
>
>So you just consider yourself a small "o" objectivist?
Let's just say I consider myself a "Friend of the Objectivists." My
philosophical interests tend to be about explaining and understanding
normal everyday life. I like Adler, Aristotle, and Rand which are all
pretty similar. I also like Ryle and Wittgenstein who encourage
looking at the typical, everyday usage of language. I think that most
people are Objectivists--or something like it--while they are living
their lives normally and not thinking about philosophy.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/27/00 12:53 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <k3gjvscjcbejpeee7...@4ax.com>
>
>>Often if a person prefers X over Y, he will say that X is "better" than Y.
>
>Ok. So, if people are able to do what they prefer, their lives will
>be a better. Does that sound about right?
They will think it makes their lives better, probably. You can't then
generalize that I would think they would be leading better lives. My notion of
'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about what is better is
based on our subjective preferences. It doesn't really make sense to refer to
"better" an any absolute sense.
>>What do you mean "shouldn't"? You're making some sort of proscriptive claim.
>>The fact is that being wrong does matter to people. People have an desire
>>to be
>>right. It may not be rational, or jutsified in some absoute sense, but they
>>have it.
>
>Desiring to be right and yet being wrong would not be a real problem,
>by your account.
I think what you mean is that there is no *rational* reason why anyone should
care. However humans are not driven by reason alone. They have feelings,
impulses, etc, which are primary. So, not having a rational reason does not
mean not having a problem.
> If there is no objectivity in the realm of
>human action, then there can be no "real" problems. Things can't
>"really" matter to people.
What do you mean, they can't? You can't give a rational justification for them,
but when a person has their preferences frustrated I'd call that an instance of
their having a problem.
>They are just blowing hot air when
>they say that, right?
Their justification isn't rational.
>>>Yeah, but so what? If morality is not objective, there cannot be any
>>>real problems for people.
>>
>>Depends on how you define "problems." I'd say a person has a problem if a
>goal
>>of theirs is frustrated.
>
>Ok.
>
>So people have preferences, and if goals of theirs are frustrated it
>is a problem.
>
>Say someone prefers to graduate and he must pass a trigonometry class
>to do so. But he does NOT prefer to take trig. He despises it and
>will dread every moment in class. If he does what he prefers, which
>is not take the trig class, than this frustrates his goal and
>preference of graduating. This is a problem according to you. If he
>takes the trig class and sweats it out, then he is acting against his
>preferences which is morally wrong by your account of morals being
>based on preferences, etc.
I don't know what your last sentance means. I have not claimed that anything is
moraly wrong. I never said acting against any preference that you may have is
moraly wrong. If you act against your preference you just act against your
preference, period. Thats it. No (objective) morality involved.
>
>Is there any way to resolve the dilemma in your scheme of preferences?
You could notice that there is no *moral* dilema, since you just injected
morality into this yourself. Generaly there are trade-offs in most actions that
you take. People might prefer to eat ice-cream, yet prefer not to gain weight.
What action they actualy take is likely based on thier net preference, or which
one is stronger.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <11fjvs8mpflvrr1o3...@4ax.com>
>
>>"This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit
>that
>>things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply
>>callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose. "
>
>Dawkins makes some excellent points. The universe itself has no
>need for morality. It is indestructible. It doesn't have to
>make choices to stay alive. We humans, on the other hand, do need to
>figure out how to stay alive and we have to act in particular ways to
>stay alive.
And there is nothing objective to say that we ought to stay alive, hence your
problem.
Here is an alalogy, again. Suppose that I want to be a mass murderer. I tell
you that "well, obviously there is nothing objective saying that I should be a
mass murderer, but it IS an objective fact that in order to be a mass murderer,
I need to do X, Y, and Z. Therefore, I ought to do X, Y and Z." Can you not see
how this doesn't follow.
In general, for you to conclude that X is nessesary for Y implies that you
ought to do X, then it is absolutely requires that you establish that you ought
to do Y. You haven't done this, and seem to just avoid the issue.
>Just like ideas aren't things inside of you, good
>and evil are not things or forces inside of objects.
>A couple doesn't buy a house because a spirit of goodness
>is embedded in the structure, but because it enables them
>to maintain their lives.
And you need to establish that they should maintain their lives.
>I know you object to such an analysis
Then why don't you address the objections, if you are going to keep talking
about it? Either accept them and stop talking about objective proscription, or
express some argument, preferable in a clear and formal manner, that shows how
I am wrong.
>but that is a
>typical example of where people use the words "should"
>and "good." We should buy a house for these reasons.
>It will be good for us in the long run.
We're both aware of when and why people use the term "good." If you want to
talk about such things I suspect starting a new thread. This thread is about
the objective existance of what they refer to.
-User
Owl
> matter.) But I am glad to see you starting to accept Owl's views
> enough that you are recommending them to others.
Me too.
> As for justifying life as the ultimate goal, I suppose this is as
> illogical as trying to justify logic. Remember Wittgenstein's quote:
> "If the true is what is grounded, then the ground is not true, nor yet
> false." Aristotle would say that life is a final end, meaning we
It is not clear to me what he meant by "ground." Seems like an ambiguous
metaphor. It's also not clear why one should accept the antecedent of that
conditional.
user...@my-deja.com
Owl <a@a.a> wrote:
> Jesus 1DE7 <jesu...@aol.com> wrote in message
> news:20001026002128...@ng-ch1.aol.com...
> > I actualy stopped at the bookstore this evening and read the first
few
> chapters
> > of the book. It seems good so far. However from my initial
impression it
> seems
> > that Dawkins is a rabid supporter of my theory that current human
> behavior can
> > be entirely explained by physical genes being selected for and
such. He
> keeps
> > saying things like "humans are just robots" and "humans are just
vessels
> for
> > the furtherance of their genes."(not direct quotes) He also makes a
sort
> of
>
> Sounds a bit extreme, but I take it that you'll be enjoying Dawkins.
Yep, thanks for the recommendation.
> I also seem to recall a sentence something like this: If you want to
draw
> a lesson out of this book, it is this: let us try to *teach* altruism,
> because we are born selfish. (not a direct quotation)
I remember something like that. Knowing the context, his point wasn't
that we *should* teach altruism. It wasn't meant as a moral
proscription, if I recall correctly. From the context I remember, I
don't see anything too notable or objectionable about it.
-User
user...@my-deja.com
No, I am not saying that. I might rephrase it "a priori strong
dispositions to believe", but in terms of math and logic, we probably
do have such things. But, for the problem with your alleged moral
knowledge, see below.
Can we figure out that 2+2=4 through reason alone? Can we
> figure out that nothing can be completely red and completely blue?
Can we
> figure out that identity is transitive?
>
> The answer to all of *these* (and indefinitely many more) is obviously
> yes.
Another thing about those is that they all seem to be logical(treating
math as a subset of logic) statements. We were talking about where
moral intuitions come from. You claimed that they come from our faculty
of reason. Well, it seems sort of obvious that logic statements do,
since logic seems to be modeled on correct reasoning.
The thing is, stating some moral fact like "murder is wrong" is as much
a fact of reason as "grass is green." We don't know physical
descriptive facts, like what color the grass is, through reason. It
seems just as odd to suppose we can know moral descriptive facts like
that. All we seem to be able to know through reason that pertains to
the physical word are rules of inference and math axioms and stuff that
seems nessesarily true, logicaly. I'm saying that claiming to percieve
some random non-logical fact has nothing to do with reason at all, and
I don't see why you'd think it came from 'reason.' Murder being wrong
doesn't logicaly seem any more reasonable than murder not being wrong.
There is no contradiction or inconsistancy in it. What makes you think
it comes from your faculty of reason?
So, your analogy about driving cars to work and to the movies seems not
to work. If we evolved for physical survival, and the only thing our
reason told us about that was logical stuff, and these moral facts are
as logicaly insignificant as what color the sky is, then I don't see
why you'd think our faculty of reason could give us anything meaningful
about morality. Driving to work and driving to the movies are quite
similar. Logical facts and moral facts have nothing to do with one-
another.
I'm out of time now. I may respond to the rest later, but this is by
far the most important part.
Joe Durnavich
>So, your analogy about driving cars to work and to the movies seems not
>to work. If we evolved for physical survival, and the only thing our
>reason told us about that was logical stuff, and these moral facts are
>as logicaly insignificant as what color the sky is, then I don't see
>why you'd think our faculty of reason could give us anything meaningful
>about morality. Driving to work and driving to the movies are quite
>similar. Logical facts and moral facts have nothing to do with one-
>another.
I'm going to keep pestering you about this, User. :-)
If we evolved for physical survival, don't you think our faculty of
reason evolved as part of the means of our survival? Or did our
faculty of reason evolve just so that we can grade ourselves on tests
and waste our life away philosophizing?
As for "logically insignificant" what is your standard of
significance? Where must you stand, so to speak, to judge the facts
"the sky is blue" and "I must eat to live" as equally insignificant?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/27/00 12:32 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>>>"This is one of the hardest lessons for humans to learn. We cannot admit
>>that
>>>things might be neither good nor evil, neither cruel nor kind, but simply
>>>callous - indifferent to all suffering, lacking all purpose. "
>>
>>Dawkins makes some excellent points. The universe itself has no
>>need for morality. It is indestructible. It doesn't have to
>>make choices to stay alive. We humans, on the other hand, do need to
>>figure out how to stay alive and we have to act in particular ways to
>>stay alive.
>
>And there is nothing objective to say that we ought to stay alive, hence your
>problem.
Actually, it is not a problem, but a confusion on your part.
To decide if one ought to live, one must ask, "For what benefit?" It
is like asking how living benefits you which is another way of asking
how living helps you live.
To argue that there is no fact saying the we ought to stay alive, as
you do, means you are comparing your life against some higher
standard. What might this standard be and how do you justify that as
the standard? For example, you might say something along the lines
of, "From the Universe's perspective, my life is meaningless." But
how do you justify using something like the "Universe's perspective"
as a standard? (It actually doesn't make any sense, but I can't think
of any other stance you can make your argument from.)
Another way of looking at is what is the PROBLEM with choosing to
live? What are the consequences of us being wrong about this choice?
In fact, can one be wrong about this choice? How would we justify the
conclusion that choosing life is "wrong" or problematical?
>Here is an alalogy, again. Suppose that I want to be a mass murderer. I tell
>you that "well, obviously there is nothing objective saying that I should be a
>mass murderer, but it IS an objective fact that in order to be a mass murd
>erer,
>I need to do X, Y, and Z. Therefore, I ought to do X, Y and Z." Can you no
>t see
>how this doesn't follow.
It does follow if you want to be a mass murderer. Mass murderer's
have to plan and have to acquire the resources to achieve their
objective. But you can ask yourself if you should be a mass murderer.
In asking "should I" you are asking if it will assist your pursuit of
a long, happy life. I haven't read too many biographies of mass
murderers, but I just don't see them living the good life.
The way this is usually pictured is as an inverted tree or hierarchy
with "long happy life" at the top as the highest value, goal, or final
end. Branching underneath it are subgoals you have to achieve to
maintain that highest value. Underneath each subgoal are further
branches with more subgoals. It may appear to you, at the moment,
that taking cocaine will give you pleasure which is something you
consider part of happiness. But if you were more knowledgable, you
would know that a cocaine habit will likely eventually interfere with
your health and your ability to maintain a job and relationships with
others.
It is this requirement to see the bigger picture as best as possible
that morality addresses. The nature of our faculty of reason is to
observe what happens in your typical, day-to-day life, note patterns,
and form principles. You may discover that telling lies causes others
to lose trust in you and that being truthful improves your standing
with others. Thus, you conclude that honesty is the best policy. Now
you have a guideline to future action that will help keep you on the
path of happiness. The weakness of inductive reasoning, of course, is
that there are borderline cases that the principle will offer little
or no guidance on. There may be cases where telling a white lie may
be the better action. There is not too much disagreement over whether
murder is wrong, but the abortion debate never seems to settle. But
this doesn't mean thinking in principles is useless, because their
primary purpose is to deal with the common, most likely situations you
are likely to face in your everyday life.
It really is like a business that has the long term goal of staying in
business. They can't be too shortsighted and plan for only the next
quarter. They also need to think several years ahead. Principles
help you think ahead. It is thinking strategically.
>In general, for you to conclude that X is nessesary for Y implies that you
>ought to do X, then it is absolutely requires that you establish that you
>ought
>to do Y. You haven't done this, and seem to just avoid the issue.
My ultimate intent was to get you too look at the bigger picture.
>Then why don't you address the objections, if you are going to keep talking
>about it? Either accept them and stop talking about objective proscription, or
>express some argument, preferable in a clear and formal manner, that shows how
>I am wrong.
I am not saying you are wrong. I am asking why should we listen to
you? Since we can't justify what we say, according to you, just what
is YOUR justification? Does anything you say really, objectively, and
factually matter?
>>but that is a
>>typical example of where people use the words "should"
>>and "good." We should buy a house for these reasons.
>>It will be good for us in the long run.
>
>We're both aware of when and why people use the term "good." If you want to
>talk about such things I suspect starting a new thread. This thread is about
>the objective existance of what they refer to.
Here is another bad habit you picked up from philosophy. Don't look
for objects behind every word. There doesn't need to be a "goodness"
spirit in actions for those actions to be really good. Whether you
like it or not, people are goal-seeking creatures. We use the words
"good" and "should" in the context of achievement.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
You gotta love Wittgenstein. One's thinking while reading any of his
philosophy tends to follow that same pattern.
User uses the foundational metaphor in justifying statements.
Arguments are supported by other arguments much as each floor of a
building is supported by lower floors, and logic itself is supposed to
be the "foundation" supporting all arguments. Applying the metaphor
further, one wants to ask what supports the foundation? In the case
of a building, we can say it is the Earth. What supports or justifies
logic, then? User wants to use the fact that people can't offer an
answer satisfactory to him to cast doubt on all knowledge. But the
question doesn't make any sense. The question makes sense when asking
about the foundation of a building. But that doesn't mean it makes
sense when asking about logic. Logic IS the method of justification.
Justifications must come to an end, and the fact they do does not
invalidate them. Even in the building metaphor, we might say the
Earth supports the foundation of the building, but it makes no sense
to ask what supports the Earth. Following Wittgenstein's statement,
the Earth is not supported, nor yet unsupported. Just because no
turtles are holding it up doesn't mean it is falling and in danger of
smashing itself into a lower "ground."
User wants us (or me, anyway) to justify that one should live. But
one's life is the justification for "shoulds" and "should nots." The
term "justification" has no meaning outside the context of one's own
life. It is ironic that User argues that we have no business arguing
for the objectivity of morality and lecturing others on what one
should or should not do, but he apparently thinks he has found a
higher ground outside of all human context from which he can lecture
us and tell us what is not the case. He needs to see that there is no
such position, that justification is a feature of, and functions only
in, human life. It is meaningless in any other context. His request
to justify that one ought to live is no more meaningful than a burst
of line noise from a modem.
--
Joe Durnavich
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> We don't know physical
> descriptive facts, like what color the grass is, through reason.
But your claim is that the descriptive fact of "grass is green" means
that grass has a certain property of absorption. How would you say we
learned this, except through reason?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
> Joe Durnavich
> >Ok. So, if people are able to do what they prefer, their lives will
> >be a better. Does that sound about right?
>
> They will think it makes their lives better, probably. You can't then
> generalize that I would think they would be leading better lives. My noti
> on of
> 'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about what is better is
> based on our subjective preferences.
How do you know what their notions of what is better are based on?
Perhaps you mean you have a /theory/ that their notions of better are
based on subjective preferences.
> It doesn't really make sense to refer to
> "better" an any absolute sense.
So we can not refer to one theory as better than another and mean
anything other than that we have a subjective preference for it? This
leaves your theory of better in a rather poor state, doesn't it? Why
should anyone find it interesting?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/28/00 11:17 AM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <luulvsor177pvmpid...@4ax.com>
>>And there is nothing objective to say that we ought to stay alive, hence
>your
>>problem.
>
>Actually, it is not a problem, but a confusion on your part.
>
>To decide if one ought to live, one must ask, "For what benefit?"
Not nessesarily, people have notions of 'ought' that are irreducable.
>It
>is like asking how living benefits you which is another way of asking
>how living helps you live.
Completely false. Asking how it is true that you should do X is not equivilant
to asking how X helps you live. This is a gross error in thinking on your part.
If you think they're equivilant, produce a formal argument showing it.
>To argue that there is no fact saying the we ought to stay alive, as
>you do, means you are comparing your life against some higher
>standard.
Completely wrong again. It could also imply that I deny that there is any
higher standard to compare it to.
A lot of these errors could b cleared up, I think, if you tried to write out
formal arguments for all of these points of yours.
>Another way of looking at is what is the PROBLEM with choosing to
>live? What are the consequences of us being wrong about this choice?
>In fact, can one be wrong about this choice?
No one is saying it is objectively wrong. The argument is that [to say it is
objectively right] is objectively wrong. It isn't right or wrong, its just a
preference that you have with no proscriptive significance.
>but it IS an objective fact that in order to be a mass murd
>>erer,
>>I need to do X, Y, and Z. Therefore, I ought to do X, Y and Z." Can you no
>>t see
>>how this doesn't follow.
>
>It does follow if you want to be a mass murderer.
No, it doesn't. I encourage you to try to construct an argument showing it.
You'll find that you need a premise that states "you ought to do what you want"
and that you won't be able to justify this premise.
>In asking "should I" you are asking if it will assist your pursuit of
>a long, happy life.
No, "should" is proscriptive. What you equate it to is not.
>>In general, for you to conclude that X is nessesary for Y implies that you
>>ought to do X, then it is absolutely requires that you establish that you
>>ought
>>to do Y. You haven't done this, and seem to just avoid the issue.
>
>My ultimate intent was to get you too look at the bigger picture.
All of your talk about your 'value tree' earlier is completely irrelevent. The
concept is quite simple and I understand it thoroughly. It does however not
establish the objective proscription that you need.
>>Then why don't you address the objections, if you are going to keep talking
>>about it? Either accept them and stop talking about objective proscription,
>or
>>express some argument, preferable in a clear and formal manner, that shows
>how
>>I am wrong.
>
>I am not saying you are wrong. I am asking why should we listen to
>you?
I am not saying that you should objectively listen to me. I am saying that I
am, in this instance objectively *correct.* Do you see that that doesn't imply
that anyone should do anything?
>Since we can't justify what we say, according to you, just what
>is YOUR justification?
I don't say that people should objectively do certain things, so I don't have
the problem of trying to justify the dubious position.
>Does anything you say really, objectively, and
>factually matter?
I don't know what you mean by "objectively matter." What I say in this instance
is true. However, it is not the case that people should believe what is true.
Whether they do or not is a matter of preference. Whether or not my positions
'matter' to people can be decided simply by observing reality. If you notice
yourself spending time responding to my positions, then they obviously matter
to you in some way. Does that mean they *should* matter? No, it doesn't make
sense to talk about *should* objectively.
>Here is another bad habit you picked up from philosophy. Don't look
>for objects behind every word. There doesn't need to be a "goodness"
>spirit in actions for those actions to be really good. Whether you
>like it or not, people are goal-seeking creatures. We use the words
>"good" and "should" in the context of achievement.
>
What you keep evading, is that these words don't objectively proscribe
anything. You actualy seem to say it here, but from the content of your other
messages I'm not sure you realize what you are saying. You think you are
somehow disagreeing with me when you say that there is no objective
proscriptive existant that "good" refers to in common usage, but that we often
use them in relational or expressive ways. This is in fact my position.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <bvplvs4casm2ckktq...@4ax.com>
>If we evolved for physical survival, don't you think our faculty of
>reason evolved as part of the means of our survival?
Yes.
>Or did our
>faculty of reason evolve just so that we can grade ourselves on tests
>and waste our life away philosophizing?
Why would anyone think this? It obviously evolved because it conferred a
gene-furthering advantage.
I don't see what you are getting at.
>As for "logically insignificant" what is your standard of
>significance? Where must you stand, so to speak, to judge the facts
>"the sky is blue" and "I must eat to live" as equally insignificant?
The point is that whether the sky is blue or not is not the subject of logic.
Reason lets us draw correct conclusions from premsies. The root of our
knowledge that the sky is blue is a visual sensation. We may then use reason to
conclude that that sensations implies the sky is blue, but our knowledge that
the sky is blue is not some 'a priori' piece of knowledge.
To your other example. You surely need to use a small amount of reason to
figure out that eating is nessesary for life. But, this fact again is not at
root the product of our rational faculty. It is derived from our sensations. We
may see that other people who don't eat get skinny, go through intense
discomfort, and die. When we stop eating, we may get thinner, go through
intense comfort, and then realize by some sort of induction that we'll likely
die if we continue to behave as the other people that we saw starve to death.
So, we start eating. We had to use our reason to make sense of our sensations,
but the conclusion is entirely dependant on, and derived from, our sensations.
For instance, it is logicaly possible that the world could have been such that
we did not need to eat in order to live. Maybe we'd live by absorbing sunlight
or something.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/26/00 8:40 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <sumhvssnm5dme6n24...@4ax.com>
>
>>Do you not see that this isn't proscriptive? It was nessesary for Hitler to
>>villify jews in order to achieve [his populous more or less accepting his
>>mistreatment of them]. Do you think it follows that he objectively ought to
>>villify jews and then carry out his plan?
>
>This is narrow, short range thinking. Step back and look at the big
>picture. Each person works to maintain a long, happy, successful
>life.
Completely irrelevent.
>We all share the same planet, so we have to figure out the
>optimal limitations of our actions so that we allow ourselves the best
>chance to pursue our life without interfering with that same objective
>of others.
We don't "have" to do anything.
>Hitler stepped over the bounds. He was wrong.
A formal argument would be nice. This doesn't follow from anything else you've
said.
That is, it doesn't follow if you mean that proscriptively. As in, Hitler did
something counter to some objective proscritpive fact.
>And look what became of Hitler and Nazi Germany. One of the most
>productive nations on the planet was reduced to shambles in 6 years. I
>bet THAT wasn't in his plans!
So? That is irrelevent to the issue.
>I don't recall him expecting to have to
>blow his brains out while hiding in a bunker.
So? Establish that doing things that you hadn't expected is somehow objectively
bad.
>The purpose of morality is to be able to avoid such a scenario as best
>as possible. We are just animals. Nothing physically prevents us all
>from living like Hitler, if we so choose. But just look at pictures
>of Berlin in April of 1945. Is that rubble really the type of
>environment life flourishes in?
Again, irrelevent. You seem to not be grasping the issue. Obviously people
*prefer* to live, and they *prefer* not to have their environment destroyed.
This has no proscriptive content.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <v50ivs0l7ijrtmtmh...@4ax.com>
>
>Let's see. Hume is the fellow who doesn't know if the sun is going to
>come out tomorrow. Yeah, that is somebody I want to take advice
>from...
He 'knew' as well as you, if you're only counting justified belief as
knowledge.
>Yes, I have read Owl's paper. I don't believe in a priori knowledge.
It isn't as clean and true as he makes it sound, I doubt. But, there is the
point that you cannot know laws of inference through observation. It is quite
probably that the human mind is such that it readily accepts and makes use of
laws of inference, even though they can't be arrived at by observation. This is
a sort of 'a priori' knowledge -- the fact that the brain has certain
properties that predisposes it to holding logical beliefs.
You don't believe that?
>But I am glad to see you starting to accept Owl's views
>enough that you are recommending them to others.
I don't accept many of his positive views, I don't think. But, he can spot a
logical inconsistancy, or error, fairly well. So, his ideas about why other
arguments don't work are pretty reliable.
>That we are alive and that we have to act in particular ways to stay
>alive can be readily discovered. I did not think this was so
>controversial, but I guess you skeptic's are prepared to doubt
>everything.
>
No one is doubting this. The problem is when you try to objectively proscribe
that we should do things that cause us to stay alive, rather than just note
that doing them would cause is to stay alive.
>As for justifying life as the ultimate goal, I suppose this is as
>illogical as trying to justify logic.
Same for trying to critisize someone elses ultimate goal. Therefore saying
people 'should' do anything in an objective sense doesn't make sense, and you
seem to have cocneded your point, even if you don't really relaize it.
If you say killing people is wrong, then someone can always ask why. You give a
reason, they ask why. This process continues until you can't justify the choice
to live, or live MQM. Their reason for killing people also cannot be justified
at its root. Your actions are no better than theirs in any objective sense, and
there is no sense in which either of you 'should' objectively conform to the
other persons preference.
>I still can't understand why you moral skeptics care about morality.
>Morality belongs to the rational.
And skeptics are not rational? Skepticism basicaly results from a pure
application of reason, so far as I can see.
>It consists of using reason and
>observation to discover techniques to live as successfully as one is
>capable of.
And here you are again with your non-proscriptive notion of morality. Find a
new term.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/28/00 1:27 PM Central Daylight Time
>Message-id: <MPG.1464e477b1...@mail.nji.com>
>> They will think it makes their lives better, probably. You can't then
>> generalize that I would think they would be leading better lives. My noti
>> on of
>> 'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about what is better
>is
>> based on our subjective preferences.
>
>How do you know what their notions of what is better are based on?
I should have been more clear. My 'notion' of better might very well be the
same, but the things that I find to be better will not be the same as everyone
elses.
>> It doesn't really make sense to refer to
>> "better" an any absolute sense.
>
>So we can not refer to one theory as better than another and mean
>anything other than that we have a subjective preference for it?
Right. However, whether or not a theory is true is still objective. Most people
have a subjective preference for true theories over false ones, all else being
equal.
When people speak of "better theories" it is often taken as a synonym for "more
likely true."
>This
>leaves your theory of better in a rather poor state, doesn't it?
Poor how?
>Why
>should anyone find it interesting?
Because it is true, perhaps?
-User
User 1DE7
>From: "Gordon G. Sollars" sol...@nji.com
>Message-id: <MPG.1464e296b8...@mail.nji.com>
>> We don't know physical
>> descriptive facts, like what color the grass is, through reason.
>
>But your claim is that the descriptive fact of "grass is green" means
>that grass has a certain property of absorption. How would you say we
>learned this, except through reason?
We may have used reason to arrive at the conclusion. What I mean is, in this
case reason is being applied to various sensations, or impressions. For
instance, our seeing the grass, or, our seeing the read-out on an electronic
instrument that measures what sort of light the grass absorbs. We start with
impressions, then we reason about them to conclude that grass is green.
Owl doesn't seem to be saying that we simply use reason to make sense of moral
impressions. He is saying that the impressions themselves somehow come from our
faculty of reason, as if the fact that grass is green could be discovered by
someone through pure thought, without ever having seen grass, or without ever
having had ANY visual sensations at all. If everyone was blind, it would be
like Owl saying that we'd somehow know grass was green through some basic
intuitions stemming from our faculty of reason. (not the same as inferring what
sort of light it absorbed through lots of scientific work with our other
senses).
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/27/00 12:53 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>>>Often if a person prefers X over Y, he will say that X is "better" than Y.
>>
>>Ok. So, if people are able to do what they prefer, their lives will
>>be a better. Does that sound about right?
>
>They will think it makes their lives better, probably. You can't then
>generalize that I would think they would be leading better lives. My notion of
>'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about what is better is
>based on our subjective preferences. It doesn't really make sense to refer to
>"better" an any absolute sense.
My original question was do you see a problem with people pursuing
their own lives (and proscribing their own action in terms of that).
You said "though maybe the world would be a better place if people
had more logical skill than that." But now you say better doesn't
apply to the world, only to your own preferences.
Is your problem with what I say merely that you don't prefer it? I
don't see that as a problem. You also say your problem with what I
say is that it isn't true. Then I don't see the "problem" either.
Why should what is true or false present a problem?
>>Desiring to be right and yet being wrong would not be a real problem,
>>by your account.
>
>I think what you mean is that there is no *rational* reason why anyone should
>care. However humans are not driven by reason alone. They have feelings,
>impulses, etc, which are primary. So, not having a rational reason does not
>mean not having a problem.
But is it not a *real* problem, right? It is not a justified problem.
>> If there is no objectivity in the realm of
>>human action, then there can be no "real" problems. Things can't
>>"really" matter to people.
>
>What do you mean, they can't? You can't give a rational justification for
>them,
>but when a person has their preferences frustrated I'd call that an instan
>ce of
>their having a problem.
But it is not an objective problem, right? Therefore, the problem
doesn't exist, by your account. Maybe you might want to come up with
a new term. :-)
>>They are just blowing hot air when
>>they say that, right?
>
>Their justification isn't rational.
So, no problem--according to you.
>>Say someone prefers to graduate and he must pass a trigonometry class
>>to do so. But he does NOT prefer to take trig. He despises it and
>>will dread every moment in class. If he does what he prefers, which
>>is not take the trig class, than this frustrates his goal and
>>preference of graduating. This is a problem according to you. If he
>>takes the trig class and sweats it out, then he is acting against his
>>preferences which is morally wrong by your account of morals being
>>based on preferences, etc.
>
>I don't know what your last sentance means. I have not claimed that anythi
>ng is
>moraly wrong. I never said acting against any preference that you may have is
>moraly wrong. If you act against your preference you just act against your
>preference, period. Thats it. No (objective) morality involved.
I had in mind that quote from Dawkins you brought up, by the way, we
he said something about morality being based on preferences, desires,
etc. You suggested he thought like you did.
>>Is there any way to resolve the dilemma in your scheme of preferences?
>
>You could notice that there is no *moral* dilema, since you just injected
>morality into this yourself. Generaly there are trade-offs in most actions
> that
>you take. People might prefer to eat ice-cream, yet prefer not to gain weight.
>What action they actualy take is likely based on thier net preference, or
>which
>one is stronger.
Ok, but this is an appeal to reason. You have to use reason to
evaluate and compare the strength of preferences. The student may
judge graduating the stronger preference because it may lead to a good
income over his lifetime. It seems to me that once you have
preferences, you can use your faculty of reason to weigh them and
figure out which ones to satisfy, or which ones conflict with each
other.
Do you have any arguments against someone using reason to identify the
stronger preferences and/or identify the trade offs necessary to
satisfy the stronger preferences?
Say a person finds they always have preferences--a lifetime full of
preferences. And, of course, they prefer to act on their preferences.
Can't they take advantage of the free calculator nature provided
them--reason--to manage things so that they can maximize the number
of, or the net strength of, preferences they do act on? And once they
figure out some of this out, won't they have, then, a guide to action,
a guide to preference maximization?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>Why
>>should anyone find it interesting?
>
>Because it is true, perhaps?
Why would your theory being true objectively matter?
--
Joe Durnavich
Owl
> User uses the foundational metaphor in justifying statements.
> Arguments are supported by other arguments much as each floor of a
> building is supported by lower floors, and logic itself is supposed to
> be the "foundation" supporting all arguments. Applying the metaphor
> further, one wants to ask what supports the foundation? In the case
> of a building, we can say it is the Earth. What supports or justifies
> logic, then?
In the quotation you gave, W was talking about 'truth.' Now you're talking
about justification. I hope you're not confusing the two.
In answer to your question, the principles of logic are self-evident.
> User wants to use the fact that people can't offer an
> answer satisfactory to him to cast doubt on all knowledge. But the
> question doesn't make any sense. The question makes sense when asking
Which question doesn't make sense? It seems to me that I just gave a
correct answer to your last question, and so I don't see how one would
conclude that the question 'doesn't make sense.' It seems that you are
just using a false analogy.
> Justifications must come to an end, and the fact they do does not
> invalidate them. Even in the building metaphor, we might say the
> Earth supports the foundation of the building, but it makes no sense
> to ask what supports the Earth. Following Wittgenstein's statement,
> the Earth is not supported, nor yet unsupported.
I don't see why one would say that. It seems pretty clear that it makes
perfect sense, and that the answer is that nothing supports the Earth; it
is floating in space.
> Just because no
> turtles are holding it up doesn't mean it is falling and in danger of
> smashing itself into a lower "ground."
True; it's not in danger of falling, because it floats freely in space
(more precisely, it is pulled around the sun).
According to W, apparently, the theory that the earth is on the back of a
turtle must be 'meaningless'. If you think that, you've been hanging
around the illogical positivists too long. Not everything that's false is
meaningless.
It seems that you and W are relying on 2 mistakes: First, the mistake of
misdescribing your analogy; it plainly *does* make sense to ask what is
supporting the Earth. Second, the mistake of arguing from analogy in the
first place. Even if you were right about the Earth, nothing would follow
about logic or ethics.
In particular, it is certainly wrong to say that the laws of logic are
neither true nor false. They are obviously true. It is not a category
error to say that "A=A" is true.
Likewise, it is certainly wrong to say that living is neither good nor
bad. Obviously it is good (provided, that is, that you have a relatively
happy life and are not living in Newark, for instance). How ridiculous to
suggest otherwise!
Wittgenstein also made the same error in another case. He said that the
standard meter in Paris neither was, nor wasn't, one meter long. How
ridiculous a thing to say! Obviously, it is a meter long. What on Earth
made W deny it? (It is, after all, the same length as all the other
one-meter-long objects in the world, isn't it?)
Owl
news:8tdoq2$1nt$1...@nnrp1.deja.com...
> Can we figure out that 2+2=4 through reason alone? Can we
> > figure out that nothing can be completely red and completely blue?
> Can we
> > figure out that identity is transitive?
> >
> > The answer to all of *these* (and indefinitely many more) is obviously
> > yes.
>
> Another thing about those is that they all seem to be logical(treating
> math as a subset of logic) statements. We were talking about where
> moral intuitions come from. You claimed that they come from our faculty
> of reason. Well, it seems sort of obvious that logic statements do,
> since logic seems to be modeled on correct reasoning.
Well, I don't see that any of those is 'logical', except perhaps the
identity statement, so for that one, you can substitute the "inside of"
relation. "2+2=4" is indeed a mathematical statement, but I don't see in
what sense it is therefore a 'logical' statement. It certainly isn't a
rule of inference or anything like that -- as one would be led to believe
from your last statement above. Nor do either of the other two examples I
cited have anything to do with inferences or correct reasoning (at least,
not more than any other truth 'has to do with' correct reasoning).
All in all, then, it seems that your (a priori?) restriction of a priori
statements to the subject matter of logic is either (a) just simply false,
based on not looking at the examples, or (b) based on an overly broad
sense of "logic" that hasn't been made clear yet. In case (b), if you want
to extend "logic" to include anything that you can see to be true by the
use of reason (that's the only way I can see to make your assessment of
the examples true), then of course I will say that ethics would be part of
'logic' so defined.
> We don't know physical
> descriptive facts, like what color the grass is, through reason. It
I don't see why my examples above are not physical descriptive facts.
They're certainly facts, aren't they? And they're descriptive, aren't
they? Maybe you think they're not physical. But wait -- aren't you the guy
who thinks there *isn't* anything non-physical?
> seems just as odd to suppose we can know moral descriptive facts like
> that. All we seem to be able to know through reason that pertains to
> the physical word are rules of inference and math axioms and stuff that
> seems nessesarily true, logicaly.
Well, "Murder is wrong" certainly seems necessarily true.
> I'm saying that claiming to percieve
> some random non-logical fact has nothing to do with reason at all, and
> I don't see why you'd think it came from 'reason.' Murder being wrong
> doesn't logicaly seem any more reasonable than murder not being wrong.
Really?!
> There is no contradiction or inconsistancy in it. What makes you think
> it comes from your faculty of reason?
First, I didn't think there was a contradiction in it. There isn't a
contradiction, formally, in the denial of any of my example statements
above.
Second, what makes me think it comes from my faculty of reason is the same
thing that makes me think all those other statements come from my faculty
of reason. When I think about it, it makes sense to me.
It seems that you have a very deep form of skepticism, if you're sticking
to everything you've said so far. Despite our past discussion of this, I
think that
you really don't accept logical knowledge, or knowledge of physical
reality, and perhaps not knowledge of the sort of statements I listed
above (we'll see about those). Traditionally, the only thing left is
knowledge of one's own current mental states; I suppose you'll probably
accept 'direct awareness' for that (but maybe not). I've said this before,
but I think that if the critics of my moral epistemology are people who
hold very deep skeptical views about lots of things other than moral
propositions, that isn't very much cause for concern for me.
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> case reason is being applied to various sensations, or impressions. For
> instance, our seeing the grass, or, our seeing the read-out on an electronic
> instrument that measures what sort of light the grass absorbs. We start with
> impressions, then we reason about them to conclude that grass is green.
This simply seems wrong. Surely you /start/ with the idea that grass is
green, and /then/ reason to your idea that "has color X" means "absorbs
light of certain kinds".
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
User 1DE7
>From: "Gordon G. Sollars" sol...@nji.com
>> We may have used reason to arrive at the conclusion. What I mean is, in
>this
>> case reason is being applied to various sensations, or impressions. For
>> instance, our seeing the grass, or, our seeing the read-out on an
>electronic
>> instrument that measures what sort of light the grass absorbs. We start
>with
>> impressions, then we reason about them to conclude that grass is green.
>
>This simply seems wrong. Surely you /start/ with the idea that grass is
>green, and /then/ reason to your idea that "has color X" means "absorbs
>light of certain kinds".
Not sure what you are saying is wrong. I meant, in my explaination, to give an
account of both definitions of green. My first statement deals with the one you
seem to like. My second statement deals with the one I like better. My
definition of green isnt the issue here. Use yours if you want. You don't know
grass is green in your sense through reason alone. It always starts with
impressions.
-User
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> >How do you know what their notions of what is better are based on?
>
> I should have been more clear. My 'notion' of better might very well be the
> same, but the things that I find to be better will not be the same as eve
> ryone
> elses.
This doesn't really answer the question, how is it that you know that
others have based their notions on subjective preferences? Again, this
just seems like an assumption on your part. But the fact that you can
disagree with others over what is "better" hardly shows that the notion
of better is not objective, or "absolute" as I believe you said. It only
makes sense that persons with different background knowledge will
disagree over what is better even while using the same idea of it.
> >> It doesn't really make sense to refer to
> >> "better" an any absolute sense.
> >
> >So we can not refer to one theory as better than another and mean
> >anything other than that we have a subjective preference for it?
>
> Right.
I disagree. We can base our /choice/ among competing theories upon
the evidence, explanatory power, predictive power, simplicity, etc.
What is subjective about this? Do you really think that physicists simply
have a preference for, say general relativity? Or biologists, just a preference
for evolution? If so, I fail to see how this sense of "preference" is not
objective.
> However, whether or not a theory is true is still objective. Most people
> have a subjective preference for true theories over false ones, all else
> being
> equal.
How very clever of them! It seems that you are strongly resisting this
formulation, but most people quite /rationally/ want a true theory over a
false one. If they have a "preference", it is a quite rational one.
> When people speak of "better theories" it is often taken as a synonym for
> "more
> likely true."
Sometimes, and sometimes other factors (like the ones I gave above) are
meant.
> >This
> >leaves your theory of better in a rather poor state, doesn't it?
>
> Poor how?
In that you can apparently only defend it based upon your subjective
preference for it.
> >Why
> >should anyone find it interesting?
>
> Because it is true, perhaps?
And why should we have a subjective preference for what is true?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
User 1DE7
>
> I should have been more clear. My 'notion' of better might very well be the
> same, but the things that I find to be better will not be the same as
everyone
> elses.
This doesn't really answer the question, how is it that you know that
others have based their notions on subjective preferences?"
Based their notions on subjective preferences? I said that the notions might be
the same, due simply to the common concept of 'better', but what people actualy
think is better would be different. I'm not really sure what you mean by basing
a notion on a subjective preference.
"But the fact that you can
disagree with others over what is "better" hardly shows that the notion
of better is not objective, or "absolute" as I believe you said. "
I didn't say that that conclusively showed it, I don't think. I don't know what
it would mean for "better" to be objective. It doesn't make sense to me.
"> >So we can not refer to one theory as better than another and mean
> >anything other than that we have a subjective preference for it?
>
> Right.
I disagree. We can base our /choice/ among competing theories upon
the evidence, explanatory power, predictive power, simplicity, etc.
What is subjective about this? "
Those criteria are not subjective. If by "better", all you mean is that a
theory meets those criteria, then the question is "why should be pick the
"better" theory?" I think some sort of proscription is actualy imbedded in your
notion of "better", though, and it is this proscription that I am saying is not
objective.
"Do you really think that physicists simply
have a preference for, say general relativity? Or biologists, just a preference
for evolution?"
They have a preference for using criteria that lead them to those theories.
"If so, I fail to see how this sense of "preference" is not
objective."
Whether the theory meets the criteria they prefer is objective. The preference
of those specific criteria is not. I don't see how it would be "objective" to
have a desire to hold a true theory rather than a false one.
"> However, whether or not a theory is true is still objective. Most people
> have a subjective preference for true theories over false ones, all else
being
> equal.
How very clever of them! It seems that you are strongly resisting this
formulation, but most people quite /rationally/ want a true theory over a
false one."
I don't know why you just injected "rational" into the description of their
preference. I fail to see what makes it more rational than any other desire.
It doesn't take strong resisting at all to not call their desire rational. In
fact I can't even imagine how it makes sense to do such a thing.
"> >This
> >leaves your theory of better in a rather poor state, doesn't it?
>
> Poor how?
In that you can apparently only defend it based upon your subjective
preference for it."
You can only defend the betterness of it like that. You can define its *truth*
quite objectively, though. Since most people regard true theories as better
theories, you can general speak of 'better' and people take it to mean more
true, or having more predictive power, or something.
"> >Why
> >should anyone find it interesting?
>
> Because it is true, perhaps?
And why should we have a subjective preference for what is true?"
Why should there be a law of gravitation? Why should momentum be conserved?
That is just the way reality is. People prefer true theories, its just one of
those properties of people. It probably conferred some sort of advantage
durring natural selection. Asking why they "should" prefer things is like
asking why a certain rock that you find in the forrest "should" be on whatever
side it is on, rather than flipped over.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>Joe Durnavich <jo...@mcs.net> wrote in message
>news:9s1mvscsmubd25abv...@4ax.com...
>> User uses the foundational metaphor in justifying statements.
>> Arguments are supported by other arguments much as each floor of a
>> building is supported by lower floors, and logic itself is supposed to
>> be the "foundation" supporting all arguments. Applying the metaphor
>> further, one wants to ask what supports the foundation? In the case
>> of a building, we can say it is the Earth. What supports or justifies
>> logic, then?
>
>In the quotation you gave, W was talking about 'truth.' Now you're talking
>about justification. I hope you're not confusing the two.
The context of W's quote is on "giving grounds," that is, justifying a
statement as true. The rest of the quote is: "If someone asked us
'but is that [the above quote] true?' we might say 'yes' to him; and
if he demanded grounds we might say "I can't give you any grounds, but
if you learn more you too will think the same'. If this didn't come
about, that would mean that he couldn't for example learn history."
I think your notion of "self-evident" is compatible with this.
>In answer to your question, the principles of logic are self-evident.
>
>> User wants to use the fact that people can't offer an
>> answer satisfactory to him to cast doubt on all knowledge. But the
>> question doesn't make any sense. The question makes sense when asking
>
>Which question doesn't make sense? It seems to me that I just gave a
>correct answer to your last question, and so I don't see how one would
>conclude that the question 'doesn't make sense.' It seems that you are
>just using a false analogy.
It seems to me that saying something is "self-evident" is another way
of saying that it makes no sense to ask for further grounds.
>> Justifications must come to an end, and the fact they do does not
>> invalidate them. Even in the building metaphor, we might say the
>> Earth supports the foundation of the building, but it makes no sense
>> to ask what supports the Earth. Following Wittgenstein's statement,
>> the Earth is not supported, nor yet unsupported.
>
>I don't see why one would say that. It seems pretty clear that it makes
>perfect sense, and that the answer is that nothing supports the Earth; it
>is floating in space.
I probably should have used "The Universe" rather than the Earth.
What we see on Earth is that there is always a "downward tugging
force" on all objects. It would be naive for someone to assume the
same holds in space. They would think that because the Earth is
unsupported, it is falling or in danger of falling.
Don't you think that this is User's goal in calling logic
"dis-justified"? Because you offer no further justification for
logic, he concludes that all knowledge is in danger of being false or
illogical (except his own, of course).
>> Just because no
>> turtles are holding it up doesn't mean it is falling and in danger of
>> smashing itself into a lower "ground."
>
>True; it's not in danger of falling, because it floats freely in space
>(more precisely, it is pulled around the sun).
Even more precisely, there is no "pulling" (force at a distance) in
gravitational physics.
>According to W, apparently, the theory that the earth is on the back of a
>turtle must be 'meaningless'. If you think that, you've been hanging
>around the illogical positivists too long. Not everything that's false is
>meaningless.
I haven't been addressing "false" statements here, but philosophical
axioms.
What can we say about philosophical axioms? Some that come to mind
are:
1. Self-evident.
2. You use them in an attempt to deny them.
3. It makes no sense to ask for further justification.
4. Skeptics reserve them for only themselves. :-)
>It seems that you and W are relying on 2 mistakes: First, the mistake of
>misdescribing your analogy; it plainly *does* make sense to ask what is
>supporting the Earth. Second, the mistake of arguing from analogy in the
>first place. Even if you were right about the Earth, nothing would follow
>about logic or ethics.
>
>In particular, it is certainly wrong to say that the laws of logic are
>neither true nor false. They are obviously true. It is not a category
>error to say that "A=A" is true.
>
>Likewise, it is certainly wrong to say that living is neither good nor
>bad. Obviously it is good (provided, that is, that you have a relatively
>happy life and are not living in Newark, for instance). How ridiculous to
>suggest otherwise!
It only sounds ridiculous because the mind wants to conclude that
because life is not good, there is a danger of it being bad. Saying
that life is good underlines that fact that it is the standard of
good. It does not mean that life is good for some other reason.
>Wittgenstein also made the same error in another case. He said that the
>standard meter in Paris neither was, nor wasn't, one meter long. How
>ridiculous a thing to say! Obviously, it is a meter long. What on Earth
>made W deny it? (It is, after all, the same length as all the other
>one-meter-long objects in the world, isn't it?)
If you are going to allow the other one meter objects to be considered
standards, then the rod is one meter long. Out of curiosity, what if
the standard rod changes size accidently, maybe lose some layers of
molecules while cleaning it? Is it still one meter long?
I don't think W's notions are ridiculous. This is one of those
philosophical issues where you can see the point and see how it
translates into your own views.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/28/00 10:06 AM Central Daylight Time
>
>>If we evolved for physical survival, don't you think our faculty of
>>reason evolved as part of the means of our survival?
>
>Yes.
>
>>Or did our
>>faculty of reason evolve just so that we can grade ourselves on tests
>>and waste our life away philosophizing?
>
>Why would anyone think this? It obviously evolved because it conferred a
>gene-furthering advantage.
>
>I don't see what you are getting at.
You said, "If we evolved for physical survival, and the only thing our
reason told us about that was logical stuff, and these moral facts are
as logically insignificant as what color the sky is,...".
Let me try to lay this out in statement form so you can point to the
parts you disagree with:
(1) Reason tells us about logical stuff.
(2) Logical stuff does not tell us how to act for our survival.
(3) Therefore, reason tells us nothing about survival.
(4) Survival confers a gene-furthering advantage.
(5) Therefore, reason confers no gene-furthering advantage.
Let me add that morality is the process of finding out how to act for
your survival.
>>As for "logically insignificant" what is your standard of
>>significance? Where must you stand, so to speak, to judge the facts
>>"the sky is blue" and "I must eat to live" as equally insignificant?
>
>The point is that whether the sky is blue or not is not the subject of logic.
>Reason lets us draw correct conclusions from premsies. The root of our
>knowledge that the sky is blue is a visual sensation. We may then use reas
>on to
>conclude that that sensations implies the sky is blue, but our knowledge that
>the sky is blue is not some 'a priori' piece of knowledge.
So, morality--which is about physical human action--cannot be
illogical, because logic doesn not deal with the physical or things we
sense, right?
>We had to use our reason to make sense of our sensations,
>but the conclusion is entirely dependant on, and derived from, our sensations.
Is this a weakness of arguments?
>For instance, it is logicaly possible that the world could have been such that
>we did not need to eat in order to live. Maybe we'd live by absorbing sunlight
>or something.
One advantage of being a plant is that you don't get pestered by
skeptics for pursuing your life. :-)
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/24/00 11:37 PM Central Daylight Time
>>
>>But assume somebody says, "You shouldn't take the expressway today
>>because it is under construction and you will never make it to work
>>ontime." That moral proscription is not based on feelings because one
>>can't discover that the expressway is under construction and its
>>effect on driving time just from feelings alone.
>
>The moral proscription gets its weight from feelings(or compulsions), using
>"feeling" in a broad sense.
You mean in a vague sense. :-)
>The moral proscription can be generalized out of this particular instance, and
>is something like "It would be bad for you to do something that will make you
>late to work, assuming you don't want to be late." That is a certain feeling,
>or impression. The fact that taking the expressway is one such act is
>irrelevent to the underlying proscriptive part of the statement here.
How can a feeling be either good or bad. What are the criteria?
Likewise, what makes a feeling a feeling *about* being late for work?
You are not proposing some variant of intuition here, where you
directly know the goodness or badness of a feeling and what the
feeling is about, are you?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/26/00 11:13 PM Central Daylight Time
>
>If you say killing people is wrong, then someone can always ask why. You g
>ive a
>reason, they ask why. This process continues until you can't justify the c
>hoice
>to live, or live MQM. Their reason for killing people also cannot be justified
>at its root. Your actions are no better than theirs in any objective sense
>, and
>there is no sense in which either of you 'should' objectively conform to the
>other persons preference.
You just have the wrong idea of what justification is. You take the
God's-eye-view approach where you want to place yourself outside of
all human--in fact, all physical--context to make your justifications.
But justification is a human technique. It happens right here, right
now, in the context of our lives in this world. We justify in and for
the pursuit of our lives. The word has meaning ONLY in that context.
Think about that. What if you have been using the word "justify" the
wrong way all this time and have been applying it to places where it
doesn't apply? Isn't this one way to resolve some of your skepticism
about logic and morality?
Now, that brings up the issue of what is the right use of the word
justify. Who is in charge of the word? Philosophers or normal
people?
>>I still can't understand why you moral skeptics care about morality.
>>Morality belongs to the rational.
>
>And skeptics are not rational? Skepticism basicaly results from a pure
>application of reason, so far as I can see.
Morality is concerned with living life. This takes place in the
physical world--a place far, far removed from the skeptic's personal
isolation in the realm of pure formal logic. As I see it, you have no
justification for telling any of us what to do...
>>It consists of using reason and
>>observation to discover techniques to live as successfully as one is
>>capable of.
>
>And here you are again with your non-proscriptive notion of morality. Find a
>new term.
...such as "find a new term." By your account, you should not be
recommending courses of action to me.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 7:40 AM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <4u9ovs8vdotminb4l...@4ax.com>
>
>Don't you think that this is User's goal in calling logic
>"dis-justified"?
Pay closer attention. It was Owl who asserted that by my theory of
justification, logic was dis-justified according to itsself. Originaly I had
held that logic was simply non-justified according to itsself, however I then
updated my theory in a response to Owl that showed how it was actualy
*justified* according to itsself.
>Because you offer no further justification for
>logic, he concludes that all knowledge is in danger of being false or
>illogical (except his own, of course).
Do you think you making these false statements about my position is
contributing to the discussion?
-User
Jesus 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <nmgmvssitsg5vd52k...@4ax.com>
>
>>>Why
>>>should anyone find it interesting?
>>
>>Because it is true, perhaps?
>
>Why would your theory being true objectively matter?
>
Why is there gravity?
It does matter to people. Why? If nothing mattered to people they wouldn't have
taken any action to live, and wouldn't have passed on their genes. Stuff
mattering to people was selected for.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/29/00 7:40 AM Central Standard Time
>
>>Because you offer no further justification for
>>logic, he concludes that all knowledge is in danger of being false or
>>illogical (except his own, of course).
>
>Do you think you making these false statements about my position is
>contributing to the discussion?
I had in mind the following direct quote from you. Notice that last
sentence.
--- Begin Quote ---
Like I have said earlier, I don't know what you mean by calling
something simply "justified." I understand justification is a
relationship between two things, the thing that is justified and the
thing that justifies it (using 'thing' in a broad sense here). I think
everyone must then accept something that is unjustified as a
foundation, upon which other things can be said to be justified or
unjustified according to this. So, I think all beliefs have this
property of being "unjustified" at their foundation. Maybe all beliefs
have something wrong with them, then.
--- End Quote ---
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/28/00 3:19 PM Central Standard Time
>>
>>>>Why
>>>>should anyone find it interesting?
>>>
>>>Because it is true, perhaps?
>>
>>Why would your theory being true objectively matter?
>>
>
>Why is there gravity?
>
>It does matter to people. Why? If nothing mattered to people they wouldn't
> have
>taken any action to live, and wouldn't have passed on their genes. Stuff
>mattering to people was selected for.
So, what really matters then is taking action to live. Hmmm. Doesn't
this make the pursuit of life an objective pursuit? If it doesn't,
then this doesn't establish that your theory being true objectively
(i.e., really) matters.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>Whether the theory meets the criteria they prefer is objective. The preference
>of those specific criteria is not. I don't see how it would be "objective" to
>have a desire to hold a true theory rather than a false one.
Then it doesn't *objectively* matter whether your theory is true or
not. Your theory has no *real* relevance to people even if it is
true.
By separating the logical from the practical you have taken away any
real purpose or use for reason. You have made it an objectively
pointless exercise.
--
Joe Durnavich
Gaius Helen Mohiam
news:20001026183255...@ng-ch1.aol.com...
> I came across some Dawkins quotes on the subject. It seems my initial
> impression of his ethical views being quite similar to mine was right.
You might also want to take a look at what Jacques Monod (Nobel Prize winner
in Biology, so much for appeal to authority ;-) ) wrote in "Chance and
Necessity" (Subtitle "An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology")
in the 70s (sorry for the rough edges, I am translating this from the French
original):
"When he [man] finally grasps this message [of the contingency of humankind]
in its full meaning, then man finally must awake from his thousand-year old
dream, and realize his total loneliness, his radical strangeness. Now he
knows that his place is like a gipsy's at the periphery of a universe which
is deaf to his music, and indifferent towards his hopes, his suffering, and
his crimes."
And he concludes his book in the final chapter ("The Kingdom Above and the
Darkness Below"):
"The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in
the universe's unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance.
His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom above or
the darkness below; it is for him to choose."
You will find that Dawkins in his writings shows significant influences from
Monod, whose "Chance and Necessity" is one of the most influential books on
the philosophy of biology. Dawkins certainly must have been familiar with
it. Monod's work is one of the most original attempts to work out the
philosophical implications of the modern synthesis in biology, with many
others, like Dawkins, following in his footsteps. Well worth reading, if you
have the time.
I note in passing that the material in Monod's book alone is sufficient to
smash that naive blather by Rand and her acolytes to pieces, and reveal how
completely empty of any facts her ignorant ramblings really are.
Best wishes -- Helen.
Rod Nibbe
> You might also want to take a look at what Jacques Monod (Nobel Prize winner
> in Biology, so much for appeal to authority ;-) ) wrote in "Chance and
> Necessity" (Subtitle "An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology")
> in the 70s (sorry for the rough edges, I am translating this from the French
> original):
> "When he [man] finally grasps this message [of the contingency of humankind]
> in its full meaning, then man finally must awake from his thousand-year old
> dream, and realize his total loneliness, his radical strangeness. Now he
> knows that his place is like a gipsy's at the periphery of a universe which
> is deaf to his music, and indifferent towards his hopes, his suffering, and
> his crimes."
> And he concludes his book in the final chapter ("The Kingdom Above and the
> Darkness Below"):
> "The ancient covenant is in pieces; man knows at last that he is alone in
> the universe's unfeeling immensity, out of which he emerged only by chance.
> His destiny is nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty. The kingdom above or
> the darkness below; it is for him to choose."
> I note in passing that the material in Monod's book alone is sufficient to
> smash that naive blather by Rand and her acolytes to pieces, and reveal how
> completely empty of any facts her ignorant ramblings really are.
How is it that nature's indifference to man's music (achievements?),
hopes, suffering, and crimes reveals a "factual vacuum" in Rand's
corpus? Were she alive today I think you'd find her in agreement with
the fact that nature is indifferent. The same for: "His destiny is
nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty." That's just a rehash of Tabula
Rasa.
If these excerpts are presented as examples of a supposed obloquy
against Rand's ideas, I think the ideas are quite safe.
> Best wishes -- Helen.
Yeah, right.
-RKN
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
Sollars:
> This doesn't really answer the question, how is it that you know that
> others have based their notions on subjective preferences?"
User:
> Based their notions on subjective preferences? I said that the notions mi
> ght be
> the same, due simply to the common concept of 'better', but what people a
> ctualy
> think is better would be different.
You also said (in a post dated 10/27/00):
> My notion of 'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about
> what
> is better is based on our subjective preferences.
I was curious how you knew their notions about "better" were based on
subjective preferences.
But now you indicate that your notions might be the same as theirs, "due
simply to the common concept of 'better'". Yet you seem to deny that we
have a common concept of 'good'.
> "But the fact that you can
> disagree with others over what is "better" hardly shows that the notion
> of better is not objective, or "absolute" as I believe you said. "
>
> I didn't say that that conclusively showed it, I don't think. I don't kno
> w what
> it would mean for "better" to be objective. It doesn't make sense to me.
This takes us back to what you mean by "objective". At one level, I
would say that multiple observers agreeing on a ranking according to
"better" is evidence of some kind of objective property that explains the
agreement. Actually getting such agreement may fail, due, I would argue,
to complexity and bounded rationality, differences in knowledge, etc. At
a second level, we can see if multiple observers agree on criteria for
"better". Again, I would take agreement as evidence that the idea of
"better" was tracking some real, though possibly very complex, property.
At a third level, we can look at standards for determining what criteria
to use for "better", etc.
Sollars:
> We can base our /choice/ among competing theories upon
> the evidence, explanatory power, predictive power, simplicity, etc.
> What is subjective about this? "
User:
> Those criteria are not subjective. If by "better", all you mean is that a
> theory meets those criteria,
As I think Owl has sagely pointed out, it is difficult to capture a term
with the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to say "all".
Nevertheless, I think that a theory that scores well on such criteria is
"better" than one that does not, and, further, that this use of "better"
is tied to other uses of it. Do you disagree with this?
> then the question is "why should be pick the
> "better" theory?" I think some sort of proscription is actualy imbedded i
> n your
> notion of "better", though, and it is this proscription that I am saying
> is not
> objective.
Right. Look, if you simply want to stipulate that "prescription is not
objective", there is no point in continuing. You are free to stipulate
whatever you like (although careless stipulation will make it difficult
for you to communicate). I think that some sort of prescription /is/
embedded in my notion of better, /and/ I think that it is rational to
pick a better theory using this sort of criteria. Do you think it is
rational to pick them by, say, flipping a coin?
I recognize that this is picking away at the edges of the "is/ought" gap,
but, again, unless you are simply stipulating such a gap, the gap is fair
game, despite Hume's intellectual stature.
Sollars:
> "Do you really think that physicists simply
> have a preference for, say general relativity? Or biologists, just a pref
> erence
> for evolution?"
User:
> They have a preference for using criteria that lead them to those theories.
And what could be reasonable than to say that this is a rational
preference? Again, unless you have merely stipulated that preferences
can not rational.
> "If so, I fail to see how this sense of "preference" is not
> objective."
>
> Whether the theory meets the criteria they prefer is objective. The prefe
> rence
> of those specific criteria is not.
Why not? What /is/ objective?
> I don't see how it would be "objective" to
> have a desire to hold a true theory rather than a false one.
Let's leave "objective" aside for a moment. Are you going to argue in
favor of a desire to hold false theories? It is reasonable to prefer
false theories?
...
Sollars:
> And why should we have a subjective preference for what is true?"
User:
> Why should there be a law of gravitation? Why should momentum be conserved?
> That is just the way reality is. People prefer true theories, its just one of
> those properties of people. It probably conferred some sort of advantage
> durring natural selection.
Indeed. And what fails to be objective about that process?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Gaius Helen Mohiam
news:39FC9C51...@ak.net...
> How is it that nature's indifference to man's music (achievements?),
> hopes, suffering, and crimes reveals a "factual vacuum" in Rand's
> corpus? Were she alive today I think you'd find her in agreement with
> the fact that nature is indifferent. The same for: "His destiny is
> nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty."
> That's just a rehash of Tabula
> Rasa.
Nonsense. It says that there is no such thing as "objective moral truth".
Monod in his book explicitly rebukes this "tabula rasa" nonsense in fairly
strong words, as would anybody who has any actual knowledge of the pertinent
facts.
> If these excerpts are presented as examples of a supposed obloquy
> against Rand's ideas,
They are not. If you had been in possession of the gift of reading
comprehension, you could have noticed that it is Monod's book, not the
quotes I mentioned that demonstrate the vacuousness of Rand's ideas.
> I think the ideas are quite safe.
Yup, I think so, too. They safely rest on the garbage dump together with
other forgettable nonsense from the history of mankind.
As an aside, you quite nicely demonstrate that amazing Randian gift of being
able to judge the contents and value of a book from a few sentences someone
quotes for you.
--Helen.
P.S.: Monod was a socialist, by thye way, so as a good "objectivist" you can
safely dismiss his ideas anyway...
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 2:23 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <ao1pvsos9oh4k6van...@4ax.com>
>>Whether the theory meets the criteria they prefer is objective. The
>preference
>>of those specific criteria is not. I don't see how it would be "objective"
>to
>>have a desire to hold a true theory rather than a false one.
>
>Then it doesn't *objectively* matter whether your theory is true or
>not.
Not sure what you mean by objectively matters. It does matter to people, and
that it matters is an objective fact. So, in fact you could say that it
objectively matters.
>Your theory has no *real* relevance to people even if it is
>true.
What are you talking about? My theory is relevent enough to you for you to
respond to it. Whether something is relevent or not to someone is easily
observed and not dependant on there being objective proscriptive facts.
>By separating the logical from the practical you have taken away any
>real purpose or use for reason.
I'm not "seperating" anything. I am pointing out the logical errors in trying
to derive a proscriptive facts.
>You have made it an objectively
>pointless exercise.
No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going to make
that no so.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 12:58 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <2psovs0fnqulpi1k4...@4ax.com>
>
>>Do you think you making these false statements about my position is
>>contributing to the discussion?
>
>I had in mind the following direct quote from you. Notice that last
>sentence.
[...]
>"So, I think all beliefs have this
>property of being "unjustified" at their foundation. "
If you read the thread, you will notice that I use "unjustified" as synonymous
with "non-justified". It does not mean dis-justifed. I have never asserted that
the acceptance of logic was dis-justified by logic.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 10:11 AM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <d0jovskgmvudiefht...@4ax.com>
>Your actions are no better than theirs in any objective sense
>>, and
>>there is no sense in which either of you 'should' objectively conform to the
>>other persons preference.
>
>You just have the wrong idea of what justification is. You take the
>God's-eye-view approach where you want to place yourself outside of
>all human--in fact, all physical--context to make your justifications.
Wrong. Read about my views on justification. They are available in this thread.
To summarize for you. Justification is a relationship. Something needs to be
justified, and something needs to do the justifying. Something is unjustified
if nothing justifies it.
Nothing inherantly God's-eye about my view.
>But justification is a human technique. It happens right here, right
>now, in the context of our lives in this world. We justify in and for
>the pursuit of our lives.
New-age babbeling.
>Think about that. What if you have been using the word "justify" the
>wrong way all this time and have been applying it to places where it
>doesn't apply?
Look at my definition. It applies always. Notice that my definition is fairly
in-line with common usage.
>Isn't this one way to resolve some of your skepticism
>about logic and morality?
Isn't what? You don't seem to have the foggiest idea about my view of
justification. You're just hinting that it may be wrong. Add some substance to
your posts. My views on justification are available in these threads if you
want to comment on them.
>Now, that brings up the issue of what is the right use of the word
>justify. Who is in charge of the word? Philosophers or normal
>people?
I'm using it as normal people do. Even if I weren't, it wouldn't be relevent as
long as we knew what we were talking about.
>>And skeptics are not rational? Skepticism basicaly results from a pure
>>application of reason, so far as I can see.
>
>Morality is concerned with living life. This takes place in the
>physical world--a place far, far removed from the skeptic's personal
>isolation in the realm of pure formal logic.
I'm certainly not isolated in the realm of pure formal logic. I haven't even
studied it. I don't know what skeptic's you're talking about.
The above is the sort of fuzzy statement that you should try to eliminate. You
can repeat "morality is concerned with living life" all you want. It really
lacks substance as far as our discussion goes. I know that people refer to
morality in the context of their lives.
You have failed to produce any sort of argument establishing a proscriptive
fact. If you have one, bring it forth. I am not interested in reading your
evasions.
>>And here you are again with your non-proscriptive notion of morality. Find a
>>new term.
>
>...such as "find a new term." By your account, you should not be
>recommending courses of action to me.
"By your account, you should.." You can stop your sentance right there and see
clearly that what you say is incorrect. By my account there are no "should"s.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 9:56 AM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <32iovskj8pbdqqk1u...@4ax.com>
>>The moral proscription can be generalized out of this particular instance,
>and
>>is something like "It would be bad for you to do something that will make
>you
>>late to work, assuming you don't want to be late." That is a certain
>feeling,
>>or impression. The fact that taking the expressway is one such act is
>>irrelevent to the underlying proscriptive part of the statement here.
>
>How can a feeling be either good or bad. What are the criteria?
I am obviously talking about the precise feelings that a person has to cause
them to say something is good.
I am not saying that the feeling itsself is good or bad.
>Likewise, what makes a feeling a feeling *about* being late for work?
A feeling that results from thinking about being late for work, for instance.
>You are not proposing some variant of intuition here, where you
>directly know the goodness or badness of a feeling and what the
>feeling is about, are you?
No, I suggest practicing your reading comprehension.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 8:36 AM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <jedovsgib9pduo2ht...@4ax.com>
>>>Or did our
>>>faculty of reason evolve just so that we can grade ourselves on tests
>>>and waste our life away philosophizing?
>>
>>Why would anyone think this? It obviously evolved because it conferred a
>>gene-furthering advantage.
>>
>>I don't see what you are getting at.
>
>You said, "If we evolved for physical survival, and the only thing our
>reason told us about that was logical stuff, and these moral facts are
>as logically insignificant as what color the sky is,...".
>
>Let me try to lay this out in statement form so you can point to the
>parts you disagree with:
>
>(1) Reason tells us about logical stuff.
>(2) Logical stuff does not tell us how to act for our survival.
Why on earth would you think (2)? That is the most absurd thing you have said
since you claimed ideas were not internal. Actualy, it is more absurd and I
don't see how it is implied in anything I said. It had to take a gross
misreading of my post to come away with that.
>(3) Therefore, reason tells us nothing about survival.
>(4) Survival confers a gene-furthering advantage.
>(5) Therefore, reason confers no gene-furthering advantage
Absolutely amazing that you would get that from my post. My views are almost
the complete opposite(for 3 and 5).
>Let me add that morality is the process of finding out how to act for
>your survival.
>
You mean that is how you define morality. This is getting quite tiresome, as
you may have been able to tell from my recent responses to you. If you claim
the above, then your theory of morality does not contain any element of
proscription, or at least it isn't appearant from your short description.
Produce an argument establishing some proscriptive fact.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 1:16 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <abtovsclh3au3vqlr...@4ax.com>
>>It does matter to people. Why? If nothing mattered to people they wouldn't
>> have
>>taken any action to live, and wouldn't have passed on their genes. Stuff
>>mattering to people was selected for.
>
>So, what really matters then is taking action to live. Hmmm.
That matters to most people, sure.
>Doesn't
>this make the pursuit of life an objective pursuit?
Uh, people who pursue life are objectively pursuing life, obviously.
>If it doesn't,
>then this doesn't establish that your theory being true objectively
>(i.e., really) matters.
To see that it does matter, conduct a survey. Ask people if it would matter to
them whether or not the world is as Dawkins views it, or if there are moral
facts or a god or something.
-User
Owl
> What can we say about philosophical axioms? Some that come to mind
> are:
>
> 1. Self-evident.
> 2. You use them in an attempt to deny them.
> 3. It makes no sense to ask for further justification.
> 4. Skeptics reserve them for only themselves. :-)
I wouldn't include 2 or 3, and I think you are missing some of the more
important things you can say about axioms. For instance,
5. True.
6. Known to be true.
7. One is directly aware of the facts that they are about.
Rod Nibbe
> "Rod Nibbe" <rni...@ak.net> wrote in message
> news:39FC9C51...@ak.net...
> > How is it that nature's indifference to man's music (achievements?),
> > hopes, suffering, and crimes reveals a "factual vacuum" in Rand's
> > corpus? Were she alive today I think you'd find her in agreement with
> > the fact that nature is indifferent. The same for: "His destiny is
> > nowhere spelled out, nor is his duty."
> > That's just a rehash of Tabula
> > Rasa.
> Nonsense. It says that there is no such thing as "objective moral truth".
Wow, staggering. And this assertion was supposed to be profound?
There's been dozens of notable writers before Monod who've asserted the
same thing. Besides, I think you're expecting far too much for us to
read the excerpts you provided and then draw the conclusion there's no
such thing as objective moral truth.
> Monod in his book explicitly rebukes this "tabula rasa" nonsense in fairly
> strong words, as would anybody who has any actual knowledge of the pertinent
> facts.
What facts are those?
> > If these excerpts are presented as examples of a supposed obloquy
> > against Rand's ideas,
> They are not. If you had been in possession of the gift of reading
> comprehension, you could have noticed that it is Monod's book, not the
> quotes I mentioned that demonstrate the vacuousness of Rand's ideas.
But that's precisely what I asked. It was your contention, as you've
just now confirmed, that Monod's book "...is sufficient to smash that
naive blather by Rand and her acolytes to pieces." That means (you
think) the book is a harsh censure of Rand's ideas, which is what
obloquy means.
Maybe when you read someone who you think agrees with your position,
you attribute your hatred of Rand to their position and the two become
inextricably one in your mind. In other words, maybe Monod's book isn't
really a censure of Rand's ideas, per se, not like you want it to be.
Oh, and by the way, reading comprehension isn't a gift, it's
accomplished one mind at a time via practice and experience. Sounds like
even Monod would agree with that.
> > I think the ideas are quite safe.
> Yup, I think so, too. They safely rest on the garbage dump together with
> other forgettable nonsense from the history of mankind.
You seem like a very angry woman, Helen. Settle down, I'm not your
enemy.
> As an aside, you quite nicely demonstrate that amazing Randian gift of being
> able to judge the contents and value of a book from a few sentences someone
> quotes for you.
My my, flunk a 12-step program did we? Look, Hel, I didn't judge the
book, you only wish I had so you could dislike me. I questioned the
conclusions you expected us to agree with from the excerpts *you*
provided.
...
(Funny, it seems stubborn Objectivists are not the only ones who use
high dudgeon and condescension as replacements for a reasonable
argument.)
> P.S.: Monod was a socialist, by thye way, so as a good "objectivist" you can
> safely dismiss his ideas anyway...
You don't anything about me, hon. I hated socialism long before I
knew anything of Rand or [O]bjectivism.
-RKN
abcd...@my-deja.com
A true theory is based on reality! Please, look at the home page:
http://www.angelfire.com/ga/chaok , you could find more.
Reading without thinking is nonsense!
__________________________________________________________----------
-
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
abcd...@my-deja.com
---------------------------------------------------------------
Truth is based on reality! Please, look at the home page:
http://www.angelfire.com/ga/chaok , you could find more.
Reading without thinking is nonsense!
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Gaius Helen Mohiam
> There's been dozens of notable writers before Monod who've asserted the
> same thing.
Yes.
> What facts are those?
Read his book, or any book on related areas in biology (ethology, in
particular).
> But that's precisely what I asked.
Not quite, but I'll let that one go.
> It was your contention, as you've
> just now confirmed, that Monod's book "...is sufficient to smash that
> naive blather by Rand and her acolytes to pieces." That means (you
> think) the book is a harsh censure of Rand's ideas, which is what
> obloquy means.
If what you are saying is that Monod did not directly address Rand and/or
her ideas, that is of course correct. I doubt that Monod had ever heard of
Rand in his life, since Rand is generally unknown and/or ignored in Europe.
> You seem like a very angry woman, Helen. Settle down, I'm not your
> enemy.
I know. But just out of curiosity, where do you see anger in my statement
about Rand's ideas being garbage? I see it as an objective evaluation, in
the same way I would judge, say, "Scientology", or "Creation Science", and I
assure you that I am emotionally quite detached when I say that. My guess is
that you would call at least one of these two examples garbage, too. Does
that make you angry? Does it mean you "hate" Hubbard, or creationists?
> My my, flunk a 12-step program did we?
We are not getting emotional, are we?
> Look, Hel, I didn't judge the
> book, you only wish I had so you could dislike me.
I don't dislike you. How could I? As you have correctly stated, I know
nothing about you.
Love -- Helen.
Joe Durnavich
User, the last sentence was, and I quote: "Maybe all beliefs
have something wrong with them, then." I simply took that as
"dis-justified" (that is what being WRONG is after all). If you
clarifed your position after that, then I stand corrected.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/29/00 2:23 PM Central Standard Time
>
>>Then it doesn't *objectively* matter whether your theory is true or
>>not.
>
>Not sure what you mean by objectively matters. It does matter to people, and
>that it matters is an objective fact. So, in fact you could say that it
>objectively matters.
I would say that something really matters to someone if they are
willing to change their life in some way such as choose it, pursue it,
keep it, avoid it, etc. In other words, they would say that they
"should" or "shouldn't" choose it. You have seem to found an
objective basis for a choice--at least for someone choosing your
theory.
>>Your theory has no *real* relevance to people even if it is
>>true.
>
>What are you talking about? My theory is relevent enough to you for you to
>respond to it. Whether something is relevent or not to someone is easily
>observed and not dependant on there being objective proscriptive facts.
I respond to your argument because you seem to be telling me that I am
wrong, which I take as a recommendation to change my beliefs or ways,
but you also seem to be saying that your are not recommending I change
my beliefs. You present me with a contradiction and I am expressing
normal, human puzzlement.
>>By separating the logical from the practical you have taken away any
>>real purpose or use for reason.
>
>I'm not "seperating" anything. I am pointing out the logical errors in trying
>to derive a proscriptive facts.
But for what purpose? It would be irrational for you--by your
account--to point to the logical error in an attempt to get someone to
change their beliefs.
>>You have made it an objectively
>>pointless exercise.
>
>No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going to make
>that no so.
Suppose that the President gets so excited about your proof that moral
realism is irrational that he lets you present it from the White House
press room. All the networks carry it and the whole country--make
that the whole world--listens.
You:
(1) State that moral realists believe that morality is the rational
guide to action.
(2) Present your rational proof that morality cannot be rational.
(3) Conclude that rationality cannot be a guide to action.
How is the country supposed to react to this? You have just "proven"
to them that there can be no rational guide to action, but you have
presented a rational argument. They can't change one single thing
because of your argument. Not one thing in the world changes.
Is this the purpose of logic to present arguments that mean literally,
objectively, really, absolutely nothing?
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>I don't know why you just injected "rational" into the description of their
>preference. I fail to see what makes it more rational than any other desire.
Hitler had these two preferences (among others):
(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
(2) A preference to eliminate the Jews.
One could rationally argue that eliminating the Jews will
lead to the destruction of Germany. This conflicts with
preference (1). Doesn't that make having these two
preferences irrational?
Conversely, say he had these two preferences instead:
(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
(3) A preference for a strong, stable economy.
Wouldn't having these two preferences be rational because they
do not conflict with each other?
--
Joe Durnavich
Dave OHearn
> User 1DE7 writes:
>
> >I don't know why you just injected "rational" into the description of
> >their preference. I fail to see what makes it more rational than any
> >other desire.
>
> Hitler had these two preferences (among others):
>
> (1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
> (2) A preference to eliminate the Jews.
>
> One could rationally argue that eliminating the Jews will
> lead to the destruction of Germany. This conflicts with
> preference (1). Doesn't that make having these two
> preferences irrational?
Holding (1) itself is irrational. No one arrives at racial supremacy
without making a massive heap of evasions. In Hitler's case, he had to
evade the reality that his Master Race wasn't already ruling the world, by
saying it had been "diluted". And he added a Jewish-Communist conspiracy
to explain why Germany's economy wasn't glorious. After acceping all this
bunk, eliminating the Jews seemed perfectly rational.
> Conversely, say he had these two preferences instead:
>
> (1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
> (3) A preference for a strong, stable economy.
>
> Wouldn't having these two preferences be rational because they
> do not conflict with each other?
As statements detached from reality, they don't appear to conflict. But
actually applying them, how would you maintain the Aryan supremacy
without eliminating rival groups? Anyone who out-did the Aryans would
have to be heavily taxed, if not wiped out, and this is just as
detremental as eliminating the Jews.
--
Dave O'Hearn
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <24tqvs42pccaq9f1m...@4ax.com>
> It does not mean dis-justifed. I have never asserted
>> that
>>the acceptance of logic was dis-justified by logic.
>>
>>-User
>
>User, the last sentence was, and I quote: "Maybe all beliefs
>have something wrong with them, then." I simply took that as
>"dis-justified" (that is what being WRONG is after all). If you
>clarifed your position after that, then I stand corrected.
>
Owl was saying that there was something wrong with having beliefs that were
simply unjustified, not dis-justified. I was saying that since all beliefs are
not justified at their root, then all beliefs have something wrong with them by
his criteria. The sentance you quote means simply "your notion of something
being wrong with a belief is lame because all beliefs have that
characteristic."
So, you were in error when you inferred I was talking about beliefs being
dis-justified when I said maybe they all had something wrong with them.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <utfrvskvns871e5i9...@4ax.com>
>Hitler had these two preferences (among others):
>
>(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
>(2) A preference to eliminate the Jews.
>
>One could rationally argue that eliminating the Jews will
>lead to the destruction of Germany. This conflicts with
>preference (1). Doesn't that make having these two
>preferences irrational?
Of course not. People can have conflicting preferences. In fact, I bet everyone
does.
For instance, suppose Bob has a preference for icecream. Suppose Bob also has a
preference for not gaining weight. Is he therefore irrational, just because he
prefers two conflicting things? Of course not. Maybe Bob will only have
icecream on special occasions, compromising between following either one or the
other preference exclusively.
Similarly, Hitler might either try to find ways to eliminate jews without
having Germany destroyed, or compromise by eliminating some jews and having
Germany only partialy damaged.
>(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
>(3) A preference for a strong, stable economy.
>
>Wouldn't having these two preferences be rational because they
>do not conflict with each other?
No, there is nothing more rational about having two non-conflicting preferences
than two conflicting ones. You might prefer to have non-conflicting ones, but
it isn't any more in accord with reason than having conflicting ones.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/30/00 1:25 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <39fdcb0c$1...@oit.umass.edu>
>> (1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
>> (2) A preference to eliminate the Jews.
>>
>> One could rationally argue that eliminating the Jews will
>> lead to the destruction of Germany. This conflicts with
>> preference (1). Doesn't that make having these two
>> preferences irrational?
>
>Holding (1) itself is irrational. No one arrives at racial supremacy
>without making a massive heap of evasions.
Where there are differences, it is definsible to label one supreme, according
to your tastes. For instance, suppose I think black skin is superior to white
skin, aestheticly. Then I could say that black people are superior, in that
regard. If I regard them as equal otherwise, then they are just plain superior,
according to my preferences.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/30/00 12:36 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <1tfrvs84k67thv6id...@4ax.com>
>
>>Not sure what you mean by objectively matters. It does matter to people, and
>>that it matters is an objective fact. So, in fact you could say that it
>>objectively matters.
>
>I would say that something really matters to someone if they are
>willing to change their life in some way such as choose it, pursue it,
>keep it, avoid it, etc. In other words, they would say that they
>"should" or "shouldn't" choose it.
I don't see how this follows. You may simply mean that if a person chooses
something they will nessesarily *say* that they should choose it. But, I am a
good counter-example to this, so that is wrong. Therefore, people neither
nessesarily say they should do what they do, nor think that they should do what
they do, nor does it follow in any way that they really should do what they do.
People simply do what they do.
Off the top of my head, I'd say something matters to someone if they
deliberately spend time or energy on it.
>You have seem to found an
>objective basis for a choice--at least for someone choosing your
>theory.
No, you just seem confused.
>>>Your theory has no *real* relevance to people even if it is
>>>true.
>>
>>What are you talking about? My theory is relevent enough to you for you to
>>respond to it. Whether something is relevent or not to someone is easily
>>observed and not dependant on there being objective proscriptive facts.
>
>I respond to your argument because you seem to be telling me that I am
>wrong, which I take as a recommendation to change my beliefs or ways,
>but you also seem to be saying that your are not recommending I change
>my beliefs. You present me with a contradiction and I am expressing
>normal, human puzzlement.
Perhaps I am recommending it. If I am, then it does not follow that there is an
objective fact that proscribes you to adopt what I recommend. I may simply
prefer that you hold certain beliefs, and I may also think that you will prefer
holding certain beliefs, once you adopt them. My actions to cause you to hold
the beliefs may consist of 'recommending' them to you. But, this of course
doesn't imply any objective proscription.
Suppose I know that you prefer true theories. Suppose I prefer that you hold
theories that are true, as well. Then I might say "I suggest adopting my
theory, as it is true." Meaning simply that it will satisfy your preferences,
not that you objectively should.
>>I'm not "seperating" anything. I am pointing out the logical errors in
>trying
>>to derive a proscriptive facts.
>
>But for what purpose? It would be irrational for you--by your
>account--to point to the logical error in an attempt to get someone to
>change their beliefs.
Not true at all. I have never said it is irrational to try to influence people.
The belief that there are proscriptive facts is irrational, but this does not
at all imply that influencing people is irrational.
The two things are unrelated.
>>>You have made it an objectively
>>>pointless exercise.
>>
>>No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going to
>make
>>that no so.
>
>Suppose that the President gets so excited about your proof that moral
>realism is irrational that he lets you present it from the White House
>press room. All the networks carry it and the whole country--make
>that the whole world--listens.
>
>You:
>
>(1) State that moral realists believe that morality is the rational
>guide to action.
>
>(2) Present your rational proof that morality cannot be rational.
>
>(3) Conclude that rationality cannot be a guide to action.
As far as 3, it can be used to guide you to achieving your goals, but it just
can't tell you which goals to achieve.
>How is the country supposed to react to this?
Most of them would probably agree, if they understood my argument. It seems
like a common position. How are they 'supposed' to? Well, you know that I don't
think anyone is *supposed* to do anything. Not sure what you mean.
>You have just "proven"
>to them that there can be no rational guide to action, but you have
>presented a rational argument. They can't change one single thing
>because of your argument. Not one thing in the world changes.
Not sure what you mean here. It is true that my argument doesn't objectively
proscribe any action on their part. However it doesn't follow that "they can't
change one thing" or that they can't be influenced by it.
>Is this the purpose of logic to present arguments that mean literally,
>objectively, really, absolutely nothing?
I don't know why you'd say the argument has no meaning. It is quite clear that
it does. It means that there are no proscriptive facts. That is certainly a
meaningful statement, not sure what you are confused about.
Do you mean "is the purpose of logic to present arguments that don't
objectively proscribe action?"? Not clear what you mean by "the purpose of
logic." Logic is a tool. Different people use it for different purposes, I
presume. Logic is oten useful for discovering or determining truth, so it gets
used in that area fairly often
-User.
Dave OHearn
>
> Where there are differences, it is definsible to label one supreme,
> according to your tastes. For instance, suppose I think black skin is
> superior to white skin, aestheticly. Then I could say that black people
> are superior, in that regard. If I regard them as equal otherwise, then
> they are just plain superior, according to my preferences.
That doesn't work because skin color is entirely nonessential. The
differences amoung individual black people are greater than their
differences as a group, compared to other groups. If you were choosing a
model for a painting, the aesthetic difference would matter, but not in
any general case.
Also, let's not forget what we're talking about here. Finding a skin color
pleasing is not comparable to wanting everyone with a different skin color
eliminated. You would have to value skin color so much that you would go
out killing people over it.
--
Dave O'Hearn
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/29/00 6:42 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <MPG.14668dee1c...@mail.nji.com>
>User:
>> Based their notions on subjective preferences? I said that the notions mi
>> ght be
>> the same, due simply to the common concept of 'better', but what people a
>> ctualy
>> think is better would be different.
>
>You also said (in a post dated 10/27/00):
>
>> My notion of 'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about
>> what
>> is better is based on our subjective preferences.
>
>I was curious how you knew their notions about "better" were based on
>subjective preferences.
>
>But now you indicate that your notions might be the same as theirs, "due
>simply to the common concept of 'better'". Yet you seem to deny that we
>have a common concept of 'good'.
We do have a fairly common concept of good, I think. I denied this earlier? Hm,
I didn't mean to.
>> "But the fact that you can
>> disagree with others over what is "better" hardly shows that the notion
>> of better is not objective, or "absolute" as I believe you said. "
>>
>> I didn't say that that conclusively showed it, I don't think. I don't kno
>> w what
>> it would mean for "better" to be objective. It doesn't make sense to me.
>
>This takes us back to what you mean by "objective". At one level, I
>would say that multiple observers agreeing on a ranking according to
>"better" is evidence of some kind of objective property that explains the
>agreement.
In this case I'd say it is evidence that they have similar preferences, due to
the fact that they all all human and such. For instance, show some humans two
computers. One of them much faster and with more features and such, and ask
them which is "better." Well, people simply subjectively prefer faster
computers with more features, so they'll all agree. This doesn't imply that the
people *should* prefer that computer. It doesn't imply that they call the fast
computer better because they all percieve some objective proscription that they
should want it more.
>At
>a second level, we can see if multiple observers agree on criteria for
>"better". Again, I would take agreement as evidence that the idea of
>"better" was tracking some real, though possibly very complex, property.
The property might be "what humans subjectively like." And yes, if you
researched this you'd find that it was an objective fact that people tended to
subjectively like certain things. Again, there is no proscription here.
>User:
>> Those criteria are not subjective. If by "better", all you mean is that a
>> theory meets those criteria,
>
>As I think Owl has sagely pointed out, it is difficult to capture a term
>with the necessary and sufficient conditions needed to say "all".
>Nevertheless, I think that a theory that scores well on such criteria is
>"better" than one that does not, and, further, that this use of "better"
>is tied to other uses of it. Do you disagree with this?
Nope, I think a theory with those properties is better, too. When I say that I
am not claiming to refer to any objective proscription at all. People have
fairly consistant notions of 'better' in all sorts of catagories. Generaly
things that are faster, more durable, accomplish what they are supposed to do
without as much hassle, etc, are called "better" -- as far as physical things
go. Therefore objects of different types that are "better" than other objects
of the same type will often have similar qualities.
>> then the question is "why should be pick the
>> "better" theory?" I think some sort of proscription is actualy imbedded i
>> n your
>> notion of "better", though, and it is this proscription that I am saying
>> is not
>> objective.
>
>Right. Look, if you simply want to stipulate that "prescription is not
>objective", there is no point in continuing.
It isn't just a stipulation. Do you just stipulate that "there is not an
invisible elephant in my house"? There are simply no good reasons for holding
the belief, and there is no unexplained phenominon that you'd need an
invisible-elephant theory to account for. It is more than a simple stipulation.
>You are free to stipulate
>whatever you like (although careless stipulation will make it difficult
>for you to communicate). I think that some sort of prescription /is/
>embedded in my notion of better, /and/ I think that it is rational to
>pick a better theory using this sort of criteria. Do you think it is
>rational to pick them by, say, flipping a coin?
Depends on your goal. If you wanted a true theoy, then the coin-flip would be
an irrational means of achieving the goal. However, if you didn't want a true
theory, but maybe a random theory, then it may be rational to flip the coin.
>I recognize that this is picking away at the edges of the "is/ought" gap,
>but, again, unless you are simply stipulating such a gap, the gap is fair
>game, despite Hume's intellectual stature.
The gap seems so blindingly obvious to me I don't know how a person could deny
it.
Let us play a little game. You construct a formal argument using no
proscriptive premises and try to reach a proscriptive conclusion. I will then
tell you which hidden proscriptive premises you need for the conclusion to
logicaly follow.
For instance, you might say something like:
(1) Hitler murdered lots of people.
(2) Therefore, Hitler was bad.
I would then point out that a hidden premise is "People who murder lots of
people are bad." We can go on like this for awhile, and eventualy it should
become appearant that you use hidden premises in all your examples.
Now, suppose you say that, no, you don't need that premise, that (2) follows
directly from (1).
The form of the above argument is:
(1) Person X engaged in action Y.
(2) Therefore, person X has property Z
Isn't it obvious from looking at the structure here that you need other
premises? There is nothing about Z in the first statement, so how can you infer
anything about Z from it?
I have a hard time thinking that I am saying anything new to you here, if you
actualy have studied philosophy at all. What I say here should seem quite old
and familiar. I just can't fathom how anyone could fail to see its logical
truth. Can you tell me what is so probematic about the above?
>Sollars:
>> "Do you really think that physicists simply
>> have a preference for, say general relativity? Or biologists, just a pref
>> erence
>> for evolution?"
>User:
>> They have a preference for using criteria that lead them to those theories.
>
>And what could be reasonable than to say that this is a rational
>preference?
I don't know why you would simply call this perference rational. It seems like
you are doing it completely out of nowhere. Just for fun, or because you like
the preference. I don't see anything that implies that it is rational. You seem
to be big on stipulating things. I prefer to have reasons for calling things
rational or not.
>> "If so, I fail to see how this sense of "preference" is not
>> objective."
>>
>> Whether the theory meets the criteria they prefer is objective. The prefe
>> rence
>> of those specific criteria is not.
>
>Why not? What /is/ objective?
Well, the fact that person X prefers Y is certainly objective. What I mean is
that it is not objctive that person X *should* prefer Y.
Why not? There is no evidence for it. It doesn't follow from anything.
Construct an argument trying to establish it for me.
Something is objective if it is a property of the object of interest, roughly.
>> I don't see how it would be "objective" to
>> have a desire to hold a true theory rather than a false one.
>
>Let's leave "objective" aside for a moment. Are you going to argue in
>favor of a desire to hold false theories?
No, I prefer true ones.
>It is reasonable to prefer
>false theories?
I don't know what it means for a preference to be rational or not. It doesn't
make sense to me.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/28/00 3:52 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <8tfhnf$cjm$1...@slb6.atl.mindspring.net>
>> Can we figure out that 2+2=4 through reason alone? Can we
>> > figure out that nothing can be completely red and completely blue?
>> Can we
>> > figure out that identity is transitive?
>> >
>> > The answer to all of *these* (and indefinitely many more) is obviously
>> > yes.
>>
>> Another thing about those is that they all seem to be logical(treating
>> math as a subset of logic) statements. We were talking about where
>> moral intuitions come from. You claimed that they come from our faculty
>> of reason. Well, it seems sort of obvious that logic statements do,
>> since logic seems to be modeled on correct reasoning.
>
>Well, I don't see that any of those is 'logical', except perhaps the
>identity statement, so for that one, you can substitute the "inside of"
>relation. "2+2=4" is indeed a mathematical statement, but I don't see in
>what sense it is therefore a 'logical' statement. It certainly isn't a
>rule of inference or anything like that -- as one would be led to believe
>from your last statement above. Nor do either of the other two examples I
>cited have anything to do with inferences or correct reasoning (at least,
>not more than any other truth 'has to do with' correct reasoning).
The completely red and completely blue one is just a sort of disguised version
of ~(A & ~A), once you take into account the physical fact that something being
completely red implies that it is not completely blue. I don't know what you
were talking about saying identity is transitive. More on the issue below.
>All in all, then, it seems that your (a priori?) restriction of a priori
>statements to the subject matter of logic is either (a) just simply false,
>based on not looking at the examples, or (b) based on an overly broad
>sense of "logic" that hasn't been made clear yet. In case (b), if you want
>to extend "logic" to include anything that you can see to be true by the
>use of reason (that's the only way I can see to make your assessment of
>the examples true)
Well, once you decode your color example and if you simply regard math as part
of logic, as I thought lots of people did, then it seems to be a fair
assessment. I don't know what the identity this was, again, but it sounded
fairly logical.
I will get away from labeling all a 'priori "knowledge" logical though, and try
a different approach later.
>> We don't know physical
>> descriptive facts, like what color the grass is, through reason. It
>
>I don't see why my examples above are not physical descriptive facts.
>They're certainly facts, aren't they? And they're descriptive, aren't
>they?
What I meant, I think, was that they seemed to be abstractions, referring to
general rules applying to physical reality, as opposited to specific claims
about how reality was in that context.
>Maybe you think they're not physical. But wait -- aren't you the guy
>who thinks there *isn't* anything non-physical?
Yep. I'd say that your examples -- the ones I understood -- were facts about
the nature of physical reality.
>> seems just as odd to suppose we can know moral descriptive facts like
>> that. All we seem to be able to know through reason that pertains to
>> the physical word are rules of inference and math axioms and stuff that
>> seems nessesarily true, logicaly.
>
>Well, "Murder is wrong" certainly seems necessarily true.
>
Why is that nessesary? Is it inconcievable for the world to instead be such
that murder was not wrong? I know you think murder is wrong now. But you also
think grass is green now. Surely it is not absolutely nessesary that in all
possible realities grass be green. Similarly, why would it be absolutely
nessesary that in all possible realities murder be wrong? However, math and ~(A
& ~A), seem to be nessesarily true in that way.
>> I'm saying that claiming to percieve
>> some random non-logical fact has nothing to do with reason at all, and
>> I don't see why you'd think it came from 'reason.' Murder being wrong
>> doesn't logicaly seem any more reasonable than murder not being wrong.
>
>Really?!
>
Well, I feel a negative compulsion when I consider killing people. I don't see
how this implies anything about reason.
>> There is no contradiction or inconsistancy in it. What makes you think
>> it comes from your faculty of reason?
>
>First, I didn't think there was a contradiction in it. There isn't a
>contradiction, formally, in the denial of any of my example statements
>above.
>
>Second, what makes me think it comes from my faculty of reason is the same
>thing that makes me think all those other statements come from my faculty
>of reason. When I think about it, it makes sense to me.
Hm, strange, when I think about it, it doesn't make sense at all. Isn't this
some evidence that it doesn't come from the faculty of reason? I think I am a
fairly reasonable person. I score high on reasoning tests, do well in math, am
able to perform the basic task of identifying the logical errors in
objectivism. I generaly agree with you about matters of logic. I can't think of
any logical disagreements that I have with you, in any of your positions. Our
disagreement seems to come from not agreeing on premises. Assuming that I am a
rational person, why would something so seemingly simple as a basic moral fact
not make sense to me if it really came from reason? You could in fact go into
#math or #physics on IRC, and from my experiences there everyone would agree
with me that moral sensations aren't a product of reason. Maybe it is somehow a
different type of reason.
Maybe your concept if what reason is is much broader than mine. If you simply
think that anything that makes sense to you is a product of reason, then it
probably is. My concept of reason is more tied to logic.
Something to think about is, what makes things make sense when you think about
them? The human brain is fairly complex, and it seems to be quite easy for
people to fool themselves, or make themselves believe things, or make things
make sense to them.
You see this a lot in religion, I think. People can get themselves to believe
that God talks to them, when no such thing occurs. If people can do that, then
it seems like it would be far easier for people to attribute a natural
compulsion that we all have to coming from our faculty of reason, if we think
about it right, and condition ourselves to think this.
If you condition children to believe in jesus, they will think that their
beliefs are just somehow right, when they consider them.
Here's a Dawkins quote on the matter:
"The patient typically finds himself impelled by some deep, inner conviction
that something is true, or right, or virtuous: a conviction that doesn't seem
to owe anything to evidence or reason, but which, nevertheless, he feels as
totally compelling and convincing. We doctors refer to such a belief as
'faith'."
This actualy is what your insistance on moral facts being true seems like to
me. Not that it is as extreme in your case as some christian, but you seem to
believe so strongly in this thing that doesn't make sense to me. We agree that
this belief doesn't owe itsself to any supporting evidence. You call it direct
awareness, but it would seem that what you call direct awareness -- something
just making sense to you when you think about it, seems present in people
raised as christians and such.
You could also use objectivists as an example. Many of them probably have
similar beliefs. They just seem "right" to them, when they reflect upon them,
even though they aren't logical or true at all.
And, actualy, back when I was first introduced to your ideas about moral
realism, I did find them fairly promising -- even more likely than any
alternative, for a very brief time. I had sort of been a moral realist before
that, as an objectivist, and the idea of moral realism still seemed sort of
natural to me. What you claimed were moral facts just seemed "right" when I
thought about them, you could say. But the thing is, the more I thought about
it, the less I could justify this feeling of "rightness." Soon when I thought
about it enough, the entire notion began to appear to me as not making any
sense at all, and simply a subjective inclination of mine to approve of
certiain things.
I think that it is actualy not that difficult to mistake our natural compulsion
as humans to approve of certain acts, disapprove of others, etc, as somehow
"right", in a similar manner to how chistians just have this irrational feeling
that they are right. (For instance, if our compullsions did not evolve to seem
natural and right, then they wouldn't be very compelling, or useful.)
However, when you take a step back and exime your beliefs, and ask "Why does
this really make sense to me?" you come to the conclusion that you really have
no reasons, and all you really know is that something *seems* somehow "right",
not that it is, and with a decent knowledge of evolution the whole notion of
these things REALLY being right seems rather nonsensical.
>It seems that you have a very deep form of skepticism, if you're sticking
>to everything you've said so far. Despite our past discussion of this, I
>think that
>you really don't accept logical knowledge, or knowledge of physical
>reality, and perhaps not knowledge of the sort of statements I listed
>above (we'll see about those).
I think I "accept" all of those things. I have just reasoned that they are not
nessesarily correct. It doesn't mean that I think physical reality doesn't
exist, though.Sort of like how you'll assign a non-0 probability to being BIV,
I bet. I don't see it as much more than that.
Anyway, did you accept my defense of logic not being dis-justified, and actualy
being justified by itsself? I haven't seen you respond to my latest post on
that.
As far as the difference I was trying to point out between knowledge or moral
facts and those of logical facts, I think I'll have to save that for another
post. Maybe I'll write up a formal argument for it.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/28/00 3:19 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <tdgmvs0n94kjer17h...@4ax.com>
>
>>They will think it makes their lives better, probably. You can't then
>>generalize that I would think they would be leading better lives. My notion
>of
>>'better' is not the same as theirs, since our notions about what is better
>is
>>based on our subjective preferences. It doesn't really make sense to refer
>to
>>"better" an any absolute sense.
>
>My original question was do you see a problem with people pursuing
>their own lives (and proscribing their own action in terms of that).
>You said "though maybe the world would be a better place if people
>had more logical skill than that." But now you say better doesn't
>apply to the world, only to your own preferences.
Right, meaning that according to my personal preferences, the world would be
better, not that it would be objectively better.
>Is your problem with what I say merely that you don't prefer it? I
>don't see that as a problem.
With what you say? Lots of what you say is false, and I don't prefer false
theories. The fact that I don't prefer your theories may not itsself be a
reason for you not to prefer them, but the REASON I don't prefer them -- that
they are false -- I think you see as a problem.
>You also say your problem with what I
>say is that it isn't true. Then I don't see the "problem" either.
>Why should what is true or false present a problem?
Well, maybe you don't claim to see it as a problem. I think you're not being
honest, then. There is no objective reason why it should or should not present
a problem. However, most all humans prefer true theories, and I have a hard
time believing that you don't.
>>I think what you mean is that there is no *rational* reason why anyone
>should
>>care. However humans are not driven by reason alone. They have feelings,
>>impulses, etc, which are primary. So, not having a rational reason does not
>>mean not having a problem.
>
>But is it not a *real* problem, right? It is not a justified problem.
Of course its real. It exists. Justified? No, but that doesn't make it
non-real.
>>> If there is no objectivity in the realm of
>>>human action, then there can be no "real" problems. Things can't
>>>"really" matter to people.
>>
>>What do you mean, they can't? You can't give a rational justification for
>>them,
>>but when a person has their preferences frustrated I'd call that an instan
>>ce of
>>their having a problem.
>
>But it is not an objective problem, right?
Of course it is. The problem objectively exists. It isn't objectively
justified, though.
>Therefore, the problem
>doesn't exist, by your account. Maybe you might want to come up with
>a new term. :-)
Nope, false inferrence.
>>>They are just blowing hot air when
>>>they say that, right?
>>
>>Their justification isn't rational.
>
>So, no problem--according to you.
Sure, there is a problem. Problems are people having their preferences
frustrated, for example -- or needing to do something to satisfy a preference.
>>I don't know what your last sentance means. I have not claimed that anythi
>>ng is
>>moraly wrong. I never said acting against any preference that you may have
>is
>>moraly wrong. If you act against your preference you just act against your
>>preference, period. Thats it. No (objective) morality involved.
>
>I had in mind that quote from Dawkins you brought up, by the way, we
>he said something about morality being based on preferences, desires,
>etc. You suggested he thought like you did.
Right, he seems to. What is your point? Dawkins didn't think anything was
objectively wrong, from what I can tell. In fact he endorsed Hume's view that
the phenominon of human morality was based on preference and desires, as you
mention.
>>You could notice that there is no *moral* dilema, since you just injected
>>morality into this yourself. Generaly there are trade-offs in most actions
>> that
>>you take. People might prefer to eat ice-cream, yet prefer not to gain
>weight.
>>What action they actualy take is likely based on thier net preference, or
>>which
>>one is stronger.
>
>Ok, but this is an appeal to reason. You have to use reason to
>evaluate and compare the strength of preferences. The student may
>judge graduating the stronger preference because it may lead to a good
>income over his lifetime. It seems to me that once you have
>preferences, you can use your faculty of reason to weigh them and
>figure out which ones to satisfy
No -- you can't use reason to tell you which preferences to satisfy, as far as
being proscriptive. You can use it to tell you which ones it would be possible
to simultaniously satisfy, or what is nessesary to satisfy some preferences,
but not which ones you *should* satisfy.
>or which ones conflict with each
>other.
Right, reason could tell you preference A conflicts with preference B, but this
wouldn't be any guide to action at all. It wouldn't even imply that you should
not attempt to satisfy them both even though it is impossible.
>Do you have any arguments against someone using reason to identify the
>stronger preferences
I don't think you can use reason to identify your stronger preferences, unless
you simply mean an application of A=A, so that your thought process goes
something like "I prefer X over Y, therefore I prefer X over Y."
>and/or identify the trade offs necessary to
>satisfy the stronger preferences?
That is perfectly legitimate -- using reason to determine what is nessesary for
what, etc.
>Say a person finds they always have preferences--a lifetime full of
>preferences. And, of course, they prefer to act on their preferences.
>Can't they take advantage of the free calculator nature provided
>them--reason--to manage things so that they can maximize the number
>of, or the net strength of, preferences they do act on?
What do you mean "can't they"? I am not proscribing them not to. I am not
proscribing anything. Certainly they are able to. It doesn't follow that they
either should or should not do so.
>And once they
>figure out some of this out, won't they have, then, a guide to action,
>a guide to preference maximization?
They'll have a guide as far as being able to determine what is nessesary for
what. They won't have anything to tell them what they objectively should do,
though.
-User
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/30/00 4:56 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <39fdfc5f$1...@oit.umass.edu>
>> Where there are differences, it is definsible to label one supreme,
>> according to your tastes. For instance, suppose I think black skin is
>> superior to white skin, aestheticly. Then I could say that black people
>> are superior, in that regard. If I regard them as equal otherwise, then
>> they are just plain superior, according to my preferences.
>
>That doesn't work because skin color is entirely nonessential.
Whether something is "essential" or not is a subjective evaluation. First I'd
ask "Essential to what?" Perhaps it is essential to someones subjective
preferences.
>The
>differences amoung individual black people are greater than their
>differences as a group, compared to other groups. If you were choosing a
>model for a painting, the aesthetic difference would matter, but not in
>any general case.
Or it would matter for countless other reasons depending on my subjective
preferences.
>Also, let's not forget what we're talking about here. Finding a skin color
>pleasing is not comparable to wanting everyone with a different skin color
>eliminated.
What do you mean, not comparable? It could very well be that you find black
skin so pleasing and white skin so non-pleasing that you'd like to murder all
those with white skin. There is nothing irrational about that in itsself.
>You would have to value skin color so much that you would go
>out killing people over it.
Exactly, nothing irrational about that.
-User
Joe Durnavich
>>You have seem to found an
>>objective basis for a choice--at least for someone choosing your
>>theory.
>
>No, you just seem confused.
Ok, so there is no objective basis for someone to DO anything
in regards to your theory--including accepting the conclusion, drawing
the conclusion, etc.
Isn't the following an application of your argument?
(1) Drawing the conclusion of your argument is a human activity.
(2) This activity consists of me making inferences with the goal of
validating your conclusion.
(3) There is no objective basis for supporting any goal.
(4) Therefore, there is no objective basis for me to draw your
conclusion.
>>>What are you talking about? My theory is relevent enough to you for you to
>>>respond to it. Whether something is relevent or not to someone is easily
>>>observed and not dependant on there being objective proscriptive facts.
>>
>>I respond to your argument because you seem to be telling me that I am
>>wrong, which I take as a recommendation to change my beliefs or ways,
>>but you also seem to be saying that your are not recommending I change
>>my beliefs. You present me with a contradiction and I am expressing
>>normal, human puzzlement.
>
>Perhaps I am recommending it. If I am, then it does not follow that there
>is an
>objective fact that proscribes you to adopt what I recommend. I may simply
>prefer that you hold certain beliefs, and I may also think that you will p
>refer
>holding certain beliefs, once you adopt them. My actions to cause you to hold
>the beliefs may consist of 'recommending' them to you. But, this of course
>doesn't imply any objective proscription.
Proscription is simply recommendation. When someone says to you,
"you should buy into these mutual funds" they are making a
recommendation. Morality is simply a guide to action--a kind of
map. Your are free to follow the map or not (but you are
not free from the consequences of your choice).
You are working hard to eliminate the word "should" from the
English language, and for no good reason. People use the word
"should" to mean: "I recommend you do this because it may help
you do what you prefer."
>Suppose I know that you prefer true theories. Suppose I prefer that you hold
>theories that are true, as well. Then I might say "I suggest adopting my
>theory, as it is true." Meaning simply that it will satisfy your preferences,
>not that you objectively should.
Suggesting I do something IS a proscription.
But is that it? You just want people to nod their heads in
agreement to your theory and do nothing else?
>>>I'm not "seperating" anything. I am pointing out the logical errors in
>>trying
>>>to derive a proscriptive facts.
>>
>>But for what purpose? It would be irrational for you--by your
>>account--to point to the logical error in an attempt to get someone to
>>change their beliefs.
>
>Not true at all. I have never said it is irrational to try to influence pe
>ople.
>The belief that there are proscriptive facts is irrational, but this does not
>at all imply that influencing people is irrational.
Proscription is all about influencing ourselves and others.
You give reasons to act a particular way:
Proscription: You should bring a coat on the trip.
Reason: Because it is cold in Minnesota this time of year
and you will be uncomfortable without a coat.
Are you now saying this is not irrational?
>The two things are unrelated.
Isn't your argument that there can be no rational way to influence
people? That is, there are no facts that can suggest a course of
action? Thus, all influence is necessarily irrational.
If you are trying to influence people here, then, well....
>>>>You have made it an objectively
>>>>pointless exercise.
>>>
>>>No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going to
>>make
>>>that no so.
Is pursuing a goal fundamentally logical or illogical? If it is
illogical, then one can't "use logic for a variety of goals"
(the phrase contradicts itself).
>>Suppose that the President gets so excited about your proof that moral
>>realism is irrational that he lets you present it from the White House
>>press room. All the networks carry it and the whole country--make
>>that the whole world--listens.
>>
>>You:
>>
>>(1) State that moral realists believe that morality is the rational
>>guide to action.
>>
>>(2) Present your rational proof that morality cannot be rational.
>>
>>(3) Conclude that rationality cannot be a guide to action.
>
>As far as 3, it can be used to guide you to achieving your goals, but it just
>can't tell you which goals to achieve.
Well, there you go. I don't think moral realism expects much
more from morality. We all have plenty of goals and preferences
at any given time. We don't need logic to generate more! But
we do need it to eliminate the conflicting goals and to find
ways to reach the ones we do want to reach.
Does that sound acceptable?
>>How is the country supposed to react to this?
>
>Most of them would probably agree, if they understood my argument. It seems
>like a common position. How are they 'supposed' to? Well, you know that I
>don't
>think anyone is *supposed* to do anything. Not sure what you mean.
Don't you want them to abandon moral realism? What changes do they
make in their lives by not abiding by moral realism?
Or did you merely want people to nod their head in agreement
about your theory and then continue living as they were as moral
realists or whatever they were?
>>You have just "proven"
>>to them that there can be no rational guide to action, but you have
>>presented a rational argument. They can't change one single thing
>>because of your argument. Not one thing in the world changes.
>
>Not sure what you mean here. It is true that my argument doesn't objectively
>proscribe any action on their part. However it doesn't follow that "they can't
>change one thing" or that they can't be influenced by it.
Does it make any real difference in peoples lives if they do allow
themselves to be influenced by your theory? Will they achieve
more or less goals, do you think?
>>Is this the purpose of logic to present arguments that mean literally,
>>objectively, really, absolutely nothing?
>
>I don't know why you'd say the argument has no meaning. It is quite clear that
>it does. It means that there are no proscriptive facts. That is certainly a
>meaningful statement, not sure what you are confused about.
I mean what actually changes in the world when people accept that
there are no moral facts?
Are there consequences if they don't accept this?
>Do you mean "is the purpose of logic to present arguments that don't
>objectively proscribe action?"? Not clear what you mean by "the purpose of
>logic." Logic is a tool. Different people use it for different purposes, I
>presume. Logic is oten useful for discovering or determining truth, so it gets
>used in that area fairly often
But one can't use the truth to set a goal because there is
no factual basis for that, right? If so, then truth has no
function in human life, life being self-directed pursuit of goals.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>>Date: 10/30/00 12:37 PM Central Standard Time
>
>>Hitler had these two preferences (among others):
>>
>>(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
>>(2) A preference to eliminate the Jews.
>>
>>One could rationally argue that eliminating the Jews will
>>lead to the destruction of Germany. This conflicts with
>>preference (1). Doesn't that make having these two
>>preferences irrational?
>
>Of course not. People can have conflicting preferences. In fact, I bet eve
>ryone
>does.
>
>For instance, suppose Bob has a preference for icecream. Suppose Bob also
>has a
>preference for not gaining weight. Is he therefore irrational, just because he
>prefers two conflicting things? Of course not. Maybe Bob will only have
>icecream on special occasions, compromising between following either one o
>r the
>other preference exclusively.
Bob is moderating his intake of ice cream. Now this is what morality
can do for you! You can figure out how much ice cream to eat and not
gain weight...
>Similarly, Hitler might either try to find ways to eliminate jews without
>having Germany destroyed, or compromise by eliminating some jews and having
>Germany only partialy damaged.
I was stipulating that one could rationally conclude that eliminating
Jews will lead to (or runs an extremely high risk of) destroying
Germany. Since Germany was destroyed in fact, I don't think this is
too farfetched. Obviously, Hitler misplanned somewhere along the way.
He held conflicting preferences.
>>(1) A preference for the supremacy of the Aryan race.
>>(3) A preference for a strong, stable economy.
>>
>>Wouldn't having these two preferences be rational because they
>>do not conflict with each other?
>
>No, there is nothing more rational about having two non-conflicting prefer
>ences
>than two conflicting ones. You might prefer to have non-conflicting ones, but
>it isn't any more in accord with reason than having conflicting ones.
So, Hitler was not irrational according to you? As long as he passed
logic class and his arguments not pertaining to human action were
valid, he could be the most rational person that ever lived, right?
It makes you wonder just what philosophy has to offer the human race,
if anything...
--
Joe Durnavich
Owl
news:20001030194259...@ng-ch1.aol.com...
> The completely red and completely blue one is just a sort of disguised
version
> of ~(A & ~A),
I'd like to see a derivation for this. The claim that some sentence entails
a contradiction is perfectly objective (at least, if we agree upon the rules
of inference allowed) -- the person making the claim should be able to
decisively prove it.
> once you take into account the physical fact that something being
> completely red implies that it is not completely blue.
What exactly is the difference between my original statement, "nothing can
be both red and blue," and your "fact that something being completely red
implies that it is not completely blue"? Aren't you just repeating my
original example?
Of course, you can always say that "once you take into account the fact that
P, to deny P would be contradictory"! Does that mean every statement is a
truth of logic?
> I don't know what you
> were talking about saying identity is transitive. More on the issue below.
Transitivity is a property of relations. It means if Rab and Rbc, then Rac.
For instance, if 'a is inside b' and 'b is inside c', then 'a is inside c.'
> Well, once you decode your color example and if you simply regard math as
part
> of logic, as I thought lots of people did, then it seems to be a fair
> assessment. I don't know what the identity this was, again, but it sounded
> fairly logical.
We have to be clear what you mean by "logic." If by "logic" you mean the
principles of correct reasoning, then it is hard to see how any of my
examples were part of logic, since none of them appeared to be a principle
of reasoning. Perhaps you have some broader conception of 'logic' that would
make them into truths of logic, but then we'll have to be careful that this
broader conception does not wind up making ethics plausibly part of 'logic'
too. As I suggested last time, you might, alternately, use "logic" to refer
to the body of truths that can be known through pure reason; but then it's
non-obvious that ethics isn't part of logic (or at least, to assert that
ethics wasn't part of "logic" so understood would be begging the question).
> >I don't see why my examples above are not physical descriptive facts.
> >They're certainly facts, aren't they? And they're descriptive, aren't
> >they?
>
> What I meant, I think, was that they seemed to be abstractions, referring
to
> general rules applying to physical reality, as opposited to specific
claims
> about how reality was in that context.
Okay. "Murder is wrong" is also an abstraction, which refers to a general
rule applying to moral reality, as opposed to specific claims like, "Charles
Manson's murder of so-and-so was wrong." So so far the analogy is preserved.
> Why is that nessesary? Is it inconcievable for the world to instead be
such
> that murder was not wrong? I know you think murder is wrong now. But you
also
> think grass is green now. Surely it is not absolutely nessesary that in
all
> possible realities grass be green.
Well, I can easily think of situations in which grass was yellow, or red,
etc., but I cannot think of any situations in which murder is ok. Can you?
Maybe you would try a situation like the following: "Imagine that murdering
one person was necessary to save the world from destruction, etc. Then it
would be ok to commit the murder." But of course, that's not what I'm
talking about when I say I think murder is wrong -- I don't mean that I
think killing someone in order to save lots of other people is wrong -- I
*don't* think that's true, not in the actual world, and not in another
hypothetical possible world. And so the hypothetical situation does not
constitute a case in which a different set of values would be justified. And
in general, I can't conceive of any cases in which a set of values different
from my actual values would be correct.
This is not, of course, an indication of dogmatism, any more than the fact
that I cannot conceive of any cases in which 7+5 is not 12 makes my belief
that 7+5=12 dogmatic.
> Similarly, why would it be absolutely
> nessesary that in all possible realities murder be wrong? However, math
and ~(A
> & ~A), seem to be nessesarily true in that way.
What makes you think they are necessary?
> Hm, strange, when I think about it, it doesn't make sense at all. Isn't
this
> some evidence that it doesn't come from the faculty of reason? I think I
am a
> fairly reasonable person. I score high on reasoning tests, do well in
math, am
I think I'm also a fairly reasonable person, and it makes sense to me, so
that's also evidence that it does come from the faculty of reason, right?
> able to perform the basic task of identifying the logical errors in
> objectivism.
Well, the last isn't saying too much. ;)
> I generaly agree with you about matters of logic. I can't think of
> any logical disagreements that I have with you, in any of your positions.
Our
> disagreement seems to come from not agreeing on premises. Assuming that I
am a
> rational person, why would something so seemingly simple as a basic moral
fact
> not make sense to me if it really came from reason? You could in fact go
into
I'm really not sure. Here are a couple of hypotheses.
1. Actually, it *does* make sense to you. You don't commit murders; I'll bet
you don't steal things or tell lies gratuitously or stab people on the
street. This is because you are, in fact, aware of your moral obligations.
You just don't realize that this awareness is, in fact, awareness of moral
facts; you incorrectly think that it is some other type of mental state,
such as a desire or feeling or, as you call it, a 'compellation.'
2. You have some general, theoretical beliefs that imply that such states of
direct awareness couldn't exist, and that suggest various things that would
make moral realism implausible. (Some of these more abstract beliefs have
come out in our discussions over the past weeks.) These theoretical beliefs,
in turn, force you to interpret your consciousness of moral facts as
something else. This seems like a plausible explanation to me, since I think
you're also a skeptic about almost everything else, besides morality.
3. You have been subjected to a general culture of relativism and skepticism
for a long time. You yourself, in this same message, went on to warn about
how biases affect what one considers to make sense.
4. You haven't thought very much about moral questions and perhaps have not
been exposed to rational discussions about them. Perhaps you also have not
explored the various alternative positions in meta-ethics, which would
enable you to judge which are more and less plausible. So far, you may only
be thinking in broad categories of 'realism' and 'anti-realism.'
5. Some people are better at some subjects than they are at others. For
instance, a person who was good at history might be bad at chemistry. And
some people just aren't very 'good at' moral philosophy.
6. Of course, while most people (I assume) have moral intuitions, everyone
*also* has emotions (well, with the possible exception of some people with
mental disorders); I'm certainly not denying *that*. It may therefore be
easy to confuse your intuitions with emotions, especially if they happen at
about the same time. (There is empirical evidence in psychology that beliefs
cause emotions.)
7. Perhaps you are not thinking of the right examples. For instance, you
might be thinking of an irrational belief such as the belief that killing
babies is more wrong than killing adult men, or the belief that fornication
is 'wrong.' In other words, when you think about 'ethics', you might be
thinking about those ethical beliefs that really *don't* come from reason.
On the other hand, I wonder what could make me, seemingly a rational person,
think that I had these 'moral intuitions' when in reality there's no such
thing and the concept isn't even coherent?
> Something to think about is, what makes things make sense when you think
about
> them? The human brain is fairly complex, and it seems to be quite easy for
> people to fool themselves, or make themselves believe things, or make
things
> make sense to them.
For instance, to fool themselves into thinking morality is subjective.
> If you condition children to believe in jesus, they will think that their
> beliefs are just somehow right, when they consider them.
True, and also, if you condition people to believe that morality is
'subjective', then they will think *that* is just somehow right.
> "The patient typically finds himself impelled by some deep, inner
conviction
> that something is true, or right, or virtuous: a conviction that doesn't
seem
> to owe anything to evidence or reason, but which, nevertheless, he feels
as
> totally compelling and convincing. We doctors refer to such a belief as
> 'faith'."
I wonder what he was referring to there.
If you want to go around constantly questioning your own thought
processes -- "Wait, what if that thought was put into me by the evil
genius?", etc. -- then you get a complete and total skepticism. If you don't
basically trust what seems to be the case to you, trust your own mind, that
is, then you really can't do any philosophy, or any thinking at all.
> You could also use objectivists as an example. Many of them probably have
> similar beliefs. They just seem "right" to them, when they reflect upon
them,
> even though they aren't logical or true at all.
In the case of the Objectivists, specific objections can be brought forward
against their views. I'm not aware of any specific objections to murder
being wrong, i.e., arguments or evidence that it's ok.
> natural to me. What you claimed were moral facts just seemed "right" when
I
> thought about them, you could say. But the thing is, the more I thought
about
> it, the less I could justify this feeling of "rightness." Soon when I
thought
> about it enough, the entire notion began to appear to me as not making any
> sense at all, and simply a subjective inclination of mine to approve of
> certiain things.
Think a little more, and maybe everything will seem that way.
> However, when you take a step back and exime your beliefs, and ask "Why
does
> this really make sense to me?" you come to the conclusion that you really
have
> no reasons, and all you really know is that something *seems* somehow
"right",
> not that it is, and with a decent knowledge of evolution the whole notion
of
Think a little more, and maybe you will see everything that way.
There is no difference between ethics and everything else; at least, not
here there isn't.
> I think I "accept" all of those things. I have just reasoned that they are
not
> nessesarily correct. It doesn't mean that I think physical reality doesn't
> exist, though.Sort of like how you'll assign a non-0 probability to being
BIV,
> I bet. I don't see it as much more than that.
>
> Anyway, did you accept my defense of logic not being dis-justified, and
actualy
> being justified by itsself? I haven't seen you respond to my latest post
on
> that.
No, I didn't, but I think the major points were already implicit or explicit
in the foregoing discussion, and I'm short on time. I'm not sure I remember
your last message very well, but I think the major points are these. a) You
can't give logical arguments for the rules of logic, without using circular
reasoning (which is illogical). b) Thus, belief in the rules of logic isn't
justified by logic. c) In any case, your view entails that the choice
between logic-based 'justification' and, e.g., Bible-based 'justification'
is completely arbitrary. I don't think that this could be a basis for
claiming knowledge. d) Your interpretation of 'justification' as a
relationship is wrong. There's no point to 'justifying' things relative to
an arbitrary starting point; you might as well just take all your beliefs as
arbitrary starting points. (If people had your view, they would never have
conceived the idea of relational justification in the first place, since it
would accomplish nothing.) On this, the skeptics definitely win (that is,
they win in an argument with you).
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
Sollars:
> >You also said (in a post dated 10/27/00):
> >
> >> what
> >> is better is based on our subjective preferences.
> >
> >subjective preferences.
And I am still curious; perhaps I am destined to remain so. I have been
clear throughout my posts here, I think, that I have no knock-down
argument to establish moral realism, although I do think that there is
good evidence to support it, and the assumption of it, like the
assumption of physical realism, makes good sense methodologically.
OTOH, you seem to have made a claim, not that you have a /theory/ that
other people base their notions of "better" on subjective preferences,
but that they flat out do so as a matter of fact ("is based on..."). So
I am going to ask again how you know this. Since you seem to like
(semi-)formal logical arguments, perhaps you have one for establishing
the truth of this claim?
> >But now you indicate that your notions might be the same as theirs, "due
> >simply to the common concept of 'better'". Yet you seem to deny that we
> >have a common concept of 'good'.
>
> We do have a fairly common concept of good, I think. I denied this earlie
> r? Hm,
> I didn't mean to.
Well, good. Perhaps you did not deny it, but I took it to be implied by
other things you have said.
> > At one level, I
> >would say that multiple observers agreeing on a ranking according to
> >"better" is evidence of some kind of objective property that explains the
> >agreement.
>
> In this case I'd say it is evidence that they have similar preferences, d
> ue to
> the fact that they all all human and such. For instance, show some humans two
> computers. One of them much faster and with more features and such, and ask
> them which is "better." Well, people simply subjectively prefer faster
> computers with more features, so they'll all agree.
I don't see what role "subjective" is /logically/ playing in the last
sentence, although rhetorically it does bolster your position. I would
say that the preference does not depend on any subjective features. All
other things being equal, all rational beings prefer more features to
less. They all agree because it is rational to do so.
> This doesn't imply that the
> people *should* prefer that computer.
I don't see why not. There is no Authority that forces people to be
rational, of course, but if your position requires defending be
irrationality, I think I'm home free.
> It doesn't imply that they call the fast
> computer better because they all percieve some objective proscription tha
> t they
> should want it more.
What is an "objective prescription"? I would have thought that you
denied that there was an "objective" prescription.
> >At
> >a second level, we can see if multiple observers agree on criteria for
> >"better". Again, I would take agreement as evidence that the idea of
> >"better" was tracking some real, though possibly very complex, property.
>
> The property might be "what humans subjectively like." And yes, if you
> researched this you'd find that it was an objective fact that people tend
> ed to
> subjectively like certain things. Again, there is no proscription here.
What's the use of repeating "subjective" here? Try this: The property
might be "what humans objectively like". And yes, if you researched this
you'd find that it was an objective fact that people tended to
objectively like certain things.
One reason is that rationality itself is prescriptive. Even instrumental
rationality prescribes taking more rather than less.
...
> > I think that a theory that scores well on such criteria is
> >"better" than one that does not, and, further, that this use of "better"
> >is tied to other uses of it. Do you disagree with this?
>
> Nope, I think a theory with those properties is better, too. When I say t
> hat I
> am not claiming to refer to any objective proscription at all.
So you are being more modest than necessary.
> People have
> fairly consistant notions of 'better' in all sorts of catagories. Generaly
> things that are faster, more durable, accomplish what they are supposed to do
> without as much hassle, etc, are called "better" -- as far as physical things
> go. Therefore objects of different types that are "better" than other objects
> of the same type will often have similar qualities.
And what is failing to be objective here?
...
> >I think that some sort of prescription /is/
> >embedded in my notion of better, /and/ I think that it is rational to
> >pick a better theory using this sort of criteria. Do you think it is
> >rational to pick them by, say, flipping a coin?
>
> Depends on your goal. If you wanted a true theoy, then the coin-flip would be
> an irrational means of achieving the goal. However, if you didn't want a true
> theory, but maybe a random theory, then it may be rational to flip the coin.
What are good reasons for wanting a theory that isn't true, other than,
say, as an example when talking /about/ theories?
> >I recognize that this is picking away at the edges of the "is/ought" gap,
> >but, again, unless you are simply stipulating such a gap, the gap is fair
> >game, despite Hume's intellectual stature.
>
> The gap seems so blindingly obvious to me I don't know how a person could
> deny
> it.
Well, it takes a great deal of courage, I admit. ;-)
> Let us play a little game. You construct a formal argument using no
> proscriptive premises and try to reach a proscriptive conclusion. I will then
> tell you which hidden proscriptive premises you need for the conclusion to
> logicaly follow.
This game does not impress me. There is no "formal argument" to show
that something is a table or that an animal is healthy. Does this mean
that it logically follows there are no tables or healthy animals? If so,
so much the worse for "logic".
> For instance, you might say something like:
>
> (1) Hitler murdered lots of people.
> (2) Therefore, Hitler was bad.
1) This object has four legs.
2) Therefore, this object is a table.
No one is going to make such a simple-minded argument to show that it
"logically follows" that that object is a table (or that an animal is
healthy). Obviously there is no /simple/ reduction of prescription to
description - if there were, then we can presume that everyone would see
it and the argument would be over. There is no reasons in principle why
the reduction could not take hundreds of thousands of steps.
But, as I have just pointed out, there is no simple reduction of "table"
(or "healthy") to a set of necessary conditions. The same is true of
"good" and "bad" as well. So I don't see the fact that there are "hidden
premises" in getting from (1) to (2) (either yours or mine) as a problem.
Now, I assume that you want to claim that one of the hidden premises
between your (1) and (2) must be "purely" prescriptive. Do you also
think that there is a single hidden premise between my (1) and (2) that
confers table-hood?
...
> >User:
> >> They have a preference for using criteria that lead them to those theo
> >> ries.
> >
> >And what could be reasonable than to say that this is a rational
> >preference?
>
> I don't know why you would simply call this perference rational. It seems
> like
> you are doing it completely out of nowhere. Just for fun, or because you like
> the preference.
I do "like" the preference for better theories, but that's because I am
rational, not the other way around. You said that you prefer them as
well. I would take a preference for a worse theory over a better one as
a sign of irrationality. Again, your position seems to hinge on
defending the possibility of being irrational, although you yourself
don't claim to be.
> I don't see anything that implies that it is rational. You seem
> to be big on stipulating things. I prefer to have reasons for calling things
> rational or not.
An excellent sign of rationality! The giving of reasons. Don't you
think that there are good reasons for preferring theories with the
properties I mentioned over others? A preference with good reasons on
balance is a rational preference.
...
> Something is objective if it is a property of the object of interest, rou
> ghly.
Well, this doesn't help me much, because I often find properties to be a
little confusing. Do you think that "healthy" names a property?
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
abcd...@my-deja.com
Subjective Value means your own valuation, it cannot be expended to the
others. So that subjetive value has no standard. Please, look at the
home page: http://www.angelfire.com/ga/chaok , you could find more.
Reading without thinking is nonsense!
-----------------------------------------------------------
user...@my-deja.com
Joe Durnavich <jo...@mcs.net> wrote:
> User 1DE7 writes:
>
> >>You have seem to found an
> >>objective basis for a choice--at least for someone choosing your
> >>theory.
> >
> >No, you just seem confused.
>
> Ok, so there is no objective basis for someone to DO anything
> in regards to your theory--including accepting the conclusion, drawing
> the conclusion, etc.
>
> Isn't the following an application of your argument?
>
> (1) Drawing the conclusion of your argument is a human activity.
> (2) This activity consists of me making inferences with the goal of
> validating your conclusion.
> (3) There is no objective basis for supporting any goal.
> (4) Therefore, there is no objective basis for me to draw your
> conclusion.
Your wording in this argument is sort of vauge. But if you interpret it
charitably it makes sense. (4) could be written more clearly "There is
no objective basis why you ought to draw my conclusion."
However, this does not imply that the conclusion isn't implied by logic
and the facts of reality. It boils down to the fact that there is no
proscriptive fact saying that you should draw conclusions that are true
rather than false.
You could say that. Recall that we are talking about *objective
proscriptive facts*. Recommendation does not imply that.
When someone says to you,
> "you should buy into these mutual funds" they are making a
> recommendation.
But they need not be saying that it is an objective fact that you
should do that.
Morality is simply a guide to action--a kind of
> map. Your are free to follow the map or not (but you are
> not free from the consequences of your choice).
>
> You are working hard to eliminate the word "should" from the
> English language, and for no good reason. People use the word
> "should" to mean: "I recommend you do this because it may help
> you do what you prefer."
Correct, people use "should" like that all the time, including myself.
There is absolutely nothing wrong with that type of statement, and I am
not trying to eliminate it. If you look closely you will note that
there is no objective proscription in the statement. It is equivilant
to informing someong that X is nessesary for Y, if Y is some preference
of theirs.
>
> >Suppose I know that you prefer true theories. Suppose I prefer that
you hold
> >theories that are true, as well. Then I might say "I suggest
adopting my
> >theory, as it is true." Meaning simply that it will satisfy your
preferences,
> >not that you objectively should.
>
> Suggesting I do something IS a proscription.
Not a factual proscription, see above.
>
> >>>I'm not "seperating" anything. I am pointing out the logical
errors in
> >>trying
> >>>to derive a proscriptive facts.
> >>
> >>But for what purpose? It would be irrational for you--by your
> >>account--to point to the logical error in an attempt to get someone
to
> >>change their beliefs.
> >
> >Not true at all. I have never said it is irrational to try to
influence pe
> >ople.
> >The belief that there are proscriptive facts is irrational, but this
does not
> >at all imply that influencing people is irrational.
>
> Proscription is all about influencing ourselves and others.
> You give reasons to act a particular way:
You confuse non-objective proscription with objective.
> Proscription: You should bring a coat on the trip.
> Reason: Because it is cold in Minnesota this time of year
> and you will be uncomfortable without a coat.
>
> Are you now saying this is not irrational?
That statement doesn't need to imply any objective proscriptive fact.
So, it could very well be not irrational.
>
> >The two things are unrelated.
>
> Isn't your argument that there can be no rational way to influence
> people?
Of course not, that is absurd. The argument is that there is no
rational reason why people SHOULD be influenced by you. Their reasons
depend on subjective preferences. But, they are, so you can influence
them.
I have to go to class, I may respond to the rest of your post later if
I see anything that I haven't covered here.
-User
Joe Durnavich
> Joe Durnavich <jo...@mcs.net> wrote:
>> User 1DE7 writes:
>>
>> >>You have seem to found an
>> >>objective basis for a choice--at least for someone choosing your
>> >>theory.
>> >
>> >No, you just seem confused.
>>
>> Ok, so there is no objective basis for someone to DO anything
>> in regards to your theory--including accepting the conclusion, drawing
>> the conclusion, etc.
>>
>> Isn't the following an application of your argument?
>>
>> (1) Drawing the conclusion of your argument is a human activity.
>> (2) This activity consists of me making inferences with the goal of
>> validating your conclusion.
>> (3) There is no objective basis for supporting any goal.
>> (4) Therefore, there is no objective basis for me to draw your
>> conclusion.
>
>Your wording in this argument is sort of vauge. But if you interpret it
>charitably it makes sense. (4) could be written more clearly "There is
>no objective basis why you ought to draw my conclusion."
Your use of "ought" here is superfluous. "Ought" means "do for a
reason." Your argument is that ultimately there are no reasons to do
anything. Thus, your argument implies that there are no reasons to
draw your conclusion--or any conclusion for that matter.
>However, this does not imply that the conclusion isn't implied by logic
>and the facts of reality. It boils down to the fact that there is no
>proscriptive fact saying that you should draw conclusions that are true
>rather than false.
Is it your belief that in the act of drawing a conclusion that the
conclusion suddenly switches from being objective to subjective?
Keep in mind that proving, implying, validating, etc. are human
actions just as much as an eagle building a nest is an eagle action.
If all human actions are subjective, then any acts of reasoning must
be too.
--
Joe Durnavich
User 1DE7
>Date: 10/31/00 8:35 PM Central Standard Time
>Message-id: <gtvuvs8g2r4fohbc7...@4ax.com>
>Maybe Bob will only have
>>icecream on special occasions, compromising between following either one o
>>r the
>>other preference exclusively.
>
>Bob is moderating his intake of ice cream. Now this is what morality
>can do for you! You can figure out how much ice cream to eat and not
>gain weight...
Try not to use the word "morality", it will be less confusing. You can use
reason to figure out the exact amount of icecream to eat to confer the maximum
overall pleasure to yourself, but again, reason cannot tell you that you should
do this.
>>Similarly, Hitler might either try to find ways to eliminate jews without
>>having Germany destroyed, or compromise by eliminating some jews and having
>>Germany only partialy damaged.
>
>I was stipulating that one could rationally conclude that eliminating
>Jews will lead to (or runs an extremely high risk of) destroying
>Germany. Since Germany was destroyed in fact, I don't think this is
>too farfetched.
Actualy, I think the main problem was Hitler's aggressiveness toward other
countries. If he had simply confined his activities to Germany, and did it
correctly, then I think he could have avoided the destruction of his country
fairly easily.
Anyway, the above is still irrelevent to proscriptive facts.
>Obviously, Hitler misplanned somewhere along the way.
>He held conflicting preferences.
Not nessesarily. Even if true, it doesn't help the cause of objective
proscription.
>>No, there is nothing more rational about having two non-conflicting prefer
>>ences
>>than two conflicting ones. You might prefer to have non-conflicting ones,
>but
>>it isn't any more in accord with reason than having conflicting ones.
>
>So, Hitler was not irrational according to you?
I don't know how rational he was.
>As long as he passed
>logic class and his arguments not pertaining to human action were
>valid, he could be the most rational person that ever lived, right?
Possible.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <f4o00tkq0iof7vpd6...@4ax.com>
>>> Isn't the following an application of your argument?
>>>
>>> (1) Drawing the conclusion of your argument is a human activity.
>>> (2) This activity consists of me making inferences with the goal of
>>> validating your conclusion.
>>> (3) There is no objective basis for supporting any goal.
>>> (4) Therefore, there is no objective basis for me to draw your
>>> conclusion.
>>
>>Your wording in this argument is sort of vauge. But if you interpret it
>>charitably it makes sense. (4) could be written more clearly "There is
>>no objective basis why you ought to draw my conclusion."
>
>Your use of "ought" here is superfluous. "Ought" means "do for a
>reason."
Completely wrong. Hitler killed for a reason. "Hitler killed for a reason" =
"Hitler ought to have killed?"
I don't know how you can make such wildly absurd statements.
When I use 'ought' or 'should' I refer to objective proscription.
>Your argument is that ultimately there are no reasons to do
>anything.
Completely wrong, again. I am not going to even respond to this rubbish. I
don't know how you could interpret my argument any worse. There is no excuse
for it.
>>However, this does not imply that the conclusion isn't implied by logic
>>and the facts of reality. It boils down to the fact that there is no
>>proscriptive fact saying that you should draw conclusions that are true
>>rather than false.
>
>Is it your belief that in the act of drawing a conclusion that the
>conclusion suddenly switches from being objective to subjective?
The above does not make sense to me. Saying a conclusion is 'objective' or
'subjective' seems confused, or at least overly ambiguous.
>Keep in mind that proving, implying, validating, etc. are human
>actions just as much as an eagle building a nest is an eagle action.
>If all human actions are subjective
No clue what you mean for an action to be subjective.
-User
User 1DE7
>From: Joe Durnavich jo...@mcs.net
>Message-id: <96suvs0p1c88rci1s...@4ax.com>
>
>>>>No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going to
>>>make
>>>>that no so.
>
>Is pursuing a goal fundamentally logical or illogical? If it is
>illogical, then one can't "use logic for a variety of goals"
>(the phrase contradicts itself).
Neither. I don't know why you don't understand my position yet. Almost
everything you say can be answered by the most basic understanding of my
position.
>>>(3) Conclude that rationality cannot be a guide to action.
>>
>>As far as 3, it can be used to guide you to achieving your goals, but it
>just
>>can't tell you which goals to achieve.
>
>Well, there you go. I don't think moral realism expects much
>more from morality.
Then your view of morality is not proscriptive.
>>Most of them would probably agree, if they understood my argument. It seems
>>like a common position. How are they 'supposed' to? Well, you know that I
>>don't
>>think anyone is *supposed* to do anything. Not sure what you mean.
>
>Don't you want them to abandon moral realism?
I think most non-religious people, in america at least, are already moral
skeptics.
>What changes do they
>make in their lives by not abiding by moral realism?
The situation with the violence in the middle-east seems to be an example of
what sort of bad things can happen when you have lots of moral realists and a
conflict. If they were moral skeptics they likely wouldn't be as dogmatic and
as self-rightous and such, and it would lead to a more peaceful situation,
perhaps.
>Or did you merely want people to nod their head in agreement
>about your theory and then continue living as they were as moral
>realists or whatever they were?
>
Nope.
>They can't change one single thing
>>>because of your argument. Not one thing in the world changes.
>>
>>Not sure what you mean here. It is true that my argument doesn't objectively
>>proscribe any action on their part. However it doesn't follow that "they
>can't
>>change one thing" or that they can't be influenced by it.
>
>Does it make any real difference in peoples lives if they do allow
>themselves to be influenced by your theory?
I can immagine people for whom it would. I bet it'd change Owl's life, for
instance, since his moral realism seems to be an important part of his
philosophy.
>Will they achieve
>more or less goals, do you think?
Who knows.
>>I don't know why you'd say the argument has no meaning. It is quite clear
>that
>>it does. It means that there are no proscriptive facts. That is certainly a
>>meaningful statement, not sure what you are confused about.
>
>I mean what actually changes in the world when people accept that
>there are no moral facts?
Lots of things could change. They might all start running around killing
eachother, for instance.
>Are there consequences if they don't accept this?
>
Who knows. The earth may turn into a wonderful paradise if they don't accept my
views.
>>Do you mean "is the purpose of logic to present arguments that don't
>>objectively proscribe action?"? Not clear what you mean by "the purpose of
>>logic." Logic is a tool. Different people use it for different purposes, I
>>presume. Logic is oten useful for discovering or determining truth, so it
>gets
>>used in that area fairly often
>
>But one can't use the truth to set a goal because there is
>no factual basis for that, right?
Right.
>If so, then truth has no
>function in human life, life being self-directed pursuit of goals.
>
Does not follow, at all. Many people's goals are dependant on what is true. For
instance, consider a person P:
P's subjective preference: That everyone should be well fed.
P wants to achieve the goal of making everyone well fed. Certain items of truth
determine how he should go about doing so. Would he need to advocate a
communist government mandating that everyone be fed 3 meals a day, by the
govenment? Or would he be better off advocating captailism? Or maybe it is
nessesary that he beat people with sticks and hope food magicaly appears in
their belly? The answer to this can be determined by reason.
-User
Owl
news:f4o00tkq0iof7vpd6...@4ax.com...
> Your use of "ought" here is superfluous. "Ought" means "do for a
> reason."
That sounds odd. "You ought to return the book to the library" then means
"You do return the book to the library for a reason"? I don't think so.
I think what you wanted to say here, which is true, is this:
"reason why S ought to do A" means "reason for S to do A." Thus, "there are
no reasons why anyone ought to do anything" implies "There are no reasons
for doing anything."
> Your argument is that ultimately there are no reasons to do
> anything. Thus, your argument implies that there are no reasons to
> draw your conclusion--or any conclusion for that matter.
Right. "There are no reasons for doing anything" implies "there are no
reasons for believing User." By the way, there are some philosophers who
believe the former -- the Popperites. David Miller wrote a book in which he
defended that position. I once read a review of it. It started, "There are
no good reasons for reading David Miller's book."
Owl
> >Your argument is that ultimately there are no reasons to do
> >anything.
>
> Completely wrong, again. I am not going to even respond to this rubbish. I
> don't know how you could interpret my argument any worse. There is no
excuse
> for it.
Please, gentlemen. This is verging on becoming a flame war, but for Joe's
restraint. Joe may be wrong, but there's no need to get personal.
Owl
> >>>>No, people use logic for a variety of goals and nothing I do is going
to
> >>>make
> >>>>that no so.
> >
> >Is pursuing a goal fundamentally logical or illogical? If it is
> >illogical, then one can't "use logic for a variety of goals"
> >(the phrase contradicts itself).
>
> Neither. I don't know why you don't understand my position yet. Almost
> everything you say can be answered by the most basic understanding of my
> position.
Let me see if I can interpret. Joe vs. User: A Philosophical Dialogue:
User: People use logic to pursue goals, because logic tells them what means
to adopt in order to achieve a given goal.
Joe: But it is not logical to adopt any given means, unless it is logical to
be pursuing the goal in the first place.
User: Don't you understand, there's no such thing as a logical goal, only a
logical means of pursuing a goal.
Time will tell what the next installment in this dialogue will be. Perhaps
it will be along the lines of:
Joe: Don't you understand, if there's no reason to pursue X, then "Doing Y
will achieve X" is not a reason for doing Y. Therefore, if there is no
reason to adopt a goal, there is no reason for adopting any means either. So
if there are no logical goals, there is nothing else logical either.
> >>As far as 3, it can be used to guide you to achieving your goals, but it
> >just
> >>can't tell you which goals to achieve.
> >
> >Well, there you go. I don't think moral realism expects much
> >more from morality.
Hm, well, maybe not.
> The situation with the violence in the middle-east seems to be an example
of
> what sort of bad things can happen when you have lots of moral realists
and a
> conflict. If they were moral skeptics they likely wouldn't be as dogmatic
and
> as self-rightous and such, and it would lead to a more peaceful situation,
> perhaps.
How is that? The skeptics are the ones who think they just do whatever they
want, and no one has any rights. The skeptics are the ones who think reason
has no place in moral disputes. What is left for resolving them, then, but
force?
Adolf Hitler is a good example of a moral anti-realist. So was Stalin.
(Peikoff documented this sort of thing in _The Ominous Parallels.)
> >Does it make any real difference in peoples lives if they do allow
> >themselves to be influenced by your theory?
>
> I can immagine people for whom it would. I bet it'd change Owl's life, for
> instance, since his moral realism seems to be an important part of his
> philosophy.
Sure, I'd stop trying to reason about what people should do, and stop trying
to respect people's rights. Say, User, I wonder when you're going to start
ignoring people's putative 'rights', since there really aren't any such
things?
> >Will they achieve
> >more or less goals, do you think?
>
> Who knows.
Well, they would get different goals (as above).
Joe Durnavich
>Joe Durnavich <jo...@mcs.net> wrote in message
>news:f4o00tkq0iof7vpd6...@4ax.com...
>> Your use of "ought" here is superfluous. "Ought" means "do for a
>> reason."
>
>That sounds odd. "You ought to return the book to the library" then means
>"You do return the book to the library for a reason"? I don't think so.
>
>I think what you wanted to say here, which is true, is this:
>"reason why S ought to do A" means "reason for S to do A." Thus, "there are
>no reasons why anyone ought to do anything" implies "There are no reasons
>for doing anything."
Yes, that was what I was trying to say.
>> Your argument is that ultimately there are no reasons to do
>> anything. Thus, your argument implies that there are no reasons to
>> draw your conclusion--or any conclusion for that matter.
>
>Right. "There are no reasons for doing anything" implies "there are no
>reasons for believing User." By the way, there are some philosophers who
>believe the former -- the Popperites. David Miller wrote a book in which he
>defended that position. I once read a review of it. It started, "There are
>no good reasons for reading David Miller's book."
I didn't intend to get User upset. Human life is nothing but "doing"
and I think User unintentionally disqualified reason from playing any
significant role in that doing.
--
Joe Durnavich
Joe Durnavich
>> >>As far as 3, it can be used to guide you to achieving your goals, but it
>> >just
>> >>can't tell you which goals to achieve.
>> >
>> >Well, there you go. I don't think moral realism expects much
>> >more from morality.
>
>Hm, well, maybe not.
I was trying to be sneaky here. We do, I think, awaken morally
somewhere in the young-adult to adult stage already somewhere in life
with a set of tentative goals. I think that in the process of sorting
things out and developing plans that you will change some goals and
certainly identify and set many new ones required to achieve the
initial goals. And as you progress, opportunities increase, and new
goals become apparent, or new ways to achieve your initial goals.
I may be wrong about this, but it seems once you start using to reason
to go after what you want, you commit yourself to moral realism.
--
Joe Durnavich