Here is one of my recent posts:
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Some time ago, way back in the last millennium, I came across a site for
an "Institute of Ethics." This being my area of interest, I took some
time to surf around and came across an interview with the founder. Not
too far into it, the founder discussed one of the moral conundrums that
exemplified the problems his institute handled. This was some years ago
so I can't remember the exact wording, but I do remember the concepts
involved and here it is:
Suppose your neighbor knocks at your door and you let him in. He
explains there is a hit man trying to kill him. He asks you to hide him
and, being a moral person, you do. A few minutes later, there is another
knock at your door. It is the hit man. You know who it is because your
neighbor gave you a good description. The hit man tells you he has
dropped in to visit your neighbor who doesn't seem to be at home at the
moment. Then he asks you the Important Question: "Do you know where he is?"
This is the supposed conundrum: do you tell the murderer a lie which
would mean your neighbor's life would be saved or do you tell the truth
which means your neighbor dies?
I read part-way through the convoluted explanation of how it was morally
acceptable to commit a minor moral evil (lie) in order to prevent a
greater moral evil (murder). I lost interest at that point and went on
to whatever else I was doing. I figured if the founder of this Ethics
Institute was so confused about simple moral principles, there was
undoubtedly little of interest at the site.
Whenever I'm asked, "What is your moral code?" I am always happy to
answer. Then I wait. Many times, the other person will detect a weakness
in the code and ask a hypothetical question to have me clarify -- or to
illustrate how the code has a fatal flaw. The details of the question
differ slightly but the general form is this: "Suppose in order to
prevent [a major moral infraction such as murder] you have to [commit a
minor moral infraction such as stealing a loaf of bread]. How does your
morality handle that?"
Sometimes the options differ only by a matter of scale: "Suppose in
order to prevent [a major moral infraction on a large scale such as the
killing of many innocent people] you have to [commit the same major
moral infraction but on a smaller scale such as killing only one or two
innocent people]."
The fact that I can write these questions in a general form means they
can be asked of any moral code. Is there any moral code that can
suitably answer such questions?
The problem with these questions is the assumption that the morality of
an act can be judged without reference to context -- in other words, an
act is moral or immoral intrinsically, without regard to circumstances
or context. However, like common words, meaning depends on context. If
you see a word such as riddle, for example, and try to give the
"correct" definition without knowing in what context the word is used,
you will find it a perplexing riddle and any defense of whichever
definition you choose will be riddled with flaws. So it is when judging
acts.
Is killing a person morally bad...or good? There is no way to determine
that because the question is asked in a way that does not establish context.
Take the Fort Hood shootings. On one side you have Major Nidal Malik,
who shot over 40 people (as of this writing, 13 have died) and on the
other side you have police Sgt. Kimberly Munley, who shot Malik (as of
this writing Malik is alive but in critical condition). Two people at
the same location at the same time and both perform the same act --
shooting someone. Each one, however, acted in a different context and
that allows us to judge that one was performing a moral good while the
other was performing a moral evil.
If killing can be a moral good if done in the right context, then how is
it that lying is always wrong?
The answer, of course, is that lying is not always wrong. Actions are
not intrinsically right or wrong. There is no way around it, morality
requires judgment.
Whether you are doing something morally good or morally bad, there are
two ways you can act, directly or indirectly. A hit man can kill an
innocent person -- he acts directly. The one who hires the hit man acts
indirectly. Both are guilty of murder. However, the hit man may pay a
cop to provide him with necessary information to make the murder
possible. In legal parlance, this is aiding and abetting and is
generally considered a crime if somewhat lower than the crime that was
committed.
In the moral sphere, to act immorally you can commit evil, you can
instigate evil or you can cooperate with evil (or interfere with good).
To act morally you can commit good, you can instigate good or you can
cooperate with good (or interfere with evil).
Doing nothing is an act. It may also be judged as moral or immoral
depending on the context. If doing nothing allows evil to be done, or
prevents good from being done, then it is morally wrong. So refusing to
act (not getting involved) is not always the morally safe decision.
So where does that put us when the hit man knocks at our door and asks
us where his intended victim is hiding? We are not pulling the trigger,
so we will not be performing the evil; we did not hire the hit man so we
are not instigating the evil; but if we answer the question truthfully,
we will be cooperating with the evil, aiding and abetting the evil,
permitting the evil to take place.
In this case, lying (interfering with evil) is the only moral course --
telling the truth would be immoral.
I anticipate some criticism that this concept, that an act is not
intrinsically good or bad but determined by context, will be seen as the
same thing as situational ethics, or the end justifies the means. Such a
conclusion would be wrong, however, which I will explain in more detail
in another column.
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--
Tomm Catt
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In
practice, there is.
>
> The answer, of course, is that lying is not always wrong. Actions are not
> intrinsically right or wrong. There is no way around it, morality requires
> judgment.
This is the single biggest sticking point for many. To them, morality has no
meaning other than mindless conformity to a set of commandments from a
higher authority. In fact, morality is a set of values, not a list of
actions. Values are always context dependent, as your example of the
shooters points out. However, the mental leap, from conformity to orders
regardless of context, to a reality based set of life sustaining values,
that demand rational application to context, is a leap very few have made.
--
Arnold
> I now have a gig. I'm writing for "The Examiner"! The url for my page is
> http://www.examiner.com/x-26551-Phoenix-Freethought-Examiner
> so come over and visit now and then. I just started so there are only a
> few columns but I hope they're interesting. I'm aiming at a couple of
> posts a week.
Nice, Tomm, very nice. Good job!! We could certainly use more people
who ain't afraid to call a spade a spade, and who don't shirnk away from
moral judgment.
I print hit and miss here and there, but the Philadelphia Bulletin runs me
regular every Sunday. Come pay me a visit!!
Keep up the great work!! Ongoing links would be greatly appreciated...
Brad Harrington
> Some time ago, way back in the last millennium, I came across a site for
> an "Institute of Ethics." This being my area of interest, I took some
> time to surf around and came across an interview with the founder. Not
> too far into it, the founder discussed one of the moral conundrums that
> exemplified the problems his institute handled. This was some years ago
> so I can't remember the exact wording, but I do remember the concepts
> involved and here it is:
>
> Suppose your neighbor knocks at your door
Suppose you could present a moral code with respect to whatever it is
you are describing before presenting a far-fetched and rather
irrelevant hypohetical situation.
Suppose I said that the sum total of my moral code is: What is the
sound of one hand clapping? Do you suppose that I would suppose you
were a bit of fool for believing anything I had to say?
> "Suppose in order to
> prevent [a major moral infraction such as murder] you have to [commit a
> minor moral infraction such as stealing a loaf of bread]. How does your
> morality handle that?"
>
See how this getting-to-the-point saves us all a lot of wasted time?
> Sometimes the options differ only by a matter of scale: "Suppose in
> order to prevent [a major moral infraction on a large scale such as the
> killing of many innocent people] you have to [commit the same major
> moral infraction but on a smaller scale such as killing only one or two
> innocent people]."
>
> The fact that I can write these questions in a general form means they
> can be asked of any moral code. Is there any moral code that can
> suitably answer such questions?
Yes. What would be in your long-term best interests? Would it
*really* be in your best interest to kill anyone on a conjecture?
>
> The problem with these questions is the assumption that the morality of
> an act can be judged without reference to context -- in other words, an
> act is moral or immoral intrinsically, without regard to circumstances
> or context.
Fine. Leave it here and forget the rest of what you said. As I just
pointed out: is it really in your best interest to kill anyone based
on a conjecture (the context here containing uncertainty)? The problem
with every hypothetical moral situtation is the assumption of
omniscient certainty rather than *contextual* certainty.. <Suppose
you do this-and-that and your mother dies.> Well, how is the
information of that consequence absolutely certain? The word
"hypothetical" itself refers to something not yet verified, but the
moral "hypothetical" contains a statement of absolute truth (the
mother will die if you do something).
> Is killing a person morally bad...or good? There is no way to determine
> that because the question is asked in a way that does not establish context.
>
Yes, However, more to the point: *all* human understanding is
contextual. That is why to understand morality, one must establish
how a man comes to understand.anything Kant, Hume, Locke do this, and
their moral codes fail because of their misunderstanding of human
understanding.
> Take the Fort Hood shootings.
And you were doing so well . . . The only moral lesson from Ft Hood:
is it moral to value cultural diversity over effective national
defense? What is the value of cultural diversity, as a matter of
fact? Raise the stakes even more: should an infidel country ban the
practice of Islam and harass and persecute all muslims? Comme ci,
comme �a Saudia Arabia!
"Each one, however, acted in a different context and
that allows us to judge that one was performing a moral good while the
other was performing a moral evil."
Are you sure you are not confusing their contexts with "our" context
(whatever that might be)?
I wonder if maybe you should have said,
"Each one, however, acted in a different context and
that allowed each man to decide that he was performing a moral good."
But if your point is that moral contexts prove objectivism wrong I
certainly agree.
Absolutely not! I do not seek to evade reality. There is no "your"
context or "my" context or "that guy over there's" context. There is
only context.
Two people at the same place at the same time and both shoot each other.
The fact that one was desired to kill as many people as possible for the
cause of his religion and the other desired to prevent a killer from
killing more people explains their actions, but do not justify either.
The context was not one that justified killing everyone around you, as
the man attempted to do. His actions altered the context so that now it
was justified to kill him, which is what the woman attempted to do. The
context did not justify him shooting her, but it did justify her
shooting him.
The motives I mentioned are guesses. But the actions were unjustified
(and therefore evil) and justified (and therefore good) even if he was
trying to get out of being shipped overseas and she was just trying to
do a good enough job to get a promotion. The moral outcome is
indifferent to their motives, their intentions, their goals.
> But if your point is that moral contexts prove objectivism wrong I
> certainly agree.
Your desire to "prove Objectivism wrong" may explain why you misconstrue
what I said, but does not justify it. I have done no such thing.
Sorry.
So why play with hypotheticals? This sounds like you're trying to
justify lying; there is no need for it, it would only postpone the
murder, and it possibly piss the hit man off. You could say something
like you have just called the cops, you have a gun, or you're an
Objectivist.
Whether an act is "right or wrong" by anyone else's view is really
unimportant.
I don't see how you arrive at that. Up to this point, I have
deliberately avoided a general discussion on values, electing to use
only killing and lying, two values close enough to being universally
accepted that my main point would get across without getting bogged down.
My point was that, no matter what values your morality claims, values do
not hold across all contexts. Killing is not always murder. Lying is not
always fraud. Inflicting pain is not always torture. War is sometimes
the answer.
A discussion of specific values will come later.
> Whether an act is "right or wrong" by anyone else's view is really
> unimportant.
This is a statement affirming moral relativity, which is not a
conclusion anyone could make based on what I wrote.
In thinking about it, I can see where you may be thinking contextually.
But you are claiming the ability to regard only your personal context
with complete disregard of the objective context around you. Morality is
only necessary in a social (more than one person) situation, so claiming
absolute authority to establish the context is, besides being quite
arrogant, not a right you can claim.
It would still be moral relativity. Only instead of saying "I define
what is right and wrong" you'd be saying "I define the context." Same thing.
--
Tomm Catt
http://www.examiner.com/x-26551-Phoenix-Freethought-Examiner
Morality is necessary to living life; if you can't claim to know what
is good for you, and what is bad for you, you can not make a rational
decision. Our values determine morality. I think you're confusing
morals with ethics.
I do claim the arrogant position that I can always do what I think is
right for me based off of what I value and my code of morals. If I
made the decision based on society I'd be valuing society more than my
own mind, and subjecting my will to the brainless zombie of society.
If your willing to act against your own morals, you will suffer the
consequences.
Lets frame this in a different light. I drink every now and then,
usually to celebrate a completed project or a special occasion; not an
every day occurrence. I hate drinking. It goes against everything I
stand for; the ability to make a well reasoned decision. Every time I
drink I get severely depressed the next day, and hate the hangover. I
hate myself for allowing myself to make such a stupid decision, all to
talk to people that I don't care about and to do nothing of any value
whatsoever. When I drink, I feel as though I've lost a day and a night
of my life, and I hate it.
Those are the instant moral consequences caused by acting against my
own morality, with nobody elses decision involved. I chose to drink. I
suffered the consequences. I knew beforehand that the decision that I
was making was incorrect and against my morals, and I chose to do it
anyway; I acted against reason.
Moral relativity is a redundant term. All morals have to be subject to
each individual's values, because it's from our values that we derive
our moral code.
I'll quit ranting on.
As Dr. Ducky explained it, ethics is where you do the right thing
because you don't want to get into trouble and morality is where you do
the right thing because its the right thing to do.
But you are claiming preeminence of one side of a feedback loop. If you
need to know what is good or bad for you before you make a rational
decision, how did you arrive at the knowledge of what was good or bad
for you? Are values instinctual? Are they imparted to us from a mystical
moral agent?
> I do claim the arrogant position that I can always do what I think is
> right for me based off of what I value and my code of morals. If I
> made the decision based on society I'd be valuing society more than my
> own mind, and subjecting my will to the brainless zombie of society.
> If your willing to act against your own morals, you will suffer the
> consequences.
Of course we act based on our values. How could we do otherwise and
remain free agents? It was the other claim that anyone else's view is
unimportant that is the problem. Morality is predominantly about how we
act toward each other -- how we treat each other. When you start out
with the idea that other people are inconsequential, are irrelevant to
how you act, then I really don't see how you can arrive at any objective
moral code. Other people exist. They are objective things that must be
accounted for.
Your claim that you must consider only yourself or be subjecting your
will "to the brainless zombie of society" is a false choice.
A morality that is completely self-centered is narcissism. A morality
that is completely society-centered is collectivism. We are not worlds
within ourselves nor are we mindless drones of the collective. We are
self-directed individuals living in a group of other self-directed
individuals. We act according to our values, but our values had better
recognize that other people exist and are acting according to their
values. Good values must consider the context in which we spend our
lives and society makes up a significant part of that context.
Otherwise our actions will be seen as a danger to society and society
will treat us accordingly. This would not be conducive to our long-term
survival -- generally, in any struggle against errant individuals,
society wins.
This is not subjugating your will to others nor others subjugating their
will to you. This is simply recognizing the fact that in a society of
traders, of free people, the other members of that society are due the
consideration and respect you desire for yourself.
> Those are the instant moral consequences caused by acting against my
> own morality, with nobody elses decision involved. I chose to drink. I
> suffered the consequences. I knew beforehand that the decision that I
> was making was incorrect and against my morals, and I chose to do it
> anyway; I acted against reason.
Let's hope that when you drink you refrain from driving or anything else
that may get other people unwillingly involved with your decision. If
so, then your values already /do/ take other peoples needs and values
into consideration. That's all I mean.
> Moral relativity is a redundant term. All morals have to be subject to
> each individual's values, because it's from our values that we derive
> our moral code.
And it's from reality that we derive our values -- assuming we have
objective values. A significant part of that reality is the society in
which we live. We shouldn't bow to society, but we can't pretend it's
not there.
> Moral relativity is a redundant term. All morals have to be subject to
> each individual's values, because it's from our values that we derive
> our moral code.
You guys are talking past each other, maybe.
"Moral relativity" or the more common "moral
relativism" usually means (to most people)
the idea that there's no independent, objective
measure of morality. But of course there is.
Yes, that independent objective standard is the
individual himself...whether taken as his life, his
survival, his happiness, whatever.
So it's personal in that sense, but still not subjective
because the individual's appraisal of the matter is not
the determining factor of what the truth is.
The truth is that the standard must be individually
oriented because the individual is the only sort of
entity which renders meaning to morality in the
first place. And yes, as you both seem to believe,
among the facts by which a person must live is
the fact that there are many more like him, at least
in this particular respect.
I'd say that historically, the mistake is usually less
that individuals recognize that they themselves are
the ultimate repository for all morality, but they
refuse to accept that therefore, they are also the
ultimate standard of it. IOW people aren't doing
the wrong thing trying to figure out what their
morality ought to be, but they very consistently
come up with the wrong answer!
jk
I see the problem. I over simplified my position; let me clarify.
When I state that "Others opinions don't really matter" or something
to the effect, what I meant was that I don't want to associate with
people that don't regard their own life as the most important thing in
their own life. I am willing to value people that are willing to act
in their own best interest. Sometimes it is in my own best interest to
act for another person's benefit, but only if I value the other
person. However, it would be perfectly acceptable for me to not help
save another person's life if the risk to my own life were too great.
I would not save a bum on the street from getting stabbed if it meant
that I could get stabbed. I would be willing to attempt it for a
productive person.
Other individuals are necessary in my life to do the work that I want
to do. I value them to this extent. I don't act as if nobody exists
because other people do exist. I won't simply conform to the ethics of
the society that I live in if it contradicts my morals though.
You are still confusing morals and ethics, however. If I act in a
manner just to be acceptable to society, I'm acting based on the
ethics of that society, not on my morals. And yes, I must necessarily
value my own life above all else. That doesn't mean there aren't
things in my life that I'd rather die than do without; a loved one, a
productive job, private property, etc.
No, it simply means that morality is not analytic. Something
can be relatively objective without being analytic.
> Yes, that independent objective standard is the
> individual himself...whether taken as his life, his
> survival, his happiness, whatever.
>
But that is correctly identified as being narcissistic. One
must explain that away with ... the fifth chapter of "ITOE",
and it's axiomatic fibre.
not that I think it can be done better*, you understand, but
that always a process of judgement, which is fallible,
is necessary.
*but hope springs....
> So it's personal in that sense, but still not subjective
> because the individual's appraisal of the matter is not
> the determining factor of what the truth is.
>
But there's no map there. The individual only has
his appraisal. In practice, this is is good
enough. Mostly. But let's not anneal it into a
revealed truth. The problem is that... the "error
bars" are wildly divergent.
To be specific - Ace Greenberg's firm, Bear Stearns,
literally bet the farm every night. They had to have
repo financing daily, because that reduced the
cost of capital, which made him more money.
Until the true cost of that came to light, he couldn't
possibly *calculate* the actual cost. Which was
substantial. he was literally performing a Randian
"sacrifice" - the trading of a greater value ( the
firm) for a lesser one ( mo' money ).
This is what is behind Greenspan's "Mea Culpa", his
retraction of his 1963 Objectivist paper that
self-interest is to be trusted. And one suspects that
even if Greenberg had had wise counsel, he would have
done nothing about it. He'll have to be content with the
few billions in the sofa cushions.
Brutally, the guy was second-handing Greenspan. No
Midas Mulligan, he. Hubris, she is a woman, the sort
a million country songs are written about...
> The truth is that the standard must be individually
> oriented because the individual is the only sort of
> entity which renders meaning to morality in the
> first place. And yes, as you both seem to believe,
> among the facts by which a person must live is
> the fact that there are many more like him, at least
> in this particular respect.
>
> I'd say that historically, the mistake is usually less
> that individuals recognize that they themselves are
> the ultimate repository for all morality, but they
> refuse to accept that therefore, they are also the
> ultimate standard of it. IOW people aren't doing
> the wrong thing trying to figure out what their
> morality ought to be, but they very consistently
> come up with the wrong answer!
>
Well said. But GIGO.
>
> jk
--
Les Cargill
Right, this is a very important point; the difference between subjective and
personal. 'Personal' can still be objective, while 'subjective' obviously
cannot be.
For example, someone who loves (values) the game of baseball, would value
meeting one of it's greatest players more than an opera singer who was
equally famous, if his favorite music was bluegrass. That is a personal, yet
objective decision based on his values.
Arnold
> Right, this is a very important point; the difference between subjective and
> personal. 'Personal' can still be objective, while 'subjective' obviously
> cannot be.
> For example, someone who loves (values) the game of baseball, would value
> meeting one of it's greatest players more than an opera singer who was
> equally famous, if his favorite music was bluegrass. That is a personal, yet
> objective decision based on his values.
So objective decisions can be made on the basis of subjective
preferences? There is a difference between a personal morality and the
context of social constraints but this difference can be minimized by
restricting the size of the social group.