The great theft
Acar
"Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words, concept
s and
other epistemological processes. We have to use these even to communicate the
metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't mean a person cannot grasp "existence
exists" AND that it would continue to do so, even if no human consciousness
remained."
There is an inadvertent equivocation in the above statement. Words communicate
concepts and would be meaningless if separated from them. The above statement
becomes obviously problematic when it is corrected for that equivalence. Now it
says that we have to use those concepts (epistemological) even to visualize
metaphysical primaries. which means; "We can not conceptualize metaphysical
primaries as such." Will someone tell me why this is not prima facie valid
ation
of Kantian epistemology?
Carmichael
Jay Allen
wsranger.com>...
The quote said "communicate". You changed "communicate" to "visualize"
(and then "visualize" to "conceptualize" - two different processes).
In addition, this sounds like it's from the appendix of ItOE, edited
and published after her death, so I wouldn't put much stock in it.
The real question for Objectivist metaphysics is whether anything of
philosophical value flows from Rand's axioms, and whether her
description of the alternative view - the Primacy of Consciousness -
is an accurate rendering of her opponents' positions. On both
questions, the answer is a loud, embarrassing No.
-J-
Dave O'Hearn
> Will someone tell me why this is not prima facie validation of Kantian
> epistemology?
I don't see why anyone should bother. You have provided a quote that
may or may not be from Ayn Rand, and you don't even know yourself, as
you quoted it off another posting in this newsgroup. You can't provide
a useful cite for the quote, and you didn't provide one for the
posting you pulled it from.
Really, there is no point thinking about the quote at all. It's on
something very fundamental in metaphysics, and you cannot get a handle
on any philosopher's metaphysics without reading at least a lengthy
essay on it.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Dean Sandin
> From a recent post I extracted the following quotation by Ayn Rand:
>
> "Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words, concept
> s and
> other epistemological processes. We have to use these even to communicate the
> metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't mean a person cannot grasp "exis
> tence
> exists" AND that it would continue to do so, even if no human consciousness
> remained."
This is a botch or a fraud. A search of the Objectivism Research
CD-ROM reveals _no_ such quote. I checked "even to communicate",
"metaphysical primaries", "concepts and other", and "entails using".
--Dean
Ken Gardner
> "Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words,
> concepts and other epistemological processes. We have to use these
> even to communicate the metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't
> mean a person cannot grasp "existence exists" AND that it would
> continue to do so, even if no human consciousness remained."
> There is an inadvertent equivocation in the above statement. Words
> communicate concepts and would be meaningless if separated from
> them. The above statement becomes obviously problematic when it
> is corrected for that equivalence. Now it says that we have to
> use those concepts (epistemological) even to visualize metaphysical
> primaries. which means; "We can not conceptualize metaphysical
> primaries as such." Will someone tell me why this is not prima
> facie validation of Kantian epistemology?
I have now read this question five times and still don't understand
it. I give up. Or maybe you should restate the problem with the
quote as you see it.
My only other comment is that Rand's statement is clearly true; we
are certainly capable of grasping, conceptually, that existence
exists and that it exists independently of our consciousness -- which
is what she is essentially saying here.
--
Ken
Acar
I'm still not discouraged from my objection to Rand's attempt to "communicate"
metaphysical concepts. In order to communicate you must use words. Words stand
for concepts. Also, you can not visualize without conceptualizing. I substi
tuted
the words to bring out the implications. The conclusion seems inevitable:
so-called metaphysical facts can can not be conceptualized as such. That they
can only be communicated about by means of epistemological concepts is a
tautology, but IMO it is an important admission. It pulls away the rug from
making direct characterizations of the "metaphysical". Kant said it first.
What got me started on this was when weeks ago I was attempting to compose a
reply to Betsy Speicher about how a "metaphysical" relationship can be
identified. (You see I was trying to do it too!) I had a terrible time finding
language to characterize the metaphysical concepts in the least possible amount
of epistemologic terms. For the moon I said "A". For the Earth I said "B". For
the moon's orbital motion I ended up saying: "kinetic activity according to its
nature". It was clear to me that this was a compromise and that there is no
language available outside of our way of knowing things (epistemology). From no
language to no concept was a short step.
Carmichel
Acar
You are too quick to cry fraud, although I understand your concern if the s
earch
came back empty. The quote was published by Kent Christiansen on June 14, 2000
in a reply on a thread, subject "Even now Speicher continues to struggle with
truth." Kent says that the quote is from ITOE chapter 4.
There is the following reference number on the Google post:
2000061317...@mail13.bigmailbox.com
Of course more important is whether the issue is real, regardless of the quote.
Carmichael
>--Dean
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Dean Sandin
> In article <3B71B45F...@bellsouth.net>, Dean Sandin says...
> >
> >Acar wrote:
> >
> >> From a recent post I extracted the following quotation by Ayn Rand:
> >>
> >> "Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words, co
> >> ncept
> >> s and
> >> other epistemological processes. We have to use these even to communicat
> >> e the
> >> metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't mean a person cannot grasp "exis
> >> tence
> >> exists" AND that it would continue to do so, even if no human consciou
> >> sness
> >> remained."
> >
> >This is a botch or a fraud. A search of the Objectivism Research
> >CD-ROM reveals _no_ such quote. I checked "even to communicate",
> >"metaphysical primaries", "concepts and other", and "entails using".
>
> You are too quick to cry fraud, although I understand your concern if the s
> earch
> came back empty.
The search coming back empty is _proof_, not just cause for
concern.
And I said fraud was one possibility. I listed it second on
purpose, precisely so as to not be too quick.
> The quote was published by Kent Christiansen on June 14, 2000
> in a reply on a thread, subject "Even now Speicher continues to struggle with
> truth." Kent says that the quote is from ITOE chapter 4.
I'm willing to accept that he said it. But that's not worth a
whole lot. At best it would be his rewording and substituted
ideas.
> Of course more important is whether the issue is real, regardless of the
> quote.
No. It was put forth as worthy of discussion because Ayn Rand
was (falsely) said to have said it. Someone else's pastiche or
or hoax is hardly a basis for arguing Ayn Rand's meaning.
--Dean
Ken Gardner
> > The quote was published by Kent Christiansen on June 14, 2000
> > in a reply on a thread, subject "Even now Speicher continues to
> > struggle with truth." Kent says that the quote is from ITOE
> > Chapter 4.
> I'm willing to accept that he said it. But that's not worth a
> whole lot. At best it would be his rewording and substituted
> ideas.
Both of you are wrong. The quote does indeed appear in a June 14,
2000 post by Kent Christiansen -- but the words are KENT'S words, not
Ayn Rand's words.
It took me about a minute to confirm this fact on Google, and I
hadn't even used its search features before.
Methinks both of you owe Kent an apology.
--
Ken
Kent
wrote:
> The quote was published by Kent Christiansen on June 14, 2000
>in a reply on a thread, subject "Even now Speicher continues to struggle with
>truth." Kent says that the quote is from ITOE chapter 4.
>There is the following reference number on the Google post:
>2000061317...@mail13.bigmailbox.com
Carmichael,
If you went to the trouble of looking up the post, why didn't you note
that it isn't a Rand quote, which are contained in the quotation
marks. My comments were addressing how discussion of this stuff is
going to be 'epistemological' by virtue of the nature of 'discussion'.
That is all that was intended to convey. You are not just taking
things out of context, to make some obscure point, (as on the other
thread), you are now wrongly attributing statements. Cut it out.
For others that got hooked, here is the note:
BEGIN POST
In article <2000061317...@mail3.bigmailbox.com>,
Jell O <fen...@anonymous.to> wrote:
> For my benefit, use this "truth" (1) or
> metaphysical truth in my formulation) in a sentence
> other than something similar in meaning to "X is true
> or X is false even if nobody knows it" or "this state,
> condition or existent exists independent of a human
> knower."
I'm sure Ken will have some answer, but I would present this for
consideration:(from ITOE, chap 4)
[note: this chapter goes over various categories of concepts and this
statement is under "..concepts of consciousness..." "These are
concepts pertaining to the *products* of psychological processes, such
as "knowledge," "science," "idea," etc."]:
""It is important to note that these concepts are not the equivalent
of their existential content - and that they belong to the category of
epistemological concepts, with their metaphysical components regarded
as their content. For instance, the concept "the science of physics"
is not the same thing as the physical phenomena which are the content
of the science. The phenomena exist independent of man's knowledge:
the science is an organized body of knowledge about these phenomena,
acquired by and communicable to a human consciousness. The phenomena
would continue to exist, even if no human conscioiusness remained in
existence; the science would not."
Note also, that "the science of physics" is just one example, such
would be true of all phenomena of all concepts in this category. This,
of course, is not saying that any concepts *about the phenomena*,
exist *in* the metaphysical components, independent of man's
knowledge, as that would be intrinsicism. But just the perception that
certain referents either correspond, or do not, with the metaphysical
components in reality, isn't intrinsicism, either. While it may be
confusing,(considering 'truth' is an epistemological term), I don't
think it is entirely improper to use the terms 'true' or 'false' to
denote the correspondence of facts in reality at the metaphysical
level.
Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words,
concepts and other epistemological processes. We have to use these
even to communicate the metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't mean
a person cannot grasp "existence exists" AND that it would continue to
do so, even if no human consciousness remained.
Kent Christiansen
END POST
Kent
Dave O'Hearn
>
> This is a botch or a fraud. A search of the Objectivism Research
> CD-ROM reveals _no_ such quote. I checked "even to communicate",
> "metaphysical primaries", "concepts and other", and "entails using".
The quote belongs to Kent Christiansen from this newsgroup, and it
dates to 2000/06/14. (!!)
Carmichael might have simply misunderstood, as Christiansen was
quoting from Ayn Rand two paragraphs above the one quoted here, but
since he puts so little effort into understanding, I won't give him
the benefit of the doubt.
--
Dave O'Hearn
Ken Gardner
> If you went to the trouble of looking up the post, why didn't you note
> that it isn't a Rand quote, which are contained in the quotation
> marks.
Initially I was taken in by that quote as well, but later I got
suspicious and eventually figured out that it wasn't actually a Rand
quote. Which makes no difference to me -- your statement, correctly
understood, is as true now as it was then.
--
Ken
Ted
>>(and then "visualize" to "conceptualize" - two different processes).
>>In addition, this sounds like it's from the appendix of ItOE, edited
>>and published after her death, so I wouldn't put much stock in it.
I think this was an extremely good counterpoint.
>I'm still not discouraged from my objection to Rand's attempt to "communicate"
>metaphysical concepts. In order to communicate you must use words.
What about diagrams? What about physically dragging someone to observe the
phenomenon first hand?
>Words stand for concepts.
True.
>Also, you can not visualize without conceptualizing.
A dog probably can see a picture of his "bowl filled with his favorite stuff
from a can" when he's hungry. So visualization without conceptualization
is not an impossibility. But you weren't referring to animals. I think the
question is, does it hold for humans?
I substituted
>the words to bring out the implications. The conclusion seems inevitable:
>so-called metaphysical facts can not be conceptualized as such. That they
>can only be communicated about by means of epistemological concepts is a
>tautology,
True. If two intelligent people do not share a common language, that would
constitute a formidable obsticle in communication, but not necessarily an
insurmountable one.
but IMO it is an important admission. It pulls away the rug from
>making direct characterizations of the "metaphysical". Kant said it first.
Kant? Who he is?
>What got me started on this was when weeks ago I was attempting to compose
a
>reply to Betsy Speicher about how a "metaphysical" relationship can be
>identified. (You see I was trying to do it too!) I had a terrible time finding
>language to characterize the metaphysical concepts in the least possible
amount
>of epistemologic terms. For the moon I said "A". For the Earth I said "B".
For
>the moon's orbital motion I ended up saying: "kinetic activity according
to its
>nature". It was clear to me that this was a compromise and that there is
no
>language available outside of our way of knowing things (epistemology).
Carmichael, you do yourself a terrible injustice. Just as Martin Luther was
thoroughly convinced of his spiritual inadequacies, you are overly critical
of the knowledge you possess.
From no
>language to no concept was a short step.
But there are many languages. So it would follow, there are many concepts.
But the words used aren't episomologically perfect. Then why haven't we aba
ndoned
this ridiculous practice eons ago? Let's return to the caves.
Ted
Jay Allen
2...@bellsouth.net>...
You're right - it's a quote from a post by Kent Christiansen:
http://groups.google.com/groups?q=+%22necessarily+entails+using+words%22+gr
oup:humanities.philosophy.objectivism&hl=en&safe=off&rnum=2&selm=8i6nuv%24t
f2%241%40nnrp1.deja.com
It's the last paragraph. Kent wrote it, not Ayn Rand.
-J-
Acar
>
>On Thu, 9 Aug 2001 00:27:34 +0000 (UTC), Acar <acar...@mail.com>
>wrote:
>
>
>> The quote was published by Kent Christiansen on June 14, 2000
>>in a reply on a thread, subject "Even now Speicher continues to struggle with
>>truth." Kent says that the quote is from ITOE chapter 4.
>>There is the following reference number on the Google post:
>>2000061317...@mail13.bigmailbox.com
>
>Carmichael,
>
>If you went to the trouble of looking up the post, why didn't you note
>that it isn't a Rand quote, which are contained in the quotation
>marks.
I apologize to all for the misattribution. The haste with which I have been
doing these things is getting me in trouble but of course haste is no excuse. I
am just lucky that there is no fine or jail time.
I saw this quote some time ago. It was preceded by a quote and I missed the end
of the quote. I cut and pasted it to WORD at the time, and this time I used it
from there. When Dean questioned it I felt that I should document it and was
quite depressed at the amount of time that this could take. I was happy to find
it fairly quickly in a Google search and as soon as I spotted I did not bother
to read. I just copied the reference data of the article and got out. HOWEVER
As I said in my reply to Dean, I have raised a point which could and would have
been addressed without the quote. The authenticity of the attribution is not a
critical issue because your words correctly represented the necessity to use
epistemological devices to communicate metaphysical facts. Not just Rand but
every Objectivist in this board would agree with your words, which are not just
Objectivism, but common sense. So, after offering well earned apologies I
request that the focus be changed from the misattribution to the content of the
argument.
>My comments were addressing how discussion of this stuff is
>going to be 'epistemological' by virtue of the nature of 'discussion'.
>That is all that was intended to convey. You are not just taking
>things out of context, to make some obscure point, (as on the other
>thread), you are now wrongly attributing statements. Cut it out.
That sounds very authoritative but it bypasses the argument, which is of course
a perfectly reasonable alternative open to all.
>For others that got hooked, here is the note:
I can not stress enough that the only thing that matters is the idea. Ideas
matter. The source does not add or detract value from an idea, ever. So there
was a misattribution but there is no hook. The argument is still on the table,
unchanged.
Carmichael
xx
x
xx
x
xx
Kent
wrote:
>In article <3b71ed44$0$1525$272e...@news.execpc.com>, Kent says...
>>If you went to the trouble of looking up the post, why didn't you note
>>that it isn't a Rand quote, which are contained in the quotation
>>marks.
>
>I apologize to all for the misattribution. The haste with which I have been
>doing these things is getting me in trouble but of course haste is no excu
>se. I
>am just lucky that there is no fine or jail time.
Apology accepted. You can argue the other stuff with Dean.
Kent
Acar
>
>Acar wrote:
>
>> In article <3B71B45F...@bellsouth.net>, Dean Sandin says...
>> >
>> >Acar wrote:
>> >
>> >> From a recent post I extracted the following quotation by Ayn Rand:
>> >>
>> >> "Further, any discussion by humans necessarily entails using words, co
>> >> ncept
>> >> s and
>> >> other epistemological processes. We have to use these even to communicat
>> >> e the
>> >> metaphysical primaries, but that doesn't mean a person cannot grasp "exis
>> >> tence
>> >> exists" AND that it would continue to do so, even if no human consciou
>> >> sness
>> >> remained."
>> >
>> >This is a botch or a fraud. A search of the Objectivism Research
>> >CD-ROM reveals _no_ such quote. I checked "even to communicate",
>> >"metaphysical primaries", "concepts and other", and "entails using".
>>
>> You are too quick to cry fraud, although I understand your concern if the s
>> earch
>> came back empty.
>
>The search coming back empty is _proof_, not just cause for
>concern.
Xcuse me!
>And I said fraud was one possibility. Someone else's pastiche or
>or hoax is hardly a basis for arguing Ayn Rand's meaning.
But even the mention of fraud or hoax shows that you are an asshole, doesn'
t it?
Carmichael
>--Dean
Gsnyquist
philosophical value flows from Rand's axioms, and whether her
description of the alternative view - the Primacy of Consciousness -
is an accurate rendering of her opponents' positions. On both
questions, the answer is a loud, embarrassing No. >>
But in some sense, it is worse than that. Rand thought of herself as a
"realist" philosopher, that is, she beleived in a reality existing
"independently" from consciousness--a reality, in other words, that would exist
whether we knew anything about it or not. Her axioms were meant as a sort of
"validation" of this "objective" reality. But here's the problem: a consistent
realist cannot have any axioms, so that Rand's attempt to defend realism with
axioms is self-defeating. For if reality exists independently of
consciousness, then all our knowledge must conform to reality, rather than
reality conforming to our ideas of it. For the realist, existence has the
priority, not merely "metaphysically," but epistemologically as well. Our
ideas, in short, must conform to reality, and not reality to our ideas. But if
you posit axioms, you have reversed the relationship. Suddenly, you're saying
that reality must conform to the axioms, which are ideas in the mind, and not
to the independent reality. It helps little to argue that the axioms are
"self-evident," because on the realist premise, there is no self-evidence. All
knowledge is conjectural and experimental, and one must be always open to
having one's knowledge tested against reality (no certainties allowed). So, in
a sense, one could describe Rand's position as somewhat Kantian, though,
instead of fixed categories, she has axioms.
GSN
John Alway
Gsnyquist <gsny...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:20010811001848...@mb-fq.aol.com...
> << The real question for Objectivist metaphysics is whether anything of
> philosophical value flows from Rand's axioms, and whether her
> description of the alternative view - the Primacy of Consciousness -
> is an accurate rendering of her opponents' positions. On both
> questions, the answer is a loud, embarrassing No. >>
> But in some sense, it is worse than that. Rand thought of herself as a
> "realist" philosopher, that is, she beleived in a reality existing
> "independently" from consciousness--a reality, in other words, that would
exist
> whether we knew anything about it or not. Her axioms were meant as a sort
of
> "validation" of this "objective" reality. But here's the problem: a
consistent
> realist cannot have any axioms, so that Rand's attempt to defend realism
with
> axioms is self-defeating. For if reality exists independently of
> consciousness, then all our knowledge must conform to reality, rather than
> reality conforming to our ideas of it.
The axioms are an affirmation of existence. They are the way by which a
mind can grasp the primacy of existence. So, I don't think your point
follows.
...John
Gsnyquist
<< The [objectivist] axioms are an affirmation of existence. They are the way
by which a
mind can grasp the primacy of existence. >>
The axioms are much more than that. They are affirmations that the primacy of
existence is a self-evident fact. It is this part of the affirmation that I
have a problem with. (I have no problem with the notion that existence is
"primary," by the way; but I'm not sure any other philosophy, including
idealism, really has a problem with it either. The question of debate between
idealists and realists is not over whether existence exists, but over what
exists and what is existence. But these questions are factual questions, and
as such, cannot be regarded as having a "self-evident" conclusion.)
The debate over whether axiomatic knowledge concerning matters of fact is a
debate between two forms of realism, the "direct" realism advocated by Rand and
Kelley, and the "critical" realism advocated by Lovejoy, Santayana, and Popper.
I simply believe that critical realism is the more consistent
position--consistent, that is, with the belief that reality exists
independently of the mind. If you believe in axioms, you believe in principles
which, because they are regarded as "self-evident," are used to interpret the
facts. This, however, seems to me as if you are forcing all your
interpretations of fact to square with the axioms. I regard this as an
incipient form of idealism which a truculent realist would be desirious of
avoiding.
Greg Nyquist
Ken Gardner
> The debate over whether axiomatic knowledge concerning matters of fact
> is a debate between two forms of realism, the "direct" realism
> advocated by Rand and Kelley, and the "critical" realism advocated by
> Lovejoy, Santayana, and Popper.
> I simply believe that critical realism is the more consistent
> position--consistent, that is, with the belief that reality exists
> independently of the mind.
Can you elaborate? How do you think "critical realism" is more consistent
with this belief than "direct realism?"
Ken
John Alway
> John Alway writes:
>
> << The [objectivist] axioms are an affirmation of existence. They are
the way
> by which a
> mind can grasp the primacy of existence. >>
>
> The axioms are much more than that. They are affirmations that the
primacy of
> existence is a self-evident fact.
This is true.
> It is this part of the affirmation that I
> have a problem with. (I have no problem with the notion that existence is
> "primary," by the way; but I'm not sure any other philosophy, including
> idealism, really has a problem with it either.
Sure they do. If your view is that you can't know existence, it can't
possibly be important to your thinking. Remember, Objectivism asserts that
you can know existence, and that your thinking should be in accordance with
it.
> The question of debate between
> idealists and realists is not over whether existence exists, but over what
> exists and what is existence.
I like to cut to the quick in cases like this. Objectivism affirms
that existence is the starting point, and that what you *perceive* is the
given, i.e. the starting point.
Objectivism also affirms that consciousness is dependent upon existence,
i.e. to be conscious you have to be conscious of something. Our minds can
not create existence.
The question "what is existence?" is one that can't be answered,
according to Objectivism. It's the given. That's all you can say about
it.
As to the question of "*what* exists?", that's a job for the specialized
sciences. All philosophers can say on the matter is that everything that
exists exists as something in particular, i.e. has an identity, and acts in
accordance with that identity, which is the foundation for logic.
> But these questions are factual questions, and
> as such, cannot be regarded as having a "self-evident" conclusion.)
Right you are, which is the value of the specialized sciences.
[...]
> I simply believe that critical realism is the more consistent
> position--consistent, that is, with the belief that reality exists
> independently of the mind. If you believe in axioms, you believe in
principles
> which, because they are regarded as "self-evident," are used to interpret
the
> facts.
I don't follow this at all. The axiom "existence exists" simply tells
you to open your eyes and deal with existence as it comes. It's
quintessentially important to deal with it! Any interpretations occur at
the conceptual, not perceptual level.
Also, keep in mind that the concept "fact" is a higher level concept.
Perceptions and then our conceptual integrations of them are our means of
discovering and knowing facts.
...John
George Dance
First of all, the quote says only that we have to use epistemological
concepts to discuss metaphysical primaries - so it does not validate
the idea that those concepts are necessary for us to grasp those
primaries. . Second, the quote does not say how we get those
epistemological concepts - so it does not validate the idea that those
concepts are a priori truths which exist in our minds independently of
experience. As those two ideas are integral to Kantian epistemology,
the quote does not validate Kantian epistemology.
Gsnyquist
< I have no problem with the notion that existence is
> "primary," by the way; but I'm not sure any other philosophy, including
> idealism, really has a problem with it either. >>
To which John replied:
<< Sure they do. If your view is that you can't know existence, it can't
possibly be important to your thinking. Remember, Objectivism asserts that
you can know existence, and that your thinking should be in accordance with
it. >>
In the first place, who on earth claims they can't "know" existence. At most,
what is claimed is that knowledge of certain aspects of existence is
"problematical" or that knowledge is never "perfect" or omniscient. And while
Objectivism asserts that you can know existence (which is a rather vague
statement), that does not follow logically from the axiom "existence exists."
The trouble with the concept of existence is that, until one determines what
exactly exists, it is an intolerably vague and empirically empty. It is this
vagueness where the trouble lies. The tendency is to confuse existence with
one's conception of existence. But even if one's concept of existence is
"true," this does not mean that the concept is identical with the reality. The
critical realist position is that our ideas are never "identical" with the
reality they represent. Knowledge, for the critical realist, is symbolic. It
is the representation of one plane of reality (the physical) in another (the
mental). These representations can never be axiomatic, because their truth is
discovered, not through deductive reasoning, but through observation, and all
observation is open to correction, as an police detective who routinely
interviews witnesses will acknowledge. Axioms only apply to ideal systems of
thought, e.g., mathematics and geometry. These ideal systems are only true
when they are exemplified in experience, as, for instance, in Einstien's famous
equation e=mc2. But e=mc2 is not true because it is founded on logic: it is
true because it is exemplified in reality. There are potentially an infinite
number of logical equations and syllogisms that are not true because they are
exemplified in reality.
The phrase "existence exists" is a mere tautology. It has little if any
empirical meaning. It only has meaning when a specific vision of existence is
incorporated into that concept. But when this occurs, the phrase is no longer
"self-evident." And so, if by existence, you mean a reality existing
"independent" of the observer, then the phrase "existence exists" is no longer
a tautology, but a description of reality. As such, it is no longer
"self-evident." This does not mean that it is not true, but its truth is never
established at one moment in time, but is constantly being corroborated by new
evidence. To say that it is "self-evident" or axiomatic is to say that our
conception existence can never be improved or corrected by further experience.
This is tantamount to saying that the conception, the principle, the axiom has
priority to observation. I don't regard this view as consistent with realism.
If things exist independently of our conception of them, then the things
themselves must be given priority to our concepts. In practical terms, this
means observation must always be given the last word in any cognitive judgment.
<< Objectivism also affirms that consciousness is dependent upon existence,
i.e. to be conscious you have to be conscious of something. Our minds can
not create existence. >>
Yes, but what is that something you are conscious of? Is it an external
physical reality, or merely a stream of ideas? Although I believe an
intelligent examination of the case at hand will indicate that the former is
the truth, it's truth is not self-evident, but must be arrived at through an
intellectual journey requiring intellectual discipline, clear thinking, and
scrupulous honesty.
<< The question "what is existence?" is one that can't be answered,
according to Objectivism. It's the given. That's all you can say about
it. >>
This is precisely where critical realists part ways with Objectivists. For the
critical realist, nothing given exists, including "existence." All that is
"given" our images and feelings before consciousness--in other words, mere
figments. Only when these figments are taken for signs from an exterior world
is existence cogitated and knowledge of existence begun.
<< As to the question of "*what* exists?", that's a job for the specialized
sciences. All philosophers can say on the matter is that everything that
exists exists as something in particular, i.e. has an identity, and acts in
accordance with that identity, which is the foundation for logic.
>>
But if this is all Objectivism asserts, then Rand would have been completely
forgotten. It's what Rand says about existence and the "identity" of things
that creates all the fuss and controversy.
<< Also, keep in mind that the concept "fact" is a higher level concept.
Perceptions and then our conceptual integrations of them are our means of
discovering and knowing facts. >>
Whether the concept "fact" is a "higher level" concept is a question I leave to
cognitive science; I think philosophy should content itself to determining what
comes first: fact or principle. I say that ultimately, the facts must come
first (at least if you adopt the realist position), and all principles, even
principles which are used to interpret facts, must come after. I'm fully aware
of the difficulty of this position (i.e., the fact that all our judgments about
the world involve presuppositions), but the alternative (making facts the
slaves of inert principles) is clearly much worse. Yes, we need regulative
principles to interpret experience, but these principles themselves need to be
flexible so that they can change to fit the facts more closely should new
evidence demand so.
Greg Nyquist
Ken Gardner
[...]
> << The question "what is existence?" is one that can't be answered,
> according to Objectivism. It's the given. That's all you can say
> about it. >>
> This is precisely where critical realists part ways with Objectivists.
> For the critical realist, nothing given exists, including "existence."
> All that is "given" our images and feelings before consciousness--in
> other words, mere figments.
Aren't you describing idealism here rather than realism? Not that I really
want to get into any semantical debate with you, just asking the question.
> Only when these figments are taken for
> signs from an exterior world is existence cogitated and knowledge of
> existence begun.
For Objectivism as well as for Aristotle and the realist tradition as I
understand it, this conclusion follows because you cannot be consciouss
without first being conscious OF something that exists independent of
consciousness.
[...]
Ken
Ken Gardner
[...]
> << The question "what is existence?" is one that can't be answered,
> according to Objectivism. It's the given. That's all you can say
> about it. >>
> This is precisely where critical realists part ways with Objectivists.
> For the critical realist, nothing given exists, including "existence."
> All that is "given" our images and feelings before consciousness--in
> other words, mere figments.
Aren't you describing idealism here rather than realism? Not that I really
want to get into any semantical debate with you, just asking the question.
> Only when these figments are taken for
> signs from an exterior world is existence cogitated and knowledge of
> existence begun.
For Objectivism as well as for Aristotle and the realist tradition as I
George Dance
970...@typhoon.austin.rr.com>...
> > But in some sense, it is worse than that. Rand thought of herself as a
> > "realist" philosopher, that is, she beleived in a reality existing
> > "independently" from consciousness--a reality, in other words, that would
> exist
> > whether we knew anything about it or not. Her axioms were meant as a sort
> of
> > "validation" of this "objective" reality. But here's the problem: a
> > consistent
> > realist cannot have any axioms, so that Rand's attempt to defend realism
> > with
> > axioms is self-defeating. For if reality exists independently of
> > consciousness, then all our knowledge must conform to reality, rather than
> > reality conforming to our ideas of it.
> The axioms are an affirmation of existence.
What does that mean? If I have non-axiomatic (synthetic or
experiential) evidence that certain things are real and certain things
are not, why should I care whether someone comes up with an "axiom"
that purports to affirm or deny the results of my own judgement?
Especially when the "axiom" doesn't even do that: it tells me nothing
at all about *what* is real, but only that whatever is real, is real.
Whoop-de-doo; I really needed that "affirmation."
> They are the way by which a
> mind can grasp the primacy of existence.
If one understands what 'existence' and 'consciousness' mean, then one
understands that whatever is conscious, exists (while it is not the
case that whatever exists, is conscious). That's sufficient to allow
one to grasp which concept has 'primacy.' Of what use is the axiom?
Gsnyquist
Previously, I wrote:
<< For the critical realist, nothing given exists, including "existence."
> All that is "given" our images and feelings before consciousness--in
> other words, mere figments >>
To which Ken replied:
<< Aren't you describing idealism here rather than realism? Not that I really
want to get into any semantical debate with you, just asking the question. >>
No, it's not idealism, for the idealist believes that only the given can exist,
that is, only what is obvious to consciousness. For the idealist, the mental
data of consciousness do not refer to anything outside of consciousness. The
data themselves are reality. (More sophisticated idealists will get around
this by positing the "absolute" or "filaments of necessity" or some other
mental construct to serve as a substitute for a physical world.)
<< For Objectivism as well as for Aristotle and the realist tradition as I
understand it, this conclusion follows because you cannot be consciouss
without first being conscious OF something that exists independent of
consciousness. >>
This other "realist" tradition, which, admitedly, is far more common, is often
known as "naive" or "direct" realism. It claims that we have "direct"
awareness of the objects, that, in other words, we see things pretty much as
they are in reality and that knowledge is more or less "literal." David
Kelley, in his book "Evidence of the Senses," tried to present a somewhat more
sophisticated defense of "direct" realism, but it's not clear that he doesn't
waver between the critical and direct realist standpoints. His idea of "forms
of perception" is none too definite. Nor does he attempt to answer Arthur
Lovejoy's devestating criticisms of direct realism in "The Revolt Against
Dualism." Any detailed examination of perception will demonstrate that what is
before consciousness are not the objects of reality but merely representations
of those objects. This can be proved by the experiment of merely looking at an
object, say a cat, and closing your eyes. In your consciousness, the cat
disappears. But does this mean that the real cat disappears? No. Hence, what
is before your consciousness is not the physical, existing cat, but a mere
representation of the cat. It is the representation that is "given." The real
cat is not given. But it is the real cat that is the object of knowledge.
Greg
Ken Gardner
> << For the critical realist, nothing given exists, including
> "existence."
> All that is "given" our images and feelings before consciousness--in
> other words, mere figments >>
> To which Ken replied:
> << Aren't you describing idealism here rather than realism? Not that I
> really want to get into any semantical debate with you, just asking the
> question. >>
> No, it's not idealism, for the idealist believes that only the given
> can exist, that is, only what is obvious to consciousness. For the
> idealist, the mental data of consciousness do not refer to anything
> outside of consciousness. The data themselves are reality.
And again, without wanting to get into a semantical dispute, aren't you
describing solipsism rather than idealism? I would say instead (following
Mortimer Adler) that the idealist believes that ideas are that which we are
aware of when we are conscious, as opposed to the realist who says that we
are aware of reality by means of our ideas. However, even an idealist need
not reject the possibility of an independent reality (e.g. Kant). The
solipsist, as constrasted from both the realist and the idealist, is the
person who says that there is no reality apart from our consciousness.
But, again, these are semantical issues. I don't care what we call these
people as long as we are using the same word to refer to the same type.
[...]
> << For Objectivism as well as for Aristotle and the realist tradition
> as I understand it, this conclusion follows because you cannot be
> consciouss without first being conscious OF something that exists
> independent of consciousness. >>
> This other "realist" tradition, which, admitedly, is far more common,
> is often known as "naive" or "direct" realism. It claims that we have
> "direct" awareness of the objects, that, in other words, we see things
> pretty much as they are in reality and that knowledge is more or less
> "literal." David Kelley, in his book "Evidence of the Senses," tried
> to present a somewhat more sophisticated defense of "direct" realism,
> but it's not clear that he doesn't waver between the critical and
> direct realist standpoints.
I have also seen the phrase "naive realism" used to describe the incorrect
view that we experience reality exactly as it really exists. Peikoff, in
OPAR, appears to reject this view in favor of what he calls the form-object
distinction. Other realists and Aristotelians who are not Objectivists,
such as the above-mentioned Mortimer Adler, also accept the form-object
distinction in some form. My understanding is that Aristotle himself
accepted the distinction.
You have now several times used the phrase "critical realism." What do you
mean by critical realism? It seems like what you are saying is that even
though the realist perspective is correct, as against the idealist and the
solipsist, we are also fallible and, therefore, we must always be critical
of our conclusions (even the obvious ones) and open to changing them in
light of persuasive criticism that they are wrong. Or is this a gross
oversimplification, as I suspect it is?
> His idea of "forms of perception" is none
> too definite. Nor does he attempt to answer Arthur Lovejoy's
> devestating criticisms of direct realism in "The Revolt Against
> Dualism." Any detailed examination of perception will demonstrate that
> what is before consciousness are not the objects of reality but merely
> representations of those objects.
How does he know that these objects are "representations" of the objects
that actually exist if he cannot know what the objects are actually like in
the first place? Looks like we have a stolen concept problem here.
> This can be proved by the experiment
> of merely looking at an object, say a cat, and closing your eyes. In
> your consciousness, the cat disappears. But does this mean that the
> real cat disappears? No. Hence, what is before your consciousness is
> not the physical, existing cat, but a mere representation of the cat.
No, what was before my consciousness before I closed my eyes was the result
of the interaction of the cat that was really there with my sense organs,
brain, and nervous system.
> It is the representation that is "given." The real cat is not given.
> But it is the real cat that is the object of knowledge.
I agree with the last part, disagree with the rest.
Ken
Gsnyquist
<< You have now several times used the phrase "critical realism." What do you
mean by critical realism? It seems like what you are saying is that even
though the realist perspective is correct, as against the idealist and the
solipsist, we are also fallible and, therefore, we must always be critical
of our conclusions (even the obvious ones) and open to changing them in
light of persuasive criticism that they are wrong. Or is this a gross
oversimplification, as I suspect it is? >>
This part of what critical realism is, but it's not the primary doctrine.
Critical realism is a form of "indirect" realism. It asserts that whatever
knowledge you hold is indirect and representative, that the datum whereby
something is known is not identical with its object. This view, sometimes
known as "epistemological dualism," spawned the "critical realist" movement in
the early part of 20th Century. The original critical realists (Santayana,
Lovejoy, R. Sellars, C. A. Strong) were reacting against the absolute idealism
dominant in anglo-American philosophy on the one side, and the pragmatic (and
"direct" or "naive") realism stemming from William James on the other.
<< How does he [Lovejoy] know that these objects are "representations" of the
objects
that actually exist if he cannot know what the objects are actually like in
the first place? Looks like we have a stolen concept problem here. >>
This touches upon the crucial difference between critical and direct realism.
Incidentally, this is the reason why Rand rejected critical realism. She
agreed with Kant on this issue: if a dualism exists between ideas and reality,
then reality becomes "unknowable." But this view is based on a false ideal of
knowledge. If knowledge means knowing things as they "are actually like," then
knowledge would be impossible. Knowledge, for the critical realist, is a
report of something existing on a different plane of reality from
consciousness. It is not a possession of the object, or even a possession of
the object's form. (And, in any case, how would you know that you possess the
object's form when you know the object, since you know the object only as an
appearence, and not how it "really" is?)
> This can be proved by the experiment
> of merely looking at an object, say a cat, and closing your eyes. In
> your consciousness, the cat disappears. But does this mean that the
> real cat disappears? No. Hence, what is before your consciousness is
> not the physical, existing cat, but a mere representation of the cat.
<< No, what was before my consciousness before I closed my eyes was the result
of the interaction of the cat that was really there with my sense organs,
brain, and nervous system >>
This misses the point. When I say "before consciousness," I mean precisely
what is experienced in the consciousness. You don't experience the cat as an
interaction between your sense organs, brain and nervous system. You
experience the cat as an aesthetic image painted across the screen of
consciousness (to describe the process metaphorically.) All that stuff about
the brain and the sense organs is learned after a great deal of reflection and
research. All that is given to consciousness are mere appearences--or
"essences," as Santayana denoted. But these do not constitute knowledge.
Knowledge only comes when one takes a conjectural leap from the appearences to
the reality represented by those appearences. No axioms can take that leap for
you, because there is nothing self-evident about it. It is an act of "animal
faith." However, once a man trusts this animal faith, his trust is rewarded at
every moment in his life.
Greg
Joe Durnavich
> Ken wrote:
>
> > This can be proved by the experiment
> > of merely looking at an object, say a cat, and closing your eyes. In
> > your consciousness, the cat disappears. But does this mean that the
> > real cat disappears? No. Hence, what is before your consciousness is
> > not the physical, existing cat, but a mere representation of the cat.
>
> << No, what was before my consciousness before I closed my eyes was the
result
> of the interaction of the cat that was really there with my sense organs,
> brain, and nervous system >>
>
> This misses the point. When I say "before consciousness," I mean
precisely
> what is experienced in the consciousness. You don't experience the cat as
an
> interaction between your sense organs, brain and nervous system. You
> experience the cat as an aesthetic image painted across the screen of
> consciousness (to describe the process metaphorically.)
When you close your eyes, the most apt description of
your experience is one of shutting your eyes on the world, including the
cat. It does not seem at all that the cat is disappearing (as if the cat
itself were really vanishing from the room). Your impression is not one
of things going away, but of you, well, closing your eyes.
--
Joe Durnavich
Ken Gardner
Thanks for the information on critical realism, as compared to direct
realism.
[...]
> (And, in any case, how would you know that you possess
> the object's form when you know the object, since you know the object
> only as an appearence, and not how it "really" is?)
What you know is the object experienced in a certain form as a result of the
interaction between the object and your sense organs, brain, nervous system,
etc. As Rand pointed out, there is simply no way to know how something
"really" is independent of any process of consciousness, i.e. all knowledge
is "processed" knowledge.
[...]
> This misses the point. When I say "before consciousness," I mean
> precisely what is experienced in the consciousness. You don't
> experience the cat as an interaction between your sense organs, brain
> and nervous system. You experience the cat as an aesthetic image
> painted across the screen of consciousness (to describe the process
> metaphorically.)
What's the difference? What you call the "aesthetic image" is what I call
the result of the interaction.
[...]
Ken
Fred Weiss
"Ken Gardner" <kesga...@home.com> wrote in message
news:Xns910DE9837C328...@24.4.64.20...
>As Rand pointed out, there is simply no way to know how something
> "really" is independent of any process of consciousness, i.e. all
knowledge
> is "processed" knowledge.
I'm not even sure what that means - what something "really" is... unless it
refers to the basic "stuff" of which reality is made up (which is a
scientific, not a philosophic, question). If we process information by sight
and another creature by sonar (such as bats) and another by some other
means, we are all perceiving exactly the same reality, just by different
means. Eventually, assuming equal intelligence, we'd all have the same
knowledge. For example, an intelligent sub-atomic creature would have
learned about sub-atomic particles faster than we would have since they
could, perhaps, perceive photons and electrons directly, without the add of
instruments or scientific inference. But they'd need more time to figure out
the existence of the solar system and the existence of stars. In our case,
it's been the reverse.
Therefore, if I understand the Objectivist position correctly, there is no
reality "as it really is". There is simply: reality ...which we can perceive
and know (by a specific means).
(How else could we know it? By a non-specific means?)
Fred Weiss
Joe Durnavich
>Gsnyquist <gsny...@aol.com> wrote:
>
>Thanks for the information on critical realism, as compared to direct
>realism.
>
>[...]
>
>> (And, in any case, how would you know that you possess
>> the object's form when you know the object, since you know the object
>> only as an appearence, and not how it "really" is?)
>
>What you know is the object experienced in a certain form as a result of the
>interaction between the object and your sense organs, brain, nervous system,
>etc.
Actually, it takes quite a bit of effort to know the form that you
speak of. Consider that many of us if asked to draw a house, say,
would draw it 2 dimensionally with flat perspective. It takes
practice to be able see and draw the house in the 3d perspective of
the form. We do pretty much perceive objects as they really are.
>As Rand pointed out, there is simply no way to know how something
>"really" is independent of any process of consciousness, i.e. all knowledge
>is "processed" knowledge.
You know, it bothers me to no end that philosophy--which is supposed
to be identifying fundamental truths--uses so damn many "scare
quotes". Sometimes I wonder if people engaged in philosophy are
"really" "talking" "about" "anything". ":-)"
I understand how flour is processed into bread. But what kind of
thing is knowledge such that it gets processed in the act of
perception? What is its original, raw form, and what does it get
processed into?
>[...]
>
>> This misses the point. When I say "before consciousness," I mean
>> precisely what is experienced in the consciousness. You don't
>> experience the cat as an interaction between your sense organs, brain
>> and nervous system. You experience the cat as an aesthetic image
>> painted across the screen of consciousness (to describe the process
>> metaphorically.)
>
>What's the difference? What you call the "aesthetic image" is what I call
>the result of the interaction.
Note that you do not perceive (only) images. You know what images
look like. The things you see around you are not images (other than
the photos, drawings, TV picture, etc.)
--
Joe Durnavich