Critique of "The Intuitionist Ethics"
Gordon G. Sollars
...
> Gordon G. Sollars:
> > May I assume that if I were to keep asking this question, you would
> > always respond with a reason /because/ you approved of that reason?
>
> You'd be mistaken if you did.
>
> Eventually you'd get back to something like "that's what my mama taught m
> e". From
> that point on we'd be getting into explanations that are not reasons for
> me, but
> merely mechanisms of me.
This seems to imply that you can never get beyond, for better or for
worse, your early training. Do you really believe that?
...
> > But I don't think there any "of course" here. For example, I think that
> > a person can fail to feel approval for what he thinks he should do. A
> > father might think that he should not be bigoted, yet find that he does
> > not feel approval that his daughter should marry a man of another
> > race or religion.
>
> That's not a counter-example to what I said. That a man disapproves of b
> igotry
> does not prevent him from being a bigot, and certainly does not ensure th
> at he will
> approve of every unbigoted action that others take.
Your explanation does not address the point of my counterexample. I can
agree that a person can disapprove of bigotry and be a bigot, and that he
could have many reasons for disapproving of the unbigoted actions of
others. You are saying that "should" denotes an attitude of approval.
I claim that a person can fail to feel an attitude of approval for what
he thinks he should do. Let's skip examples. Why do you think my claim
is false?
> The man you describe is in a dissonant state. He disapproves of bigotry,
No. In my example, he did not think that he should be bigoted, but he
approves of a bigoted action (opposing his daughter's marriage).
Apparently you do not deny that this is possible. You need to show that
he can not (truthfully) say that he should be unbiased without having a
feeling of approval towards unbiased behavior, along with possibly other
feelings which create dissonance.
...
> > Of course, you could say that he /must/ feel /some/
> > sort of approval, because that's what it means to say he thinks he should
> > not be bigoted. But then you are merely asserting your theory.
>
> I stand by my theory. He disapproves of bigotry, even as he disapproves
> of his
> daughter's choice. You are mistaken to think that he cannot disapprove o
> f both.
Again, this is not my point. I do not claim that he can not disapprove
of both. I claim that he can think that he should not be bigoted without
feeling an attitude of approval towards not being bigoted. As far as I
can see, you are stuck with simply insisting that if he "really" believes
he should do X, he simply /must/ feel approval toward doing X. I do not
see why the connection between "should" and "feeling of approval" is one
of identity, although I agree that we often feel approval towards what we
should do, and perhaps even more often think that we should do that of
which we approve.
> > I am tentatively thinking that if we had evidence that
> > choosing a moral theory was like choosing a "side of the road" theory,
> > then morality would not be real.
>
> Good. Now, what would count as evidence that morality is merely a coordi
> nation
> mechanism?
Two completely opposed moral systems, as with right- and left-hand
driving. But, as I have argued before, different moral systems are not
completely opposed. We had a long discussion about the Nazis on this.
Within each actual system there is a great deal of agreement on how
persons ought to be treated, even if there is disagreement over what
counts as a person.
...
> It is necessary, but not sufficient, that you commit to the reality
> of the observed. Since I can say without contradicting myself that A jud
> ged that X
> and B judged that not X, it follows that I am not committing to the reali
> ty of X
> when report that A judged that X, and so judging that is not a form of ob
> servation.
>
> To be an observation, something must be "present to the senses".
OK, I'll just stop making an analogy to observations. Whatever the
situation with observations, as I said before, we make a commitment to
the reality of X when we hold a correspondence theory of truth and that
"X is true".
...
> To say that your moral claims are true is to commit to
> their reality. But what I want is a justification for your claim that (s
> ome of
> them, at least) are true.
Part of my justification is the basic similarities among moral views.
This is evidence for an underlying reality being described. Also, I
think moral realism fits the facts better than an "attitude" or an
emotive theory. Further, I think that from a methodological standpoint,
realism is the best working hypothesis if we really want to understand
something. We should adopt realism unless there are good reasons to be
driven from it.
...
> You can haul out a bunch is statements to support your claim, but
> eventually you are going to have to haul out an ought statement that you
> claim to
> be true -- and *that* is where I am going to balk. I want you to justify
> your
> claim that *that* claim is true -- and not just a statement about what yo
> u (or some
> large set of people) (dis)approve of.
Well, I might not be able to justify to you that an ought claim is true.
I have not been able to convince you of "aesthetic realism", either, yet
I am convinced that "Louis Armstrong was the most important musician in
jazz" is true. But I have tried to show that I do not think that an
ought statement is "just about what someone approves of", since it seems
clear to me that someone can think they ought to do X without feeling
approval toward doing X. Similarly, one could believe the truth of the
Armstrong claim without approving of his music.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Gordon G. Sollars
> All I meant was that I do not have an infinite regress
> of reasons -- at some point it will bottom out in some feeling I have imm
> ediately
> -- whether because it was part of my early training, as in the example I
> gave, or
> some other non-rational basis (such as genetics).
Why can't it be something you trained yourself in? And are you sure that
a genetic basis should be labeled "non-rational"? It is a maximizing
process, after all.
...
> > Let's skip examples. Why do you think my claim is false?
>
> Because approving of something means having a favorable opinion of it, an
> d when
> you say that someone should do X you express a favorable opinion of that
> person
> doing X.
This is simply how you understand "should". But why should ( ;-)) I
understand it that way? I think it is possible for a person to say that
he should do X, meaning that his best understanding of morality is that X
be done by him, without his having a feeling of approval toward his doing
X. It is, of course, much easier for him to do X if he has a favorable
opinion of his doing it, but that is another matter.
It seems that you must either deny my claim and say that some feeling is
present whenever "should" is involved, or say that "approving" or "having
favorable opinion" is not really having a feeling or emotion but
something that can be accompanied by a feeling of liking (or some other
feeling that can motivate). But, then, what is that something? If is
cognitive, if it is something that can be reasoned about, then it seems
that it is something that one could be wrong about - which is a start in
my direction. If it is not cognitive or a feeling, then what is it?
[What follows is slightly out of the original order of the post.]
> Be more precise -- can he think that he should not be bigoted without fee
> ling an
> attitude of disapproval toward his being bigoted? I say no
I say yes, unless "feeling an attitude of disapproval" is a term of art
that you identify with "should" by stipulation. Unless I don't
understand what a feeling is.
> -- if he doesn't feel
> disapproval of his being bigoted, then he really doesn't think that he sh
> ouldn't
> be bigoted -- in spite of what he might say about the matter. If he says he
> thinks he should not be bigoted, and yet does not feel disapproval of his
> being
> bigoted, then he is lying or mistaken about what he thinks.
Or he recognizes that his feelings are not in line with what he should do
- as with weakness of will, for example. On your view, we can not
distinguish between what we feel approval toward and what we think is
morally correct. Why is that?
...
> I do not need to show that everyone is
> consistent -- that would be impossible, since it is actually false. It is
> perfectly possible to approve of X and at the same time disapprove of app
> roving
> of X -- it's something that people will typically deny doing, but only be
> cause
> following thru the logic would require that they disapprove of their own
> actions
> and hence of themselves.
But this is not what I am getting at. Instead, I am asking "What kind of
thing is an 'approval'?" When I say "I should not approve of X", I mean
that my approval of X is wrong. You seem to mean that I do not approve
of my approval of X. I can explain why I should not approve of X with
reference to a moral theory; can you explain why you do not approve of
your approval of X?
...
> Moral systems are more complex than "which side of the road do we drive o
> n". All
> you should need is one question (yes/no) on which moral systems are oppos
> ed as
> *evidence* that it's a mere coordination mechanism. The more such questi
> ons you
> can find, the more evidence you have. Exactly how much evidence you need
> can be
> left open -- I'm perfectly willing to say your belief in moral realism is
> rational so long as you can identify a reasonable set of evidence that would
> cause you to drop that belief. If you require that you find two moral sy
> stems
> that oppose each other on each and every moral axiom, I'd say that you ar
> e being
> irrational.
OK. I do not require two completely opposed systems to conclude that
moral realism /might be/ false. My point was that I thought that two
such systems (which I claim we do not have) would show that it was false.
Any moral disagreement is /some/ evidence that moral realism is
incorrect. I would reject moral realism if "really central" claims were
opposed, but I am not sure that I can characterize what is central in a
way that you will find acceptable at present. Also, a central claim
might involve a borderline case, as does your infanticide example.
Disagreement is to be expected in such cases (is this color green or
blue?).
...
> > Also, I
> > think moral realism fits the facts better than an "attitude" or an
> > emotive theory.
>
> Which facts?
Let's see if we make any progress on how "shoulds" and "feelings"
work above.
> > Further, I think that from a methodological standpoint,
> > realism is the best working hypothesis if we really want to understand
> > something. We should adopt realism unless there are good reasons to be
> > driven from it. [...]
>
> I want to understand why people make moral claims. I am a realist about
> moral
> claims. I want to understand why children make Santa claims. I am a realist
> about Santa claims. I do not need to be a realist about morality nor abo
> ut Santa
> to understand the claims made, nor even to separate the "true" ones from the
> "false" ("Santa wears a red suit and lives at the North Pole" is a "true"
> Santa
> claim).
Well, perhaps, in the end, moral claims turn out to be like Santa claims.
At least they will have enough structure to be "true" or "false", even if
they are not true or false. Tell me, are mathematical claims like Santa
claims? Or, more basically, do numbers exist?
...
> I hope you are not confusing approval with anticipation or enjoyment or a
> ny other
> feeling.
I hope that you will expand on this above. Approval or "favorable
opinion" seems to be a feeling that is unlike other feelings in rather
basic ways.
> I agree that one can feel that one should do something while not
> feeling motivated to do it -- even extremely motivated *not* to do it. I
> just
> don't see how anyone can be of the opinion that they should do X without
> having a
> favorable opinion (i.e. approving) of them doing X -- without thinking th
> at X is
> the action that would be best for them to do.
Well, I think that "should" is tied to "best" in some way, but, of
course, I don't think that "best" is, or is only, an expression of a
feeling.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Gordon G. Sollars
> Absolutely. And we have operational ways of settling those contrary claims.
> All I'm asking for is something similar for ethical claims.
Consider the claim that the increase in U.S. defense spending during the
1980's caused the collapse of the Soviet Union. What are the
"operational" ways of settling this claim? Or do you think that
this claim, like ethical claims, is neither true nor false? Perhaps I
misunderstand you, but I take "operational statements" to be ones like "A
flash of light was noted at time t1", "The object was at position (x,y,z)
at time t2", etc.
> > Your "operationally" suggests that you think that there is some privileged
> > method of getting at what is true,
>
> How so?
It suggests (to me) that critical analysis, to actually establish the
truth or falsity of a claim, must take a certain form, one that uses
"operational" statements.
...
> This possibility is the one I want you to rule out -- not because I take it,
> but because it is one that can be taken on any moral claim you'd like to
> make. Now the possible objections you raised are ones with factual problems
> -- there is no God, and (so far as I know) we have not done such terrible
> things.
So there are ethical judgments that can be seen to contradict facts,
i.e.., are false.
> But as I have pointed out, those are not the problematic cases. The
> problematic cases are the ones where fundamental moral premises collide.
Can't win 'em all, I suppose. Look, if a person asserts a fundamental
moral premise as definitional, that is no more subject to critical
analysis than any other sort of definitional stipulation. However, if a
Nazi says that it is right to kill Jews because they are sub-human, that
is a clam that can be analyzed (and found to be false).
> Suppose I observe my neighbour about to kill and eat her infant child. I
> rush over and rescue the baby. The police get called, and she is taken away
> to an insane asylum, and I am treated as a minor hero by the international
> media and everyone who meets me.
>
> But here is our very own Bob Kolker posting on this newsgroup that I am an
> immoral bastard, and that this woman has been terribly wronged. He provides
> his reasoning (you did realize that this was a fantasy, didn't you), and is
> firm in his convictions (well that's realistic enough).
>
> You and I agree that he is an awful person for thinking so, but you go on to
> say that he is mistaken.
I do think he is mistaken; I am not sure that he is an awful person for
thinking as he does. I think he is mistaken because I don't think that
his reasoning is correct. I am at a little bit of a disadvantage,
however, since you do not give his reasoning in your example. From what
I have seen of his actual views, his justification for infanticide is
that parents own their children. But parents do not own their children.
However, children, born or unborn, do present a difficult borderline case
for moral theories. So I grant that I could be wrong about when abortion
or infanticide are morally correct. Thus, if Bob were to claim that
infanticide was permissible in some case (or generally) he might be
correct, even if for the wrong reasons.
However, it would probably be unreasonable (and so, wrong) for him to
call you an immoral bastard, precisely because such a borderline case was
involved. Hopefully, each of us does the best he knows how to do, in
borderline cases as in others.
> I want to know how you show him to be mistaken.
I show that, e.g., his claim that parents own their children is mistaken.
> He
> has all the facts (at least, what I agree are the facts), but comes up with a
> different evaluation of the situation. It can only be his moral premises
> that are mistaken.
The assumption here is that all relevant considerations can be sorted
unambiguously into one of two bins, one marked "factual" and other
"moral". I'm not sure that is correct.
...
> That's not right. Cultural relativism says that the statements are true if
> they accord with the values of the culture of the speaker.
OK, perhaps I should say that I am a "human relativist": the statements
are true if they accord with values common to all cultures. If that be
relativism, then make the most of it. My guess is that this comes to the
same thing as simply saying that some moral statements are true, but it
could turn out that there are other rational creatures with values that
do not overlap ours in any way.
...
> If all we get is consistency, does that mean that we have not got objective
> truth, or that we can't know whether we've got objective truth?
I am taking a sort of Quinian approach to all of this. I think that
moral claims can "bump up against the world" in a way similar to other
kinds of claims. When this happens, there are, logically, a great many
ways to proceed to fix things so that we again have consistency and the
bump has gone away (but, in practice, only a small number of these ways
suggest themselves to our minds). Also, I think that objective truth -
for any category of claims - is a regulatory ideal, not something that we
"get" now and forever. Now, perhaps moral claims only "bump against"
other moral claims. I suppose that if that is true, then I would have to
give up on moral realism, although there could still be better (or worse)
reasons for adopting one claim over another.
> >> It is no contradiction to say that A judges that X while B judges that
> >> not X.
>
> > It should be clear that I don't fully agree with that. A moral judgment
> > (or an aesthetic one - remember Louis Armstrong!) can be a true or false
> > statement on my view, so if A and B make such judgments there is a
> > contradiction.
>
> You misunderstand. I meant just what I wrote -- that it is not a
> contradiction to say [that A judges that X while B judges that not X].
Then it is not a contradiction to say that [A observes X while B observes
not X], except for the way you understand "observation". A always
reports something like "I saw a flash of light". But it is no
contradiction for A to report a flash of light and B not to.
...
> When I say that A has observed that X, I commit myself not only to the truth
> of [that A has observed that X], but also to the truth of [X]. Thus I am
> contradicting myself if I say that A has observed that X and B has observed
> that not X -- as I have thereby committed myself to the truth of [X and not
> X].
But then it is only a stipulation that A has observed X, on your view.
What we know is that A reports X. Try this: When I say that A has judged
X, I commit myself not only to the truth of [that A has judged that X],
but also to the truth of [X]." If X is not true, then A has not really
judged (observed) X, he merely reports that he has.
Now, I don't think that we use "judge" in this way, but, then, I don't
think that we use "observation" as you do, either.
[I'm going to have to skip the "Rawls" part of this discussion due to
time constraints, at least for now.]
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com