Smith and rational anarchism
Chris Cathcart
http://home.att.net/~eknauer/in_defense_of_rational_anarchism.htm
I only think off-and-on about this issue over the years, so I'm
necessarily going to be somewhat rusty. I just know that whenever I
try to step into the river of this debate, the current is too fast for
me to want to wade much more than a few feet and then head on back.
:-) So I may not wade very far in this time, either.
Anyway, I read the essay and the bulk of the follow-up stuff linked at
the bottom of the essay, including the entirety of the last post where
Smith replies to Will Thomas.
As far as I see, George argues a simple, straight and clear point --
that the actions of some defense agency are to be judged and either
supported or opposed solely on the basis of whether the agency is
acting in accordance with objective principles of justice. Smith
claims that "the right to enforce the rules of justice" is a primary
right held by individuals and that such a right can only be delegated
by an explicit act of consent. Meaning, in practice, no sovereignty
and, therefore, "anarchy."
It seems that Smith may nonetheless be overlooking at least two
potential objections. (Damn, I wish he'd join up with h.p.o. and
enter the fray! :-) It probably turns out that these two objections
are closely linked together.
Objection #1: Suppose that there is what we might call the "stability"
problem: that without one agency to prevent anyone else from coming in
and exercising their (alleged) "right to enforce the rules of
justice," you can end up with too many agencies with conflicting views
about justice -- some of them might be in the right, Smith would say,
and so they would be justified in supressing the others who are in the
wrong -- and that, as a potential result, some messy, protracted,
maybe even bloody conflicts ensue because too many different parties
have their own sense of justice. Just because the principles of
justice are objectively knowable, doesn't mean that even a substantial
portion of people are going to be objective and just. They may
sincerely believe that justice requires income and wealth
redistribution, and some of them might be violent revolutionaries out
to see to it that some social order is established where the rich are
required by force to give up some of their wealth to support others in
society.
This leads somewhat straightforwardly into the second objection:
#2: Smith, invoking John Locke as intellectual precedent, says that
the "right to enforce the rules of justice" is an individual right.
It is a primary right held by all individuals independent of any
social institutions. This is, presumably, a right that flows from the
right of self-defense. An individual, under this argument, has a
right to enforce the rules of justice, on his own, as long as those
principles are objectively just and the individual always acts
rationally in accordance with them. And so does every other
individual in society. If some individual or group of individuals get
out line, then this individual or a group of rational, just
individuals has the right to forcibly suppress their unjust
activities.
(I'm left wondering in all of this: Is this really just an argument
about what people *have a right to do*, vs. what people *would* do,
and what society *would* look like if people acted this way? More of
this in a minute.)
Now, I'm wondering: this "right to enforce the rules of justice"
individually doesn't seem *argued for* at all. Sure, there's the
right of self-defense: you have the right to use force to repel an
aggressor. But what, *specifically* is the scope of this right?
Since when does each individual have this natural right all the way
back from the state of nature to "enforce the rules of justice" with
the cornucopia of powers that this would most likely entail? Wherever
did *this* right come from? Could one question whether individuals
have full discretion with regard to "enforcing the rules of justice"
and still allow for a respectable scope for a genuine right of
self-defense? How does natural rights theory get us from "individuals
have a right to be free in the exercise of their person and property"
to "individuals have the right to the full scope of powers to enforce
the rules of justice"?
I don't know where Locke gets that particular set of rights-claims and
ascribes them to individuals in the state of nature. Locke recognizes
(or maybe asserts, as Smith and other anarchists might say) that
individuals having full discretion to act this way in defense of what
they think are their rights (again, we're talking about normal human
beings pretty much as they are now, meaning not all converts to
libertarianism, and not infallible in defending their rights-claims
even if they are libertarians) leads to "inconveniences." And then
we're off and running to the argument from consent and then to
sovereignty based on "implicit consent," and the typical anarchist
response to that line of argument.
I'm just questioning, at this juncture, where the heck this supposed
right (to "enforce the rules of justice") comes from. It's not
self-evident. It's not self-evidently derived from the principle of
rights or the right of self-defense. Locke or Smith just can't assume
these rights in a state of nature.
But aside from this skepticism, here's where practical considerations
come in: Maybe it's *because* of the inconveniences that are likely to
arise that there was *no such robust right* to begin with. Here's
where the charge of context-dropping often understandably comes in
from the defenders of the standard pro-limited-government position.
Rights are conditions for existence required for men to live
rationally in a social context. The origin and content of our rights
should be understood with this in mind. If an uninhibited right to
"enforce the rules of justice" turns out to be fundamentally
disruptive of peaceful social conditions, then that's very strong
grounds for questioning whether any such "right" existed to begin
with.
What I think we have, instead, are agencies duly authorized with the
*powers* to enforce the rules of justice on behalf of individuals, in
a peaceful, orderly manner where the kinds of inconveniences that
Locke spoke of aren't an integral feature. There is the need for some
readily identifiable agency(ies) delegated or assigned the
responsibilities of resolving disputes, punishing wrongdoers, or, in
other words, generally keeping peace and order with regard to the
administration of justice.
Smith and others may think that this is just yet again the
"governmentalists'" coy way of introducing state sovereignty again,
when in fact, Smith argues, the agency(ies) to whom the powers of
enforcement of justice are delegated can be judged solely on the basis
of whether they act in accordance with objectively knowable rules of
justice. But I still think that the "anarchists" have plenty of room
to maneuver, still. But this requires thinking not just in terms of
what people abstractly have the right to do, but what actual, living,
breathing human beings *would* do, and how real social institutions
*would* look, under given conditions. Say that people *were* allowed
to choose an enforcement agency of their liking with the understanding
that they're not delegating a "right to enforce the rules of justice,"
but are, instead, choosing which defense agencies will have the powers
to defend them, enforce their justifiable claims, etc. And say that
an orderly, peaceable system for the administration of justice can be
achieved with more than one agency -- several, in fact, cooperating
and working out arrangements in which they are the publically
identifiable, duly authorized agents for the use of force on behalf of
individuals (with the exception of immediate self-defense or anything
else vital that doesn't come to mind).
In this possible world, you have what may come closest to a
convergence between the "governmentalists" and the "anarchists" who
genuinely share a common conception of justice. And you even have a
well-trained professor of law and economics here or there who could
explain how such a possible state of affairs is really attainable.
Assuming their arguments explaining how such a state would be achieved
turn out to succeed, given our knowledge of social, political and
legal theory and of human behavior, then I don't see how the two sides
would disagree about the right way to achieve a just social and legal
system.
If, on the other hand, there can be shown to be a real insoluble
stability problem as mentioned in Objection #1 above, then the
"anarchists" should be prepared to concede that, given a proper
understanding of the context in which rights originate, a monopoly
agency would be the right and just means of instituting and enforcing
the rules of justice.
There, that about wraps that one up, ... . :-)
Now preparing for the overwhelming full-scale onslaught of objections
and criticisms,
Chris C.
(I'll send a copy to GHS and await his response, as well.)
Don Watkins III
> Objection #1: Suppose that there is what we might call the "stability"
[snip]
> Now, I'm wondering: this "right to enforce the rules of justice"
> individually doesn't seem *argued for* at all. Sure, there's the
> right of self-defense: you have the right to use force to repel an
> aggressor. But what, *specifically* is the scope of this right?
> Since when does each individual have this natural right all the way
> back from the state of nature to "enforce the rules of justice" with
> the cornucopia of powers that this would most likely entail? Wherever
> did *this* right come from? Could one question whether individuals
> have full discretion with regard to "enforcing the rules of justice"
> and still allow for a respectable scope for a genuine right of
> self-defense? How does natural rights theory get us from "individuals
> have a right to be free in the exercise of their person and property"
> to "individuals have the right to the full scope of powers to enforce
> the rules of justice"?
Do you realize that you've answered your first objection with this
second? Since no one has the right to "enforce the rules of justice"
then there is no justification for one or many "governments."
Just as you pointed out, individuals have a right to engage in
self-defense. If they wish to delegate that right to a bodyguard or
an protection agency then of course, they are within their rights to
do so.
But, what they can't delegate is something they don't have -- the
right to impose their version of justice on anyone else. This goes
back to the point about retaliation. There is no justification for
forceful retaliation, and thus there can be no justification for an
monopoly institution for forceful retaliation.
[snip]
> I'm just questioning, at this juncture, where the heck this supposed
> right (to "enforce the rules of justice") comes from. It's not
> self-evident. It's not self-evidently derived from the principle of
> rights or the right of self-defense. Locke or Smith just can't assume
> these rights in a state of nature.
More good questions...
> But aside from this skepticism, here's where practical considerations
> come in: Maybe it's *because* of the inconveniences that are likely to
> arise that there was *no such robust right* to begin with. Here's
> where the charge of context-dropping often understandably comes in
> from the defenders of the standard pro-limited-government position.
> Rights are conditions for existence required for men to live
> rationally in a social context. The origin and content of our rights
> should be understood with this in mind. If an uninhibited right to
> "enforce the rules of justice" turns out to be fundamentally
> disruptive of peaceful social conditions, then that's very strong
> grounds for questioning whether any such "right" existed to begin
> with.
> What I think we have, instead, are agencies duly authorized with the
> *powers* to enforce the rules of justice on behalf of individuals, in
> a peaceful, orderly manner where the kinds of inconveniences that
> Locke spoke of aren't an integral feature. There is the need for some
> readily identifiable agency(ies) delegated or assigned the
> responsibilities of resolving disputes, punishing wrongdoers, or, in
> other words, generally keeping peace and order with regard to the
> administration of justice.
Two errors: First, as Rand pointed out, no collective of individuals
can have any rights over and above those of the individuals
themselves. You are right when you say that individuals never had the
right to impose their ideas of justice on other people. But you're
wrong to concede that maybe the government does.
Second, there is nothing wrong with individuals choosing to consent to
a monopoly government, if they think that it will best serve their
ends. They may consent to a government that retaliates. They may
even consent to a government which taxes them and imposes unjust laws
on them. But what no one may ever rightfully claim to do, is impose,
by force, such a government or such rules on anyone else.
I'll leave the rest for David Friedman <g>.
Don Watkins
EricK
b322.0202111...@posting.google.com>...
> Objection #1: Suppose that there is what we might call the "stability"
problem: that without one agency to prevent anyone else from coming
in
and exercising their (alleged) "right to enforce the rules of
justice," you can end up with too many agencies with conflicting
views
about justice -- some of them might be in the right, Smith would say,
and so they would be justified in supressing the others who are in
the
wrong -- and that, as a potential result, some messy, protracted,
maybe even bloody conflicts ensue because too many different parties
have their own sense of justice. Just because the principles of
justice are objectively knowable, doesn't mean that even a
substantial
portion of people are going to be objective and just. They may
sincerely believe that justice requires income and wealth
redistribution, and some of them might be violent revolutionaries out
to see to it that some social order is established where the rich are
required by force to give up some of their wealth to support others
in
society.
This is David Friedman's specialty and I'm sure Smith is aware of the
argument, but his essay seems to focus mostly on the philosophical
defense of anarcho-capitalism just as Rand's argument against
anti-trust was primarily non-pragmatic in nature. She does mention
why one sole provider is unlikely in a free-market but that is not the
main thrust of her argument. Btw, Smith does have paper entitled
"Justice Entrepeneurship In a Free Market", although I'm not sure if
it addresses overlapping jurisdictions.
> Now, I'm wondering: this "right to enforce the rules of justice"
individually doesn't seem *argued for* at all. Sure, there's the
right of self-defense: you have the right to use force to repel an
aggressor. But what, *specifically* is the scope of this right?
Since when does each individual have this natural right all the way
back from the state of nature to "enforce the rules of justice" with
the cornucopia of powers that this would most likely entail?
Wherever
did *this* right come from? Could one question whether individuals
have full discretion with regard to "enforcing the rules of justice"
and still allow for a respectable scope for a genuine right of
self-defense? How does natural rights theory get us from
"individuals
have a right to be free in the exercise of their person and property"
to "individuals have the right to the full scope of powers to enforce
the rules of justice"?
You're right that Smith does assume the right to enforce rules of
justice without justification in that essay but he does make it clear
that actions taken by a government are derived of individual rights as
Ayn Rand believed when she wrote "the government as such has no rights
except the rights delegated to it by the citizens for a specific
purpose." So if individuals don't have the right to enforce justice,
how did the government inherit that right? I think the key to
understanding Smith (and Rothbard as well) is that they base their
arguments on Crusoe scenarios. For instance, if I lived on an island
with myself or my family, and an invader came and tried to loot and
pillage our property, we would have the right to protect our person
and property and enforce justice if necessary. If there is no such
right, then it seems that pacifism is morally mandated, no?
> I'm just questioning, at this juncture, where the heck this supposed
right (to "enforce the rules of justice") comes from. It's not
self-evident. It's not self-evidently derived from the principle of
rights or the right of self-defense. Locke or Smith just can't
assume
these rights in a state of nature.
I think if you accept that self-defense is justified, then you are in
a sense enforcing a rule of justice. If I kill someone in self
defense if they are trying to kill me, I am protecting myself and
enacting justice at the same time. If someone attacks my family on my
island, locking them up until they show they are no longer a threat is
self-defense and is an act of justice. Let's say I find the person who
tried to attack my island had enough money to cover the damage he
caused to my property. Would it be wrong to take it as compensation?
If not, is this not justice?
> But aside from this skepticism, here's where practical considerations
come in: Maybe it's *because* of the inconveniences that are likely
to
arise that there was *no such robust right* to begin with. Here's
where the charge of context-dropping often understandably comes in
from the defenders of the standard pro-limited-government position.
Rights are conditions for existence required for men to live
rationally in a social context. The origin and content of our rights
should be understood with this in mind. If an uninhibited right to
"enforce the rules of justice" turns out to be fundamentally
disruptive of peaceful social conditions, then that's very strong
grounds for questioning whether any such "right" existed to begin
with.
Here you run into a double standard because government can certainly
be shown to be "fundamentally disruptive of peaceful social
conditions" if history and the amount of dead count for anything. If
you're argument against AC has shifted to empirical data, then
historical examples of government limited to protecting rights is not
very favorable. The anarchist could simply say once you give monopoly
power to government, it has the inherhent tendency to grow unless a
majority of the population are minarchists.
> In this possible world, you have what may come closest to a
> convergence between the "governmentalists" and the "anarchists" who
> genuinely share a common conception of justice. And you even have a
> well-trained professor of law and economics here or there who could
> explain how such a possible state of affairs is really attainable.
> Assuming their arguments explaining how such a state would be achieved
> turn out to succeed, given our knowledge of social, political and
> legal theory and of human behavior, then I don't see how the two sides
> would disagree about the right way to achieve a just social and legal
> system.
If minarchists are willing to accept that individuals have the legal
right to choose from another justice agency to protect their rights
when they are being violated, then I agree that there is not much
disagreement. Anarcho-capitalists envision a society where it is
acceptable that Jones has the right to switch agencies if he so
chooses as long as the agency is not corrupt. As far as I can tell,
minarchists aren't really keen on the idea of opting out legally and
instead favor voting or violent revolution as a way to fix corruption.
Smith's views on sovereignty determine different legal procedures
that are tolerable under AC but not under monopoly government. I
can't envision any sort of "secession" under minarchy whereas under
anarchy it is justified.
> If, on the other hand, there can be shown to be a real insoluble
> stability problem as mentioned in Objection #1 above, then the
> "anarchists" should be prepared to concede that, given a proper
> understanding of the context in which rights originate, a monopoly
> agency would be the right and just means of instituting and enforcing
> the rules of justice.
The problem I see with this is that at what point do you say on system
is stable and the other one isn't since both sides concede that utopia
is not an option. Both system will never be perfect.
Post George's response if you get one.
-Eric
Chris Cathcart
615.79...@posting.google.com>...
> Chris Cathcart writes:
> > Objection #1: Suppose that there is what we might call the "stability"
> > problem...
>
> [snip]
>
> > Now, I'm wondering: this "right to enforce the rules of justice"
> > individually doesn't seem *argued for* at all. Sure, there's the
> > right of self-defense: you have the right to use force to repel an
> > aggressor. But what, *specifically* is the scope of this right?
> > Since when does each individual have this natural right all the way
> > back from the state of nature to "enforce the rules of justice" with
> > the cornucopia of powers that this would most likely entail? Wherever
> > did *this* right come from? Could one question whether individuals
> > have full discretion with regard to "enforcing the rules of justice"
> > and still allow for a respectable scope for a genuine right of
> > self-defense? How does natural rights theory get us from "individuals
> > have a right to be free in the exercise of their person and property"
> > to "individuals have the right to the full scope of powers to enforce
> > the rules of justice"?
>
> Do you realize that you've answered your first objection with this
> second? Since no one has the right to "enforce the rules of justice"
> then there is no justification for one or many "governments."
I don't see that the latter follows. I see that some people or groups
of people, as specifically designated, can have duly-authorized powers
to enforce *objective* rules of justice. You can call them
governments or enforcement agencies or whatever you want.
Note that the full implications of what an objective system of justice
means, hasn't been spelled out. I haven't specified, for instance,
that the inconveniences that arise in a state of "anarchy" might
necessitate the need for a single aribiter in the enforcement of the
(objective) rules of justice. But I remain to be convinced that
Friedman-style arrangements and provisions won't address that problem.
And Friedman has enough common-sense to recognize the need for
stability as a crucial part of any viable and just social arrangement.
Hey, if out and out "anarchy" with people exercising their own "right
to enforce the rules of justice" all on their own doesn't have any
stability problems (this has to do with what people normally
constituted *would* do and not have the abstractly-asserted *right* to
do), then I'd have no problem with it. But I don't think that even
Friedman believes that such is a workable arrangement and that there
is a need to defer such enforcement powers to distinct and
identifiable agencies authorized for that purpose.
He's free to correct me on any of these interpretations, of course.
> Just as you pointed out, individuals have a right to engage in
> self-defense. If they wish to delegate that right to a bodyguard or
> an protection agency then of course, they are within their rights to
> do so.
>
> But, what they can't delegate is something they don't have -- the
> right to impose their version of justice on anyone else.
I find this confused. Some person(s) or agency(ies) have the right to
impose -- forcibly, if necessary -- *objective* rules of justice.
Would-be socialist redistributors or simply free-lance socialists
(street thugs) can be rightfully suppressed from carrying out *their*
visions of justice. If they want to go off and live in their own
socialist communes where there's freedom of entry and exit and they
can attempt to live out their vision of justice in a truly voluntary
fashion, then no one, of course, would have the right to stop them.
> This goes
> back to the point about retaliation. There is no justification for
> forceful retaliation, and thus there can be no justification for an
> monopoly institution for forceful retaliation.
There is justification for seeking redress for wrongs. Then again,
there might be an unbridgeable rift between you and Klein and Swann
(?) on this and what many here, myself included I think, believe. But
then again, I think I distinctly remember Klein admitting that we'd
have the *right* to seek redress of wrongs, but that its being in our
*interest* to do so is not at all clear.
One thing I should make clear: the right to seek redress of wrongs is
not equivalent to a "right to enforce the rules of justice" given
stability issues. You have the right to seek legal redress within
certain confines. But hey, if it's something where you're stranded on
a desert island and there's no designated authority around for
enforcing the rules, then by all means, you could be said to have that
right. But we're talking about the kinds of rights we have in the
normal kind of human society with the complex web of social
relationships we have now. In a *literal* state of nature, where
people literally are left to fend for themselves before human society
is instituted or after human society has broken down, Locke and Smith
could be right.
But like so many an annoying empiricist would ask: where have such
instances of a literal state of nature been achieved on a grand scale?
(I've seen something attributed to Rothbard in this regard: "Here in
New Yawk we have the war of awl against awl, and it woiks just fine.")
[...]
> > What I think we have, instead, are agencies duly authorized with the
> > *powers* to enforce the rules of justice on behalf of individuals, in
> > a peaceful, orderly manner where the kinds of inconveniences that
> > Locke spoke of aren't an integral feature. There is the need for some
> > readily identifiable agency(ies) delegated or assigned the
> > responsibilities of resolving disputes, punishing wrongdoers, or, in
> > other words, generally keeping peace and order with regard to the
> > administration of justice.
>
> Two errors: First, as Rand pointed out, no collective of individuals
> can have any rights over and above those of the individuals
> themselves. You are right when you say that individuals never had the
> right to impose their ideas of justice on other people. But you're
> wrong to concede that maybe the government does.
Again, with this "right to impose one's ideas of justice" stuff, I'd
respond as I did above. If objectivity is possible, then there can be
a right (authority, whatever you ultimately want to call it) to
enforce objective rules of justice -- objectively identified,
justified, established, etc. Smith says that there is such a right,
and it derives from facts of reality and not from some assertion to
sovereignty. I think he's got it mostly right; other facts of reality
that need to be taken into account are things like the stability
issue.
> Second, there is nothing wrong with individuals choosing to consent to
> a monopoly government, if they think that it will best serve their
> ends. They may consent to a government that retaliates. They may
> even consent to a government which taxes them and imposes unjust laws
> on them. But what no one may ever rightfully claim to do, is impose,
> by force, such a government or such rules on anyone else.
"Consenting to a government that taxes them and imposes unjust laws on
them" involves a contradiction in terms. Heck, with something this
broad, you could say that many a cult or church are such a consensual
governmental relationship. They are required to make contributions,
obey "unjust" laws, etc. Only that they aren't ultimately forced
contributions (i.e., the authority to compel payment stems from
assertion to sovereignty rather than objective rules of justice), and
the "laws" they are required to follow might be called *unreasonable*
ones but not unjust ones. But then, what's unreasonable or
unreasonable to demand of someone may depend on their beliefs. Some
people don't find it unreasonable to have to pray to Mecca fives times
a day, whereas others would. Socialists living off in their communes
wouldn't find it unreasonable to give up their earnings to the
collective, but . . . you get the idea.
Anyway, what you've got your panties in a bunch about ( :-) ) is
whether someone can claim a legitimate authority to "impose" their
conception of justice on anyone else. And I say, sure they do, if the
conception of justice is objective. We don't require a criminal's
"consent" to go punish him (oops, oops, sorry -- seek redress) for
genuine wrongs. By the same token, if people want to go off and live
in a special criminals' commune where everyone's "property" is open
for the taking and where, in the confines of the commune there is "war
of all against all," and the participants have freedom of exit and
entry, then fine, we wouldn't have the right to stop them from going
and forming that idiot commune.
(Are we sure that _The Onion_ hasn't done some kind of story on this?
Involving mafia lords, maybe?)
> I'll leave the rest for David Friedman <g>.
Always comes back around to that, doesn't it? :-)
Anyway, look -- I think that you and I both agree about the need for a
peacable social order as necessary to human life. Our talk of what
kinds of rights we have or don't have should keep this in mind.
Chris Cathcart
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>
> > Objection #1: [stability problem]
>
> This is David Friedman's specialty and I'm sure Smith is aware of the
> argument, but his essay seems to focus mostly on the philosophical
> defense of anarcho-capitalism just as Rand's argument against
> anti-trust was primarily non-pragmatic in nature.
Well, I think that the point of my posting was that Smith's
"philosophical argument" is just too simplistic as it stands, and
overlooks those messy empirical things like how human beings as we
know them tend to actually behave. I don't like this notion of
individuals going around "exercising their right to enforce the rules
of justice" with the expectation that what we'd get is a desirable
result. Doing philosophy without any particular concern about the
desirability of results doesn't strike me as a good idea.
Say, for instance, the radical aims of libertarianism were implemented
and we had a fully free, fully unregulated (by government) capitalist
economy, and that the result was widespread and massive economic
failure, poverty, misery, etc. Not something that any well-trained
libertarian economists believe, mind you, but we're talking here only
about abstract "philosophy," right? The *results* of fully free,
unregulated capitalism are not actually brought into consideration by
people like Rothbard in the treatises like _Ethics of Liberty_, are
they? Rothbard follows a kind of a priori method within the framework
of natural rights theory, leaving the considerations of economics out
of it. Regardless of economic consequences, Rothbard comes down on
the side of fully free, unregulated private-property capitalism. Even
if the results were widespread economic failure, Rothbard still holds
hard and fast to fully free, unregulated capitalism.
My contention is that if widespread economic failure were the result,
then something went wrong in the philosophical stages. I don't think
good philosophy is done ahistorically or independent of real-world
consequences.
So, if people acting on their rights as Smith describes them leads to
disastrous results, you have to question the legitimacy of said
"rights." This isn't so say that Smith never considered this, but as
he developed his essay, it is still very much an open question.
> She does mention
> why one sole provider is unlikely in a free-market but that is not the
> main thrust of her argument. Btw, Smith does have paper entitled
> "Justice Entrepeneurship In a Free Market", although I'm not sure if
> it addresses overlapping jurisdictions.
I'm not sure if overlapping jurisdictions is the fundamental concern
here, if, as Friedman (I assume correctly) points out, we have such a
phenomenon here and now in today's world, and stability problems don't
seem to have arisen as a result.
> > [Re: where does the alleged "right to enforce the rules of justice" come
> > from?]
>
> You're right that Smith does assume the right to enforce rules of
> justice without justification in that essay but he does make it clear
> that actions taken by a government are derived of individual rights as
> Ayn Rand believed when she wrote "the government as such has no rights
> except the rights delegated to it by the citizens for a specific
> purpose." So if individuals don't have the right to enforce justice,
> how did the government inherit that right? I think the key to
> understanding Smith (and Rothbard as well) is that they base their
> arguments on Crusoe scenarios. For instance, if I lived on an island
> with myself or my family, and an invader came and tried to loot and
> pillage our property, we would have the right to protect our person
> and property and enforce justice if necessary. If there is no such
> right, then it seems that pacifism is morally mandated, no?
I did basically grant this point in my reply to Don. (About a right
to enforcement, not about pacifism being morally mandated. :-)
Desert-island scenarios would demand individuals acting on their own
accord to enforce rules of justice. It doesn't follow, of course,
that the same principles and procedures would apply to human society
as we know it today.
And, I don't buy the argument, as (rationalistically) stated, that the
"rights of the government derive from the rights of individuals."
Rights, legitimate powers, whatever you want to call them (the *name*
isn't so important, after all, it's the phenomenon at work we're
analyzing) of some enforcement agency *do* derive in *some* way from
the rights of individuals. Abstractly, individuals have the right to
seek redress of wrongs -- what *form* this right will take is not
something that can be done abstractly and rationalistically. Yes, the
rights or powers of an enforcement agency would not exist were it not
for the rights of individuals; that's not so simple and straight as
saying that their "rights derive from the rights of individuals" and
then go right to the conclusion that if there is a "right to enforce
the rules of justice" that this right belongs to each and every
individual. Yes, in some *ultimate* sense, this right originates with
individuals, otherwise in the Robinson Crusoe scenario there wouldn't
be any such rights. And, in this society as we know it now,
individuals have the right to seek redress of wrongs -- WITHIN THE
CONFINES OF AN ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDER. Enforcement agencies can be
said to exercise that right on behalf of individuals, or that
enforcement agencies can be said to exercise rights that derive from
the rights of individuals.
It's just that this notion of a "right to enforce rules of justice,"
as stated, most definitely gets my panties in a bunch and I think for
good reason. Apart from a real state of nature, I don't see this
"right," so abstractly stated, as claimed by individuals. By the time
you get around to having an established legal order and enforcement
agencies (be they of a Randian or a Friedmanite character), this isn't
something left up to individuals but to recognized agencies acting on
their behalf.
Smith still has a perfectly valid point when it comes to whether the
agency or agencies are acting *justly*, BTW. That is determined by
reference to objectively identifiable principles of justice, and not
claims to sovereignty. It's just that Smith seems to rule out of
court the possibility that there could be a legitimate claim to
sovereignty as consequence of appeal to objectively identifiable
principles of justice -- e.g., the requirement for peaceful social
order that legal stability be established. Smith isn't convinced that
a single sovereign is necessary for legal stability and neither am I,
but I hold out for the possibility that it *could* be if those darned
pragmatic-consequentialist arguments for A-C fall through.
What is at least equally as irksome coming from the other side is the
rejection, seemingly out-of-hand and virtually by definition, of the
possibility that A-C institutions could produce legal stability. Of
course, much of that is accompanied with argument-by-sneer.
[...]
> > But aside from this skepticism, here's where practical considerations
> come in: Maybe it's *because* of the inconveniences that are likely
> to
> arise that there was *no such robust right* to begin with. Here's
> where the charge of context-dropping often understandably comes in
> from the defenders of the standard pro-limited-government position.
> Rights are conditions for existence required for men to live
> rationally in a social context. The origin and content of our rights
> should be understood with this in mind. If an uninhibited right to
> "enforce the rules of justice" turns out to be fundamentally
> disruptive of peaceful social conditions, then that's very strong
> grounds for questioning whether any such "right" existed to begin
> with.
>
>
> Here you run into a double standard because government can certainly
> be shown to be "fundamentally disruptive of peaceful social
> conditions" if history and the amount of dead count for anything.
I assume by "government" you mean "State." Again, of course, the
nature of the entity rather than the label is crucial. What you're
referring to is an institution that lays claim to sovereign power, be
it via bullshit "consent" arguments or simply an unargued-for "need"
for a sovereign power. Assuming we've got a reasonably good
understanding of human behavior, the claim that such an institution
can only create evil to some degree or other is plausible, considering
the kind of power vested in such an authority and the kind of people
we know who come to power. With this, David and others probably have
a very legitimate point about what kinds of things can be expected to
happen given what we know about how humans actually behave. And this
strong-point in favor of the A-C position is backed up by ample
historical examples (one reason it's a strong-point in favor of A-C).
> > In this possible world, you have what may come closest to a
> > convergence between the "governmentalists" and the "anarchists" who
> > genuinely share a common conception of justice. And you even have a
> > well-trained professor of law and economics here or there who could
> > explain how such a possible state of affairs is really attainable.
> > Assuming their arguments explaining how such a state would be achieved
> > turn out to succeed, given our knowledge of social, political and
> > legal theory and of human behavior, then I don't see how the two sides
> > would disagree about the right way to achieve a just social and legal
> > system.
>
> If minarchists are willing to accept that individuals have the legal
> right to choose from another justice agency to protect their rights
> when they are being violated, then I agree that there is not much
> disagreement. Anarcho-capitalists envision a society where it is
> acceptable that Jones has the right to switch agencies if he so
> chooses as long as the agency is not corrupt. As far as I can tell,
> minarchists aren't really keen on the idea of opting out legally and
> instead favor voting or violent revolution as a way to fix corruption.
Yes, this seems to be something of a problem in the
limited-governmentalist position and I've never been quite clear on
their rationale (then again I haven't followed all that closely in a
while) for sovereignty in the face of this objection. Appealing to
fake or funny notions of consent don't work and I think individualists
should know better than to do it. Opting out for an alternative
"justice provider" doesn't seem genuinely allowable by their position,
even if one opts for one that follows objectively just principles. To
*that* extent, Smith has a pretty strong case as far as I can see. It
looks like to *some* extent even the Randian limited-government
position forces compliance in some way or other on the basis of claims
to sovereignty -- if not in the form of taxation, then in the form of
prohibiting opting-out.
Peikoff has a curt dismissal of anarchism in OPAR where he states to
the effect: "Okay, you can go start your own government, but you have
no right to force *us*, the citizens under the current government, to
comply with your rules." That seems already to grant too much to what
Smith is saying for it to qualify as a monopoly-government position.
But this is also where my head starts spinning keeping track of
exactly what each side *is* allowing or prohibiting by their theory.
A Peikoffian appears to allow for rights of secession but still
insists on the need for a monopoly on enforcement as integral to legal
objectivity, and things seem to get messy from there.
[...]
> Post George's response if you get one.
Okay, if he'll let me.
Charles Novins
> But like so many an annoying empiricist would ask: where have such
> instances of a literal state of nature been achieved on a grand scale?
CHARLES NOVINS:
One place I can think of - Earth.
Since no "world government" exists or has ever existed, the Earth, taken as
a whole, has operated anarchicly. Because I was never exposed to any
pro-liberty or anarchist arguments in my youth, I simply assumed that the
Earth would wind up in flames eventually, and most on the left will tell you
it's inevitable unless we have "one world." The empirical facts \- the
world is still here, and it's better than ever - were among the reasons I
came to accept many of Rand's (and others') ideas.
Of course, on a country-by-country basis, there is less freedom and more
authoritarian defense agencies, many of them way out of line. Still, I have
serious reservations - both theoretical and practical (I divide them for
purposes of speculation) - about the results if even the best of them
managed to gain 100% control.
Finally, an annoying empiricist who asks a question like that is far more
annoying than empiricist. It's like telling Edison that recorded sound is
impossible because you've never seen a record player.
Stephen Grossman
NYT for horror stories. Where's my AK-47?!
Don Watkins III
> > Do you realize that you've answered your first objection with this
> > second? Since no one has the right to "enforce the rules of justice"
> > then there is no justification for one or many "governments."
Chris Cathcart writes:
> I don't see that the latter follows. I see that some people or groups
> of people, as specifically designated, can have duly-authorized powers
> to enforce *objective* rules of justice. You can call them
> governments or enforcement agencies or whatever you want.
Okay, if what you mean by "as specifically designated" is "freely
consented to."
> Note that the full implications of what an objective system of justice
> means, hasn't been spelled out. I haven't specified, for instance,
> that the inconveniences that arise in a state of "anarchy" might
> necessitate the need for a single aribiter in the enforcement of the
> (objective) rules of justice. But I remain to be convinced that
> Friedman-style arrangements and provisions won't address that problem.
> And Friedman has enough common-sense to recognize the need for
> stability as a crucial part of any viable and just social arrangement.
> Hey, if out and out "anarchy" with people exercising their own "right
> to enforce the rules of justice" all on their own
But the point is, they don't have the right to enforce the "rules of
justice" if -- by that -- you mean, the right to retaliate and punish.
The only way they can "get" that right, is if the people they are
punishing have freely consented to the "rules."
> doesn't have any
> stability problems (this has to do with what people normally
> constituted *would* do and not have the abstractly-asserted *right* to
> do), then I'd have no problem with it. But I don't think that even
> Friedman believes that such is a workable arrangement and that there
> is a need to defer such enforcement powers to distinct and
> identifiable agencies authorized for that purpose.
Of course, if most people accept the idea that they have the right to
use force to impose their ideas of justice on others, then there's
going to be a big stability problem. But the error is not in the
system they choose to impose their idea of justice...the error is in
the idea that they have the RIGHT to impose their idea of justice on
others.
They don't. They have a right to self-defense, and they right to make
social agreements with other rational beings. That's all.
> He's free to correct me on any of these interpretations, of course.
> > Just as you pointed out, individuals have a right to engage in
> > self-defense. If they wish to delegate that right to a bodyguard or
> > an protection agency then of course, they are within their rights to
> > do so.
> > But, what they can't delegate is something they don't have -- the
> > right to impose their version of justice on anyone else.
> I find this confused. Some person(s) or agency(ies) have the right to
> impose -- forcibly, if necessary -- *objective* rules of justice.
No they don't. That's the fundamental error in your approach, IMHO.
> Would-be socialist redistributors or simply free-lance socialists
> (street thugs) can be rightfully suppressed from carrying out *their*
> visions of justice. If they want to go off and live in their own
> socialist communes where there's freedom of entry and exit and they
> can attempt to live out their vision of justice in a truly voluntary
> fashion, then no one, of course, would have the right to stop them.
Right, and if you want to go off and live with some of your "Objective
Rules of Justice" friends in your own retaliation commume, then I have
no right to stop you.
> > This goes
> > back to the point about retaliation. There is no justification for
> > forceful retaliation, and thus there can be no justification for an
> > monopoly institution for forceful retaliation.
> There is justification for seeking redress for wrongs. Then again,
> there might be an unbridgeable rift between you and Klein and Swann
> (?) on this and what many here, myself included I think, believe. But
> then again, I think I distinctly remember Klein admitting that we'd
> have the *right* to seek redress of wrongs, but that its being in our
> *interest* to do so is not at all clear.
AFAIK, that's Jim's stance on the issue. I'm inclined to agree with
him, but I haven't given the question that much thought, yet.
[snip]
> > Two errors: First, as Rand pointed out, no collective of individuals
> > can have any rights over and above those of the individuals
> > themselves. You are right when you say that individuals never had the
> > right to impose their ideas of justice on other people. But you're
> > wrong to concede that maybe the government does.
> Again, with this "right to impose one's ideas of justice" stuff, I'd
> respond as I did above. If objectivity is possible, then there can be
> a right (authority, whatever you ultimately want to call it) to
> enforce objective rules of justice -- objectively identified,
> justified, established, etc.
Well, yeah, if you can objectively defend punishing evil-doers. But
I'm betting that you can't. Not if they haven't consented to the
rules.
>Smith says that there is such a right,
> and it derives from facts of reality and not from some assertion to
> sovereignty.
He says it, like everyone says (assumes) it, but I've yet to see
anyone defend it. Probably the best defense I've seen is Dismuke's
(of all people!), but even that fell apart pretty easily.
> I think he's got it mostly right; other facts of reality
> that need to be taken into account are things like the stability
> issue.
I don't have a problem with addressing those problems. But, in doing
so, you can't contradict the primaries...the principles further down
the hierarchy on which they depend.
The fist primary is that you have no rights to and of other people, to
which they have not consented. You have no right to punish or
retaliate...only to defend yourself and make agreements with other
rational beings.
The second primary is simply an further identification based on the
first -- no agency, monopoly or otherwise, which employs force as a
means, can rightfully do so without the free consent of all parties.
The only exception is if they are -- with YOUR consent -- acting as
agents of your self-defense (like a body-guard).
> > Second, there is nothing wrong with individuals choosing to consent to
> > a monopoly government, if they think that it will best serve their
> > ends. They may consent to a government that retaliates. They may
> > even consent to a government which taxes them and imposes unjust laws
> > on them. But what no one may ever rightfully claim to do, is impose,
> > by force, such a government or such rules on anyone else.
> "Consenting to a government that taxes them and imposes unjust laws on
> them" involves a contradiction in terms.
No it doesn't. Well, not if you interpret "impose" charitably.
> Heck, with something this
> broad, you could say that many a cult or church are such a consensual
> governmental relationship. They are required to make contributions,
> obey "unjust" laws, etc. Only that they aren't ultimately forced
> contributions (i.e., the authority to compel payment stems from
> assertion to sovereignty rather than objective rules of justice), and
> the "laws" they are required to follow might be called *unreasonable*
> ones but not unjust ones. But then, what's unreasonable or
> unreasonable to demand of someone may depend on their beliefs. Some
> people don't find it unreasonable to have to pray to Mecca fives times
> a day, whereas others would. Socialists living off in their communes
> wouldn't find it unreasonable to give up their earnings to the
> collective, but . . . you get the idea.
> Anyway, what you've got your panties in a bunch about ( :-) ) is
> whether someone can claim a legitimate authority to "impose" their
> conception of justice on anyone else. And I say, sure they do, if the
> conception of justice is objective.
But that's the problem. Not only do you have to justify punishment
and/or retaliation (which I don't think you can)...you have to explain
the contradiction you've put yourself into.
"So long as my rules are objective, I can impose them on everyone."
But the problem is "that which is objective," can only be decided by
each man, for himself, by himself. Unless he agrees that your rules
are objective, you can't impose those rules on him. For example, we
both agree that religion is false and self-destructive (in most
cases). Just because we determined that objective, doesn't mean that
we can rightfully bar people from practicing religion.
> We don't require a criminal's
> "consent" to go punish him (oops, oops, sorry -- seek redress) for
> genuine wrongs.
Two points: one, Greg Swann says that we just might have to get a
criminal's consent, but that's for another day.
Second, keep in mind that punishment is not the same as nor consistant
with "seeking redress."
[snip rest of post]
Don Watkins
Bob Kolker
Stephen Grossman wrote:
>
> Are Afghanistan and Somalia good examples of the joys of anarchy?
No.
Bob Kolker
EricK
>>
>> > Objection #1: [stability problem]
>>
>> This is David Friedman's specialty and I'm sure Smith is aware of
the
>> argument, but his essay seems to focus mostly on the philosophical
>> defense of anarcho-capitalism just as Rand's argument against
>> anti-trust was primarily non-pragmatic in nature.
>
>Well, I think that the point of my posting was that Smith's
"philosophical argument" is just too simplistic as it stands, and
overlooks those messy empirical things like how human beings as we
know them tend to actually behave. I don't like this notion of
individuals going around "exercising their right to enforce the rules
of justice" with the expectation that what we'd get is a desirable
result. Doing philosophy without any particular concern about the
desirability of results doesn't strike me as a good idea.
Smith doesn't agree that people should go around exercising that
right, but should delegate it to a third party to exercise it
responsibly. His essay "Justice Entrepreneurship In a Free Market"
(http://www.mises.org/jlsDisplay.asp?letter=s&action=alphaAuthor)
discusses this very issue.
>Say, for instance, the radical aims of libertarianism were
implemented
>and we had a fully free, fully unregulated (by government) capitalist
>economy, and that the result was widespread and massive economic
>failure, poverty, misery, etc. Not something that any well-trained
>libertarian economists believe, mind you, but we're talking here only
>about abstract "philosophy," right? The *results* of fully free,
>unregulated capitalism are not actually brought into consideration by
>people like Rothbard in the treatises like _Ethics of Liberty_, are
>they? Rothbard follows a kind of a priori method within the
framework
>of natural rights theory, leaving the considerations of economics out
>of it. Regardless of economic consequences, Rothbard comes down on
>the side of fully free, unregulated private-property capitalism.
Even
>if the results were widespread economic failure, Rothbard still holds
>hard and fast to fully free, unregulated capitalism.
Rand was no utilitarian either and shared this sentiment when she
wrote "the moral justification of capitalism does not lie in the
altruist claim that it represents the best way to achieve 'the common
good'...The moral justification of capitalism lies in the fact that it
is the only system consonant with man's rational nature, that it
protects man's survival qua man, and that its ruling principle is
justice", and "In a capitalist society, all human relationships are
voluntary...they can deal with one another in terms of and by means of
reason, I.e., by means of discussion, persuasion, and contractual
agreement, by voluntary choice to mutual benefit." In other words, if
an egalitarian mixed economy produced more overall happiness than
laissez-faire, she would still be opposed to it. Voluntary choice
trumps economic consequences with Rand, Rothbard and Smith. I think
you bring up an interesting issue of justification, but it's not
really one that applies to Smith, Rand and Rothbard since they seem to
use the same individual rights criteria to defend capitalism.
>My contention is that if widespread economic failure were the result,
then something went wrong in the philosophical stages. I don't think
good philosophy is done ahistorically or independent of real-world
consequences.
What are your thoughts on the phrase, "the moral is the practical"?
It seems there are two distinct justifications- the a
priori/individual rights method or the economic/positivist/utilitarian
method. Are they mutually exclusive or compliment each other?
>So, if people acting on their rights as Smith describes them leads to
>disastrous results, you have to question the legitimacy of said
>"rights." This isn't so say that Smith never considered this, but as
>he developed his essay, it is still very much an open question.
See "Justice Entrepreneurship In a Free Market". Interestingly
enough, he gives an example of someone taking matters into their own
hands by using force to take back his wallet (or something like that)
that was stolen, and that the person using force to get his wallet
back is obligated to make this fact public or else a third party will
think the person getting the wallet back is actually initiating force,
and that a third party is justified (based on the limited knowledge
available) is using force against the person getting the wallet back.
>I did basically grant this point in my reply to Don. (About a right
>to enforcement, not about pacifism being morally mandated. :-)
>Desert-island scenarios would demand individuals acting on their own
>accord to enforce rules of justice. It doesn't follow, of course,
>that the same principles and procedures would apply to human society
>as we know it today.
I agree and it's not like anarcho-capitalists avoid complex legal
societies. See Randy Barnnet's work, which discusses a natural rights
foundation and legal issues.
>
>And, I don't buy the argument, as (rationalistically) stated, that
the
>"rights of the government derive from the rights of individuals."
>Rights, legitimate powers, whatever you want to call them (the *name*
>isn't so important, after all, it's the phenomenon at work we're
>analyzing) of some enforcement agency *do* derive in *some* way from
>the rights of individuals. Abstractly, individuals have the right to
>seek redress of wrongs -- what *form* this right will take is not
>something that can be done abstractly and rationalistically. Yes,
the
>rights or powers of an enforcement agency would not exist were it not
>for the rights of individuals; that's not so simple and straight as
>saying that their "rights derive from the rights of individuals" and
>then go right to the conclusion that if there is a "right to enforce
>the rules of justice" that this right belongs to each and every
>individual. Yes, in some *ultimate* sense, this right originates
with
>individuals, otherwise in the Robinson Crusoe scenario there wouldn't
>be any such rights. And, in this society as we know it now,
>individuals have the right to seek redress of wrongs -- WITHIN THE
>CONFINES OF AN ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDER. Enforcement agencies can be
>said to exercise that right on behalf of individuals, or that
>enforcement agencies can be said to exercise rights that derive from
>the rights of individuals.
I agree with all of this and so would Smith I assume. For example, if
an intruder invades your home, you have the right to use whatever
force (within the confines of your home) necessary to stop him, but
you don't have the right to endanger third parties by running down the
block shooting at him as he flees.
>It's just that this notion of a "right to enforce rules of justice,"
>as stated, most definitely gets my panties in a bunch and I think for
>good reason. Apart from a real state of nature, I don't see this
>"right," so abstractly stated, as claimed by individuals. By the
time
>you get around to having an established legal order and enforcement
>agencies (be they of a Randian or a Friedmanite character), this
isn't
>something left up to individuals but to recognized agencies acting on
>their behalf.
It depends on the situation. I do have the right to retaliate if
someone invades my house but I don't have the same right if it
endangers innocent third parties.
>Smith still has a perfectly valid point when it comes to whether the
>agency or agencies are acting *justly*, BTW. That is determined by
>reference to objectively identifiable principles of justice, and not
>claims to sovereignty. It's just that Smith seems to rule out of
>court the possibility that there could be a legitimate claim to
>sovereignty as consequence of appeal to objectively identifiable
>principles of justice -- e.g., the requirement for peaceful social
>order that legal stability be established. Smith isn't convinced
that
>a single sovereign is necessary for legal stability and neither am I,
>but I hold out for the possibility that it *could* be if those darned
>pragmatic-consequentialist arguments for A-C fall through.
I think your argument is valid if that essay was exhaustive but he
discusses procedural matters elsewhere.
>What is at least equally as irksome coming from the other side is the
>rejection, seemingly out-of-hand and virtually by definition, of the
>possibility that A-C institutions could produce legal stability. Of
>course, much of that is accompanied with argument-by-sneer.
True, but at least IOS will entertain speakers like Randy Barnett and
George Smith.
Yet Rand did speak in favor of secession even under mixed economies.
Unfortunately, she didn't say much more than that.
>Peikoff has a curt dismissal of anarchism in OPAR where he states to
>the effect: "Okay, you can go start your own government, but you have
>no right to force *us*, the citizens under the current government, to
>comply with your rules." That seems already to grant too much to
what
>Smith is saying for it to qualify as a monopoly-government position.
>
>But this is also where my head starts spinning keeping track of
>exactly what each side *is* allowing or prohibiting by their theory.
>A Peikoffian appears to allow for rights of secession but still
>insists on the need for a monopoly on enforcement as integral to
legal
>objectivity, and things seem to get messy from there.
Yeah, and I used to go back and forth with Chris Wolf on this point.
At least with AC theorists, it is much more clear on such issues.
>> Post George's response if you get one.
>
>Okay, if he'll let me.
Or you get one. :-)
-Eric
EricK
@att.net>...
> Are Afghanistan and Somalia good examples of the joys of anarchy? See
> NYT for horror stories. Where's my AK-47?!
Are they good examples of the joys of capitalism?
Stephen Grossman
<bobk...@mediaone.net> wrote:
you are an anarchist horrified by the effects of whim-worship
--
==============================================
The smile of a sunny soul. AYN RAND
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radically systematic radical metaphysics: Existence 2
http://home.att.net/~sdgross
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Stephen Grossman Fairhaven, MA, USA sdg...@att.net
===============================================
Stephen Grossman
<ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
im glad that you agree so much that you committed the tu quoque (youre
another) fallacy.
no, they are not examples of capitalism since that rests on reason, not
whim or religion or tribalism
EricK
607...@52.cambridge-25rs.ma.dial-access.att.net>...
> In article <69488bbc.02021...@posting.google.com>, EricK
> <ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> > Stephen Grossman <sdg...@att.net> wrote in message news:<3C6A7036.FDB2E8EB
> > @att.net>...
> > > Are Afghanistan and Somalia good examples of the joys of anarchy? See
> > > NYT for horror stories. Where's my AK-47?!
> >
> > Are they good examples of the joys of capitalism?
> im glad that you agree so much that you committed the tu quoque (youre
> another) fallacy.
Say what?
> no, they are not examples of (anarcho)-capitalism since that rests on rea
> son, not whim or religion or tribalism
I'm glad you see it that way. :-)
George H. Smith
> Well, I think that the point of my posting was that Smith's
> "philosophical argument" is just too simplistic as it stands, and
> overlooks those messy empirical things like how human beings as we
> know them tend to actually behave. I don't like this notion of
> individuals going around "exercising their right to enforce the rules
> of justice" with the expectation that what we'd get is a desirable
> result. Doing philosophy without any particular concern about the
> desirability of results doesn't strike me as a good idea.
My articles on "Rational Anarchism" were originally posted on the
Objectivist e-group "OWL" by invitation, as part of a formal four-person
debate. This debate had to do with whether or not Ayn Rand's theory of
rights leads logically to anarchism, as many have claimed. I maintained that
anarchism is indeed the logical outcome of Rand's "political
reductionism" -- i.e., the tenet that all natural rights are individual
rights, and that there are no special "group rights" -- and that such
rights, where no force or threat thereof is present, can be alienated only
via voluntary consent.
Rand, like John Locke and many other social contractarians, maintained that
the right of self-defense is an individual right that must be *voluntarily*
delegated to a government (or protection agency, in the case of Randian
anarchists). With rare exceptions, the social contract model has been
offered, not as an historical account of how governments actually arose, but
as a method of moral analysis by which we may judge the legitimacy of moral
claims made by existing governments. If a government claims a right that no
individual can possibly possess, then that "right" is ex hypothesi
illegitimate. One cannot acquire special "rights" by banding together into a
coercive group and calling this a "government."
To call this approach "simplistic" is, in effect, to label all moral
arguments as simplistic, including those that Rand used to defend
government. Moral arguments do not purport to cover every aspect of a
problem, or to solve every problem that may arise. I regard moral arguments
as a very important component of issues pertaining to coercive institutions,
but I would never deny that other aspects are important as well.
We must always remember that governments are *moral institutions,* in the
sense that they rest on moral claims (and therefore, by implication, on
moral arguments). As Locke pointed out, a "legitimate" government does not
demand that you (say) surrender your money (in the form of taxes) *merely*
because it has the power to compel you, or to punish you if you disobey.
No, a government, claims that you have a moral *duty* to obey its dictates,
and that it has a *right* to use force to enforce this duty.
So what is the source and justification of this "right" which governments
claim? Political reductionists have tried to justify it by positing
individual rights and then showing, hypothetically, how some of these
individuals rights could have been transferred to government by morally
legitimate means, i.e., via consent.
The problem is that the social contract model, consistently applied, leads
to anarchism rather than to a sovereign government. This was recognized,
even before Locke happened on the scene, by the absolutist critics of
individualism such as Sir Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes. As a later critic
(Josiah Tucker) put it, the Lockean theory of individual rights is "the
universal demolisher of all governments, but not the builder of any." This
"specter of anarchy" argument became the most common objection against
natural rights, having been used by Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarians
throughout the 19th century. And, in my opinion, these critics were correct.
You cannot begin "here" with individual rights and end up "there" with a
sovereign, monopolistic government.
It is a mistake to think that Locke and other early libertarians were
somehow introducing natural rights into a situation in which moral arguments
were previously absent. In claiming the right of political sovereignty, a
government is simultaneously advancing a moral argument, so those who defend
political sovereignty have as much responsibility to defend this "right" of
government as does any libertarian who defends individual rights.
I did not attempt to justify individual rights in my OWL posts because,
given the Objectivist background of the intended audience, this was a
"given" that all participants agreed with.
George Dance
$P21.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
snip
> We must always remember that governments are *moral institutions,* in the
> sense that they rest on moral claims (and therefore, by implication, on
> moral arguments). As Locke pointed out, a "legitimate" government does not
> demand that you (say) surrender your money (in the form of taxes) *merely*
> because it has the power to compel you, or to punish you if you disobey.
> No, a government, claims that you have a moral *duty* to obey its dictates,
> and that it has a *right* to use force to enforce this duty.
>
> So what is the source and justification of this "right" which governments
> claim? Political reductionists have tried to justify it by positing
> individual rights and then showing, hypothetically, how some of these
> individuals rights could have been transferred to government by morally
> legitimate means, i.e., via consent.
That was Nozick's claim, for instance.
> The problem is that the social contract model, consistently applied, leads
> to anarchism rather than to a sovereign government.
That is not a fact, but the very problem being debated.
> This was recognized,
> even before Locke happened on the scene, by the absolutist critics of
> individualism such as Sir Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes.
Filmer was clearly making a strawman argument, and Hobbes' description
of life without Leviathan is no less a caricature (no matter how much
he may have believed in it). To say that either recognized a fact
just begs the question.
> As a later critic
> (Josiah Tucker) put it, the Lockean theory of individual rights is "the
> universal demolisher of all governments, but not the builder of any." This
> "specter of anarchy" argument became the most common objection against
> natural rights, having been used by Jeremy Bentham and other utilitarians
> throughout the 19th century. And, in my opinion, these critics were correct.
Because none of those writers took the idea of a voluntary state
seriously, it does not follow that the idea cannot be taken seriously.
> You cannot begin "here" with individual rights and end up "there" with a
> sovereign, monopolistic government.
No? If I and other individuals have individual rights, then I have a
right to 'enforce the principles of justice;' otherwise a government
could not have it, or neither could a voluntary agency. No one could,
morally, enforce principles of justice (or just 'enforce justice').
So I must have that right, as an individual right, for it to be a
right at all.
So does a typical other person, Jones (sorry, I almost called him
Smith <g>). If Jones and I each have a right to enforce justice, then
we can each delegate taht right to each other, or to any third party
we chose. That third party could be an organization, and it could
call itself a 'government.'
So does David Friedman. Friedman claims that, if someone stole his
TV, he can dispense with due process and steal it back; which stems
solely from his right to enforce justice (which, to be consistent, I
have to recognize is a right that he has).
Suppose that one day, or the institution that represents me, comes
across Friedman stealing a TV from Jones's apartment. If it's just
me, then there's the question: do I have any right to 'enforce
justice' in a matter that does not concern me at all? But if it's the
institution that represents me (which happens to call itself a
government), and this 'government' also represents Jones, then the
question is settled: the 'government' also has the right to enforce
justice, against Jones if necessary (by his consent to its authority)
and against Friedman if necessary (by his consent to the principle
that there is a right to enforce justice, against both those who
recognize one's authority to do so and those who do not, which gave
him the right to enforce justice against the Jones).
If the government has a right to enforce justice against either party,
then it has a right to: give the TV to Friedman (or let him keep it)
if it's his; or to give the TV to Jones (or let him keep it) if it's
his. It has to do one or the other, and it can't do both. And
assuming it's a moral government (assumed in the idea that I would
consent to it), its goal is to do the one that would actually enforce
justice, meaning it has to determine whose TV it actually is.
Now, suppose there's no serial number, and in fact no non-testimonial
evidence on either side (eg, Friedman says it's the same model, but he
has no proof that it is tne same model). So the 'government' asks him
what process he used; and Friedman (consistent with his argument that
justice depends on the outcome rather than the process) replies:
"Well, I opened the phone book and picked a name; and that worked, as
I found my TV." Would the government morally have to conclude, "Well,
that was Friedman's method, and since we respect his right to enforce
justice, we have to allow his method and give him the TV."? Is so,
then it is certainly neither respecting Jones's rights nor fulfilling
its responsibility to him. But if not, then it is preventing Friedman
from enforcing justice his way - it is declaring that Friedman can
enforce justice only it that conforms to its own notions of enforcing
justice.
And if government acts on this as a general principle - which it has a
right to do, and no right to not do - then it must regulate all acts
of enforcement wrt its voluntary subscribers (whether the perps are
subscribers or not), allowing only those that it considers just, which
means that it is claiming a monopoly on justice.
> It is a mistake to think that Locke and other early libertarians were
> somehow introducing natural rights into a situation in which moral arguments
> were previously absent. In claiming the right of political sovereignty, a
> government is simultaneously advancing a moral argument, so those who defend
> political sovereignty have as much responsibility to defend this "right" of
> government as does any libertarian who defends individual rights.
Certainly.
David Friedman
George Dance <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> And if government acts on this as a general principle - which it has a
> right to do, and no right to not do - then it must regulate all acts
> of enforcement wrt its voluntary subscribers (whether the perps are
> subscribers or not), allowing only those that it considers just, which
> means that it is claiming a monopoly on justice.
And, by precisely the same argument, each enforcement agency does the
same.
The claim of monopoly that I reject is not the claim that agency A can
use force against agency B when B is violating the rights of A's
customer. It is the claim that G (the government) can use force against
agency A even though agency A is behaving in the same way in which G
routinely behaves--i.e. employing both defensive and retaliatory force
on behalf of its customers.
But, you say, what if G believes that A's act is rights violating and A
believes it is not. Carrying it further, what if both G and A are
"right" in the sense that each is correctly reasoning from the
(different) evidence available to each. G concludes that the odds are
99% the television I am "reclaiming" is not mine, so I (or A on my
behalf) is violating rights. A (one of whose trusted employees observed
the theft) concludes the odds are 99% that it is mine, so G, in
preventing it from reclaiming the television, is violating rights.
One answer is that they use force against each other, each rationally
(but one mistakenly) believing that it is acting justly. A more sensible
answer is that, since A and G both know they live in a world of
imperfect information, they anticipat that such situations will
sometimes occur. They don't want to get involved in violent conflicts,
so they agree in advance on a third party arbitrator, a private court,
to settle such. Add in a hundred more agencies, each pair with such a
contract, and we are back in Part III of _Machinery of Freedom_.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Chris Cathcart
"George H. Smith" <smi...@earthlink.net> wrote in message news:<YWfb8.12188
$P21.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "Chris Cathcart" <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote in message
> news:b030b322.02021...@posting.google.com...
>
[...]
> Rand, like John Locke and many other social contractarians, maintained that
> the right of self-defense is an individual right that must be *voluntarily*
> delegated to a government (or protection agency, in the case of Randian
> anarchists). With rare exceptions, the social contract model has been
> offered, not as an historical account of how governments actually arose, but
> as a method of moral analysis by which we may judge the legitimacy of moral
> claims made by existing governments. If a government claims a right that no
> individual can possibly possess, then that "right" is ex hypothesi
> illegitimate. One cannot acquire special "rights" by banding together into a
> coercive group and calling this a "government."
>
> To call this approach "simplistic" is, in effect, to label all moral
> arguments as simplistic, including those that Rand used to defend
> government. Moral arguments do not purport to cover every aspect of a
> problem, or to solve every problem that may arise. I regard moral arguments
> as a very important component of issues pertaining to coercive institutions,
> but I would never deny that other aspects are important as well.
I'll just start off by clarifying that I don't think simplistic
arguments are limited to just one side of this debate. :-) I don't
buy the Randian argument as stated with the decisiveness and finality
(and intimidation) she and the supporters of her view think it has.
It's overly-simplistic to proceed from "there is an objective need for
an established rule of law" straight to "there must be a monopoly held
by one agency to enforce the rules of justice." I think that
arguments by those like David F. do enough to at least call this
slippery inference into question, and make it at least open to debate
whether the institutions he envisions produce a stable rule of law.
Anyway, my concern here is: a stable rule of law. :-) I'm asking to
invoke consequences for a moment and see whether that informs our
conception about the kinds of rights people have. Say that "anarchy"
produces massive instability in social relations. Say that you get
the worst-case-scenario anarchy as popularly believed would occur if
government (more specifically, the state) as we know it were
abolished. No rulers, but no rule of law, either. Everyone at
liberty to enforce justice as they see fit, without established
institutions to carry out that function. IOW, to use the
scare-phraseology of a certain ARI leader: "Mass death would be the
consequence."
Now, if that were the result, wouldn't that undercut the very basis of
the objective requirements for a peaceful social system? If so, why
would we still go about talking about people's "right," individually,
to enforce justice as they see fit? Doesn't it strike you as
context-dropping to speak of rights that, universally practiced,
undercut the whole point of rights? (To *this* extent, I'm saying
that the orthodox-Randians who support the "limited-government"
position, who typically invoke this charge, have a legitimate point.)
Now, we can debate how it is that the rightful authority for (a)
defense agency(ies) arises from individual rights to self-defense.
I'm not saying that this is an easy-as-pie question to answer. I
understand the point of your political-reductionist challenge: just
where *would* a defense agency get a right to enforce rules of justice
if we don't allow that individuals have an unrestricted right to do
so, individually? Like I pointed out in another post, we might
approach that question in a number of ways, keeping in mind such
things as: The enforcement agency(ies) wouldn't have such rights
independently of individuals having rights, or: the defense agencies
wouldn't have these rights (rightful authority) were it not for the
rights of individuals, or: the rights (rightful authority) of defensie
agency(ies) must, in some way, derive from the rights of individuals.
One idea that comes readily to mind is that individuals do have such a
right but that they are rights exercised on their behalf by an
established, recognized defense agency. Akin to a principle that I
think libertarians already accept as applied to the rights of
children: the children have certain rights that are exercised on their
behalf by their parents.
That's just one possibility that comes to mind about the way to
approach this question; there are probably more that don't come to
mind at the moment.
So, you write:
> So what is the source and justification of this "right" which governments
> claim? Political reductionists have tried to justify it by positing
> individual rights and then showing, hypothetically, how some of these
> individuals rights could have been transferred to government by morally
> legitimate means, i.e., via consent.
I would agree that some morally legitimate means needs to be
established to derive rights of governments or defense agencies from
the rights of individuals. Whether this has to be via consent, I
don't know. You do seem to speak of social contract theories not as
theories about what any of us actually consented to, but as devices
for establishing principles of justice which individuals may be
rightfully compelled to abide by. (E.g., we don't need criminals'
consent to agree to libertarian principles of justice to be justified
in still holding them accountable to libertarian principles. A
Rawlsian could say the same thing about his theory, but we're assuming
here that Rawls' theory doesn't wash for other reasons....) And, I
would most assuredly hold that principles of justice involve the need
for a peaceful social order with an established rule of law.
[...]
> I did not attempt to justify individual rights in my OWL posts because,
> given the Objectivist background of the intended audience, this was a
> "given" that all participants agreed with.
I was challenging the not the notion of all individual rights, but of
a proposed unrestricted right by individuals to "enforce the rules of
justice." Now, I already did acknowledge elsewhere in this thread
that, keeping the proper context, we can speak of such rights, like in
a Robinson Crusoe situation where individuals are left literally to
fend for themselves. But when the context comes to an advanced
civilization with an extensive network of social relationships and
institutions, that the form of their exercise of their rights may
change significantly from that of the desert-island situation. (They
may be exercised on their behalf by defense agencies, for instance.)
I think that context is crucial to this. That helps us to reexamine
and amend our principles if they lead to chaos and mass death in
practice, for instance. That's why I think it sounds rationalistic in
method -- not maintaining an appropriate respect for the role of
context -- to talk about Rand's position on rights "logically leading
to anarchy." Other considerations need to be brought in other than
abstractly-proposed rights that may, in practice, undercut their own
basis (as I allude to above).
Chris
David Friedman
Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> Now, if that were the result, wouldn't that undercut the very basis of
> the objective requirements for a peaceful social system? If so, why
> would we still go about talking about people's "right," individually,
> to enforce justice as they see fit?
The problem with this line of argument has been discussed in the past in
the contest of Roy Child's argument for anarchy.
Suppose we conclude that respecting rights, as Objectivists normally
define them, has catastrophic consequences (in other words, suppose we
agree that Roy got the rights part of his argument correct, but conclude
that I have the consequentialist part of mine wrong). Since Objectivist
rights are supposed to be derived from the requirements of human life,
we have to conclude that the rights we thought existed don't--in this
case, that the individual's right to retaliatory force can somehow be
delegated without his consent (or whatever other tweak you prefer).
The problem with this is that it undercuts the standard Objectivist
rhetoric about rights. Objectivists (and many libertarians) like to
avoid consequentialist arguments by saying "what you propose violates
individual rights, therefore we know it is wrong, therefore we don't
have to demonstrate that it has bad consequences." But once you accept
the line of argument sketched above, the person on the other side can
always say "if my consequentialist arguments are right, then you will
have to revise your account of rights, so the rights argument itself
doesn't buy you anything."
One area where this might be a serious problem is taxation. Lots of
people--practically everyone except most Objectivists and reasonably
hard core libertarians--believes that a government cannot function, even
for its minimal purposes, without being able to collect taxes.
Objectivists like to respond that taxation obviously violates
rights--and then try to fudge up alternative ways of funding government.
But once you make the argument sketched above, the pro-tax side can
offer their consequentialist arguments and point out that if those
arguments are correct, Objectivists will simply have to revise their
account of rights to permit taxation.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Chris Cathcart
22...@iad-read.news.verio.net>...
You are correct that I speak of rights in terms of what is required
for human life in a social context. Peace is a necessary precondition
for people to be able to act freely, which I regard as a fundamental
precondition for human life.
The kind of "consequence," if you want to call it that, that I am
speaking in terms of, is the consequence in which people have the
effective freedom as afforded by being secure in their rights.
In other words, I am thinking I am making a rights-argument *in terms
of rights*, not "consequences." Another way of putting it, which I
think I basically have already, is that my argument isn't so much in
terms of people's primary rights of life, liberty, and property, but a
question about how people can be *secure* in the exercise of those
rights in a peaceful social context. I think proposed rights that
would come into conflict with, and undermine, the basic conditions
necessary for people to be secure in the exercise of their rights, are
not things that we can have much basis for calling "rights."
Maybe you'd respond that the determination in question (of whether
proposed rights would lead to a threat to the peace and the security
of people to exercise their rights) needs to involve resorting to
empirical, consequential analysis -- that we need to know, be it
historically or by reference to some discipline that analyzes proposed
institutions in terms of the way that we know humans actually behave,
whether some result would be at fundamental odds with people's
peacable enjoyment of their rights. (Whew, that was a long sentence.
Hope I was clear. :-) And that, I will grant, we may have to do. I
don't think I would want to propose some rights theory in some
ahistorical or non-empirical vacuum. I would say that we have the
rights we do in virtue of what is are necessary prerequisites for
people to be free in the enjoyment of their (fundamental) rights to
life, liberty, and property.
I take these fundamental rights, for purposes of discussions like
this, to be fundamental while questions such as A-C vs. limited
"government" should be resolved in terms of what makes people secure
in the enjoyment of their fundamental, primary rights. Note that I
also don't endorse a departure from political reductionism when I say
that individuals might not have any such proposed individual right as
a "right to enforce the rules of justice" outside of the desert-island
context. I suggested earlier that defense agencies could be spoken of
in terms of exercising rights on behalf of individuals -- not the
(fundamenal, primary) right of life, liberty, or property, but the
"right to enforce rules of justice." So I think we have plenty of
room to speak about all this in terms of rights while at the same time
bringing in empirical or praxeological or social-scientific
considerations. Speaking loosely, I see this issue of "gov't" vs.
"anarchy" not in terms of what are the correct principles (i.e.,
individual rights to life, liberty, and property), but the proper
application or implementation of them.
I trust you're of the mind to be able to at least grasp the
distinctions I'm trying to make here. :-)
(Now, if the analysis was straightforwardly consequentialist and we
had empirical or praxeological analysis telling us that laissez-faire
capitalist institutions generally lead to widespread death, misery,
poverty, etc. [but not to widespread violations of libertarian rights,
say], we may have reasons *there* as well to very strongly reconsider
whether a view of rights that led to laissez-faire capitalist
institutions was a good theory of rights to begin with -- i.e., we'd
want to strongly reconsider a theory of rights that turned out to be
in conflict with the requirements of human life. But I take this to
be a rather separate point that deals at a different level of moral
theory and doesn't directly concern me here in this particular
discussion/thread, so that would have to wait for some other time.)
David Friedman
Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> I take these fundamental rights, for purposes of discussions like
> this, to be fundamental while questions such as A-C vs. limited
> "government" should be resolved in terms of what makes people secure
> in the enjoyment of their fundamental, primary rights. Note that I
> also don't endorse a departure from political reductionism when I say
> that individuals might not have any such proposed individual right as
> a "right to enforce the rules of justice" outside of the desert-island
> context. I suggested earlier that defense agencies could be spoken of
> in terms of exercising rights on behalf of individuals -- not the
> (fundamenal, primary) right of life, liberty, or property, but the
> "right to enforce rules of justice." So I think we have plenty of
> room to speak about all this in terms of rights while at the same time
> bringing in empirical or praxeological or social-scientific
> considerations. Speaking loosely, I see this issue of "gov't" vs.
> "anarchy" not in terms of what are the correct principles (i.e.,
> individual rights to life, liberty, and property), but the proper
> application or implementation of them.
This sounds like something along the lines of Nozick's "utilitarianism
of rights" (I think that's what he called it).
Two problems:
1. It isn't clear to me that the right to take back my stolen property
(one of the things that a P.O.G. presumably won't let me do save through
them) is less fundamental than the right to possess property. So I don't
think the hierarchy "primary rights vs secondary rights" solves the
problem.
2. I have a good deal of sympathy for the idea that minimizing rights
violations isn't the same thing as eliminating them, and that it's at
least conceivable that, when you have minimized rights violations, some
of the remaining ones are institutionalized--taxation, monopoly
government, or the like. But most people who talk about rights, at least
in the libertarian/objectivist context, want to make the argument more
absolute than that--if something involves deliberately violating rights,
then it is wrong.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Chris Cathcart
22...@iad-read.news.verio.net>...
> In article <b030b322.02021...@posting.google.com>,
> Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
>
> > I take these fundamental rights, for purposes of discussions like
> > this, to be fundamental while questions such as A-C vs. limited
> > "government" should be resolved in terms of what makes people secure
> > in the enjoyment of their fundamental, primary rights. Note that I
> > also don't endorse a departure from political reductionism when I say
> > that individuals might not have any such proposed individual right as
> > a "right to enforce the rules of justice" outside of the desert-island
> > context. I suggested earlier that defense agencies could be spoken of
> > in terms of exercising rights on behalf of individuals -- not the
> > (fundamenal, primary) right of life, liberty, or property, but the
> > "right to enforce rules of justice." So I think we have plenty of
> > room to speak about all this in terms of rights while at the same time
> > bringing in empirical or praxeological or social-scientific
> > considerations. Speaking loosely, I see this issue of "gov't" vs.
> > "anarchy" not in terms of what are the correct principles (i.e.,
> > individual rights to life, liberty, and property), but the proper
> > application or implementation of them.
>
> This sounds like something along the lines of Nozick's "utilitarianism
> of rights" (I think that's what he called it).
No, though I did at one time have a sympathy to that view. Now I
don't care for utilitarianism in any form. I do see the appeal,
though -- "minimize rights-violations" -- but it carries with it the
problems usually found in utilitarianism generally.
> Two problems:
>
> 1. It isn't clear to me that the right to take back my stolen property
> (one of the things that a P.O.G. presumably won't let me do save through
> them) is less fundamental than the right to possess property. So I don't
> think the hierarchy "primary rights vs secondary rights" solves the
> problem.
I don't think I made such a distinction. I did speak of fundamental
rights, which I take to be unarguably fundamental for this discussion,
and then I spoke of the correct implementation of a principle of
rights. The implementation of principles could take the form of a
defense agency exercising rights on behalf of individuals it
represents.
But let's say, to take your example, that I take back property stolen
from me. And let's say that you *do* have that fundamental right.
But let's say that you *also* are under some kind of obligation of
accountability to the legal process to prove that you were taking back
your own property and not stealing it from its rightful owner, should
you be called upon to do so.
I'm actually not comfortable with this. Taking back what is
rightfully yours by stealth and not force doesn't seem to generate the
kind of problems that arise in my mind should you decide to resort to
force and you meet resistance. Should you and I just be allowed to
"duke it out" and let the courts sort it out later to determine, after
the fact, who was in the right? Say that this is a threat to legal or
social stability to allow people to do this. Or would you not grant
that it is?
Presumably you are of the view that people *don't* this sort of thing
precisely *because* of the dangerous consequences it can bring, which
is why you would have working arrangements that people would defer to
in order to settle such disputes. I thought that was the whole point
of your example with Joe Bock and the television set -- that duking it
out is not going to happen because that would be the unacceptable way
of handling the dispute.
The unacceptability of that means of dispute resolution I had taken to
be at root of Rand's brief dismissal of anarchy, and of your argument
in favor of the plausibility of anarcho-capitalist institutions to be
able to handle them. If violence is an accepted or established norm
of dealing with things, you're not going to have a workable social
framework no matter what, methinks. I gather you accept that.
> 2. I have a good deal of sympathy for the idea that minimizing rights
> violations isn't the same thing as eliminating them, and that it's at
> least conceivable that, when you have minimized rights violations, some
> of the remaining ones are institutionalized--taxation, monopoly
> government, or the like. But most people who talk about rights, at least
> in the libertarian/objectivist context, want to make the argument more
> absolute than that--if something involves deliberately violating rights,
> then it is wrong.
I'd say that the aim of social institutions should be to ensure
stability, and the security of people in the enjoyment of their
rights, as best they can. An institution that does that does its job
adequately as far as I see. Whether A-C institutions you propose or a
monopoly agency would ensure that, I don't proclaim to know, though I
acknowledge that those reasoning from the standpoint of praxeology
have thought through this more than I have. I don't think this makes
essential reference to "minimizing rights violations" as the aim of
institutions, though.
I'll note one consideration that would work in favor of A-C, though it
involves hypotheticals. Suppose A-C and a monopoly agency did a
comparably good job of ensuring legal stability and security. On what
basis would I go for one over the other? I'd go for A-C since the
prima facie presumption is that measures involving some kind of
compulsion of individual behavior stand in need of justification, and
further, that if compulsion (like that involved in enforcing a
monopoly agency) isn't necessary to achieving the aim in question,
then it isn't justified. Or: other things being equal, compulsion is
never justified. The distinct "feel" of A-C institutions as proposed
is an environment of voluntariness that is in some form abridged when
it comes to a monopoly agency. Other things being equal, that's a
consideration in favor of A-C.
I'm not comfortable with all this, though. I've never been all that
comfortable when it comes to this issue. But I'm tired at the moment
so maybe my thoughts aren't as clear as they might be.
George H. Smith
"Chris Cathcart" <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote in message
news:b030b322.02021...@posting.google.com...
> Anyway, my concern here is: a stable rule of law. :-) I'm asking to
> invoke consequences for a moment and see whether that informs our
> conception about the kinds of rights people have. Say that "anarchy"
> produces massive instability in social relations. Say that you get
> the worst-case-scenario anarchy as popularly believed would occur if
> government (more specifically, the state) as we know it were
> abolished. No rulers, but no rule of law, either. Everyone at
> liberty to enforce justice as they see fit, without established
> institutions to carry out that function. IOW, to use the
> scare-phraseology of a certain ARI leader: "Mass death would be the
> consequence."
How would any rational person respond if, upon seeing one's basic moral
principles put into practice, the consequences differed radically from what
one had good reason to expect? As Mises said in the parallel case of
economic theory, facts per se cannot refute a theory, because those selfsame
facts do not "speak" for themselves, but must be interpreted and understood
with the aid of a theory.
This does not mean that facts (consequences, in this case) are irrelevant to
the validity of a theory; it only means that they must themselves be
interpreted theoretically, and that this new theoretical perspective can
then be used to overturn and possibly replace the theory deemed to be
flawed.
This point is especially important to keep in mind when dealing with complex
social phenomena where causal chains cannot be directly observed, but must
be understood through the lenses of social, economic, and political
theories. If an anarchistic (i.e., purely voluntary) society resulted in
catastrophic consequences, we would have to embark on a theoretical
investigation to ascertain the reasons for this. Suppose the "chaos" was
caused by power-hungry statists who would use any means, including massive
violence, to establish power over others? Would we then say that freedom had
failed? I don't think so. Rather, we would likely say that freedom will
always be threatened by those who wish to rule over others, and that
"eternal vigilance" is the price we must pay for a free society.
To say that every individual has the right to enforce the rules of justice
(which Locke and others referred to as the "executive power," i.e., the
right to "execute" the laws of nature), does not necessarily mean that it
would be in their self-interest to do so. I agree with Locke that there are
serious "inconveniences" in acting as judge in one's own case, not the least
of which is the public perception that the defendant has not received a fair
trial. (I discussed this problem in some detail in "Justice Entrepreneurship
in a Free Market.") If one uses force beyond that necessary for immediate
self-defense, then one must be prepared to justify this exercise of
"punishment" or face the public suspicion that one has engaged in an
aggressive act against others.
Moreover, given the historical record of governments, we already know that
the statement, "Mass death would be the consequence," applies to them. We
know this as a matter of historical record, not speculation. Thus, given the
catastrophic consequences of government, the logic of your argument should
lead to the conclusion that governments are unacceptable, regardless of what
theoretical justification may be offered in their defense.
To this the limited governmentalist will likely respond, "Oh, but I am
talking about an ideal limited government, not to governments as they have
actually existed." Well, if the limited governmentalist may talk about
ideals, based on theories about the nature of man and society, then the
anarchist may do so as well.
The point, after all, isn't whether an anarchistic society would be utopian,
but whether it would perform *better* than governmental systems. And, given
the historical record of governments, this places the bar at a very low
level.
In the final analysis, it simply won't do to posit a "what if" scenario as
an objection to anarchism, for this generic objection can be leveled at any
political theory. There is no reason to assume that self-interest in the
realm of justice would not lead to the same kind of stable institutions that
we see in the realm of economics. Time and again throughout history, enemies
of the free market have complained of its anarchistic nature, and its
supposed inability to maintain a stable economic order. Do free-market
advocates, upon hearing such objections, simply fold up their tents and
concede that we need governmental regulations? No, of course not -- and
there is no reason why advocates of political anarchy, like advocates of
economic anarchy (and this is really what laissez-faire amounts to) should
respond any differently.
> Now, if that were the result, wouldn't that undercut the very basis of
> the objective requirements for a peaceful social system? If so, why
> would we still go about talking about people's "right," individually,
> to enforce justice as they see fit? Doesn't it strike you as
> context-dropping to speak of rights that, universally practiced,
> undercut the whole point of rights? (To *this* extent, I'm saying
> that the orthodox-Randians who support the "limited-government"
> position, who typically invoke this charge, have a legitimate point.)
If a consistent respect for individual rights leads to catastrophic
consequences, then the limited governmentalist is in the same sinking boat
as the anarchist. For we may legitimately ask, "What if the ideal limited
government were to result in social chaos?" Would it not constitute "context
dropping" to advocate such a government in view of these consequences?
Suppose, for example, that drug legalization were to lead to millions of
addicts preying upon others? Or suppose that a consistent respect for
property rights would result in massive starvation and an attendant social
instability?
The anarchist has as much right to pose such questions to the limited
governmentalist as the reverse situation which you posit here. So how would
the limited governmentalist respond to such hypothetical questions? Answer
this question, and you will understand how the anarchist deals with similar
questions.
In short, your "kamikaze" style of argument" is as effective against the
Randian limited government, which is defended in terms of individual rights,
as it is against the anarchist position, which is also defended in terms of
rights.
In short, the anarchist is saying, "If you wish to be a consistent advocate
of individual rights, then you cannot logically defend a monopolistic
government." But if it should turn out that a consistent respect for rights
leads to social chaos, then the fault lies not with anarchy per se but with
the notion of individual rights -- and, in such a case, all bets are off, so
far as libertarians are concerned, for this would mean that freedom itself
cannot be justified.
If the limited governmentalist wishes to argue that rights are sometimes a
bad thing, so we need a government to violate them in some cases, then,
fine, let's hear the argument. But that is not what Randian governmentalists
normally wish to argue.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> The claim of monopoly that I reject is not the claim that agency A
> can use force against agency B when B is violating the rights of A's
> customer. It is the claim that G (the government) can use force
> against agency A even though agency A is behaving in the same way in
> which G routinely behaves--i.e. employing both defensive and
> retaliatory force on behalf of its customers.
I'd like to point out that the symmetry fails where the monopoly is
geographic in nature, as is traditionally the case, and also the case
in the Objectivist view of government.
The U.S.A., then, would be wrong to use force against Japan, in the
case where Japan is not interfering with the citizens of the U.S.A.,
but is instead merely employing both defensive and retaliatory force
on behalf of its own citizens.
Surely David will acknowledge that there would be a significant
difference between Japan attempting to mediate a dispute in the middle
of Kansas, as compared to an imaginary situation in which Chicago has
5 "defense agencies" in competition.
The "puzzle" of how a legitimate government can stop "competitors"
dissolves if we understand governmental authority to be tied to
geographic areas, preferably through contract, but more realistically
as a legitimization of longstanding tradition.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> If an anarchistic (i.e., purely voluntary) society resulted in
> catastrophic consequences, we would have to embark on a theoretical
> investigation to ascertain the reasons for this.
I don't think it's really fair of you to smuggle in the equation of
"anarchistic" and "purely voluntary" like this. The two are not
identical, and in light of "Roy Childs like" arguments against the
Objectivist view of government, the equation of the two is obviously
hotly contested.
> In short, the anarchist is saying, "If you wish to be a consistent
> advocate of individual rights, then you cannot logically defend a
> monopolistic governent."
I know I'm stepping into the middle of an argument here, but why not?
Think of Galt's Gulch -- in order to enter the valley, one must agree
to abide by the laws there -- voluntarily. The governmental unit has
as its jurisdiction the geographical area of the Gulch. If Andy
Anarchist comes in, agreeing to the rules, and then crows that his
rights are being violated when he gets in trouble for attempting to
jail Mindy Minarchist in his basement, he's just wrong about who is
doing the rights violating.
If he wants to set up his own competing government, he's welcome to do
so... in a different geographical area. This area is already
governed, by full voluntary agreement of the inhabitants, by a
monopoly government.
If you object to this, then the onus of proof is surely on you. Why is it
that 3rd parties can step in, using force if necessary, to prevent purely
voluntary arrangements within the valley? By what right?
--Jimbo
George H. Smith
"Chris Cathcart" <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote in message
news:b030b322.02021...@posting.google.com...
> I was challenging the not the notion of all individual rights, but of
> a proposed unrestricted right by individuals to "enforce the rules of
> justice." Now, I already did acknowledge elsewhere in this thread
> that, keeping the proper context, we can speak of such rights, like in
> a Robinson Crusoe situation where individuals are left literally to
> fend for themselves. But when the context comes to an advanced
> civilization with an extensive network of social relationships and
> institutions, that the form of their exercise of their rights may
> change significantly from that of the desert-island situation. (They
> may be exercised on their behalf by defense agencies, for instance.)
>
> I think that context is crucial to this. That helps us to reexamine
> and amend our principles if they lead to chaos and mass death in
> practice, for instance. That's why I think it sounds rationalistic in
> method -- not maintaining an appropriate respect for the role of
> context -- to talk about Rand's position on rights "logically leading
> to anarchy." Other considerations need to be brought in other than
> abstractly-proposed rights that may, in practice, undercut their own
> basis (as I allude to above).
I don't mean to be overly literal in construing your initial remarks, but
all actions are the actions of individual human beings, so only individuals
can enforce the rules of justice.
In speaking of limitations on individuals to enforce the rules of justice, I
assume you are referring to (a) the classic problem (which goes back at
least as far as Aristotle) of acting as judge in one's own case; and (b) the
need for institutional safeguards and objective procedures in the juridical
realm.
I don't deny that these are legitimate issues, but they have nothing to do
with the fundamental right in question. It is true that we encounter
knowledge problems in a complex society that we would not encounter in a
Crusoe/Friday scenario, but these have to do with how the "executive right"
would best be implemented, not with the validity of the right itself. And I
think a competitive, pluralistic juridical system would tend to be more
efficient than a monopolistic government in enforcing the rules of justice.
(In addition to David Friedman's case in *The Machinery of Freedom,* Randy
Barnett also presents an excellent case in his book, *The Structure of
Liberty.*)
Here is one point to keep in mind. When libertarian-oriented theorists like
John Locke and Algernon Sidney condemned absolute monarchy (in which the
sovereign is said to be "above" the law) as an illegitimate form of
government, they both appealed to the principle that one should not act as
judge in one's own case. In other words, if the absolute monarch is to act
as the final judge in all cases in which his own interests are involved,
then he, like everyone else, will likely be biased in his own favor.
This was the idea behind the "rule of law," in which everyone, including the
sovereign, is "under" the law rather than "above" it. But the practical
problem remained , viz., who should judge the sovereign? Locke answered,
"The people shall judge" -- and this was the basis for his defense of the
rights of resistance and revolution. (There is obviously more involved than
this, but this is the gist.)
I think a pluralistic legal system deals with this problem in an effective
way, because it provides a mechanism for checking power such that the last
resort, i.e., outright revolution, may not be necessary. This was the idea
behind the federalism (in the classic sense) of the Jeffersonians. For them,
the truly effective system of checks and balances lies not in the division
of powers in the federal government (which Madison castigated as a mere
"parchment barrier" to the abuse of power), but in the distribution of power
between the federal government and the states. In its own way, this embodied
the notion of legal pluralism, especially for those Jeffersonians who
believed that states should be able to nullify federal laws. It was also a
competitive system, in the sense that individuals could flee to another
state, in the event their state became too oppressive.
Libertarian anarchists have simply extended this idea of decentralized
power, so we might call them "unterrified Jeffersonians." The perennial
charge that Lockeans were advocating anarchy, in effect, was quite
justified -- given the notion of "sovereignty" that prevailed at the time,
according to which "mixed sovereignty" is a veritable contradiction in
terms.
George H. Smith
"George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:6312c50b.02021...@posting.google.com...
[Smith]
> > The problem is that the social contract model, consistently applied,
leads
> > to anarchism rather than to a sovereign government.
[Dance]
> That is not a fact, but the very problem being debated.
Yes, of course it is; I was merely summarizing the conclusion that I
presented in my piece, "In Defense of Rational Anarchism" that has been the
topic of discussion. I saw no reason to repeat those arguments in this
limited format, when they are accessible to anyone who cares to read them.
[Smith]
> > This was recognized,
> > even before Locke happened on the scene, by the absolutist critics of
> > individualism such as Sir Robert Filmer and Thomas Hobbes.
>
[Dance]
> Filmer was clearly making a strawman argument, and Hobbes' description
> of life without Leviathan is no less a caricature (no matter how much
> he may have believed in it). To say that either recognized a fact
> just begs the question.
What did you expect me to do -- write an entire essay on Filmer and Hobbes?
You are confusing my summary statements with arguments.
For the record, Filmer was not making a "strawman argument." Although
Filmer's positive case for patriarchalism lacks merit, the same cannot be
said for his negative criticism of social contractarianism, which he
condemned as implicitly anarchistic. So serious indeed were his criticisms
that they spawned at least three major replies: Locke's *Two Treatises of
Government* (the *Second Treatise* in particular). Sidney's *Discourses
Concerning Government,* and James Tyrrell's *Patriarcha non Monarcha.*
As for Hobbes's "caricature" of life in a state of nature without
government, in which life is "nasty, brutish, and short," Ayn Rand said much
the same thing in her essay, "The Nature of Government." Rand described the
state of nature in Hobbesian (rather than Lockean) terms, as a condition
that would "compel every citizen to go around armed, to turn his home into a
fortress, to shoot any strangers approaching his door -- or to join a
protective gang of citizens who would fight other gangs...and thus bring
about the degeneration of that society into the chaos of gang rule, i.e.,
rule by brute force, into perpetual tribal warfare of prehistorical
savages." (VOS, p.108)
This passage could have come directly from the pages of *Leviathan.* Rand
did not share Locke's view that life in a state of nature could be
essentially peaceful and civilized, and that it is owing to certain
"inconveniences" that a government becomes necessary. Rand was a
thorough-going Hobbesian in this matter, and I think her failure to
understand the spontaneous evolution of social and legal institutions in a
"state of nature" badly warped her view of anarchism.
[Dance]
> Because none of those writers took the idea of a voluntary state
> seriously, it does not follow that the idea cannot be taken seriously."
If you care to defend a protective institution that is purely voluntary,
then no anarchist will object, even if you do use the peculiar label "state"
to describe such an institution. (This is not at all what the term "state"
has meant historically. You might, with equal justification, call it a
"church.")
[Smith]
> > You cannot begin "here" with individual rights and end up "there" with a
> > sovereign, monopolistic government.
[Dance]
> No? If I and other individuals have individual rights, then I have a
> right to 'enforce the principles of justice;' otherwise a government
> could not have it, or neither could a voluntary agency. No one could,
> morally, enforce principles of justice (or just 'enforce justice').
> So I must have that right, as an individual right, for it to be a
> right at all.
>
> So does a typical other person, Jones (sorry, I almost called him
> Smith <g>). If Jones and I each have a right to enforce justice, then
> we can each delegate that right to each other, or to any third party
> we chose. That third party could be an organization, and it could
> call itself a 'government.'
Yes, of course, and (as I said) it could also call itself a "church" or a
"club" or the "scouts," if the people who constitute that institution have
no regard for the conventional meaning of words. You can even call the Board
of Directors of a private corporation a "government," if you wish. No one is
stopping you.
>
Ghs
http://thephilosophe.com
Don Watkins III
>Think of Galt's Gulch -- in order to enter the valley, one must agree
>to abide by the laws there -- voluntarily. The governmental unit has
>as its jurisdiction the geographical area of the Gulch. If Andy
>Anarchist comes in, agreeing to the rules, and then crows that his
>rights are being violated when he gets in trouble for attempting to
>jail Mindy Minarchist in his basement, he's just wrong about who is
>doing the rights violating.
>If he wants to set up his own competing government, he's welcome to do
>so... in a different geographical area. This area is already
>governed, by full voluntary agreement of the inhabitants, by a
>monopoly government.
If a government is built upon a foundation of consent, its legitamite sphere of
action is not tied to geographic location -- it's tied to the people who have
consented.
How can a government have dominion over my land without my consent?
Don Watkins
*******************************************************
Pictures of my beautiful girlfriend and me:
http://www.geocities.com/mrgalt.geo/me.html
*******************************************************
George H. Smith
"Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales" <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote in message
news:slrna72ksa...@joey.bomis.com...
> Think of Galt's Gulch -- in order to enter the valley, one must agree
> to abide by the laws there -- voluntarily. The governmental unit has
> as its jurisdiction the geographical area of the Gulch. If Andy
> Anarchist comes in, agreeing to the rules, and then crows that his
> rights are being violated when he gets in trouble for attempting to
> jail Mindy Minarchist in his basement, he's just wrong about who is
> doing the rights violating.
Galt's Gulch is an example of a voluntary, anarchistic society, in which the
inhabitants had seceded from the American legal system and formed their own
juridical community. Suppose it has a "government" of sorts. How did this
institution acquire its jurisdiction? By the voluntary consent of the
landowners? If so, fine -- for if those same landowners (either all or some)
become dissatisfied with the services provided by this institution, then
they can fire its employees and hire another justice agency instead. This is
the essence of libertarian anarchism.
> If he wants to set up his own competing government, he's welcome to do
> so... in a different geographical area. This area is already
> governed, by full voluntary agreement of the inhabitants, by a
> monopoly government.
No anarchist has ever objected to a volunary "market monopoly" of this kind,
any more than free market advocates object to the prospect of only grocery
store in a small town where there is not sufficient demand to support a
competing store. All that anarchists have objected to are "coercive
monopolies," such as we find in every government that has ever existed on
the face of the earth. Do you think, if you own a parcel of land, that you
can "fire" the American government and hire another justice agency instead?
I wouldn't recommend trying this.
> If you object to this, then the onus of proof is surely on you. Why is it
> that 3rd parties can step in, using force if necessary, to prevent purely
> voluntary arrangements within the valley? By what right?
I don't object to purely voluntary institutions, ones that you can hire and
fire as you would any free market service. But this is not what has
conventionally been meant by the term "government" or "state." These are
institutions that claim a coercive, monopolistic jurisdiction over a given
geographical area. This is the essence of political "sovereignty." If you
want to redefine basic terms and talk about creating voluntary "sovereign
governments," then you do so at the price of creating immense confusion.
A.J. Nock -- a self-professed "anarchist" -- did exactly this. He claimed
that, as an anarchist, he opposed the "state" but not "government." So he
presented the peculiar picture of an anarchist who defended "government."
I don't see any point in this kind of word play. Call your purely voluntary
institution a "government" if you wish -- but what do you suppose the
traditional debate among libertarians has been about, since no anarchist
would ever object to the kind of voluntary institution you describe?
Bob Kolker
Don Watkins III wrote:
>
>
> How can a government have dominion over my land without my consent?
They have guns.
Bob Kolker
>
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
George H. Smith <smi...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Galt's Gulch is an example of a voluntary, anarchistic society, in
> which the inhabitants had seceded from the American legal system and
> formed their own juridical community. Suppose it has a "government"
> of sorts. How did this institution acquire its jurisdiction? By the
> voluntary consent of the landowners? If so, fine -- for if those
> same landowners (either all or some) become dissatisfied with the
> services provided by this institution, then they can fire its
> employees and hire another justice agency instead. This is the
> essence of libertarian anarchism.
This is a very curious form of anarchism, then. It's a form of
anarchism where there is one and only one government, and which
permits no others to engage in the provision of the same services.
No, this isn't anarchism unless we torture the language to obliterate
important distinctions. If every non-coercive system automatically
qualifies as "anarchism" then we have no means by which to discern the
difference between an Objectivist monopoly government and a
Friedman-style network of defense agencies. But surely we can and
should make that distinction, and we can and should use coherent and
simple language in so-doing.
> No anarchist has ever objected to a voluntary "market monopoly" of this kind,
> any more than free market advocates object to the prospect of only grocery
> store in a small town where there is not sufficient demand to support a
> competing store. All that anarchists have objected to are "coercive
> monopolies," such as we find in every government that has ever existed on
> the face of the earth.
I believe that you are mistaken about what anarchists might object to.
I believe that David Freidman _would_ object to a voluntary market
monopoly of the type that I have described, on grounds related to
economic efficiency. I believe that other anarchists (you, most
likely!) would object that such a system would be unlikely to be as
stable over time as a "pluralistic" system, since -- to date -- even
the fairly complex system of checks and balances of the U.S. has
proven inadequate for the preservation of liberty.
Doesn't that sound accurate? Wouldn't anarchists raise those
objections? Wouldn't the typical anarchist say that "Even if a
monopolistic system could be set up without coercion, it would likely
tend to coercion more quickly than a system of 'competing
government'"? And so on?
If so, then _that's_ the real debate, and it's a debate you can't
eliminate by simply using your own special curious definitions.
> Do you think, if you own a parcel of land, that you can "fire" the
> American government and hire another justice agency instead? I
> wouldn't recommend trying this.
Of course not, George, and this is what I really had in mind when I
called your remarks disingenuous. Did I give you any reason to think
that I suppose such a thing? Of course not.
I don't think in Galt's Gulch that any one resident, say Wyatt, could
"fire" the government. That's not what he agreed to do when he
entered. But if all the residents got together and unanimously
decided to change the system, then of course they could. No one would
be there to stop them.
Similarly, if one or two people decide to "fire" the United States
government, they can't. But even under a questionable system of
democracy, a large group of people can fire the government. Does that
mean that even the U.S. government is anarchy? (No, of course not.)
> I don't object to purely voluntary institutions, ones that you can hire and
> fire as you would any free market service. But this is not what has
> conventionally been meant by the term "government" or "state." These are
> institutions that claim a coercive, monopolistic jurisdiction over a given
> geographical area. This is the essence of political "sovereignty."
I don't think this is what is conventionally meant at all. Certainly,
governments have been coercive and monopolistic, but if we are
discussing -- as we surely are! -- the finer points of free market
theory, including in this forum Ayn Rand's notion of a voluntary but
monopolistic government, it simply does no good to throw "coercive"
into our definition of government in this way.
Contrary to your supposition, I'm not proposing any special or unusual
definition of "government". I'm proposing the exact opposite. I'm
proposing that we not _define_ government in a very strange and
obscure way, just so that it turns out that all government is
definitely coercive, by definition.
That's just silly.
Here's the core problem with at least one version of the argument
against monopolistic government: It is possible to set up, as per the
fictional description in Galt's Gulch, a non-coercive government which
is also, by agreement, a monopolistic government. Presumably, if done
well, it will have stable mechanisms for peaceful change, etc.
Therefore, we can't just equate "coercive" with "monopolistic" and
suppose that the real questions are all handled. If a non-coercive
monopoly is possible (on the model of Galt's gulch) then we have to
delve more deeply into the wisdom of setting that up, versus setting
up Freidman-esque defense agencies, competing within a geographical
area.
You know as well as I do that Rand is often taken to task for an
alleged "contradiction" in her political theory. I'm just saying:
whatever arguments there may be against her theory, this one is not
valid, since a non-coercive monopoly government can surely exist.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> If a government is built upon a foundation of consent, its
> legitamite sphere of action is not tied to geographic location --
> it's tied to the people who have consented.
Not necessarily -- it depends upon what the people have consented
_to_.
In the case of Galt's Gulch, it was explicit (as per my memory, but
someone may wish to provide more exact details) that the laws of
Galt's Gulch were derived from the original owner's (i.e. Midas
Mulligan's) explicit and voluntary relationships with each person
invited into the Valley. The laws of the Gulch applied within the
gulch and not outside.
> How can a government have dominion over my land without my consent?
Well, "dominion" is a loaded word. I don't think "dominion" is a
valid form of human relationship, do you? So it isn't a very useful
word to use in discussing what a proper government might look like.
But if you're asking how a government might come to have
rights-respecting and rights-protecting jurisdiction over land that
you own, it might happen in any number of legitimate ways.
For example, in the valley, if you buy land from Midas Mulligan,
you'll be buying land _under the stipulation_ that rights-respecting
rights-protection will continue to be provided on that land by his
government. Presumably, you'd only agree to move there in the first
place if you were convinced that the rules in place, and the
institutions in place, were actually likely to protect rather than
harm your rightful interests.
If you turned around to sell the land to a third party, you'd of
course have to disclose what your rights in the land actually are.
Perhaps you own the mineral rights, but perhaps you sold them to
someone else. Perhaps you own the jurisdictional rights, or perhaps
you never bought them from Midas in the first place.
--Jimbo
Bob Kolker
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales wrote:
>
>
> Here's the core problem with at least one version of the argument
> against monopolistic government: It is possible to set up, as per the
> fictional description in Galt's Gulch, a non-coercive government which
> is also, by agreement, a monopolistic government. Presumably, if done
> well, it will have stable mechanisms for peaceful change, etc.
>
> Therefore, we can't just equate "coercive" with "monopolistic" and
> suppose that the real questions are all handled. If a non-coercive
> monopoly is possible (on the model of Galt's gulch) then we have to
> delve more deeply into the wisdom of setting that up, versus setting
> up Freidman-esque defense agencies, competing within a geographical
> area.
The interesting thing is that the * visible * differences between a
working minarchy and a working anarchy are not that great. In either
case you will hardly notice the hand of authority since it will rest
lightly in either case. In a working minarchy the only evidence that you
have a government will be the appearance of the occasional policeman or
soldier. Most activity will be private, the way God intended activity to
be.
Bob Kolker
George H. Smith
> I believe George's response is more than a little bit disingenuous.
Perhaps you should read what market anarchists from Benjamin R. Tucker to
Murray Rothbard to Randy Barnett have actually argued, rather than guessing.
None has objected to the kind of purely voluntary system you outline, and
none has spoken of "monopoly" in the way that you do. (And I seriously doubt
whether you have accurately represented David Friedman's position, but I
will leave that for him to comment on.)
If anything is "disingenuous," it is to engage in a discussion without the
slightest idea of what your adversaries have argued for over a century.
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> David Friedman <dd...@best.com> wrote:
> > The claim of monopoly that I reject is not the claim that agency A
> > can use force against agency B when B is violating the rights of A's
> > customer. It is the claim that G (the government) can use force
> > against agency A even though agency A is behaving in the same way in
> > which G routinely behaves--i.e. employing both defensive and
> > retaliatory force on behalf of its customers.
>
> I'd like to point out that the symmetry fails where the monopoly is
> geographic in nature, as is traditionally the case, and also the case
> in the Objectivist view of government.
But the question is how one defends that view against the challenge
presented by a competing agency of retaliatory force. The Objectivist
answer, as I understand it, is that the government uses force to
suppress that agency, even if it is doing (some of) the same things the
government is doing.
> The U.S.A., then, would be wrong to use force against Japan, in the
> case where Japan is not interfering with the citizens of the U.S.A.,
> but is instead merely employing both defensive and retaliatory force
> on behalf of its own citizens.
If the Japanese government is acting justly, it would be wrong to use
force to stop them. But if the Japanese government is picking people at
random and torturing them to death, it is appropriate for outsiders to
use force to stop them.
> Surely David will acknowledge that there would be a significant
> difference between Japan attempting to mediate a dispute in the middle
> of Kansas, as compared to an imaginary situation in which Chicago has
> 5 "defense agencies" in competition.
Obviously geographical sovereignty provides one possible partial
solution to the problem of multiple agencies involved in the same
dispute. It isn't a complete solution because not all disputes have a
well defined geographical location. My system of pairwise contracts
between agencies provides another possible solution.
> The "puzzle" of how a legitimate government can stop "competitors"
> dissolves if we understand governmental authority to be tied to
> geographic areas, preferably through contract, but more realistically
> as a legitimization of longstanding tradition.
If you can do it by unanimous contract there is no problem, but in
practice you don't. So how do you get any moral force out of
"legitimization of longstanding tradition?" The longstanding traditions
of this part of the world include lots of things that neither of us
approves of--are they legitimate anyway? How about other parts of the
world?
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> I believe that David Freidman _would_ object to a voluntary market
> monopoly of the type that I have described, on grounds related to
> economic efficiency.
Depends how big it is.
If someone proposed that every landowner in the U.S. agree to set up a
single monopoly government, I would argue against the idea on the
grounds you suggest. If I lost, and did not happen to be a landowner, I
would have no good moral argument against that government but would
still regard it as a mistake--just as I regard lots of actions that
other people take and have a right to take as mistakes.
On the other hand, if someone proposed the same idea on the scale of a
housing development of a square mile or so, I would have no objection to
it. Whether monopoly government on that scale, with very easy exit
options, is a good idea seems to me very much an open question.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
my intention.
> Perhaps you should read what market anarchists from Benjamin R. Tucker to
> Murray Rothbard to Randy Barnett have actually argued, rather than guessing.
But of course I've read all these people, to varying degrees, and I don't think
that any one of them would agree George that he can just dismiss my argument
with handwaving, rather than meet the challenge head-on.
Allow me to repeat the salient point.
I am objecting, in the main, to the very common argument that Rand was
mistaken in her politics, because a voluntary monopolistic government
is some kind of contradiction in terms. I'm arguing that this is not
true, because for Rand, a proper monopolistic government is confined
to a geographical area, and a non-coercive monopoly on the use of force
within a specific area is possible.
George huffs that "None", meaning no anarchists, "has objected to the kind
of purely voluntary system you outline..." And he invites me to read, among
others, Randy Barnett. But read what Barnett has said, regarding Nozick's
notion of an "immaculate conception" of the state:
"Second, and much less importantly, it purported to provide a morally
permissible route by which a monopoly law enforcement agency could
arise without violating rights. This argument was refuted at the time
by thoughtful libertarians (See vol. 1, issue 1 of the Journal of
Libertarian Studies). It has not fared any better in the interim."
http://zolatimes.com/V3.16/barnett.html
I can find more stuff like this, if George really wants to make me do it,
but it'll have to wait until I'm at home to look things up.
> None has objected to the kind of purely voluntary system you outline, and
> none has spoken of "monopoly" in the way that you do. (And I seriously doubt
> whether you have accurately represented David Friedman's position, but I
> will leave that for him to comment on.)
Well, we'll see when he weighs in. Let's ask him a specific question, here:
If a group of people ended up somehow in absolute control of some part
of the globe, and they approached you to assist with the setup of a
new system of rights protection, would you advise them to go with your
ideas on competing defense agencies, or would you advise them to setup
a constitutional republic under which there is a single body which
administers the rules, and alternative defense agencies are
prohibited?
I think he'll have an opinion, contrary to your suggestion that no
anarchist has ever objected to a voluntary monopoly government.
> If anything is "disingenuous," it is to engage in a discussion without the
> slightest idea of what your adversaries have argued for over a century.
Well, if you see that happening, I'm sure you'll be the first to let us know.
But for now, why don't you focus on the argument, rather than dancing aroun
d it?
--Jimbo
David Friedman
Chris Cathcart <cath...@liquidinformation.com> wrote:
> I'm actually not comfortable with this. Taking back what is
> rightfully yours by stealth and not force doesn't seem to generate the
> kind of problems that arise in my mind should you decide to resort to
> force and you meet resistance. Should you and I just be allowed to
> "duke it out" and let the courts sort it out later to determine, after
> the fact, who was in the right? Say that this is a threat to legal or
> social stability to allow people to do this. Or would you not grant
> that it is?
>
> Presumably you are of the view that people *don't* this sort of thing
> precisely *because* of the dangerous consequences it can bring, which
> is why you would have working arrangements that people would defer to
> in order to settle such disputes. I thought that was the whole point
> of your example with Joe Bock and the television set -- that duking it
> out is not going to happen because that would be the unacceptable way
> of handling the dispute.
Correct. More precisely, it will happen rarely.
> The unacceptability of that means of dispute resolution I had taken to
> be at root of Rand's brief dismissal of anarchy, and of your argument
> in favor of the plausibility of anarcho-capitalist institutions to be
> able to handle them. If violence is an accepted or established norm
> of dealing with things, you're not going to have a workable social
> framework no matter what, methinks. I gather you accept that.
Yes, although you can have a workable social framework in which violence
is implicit in the background but rarely employed. Indeed, I think that
describes most workable societies.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
George H. Smith
> But for now, why don't you focus on the argument, rather than dancing
aroun
> d it?
I normally don't respond to those Christians who argue that all atheists are
necessarily immoral, since they don't display the least interest in
understanding their adversaries. I simply tell them to go read something
written by atheists before shooting their mouth off. The same goes with any
objections to market "anarchism" that are equally uniformed.
Why on earth would any libertarian anarchist object (as a matter of justice)
to a voluntary, contractual agreement between a client and a justice agency?
You make it sound as if we would prohibit such "monopolistic" agreements and
compel the client to employ competing agencies instead. This is bonkers,
plain and simple. Would you care to quote so much as *one* passage from any
libertarian anarchist who has ever said such an absurd thing?
When and if you do, then I will respond to your supposed "argument." Good
luck on your snipe hunt. Meanwhile, I will continue to be "disingenuous" by
insisting that you deal with the real world of ideas, instead of making
things up as you go along.
Don Watkins III
>> If a government is built upon a foundation of consent, its
>> legitamite sphere of action is not tied to geographic location --
>> it's tied to the people who have consented.
Jimbo Wales writes:
>Not necessarily -- it depends upon what the people have consented
>_to_.
Granted, but they can't consent to terms that bind me without my consent.
That's the only point I was making.
>In the case of Galt's Gulch, it was explicit (as per my memory, but
>someone may wish to provide more exact details) that the laws of
>Galt's Gulch were derived from the original owner's (i.e. Midas
>Mulligan's) explicit and voluntary relationships with each person
>invited into the Valley. The laws of the Gulch applied within the
>gulch and not outside.
Okay, but I don't think you can use Galt's Gulch as a valid example, because
the legitimacy of the "laws" comes from the fact the the Gulch was Mulligan's
property. The United States is not the property of the government.
>> How can a government have dominion over my land without my consent?
>Well, "dominion" is a loaded word. I don't think "dominion" is a
>valid form of human relationship, do you? So it isn't a very useful
>word to use in discussing what a proper government might look like.
Okay.
>But if you're asking how a government might come to have
>rights-respecting and rights-protecting jurisdiction over land that
>you own, it might happen in any number of legitimate ways.
>For example, in the valley, if you buy land from Midas Mulligan,
>you'll be buying land _under the stipulation_ that rights-respecting
>rights-protection will continue to be provided on that land by his
>government.
Fair enough.
>Presumably, you'd only agree to move there in the first
>place if you were convinced that the rules in place, and the
>institutions in place, were actually likely to protect rather than
>harm your rightful interests.
>If you turned around to sell the land to a third party, you'd of
>course have to disclose what your rights in the land actually are.
>Perhaps you own the mineral rights, but perhaps you sold them to
>someone else. Perhaps you own the jurisdictional rights, or perhaps
>you never bought them from Midas in the first place.
I don't have a problem with any of that. What I objected to was the idea that
consent could be derived by the government saying, in effect, "love it, or
leave it."
The implication there is that IT has a right to or over you and/or your
property without your prior consent. But if the government has no rights --
only delegated powers -- this is not possible.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>> I believe that David Freidman _would_ object to a voluntary market
>> monopoly of the type that I have described, on grounds related to
>> economic efficiency.
David responded:
> Depends how big it is.
*nod*
> If someone proposed that every landowner in the U.S. agree to set up a
> single monopoly government, I would argue against the idea on the
> grounds you suggest. If I lost, and did not happen to be a landowner, I
> would have no good moral argument against that government but would
> still regard it as a mistake--just as I regard lots of actions that
> other people take and have a right to take as mistakes.
Yes, I thought you might say that.
> On the other hand, if someone proposed the same idea on the scale of a
> housing development of a square mile or so, I would have no objection to
> it. Whether monopoly government on that scale, with very easy exit
> options, is a good idea seems to me very much an open question.
I understand what you are saying.
Well, in my current (and suprising to me, since I didn't really anticipate it!)
dispute with George, I think that he would latch on to your saying that you
"would have no good moral argument against that government but would still
regard it as a mistake" as evidence that you would not object to it. If that's
all he meant, then o.k.
But I think that the real point is simply this: if there can be such a
thing as a voluntary monopoly government (on some scale), then simply
calling all monopoly governments coercive, and imaginging that there
can be no rights-respecting way to set one up, is a mistake.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
I wrote:
>> But for now, why don't you focus on the argument, rather than dancing
>> around it?
George H. Smith <smi...@earthlink.net> wrote>:
> I normally don't respond to those Christians who argue that all atheists are
> necessarily immoral, since they don't display the least interest in
> understanding their adversaries. I simply tell them to go read something
> written by atheists before shooting their mouth off. The same goes with any
> objections to market "anarchism" that are equally uniformed.
Uniformed? :-)
> Why on earth would any libertarian anarchist object (as a matter of justice)
> to a voluntary, contractual agreement between a client and a justice agency?
> You make it sound as if we would prohibit such "monopolistic" agreements and
> compel the client to employ competing agencies instead. This is bonkers,
> plain and simple.
It certainly would be, if I ever said it. You can make up positions
and attribute them to me, and we can play around with that for awhile,
but really is that the way you want this argument to go?
Let me just say this: it would surprise me greatly if a "libertarian
anarchist" said that we should prohibit a voluntary monopolistic
government and compel people to employ competing agencies instead.
That would be very bonkers, and quite contrary to standard anarchist
dogmas.
I didn't "make it sound as if" _anything_ other than what I specifically wrote.
> Would you care to quote so much as *one* passage from any
> libertarian anarchist who has ever said such an absurd thing?
Sure, as soon as you quote me *one* passage from anything *I* ever
wrote which said such an absurd thing?
> When and if you do, then I will respond to your supposed "argument." Good
> luck on your snipe hunt. Meanwhile, I will continue to be "disingenuous" by
> insisting that you deal with the real world of ideas, instead of making
> things up as you go along.
George, George, let me repeat myself again for you. This time read
what I am saying, instead of imagining that I'm saying other things
that somehow offend you so badly that you can't bother to respond.
There is a very common argument about Rand's take on government which
says that she implicitly contradicted herself. I think that argument
is mistaken, as follows.
The argument is usually presented in some form or another similar to
that of Roy Childs. And this is that a "noncoercive limited
government" as envisioned by Rand is a contradiction in terms -- that
a limited government would prohibit the formation of competing
"agencies" providing the same service, and that _this_ is coercive.
I think this argument is too simplistic and simply mistaken. One key
is that Rand envisioned governments to be geographically delimited
after the fashion of Galt's Gulch. And the reason that individual
inhabitants of the Gulch can't just up and start their own government
_within the gulch_ is that they voluntarily agreed not to do so, at
the outset. There is, therefore, no _necessary_ contradiction between
a monopoly government in a geographical area, and the notion of a
purely voluntary arrangement.
It is for this reason that I launched the thread by objecting to your
equation of "coercive" and "monopolistic". The two are different and
we need to treat them as different. We can't simply avoid the central
debate of anarchocapitalism versus minarchism by defining the concept
"government" in such a way that minarchism automatically loses.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> That's the only point I was making.
And it's a very good point.
> I don't have a problem with any of that. What I objected to was the idea
> that
> consent could be derived by the government saying, in effect, "love it, or
> leave it."
>
> The implication there is that IT has a right to or over you and/or your
> property without your prior consent. But if the government has no rights --
> only delegated powers -- this is not possible.
That's right, I don't disagree with any of that.
However, I think that things are very complex when it comes to
transitioning from a rights-violating system to a more
rights-respecting system. It's one thing for us to imagine a system
as we'd like it to be -- but it's another thing altogether to figure
out the most rights-respecting way to get there.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
kind enough to send me a copy back so I could post it... I made one
small modification based on a comment he made in an email response.)
>> I'd like to point out that the symmetry fails where the monopoly is
>> geographic in nature, as is traditionally the case, and also the case
>> in the Objectivist view of government.
> But the question is how one defends that view against the challenge
> presented by a competing agency of retaliatory force. The Objectivist
> answer, as I understand it, is that the government uses force to
> suppress that agency, even if it is doing (some of) the same things the
> government is doing.
That's right, the government uses force to suppress that agency, even
if it is doing (some of) the same things the government is doing. It
does so, we are presuming, because that is the way it was set up,
voluntarily, by the citizens.
But the _real_ question is whether this amounts to a rights violation
or not, or, in Objectivist terms, whether this amounts to an
initiation of force or not.
> If the Japanese government is acting justly, it would be wrong to use
> force to stop them. But if the Japanese government is picking people at
> random and torturing them to death, it is appropriate for outsiders to
> use force to stop them.
Yes, we agree completely about that, at least. :-)
We probably also agree, to some extent, that there is (a) room for
variation in systems to a certain degree that doesn't extend so far as
picking people at random and torturing them to death and (b) that even
when a particular government has "crossed the line", there are
prudential reasons why it might or might not be appropriate for
outsiders to use force to stop them.
> Obviously geographical sovereignty provides one possible partial
> solution to the problem of multiple agencies involved in the same
> dispute. It isn't a complete solution because not all disputes have a
> well defined geographical location. My system of pairwise contracts
> between agencies provides another possible solution.
That's right. One of the problems that geographical monopoly partly
solves is the problem of multiple agencies. One of the possible
problems that it raises is certain types of dangers inherent in
centralized authority. I don't think we disagree about any of that.
> If you can do it by unanimous contract there is no problem, but in
> practice you don't. So how do you get any moral force out of
> "legitimization of longstanding tradition?" The longstanding traditions
> of this part of the world include lots of things that neither of us
> approves of--are they legitimate anyway? How about other parts of the
> world?
No, of course not, but I think you spoke well when you talked about
"minimizing rights violations" versus "eliminating them completely".
In thinking about transitioning from our current system to a better
system, longstanding traditions can of course play a useful role in
helping us to minimize rights violations.
As an example that's hopefully not too far afield: Many areas which
would have a system of deed convenants and restrictions do not, or
anyway have fewer than they would, because the government has
inappropriately usurped land-use decisionmaking through the use of
zoning laws. How do we transition from the current coercive system to
a voluntary system?
There are many possible ways of doing it, and they all have their
pro's and con's. One thing to do is to unilaterally declare all
property in the area to be without restriction, forcing the residents
to try to negotiate to where they really want to be. Another plan,
which has some big benefits in my opinion, is to simply convert the
existing zoning restrictions into property rights, and to permit
people to contract from there to where they really want to be.
Coase tells us that in the absence of transactions costs, we'll end up
with efficient land uses in either scenario, right? (Not a rhetorical
question, my memory is fading on this point.) But with transactions
costs, it strikes me as better to assume that the imperfect non-market
give-and-take of democracy has given rise to a land-use-restriction
paradigm that's at least partially consistent with what people want.
Additionally, converting existing zoning restrictions _may_ in many
cases reduce the amount of redistribution of wealth that the changes
create. (But, there can be some pretty obvious and important
exceptions to this, depending on how "bad" the existing zoning laws
were.)
Did this example help? What I wanted to illustrate with it is how we
might reasonably draw on traditional structures, even though they are
of course inevitably tainted with coercion, to try to minimize rights
violations going forward.
--Jimbo
Chris Cathcart
d.jw...@joey.bomis.com>...
> Surely David will acknowledge that there would be a significant
> difference between Japan attempting to mediate a dispute in the middle
> of Kansas, as compared to an imaginary situation in which Chicago has
> 5 "defense agencies" in competition.
That's imaginary?
:-)
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Chris Cathcart
$P21.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
[my remarks snipped]
> I don't mean to be overly literal in construing your initial remarks, but
> all actions are the actions of individual human beings, so only individuals
> can enforce the rules of justice.
>
> In speaking of limitations on individuals to enforce the rules of justice, I
> assume you are referring to (a) the classic problem (which goes back at
> least as far as Aristotle) of acting as judge in one's own case; and (b) the
> need for institutional safeguards and objective procedures in the juridical
> realm.
>
> I don't deny that these are legitimate issues, but they have nothing to do
> with the fundamental right in question. It is true that we encounter
> knowledge problems in a complex society that we would not encounter in a
> Crusoe/Friday scenario, but these have to do with how the "executive right"
> would best be implemented, not with the validity of the right itself.
Okay, on this I think I've come to agree.
(Yep, that's all I needed to say. :-)
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EricK
> to abide by the laws there -- voluntarily. The governmental unit has
> as its jurisdiction the geographical area of the Gulch. If Andy
> Anarchist comes in, agreeing to the rules, and then crows that his
> rights are being violated when he gets in trouble for attempting to
> jail Mindy Minarchist in his basement, he's just wrong about who is
> doing the rights violating.
It depends on what rights Andy is claiming are being violated.
How about using a more realistic example instead of Galt's Gulch.
Let's say Andy buys some land in within a certain jurisdiction and
agrees to abide by reasonable rules that exist. He agrees to pay a
flat 5 percent income tax fee to fund government services. Next year,
the government decides to raise the tax to 10 percent and imposes a
social security retirement scheme for the elderly folk within that
jurisdiction, which extracts another 10 percent from Andy's income.
Also, he was allowed to smoke weed that he uses to relieve his nausea
but the following year the government has plans to ban this option for
all of the residents. Can Andy and those landowners who disagree with
the new laws lawfully opt out and fund a new minimal governing body to
protect their rights?
-Eric
Don Watkins III
>> I don't have a problem with any of that. What I objected to was the idea
>> that
>> consent could be derived by the government saying, in effect, "love it, or
>> leave it."
>> The implication there is that IT has a right to or over you and/or your
>> property without your prior consent. But if the government has no rights
>> only delegated powers -- this is not possible.
Jimbo Wales writes:
>That's right, I don't disagree with any of that.
>However, I think that things are very complex when it comes to
>transitioning from a rights-violating system to a more
>rights-respecting system. It's one thing for us to imagine a system
>as we'd like it to be -- but it's another thing altogether to figure
>out the most rights-respecting way to get there.
You've got that right. In fact, I think that's probably most important gap in
the Objectivist politics...how to get there from here.
The ARIans want a short-cut, and so they do away with consent. The Government
at any price crowd, I like to call them. Just goes to show how far from
Objectivism their philosophy really is.
Don Watkins
*******************************************************
My homepage
http://www.geocities.com/mrgalt.geo/
*******************************************************
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>> Think of Galt's Gulch -- in order to enter the valley, one must agree
>> to abide by the laws there -- voluntarily. The governmental unit has
>> as its jurisdiction the geographical area of the Gulch. If Andy
>> Anarchist comes in, agreeing to the rules, and then crows that his
>> rights are being violated when he gets in trouble for attempting to
>> jail Mindy Minarchist in his basement, he's just wrong about who is
>> doing the rights violating.
EricK <ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> How about using a more realistic example instead of Galt's Gulch.
> Let's say Andy buys some land in within a certain jurisdiction and
> agrees to abide by reasonable rules that exist. He agrees to pay a
> flat 5 percent income tax fee to fund government services. Next year,
> the government decides to raise the tax to 10 percent and imposes a
> social security retirement scheme for the elderly folk within that
> jurisdiction, which extracts another 10 percent from Andy's income.
> Also, he was allowed to smoke weed that he uses to relieve his nausea
> but the following year the government has plans to ban this option for
> all of the residents. Can Andy and those landowners who disagree with
> the new laws lawfully opt out and fund a new minimal governing body to
> protect their rights?
I think that Andy and those landowners who disagree with the new laws
can _morally_ opt out. Obviously, it usually isn't _legal_ to opt out
of tyranny. :-) That's the whole problem with tyranny -- the tyrant
controls what's legal or not, and in a bad way.
I'm assuming that these new laws were passed in contradiction to the
Constitution of the area. But if the new laws are consistent with the
original agreement, it's hard to see what justification Any and
friends would have for engaging in open revolt. They could leave, or
move, or vote, or whatever else is part of the original agreement.
(And of course, there's also a necessary caveat here about some
injustices being so grave that even prior "consent" can't justify
them. But the things you mentioned don't really rise to that level.
I think that if Andy consented to those things, they'd be legitimate.)
--Jimbo
George H. Smith
[Smith]
> > Why on earth would any libertarian anarchist object (as a matter of
justice)
> > to a voluntary, contractual agreement between a client and a justice
agency?
> > You make it sound as if we would prohibit such "monopolistic" agreements
and
> > compel the client to employ competing agencies instead. This is bonkers,
> > plain and simple.
>
[Wales]
> It certainly would be, if I ever said it. You can make up positions
> and attribute them to me, and we can play around with that for awhile,
> but really is that the way you want this argument to go?
Here is what I wrote:
"All that anarchists have objected to are "coercive monopolies," such as we
find in every government that has ever existed on the face of the earth."
Wales replied:
"I believe that you are mistaken about what anarchists might object to."
Pardon me for taking you at your word.
And what was your point about how an anarchist would object to Galt's Gulch,
owing to the absence of competing agencies? When I remarked that Galt's
Gulch is an example of a voluntary, anarchistic society, you replied:
"This is a very curious form of anarchism, then. It's a form of anarchism
where there is one and only one government, and which permits no others to
engage in the provision of the same services."
Again, my apologies for assuming that you meant what you wrote.
The only reason that no other agency is "permitted" here is because the
clients have no desire to hire anyone else. This is like saying that, in
hiring a single housekeeper, I am not "permitting" any competing
housekeepers to enter my home and clean it up, against my will. "Ah," you
may reply, "this is a curious form of competition indeed! I have hired only
ONE housekeeper, and will not permit anyone else to intrude upon this
monopoly."
Give me a break. This has nothing whatever to do with a claim of political
sovereignty over a given geographical area. If you own an acre of land and
hire the Alpha justice agency to protect it, and I own a neighboring acre of
land but hire the Omega justice agency instead, then it is quite absurd --
at least if we have any regard at all for the history of political
discourse -- to call these monopolistic sovereign "governments,". since they
can be hired and fired at will. This is never what the terms "government" or
"state" have meant.
But if you wish to defend market anarchism, while calling this a defense of
government, then be my guest. Perhaps I can also say that my atheism makes
me a good Christian. After all, who said there cannot be an atheistic
Christian? Like Humpty Dumpty, I will simply claim that when I use a word,
it means precisely what I want it to mean, nothing less and nothing more.
Why encumber ourselves with the conventional meaning of words, when a simple
change of labels can make us appear oh-so-much-more respectable?
> Let me just say this: it would surprise me greatly if a "libertarian
> anarchist" said that we should prohibit a voluntary monopolistic
> government and compel people to employ competing agencies instead.
> That would be very bonkers, and quite contrary to standard anarchist
> dogmas.
This is not a "monopolistic" government in any meaningful sense, because it
can be fired at the will of those who hire it. Free market competition means
that you can select from among alternatives; it does *not* mean that, having
made a choice, you have need for only one provider. If I choose to eat no
candy other than Hershey bars, this doesn't mean that Hershey enjoys a
"monopoly" on my sweet tooth. It simply means that I invariably choose
Hershey bars from among many market options.
A "monopolistic" government is precisely one that permits you no options; it
is one that will forcibly prevent you from employing an alternative justice
agency. Your use of "monopoly," in the present context, does nothing more
than confuse matters.
> There is a very common argument about Rand's take on government which
> says that she implicitly contradicted herself. I think that argument
> is mistaken, as follows.
>
> The argument is usually presented in some form or another similar to
> that of Roy Childs. And this is that a "noncoercive limited
> government" as envisioned by Rand is a contradiction in terms -- that
> a limited government would prohibit the formation of competing
> "agencies" providing the same service, and that _this_ is coercive.
>
> I think this argument is too simplistic and simply mistaken. One key
> is that Rand envisioned governments to be geographically delimited
> after the fashion of Galt's Gulch. And the reason that individual
> inhabitants of the Gulch can't just up and start their own government
> _within the gulch_ is that they voluntarily agreed not to do so, at
> the outset. There is, therefore, no _necessary_ contradiction between
> a monopoly government in a geographical area, and the notion of a
> purely voluntary arrangement.
Please give the relevant cites where Rand argued this way. This was not her
argument.
>
> It is for this reason that I launched the thread by objecting to your
> equation of "coercive" and "monopolistic". The two are different and
> we need to treat them as different. We can't simply avoid the central
> debate of anarchocapitalism versus minarchism by defining the concept
> "government" in such a way that minarchism automatically loses.
>
It is not "we" who are defining "government" as a coercive monopoly. This is
the way the term has been employed throughout the history of political
thought. You may wish to ignore 2500 years of political discourse, but don't
expect others to adopt your idiosyncratic usage.
And, btw, many Objectivists have defended precisely the kind of "coercive
monopoly" that you claim is so unfair. And this is what has given rise to
the anarchist/government dispute that has raged over the past several
decades. Why do you suppose Rand objected so vigorously to what she
misleadingly called "competing governments"? According to your position, she
should have had no objection whatsoever, so long as all arrangements are
voluntary. Kind of makes you think, doesn't it?
To repeat: If you wish to defend private protection agencies (call them
what you will), ones that are purely voluntary and allow for the right of
secession (which, as Lincoln correctly pointed out, is "the essence of
anarchy"), then welcome to the anarchist camp. We needn't quibble any longer
over labels. If you wish to call your private company a "voluntary
government" -- a few other anarchists have also used this label -- I can
live with that, since it is the principle that counts. But don't expect
Objectivists to line up on your behalf. This has never been the traditional
Objectivist position.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> ap in
> the Objectivist politics...how to get there from here.
Well, I don't like the word "gap" in this context, nor am I sure that
it is the task of _philosophy_ (as opposed to _political science_) to
answer such questions.
And I wonder if maybe a more important need is for Objectivist
scholars to do some work in the area of describing in more detail what
_there_ looks like. It would be interesting to see specific proposals
or at least arguments about proposals.
> The ARIans want a short-cut, and so they do away with consent. The Gover
> nment
> at any price crowd, I like to call them. Just goes to show how far from
> Objectivism their philosophy really is.
Are you sure about this? Who is in favor of doing away with consent?
Perhaps there have been some developments that I'm unaware of.
The reason I ask is that I think sometimes accusations like this get
tossed around too lightly. Consent is not necessary for the
enforcement of rights. We don't need to get consent forms signed by
murderers before we lock them up, for example.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
He seems to think that I'm talking about a single individual or two banding
together and calling themselves a government. I'm not. I'm talking about a
full-fledged government, voluntarily formed, with a potentially large popul
ation
base and no right of secession.
George H. Smith <smi...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> The only reason that no other agency is "permitted" here is because the
> clients have no desire to hire anyone else. This is like saying that, in
> hiring a single housekeeper, I am not "permitting" any competing
> housekeepers to enter my home and clean it up, against my will. "Ah," you
> may reply, "this is a curious form of competition indeed! I have hired only
> ONE housekeeper, and will not permit anyone else to intrude upon this
> monopoly."
Galt's Gulch has a population of, let's imagine, 20,000. Or 200,000.
Or 2,000,000. Under the constitution of Galt's Gulch, competing
defense agencies are not permitted within its borders. And it grows
by acquiring land -- or at least acquiring jurisdictional rights -- in
a just manner, either by seizing them from the tyrants who were there,
or by negotiating for peaceful annexation with the existing
inhabitants.
This government, this Galt's Gulch, maintains a monopoly within its
region. It does not permit competition within its region. And it
also, barring certain justified defensive military measures, does not
attempt to enforce its laws outside its region.
Under the constitution, there is a legislature and a court system and
an executive branch. Some decisions are made by representatives
elected by the people. Other decisions are made with reference to the
constitution. You may imagine a system similar to the U.S. system,
but with additional safeguards for rights.
This government hires judges and police and soldiers. It has courts
and prisons and military bases.
A change of government can not come unilaterally at the whim of any
individual -- it has to come through the political process, which is
as long and torturous as you might expect from a complex system.
While it is of course true in some extended sense that this government
may be hired and fired at the will of its owners, it is no more true
than it is for any constitutional democratic government lacking
popular support. Certainly, individuals living within this society
can't just wake up one morning and decide to choose a different
defense agency, as typically envisioned by anarchocapitalists.
As to secession -- it is specifically mentioned, we may imagine, as
something that all parties agree not to do except in the case of the
government violating the constitution. Certainly, no individual can
simply _opt out_ or _hire someone else_. What you can do, is move
out.
That's a government, and only a torture of the language would say that
it isn't.
George may claim that in 2500 years, no one has ever called something
like that a government, but I think everyone will see that this would
be a rather bizarre claim.
> If you own an acre of land and hire the Alpha justice agency to
> protect it, and I own a neighboring acre of land but hire the Omega
> justice agency instead, then it is quite absurd -- at least if we
> have any regard at all for the history of political discourse -- to
> call these monopolistic sovereign "governments,". since they can be
> hired and fired at will. This is never what the terms "government"
> or "state" have meant.
Oh, I agree completely. But this is not all that I am envisioning,
nor have I written anything that would plausibly lead you to conclude
that it is.
You can huff and puff all you like, claiming that I'm using words in a
strange manner, but I most assuredly am not.
> A "monopolistic" government is precisely one that permits you no options; it
> is one that will forcibly prevent you from employing an alternative justice
> agency. Your use of "monopoly," in the present context, does nothing more
> than confuse matters.
But I think you are the one who is confused here. You're confused by
unnecessarily entangling two separate concepts: "coercion" and
"government".
>> I think this argument is too simplistic and simply mistaken. One key
>> is that Rand envisioned governments to be geographically delimited
>> after the fashion of Galt's Gulch. And the reason that individual
>> inhabitants of the Gulch can't just up and start their own government
>> _within the gulch_ is that they voluntarily agreed not to do so, at
>> the outset. There is, therefore, no _necessary_ contradiction between
>> a monopoly government in a geographical area, and the notion of a
>> purely voluntary arrangement.
>
> Please give the relevant cites where Rand argued this way. This was not her
> argument.
See Atlas Shrugged for her general description of the valid founding
of Galt's Gulch. If you're looking for something more specific, I'm
afraid that you won't find it: she essentially ignored the anarchist
argument completely.
> It is not "we" who are defining "government" as a coercive monopoly. This is
> the way the term has been employed throughout the history of political
> thought. You may wish to ignore 2500 years of political discourse, but don't
> expect others to adopt your idiosyncratic usage.
Oh, I don't have an idiosyncratic usage here at all.
Look: consider an organization as I outlined it above. It exists
within a single geographical area. It has laws. It has police,
judges, military, legislators, courts, etc.. It has a constitution
which permits some kinds of change via a democratic process, but
forbids other kinds of change via constitutional protections of
rights. It is a monopoly _within its borders_, and it uses force as
necessary to maintain that monopoly.
But it does all of these things through the explicit assent of the
people living there -- all others were never permitted into the
country in the first place. In order to come in, you have to read the
constitution and sign off on it. Later, if you object but haven't
committed any crimes, you're free to go, or free to work within the
system for change.
Now, you don't want to call that a government. But that's a very
strange abuse of language. It's a government. It's not even a
"borderline" case. It's a clear instance of the concept.
> And, btw, many Objectivists have defended precisely the kind of "coercive
> monopoly" that you claim is so unfair.
Of course they have, George. Is this supposed to mean something to
me? Do you imagine that I'm taking polls to find out what is true?
--Jimbo
EricK
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales wrote in message ...
>> How about using a more realistic example instead of Galt's Gulch.
>> Let's say Andy buys some land in within a certain jurisdiction and
>> agrees to abide by reasonable rules that exist. He agrees to pay a
>> flat 5 percent income tax fee to fund government services. Next year,
>> the government decides to raise the tax to 10 percent and imposes a
>> social security retirement scheme for the elderly folk within that
>> jurisdiction, which extracts another 10 percent from Andy's income.
>> Also, he was allowed to smoke weed that he uses to relieve his nausea
>> but the following year the government has plans to ban this option for
>> all of the residents. Can Andy and those landowners who disagree with
>> the new laws lawfully opt out and fund a new minimal governing body to
>> protect their rights?
>I think that Andy and those landowners who disagree with the new laws
can _morally_ opt out. Obviously, it usually isn't _legal_ to opt out
of tyranny. :-) That's the whole problem with tyranny -- the tyrant
controls what's legal or not, and in a bad way.
So you would support a contractual type of scenario where it is legal for
landowners to privately fund law enforcement agencies and renew contracts if
necessary?
>I'm assuming that these new laws were passed in contradiction to the
Constitution of the area. But if the new laws are consistent with the
original agreement, it's hard to see what justification Any and
friends would have for engaging in open revolt. They could leave, or
move, or vote, or whatever else is part of the original agreement.
You say Constitution, I say contract. Forget voting. If the landowners are
dissatisfied with law enforcement and have the moral right to opt out, then
they should have the legal right to renew the terms of agreement.
Libertarian anarchists envision a society where it is lawful to change
governing agencies when desirable and legitimate.
>(And of course, there's also a necessary caveat here about some
injustices being so grave that even prior "consent" can't justify
them. But the things you mentioned don't really rise to that level.
I think that if Andy consented to those things, they'd be legitimate.)
I think you raise an interesting point of the validity of certain contracts.
At what point are contracts morally unenforceable? Can I quit a job early
even though I may have agreed to work for the next 4 years? You can as a
civilian but not as a GI.
-Eric
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
...
> That's a government, and only a torture of the language would say that
> it isn't.
And the components of a defense agency that handle disputes between its
own clients could be structured so that calling them a government would
not be tortuous, either. But I think it would be confusing for me to do
so, without explaining my point.
> George may claim that in 2500 years, no one has ever called something
> like that a government, but I think everyone will see that this would
> be a rather bizarre claim.
Well, leave me out. I see no objection to calling what you describe a
"government", but I have never before seen anyone talk about a government
that arises by actual (as opposed to hypothetical or tacit) contract.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
George H. Smith
> Perhaps I am beginning to see where George and I are miscommunicating.
>
> He seems to think that I'm talking about a single individual or two
banding
> together and calling themselves a government. I'm not. I'm talking about
a
> full-fledged government, voluntarily formed, with a potentially large
popul
> ation
> base and no right of secession.
How can the right of secession be legitimately denied? If you enter into a
voluntary contract with a "government," and if you later decide that it has
violated or reneged on its contractual obligations, or performed them with
intolerable inefficiency, then you would most certainly have a right to
"secede." This means that you would declare the contract to have been
violated by the other party and therefore to be no longer binding on you.
We also have the old problem of which contracts are and are not enforceable.
For reasons I have explained elsewhere, I do not think "slavery contracts"
are enforceable, because no legitimate titles have been exchanged. (The mere
fact that you can write words on a piece of paper and call it a "contract"
doesn't necessarily mean anything, unless a legitimate transfer of titles is
possible.)
Nor do I think "specific performance" contracts are enforceable in most
cases (with some exceptions that have been recognized in the common law
tradition). If I pay a kid $10 to mow my lawn, but he fails to do so, then I
can recover my money, but I cannot point a gun at his head and force him to
mow my lawn. (This, as Rothbard has argued, is a version of a "slave
contract" and is therefore null and void.)
As someone else has already pointed out (sorry, I don't recall who), we are
now in the realm of which contracts can and cannot be legitimately enforced.
> Galt's Gulch has a population of, let's imagine, 20,000. Or 200,000.
> Or 2,000,000. Under the constitution of Galt's Gulch, competing
> defense agencies are not permitted within its borders. And it grows
> by acquiring land -- or at least acquiring jurisdictional rights -- in
> a just manner, either by seizing them from the tyrants who were there,
> or by negotiating for peaceful annexation with the existing
> inhabitants.
If all landowners agree to this "constitution" (covenant might be a better
word), the question then becomes one of its specific terms, and their
enforceability. Suppose, for example, that one person sells his land, but
only on the condition that the buyer subscribes to the "government" in
perpetuity. Is this kind of restrictive covenant enforceable? Not with an
absolute transfer of property title, in which case the new owner would have
absolute say-so over which protection agency he wishes to hire. Any such
agreement would have to be a kind of usufruct, in which the original owner
agrees to the conditional use of what ultimately remains his land.
Could the original owners sign a covenant wherein each agrees never to sell
his land to anyone who refuses to abide by the terms of the original
constitution? Yes, they could agree to this, but this would merely
constitute an unenforceable exchange of promises, not a formal, enforceable
contract which involves an exchange of property titles. So long as you have
title in your land, then what you do with is ultimately your business,
whatever promises you make to others. Only by alienating title (or some
aspect thereof, as in usufruct) would coercive enforcement be possible --
and I suspect (though I haven't given the matter much thought) that a
perpetual covenant if this kind would be possible only by transferring title
to the agency in question. But why would anyone agree to this, when the same
services could be obtained under much more favorable conditions?
Theoretically, however, I suppose it would be possible in a society where
people are eager to surrender their liberties.
To illustrate some of the problems here, consider this hypothetical
scenario. The owners of Disneyland, disgusted by the number of people who
have been spitting on their sidewalks, require every person to sign the
following agreement before being admitted to Disneyland. It specifies that,
should you be caught spitting on the sidewalk (video cameras are
everywhere), you agree to be immediately executed by a firing squad
consisting of the Seven Dwarfs.
Well, you sign the agreement because your kids really want to go to
Disneyland. But after a while you feel that this was a silly provision, so
you spit on a sidewalk just for the hell of it. Sure enough, you are
immediately apprehended by Mickey and Minnie Mouse, who handcuff you, and
take you to a tribunal presided over by Goofy. He shows you video tape of
your crime (from three different cameras), pronounces you guilty as
charged -- and you are then trotted off to be shot, according to the terms
of an agreement that you signed and expressly consented to.
So is this an enforceable contract, in your book. And if not, why not?
> This government, this Galt's Gulch, maintains a monopoly within its
> region. It does not permit competition within its region. And it
> also, barring certain justified defensive military measures, does not
> attempt to enforce its laws outside its region.
What does it mean to say that legal competition is not permitted in Galt's
Gulch? What kind of contract did the landowners sign with the protection
agency anyway? Did it say, in effect, "The Omega Agency can never be fired
or replaced, no matter what it does"? If so, this would constitute an
unenforceable slave contract, even assuming that people were stupid enough
to sign it.
In short, far more detail is required to make your example plausible.
Perhaps you will say that no competition is permitted so long as the agency
in questions upholds its side of the agreement. So who is to judge whether
or not the contract has been violated? If I, as a landowner in Galt's Gulch,
feel that the protection agency has exceeded the bounds of the original
contract, then I would certainly be justified in firing my supposed
protector.
Given your denial of the right of secession, your "voluntary government" is
looking more and more like the kind of coercive monopoly that we have come
to know and love as real "governments." You seem to be arguing that there is
some way for people en masse to permanently sign away their natural rights
and liberties to a government. This has indeed been the standard approach of
various social contractarians, but I have never encountered a workable model
that is consistent with a libertarian theory of individual rights, in which
the concept of "inalienable rights" has typically played a major role.
Don Watkins III
>> You've got that right. In fact, I think that's probably most important g
>> ap in
>> the Objectivist politics...how to get there from here.
Jimbo Wales writes:
>Well, I don't like the word "gap" in this context, nor am I sure that
>it is the task of _philosophy_ (as opposed to _political science_) to
>answer such questions.
You may not like it, but there is a gap for this reason: there is good reason
to think that we can't get from here to there. Not morally, anyhow.
Why? Well, there are a number of reasons. Some of them, David Friedman has
described. Others, guys like George Smith and Greg Swann have pointed out.
Now, I'd like to think those difficulties can be overcome -- I don't like being
an anarchist, although I suppose I am that, by default. However, as it stands,
those difficulties have NOT been overcome.
If you want specifics, feel free to ask.
>And I wonder if maybe a more important need is for Objectivist
>scholars to do some work in the area of describing in more detail what
>_there_ looks like. It would be interesting to see specific proposals
>or at least arguments about proposals.
With this, I agree. Around here, Jim Prescott has a lot of interesting things
to say about what "there" would (should?) look like. Other than his approach,
which I'm not too fond of, I've seen very little in that area.
>> The ARIans want a short-cut, and so they do away with consent. The Gover
>> nment
>> at any price crowd, I like to call them. Just goes to show how far from
>> Objectivism their philosophy really is.
>Are you sure about this?
Yes.
>Who is in favor of doing away with consent?
De facto? Every ARIan around here, to my knowledge. Of course, they'll deny
it, but that's a seperate issue.
>Perhaps there have been some developments that I'm unaware of.
I suppose you haven't been around here for a while (not during my tenure,
anyway). Check the archives (try "consent") if you're interested.
>The reason I ask is that I think sometimes accusations like this get
>tossed around too lightly.
Probably. But not in this case.
>Consent is not necessary for the
>enforcement of rights. We don't need to get consent forms signed by
>murderers before we lock them up, for example.
Oh, well that's a different issue, IMO. What I'm talking about is the consent
of those who don't initiate force.
Now, as far as the morality of coercive retribution (apart from cases where all
parties consent): while I have problems with that, it's not relevant to the
point I was making with regard to the Government at any Pricers.
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> But I think that the real point is simply this: if there can be such a
> thing as a voluntary monopoly government (on some scale), then simply
> calling all monopoly governments coercive, and imaginging that there
> can be no rights-respecting way to set one up, is a mistake.
On the other hand, if the probability of a voluntary monopoly government
on the scale that people are usually thinking of when they talk about
governments is vanishingly small--and it is--then describing monopoly
government as coercive is more nearly correct than most things people
say--and close enough for almost all practical purposes. One can deal
with the odd case either by saying that there are exceptions, or by
saying that that isn't what you mean by a government--just an odd and
unlikely system of private rights enforcement that happens to look very
much like a government.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> That's right, the government uses force to suppress that agency, even
> if it is doing (some of) the same things the government is doing. It
> does so, we are presuming, because that is the way it was set up,
> voluntarily, by the citizens.
You are assuming that your "government" was set up by unanimous consent
of those on behalf of whom it is exercising retaliatory force. Some of
us call that a rights enforcement agency.
> We probably also agree, to some extent, that there is (a) room for
> variation in systems to a certain degree that doesn't extend so far as
> picking people at random and torturing them to death and (b) that even
> when a particular government has "crossed the line", there are
> prudential reasons why it might or might not be appropriate for
> outsiders to use force to stop them.
Yes.
> > If you can do it by unanimous contract there is no problem, but in
> > practice you don't. So how do you get any moral force out of
> > "legitimization of longstanding tradition?" The longstanding traditions
> > of this part of the world include lots of things that neither of us
> > approves of--are they legitimate anyway? How about other parts of the
> > world?
>
> No, of course not, but I think you spoke well when you talked about
> "minimizing rights violations" versus "eliminating them completely".
But I also at least suggested, without discussing, the distinction
between minimizing the total of rights violation, which might include
some deliberate rights violation by the good guys (taxation, for
example), and the alternative of good guys not violating any rights
while recognizing that there would still be some rights violation they
failed to prevent. The former is Nozick's "Utilitarianism of rights,"
the latter is a realistic view of the result of treating rights as a
side constraint.
I have no real problem with someone who, having concluded that I am
wrong about the relative effectiveness of competing vs monopoly models
of rights enforcement, argues in favor of limited government on the
grounds that it violates some rights, but fewer than any alternative.
But that isn't a position that, in my experience, many Objectivists are
willing to take.
And note that if you do take that position, you have to think about
whether you are willing to take it at the individual level as well.
Suppose both A and B have property which is threatened by robbers, but
B's property is easier to get at so an attempt against it is much more
likely. A owns a gun. The gun is worth $100, the savings in expected
losses from robbery if the gun is transferred to B is $200. Do you, C,
take a convenient opportunity to steal the gun from A and give it to B
(for some reason A isn't willing to sell it or lend it)? Doing so
increases rights violations by $100 of theft (by you), decreases them by
$200, hence produces a net reduction in rights violations of $100. Do
you do it? Should you?
I actually have a piece on this general issue. It's webbed at:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Metarules/Metarules.html
But in order to use the argument you are sketching to justify anything
close to a monopoly government along the lines Rand envisioned, you also
have to be claiming that the rights distribution corresponding to a
monopoly government of realistic size--the U.S., for instance--is close
to what would have emerged by unanimous consent from private bargaining.
Since no such event has ever been observed, that seems a bit
implausible. Deed restrictions and the like, on the other hand, have
been observed.
> Did this example help? What I wanted to illustrate with it is how we
> might reasonably draw on traditional structures, even though they are
> of course inevitably tainted with coercion, to try to minimize rights
> violations going forward.
Sure. I'm a conservative too, in that sense--I think there is much to be
said for incremental change. But I don't think that answers the question
of whether the P.O.G. is or is not ultimately consistent with
Objectivist (or libertarian) ethics.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> George huffs that "None", meaning no anarchists, "has objected to the kind
> of purely voluntary system you outline..." And he invites me to read, among
> others, Randy Barnett. But read what Barnett has said, regarding Nozick's
> notion of an "immaculate conception" of the state:
>
> "Second, and much less importantly, it purported to provide a morally
> permissible route by which a monopoly law enforcement agency could
> arise without violating rights. This argument was refuted at the time
> by thoughtful libertarians (See vol. 1, issue 1 of the Journal of
> Libertarian Studies). It has not fared any better in the interim."
> http://zolatimes.com/V3.16/barnett.html
But Nozick's notion, if you are referring to the passage I think you are
(the step to the ultraminimal state and from there up, in _Anarchy,
State and Utopia_) was not of a state created by unanimous assent, so I
don't see the relevance of the passage to your argument with George.
> > (And I seriously doubt
> > whether you have accurately represented David Friedman's position, but I
> > will leave that for him to comment on.)
>
> Well, we'll see when he weighs in. Let's ask him a specific question, here:
> If a group of people ended up somehow in absolute control of some part
> of the globe, and they approached you to assist with the setup of a
> new system of rights protection, would you advise them to go with your
> ideas on competing defense agencies, or would you advise them to setup
> a constitutional republic under which there is a single body which
> administers the rules, and alternative defense agencies are
> prohibited?
The former, assuming they had morally acquired that control and the
environment was one in which I believed that the competing system would
be stable.
But I can imagine circumstances where my best guess was that it would
not be stable, either because it would be unable to solve the public
good problem of protecting itself from nations or because economies of
scale in enforcement would give you too few agencies for the competitive
system to work. In that case I expect I would advise them to set up a
monopoly system, with the best internal controls they could design to
keep it honest. It's a second best solution, but better than a "best"
solution that doesn't work in that particular environment.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> It is for this reason that I launched the thread by objecting to your
> equation of "coercive" and "monopolistic". The two are different and
> we need to treat them as different. We can't simply avoid the central
> debate of anarchocapitalism versus minarchism by defining the concept
> "government" in such a way that minarchism automatically loses.
It doesn't automatically lose--at most, it automatically involves rights
violations.
Suppose we consider, realistically, a minarchy that was not established
by unanimous consent of all property owners in the area over which it
claims monopoly jurisdiction. So far as I can tell, that is what Rand
was considering--I know of no passage in her writing that suggests
reducing government down to a million Galt's gulches, which is the scale
on which unanimity is a practical option.
Further suppose that I am wrong both about the economics of competing
enforcement agencies and the economics of limited government. Suppose,
in other words, that my system really would end up with the sort of
continual warfare that unthinking critics think it obviously would
produce, and that there really was a way of designing a monopoly
government that did a very good job of protecting and not violating
rights, aside from its activities maintaining its monopoly.
On those assumptions, we are choosing between a system with continual
large scale rights violation (mine) and a system with continual low
level rights violation (minarchy). Don't you think most people would
prefer the latter?
What is true is that, once people have opted for the latter system, they
will have a problem making arguments that presume that the right answer
involves no rights violations at all.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
both of whom I respect and neither of whom I am much in the habit of
agreeing with.
There are two different, although probably not unrelated, grounds on
which people argue for or against anarchy. One is moral--typically
natural rights or something similar--and one is consequential. I got to
anarchy through the moral argument and continue to dabble in it
occasionally, but I feel much more confident about, and interested in,
the consequential argument.
From the moral standpoint, Jimbo's voluntary state is merely a very
peculiar and improbable form of anarchy. That is George's point, and I
agree with it.
From the consequentialist standpoint, Jimbo's voluntary state is merely
a state with a very odd and unlikely history. Once it exists, the
arguments for why a state will or will not produce desirable outcomes
apply to it as to other states. That is, or at least should be, Jimbo's
point, and I agree with it.
I discussed the limitations of that second statement, in the context of
proprietary communities vs local governments, in an old _Liberty_
article, webbed at:
http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Libertarian/Capitalist_Trucks.html
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
"George H. Smith" <smi...@earthlink.net> wrote:
> Perhaps you will say that no competition is permitted so long as the agency
> in questions upholds its side of the agreement.
That is what he did say.
> So who is to judge whether
> or not the contract has been violated? If I, as a landowner in Galt's Gulch,
> feel that the protection agency has exceeded the bounds of the original
> contract, then I would certainly be justified in firing my supposed
> protector.
Surely not. You don't want to say that whether you *are* justified
depends on whether you *feel that* the protection agency has exceed the
bounds of the original contract. Whether you are justified depends on
whether it in fact has exceeded those bounds. Jimbo is proposing a
"government" that doesn't exceed the bounds, and arguing that you are
then morally obligated to abide by your contract giving it a monopoly
over exercising retaliatory force on your behalf.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Don Watkins III <aynr...@aol.com> wrote:
> >Perhaps there have been some developments that I'm unaware of.
>
> I suppose you haven't been around here for a while (not during my tenure,
> anyway). Check the archives (try "consent") if you're interested.
Jimbo has been on an extended vacation from h.p.o., lasting several
years. Fortunately it seems to have ended.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> > The ARIans want a short-cut, and so they do away with consent. The Gover
> > nment
> > at any price crowd, I like to call them. Just goes to show how far from
> > Objectivism their philosophy really is.
>
> Are you sure about this? Who is in favor of doing away with consent?
> Perhaps there have been some developments that I'm unaware of.
>
> The reason I ask is that I think sometimes accusations like this get
> tossed around too lightly. Consent is not necessary for the
> enforcement of rights. We don't need to get consent forms signed by
> murderers before we lock them up, for example.
Almost everyone in the argument agrees with that (the exceptions being
the ones who don't think anyone has the right to exercise retaliatory
force).
The relevant "consent" is consent to delegate your right to engage in
retaliatory force to the government. In my experience, at least, almost
all Objectivists are in favor of doing away with that form of
consent--of claiming that people who have not chosen to delegate their
rights to engage in retaliatory force to the government have somehow
done it anyway.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Chris Cathcart
3.jw...@joey.bomis.com>...
[Proposes a non-coercive yet monopolistic government within a
geographic area, freely consented to by the inhabitants, with freedom
of entry and exit.]
I assume I've characterized your proposal correctly. (Please correct
me if I haven't.) I see that it may be vulnerable to the
political-reductionist viewpoint advocated by George Smith. Suppose
private property is all broken up amongst individuals in a geographic
area. (In a capitalistic society, by Rand's definition, all property
is privately owned.) How do we go, non-coercively and consensually,
from a dispersed set of property holdings in a geographic area to a
government that has a monopoly of jurisdiction over that geographic
area?
Note that we're talking about *jurisdiction* here, and not ownership
rights, since all rights are vested in individuals. With Galt's
Gulch, you have one owner of the valley who lays down the rules as he
has the right to do under his property rights, and it creates de facto
jurisdiction resting ultimately with him. A proposed consented-to
monoply government would have to justly gain jurisdictional powers
without exercising property rights, via the consensual arrangement
made by the inhabitants of the geographic territory.
And the anarcho-capitalists like David Friedman would say that this
leaves open plenty of room for cross-jurisdiction (or overlapping
jurisdiction, or legal pluralism, whatever they call it) if some of
the inhabitants in the geographical area don't consent to the
arrangement, or want to opt out. If individuals have the right to opt
out of the arrangement and seek a different one, and original property
rights are vested in each individual, where does the government get
the rightful authority to claim jurisdiction with respect to this
individual? His merely inhabiting a certain geographical area
wouldn't be the determining factor, would it?
Or is settling on a geographical area for jurisdictional purposes in
some sense theoretically prior to the property rights of the
inhabitants? I can easily see how individuals can encounter
un-occupied, un-owned land, and make certain agreements about the
rules of governance in that territory prior to or at the same time as
the establishment of individual property deeds in that area. But it
looks like the question is how it would be done in today's world where
lands are already occupied and jurisdictions claimed.
And this still seems like a separate matter from whether a monopoly of
jurisdiction in a given geographical territory is necessary for stable
legal institutions. That's the whole point of arguments like
Friedman's. If individuals in a given geographical territory can opt
out and still remain inhabitants of the territory, then Friedman would
say that they can seek other arrangements without upsetting the legal
framework.
Chris Cathcart
3.jw...@joey.bomis.com>...
[...]
I'm smirking at the moment. That's because I remember a similar
situation when Jimbo and David Friedman first met up 6 or so years ago
on a.p.o. After several rounds of shit-kicking, they finally got
around to some really productive exchanges.
I trust that both Jimbo and George will get around to something really
productive as well, as their talents would go to waste merely with
shit-kicking. I'd say that both have pretty good grasps (or ability
to grasp) of what major authors in this debate have had to say.
So, once you two get done with the shit-kicking, let's see something
intelligent and productive as we would naturally expect from you two,
okay?
:-)
Rod Nibbe
> I am objecting, in the main, to the very common argument that Rand was
> mistaken in her politics, because a voluntary monopolistic government
> is some kind of contradiction in terms. I'm arguing that this is not
> true, because for Rand, a proper monopolistic government is confined
> to a geographical area, and a non-coercive monopoly on the use of force
> within a specific area is possible.
I think Rand's politics is a non sequitur in
light of her preceding ethical argument. She
said man qua man must delegate his right to
the use of force because supposedly if he
didn't, then the worst kind of anarchy would
result. But if this man qua man of hers is
rational and objective, why *must* he delegate
his natural right to the use of defensive force
to a monopoly government, even if it is a
non coercive monopoly?
I can easily envision many people not wanting to
pay any agency to defend their rights, preferring
instead to go solo. This is why I think many
Objectivist-sympathizing libertarians (like myself)
object to "The Nature of Government," not because a
non coercive monopoly on force is impossible, but
because Rand left no room for the objective, rational
egoist she constructed in TOE to act as his own hero,
in *all* matters of ethical import.
-RKN
Beaten Paths Are For Beaten Men
Chris Cathcart
$P21.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> To illustrate some of the problems here, consider this hypothetical
> scenario. The owners of Disneyland, disgusted by the number of people who
> have been spitting on their sidewalks, require every person to sign the
> following agreement before being admitted to Disneyland. It specifies that,
> should you be caught spitting on the sidewalk (video cameras are
> everywhere), you agree to be immediately executed by a firing squad
> consisting of the Seven Dwarfs.
>
> Well, you sign the agreement because your kids really want to go to
> Disneyland. But after a while you feel that this was a silly provision, so
> you spit on a sidewalk just for the hell of it. Sure enough, you are
> immediately apprehended by Mickey and Minnie Mouse, who handcuff you, and
> take you to a tribunal presided over by Goofy. He shows you video tape of
> your crime (from three different cameras), pronounces you guilty as
> charged -- and you are then trotted off to be shot, according to the terms
> of an agreement that you signed and expressly consented to.
Do the Dwarfs march into the execution yard whistling their work tune?
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Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> The relevant "consent" is consent to delegate your right to engage in
> retaliatory force to the government. In my experience, at least, almost
> all Objectivists are in favor of doing away with that form of
> consent--of claiming that people who have not chosen to delegate their
> rights to engage in retaliatory force to the government have somehow
> done it anyway.
I don't think this is accurate, but of course I can't really speak for
the people you're talking about.
There will be difficult and thorny questions with any transition, of
course. So we must not confuse positions about what's the most
appropriate transitional path, with theoretical constructs about the
ideal formation of a government.
But Rand is very clear about the authority of the government properly
coming from the consent of the governed. That is, her view is that
people get together and delegate their rights to engage in retaliatory
force. In _Atlas_, for example, everyone has to make an explicit
agreement before entering the Gulch.
In our zoning law discussion yesterday, we talked about how a
transition might involve converting, as best possible, existing zoning
laws into property rights, on the theory that the existing laws at
least codify to some degree what would have happened in a free system.
Similarly, rather than dismantling the state to get to an imaginary
"state of nature", we might convert the existing government into a
non-rights-violating government, on the theory that in a voluntary
system this is what would evolve anyway, or close to it.
You'd disagree with that, I imagine! And that's fine. My only point
is that one can advocate a conversion of the existing government into
a similar but non-rights-violating monopoly government, without
thereby endorsing the position that people should be forced into a
setup without their consent.
Some hardliners might argue that zoning laws are totally invalid, and
that a conversion should not privatize existing injustices, but that
everything should go to "ground zero". I don't think that position is
really tenable, because "ground zero" is no longer possible -- the
imbalances and impacts of injustice are so complex that turning back
the clock isn't really possible.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> So you would support a contractual type of scenario where it is legal for
> landowners to privately fund law enforcement agencies and renew contracts if
> necessary?
No, I wouldn't support such a system, although I don't think that it
_necessarily_ (as a matter of definition, say) violates rights. I
just think that it wouldn't be a very good idea. I think that a
system of competing law enforcement agencies would dissolve into
competing fiefdoms.
I think that there are certain "public goods" aspects to crime
fighting that make it more sensible to have a single provider. I
think that even if by some miracle, Friedman-esque agencies were set
up today, they would fairly quickly either merge into a single good
(or bad) government, or else they would achieve some stable
arrangement of petty tyrannies.
(There's a long discussion about this that David and I had a long time
ago. I didn't convince him, and my own impression of the way it ended
up is that I got busy and didn't finish the argument, and that I left
some questions hanging. So perhaps David won that argument. But he
did seem to think that what I had to say was at least interesting, so
you might want to look it up on google. Or, stick around, I have a
feeling we're going to get into that in a few days anyway.)
>>I'm assuming that these new laws were passed in contradiction to the
> Constitution of the area. But if the new laws are consistent with the
> original agreement, it's hard to see what justification Any and
> friends would have for engaging in open revolt. They could leave, or
> move, or vote, or whatever else is part of the original agreement.
>
> You say Constitution, I say contract. Forget voting. If the landowners are
> dissatisfied with law enforcement and have the moral right to opt out, then
> they should have the legal right to renew the terms of agreement.
> Libertarian anarchists envision a society where it is lawful to change
> governing agencies when desirable and legitimate.
Right, I know that's what they envision. I'm just not in favor of it.
The main point I'm trying to make right now is that there is a
voluntary alternative, a way of generating a voluntary monopoly
government, as outlined in _Atlas_.
>>(And of course, there's also a necessary caveat here about some
> injustices being so grave that even prior "consent" can't justify
> them. But the things you mentioned don't really rise to that level.
> I think that if Andy consented to those things, they'd be legitimate.)
>
> I think you raise an interesting point of the validity of certain contracts.
> At what point are contracts morally unenforceable? Can I quit a job early
> even though I may have agreed to work for the next 4 years? You can as a
> civilian but not as a GI.
Right. Well, those are interesting questions to be sure. :-)
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
>> Perhaps you will say that no competition is permitted so long as the agency
>> in questions upholds its side of the agreement.
David followed with:
> That is what he did say.
>> So who is to judge whether
>> or not the contract has been violated? If I, as a landowner in Galt's Gulch,
>> feel that the protection agency has exceeded the bounds of the original
>> contract, then I would certainly be justified in firing my supposed
>> protector.
> Surely not. You don't want to say that whether you *are* justified
> depends on whether you *feel that* the protection agency has exceed the
> bounds of the original contract. Whether you are justified depends on
> whether it in fact has exceeded those bounds. Jimbo is proposing a
> "government" that doesn't exceed the bounds, and arguing that you are
> then morally obligated to abide by your contract giving it a monopoly
> over exercising retaliatory force on your behalf.
Right. However, I will gladly agree that this is a valid question,
though separate from what I take to be our main line of inquiry.
We can stipulate, for the sake of argument, that _if_ the government
doesn't exceed certain bounds, then you're morally obligated to follow
your agreement. And so this provides for a theoretical model of a
mechanism whereby a non-coercive monopoly government might arise.
A separate question would be whether or not such a thing is a good
idea, and one possibly valid objection is that with a monopoly
government, it may be hard to get a "fair shake" in a contract dispute
_with the government_. If they violate the agreement, what are you
going to do, sue them in their own courts?
Well, one answer is: yes. That's what we do now, and although there
are problems with it, there are ways of making it work. People do win
lawsuits against the government all the time. They also lose them all
the time. Some of the factors that may be beneficial would be things
like independence of the judiciary (by the constitution), trial by
jury, the requirement that the government provide counsel if the
citizen can't afford it, and so on.
Now, standing at the outskirts of the Gulch, reading over the
constitution, you might say: "Gee, those protections don't seem strong
enough. I think I'll decline to enter this country." But it's hard
to see how _if you agree to these conditions_, they are inherently
violative of your rights.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
David Friedman <dd...@best.com> wrote:
>> It is for this reason that I launched the thread by objecting to your
>> equation of "coercive" and "monopolistic". The two are different and
>> we need to treat them as different. We can't simply avoid the central
>> debate of anarchocapitalism versus minarchism by defining the concept
>> "government" in such a way that minarchism automatically loses.
>
> It doesn't automatically lose--at most, it automatically involves rights
> violations.
Fair enough. To me, it automatically loses if it automatically
involves rights violations.
> Suppose we consider, realistically, a minarchy that was not established
> by unanimous consent of all property owners in the area over which it
> claims monopoly jurisdiction. So far as I can tell, that is what Rand
> was considering--I know of no passage in her writing that suggests
> reducing government down to a million Galt's gulches, which is the scale
> on which unanimity is a practical option.
I don't think you're right about what Rand was proposing. I don't
think she was proposing a million Galt's gulches, but rather proposing
that, upon the collapse of society at the end of the book, the
original Galt's Gulch would expand in a consensual and
non-rights-violating manner.
So I think she would say, as she did say, that consent is key.
However, we have to deal with the fact that her writings on the exact details
of government are sketchy-to-non-existent.
> On those assumptions, we are choosing between a system with continual
> large scale rights violation (mine) and a system with continual low
> level rights violation (minarchy). Don't you think most people would
> prefer the latter?
>
> What is true is that, once people have opted for the latter system, they
> will have a problem making arguments that presume that the right answer
> involves no rights violations at all.
Right, well, maybe so.
I think we have to keep some distinctions in mind as to the _types_ of
rights violations, or maybe a better way to put it is the _causes_ of
the rights violations.
If we're reasonable, I think we will all concede that under every
possible system, there will sometimes be injustices, due to human
error, or even due to human evil within the system, be it
anarcho-capitalism as envisioned by its supporters, or a minimal state
as envisions by its supporters. But this is different from, for
example, a supporter of communism who simply declares that individual
rights are unimportant or nonexistent, and whose plans involve
deliberate and systematic rights violations.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> Well, leave me out. I see no objection to calling what you describe a
> "government", but I have never before seen anyone talk about a government
> that arises by actual (as opposed to hypothetical or tacit) contract.
O.k. I'm not sure what I'm leaving you out of, but o.k. :-)
I think that Rand talks about this in the context of Galt's Gulch.
Everyone there agrees to the rules, or else they have to leave. They
treat Dagny well, as a guest, but they make her leave until she agrees
to the rules.
I think that one difficulty we have in thinking clearly about this
stuff is that there's a difference between a theoretical model of
where we want to go, and the transitional steps that we'd take to get
there. I think this is where we see people making the leap (not
entirely unjustified) from actual contract to hypothetical or tacit.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> I think Rand's politics is a non sequitur in
> light of her preceding ethical argument. She
> said man qua man must delegate his right to
> the use of force because supposedly if he
> didn't, then the worst kind of anarchy would
> result. But if this man qua man of hers is
> rational and objective, why *must* he delegate
> his natural right to the use of defensive force
> to a monopoly government, even if it is a
> non coercive monopoly?
Well, I think she'd say: because the worst kind of anarchy would
result. Therefore, it is in his self-interest to delegate, and is
self-destructive to not delegate.
> I can easily envision many people not wanting to
> pay any agency to defend their rights, preferring
> instead to go solo. This is why I think many
> Objectivist-sympathizing libertarians (like myself)
> object to "The Nature of Government," not because a
> non coercive monopoly on force is impossible, but
> because Rand left no room for the objective, rational
> egoist she constructed in TOE to act as his own hero,
> in *all* matters of ethical import.
Right, well, I must confess that I find this very hard to envision,
myself. Even the anarchocapitalist competitive defense agency world
makes more sense to me than this.
Do you envision a society in which, whenever you perceive some wrong
done against you, you just grab a rifle and go arrest them, locking
them in your basement until you're satisfied? Do you argue that we're
violating your rights if we say that this is _not an objective
procedure_, and don't let you do it?
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> Jimbo has been on an extended vacation from h.p.o., lasting several
> years. Fortunately it seems to have ended.
Thanks. Unfortunately, I seem to have terribly offended George.
In private email, he indicated to me that he thought I was being
insulting when I accuse him of being 'disingenuous' in a reply. While
I certainly didn't intend that as a _compliment_, neither did I intend
it as an _insult_.
I'm very sorry that I used the word now, as it seems to have gotten in the
way of what is otherwise a very interesting discussion.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> being
> an anarchist, although I suppose I am that, by default. However, as it s
> tands,
> those difficulties have NOT been overcome.
>
> If you want specifics, feel free to ask.
Sure. Can you give specifics?
I take it by "specifics" you mean specific details on why
transitioning to a moral monopoly government involves such grave
rights violations that we can't justify it, while (in the same
detailed scenario) transitioning to a system of competing defense
agencies would _not_ involve similarly grave rights violations?
>>Who is in favor of doing away with consent?
>
> De facto? Every ARIan around here, to my knowledge. Of course, they'll deny
> it, but that's a seperate issue.
Well, maybe their denials are authentic, and some hostility on other
issues is keeping you from seeing it?
> I suppose you haven't been around here for a while (not during my tenure,
> anyway). Check the archives (try "consent") if you're interested.
O.k., I will!
> Oh, well that's a different issue, IMO. What I'm talking about is the co
> nsent
> of those who don't initiate force.
*nod*
--Jimbo
Don Watkins III
> Sure. Can you give specifics?
> I take it by "specifics" you mean specific details on why
> transitioning to a moral monopoly government involves such grave
> rights violations that we can't justify it, while (in the same
> detailed scenario) transitioning to a system of competing defense
> agencies would _not_ involve similarly grave rights violations?
No, that's not what I mean. I'm not a proponent of the
anarcho-capitalist notion of "competing enforcement agencies" (which
is actually what they are) any more than I am a proponent of Little
Big Brother.
The first identifications relevant to this subject concern the
foundations of moral social interaction. I think we agree on the
basics -- NIOF, and the like.
Now, my only foundational premise, here, is consent. If you can build
a monopoly government with the consent of all participants, then it
doesn't matter to me what that government would look like (unless you
happen to be asking for_my_consent!).
And if you want to set up a system of private enforcement agencies, I
have no problem with that, either...so long as it doesn't try to
impose terms on non-consenting parties (it almost seems as though
that'd be a more difficult one to pull off, doesn't it?).
In any case, here are some barriers to constructing a monopoly
government built on a foundation of consent:
-- The incentive problem: The nature of a government is such that it
tends to grow, no matter the barriers, nor the starting point. David
Friedman has pointed out how -- for instance -- while you may not be
willing to pay to keep drugs, gambling, etc. illegal, you may be
willing to vote for it. Or, there's no incentive for one person to
learn a lot about a particular candidate since his vote is unlikely to
make a difference in the outcome. Or, it makes more sense for a
company to try to buy favores directly from the government than it
does to try to prevent EVERYONE from gaining privelages from the
government. Or, a judge has no incentive to be honest -- likely, the
oppossite. What this implies is that a government, no matter how good
it starts off, will tend towards corruption.
-- Maintaining the monopoly: This is the problem George Smith wrote
about. To maintain a monopoly on the use of retaliatory force, the
government must initiate force (I actually have an answer for this,
but not the one Objectivists want to hear).
-- Funding a government: Contrary to what Rand thought, there is good
reason to think that a government could not sustain itself without
forced taxation. I'm actually skeptical of this objection, but Jim
Prescott has made a prima facie good case for it.
Now, I don't care to argue for any particular one of those objections.
My point is that they need to be addressed before a plan for monopoly
government can get off the ground.
But let's assume that we've taken care of all those objections. The
question still remains, is the end government is suppossed to serve a
valid end? If so, is it the best means to achieving that end? Those,
for me, are the important questions.
The first question is the one I'd most like to discuss with you. The
second...well, let's just say that there's no chance in hell that I
have anything to add to what you and David Friedman have said on that
topic!
Take care,
Don Watkins
George H. Smith
"David Friedman" <dd...@best.com> wrote in message
news:ddfr-8CD0DD.2...@ord-read.news.verio.net...
As in many cases, what we are discussing here was covered, in principle,
during seventeenth and eighteenth-century discussions of the social
contract. What we are depicting as "firing" a government or protection
agency was then cast in terms of the rights of resistance and revolution.
The problem with Jimmy Wales's version of a voluntary "social contract" is
that the terms of this contract have not been specified. He appears to be
calling for a Hobbesian model, according to which every member of a society
"contracts" with every other member of that society to surrender their
rights to execute the natural laws of justice. This right, for Hobbes, was
absolute and irrevocable, because the political sovereign, in his function
as the supreme judge, is the only person authorized to decide whether or
not he has violated the conditions of his rule. Thus you cannot overthrow
(or "fire") a government without that government's permission. (This was
essentially the absolutist case against the right of revolution, even
against governments that are irredeemably tyrannical.)
Hobbes denied the right of revolution (which in our case is analogous to the
right to fire), because the social contract, having been agreed to by every
member of society, cannot be dissolved without the unanimous consent of
every member (which of course will never happen, since at least some of
these people will always side with the sovereign).
The problem in our case, as in earlier disputes, is not whether a sovereign
has a duty to fulfill certain obligations (even defenders of absolute
monarchy conceded this), but rather WHO shall judge whether or not these
conditions have been fulfilled. In the Lockean model, no "contract" is
formed with the ruler per se. Rather, the members of a society first
*unanimously* agree to abide by the decision of the majority, and this
majority then decides on the "form" of government that shall govern that
society, including the procedures for selecting a ruler.
Locke spoke only a "social contract," not a "political contract." He
maintained that there is no "contract" with a ruler per se, but that this
ruler holds his power as a delegated "trust." He is appointed -- "hired," if
you will -- according to the appropriate political procedures, and he
functions merely as an agent, not as an equal party in a contract. Thus, the
ruler may be fired at will, according to the judgment of his principals, if
they no longer deem his services worthwhile -- and if this is what they
decide, the ruler has no say in the matter. This legal relationship is
analogous to that between a principal and his attorney, i.e., an agent who
has only those powers "delegated" to him by his clients, and who may be
fired at will when his clients no longer desire his services. (If it wasn't
clear before why Locke's version of the social contract was so often
condemned as implicitly anarchistic, this should help to explain the
reason.)
In terms of fundamentals, this is an *extremely* radical theory. Where
Locke fudged, and thereby avoided anarchism, was by appealing to a theory of
"tacit consent." (This escape hatch, which was later used by James Madison
and other Americans, had been defended in detail by Samuel Pufendorf.) This
is why Lysander Spooner and other American Anarchists are sometimes called
"unterrified Lockeans." Spooner's approach is Lockean throughout; the only
significant difference is that Spooner, unlike Locke, demanded *express*
consent in order for a constitution to be morally binding.
My remarks to Jimmy Wales were predicated on the Lockean model. I, like
other anarchists, view the contractual relationship between an individual
and a justice agency as a "trust," in which the it functions as the agent of
those principals who employ it. (Hence my label of choice, "justice
*agencies*.") Hence, according to this model, I may hire or fire my agent,
according to my own judgment of how well he is performing his job, whether I
think I can do better with another agency, etc. The justice agency differs
in no essential respect from other agents whom I hire to perform a job, and
whom I may also fire if I am not satisfied with their work.
Of course, an agent-employee might legitimately sue for compensation if I
violate a contract, but he cannot force "specific performance" upon me by
insisting that he will continue to function as my agent, whether I want him
to or not. My lawyer might have grounds to sue me for expenses if I
arbitrarily fire him (i.e., for no good reason) in the middle of an
expensive lawsuit in which his firm has invested a good deal of money, but
he cannot compel me to accept his legal "services" thereafter," when I no
longer desire them.
I assume Jimmy is suggesting another contractual model, which is why I
suggested that he needs to give more details. And until I learn more about
his model, I really can't comment much more about his argument. What kind of
specific provisions does he envision, such that clients are barred from
"seceding," terminating their employee, or otherwise enlisting the services
of another agency? In what type of employment contract can one permanently
surrender these fundamental rights? I can think of no such legitimate
contract. Although we can delegate our basic rights, we cannot permanently
alienate them in this manner. And, what is perhaps most important, WHO
decides whether or not the terms of a contract have been violated? Must we
seek the permission of a government that has become tyrannical before we can
replace it (which was Hobbes's argument)?
Whatever model Jimmy proposes, I see no reason why everyone must choose this
model. Indeed, I see no reason why virtually anyone would agree to such an
onerous contract, one in which they must surrender their rights, when other
options are available to them in the marketplace.
Although I won't pursue the issue in this post, we are getting much closer
to the point about why governments are necessarily *coercive* monopolies. My
reasons for claiming this should become more clear as we proceed. Although
Jimmy is maintaining that a government can be purely "voluntary" in terms of
its *origin,* I suspect his model will eventually fall back on a supposed
surrender (not delegation) of inalienable rights. And if this is correct --
it may not be, I am only surmising at this point -- then it will indeed
prove impossible to justify a government from libertarian premises.
Suppose I were to argue that slavery is not necessarily "coercive," because
it is possible to sketch a scenario in which every slave voluntarily agreed
to forfeit *all* of his fundamental rights. Aside from the practical
improbability of this scenario ever occurring in the real world, it also
presents basic theoretical questions that must be addressed. In any event,
if Jimmy will concede that a condition of "voluntary slavery" is
theoretically possible for millions of people (as it is, according to some p
olitical theorists), then he will have no problem maintaining the
governments may he purely "voluntary" as well. But I assume this is *not*
his argument.
I can take heart that Jimmy is at least what I call a "practical anarchist."
That is to say, according to his criteria for a legitimate government,
absolutely NO government in history (including the U.S. government) has been
legitimate, and no government will ever likely be so. I can live with this.
--
Ghs
http://thephilosophe.com
>
EricK
.jwa...@joey.bomis.com>...
> EricK <ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > So you would support a contractual type of scenario where it is legal for
> > landowners to privately fund law enforcement agencies and renew contrac
> > ts if
> > necessary?
> No, I wouldn't support such a system, although I don't think that it
_necessarily_ (as a matter of definition, say) violates rights. I
just think that it wouldn't be a very good idea. I think that a
system of competing law enforcement agencies would dissolve into
competing fiefdoms.
Still preferable to one giant all-powerful fiefdom. :-)
> I think that there are certain "public goods" aspects to crime
fighting that make it more sensible to have a single provider. I
think that even if by some miracle, Friedman-esque agencies were set
up today, they would fairly quickly either merge into a single good
(or bad) government, or else they would achieve some stable
arrangement of petty tyrannies.
Perhaps considering "negative liberty" isn't much appreciated these
days but that also means limited government saying limited is just as
unlikely.
> The main point I'm trying to make right now is that there is a
voluntary alternative, a way of generating a voluntary monopoly
government, as outlined in _Atlas_.
The problem with this example is that you are relying on a snapshot of
a perfect society with an objectivist population. The example is
rigged because it assumes the government will remain just, and is
incapable of degenerating into a rights violating government.
Anarchists reject this utopian example and proceed to ask what happens
when people are flawed including government. If you reject property
owners having the legal right to enter into new contracts with law
enforcement, then you have destroyed an essential moral component of
Rand's philosophy whether it be consent or property rights.
-Eric
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> The problem with Jimmy Wales's version of a voluntary "social contract" is
> that the terms of this contract have not been specified.
What terms would you like specified? I'm basically leaving the
details up to your imagination for a specific reason -- I want the
contract to be appealing to you, insofar as possible, given the
constraint that it must (for the example to be coherent at all) leave
us with a voluntary but monopolistic organization that any ordinary
person would call a government.
But, if there are some terms you'd like specified, I'll do my best.
(Ah, I see now that you asked specific questions, below.)
> He appears to be calling for a Hobbesian model, according to which
> every member of a society "contracts" with every other member of
> that society to surrender their rights to execute the natural laws
> of justice.
Well, you just made that up, because I'm calling for no such thing.
> I assume Jimmy is suggesting another contractual model, which is why I
> suggested that he needs to give more details. And until I learn more about
> his model, I really can't comment much more about his argument. What kind of
> specific provisions does he envision, such that clients are barred from
> "seceding," terminating their employee, or otherwise enlisting the services
> of another agency?
When Midas Mulligan stood in his valley as lone sovereign, he got
lonely. Here he is, up in the hills, with the nifty shield that John
Galt built for him, but he's bored. And so he seeks the company of
rational individuals, and he chooses to deal with them on terms
suitable for human life on earth. But, he's opposed to competing
governments for whatever reason, and so he wants to make sure that
they won't happen in his valley.
He invites people in, but on certain conditions, namely that they
agree that while on his land, they will obey his rules. He prints
them out, and you may imagine them to be whatever you like, but lets
just say they are very very good from a libertarian point of view,
except for the bit about anarchy.
Later on, he lets people buy some land. But he does so under a
specific contract in which they agree that they are _not_ buying
jurisdictional rights. Those remain with him, under the list of rules
("the constitution") that he's shown them.
Under this constitution, everyone in the valley has a vote in some
kinds of decisions. There will be courts, police, an army, etc., etc.
There will be mechanisms in place for the filing of grievances,
including such things as the right to an attorney in criminal cases,
jury trials, and so on.
If they don't want this, they shouldn't buy land in the valley. They
shouldn't even come into the valley. And they are free to go if they
like, so long as they haven't committed a crime by violating anyone's
rights.
And -- this is important -- if the government goes astray, then beyond
a certain point of course people have the bedrock absolute inalienable
moral right to revolt against it. If this is what George meant by a
"right of secession" then of course I'm all for it.
What I'm saying is that this monopoly government does not allow
individuals within this geographic area to simply unilaterally declare
that they are _seizing from Midas's organization_, the right of
jurisdiction of this land. Instead, they may simply sell their land
and leave. (Or, just leave and abandon the land, of course, if they
like.)
> Suppose I were to argue that slavery is not necessarily "coercive," because
> it is possible to sketch a scenario in which every slave voluntarily agreed
> to forfeit *all* of his fundamental rights. Aside from the practical
> improbability of this scenario ever occurring in the real world, it also
> presents basic theoretical questions that must be addressed.
No doubt. I would dismiss such an argument on the same grounds that
you've outlined here -- some rights are in fact inalienable, as
opposed to merely procedural legal rights.
> I can take heart that Jimmy is at least what I call a "practical anarchist."
> That is to say, according to his criteria for a legitimate government,
> absolutely NO government in history (including the U.S. government) has been
> legitimate, and no government will ever likely be so. I can live with this.
O.k., but don't rest too easy yet.
And again, I must say that I'm a very strange sort of anarchist, when
I'm advocating for a single monopoly government over a geographic
region which does not permit any competition. If we end up here, with you
saying that I'm really an anarchist, I'm just going to say: you have a very
odd manner of speaking.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
EricK <ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> The problem with this example is that you are relying on a snapshot of
> a perfect society with an objectivist population. The example is
> rigged because it assumes the government will remain just, and is
> incapable of degenerating into a rights violating government.
Oh, no, I don't _assume_ that at all. And I think that's a really
interesting part of the whole debate.
The way I view it, my hypothetical good government is merely a
rejoinder to those who claim that there's something inherently
self-contradictory about the notion of a monopoly government that's
non-coercive.
There's an entirely separate set of questions as to which kinds of
institutions are likely to generate good rights-respecting outcomes.
And there are some reasons to be suspicious, as you are, about
hand-waving claims that some as-yet-unspecified and as-yet-untested
constitution is going to do the trick.
My only point _here_ is that a certain popular argument against
monopoly government isn't so strong as some people may have thought
that it is.
That argument goes loosely like this: the only way that a government
can be a monopoly is if it prevents others from doing the same kinds
of things that it is doing. This is clearly a rights violation. If
it's o.k. for the government to have police and courts, because they
are (we suppose) fair and objective, then it's o.k. for someone else
to do the same thing.
I say this argument is weak because it ignores the possibility of a
perfectly valid geographically based government, deriving its powers
from the consent of the citizens within it.
The argument I'm responding to is abstract and hypothetical, so simply
saying that my response involves an abstract and hypothetical founding
of a state really misses the point, I think.
Now, once we dispense with the idea that a monopoly government is
_necessarily_ (by definition) coercive, we can move on to the more
interesting question of what's right and wrong with various proposals
for institutions of rights protection. And we've (correctly) deprived
ourselves of an invalid "a priori" crutch that tells us to never look
for geographic monopoly solutions, because we allegedly know _by
construction_ that they involve rights violations.
--Jimbo
David Friedman
.jwa...@joey.bomis.com>...
> You'd disagree with that, I imagine! And that's fine. My only point
> is that one can advocate a conversion of the existing government into
> a similar but non-rights-violating monopoly government, without
> thereby endorsing the position that people should be forced into a
> setup without their consent.
The problem is with your definition of a "non-rights-violating
monopoly government." What actions do or don't violate rights depends,
among other things, on who we think owns what.
Suppose your "conversion" was to a brutal tyranny whose one redeeming
feature was that it permitted anyone who wanted to leave. One could
argue that that is a "non-rights-violating monopoly
government"--provided you assume that the government starts out as the
owner of all land in the U.S. and so can morally forbid anyone to
remain here who does not accept their terms. You might even claim it
was non-rights violating even if it didn't permit people to leave, on
the grounds that it had no obligation to let you trespass on its
property en route.
Your version is somewhat milder. Your government starts out "owning"
everyone's right to exercise retaliatory force in defense of his own
rights. Hence it can forcibly suppress competing rights enforcers
without violating rights. But to anyone who starts out observing that
people haven't all delegated that right, its behavior is rights
violating. Hence you have not constructed a non-rights violating
monopoly government, merely a government that would be non-rights
violating if it had some rights that it doesn't have.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> foundations of moral social interaction. I think we agree on the
> basics -- NIOF, and the like.
Right. Unless we find out otherwise, we can assume as a context the
standard Objectivist positions on rights and responsibilities and so
on.
> Now, my only foundational premise, here, is consent. If you can build
> a monopoly government with the consent of all participants, then it
> doesn't matter to me what that government would look like (unless you
> happen to be asking for_my_consent!).
Well, I'm not sure that's really true. As for me, I don't think
people can validly contract to be slaves, for example. To be more
specific, if they do consent to it, and later withdraw their consent,
I think that their withdrawal trumps the original consent, unlike in
the case of ordinary things that we _can_ validly contract for.
And there are many other things that we don't need consent for. For
example, arresting and jailing murderers does not require us to get
their consent first.
> -- Maintaining the monopoly: This is the problem George Smith wrote
> about. To maintain a monopoly on the use of retaliatory force, the
> government must initiate force (I actually have an answer for this,
> but not the one Objectivists want to hear).
Well, this has been the main focus of the discussion that George and I
have been having. I don't think it is at all necessary for the
government to initiate force in order to maintain a monopoly on its
(valid) use _within a geographic area_.
> -- Funding a government: Contrary to what Rand thought, there is good
> reason to think that a government could not sustain itself without
> forced taxation. I'm actually skeptical of this objection, but Jim
> Prescott has made a prima facie good case for it.
Think about it this way: if competing agencies can run at a profit,
why can't a monopoly run at a profit? My only point here is that if
we can't find a way to pay for defense of rights, then, yes, we'll
never get them.
> My point is that they need to be addressed before a plan for monopoly
> government can get off the ground.
Yes, that's right.
> But let's assume that we've taken care of all those objections. The
> question still remains, is the end government is suppossed to serve a
> valid end? If so, is it the best means to achieving that end? Those,
> for me, are the important questions.
Right, I think that's absolutely very interesting.
--Jimbo
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> Suppose your "conversion" was to a brutal tyranny whose one redeeming
> feature was that it permitted anyone who wanted to leave. One could
> argue that that is a "non-rights-violating monopoly
> government"--provided you assume that the government starts out as the
> owner of all land in the U.S. and so can morally forbid anyone to
> remain here who does not accept their terms.
But one would be wrong if they argued that way, because -- in fact --
the government does _not_ own all land in the U.S., not even under
current law. I don't think that our path _towards_ a freer society
validly starts with steps _away from_ a freer society.
> You might even claim it
> was non-rights violating even if it didn't permit people to leave, on
> the grounds that it had no obligation to let you trespass on its
> property en route.
I almost just deleted this part because it isn't really relevant, but
maybe it will turn out to be. I don't think that property owners can
deny the right of trespassers to leave. So this would fail for a
different reason.
> Your version is somewhat milder. Your government starts out "owning"
> everyone's right to exercise retaliatory force in defense of his own
> rights. Hence it can forcibly suppress competing rights enforcers
> without violating rights. But to anyone who starts out observing that
> people haven't all delegated that right, its behavior is rights
> violating. Hence you have not constructed a non-rights violating
> monopoly government, merely a government that would be non-rights
> violating if it had some rights that it doesn't have.
That's right, as far as it goes. But the exact same argument holds for any
transition to anarchocapitalism.
We're moving from a situation where things are quite muddled -- and,
historically, that's always how it has been and always how it will be.
So as we move forward, we should do so in a fashion that's as
sensitive as possible to potential rights violations.
You see, _any_ change can be construed as rights-violating if we look
for some explicit "delegation". Let's go back to our zoning law
example.
Bob buys a house in an area with zoning laws. He never votes, and he
publicly expresses his disgust with the laws at every opportunity. If
it weren't for the fact that the city cops have guns, he'd build a
noisy factory in this quiet neighborhood. These laws are an ongoing
infringement of his rights.
Alice buys the house next door. She likes the zoning laws, because
they keep the neighborhood quiet. She's also opposed to the zoning
laws, but she realizes that they were set up before the subdivision
was even built, voted for by city council members who got campaign
donations from the developers, and she regards them as being an
imperfect representation of what a free market would have generated
anyway.
Now, we come in "after the revolution" to make a change. If we remove
all the restrictions, the property values will drop, and Alice will
(justifiably, I think) feel that she's been robbed. Everyone who moved
into the neighborhood knew about the laws and took actions consistent
with agreeing to them when they moved there.
But if we simply turn the zoning laws into property rights, as is,
then Bob will be (justifiably, I think!) able to say that he never
actually agreed to any contracts having to do with how he can use his
property. He feels that _he's_ been robbed.
Truth is, they've both been robbed by the invalid previous system,
which let such muddled non-consent-based situations arise.
Now, either assumption we make, someone is going to feel that their
rights have been violated. And they will have a reasonable case.
(I'm sure with more work, we could make an even simpler and better
example than this one.)
Now, apply this to the notion of delegation. Either assumption that
we make, _some_ people are going to be rightfully annoyed. I think
that a proper transition ought to try to do the best we can to respect
everyone, but it'll be really complicated and _because we are starting
from a system of rights violations_, there will be cases where the
best we can do is still problematic from some point of view.
But that's really no reason not to transition, because _staying_ in
the current situation, is _certainly_ rights violating.
--Jimbo
EricK
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales wrote in message ...
>The way I view it, my hypothetical good government is merely a
>rejoinder to those who claim that there's something inherently
>self-contradictory about the notion of a monopoly government that's
>non-coercive.
It is coercive if it forces non-consenting landowner's under its
jurisdiction. I'm still not clear where you stand on this issue. If
monopoly government doesn't coerce landowners who wish to fund other law
enforcement agencies, then you have anarcho-capitalism in my book.
>My only point _here_ is that a certain popular argument against
monopoly government isn't so strong as some people may have thought
that it is.
I see it the other way- that the popular minarchist argument against
anarcho-capitalism is flawed. :-)
>That argument goes loosely like this: the only way that a government
can be a monopoly is if it prevents others from doing the same kinds
of things that it is doing. This is clearly a rights violation. If
it's o.k. for the government to have police and courts, because they
are (we suppose) fair and objective, then it's o.k. for someone else
to do the same thing.
>I say this argument is weak because it ignores the possibility of a
perfectly valid geographically based government, deriving its powers
from the consent of the citizens within it.
But it's still a bit fuzzy what you mean by "geographically based"
government. Can one landowner be a legitimate government? Two or more?
If you and I are neighbors and we both patronize separate law enforcement
agencies to protect our rights, is this an example of "competing
governments" that you object to?
If all property is private, then you have your geographically based
jurisdictions. Of course, legal issues will arise that involve overlapping
jurisdictions just as there is now among nations, but this doesn't ensure
chaos or else all nations would be at war and there would be no such thing
as "international law".
>Now, once we dispense with the idea that a monopoly government is
_necessarily_ (by definition) coercive, we can move on to the more
interesting question of what's right and wrong with various proposals
for institutions of rights protection. And we've (correctly) deprived
ourselves of an invalid "a priori" crutch that tells us to never look
for geographic monopoly solutions, because we allegedly know _by
construction_ that they involve rights violations.
If the anarchists and minarchists agree that all land should be private,
consent must be obtained from law enforcement agencies, and landowners can
opt out of inefficient or corrupt governing agencies, then all I see is a
difference of semantics. Minarchists, however, usually won't concede this
point, but remain vague when talking about consent, secession, and property,
and how they interact in a free society.
-Eric
George Dance
$P21.1...@newsread1.prod.itd.earthlink.net>...
> "George Dance" <georg...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
> news:6312c50b.02021...@posting.google.com...
>
> [Smith]
> > > The problem is that the social contract model, consistently applied,
> leads
> > > to anarchism rather than to a sovereign government.
>
> [Dance]
> > That is not a fact, but the very problem being debated.
>
> Yes, of course it is; I was merely summarizing the conclusion that I
> presented in my piece, "In Defense of Rational Anarchism" that has been the
> topic of discussion. I saw no reason to repeat those arguments in this
> limited format, when they are accessible to anyone who cares to read them.
I did of course read your essay
http://home.att.net/~eknauer/in_defense_of_rational_anarchism.htm
but I find that it follows the exact same pattern of merely presenting
conclusions rather than making arguments. For instance, here is your
'argument' for the genetic fallacy, "governments have historically
been illegitimate -> governments by their nature are illegitimate":
<quote>
Objectivists insist that government can be justified in theory --
though none (that I know of) has ever spelled out the necessary
criteria -- but this theoretically legitimate government has never
existed anywhere on this earth. Nor can it exist anywhere except in
what Edmund Burke called "the fairyland of philosophy." As Josiah
Tucker (a contemporary of Burke) put it, the consent theory of
government is "the universal demolisher of all governments, but not
the builder of any."
</quote>
Your conclusion is supported by nothing other than an appeal to the
authority of Josiah Tucker, which I note you did manage to squeeze
into your summary as well.
At the same time, I note, you found no room in it for any kind of a
reply to the argument I did give:
snip
>
> [Smith]
> > > You cannot begin "here" with individual rights and end up "there" with a
> > > sovereign, monopolistic government.
>
> [Dance]
> > No? If I and other individuals have individual rights, then I have a
> > right to 'enforce the principles of justice;' otherwise a government
> > could not have it, or neither could a voluntary agency. No one could,
> > morally, enforce principles of justice (or just 'enforce justice').
> > So I must have that right, as an individual right, for it to be a
> > right at all.
> >
> > So does a typical other person, Jones (sorry, I almost called him
> > Smith <g>). If Jones and I each have a right to enforce justice, then
> > we can each delegate that right to each other, or to any third party
> > we chose. That third party could be an organization, and it could
> > call itself a 'government.'
>
> Yes, of course, and (as I said) it could also call itself a "church" or a
> "club" or the "scouts," if the people who constitute that institution have
> no regard for the conventional meaning of words. You can even call the Board
> of Directors of a private corporation a "government," if you wish. No one is
> stopping you.
Note, though, that Jones's 'government' is preventing (some) third
parties from enforcing judgements, and allowing others, but in the
process judging all of them. And if my argument is correct, it is
doing so morally. It has a right to 'sovereignty', or IOW a right to
use force at its own discretion in response to others' use of force
against its members. It does not have an exclusive right to do so, of
course; but if it were a dominant organization, it could do so
exclusively (at least wrt its voluntary subscribers), without any
taint of illegitimacy.
The only unresolved question, AFAICS, is: does Jones's 'government'
also have a moral right to intervene in acts of force against
non-subscribers? I can see a reason why it might not in practice -
that would lower the value of subscribing - but no moral reason why it
should not.
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales
> It is coercive if it forces non-consenting landowner's under its
> jurisdiction. I'm still not clear where you stand on this issue. If
> monopoly government doesn't coerce landowners who wish to fund other law
> enforcement agencies, then you have anarcho-capitalism in my book.
This is precisely what I'm arguing against. I don't think it makes
sense to call a system with a single monopoly government that doesn't
allow competition within its borders "anarcho-capitalism". It's a
monopoly government, albeit a nice and good one.
See, I think there's a rhetorical "trick" here that some anarchists
like to pull. They define their terms in a bizarre and
counter-intuitive way so that "government" and "rights violating" are
hopelessly entangled. Any system that isn't rights violating is
suddenly "anarcho-capitalism"... even if it looks like exactly what
their opponents have been advocating for years.
> But it's still a bit fuzzy what you mean by "geographically based"
> government.
In this context, it's best to think of a government that grew out of
Galt's Gulch. It covers a broad territory, like the United States or
France. In the theoretical scenario, it has grown by obtaining
consent from landowners along the way and also by obtaining consent
from everyone who enters the territory.
> If all property is private, then you have your geographically based
> jurisdictions. Of course, legal issues will arise that involve overlapping
> jurisdictions just as there is now among nations, but this doesn't ensure
> chaos or else all nations would be at war and there would be no such thing
> as "international law".
That's right.
> If the anarchists and minarchists agree that all land should be private,
> consent must be obtained from law enforcement agencies, and landowners can
> opt out of inefficient or corrupt governing agencies, then all I see is a
> difference of semantics. Minarchists, however, usually won't concede this
> point, but remain vague when talking about consent, secession, and property,
> and how they interact in a free society.
Well, I don't think I'm remaining vague. But, you just met me. :-)
In my example, landowners within Galt's Gulch can't just "opt out"
whenever they feel like it, anymore than under anarchocapitalism you
could just "opt out" if you just signed a contract. Unless the other
party has done something to violate the contract.
What I envision is that Mulligan had full ownership of the land at a
time when there is no even halfway legitimate government anywhere, as
in the novel. Then he started to let people in, one at a time, but
only under certain contractual conditions.
--Jimbo
Fred Weiss
"Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales" <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote in message
news:slrna75358...@joey.bomis.com...
> But Rand is very clear about the authority of the government properly
> coming from the consent of the governed. That is, her view is that
> people get together and delegate their rights to engage in retaliatory
> force.
I don't think it has to be an explicit, physical "getting together" or some
formal, physical act of granting consent, such as signing a form. The
consent is implied and required by the very act of your choosing to live in
society. You don't have the right to do whatever you want and to retaliate
in any way you want to any perceived injury, whether it is on your own, or
with a vigilante gang, of by hiring one of David's hit man "private
agencies". Retaliation has to be made objective. You know, the absurdity in
all of this is that of all the objections to gov't, the lest objectionable
is the body of civil and criminal law and its procedures which has been
built up in civilized countries over the last several centuries into a
pretty damn good and fair system of justice.
What does it mean that someone doesn't consent to this? That they want to
hang rustlers from the nearest tree without a trial? That if someone doesn't
pay back a loan, you want to be able to break their legs? That if someone
rapes your sister you want to be able to cut off their dick? When you cut
through the "rationalism" and the disconnected from reality clever
arguments, what are they advocating and for what purpose?
Incidentally, I asked a question a few days ago which no one has chosen to
answer. We have actual, real life examples of anarchism. Somalia for one.
The country is a wreck. If that isn't anarchism, why isn't it and why isn't
that what we can expect from it?
Fred Weiss
EricK
Fred Weiss wrote in message ...
>Incidentally, I asked a question a few days ago which no one has chosen to
>answer. We have actual, real life examples of anarchism. Somalia for one.
>The country is a wreck.
I replied.
Fred Weiss
"Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales" <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote in message
news:slrna75mon...@joey.bomis.com...
> That argument goes loosely like this: the only way that a government
> can be a monopoly is if it prevents others from doing the same kinds
> of things that it is doing. This is clearly a rights violation. If
> it's o.k. for the government to have police and courts, because they
> are (we suppose) fair and objective, then it's o.k. for someone else
> to do the same thing.
This argument might make some sense if the gov't weren't rights-respecting
and one wanted to set up one that was.
But there is only one legitimate way to do that: persuade people that
respecting rights is desirable. If you can't persuade them are you going to
*force* them and who will do the forcing - the characters who run Druids and
ferret activists for political office? Then where is your consent and what
do you have then? A rights-respecting dictatorship run by Howard Stern and
Kramer from Seinfeld (more clown candidates of the Libertarian Party)! This
can barely be dignified with an argument.
Look, either the population wants limited gov't or it doesn't. If it
doesn't, you can't force them to. You have to engage in a slow process of
persuasion. If you succeed and now they do, why do we need to "privatize"
the process. We'd already have what we want. Do you want some guarantee that
it will stay that way? Sorry, there are no guarantees. Freedom has to be
constantly fought for. And it would help if it had a rock-solid
philosophical foundation which it never has had. But it is notable that
anarchists are not particularly interested in such a proposition and, if
anything, actively oppose it.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"EricK" <ekn...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:_BEc8.13489$BR3.7...@bgtnsc04-news.ops.worldnet.att.net...
I must have missed it. Feel free to repost. It will now get more attention
in this more active thread.
Fred Weiss
Don Watkins III
>Freedom has to be
>constantly fought for. And it would help if it had a rock-solid
>philosophical foundation which it never has had. But it is notable that
>anarchists are not particularly interested in such a proposition and, if
>anything, actively oppose it.
To the contrary. It's my devotion to philosophical principles which leads me
to conclude that if a government can't be established morally, then it ought
not be established.
Hell, I fought tooth and nail for the idea of monopoly government about a year
and half ago, if you recall. It's not like I'm a passionate anarchist or
anything.
But the facts are as they are, and I put the right of each man to walk his own
path above the suppossed need for government.
Don Watkins
*******************************************************
My homepage
http://www.geocities.com/mrgalt.geo/
*******************************************************
Don Watkins III
>I don't think it has to be an explicit, physical "getting together" or some
>formal, physical act of granting consent, such as signing a form. The
>consent is implied and required by the very act of your choosing to live in
>society.
Well, I agree that consent not involve form signing, but I think that each
person should decide for himself whether or not he will deal only with other
Consenters. If so, then anyone who trades with that person has implicitly
consented.
>You don't have the right to do whatever you want and to retaliate
>in any way you want to any perceived injury, whether it is on your own, or
>with a vigilante gang, of by hiring one of David's hit man "private
>agencies".
Why not?
>Retaliation has to be made objective.
I thought individuals could be objective.
>You know, the absurdity in
>all of this is that of all the objections to gov't, the lest objectionable
>is the body of civil and criminal law and its procedures which has been
>built up in civilized countries over the last several centuries into a
>pretty damn good and fair system of justice.
>What does it mean that someone doesn't consent to this? That they want to
>hang rustlers from the nearest tree without a trial? That if someone doesn't
>pay back a loan, you want to be able to break their legs? That if someone
>rapes your sister you want to be able to cut off their dick? When you cut
>through the "rationalism" and the disconnected from reality clever
>arguments, what are they advocating and for what purpose?
I want all my goddamn rights respected. Is that too much to ask?
>Incidentally, I asked a question a few days ago which no one has chosen to
>answer. We have actual, real life examples of anarchism. Somalia for one.
>The country is a wreck. If that isn't anarchism, why isn't it and why isn't
>that what we can expect from it?
Fred, I guess you missed it, but I started a whole thread on this
topic...Somolian Anarchism?
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> Think about it this way: if competing agencies can run at a profit,
> why can't a monopoly run at a profit?
An interesting question.
A competing agency charges for rights protection; if you don't pay, it
doesn't protect you. Analogously, a monopoly could charge for rights
protection. If you don't pay, it doesn't protect you.
There is one big difference. Not only does it not protect you, it uses
force to keep other people from protecting you--that's the monopoly part.
So you have a choice:
1. The policy I just describes is legitimate, is not rights violating.
You have just justified taxation.
2. To insist on payment for protection is rights violating if you forbid
alternative forms of protection, hence the government can't justly
collect taxes. That seems to have been Rand's view. That then leaves you
with the usual problems of funding government.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> If we're reasonable, I think we will all concede that under every
> possible system, there will sometimes be injustices, due to human
> error, or even due to human evil within the system, be it
> anarcho-capitalism as envisioned by its supporters, or a minimal state
> as envisions by its supporters. But this is different from, for
> example, a supporter of communism who simply declares that individual
> rights are unimportant or nonexistent, and whose plans involve
> deliberate and systematic rights violations.
I think I already made the relevant distinction in an earlier post,
although it is possible that you hadn't read it when you posted the
above.
The distinction is between a rights respecting organization for
protecting rights which recognizes that it will do so imperfectly, and
an organization for protecting rights which deliberately violates
rights, and justifies doing so on the grounds that the resulting gain in
rights protection is greater than the loss.
Again consider my example--a rights violating monopoly government,
perhaps supported by taxation, not established by unanimous consent. You
could argue that it results in less rights violation than any
alternative. If you believe that argument, are you in favor of it--even
though it is engaged in "deliberate and systematic rights violations?"
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> That argument goes loosely like this: the only way that a government
> can be a monopoly is if it prevents others from doing the same kinds
> of things that it is doing. This is clearly a rights violation. If
> it's o.k. for the government to have police and courts, because they
> are (we suppose) fair and objective, then it's o.k. for someone else
> to do the same thing.
>
> I say this argument is weak because it ignores the possibility of a
> perfectly valid geographically based government, deriving its powers
> from the consent of the citizens within it.
And I reply that everyone who makes the argument would agree with that
limitation--and ignore it because it describes no government of any
reasonable size that ever has existed or is ever likely to exist.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
David Friedman
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales <jwa...@bomis.com> wrote:
> David Friedman <dd...@best.com> wrote:
> > Suppose your "conversion" was to a brutal tyranny whose one redeeming
> > feature was that it permitted anyone who wanted to leave. One could
> > argue that that is a "non-rights-violating monopoly
> > government"--provided you assume that the government starts out as the
> > owner of all land in the U.S. and so can morally forbid anyone to
> > remain here who does not accept their terms.
>
> But one would be wrong if they argued that way, because -- in fact --
> the government does _not_ own all land in the U.S., not even under
> current law. I don't think that our path _towards_ a freer society
> validly starts with steps _away from_ a freer society.
I don't think it is clear that the government in fact does not own all
land--descriptively as opposed to morally. The government does claim the
right to decide who lives in this country--that's the essence of control
over immigration. It's true that the government has set up elaborate
procedures for removing the right to live here from someone--but that
doesn't mean it can't remove that right if it wants to. Similarly, the
government does claim the right to seize any piece of land it wishes.
> > Your version is somewhat milder. Your government starts out "owning"
> > everyone's right to exercise retaliatory force in defense of his own
> > rights. Hence it can forcibly suppress competing rights enforcers
> > without violating rights. But to anyone who starts out observing that
> > people haven't all delegated that right, its behavior is rights
> > violating. Hence you have not constructed a non-rights violating
> > monopoly government, merely a government that would be non-rights
> > violating if it had some rights that it doesn't have.
> That's right, as far as it goes. But the exact same argument holds for any
> transition to anarchocapitalism.
My point is that if your definition of "non-rights violating" is "there
is some subset of the rights the government now claims such that if our
new government had all the rights in that subset then it would be non
rights violating," then "non-rights violating" is a very weak
restriction on the nature of government. Having taken that step, you
might as well move all the way to either utilitarianism or a
utilitarianism of rights, instead of trying to argue that your
government isn't really rights violating.
To take the obvious example, precisely the same argument you are
offering would make any level of taxation that is no higher than the
highest that has ever existed historically a "non rights violating"
act--the government is merely acting on its ownership of a share of your
income, just like a creditor.
--
David Friedman
www.daviddfriedman.com/
Gordon G. Sollars
writes...
> Gordon G. Sollars <sol...@nji.com> wrote:
> > Well, leave me out. I see no objection to calling what you describe a
> > "government", but I have never before seen anyone talk about a government
> > that arises by actual (as opposed to hypothetical or tacit) contract.
>
> O.k. I'm not sure what I'm leaving you out of, but o.k. :-)
Out of the group that has called your voluntary association a
"government" sometime during the last 2500 years. As I said, I don't
have any real objection to your usage, but I had not heard it before.
> I think that Rand talks about this in the context of Galt's Gulch.
I think it is a stretch to try to bring all of Objectivist political
philosophy out of Galt's Gulch.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
Rod Nibbe
> Rod Nibbe <r...@rknibbe.com> wrote:
>> I think Rand's politics is a non sequitur in
>> light of her preceding ethical argument. She
>> said man qua man must delegate his right to
>> the use of force because supposedly if he
>> didn't, then the worst kind of anarchy would
>> result. But if this man qua man of hers is
>> rational and objective, why *must* he delegate
>> his natural right to the use of defensive force
>> to a monopoly government, even if it is a
>> non coercive monopoly?
> Well, I think she'd say: because the worst kind of anarchy would
> result. Therefore, it is in his self-interest to delegate, and is
> self-destructive to not delegate.
How is it that anarchy would result in a society
that is by and large composed of objective and
rational individuals? She was talking about a
Proper Objectivist Government in NOG, no?
Furthermore, even under an Objectivist type of
government, why is it that any single egoist should
find it imperative - I believe Rand said "must" -
to delegate his right to protect his own rights?
This is my point: I don't see that Rand left any
room for exceptions. If objectivity and rationality
are the key virtues for objectifying the use of force,
then clearly the egoist should be able to do just as
well as any agency in meting justice, since clearly
in TOE she said the individual was capable of those
virtues - in fact *should* become so virtuous.
>> I can easily envision many people not wanting to
>> pay any agency to defend their rights, preferring
>> instead to go solo. This is why I think many
>> Objectivist-sympathizing libertarians (like myself)
>> object to "The Nature of Government," not because a
>> non coercive monopoly on force is impossible, but
>> because Rand left no room for the objective, rational
>> egoist she constructed in TOE to act as his own hero,
>> in *all* matters of ethical import.
> Right, well, I must confess that I find this very hard to envision,
> myself. Even the anarchocapitalist competitive defense agency world
> makes more sense to me than this.
> Do you envision a society in which, whenever you perceive some wrong
> done against you, you just grab a rifle and go arrest them, locking
> them in your basement until you're satisfied? Do you argue that we're
> violating your rights if we say that this is _not an objective
> procedure_, and don't let you do it?
Please understand: the only reason I jumped
in this thread was to comment on what you said
about why people find Rand's politics to be a
contradiction. I intended to point out what *I*
see as the contradiction, by dissecting Rand's
argument, particularly as it segues from ethics
to politics. I did not respond with an intention
to offer an alternative model of societal cooperation
sans monopoly government, or offer support one way or
another for anarcho-capitalism. As a practical matter,
I doubt either system would be dominated by maverick
egoists, but but that doesn't erase the fact that a
rational and objective man, presumably, can do as well
meting his own justice as a monopoly government or
private defense agency can.
Once upon a time I think it was David Friedman who
characterized me as an "Armadillo" for saying so.
-RKN
Beaten Paths Are For Beaten Men
EricK
Jimmy -Jimbo- Wales wrote in message ...
like to pull. They define their terms in a bizarre and
counter-intuitive way so that "government" and "rights violating" are
hopelessly entangled. Any system that isn't rights violating is
suddenly "anarcho-capitalism"... even if it looks like exactly what
their opponents have been advocating for years.
It seems the minarchists object more to "competing definitions" than actual
political principles.
Rand wrote, "No individual or private group or private organization has the
legal power to initiate the use of physical force against other individuals
or groups and to compel them to act against their own voluntary choice.
Only a government holds that power. The nature of government action is:
coercive action."
In order for a government to be non-coercive it must use force properly by
retaliating against initiated physical force. However, I think this is
literally utopian because government will never be perfect and will on
occasion violate rights whether is be on a massive scale or a minor scale.
Because of this, anarchists claim that government will have to necessarily
violate rights when individuals decide that they've had enough and want to
consent to alternative law enforcement. There's your reality based
entanglement.
>
>> But it's still a bit fuzzy what you mean by "geographically based"
>> government.
>
>In this context, it's best to think of a government that grew out of
>Galt's Gulch. It covers a broad territory, like the United States or
France. In the theoretical scenario, it has grown by obtaining
consent from landowners along the way and also by obtaining consent
from everyone who enters the territory.
That's fine as long as consent can be revoked when a landowner chooses
another government to protect his rights.
Forget about the U.S. and France and stick with the theoretical scenario.
Can one landowner or combination of landowners be considered a legitimate
government in a "broad" territory?
>> If the anarchists and minarchists agree that all land should be private,
>> consent must be obtained from law enforcement agencies, and landowners
can
>> opt out of inefficient or corrupt governing agencies, then all I see is a
>> difference of semantics. Minarchists, however, usually won't concede
this
>> point, but remain vague when talking about consent, secession, and
property,
>> and how they interact in a free society.
>Well, I don't think I'm remaining vague. But, you just met me. :-)
Take the word "broad" for instance. :-)
>In my example, landowners within Galt's Gulch can't just "opt out"
whenever they feel like it, anymore than under anarchocapitalism you
could just "opt out" if you just signed a contract. Unless the other
party has done something to violate the contract.
I can live with your "Unless the other party has done something to violate
the contract" criteria because under Randian government, government is
forbidden to violate rights, and Rand wrote that a government that violates
rights, "can claim no rights whatsoever". No we're back to
anarcho-capitalism practically speaking because a perfect government staying
limited to protecting rights is not an option since it is capable of
mistakes and it will make them if history tells us anything.
>What I envision is that Mulligan had full ownership of the land at a
time when there is no even halfway legitimate government anywhere, as
in the novel. Then he started to let people in, one at a time, but
only under certain contractual conditions.
I have no objection to that in theory, but I do practically speaking when
Mulligan implements taxation, drug prohibition, or a coercive retirement
scheme.
-Eric