The relationship of Philosophy to Science
William Allen Scheer
Science, absolutely nothing at all"
Further I have been told that "Science owes nothing to Philosophy", or words
to that effect.
Any comments?
Scott Amspoker
And a Ford Thunderbird owes nothing to cars.
Just for starters, science presupposes:
1. There is an external reality that is discoverable
2. A consciousness (a scientist) exists to observe things
3. A "true" theory cannot contain contradictions
4. Experiments can be repeated
There, you already have a truckload of philosophical baggage.
sda_mail Scott | Yields over 30 blasts or
@comcast.net Amspoker | 80 gentle honks per charge!
^ my email |
Robert J. Kolker
>
> Any comments?
I would say yes and no to both the above. To do science, some
metaphysical and epistomological constraints and assumptions must be
made. For example, to do science, one assumes there is an Out There out
there, else what is being measured, observed, studied and predicted?
Then there is the requirement of consistency. Our theories and modies
must be logically consistent to be useable. Otherwise anything and
everything is predicted (implied) by the assumptions of the theory.
Then we must assume that we and our neighbors are experiencing the same
thing in reality (after variations in view point are factored out) and
we can communicate our findings meaningfully.
None of the above constraints make a commitment to strict determinism or
strict causality. Both reduction and emergence are compatible with the
constraints.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
Scott Amspoker wrote:
> Just for starters, science presupposes:
>
> 1. There is an external reality that is discoverable
> 2. A consciousness (a scientist) exists to observe things
> 3. A "true" theory cannot contain contradictions
> 4. Experiments can be repeated
>
> There, you already have a truckload of philosophical baggage.
Not all that much. For example, telos need not be assumed. That means
only efficient causes need be considered.
Bob Kolker
|
William Allen Scheer
"Here are the five steps of the scientific method. Please tell me
which one you feel requires, assumes, enforces or even acknowledges
any particular philosophical construct or view. Please be as specific
as possible."
1. Observe some aspect of the universe.
2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is
consistent with what you have observed.
3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions.
4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and
modify the hypothesis in the light of your results.
5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between
theory and experiment and/or observation.
Robert J. Kolker
William Allen Scheer wrote:
> This is how the question is specifically put to me:
>
>
> "Here are the five steps of the scientific method. Please tell me
> which one you feel requires, assumes, enforces or even acknowledges
> any particular philosophical construct or view. Please be as specific
> as possible."
>
> 1. Observe some aspect of the universe.
Assumes a reality to observe and assumes that we as observers can
structure what our senses tell us. This is what separating an aspect
requires.
> 2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is
> consistent with what you have observed.
Assumes we have the brains to formulate such hypothesis and that we have
the logical skill to use hypotheses.
> 3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions.
Assumes that we can deduce consequences of our hypotheses.
> 4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and
> modify the hypothesis in the light of your results.
Assumes we can create experiments that isolate those aspects of reality
we want to measure and test.
> 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between
> theory and experiment and/or observation.
Assumes we can "zero in" by means of correction. That means we can
estimate how far off our predictions are from what is actually measured.
This is a special case of induction.
Bob Kolker
>
JohnnyOnTheSpot
essage news:<viijcp6...@corp.supernews.com>...
> Any comments?
I think they are practical oposites. If something is scientificly
objective it's no longer a philisophicaly subjective, like the sun
revolving around the earth was once based on the philisophical premise
that earth was in the middle, and then science came along and defined
our relative position to the sun and dried up any philosophies that
were dependant on the earth being in the center of the universe.
One day they might discover what causes gravity or discover that our
dream worlds are actualy real worlds in another dimension and dry up
several more philosphies in the process.
jposamen
"Philosophy can delimit what is possible, but only science can
determine what possibilities are actual."
IOW, philosophy tells you where to go look (and that you CAN look),
but only science tells you what you can see.
And the more you see, the more options you have for where to look, so
science in turn influences philosophy. They are kept in a reciprocal
relationship skewed fundamentally toward philosophy, for if we never
knew (implicitly or not) where to or that we could look, then we'd
have never seen in the first place.
Peter Kinane
From: "William Allen Scheer"
<dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Thursday, July 31, 2003 7:12 PM
Subject: ADDENDUM: The relationship of Philosophy to Science
> This is how the question is specifically put to me:
>
>
> "Here are the five steps of the scientific method. Please tell me
> which one you feel requires, assumes, enforces or even acknowledges
> any particular philosophical construct or view. Please be as specific
> as possible."
>
> 1. Observe some aspect of the universe.
> 2. Invent a tentative description, called a hypothesis, that is
> consistent with what you have observed.
> 3. Use the hypothesis to make predictions.
> 4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and
> modify the hypothesis in the light of your results.
> 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 until there are no discrepancies between
> theory and experiment and/or observation.
>
If it is appropriate to give a non-'Objectivist' reply (also, your
second post is not yet on Google, so):
It seems to me that philosophy, by its nature, deals with the nature
of "observation"/perception/awareness. Also, it seems to me that any
concept implies or connotes the entire system of which it is a
feature. So, the implications or connotations of the first word in
your "five steps" would determine all subsequent concepts - they would
be consequent ot it.
Also, I don't see any significant difference between philosophy and
science. They both commence with a premise and go on to fit together,
as best they can, the stuff, effectively of that model. Perhaps it
might better be described as playing around with the potential of the
premise- -model.
Peter Kinane
http://www.effectuationism.com/
R Lawrence
>Here's a cute little soundbite from Rand:
>"Philosophy can delimit what is possible, but only science can
>determine what possibilities are actual."
Is there a source for that soundbite? I don't recall seeing it in Rand's
writings.
--
Richard Lawrence <RL0...@yahoo.com>
Visit the Objectivism Reference Center: http://www.noblesoul.com/orc/
puppe...@hotmail.com
99$Ho3.5247@sccrnsc03>...
> William Allen Scheer wrote:
[snips]
> > 4. Test those predictions by experiments or further observations and
> > modify the hypothesis in the light of your results.
>
> Assumes we can create experiments that isolate those aspects of reality
> we want to measure and test.
Well, it does not strictly assume that the aspects of interest
can be isolated. That is simply one way that many experiments
are done in science. However, many times the other aspects are
not capable of being isolated, and an accounting has to be made
for this. This is one contributing reason, for example, that
many activities such as smoking have a statistical component to
the reported effects. It is one way of accounting for the various
unmeasured factors involved in the effects.
Socks
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com> wrote:
>I was recently told on another group that "Philosophy has nothing to do with
>Science, absolutely nothing at all"
Do you mean this?
From: Willondon <will...@dsisp.net>
Newsgroups: talk.origins
Subject: Re: Regarding the Scientific Method and the Falsification
Principle
Date: Mon, 28 Jul 2003 13:56:55 +0000 (UTC)
"Yes, there's something intuitive about arranging philosophy, science,
technology and craft this way. But I don't believe it's actually the
case, certainly not in a sense that would support an argument that
science requires philosophy in order to proceed."
>Further I have been told that "Science owes nothing to Philosophy", or words
>to that effect.
>
>Any comments?
The thread on that forum discussed the conflation of science and
philosophy versus their absolute distinction. I didn't read where
anybody mentioned the fact that the distinction is a modern one. If
one wishes to discuss their inter-relationship, then exploring their
respective origins would be fruitful. If you read a modern text on
cosmology it can at times be difficult to tell where the science ends
and the philosophy begins. Some authors will claim that philosophy is
a thing of the past, and then engage in speculations concerning the
findings of modern science which border on the mystical. It seems that
in order to absolutely distinguish the two pursuits, it would be
necessary to cut the human brain in half.
As for your quote, you attribute that view to Lenny Flank. But I don't
see where he actually said that. What he said was, 'please
show us exactly how including your Philosophy (or mine or my next door
neighbor's or my sister's dog's former owner's) would change any of
these five steps [of the scientific method] and make science "operate
better".'
Let's consider step 1: "Observe some aspect of the universe." What
tells us that these aspects are objective enough to be pinned down and
observed? Philosophy. Science doesn't tell us that, it only assumes
it. Science assumes a lot of philosophical premises which it takes for
granted while at the same time attempting to deny the source:
philosophy.
The scientific method itself is the result of one philosopher, Bacon,
overturning another philosopher, Aristotle. Ironically, while science
primarily uses induction to make its discoveries, its assumptions are
part of a deductive process which starts with certain basic axioms and
proceeds from there. These axioms are philosophical in nature.
---------------
"Oh yeahhhh? Well don't get so distressed. Did I happen to mention
that I am impressed?"
Violent Femmes
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> The scientific method itself is the result of one philosopher, Bacon,
> overturning another philosopher, Aristotle. Ironically, while science
> primarily uses induction to make its discoveries,
Physics uses Abduction more than Induction [1]. Abduction was identified
by Charles Sanders Pierce, somewhat of a Kantian and a very original
contributor to logic and the logic of discovery. Unfortunately he did
not publish as much as he produced so he is not as appreciated and well
known as he should be.
Bob Kolker
[1] For example, induction was not used to come up with the idea of
atoms or molecules. If this were done inductively we would have
something like this: apples are made of atoms, pears are made of atoms,
rocks are made of atoms so I guess everything must be made of atoms.
That is not how or why the atomic hypothesis was put forth. It turns out
that the only hypothesis that explains why the elements in compounds
bear a weight ratio to each other that is almost n:m where n and m are
integers, is that the elements must come in little indivisible units of
a weight peculiar to that element.
When the heat of bodies was studied it was found that they hypothesis
that heat was a continuous and very light fluid ran into trouble. The
next guess was that heat is motion of the tiny parts of bodies. Maxwell
and Boltzmann expanded (sic) on this and the rest is history.
William Allen Scheer
news:7fdjivcgantkq5u24...@4ax.com...
> As for your quote, you attribute that view to Lenny Flank. But I don't
> see where he actually said that.
Actually, he did so here:
"Lenny Flank" <lfl...@ij.net> wrote in message
news:238b53a4.03072...@posting.google.com...
[snip]
> I'm still waiting for you to show me which of the five steps of the
> scientific method is dependent upon, enforces, requires or even
> acknowledges any sort of "philosophical construct" . . . . . . .
And here:
"Lenny Flank" <lfl...@ij.net> wrote in message
news:238b53a4.03073...@posting.google.com...
[snip]
> Here are the five steps of the scientific method. Please tell me
> which one you feel requires, assumes, enforces or even acknowledges
> any particular philosophical construct or view. Please be as specific
> as possible.
[snip]
And here:
"Lenny Flank" <lfl...@ij.net> wrote in message
news:238b53a4.03072...@posting.google.com...
[snip]
> There is no "philosophical construct" to the scientific method. None
> at all.
[snip]
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>
>> The scientific method itself is the result of one philosopher, Bacon,
>> overturning another philosopher, Aristotle. Ironically, while science
>> primarily uses induction to make its discoveries,
>
>Physics uses Abduction more than Induction [1]. Abduction was identified
>by Charles Sanders Pierce,
Peirce.
>somewhat of a Kantian and a very original
>contributor to logic and the logic of discovery. Unfortunately he did
>not publish as much as he produced so he is not as appreciated and well
>known as he should be.
I knew about him, and have mentioned him before here.
>Bob Kolker
>
>[1] For example, induction was not used to come up with the idea
...hypothesis, you mean...
>of atoms or molecules. If this were done inductively we would have
>something like this: apples are made of atoms, pears are made of atoms,
>rocks are made of atoms so I guess everything must be made of atoms.
>That is not how or why the atomic hypothesis was put forth. It turns out
>that the only hypothesis that explains why the elements in compounds
>bear a weight ratio to each other that is almost n:m where n and m are
>integers, is that the elements must come in little indivisible units of
>a weight peculiar to that element.
Which is wrong because atoms are not indivisible. Nor have I ever seen
the definition of "atom" as "unit of weight." Furthermore, only
evidence is abducted for the creation of hypotheses, while induction
is involved in the process of forming theories. Both abduction and
induction are necessary processes, and I would not say that one or the
other is primary. But abduction or induction are obviously primary to
whatever stage of development the scientist's hypothesis is involved
in. But neither one is primary per se. Abduction comes first, that's
the most I can say for it.
>When the heat of bodies was studied it was found that they hypothesis
>that heat was a continuous and very light fluid ran into trouble. The
>next guess was that heat is motion of the tiny parts of bodies. Maxwell
>and Boltzmann expanded (sic) on this and the rest is history.
Abduction is nothing but a preliminary procedure for developing
hypotheses, a heuristical method of gathering empirical data which
precedes the induction which is appropriate to the scientific method.
None of this matters to my original point, which was to distinguish
science from philosophy by pointing out the inductive versus deductive
methods by which they respectively operate, and to show that even
science secretly operates under certain meta-assumptions which were
originally deduced philosophically.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com> wrote:
>"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:7fdjivcgantkq5u24...@4ax.com...
>> As for your quote, you attribute that view to Lenny Flank. But I don't
>> see where he actually said that.
>
>Actually, he did so here:
I can now understand the feeling of frustration that Lenny Flank and
others on that forum must undergo when dealing with your posts.
William Allen Scheer
> I can now understand the feeling of frustration that Lenny Flank and
> others on that forum must undergo when dealing with your posts.
Maybe you can give me some needed correction.
tom neville
The relationship of PHILOSOPHY to science includes:
(in no preferential order)
Astrology, Cosmology, Ecology, Geneneology, Ideology, Neurology,
Phsycology, Political, Religious, Scientific, Technical, Universal,
Visual, Whoopdedo, X?.......
Why not concentrate on the system we live with?
Just because we are inherited with "a" system that
is obviously inadaquate does not mean there is no
alternative?
Lazy, lazy, lazy, if money was taken away would we all die?
Are we all unconscious as to who we are?
Discuss it by all means, Philosophicaly.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>
> Which is wrong because atoms are not indivisible.
That was discovered later when Thompson discovered that atoms have
parts. However the idea of atoms (or hypothesis if you will) has its
origins in the nearly integral weight ratios of the elements in compunds.
> Nor have I ever seen
> the definition of "atom" as "unit of weight."
Whe it was believed that atoms were indivisble (that is what atom means
in Greek, by the way), the weight of a substance would be proportional
to the number of atoms (or molecules in it). This is what was discovered
by Avagadro. Hence an atom implied a unit of weight, which it still
does. In compounds entire atoms are present, but just a portion of the
particles that make them up, so atoms are units of mass, hence weight.
> Furthermore, only
> evidence is abducted for the creation of hypotheses, while induction
> is involved in the process of forming theories. Both abduction and
> induction are necessary processes, and I would not say that one or the
> other is primary.
Yes, but there is a common belief that induction is all that is required
to formulate hypothesis. This is simply not the case. Very few people
even mention abduction, yet this is the "creative" part of science. It
enables a leap beyond the corpus of facts, to formulate principles that
can predict further facts. An even more striking example of abduction is
Maxwell's postulation of the displacement current. That was pure leap,
motivated by preserving the continuity of Ampere's law and accounting
for magnetic fields even when there was no physical circuit (i.e. a
wire) to carry the charge. It was a way of completing or perfecting the
law relating magnetic fields to currents of charge. There was virtually
no evidence for such a current, yet it was necessary for the symmetry
and continuity of the electromagnetic laws. Abduction in this instance
was a higher order kind induction, not based merely on accumulated fact.
Perhaps we could call abduction meta-induction.
To put a point on it, theories (or hypothesis) do not leap from piles of
facts. Generative hypothesis have to be conceived in the imagination.
That is why science will never be done purely by mechanical devices. It
takes imagination to make it happen.
> But abduction or induction are obviously primary to
> whatever stage of development the scientist's hypothesis is involved
> in. But neither one is primary per se. Abduction comes first, that's
> the most I can say for it.
I think we are in violent agreement on this point.
>
>
>>When the heat of bodies was studied it was found that they hypothesis
>>that heat was a continuous and very light fluid ran into trouble. The
>>next guess was that heat is motion of the tiny parts of bodies. Maxwell
>>and Boltzmann expanded (sic) on this and the rest is history.
>
>
> Abduction is nothing but a preliminary procedure for developing
> hypotheses, a heuristical method of gathering empirical data which
> precedes the induction which is appropriate to the scientific method.
>
> None of this matters to my original point, which was to distinguish
> science from philosophy by pointing out the inductive versus deductive
> methods by which they respectively operate, and to show that even
> science secretly operates under certain meta-assumptions which were
> originally deduced philosophically.
I would not say deduced, but there are meta-assumptions, that is
assumptions beyond the the collection of facts to pertaining to phenomenon.
If we did not do abduction, the -best- science we could ever cook up
would be formulas relating columns of numbers, as in Boyles law. Boyles
law is really a rule of thumb, which has its uses. It requires the
molecular hypothesis to produce a sufficient reason for gases to act as
they do.
This is the point on which Mach and the ueber positivists are in error.
They think that science can be done by considering -only- those things
which can be observed. If we did not postulate "hidden" entities like
molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, we would never be motivated to
make machines and devices to tease out the existence of entities which
are beyond the reach of our unaided or barely aided senses. Our science
would be much or incomplete and superficial if we just stuck to the
readily observable.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> Which is wrong because atoms are not indivisible.
Strictly speaking, yes. However in chemical reactions atoms participate
in their entirety, as opposed to nuclear reactions. So in the context of
analystic chemistry (where weight is what counts) we can regard atoms as
indivisible (which they are really not).
Bob Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid
The "unit of weight" theory assumes that every atom weighs the same
from substance to substance.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
I had already given the appropriate Lenny Flank quote, 'please show us
exactly how including your Philosophy (or mine or my next door
neighbor's or my sister's dog's former owner's) would change any of
these five steps [of the scientific method] and make science "operate
better".' So your response to me was very unenlightening and did not
address my point.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
>Yes, but there is a common belief that induction is all that is required
>to formulate hypothesis. This is simply not the case. Very few people
>even mention abduction, yet this is the "creative" part of science. It
>enables a leap beyond the corpus of facts, to formulate principles that
>can predict further facts. An even more striking example of abduction is
>Maxwell's postulation of the displacement current. That was pure leap,
>motivated by preserving the continuity of Ampere's law and accounting
>for magnetic fields even when there was no physical circuit (i.e. a
>wire) to carry the charge. It was a way of completing or perfecting the
>law relating magnetic fields to currents of charge. There was virtually
>no evidence for such a current, yet it was necessary for the symmetry
>and continuity of the electromagnetic laws. Abduction in this instance
>was a higher order kind induction, not based merely on accumulated fact.
>Perhaps we could call abduction meta-induction.
>
>To put a point on it, theories (or hypothesis) do not leap from piles of
>facts. Generative hypothesis have to be conceived in the imagination.
>That is why science will never be done purely by mechanical devices. It
>takes imagination to make it happen.
I've never seen anybody claim that induction is required to form
hypotheses, only to prove hypotheses as theories. As part of this
inductive process, it is necessary to gather, that is, abduct
evidence. What guides this process?
Philosophypages.com: Abduction is "A heuristic procedure that reasons
inductively from available empirical evidence to the discovery of the
probable hypotheses that would best explain its occurrence." So
abduction is just induction applied to evidence in the formation of a
hypothesis. Thus it remains the case that induction is that process
which distinguishes physics from philosophy.
>> But abduction or induction are obviously primary to
>> whatever stage of development the scientist's hypothesis is involved
>> in. But neither one is primary per se. Abduction comes first, that's
>> the most I can say for it.
>
>I think we are in violent agreement on this point.
>I would not say deduced, but there are meta-assumptions, that is
>assumptions beyond the the collection of facts to pertaining to phenomenon.
Philosophy is deductive in that it attempts to arrive at truths and
not mere probabilities as with the sciences. The sciences then take
these "truths" as their starting-point, the basic assumptions which
drive the sciences onward inductively.
>If we did not do abduction, the -best- science we could ever cook up
>would be formulas relating columns of numbers, as in Boyles law. Boyles
>law is really a rule of thumb, which has its uses. It requires the
>molecular hypothesis to produce a sufficient reason for gases to act as
>they do.
This really is quite Kantian, to seek beyond the evidence for
invisible forces behind the scenes which heuristically explain the
results of empirical experiments in a manner which leads to the best
predictiveness. I just don't see what that has to do with abduction,
which is the gathering of evidence and not the ignoring of it. Through
abduction, I still see the scientist sifting through mounds of
statistical evidence trying to form it into a pattern which may be
formulized.
>This is the point on which Mach and the ueber positivists are in error.
>They think that science can be done by considering -only- those things
>which can be observed. If we did not postulate "hidden" entities like
>molecules, atoms, sub-atomic particles, we would never be motivated to
>make machines and devices to tease out the existence of entities which
>are beyond the reach of our unaided or barely aided senses. Our science
>would be much or incomplete and superficial if we just stuck to the
>readily observable.
Poincare had a lot to say about this matter, apparently. But I don't
recall him referring to the abductive process, only to the
mysteriousness of the process of forming hypotheses.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> predictiveness. I just don't see what that has to do with abduction,
> which is the gathering of evidence and not the ignoring of it. Through
> abduction, I still see the scientist sifting through mounds of
> statistical evidence trying to form it into a pattern which may be
> formulized.
Maxwell did not do this to arrive at the displacement current
hypothesis. It too several decades past Maxwell's inspiration to measure
displacement current directly. Maxwell (as well as Faraday) was an
etherist. He saw displacement current as stresses in an elastic medium
passing from from one charged body to another (as in a capacitor). So
Maxwell had a figment (as it were) guiding his hypothesis.
Bob Kolker
William Allen Scheer
> I had already given the appropriate Lenny Flank quote, 'please show us
> exactly how including your Philosophy (or mine or my next door
> neighbor's or my sister's dog's former owner's) would change any of
> these five steps [of the scientific method] and make science "operate
> better".' So your response to me was very unenlightening and did not
> address my point.
I was simply documenting that he did indeed say what I said he did. I was
not attempting any further enlightenment.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com> wrote:
>I was simply documenting that he did indeed say what I said he did. I was
>not attempting any further enlightenment.
Yes you were, you were attempting to enlighten me to the fact that
Flank said this and this and this. I just don't know why you did that
when I had already provided a good Flank quote.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>Maxwell did not do this to arrive at the displacement current
>hypothesis. It too several decades past Maxwell's inspiration to measure
>displacement current directly. Maxwell (as well as Faraday) was an
>etherist. He saw displacement current as stresses in an elastic medium
>passing from from one charged body to another (as in a capacitor). So
>Maxwell had a figment (as it were) guiding his hypothesis.
It is heuristic in that sense, but I don't see his theory of currents
as involving abduction of evidence when in fact there was no evidence
to support it, only its workability.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> It is heuristic in that sense, but I don't see his theory of currents
> as involving abduction of evidence when in fact there was no evidence
> to support it, only its workability.
It was the principle of the thing in a very literal sense. The equations
for magnetic induction by current flow simply begged to be completed.
The "evidence" was not so much empirical measurement as mathematical
form and necessity.
Maybe there ought to be a special term for scientific hypothesis
creation motivation by the formalism or underlying conceptual
infrastruacture of the science, rather than a corpus of empirical evidence.
Bob Kolker
jposamen
> Is there a source for that soundbite? I don't recall seeing it in Rand's
> writings.
I got it from an essay by Ronald Merrill called, "Axioms: The
Eightfold Way". see:
http://www.monmouth.com/~adamreed/Ron_Merrill_writes/Articles/AxiomsTheEigh
tfoldWay.htm
In retrospect, Merrill might've paraphrased something from IOE. It's
unclear. It's an interesting essay thought. Check it out if you get a
chance.
Jordan
HPO Jury = Malenoid
Perhaps. But if there was mathematics involved, then what you are
doing is deducing the rest of the equations from axioms, one of which
is the assumption of the existence of a current. This is particularly
true if you claim their NECESSITY, a factor which is not invoked in
induction (or abduction) at all.
I agree that abduction is an important method, I just don't see where
you have applied it at all in these posts.
William Allen Scheer
> Yes you were, you were attempting to enlighten me to the fact that
> Flank said this and this and this. I just don't know why you did that
> when I had already provided a good Flank quote.
Because you said: "As for your quote, you attribute that view to Lenny
Flank. But I don't see where he actually said that."
It seemed that you were suggesting that I was misquoting him, hence my
reply. Sorry if there was any misinterpretation.
Eudaimonus
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:eItWa.41827$o%2.21353@sccrnsc02...
> Abduction in this instance
> was a higher order kind induction, not based merely on accumulated fact.
> Perhaps we could call abduction meta-induction.
Actually, one would best consider induction as a simple kind of abduction.
Abduction, remember, is inference to the best explanation. That is, you
have a certain set of facts, and you ask yourself "what fact, if true, would
explain best these facts?" When one induces, one could say one abduces from
a large number of coincidences to the existence of a law - that, say, the
best explanation for having seen a few hundred white swans and no swans of
any other color, is that all swans are white.
Don Matt
> tells us that these aspects are objective enough to be pinned down and
> observed? Philosophy. Science doesn't tell us that, it only assumes
> it. Science assumes a lot of philosophical premises which it takes for
> granted while at the same time attempting to deny the source:
> philosophy.
> The scientific method itself is the result of one philosopher, Bacon,
> overturning another philosopher, Aristotle. Ironically, while science
> primarily uses induction to make its discoveries, its assumptions are
> part of a deductive process which starts with certain basic axioms and
> proceeds from there. These axioms are philosophical in nature.
The issue is very interesting and I must be fair with Kolker saying
that his dicussion with you about the abductuion/induction concept is
being nice.
However a problem has occured to me. Bacon´s and Descartes´ initial
axioms were, as you´ve said, that the universe was objective eough to
be precisely described by an independent observer. On my view this was
valid untill the recent quantum experiments, specially those that deal
with the (dual) nature of light.
When science concludes that the observer is a part that determines
the result of an experiment this ruin the initial axioms.
This means that philosophy has not absolute, pure, axioms when
related with science?
Don.
Don Matt
> tells us that these aspects are objective enough to be pinned down and
> observed? Philosophy. Science doesn't tell us that, it only assumes
> it. Science assumes a lot of philosophical premises which it takes for
> granted while at the same time attempting to deny the source:
> philosophy.
> The scientific method itself is the result of one philosopher, Bacon,
> overturning another philosopher, Aristotle. Ironically, while science
> primarily uses induction to make its discoveries, its assumptions are
> part of a deductive process which starts with certain basic axioms and
> proceeds from there. These axioms are philosophical in nature.
The issue is very interesting and I must be fair with Kolker saying
that his dicussion with you about the abductuion/induction concept has
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com> wrote:
>"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:i3dlivsn13ic0348u...@4ax.com...
>It seemed that you were suggesting that I was misquoting him, hence my
>reply. Sorry if there was any misinterpretation.
I didn't know if you were misinterpreting or not, but as it turns out
you were paraphrasing Flank using quotes. If it was a quote I wanted
to find it.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
You are bringing up what one might call the old QM vs. Philosophy
argument which I have seen since practically day one of my usenet
posting.
I don't recall saying that observation was precise, only that it was a
necessary first step of the scientific method. I was also indirectly
disputing Lenny Flank on another forum who skeptically inquired how it
would be possible for philosophy to improve on the scientific method,
and I replied, it was a philosopher (Francis Bacon) who invented the
scientific method in the first place. Then I stated that even step one
of this method was based on a philosophical assumption.
QM itself must start with certain basic assumptions, or else it would
not be able to proceed with its investigations. There would be, in
that case, no rules with which to generate hypotheses, and these rules
are not generated by factual material itself. For example, the laws of
probability existed prior to QM's discovery of the probabilistic
nature of sub-atomic phenomena. QM did not discover the laws of
probability, it only applied them. As for philosophy, QM has not
discovered any new principle, it has only applied old principles to
explain the anti-common sense nature of sub-atomic phenomena. For
example, it seems to validate Humean skepticism through its apparent
violation of the laws of causality. And perhaps Hume works well on
that level, because his critique certainly falls flat on the level of
normal human experience.
Michael
see the title of Newton's book .....' The Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy '
Best
:)
"Scott Amspoker" <see...@nospam.com> wrote in message
news:eekiivctmlulnmgan...@4ax.com...
> William Allen Scheer <dans...@ANTISPAMBLOCKREMOVEME.excite.com> wrote:
>
> >I was recently told on another group that "Philosophy has nothing to do
with
> >Science, absolutely nothing at all"
> >
> >Further I have been told that "Science owes nothing to Philosophy", or
words
> >to that effect.
> >
> >Any comments?
>
> And a Ford Thunderbird owes nothing to cars.
>
> Just for starters, science presupposes:
>
> 1. There is an external reality that is discoverable
> 2. A consciousness (a scientist) exists to observe things
> 3. A "true" theory cannot contain contradictions
> 4. Experiments can be repeated
>
> There, you already have a truckload of philosophical baggage.
>
> sda_mail Scott | Yields over 30 blasts or
> @comcast.net Amspoker | 80 gentle honks per charge!
> ^ my email |
Don Matt
> >axioms were, as you“ve said, that the universe was objective eough to
> >be precisely described by an independent observer. On my view this was
> >valid untill the recent quantum experiments, specially those that deal
> >with the (dual) nature of light.
> > When science concludes that the observer is a part that determines
> >the result of an experiment this ruin the initial axioms.
> > This means that philosophy has not absolute, pure, axioms when
> >related with science?
> You are bringing up what one might call the old QM vs. Philosophy
> argument which I have seen since practically day one of my usenet
> posting.
In fact, the argument is older than usenet.
> I don't recall saying that observation was precise, only that it was a
> necessary first step of the scientific method.
Step one is a philosophical premisse that, in my view, has led to
neglection of philosophy. If the world is so objective it is not our
duty try to philosophize about it but only try to describe it, in
accord with "philosophy of step one".
> I was also indirectly
> disputing Lenny Flank on another forum who skeptically inquired how it
> would be possible for philosophy to improve on the scientific method,
> and I replied, it was a philosopher (Francis Bacon) who invented the
> scientific method in the first place. Then I stated that even step one
> of this method was based on a philosophical assumption.
Who is Lenny Frank?
> QM itself must start with certain basic assumptions, or else it would
> not be able to proceed with its investigations. There would be, in
> that case, no rules with which to generate hypotheses, and these rules
> are not generated by factual material itself. For example, the laws of
> probability existed prior to QM's discovery of the probabilistic
> nature of sub-atomic phenomena. QM did not discover the laws of
> probability, it only applied them. As for philosophy, QM has not
> discovered any new principle, it has only applied old principles to
> explain the anti-common sense nature of sub-atomic phenomena.
QM was only possible because some philosophical premisses were
applied. I am not arguing that science comes first and philosophy
second I am only arguing that maybe science could show us that a
certain philosophy was not enough to explain the universe. "Philosophy
of step one" considered the objectivity absolute but always have
existed different views, like the Platonic, that stated also a world
of pure ideas.
> For
> example, it seems to validate Humean skepticism through its apparent
> violation of the laws of causality. And perhaps Hume works well on
> that level, because his critique certainly falls flat on the level of
> normal human experience.
I see the thing on a different way. When the experiments revealed
that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
impossible.
I am pretty convinced that, on the medical field for example, one can
prove that a disease has an emotional basis when another also says
that the same patology has only phisical causes. Depends on the
initial premisses that you have.
Don.
Fred Weiss
"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:82f24994.03080...@posting.google.com...
>.... When the experiments revealed
> that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
> observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
> impossible.
Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
observer". It is what is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't
effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively.
> I am pretty convinced that, on the medical field for example, one can
> prove that a disease has an emotional basis when another also says
> that the same patology has only phisical causes. Depends on the
> initial premisses that you have.
No, it depends on the facts - which in a given state of knowledge the
evidence might not yet be conclusive to establish the cause of a disease. It
is quite possible that a certain disease, even disease in general, might
have both physical and "emotional" causes. It is a controversial area which
doesn't mean it's non-objective.
Your error here is "the primacy of consciousness", the belief that our state
of knowledge or the way in which we process knowledge effects the facts of
reality. It does not. If it did you couldn't discuss this issue
with...well...any objectivity - which it is evident you are implicitly
attempting to do.
This is another example of stealing concepts - of implicitly affirming what
you are attempting to deny.
Fred Weiss
DMF
> Don Matt wrote...
> >.... When the experiments revealed
> > that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
> > observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
> > impossible.
>
> Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
> specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
> observer". It is what is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't
> effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
> world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively.
Fred is exactly right here. Implicit in the erroneous view that Fred rejects
is the Kantian idea of objectivity -- namely, that knowledge must be acquired
without any impact, influence or participation of consciousness in order to be
objective. Of course, AR pointed out that this is a denial of consciousness
and that on Kantian terms knowledge is a stolen concept.
In fact, to be objective on the proper standard means to clearly identify the
role
of consciousness in the process of knowing. In physics this means identifying
that the act of measuring itself has effects -- and when these effects are
important.
That the measurement of certain quantum phenomenon is influenced by the very
act of measurement is not a reason to throw out the concept of an independent
existence -- but indeed demonstrates the epistemological need (and role) of
the
proper concept of objectivity in our thinking.
Regards,
David
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<dma...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>> You are bringing up what one might call the old QM vs. Philosophy
>> argument which I have seen since practically day one of my usenet
>> posting.
> In fact, the argument is older than usenet.
Yes, but I stopped reading Scientific American years ago. Ironically,
I find that philosophy is more real than science in many respects,
considering the far-out fantasies that physicists engage in nowadays
involving things that are far outside the realm of human everyday
experience. Physics seems to be more-or-less a type of escapism.
>> I don't recall saying that observation was precise, only that it was a
>> necessary first step of the scientific method.
>
> Step one is a philosophical premisse that, in my view, has led to
>neglection of philosophy. If the world is so objective it is not our
>duty try to philosophize about it but only try to describe it, in
>accord with "philosophy of step one".
It could have that stultifying effect on philosophy, and I suspect it
probably has, at least symbolically.
>> I was also indirectly
>> disputing Lenny Flank on another forum who skeptically inquired how it
>> would be possible for philosophy to improve on the scientific method,
>> and I replied, it was a philosopher (Francis Bacon) who invented the
>> scientific method in the first place. Then I stated that even step one
>> of this method was based on a philosophical assumption.
> Who is Lenny Frank?
Flank? I don't know, some troll on another forum.
>> QM itself must start with certain basic assumptions, or else it would
>> not be able to proceed with its investigations. There would be, in
>> that case, no rules with which to generate hypotheses, and these rules
>> are not generated by factual material itself. For example, the laws of
>> probability existed prior to QM's discovery of the probabilistic
>> nature of sub-atomic phenomena. QM did not discover the laws of
>> probability, it only applied them. As for philosophy, QM has not
>> discovered any new principle, it has only applied old principles to
>> explain the anti-common sense nature of sub-atomic phenomena.
> QM was only possible because some philosophical premisses were
>applied. I am not arguing that science comes first and philosophy
>second I am only arguing that maybe science could show us that a
>certain philosophy was not enough to explain the universe. "Philosophy
>of step one" considered the objectivity absolute but always have
>existed different views, like the Platonic, that stated also a world
>of pure ideas.
You have jumped from QM to "the universe." Are you implying that QM is
descriptive of the universe? While you will find
statistically-generated causal anomalies in the microcosm, I won't be
impressed with those until these anomalies also occur in physical
experience. These physicists try to impress us by stating things like
it is *statistically* possible for you to be physically transported in
the blink of an eye from one location to another in space/time.
However, that does not make it physically possible in reality, only
mathematically possible in theory. These physicists will then claim
that the *likelihood* of such an event occurring is billions to one.
However, that is not the same thing as judging the odds of a horse
winning a race, no matter how high the odds. How convenient, to say
that the human race will never actually see a quantum probability
manifest itself on the macro level, and then pretend that the
mathematics is proof enough.
Step one of the scientific method is at least empirical, but it
overturns Aristotle in that it doesn't start with assumptions about
what is out there, as you imply in your statement about Platonic
ideas. Even if such a realm of Ideas existed, it wouldn't change the
fact that observation is primary to the scientific process. For
Aristotle, science and philosophy were not even properly separated
disciplines. And from my reading, Aristotle's starting-point was not
empirical reality, but the philosophies of the past, such as those of
Parmenides and Heraclites, which he treated as a priori and then
synthesized to generate higher axioms yet based on our common
experience which is subjective in nature. There is a certain dogma
attached to treating common sense as an unquestionable given to which
philosophy must adhere, just as certainly as the reverse process is
also dogmatic. The result in Aristotle's case is that science could
never progress beyond the range of the senses, much less be grounded
there. The opposite course would be to take the Platonic view of
science. That at least has been helpful in delivering science from the
chains of common sense, although it too has its limits in static
dogma.
>> For
>> example, it seems to validate Humean skepticism through its apparent
>> violation of the laws of causality. And perhaps Hume works well on
>> that level, because his critique certainly falls flat on the level of
>> normal human experience.
> I see the thing on a different way. When the experiments revealed
>that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
>observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
>impossible.
Are you referring to the slit experiments, or Einstein
thought-experiments?
> I am pretty convinced that, on the medical field for example, one can
>prove that a disease has an emotional basis when another also says
>that the same patology has only phisical causes. Depends on the
>initial premisses that you have.
Your own theory of perspectivism may be only your own perspective, so
it wouldn't apply universally.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
>Fred Weiss wrote...
>> Don Matt wrote...
>> >.... When the experiments revealed
>> > that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
>> > observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
>> > impossible.
>> Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
>> specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
>> observer". It is what is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't
>> effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
>> world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively.
>Fred is exactly right here. Implicit in the erroneous view that Fred rejects
>is the Kantian idea of objectivity -- namely, that knowledge must be acquired
>without any impact, influence or participation of consciousness in order to be
>objective. Of course, AR pointed out that this is a denial of consciousness
>and that on Kantian terms knowledge is a stolen concept.
That interpretation of Kant is as old as it is wrong. However, I do
not have to disprove your arbitrary assertion. So please cite me an
instance where Kant states that objective knowledge does not require
the participation of a conscious observer.
>In fact, to be objective on the proper standard means to clearly identify the
>role of consciousness in the process of knowing.
You mean, objective knowing...
Which is exactly what Kant does, to your chagrin. The Deduction of the
Categories is Kant's proof that it is our distinctive, rational manner
of cognition that is responsible for the judgment that reality is
objective. Have you read it, or only read about it second-handedly?
>In physics this means identifying
>that the act of measuring itself has effects -- and when these effects are
>important.
>That the measurement of certain quantum phenomenon is influenced by the very
>act of measurement is not a reason to throw out the concept of an independent
>existence -- but indeed demonstrates the epistemological need (and role) of
>the proper concept of objectivity in our thinking.
QM is stating that objectivity is not possible in this measuring. You
will reply that the fact that it is impossible is itself an objective
fact. However, the measurement itself is still not objective. The
participation of the QM observer introduces a subjective element which
corrupts the objectivity of the measurement, making it impossible to
determine.
Don Matt
> > that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
> > observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
> > impossible.
> Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
> specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
> observer". It is what is independent of us.
Let me explain myself. I did not mean that QM experiments showed that
our thoughts or our desires could ever change what is the truth. I was
refering to experiments that showed our intrinsic inability to really
know the ultimatte objective truth. We will always "see" the world
through our mind, we will always have some necessary initial
philosophical premisses that will guide our focus through one aspect
of reality. This of course is not supposed to change reality, reality
is, light is, but when we try to describe it we can not see the whole
reality. That´s how Bohr coined his principle of complementarity.
But understand, I personally consider this is a rather difficult
issue that I´m still investigating. However, the internet is full of
articles that explain what I´ve said. This one, for example:
http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/asem20jh.html
> Our lack of knowledge doesn't
> effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
> world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively.
> > I am pretty convinced that, on the medical field for example, one can
> > prove that a disease has an emotional basis when another also says
> > that the same patology has only phisical causes. Depends on the
> > initial premisses that you have.
> No, it depends on the facts - which in a given state of knowledge the
> evidence might not yet be conclusive to establish the cause of a disease.
Right, but you may not see some facts if you don´t look for them. As
I´ve already pointed in this group some mental diseases for example
can be described only in neurologycal terms if the researcher don´t
believe in any psycologycal process. But those that believe in primacy
of mind over body are equally able to describe some diseases only in
psychologycal terms.
> It
> is quite possible that a certain disease, even disease in general, might
> have both physical and "emotional" causes.
If you consider the posibility that a disease is either material or
emotional is because you, as a philosopher, recognize the value of the
cognition. Another person that denies any philosophycal attempt,
including free-will, will only see chemical reactions. Afterall it is
quite difficult for a thing to be caused either material and either
emotional, isn´t it?
> It is a controversial area which
> doesn't mean it's non-objective.
I personally don´t consider it non-objective, I only tend to think we
must consider, as a philosophical premisse, that our objectivity has
some limits.
> Your error here is "the primacy of consciousness", the belief that our state
> of knowledge or the way in which we process knowledge effects the facts of
> reality. It does not.
Then, how to explain the QM light experiments?
> If it did you couldn't discuss this issue
> with...well...any objectivity - which it is evident you are implicitly
> attempting to do.
That´s true. If I did not considered possible any kind of objectivity
this discussion would be a contradiction.
When a scientist discovers, by a reproducible experiment, that light
is a particle he/she is doing a trully objective approach. But note
that if scientists never looked for the energy aspect of light this
would not be known. And it was not because they imagined that light
was energy but because they were able to do reproducible - objective -
experiments that show this another aspect of light reality, that this
became valid knowledge.
The same, on my view, applies to the experiments you can do on the
medical field. Dreams, for example, would never be relevant to the
understanding of human emotional behavior if Freud did not believed
they could ever show something. Before Freud nobody really believed
that dreams mean something, it was his "feeling" and a sistematic
approach that revealed something objective about this issue. A pure
materialist view would treat dreams only as brain signs. And perhaps
dreams are really brain signs this is only part of the truth.
So I do not see my view as a denial of objectivity. It is possible
but it is always partial, submisse somehow to our initial world view.
This world view does not change the results of our experiments but I
think they change the experiments we choose to do.
Therefore, on my view, a correct philosophy of science should correct
this bias of our mind.
Don.
Homer
HPO Jury = Malenoid <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>"Oh yeahhhh? Well don't get so distressed. Did I happen to mention
>that I am impressed?"
>
>Violent Femmes
Well all the hooligans and rude boys
know one thing for sure: scars be stricken
on their face. > Rancid.
Violent femmes wisdom exists only in your
imagination.
Homer
Fred Weiss
"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:82f24994.03080...@posting.google.com...
> .... I did not mean that QM experiments showed that
> our thoughts or our desires could ever change what is the truth. I was
> refering to experiments that showed our intrinsic inability to really
> know the ultimatte objective truth.
QM shows no such thing. First of all our inability to measure certain
quantum phenomenon precisely doesn't effect our ability in any other area.
It is one particular, exceptional kind of phenomenon, our study of which is
still relatively recent. It not only says nothing about our ability to know
truth, it is an example of our ability. QM is an extremely advanced branch
of science and is a reflection of our scientific abilities, not the
opposite.
> We will always "see" the world
> through our mind,...
We see so we are blind? Is that it?
Of course we have to process the data provided by our senses. What would be
unprocessed data? But the data we are processing is *of reality*. It doesn't
matter in the slightest how we process it. It is not how we process it. It
is what we are processing.
>.... reality is, light is, but when we try to describe it we can not see
the whole
> reality.
This is pure Kantian nonsense. What about reality can't we grasp? And how do
you know that you aren't grasping it "whole", i.e. that you are missing
something? What are we missing?
>.... However, the internet is full of
> articles that explain what I“ve said. This one, for example:
>
> http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/asem20jh.html
It's total self-contradictory nonsense. Again, an example of the viciously
pernicious and pervasive influence of Kant on modern thought.
>
> > No, it depends on the facts - which in a given state of knowledge the
> > evidence might not yet be conclusive to establish the cause of a
disease.
>
> Right, but you may not see some facts if you don“t look for them.
So, look for them!
>.... I only tend to think we
> must consider, as a philosophical premisse, that our objectivity has
> some limits.
How do you know that, unless you know what it is that is limiting you? If
you know there may be aspects of a situation you are overlooking, then you
know those aspects. If you don't know what they are, how do you know they
are there?
> Then, how to explain the QM light experiments?
That's a problem of physics, not philosophy.
> ....If I did not considered possible any kind of objectivity
> this discussion would be a contradiction.
That's really all that needs to be said on the subject.
>... Before Freud nobody really believed
> that dreams mean something, ....
And before Darwin or before Einstein or before......Such is the way
knowledge advances. It has nothing to do with objectivity. Without
objectivity it couldn't advance.
>... This world view does not change the results of our experiments but I
> think they change the experiments we choose to do.
> Therefore, on my view, a correct philosophy of science should correct
> this bias of our mind.
A correct approach to science should definitely try and avoid personal
biases. I think that is a basic principle of science.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:8t0rivs7l54o9n9o4...@4ax.com...
>... And from my reading, Aristotle's starting-point was not
> empirical reality, but the philosophies of the past, such as those of
> Parmenides and Heraclites, which he treated as a priori and then
> synthesized to generate higher axioms yet based on our common
> experience which is subjective in nature.
This is a complete misreading of Aristotle - and it is something we've been
over before. His review of existing knowledge is just that, a review - a
base from which he then applies his own observations
>... The result in Aristotle's case is that science could
> never progress beyond the range of the senses, much less be grounded
> there.
What are you blathering about? This is total nonsense.
> The opposite course would be to take the Platonic view of
> science.
You mean to disconnect it from reality?
Fred Weiss
Peter Kinane
thread (mine apart).
"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:82f24994.0308012048.
7522...@posting.google.com...
> > Let's consider step 1: "Observe some aspect of the universe." What
> > tells us that these aspects are objective enough to be pinned down and
> > observed? Philosophy.
It seems to me that as 'conventional' - Categoricalist - philosophy
does not make formidably coherent, true to life sense it tells us
nothing but highlights problems.
> However a problem has occured to me. Bacon“s and Descartes“ initial
> axioms were, as you“ve said, that the universe was objective eough to
> be precisely described by an independent observer. On my view this was
> valid untill the recent quantum experiments, specially those that deal
> with the (dual) nature of light.
> When science concludes that the observer is a part that determines
> the result of an experiment this ruin the initial axioms.
Good stuff.
> This means that philosophy has not absolute, pure, axioms when
> related with science?
Perhaps omitting "absolute", I do hope you are not including
"Effectuationism" in that philosophy grouping.
"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:82f24994.0308031726.
74b9...@posting.google.com...
> Let me explain myself. I did not mean that QM experiments showed that
> our thoughts or our desires could ever change what is the truth. []
Dare to investigate your concept "what is the truth". I contend that
there is a premise to a solution to be found there to your problem
below.
"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:82f24994.0308022232.
3f12...@posting.google.com...
>
> I see the thing on a different way. When the experiments revealed
> that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
> observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
> impossible.
Peter Kinane
http://www.effectuationism.com/
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
>"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:8t0rivs7l54o9n9o4...@4ax.com...
>
>>... And from my reading, Aristotle's starting-point was not
>> empirical reality, but the philosophies of the past, such as those of
>> Parmenides and Heraclites, which he treated as a priori and then
>> synthesized to generate higher axioms yet based on our common
>> experience which is subjective in nature.
>
>This is a complete misreading of Aristotle - and it is something we've been
>over before. His review of existing knowledge is just that, a review - a
>base from which he then applies his own observations
Actually it's a little different from our previous argument. I agree
that there is a certain reviewing of older philosophies going on, but
the final arbiter for Aristotle is common sense. This common sense
incorporates and synthesizes the opposites, change vs. permanence in
substance, found in the views of Heraclites and Parmenides
respectively.
That Aristotle is wrong at this has been demonstrated in modern times.
He would not honestly be able to start with common sense these days,
as science has made discoveries which sometimes contradict common
sense. But even starting with science's discoveries (or a little
common sense mixed with a little science) would be foolish, because
science's methods are based on previous philosophies that were
developed, not on scientific grounds (a posteriori), but on a priori
grounds.
Ayn Rand has carried on faithfully with Aristotle's methodology,
taking common sense and science at face-value and ignoring the
philosophies at work behind them which are responsible for their
progress, and then castigating them besides. She is biting the hand
that feeds her. And if she claimed that Aristotle is responsible for
modern science, she is just wrong. Aristotle isn't even responsible
for modern logic, much less modern science.
>>... The result in Aristotle's case is that science could
>> never progress beyond the range of the senses, much less be grounded
>> there.
>
>What are you blathering about? This is total nonsense.
>
>> The opposite course would be to take the Platonic view of
>> science.
>
>You mean to disconnect it from reality?
Mathematics is "disconnected from reality" in the sense that deducing
propositions from axioms takes place in the a priori. It was not
a-posteriori science that was responsible for the development of
non-euclidean geometry, but a priori investigation, through a process
of "self-questioning" that went on for many generations of
geometricians. Einstein proved that this geometry is applicable to
reality as it lies beyond the senses, beyond common sense. And he
proved it, not through scientific experiment, but a priori.
You can call this "Platonic" if you want, but innuendo won't change
the fact that scientific progress cannot be made a posteriori, by
sifting through empirical data and the like. That is not progress.
Finding a new star or galaxy is not progress. True progress lies on
the theoretical level, and can only take place a priori, in the mind
of the thinker.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
wrote:
>>Violent Femmes
It's just a sig. Don't get so excited, Homey!
.
.
.
.
.
.
---------------
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
>"Don Matt" <dma...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:82f24994.03080...@posting.google.com...
>
>> .... I did not mean that QM experiments showed that
>> our thoughts or our desires could ever change what is the truth. I was
>> refering to experiments that showed our intrinsic inability to really
>> know the ultimatte objective truth.
>
>QM shows no such thing. First of all our inability to measure certain
>quantum phenomenon precisely doesn't effect our ability in any other area.
>It is one particular, exceptional kind of phenomenon, our study of which is
>still relatively recent. It not only says nothing about our ability to know
>truth, it is an example of our ability. QM is an extremely advanced branch
>of science and is a reflection of our scientific abilities, not the
>opposite.
>
>> We will always "see" the world through our mind,...
>
>We see so we are blind? Is that it?
>
>Of course we have to process the data provided by our senses. What would be
>unprocessed data? But the data we are processing is *of reality*. It doesn't
>matter in the slightest how we process it. It is not how we process it. It
>is what we are processing.
Circular. And if true, you might as well throw away your copy of ITOE.
>
>>.... reality is, light is, but when we try to describe it we can not see
>the whole reality.
>
>This is pure Kantian nonsense. What about reality can't we grasp? And how do
>you know that you aren't grasping it "whole", i.e. that you are missing
>something? What are we missing?
I don't see any Kantianism in that. It is from a more modern,
20th-century dialectics. But what he is saying is that we should not
*assume* we have grasped the whole picture. That is one way of
avoiding bias. There is always another perspective on things, and to
assume one has the complete picture, and has thus intellectually
encompassed every perspective, would be a pretense at omniscience.
>>.... However, the internet is full of
>> articles that explain what I“ve said. This one, for example:
>>
>> http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/asem20jh.html
>
>It's total self-contradictory nonsense. Again, an example of the viciously
>pernicious and pervasive influence of Kant on modern thought.
You have to understand Kant before you can make that kind of judgment.
>> > No, it depends on the facts - which in a given state of knowledge the
>> > evidence might not yet be conclusive to establish the cause of a
>disease.
>> Right, but you may not see some facts if you don“t look for them.
>So, look for them!
How do you know where to look? What guides you? Reality cannot guide,
it can only give reason its clues. But you have to know which
direction to look in first, and this knowledge is a priori to the
investigation.
>>.... I only tend to think we
>> must consider, as a philosophical premisse, that our objectivity has
>> some limits.
>
>How do you know that, unless you know what it is that is limiting you? If
>you know there may be aspects of a situation you are overlooking, then you
>know those aspects. If you don't know what they are, how do you know they
>are there?
It depends on what he means by "objectivity," a term that has 2 or 3
very different definitions. But here's my take on his statement.
Scientific instruments are supposed to be more objective than our own
senses. However, when even the acutest instrument has surpassed its
own abilities and we have to start relying on probabilities, then
we've pretty much reached the limits of our objectivity. A calculated
guess is not objective if our standard is perfect accuracy of
measurement.
But does that lead me to pine in despair over the limitations of our
rational faculty? I think that is what Frederick fears will be the
result of skepticism over objectivity. However, I have found nothing
to fear in such "skepticism." Reason uses its limits to make it
stronger, not weaker, merely by acknowledging those limits a priori.
This was Einstein's error when he was confronted with the various
oddities of QM, expressed in the famous quote, "God does not play dice
with the universe." But through acknowledging our limits (thus
ignoring Einstein's hand-wringing anxieties), mankind was able to
unleash the almost-unlimited power of the atom, and there is no doubt
more to come.
>> Then, how to explain the QM light experiments?
>
>That's a problem of physics, not philosophy.
>
>> ....If I did not considered possible any kind of objectivity
>> this discussion would be a contradiction.
>
>That's really all that needs to be said on the subject.
>
>>... Before Freud nobody really believed
>> that dreams mean something, ....
>
>And before Darwin or before Einstein or before......Such is the way
>knowledge advances. It has nothing to do with objectivity. Without
>objectivity it couldn't advance.
>
>>... This world view does not change the results of our experiments but I
>> think they change the experiments we choose to do.
That is correct, a world view which is a priori to the experiments one
chooses to do, a world view which guides our manner of selecting them.
>> Therefore, on my view, a correct philosophy of science should correct
>> this bias of our mind.
>
>A correct approach to science should definitely try and avoid personal
>biases. I think that is a basic principle of science.
Notice the difference between these two statements: "philosophy of
science" vs. "approach to science." But how can one approach science
without a philosophy to begin with, a philosophy which is not based on
the findings but is, rather, a priori to them? The only way to correct
a bias of mind is through critical self-questioning, and this does not
take place on the level of the empirical, but a priori to one's
investigations, both in the temporal and intellectual senses.
HPO Jury = Malenoid
wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>"Oh yeahhhh? Well don't get so distressed. Did I happen to mention
>>that I am impressed?"
>>Violent Femmes
>Well all the hooligans and rude boys
>know one thing for sure: scars be stricken
>on their face. > Rancid.
Btw, it's not "rude boys," it's "boot boys." And "scars BEEN stricken
on their face."
Kewl song.
---------------
Homer
HPO Jury = Malenoid <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>Well all the hooligans and rude boys
>>know one thing for sure: scars be stricken
>>on their face. > Rancid.
>
>Btw, it's not "rude boys," it's "boot boys." And "scars BEEN stricken
>on their face."
>
>Kewl song.
You are the kewlest man I have ever seen.
Sara ceased existing long before she died,
A fifth of burbon and a motor cycle ride...
Homer
Lon
.sonic.net>...
> Fred Weiss wrote...
> > Don Matt wrote...
> > >.... When the experiments revealed
> > > that the light was either particle and energy, depending on the
> > > observer, it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was
> > > impossible.
> >
> > Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
> > specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
> > observer". It is what is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't
> > effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
> > world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively.
>
> Fred is exactly right here. Implicit in the erroneous view that Fred rejects
> is the Kantian idea of objectivity -- namely, that knowledge must be acquired
> without any impact, influence or participation of consciousness in order
> to be
> objective. Of course, AR pointed out that this is a denial of consciousness
> and that on Kantian terms knowledge is a stolen concept.
>
attribute their errors to Rand whether they are slandering
her, or she really had that poor an understanding. Kant
did not have the view that there was no objectivity when a
rational consciousness is involved. His view was that reality
exists independently of any influence of our consciousness
(to put it in the language of this group he rejected the
primacy of consciousness) and so made a distinction between
how things were prior to the influence of consciousness,
and they are when they are perceived. The first of these
things is purely objective. The latter has both objective
and subjective parts. The objective parts being the
parts that are true for any rational agent, and the subjective
parts being those which can vary from person to person.
But even if we consider the criticism of the fictional
Kant that you are responding to, how does one get from the
view that there is no knowledge when a consciousness is
involved to a denial of consciousness? Non-sequitors are
not the strongest of arguments.
> In fact, to be objective on the proper standard means to clearly identify the
> role
> of consciousness in the process of knowing. In physics this means identifying
> that the act of measuring itself has effects -- and when these effects are
> important.
> That the measurement of certain quantum phenomenon is influenced by the very
> act of measurement is not a reason to throw out the concept of an independent
> existence -- but indeed demonstrates the epistemological need (and role) of
> the
> proper concept of objectivity in our thinking.
There are a number of things thrown together here in an
odd way. Measurement and consciousness are not the same
thing. The fact that to measure the position of a particle
one has to interact with it is a truth that has nothing to
do with consciousness. The idea that consciousness plays
a role in measurement is more extreme than you are suggesting
here. There is nothing in quantum mechanics that commits
us to it.
On the otherhand, it has been shown that when one takes
the effects of measurement into account and try to figure out
what the state of particles are when they are not being
affected by a measurement interaction, we cannot wind up
with states that are like the systems are when measured.
That is to say that we cannot assign particles positions
and momenta without bringing in a bizarre causal story.
Lon
>
> Regards,
> David
Fred Weiss
"Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
news:c24964d1.0308...@posting.google.com...
>.. Kant did not have the view that there was no objectivity when a
> rational consciousness is involved. His view was that reality
> exists independently of any influence of our consciousness...
...except that we couldn't know what it is, i.e. the noumenal "things in
themselves". So where is the objectivity?
So what you are saying is a total non-sequitur.
>... The objective parts being the
> parts that are true for any rational agent, ...
Not "the parts" that are true of reality? Of course not because according to
Kant we can't know what that is.
> > In fact, to be objective on the proper standard means to clearly
identify the
> > role of consciousness in the process of knowing.
This is to say the least deliberately ambiguous and in this context
dishonest because you are clearly trying to gloss over the essence of Kant's
epistemology which is that we cannot know reality as it "really is". The
"role of consciousness" then becomes how to seem to be rational and
objective in the face of its impossibility.
<snip the physics commentary which is irrelevant because, first, it is a
matter of physics, not philosophy, and second, I've already addressed the
point and third, and perhaps most importantly, since I have as little
interest in your apologetics for Kant as I do for your apologetics for
terrorism and really don't want to belabor either more than is necessary
except to reveal its profound dishonesty and irrationality>
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:q1utivk08ldko5k47...@4ax.com...
> On Mon, 4 Aug 2003 05:17:21 +0000 (UTC), Fred Weiss
> <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> >Of course we have to process the data provided by our senses. What would
be
> >unprocessed data? But the data we are processing is *of reality*. It
doesn't
> >matter in the slightest how we process it. It is not how we process it.
It
> >is what we are processing.
>
> Circular. And if true, you might as well throw away your copy of ITOE.
Moronic. And, like you have the slightest grasp of ITOE.
>...we should not
> *assume* we have grasped the whole picture.
That is not the issue. The issue is whether we are capable of grasping "the
whole picture" or even whatever it is we grasp that it is of the picture "as
it is".
>...There is always another perspective on things, and to
> assume one has the complete picture, and has thus intellectually
> encompassed every perspective, would be a pretense at omniscience.
That is not the issue. One doesn't have to know everything to know that you
know something. The real pretense of omniscience here is your assumption
that omniscience is required to know anything, i.e. that if you don't know
everything, you can't know anything, i.e. if you don't have "the whole
picture" then you can't have any part of it.
> >> > No, it depends on the facts - ...
> How do you know where to look?
Err...reality.
> What guides you?
Err...reason and logic.
>...you have to know which
> direction to look in first, and this knowledge is a priori to the
> investigation.
This knowledge is disconnected from what it is you are investigating? Or are
you merely deliberately using "a priori" in an ambiguous manner to try and
convey that you are saying something seemingly rational and innocouous when
in fact your purpose is the exact opposite.
> ...Scientific instruments are supposed to be more objective than our own
> senses...
They are? What's not objective about our senses? And if our senses aren't
objective, how do they read the instruments to know that the instruments are
more objective?
<snip more of the same pathetic attempts to salvage the hopeless cause of
Kantianism>
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:ufstivgccdm7gsu1h...@4ax.com...
>.. I agree
> that there is a certain reviewing of older philosophies going on, but
> the final arbiter for Aristotle is common sense.
You've been reading Kolker instead of Aristotle. The final arbiter for
Aristotle is observation. Admittedly he was not always consistent in this
regard, but he also preceded modern science by nearly 2,000 years.
The essence of his approach, while it may also have been commonsensical, was
primarily based on observation:
"Aristotle's work in zoology was the best biological synthesis of the time,
and remained the ultimate authority for centuries after his death. Some
scientific discoveries in the Middle Ages and Renaissance were criticized
simply because they were not found in Aristotle. It is ironic that
Aristotle's writings, which in many cases were based on first-hand
observation, were used to impede the progress of observational science.
Aristotle described the embryological development of a chick and the social
organization of bees. His classification of animals grouped together
animals with similar characters into broad categories called genera, and
species within the genera. He described over 500 different kinds of animals
...." etc. etc
http://www.briefhistoryoflife.com/BHL2appendix.htm
<snip everything which follows from your basic error and which therefore is
not worth belaboring>
Fred Weiss
Robert J. Kolker
Lon wrote:
> I always wonder when people misrepresent Kant and then
> attribute their errors to Rand whether they are slandering
> her, or she really had that poor an understanding. Kant
> did not have the view that there was no objectivity when a
> rational consciousness is involved. His view was that reality
> exists independently of any influence of our consciousness
> (to put it in the language of this group he rejected the
> primacy of consciousness) and so made a distinction between
> how things were prior to the influence of consciousness,
> and they are when they are perceived. The first of these
> things is purely objective. The latter has both objective
> and subjective parts. The objective parts being the
> parts that are true for any rational agent, and the subjective
> parts being those which can vary from person to person.
Didn't Kant regard Space and Time as artifacts of consciousness. That is
to say Space and Time are not Out There but In Here (the consciousness
of the observer.
This is not necessarily a fatal criticism. To observe a process or
entity one requires an observing mechanism be it an eye, a telescope, a
cloud chamber etc. and a consciousness to integrate the perceptions that
make up the observations. The observation is the result of an
interaction between the thing observed and the observing mechanism or
process. So it becomes a fair question to ask how much of space and time
is a property of the basic observing mechanism, namely the brain and how
much is it a property of what is being observed.
This leads to the general question of to what extent is consciousness
intermixed with what is observed. Experiments in human perception
indicate that consciousness is not a passive participant in the act of
observation. The history of the observer's consciousness in some
circumstances clearly influences the -observeration-, i.e. the resulting
of the observer (complete with consciousness) and the thing observed.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
Fred Weiss wrote:
> The essence of his approach, while it may also have been commonsensical, was
> primarily based on observation:
>
That is how he concluded that heavier objects fall faster than lighter
objects?
Bob Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid
But is observation the origin of Aristotle's idea that virtuous action
is formed by the inculcation of habits that go against human nature?
"VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral,
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to
teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while
moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name
(ethike) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word
ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that NONE OF THE MORAL
VIRTUES ARISE IN US BY NATURE; FOR NOTHING THAT EXISTS
BY NATURE CAN FORM A HABIT CONTRARY TO ITS NATURE."
Nichomachean Ethics (II,1).
Lon
1.atl.mindspring.net>...
> "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
> news:c24964d1.0308...@posting.google.com...
>
> >.. Kant did not have the view that there was no objectivity when a
> > rational consciousness is involved. His view was that reality
> > exists independently of any influence of our consciousness...
>
> ...except that we couldn't know what it is, i.e. the noumenal "things in
> themselves". So where is the objectivity?
>
given by people other than yourself, so I will try to
explain this using an argument by someone who is more on
your level. A couple of posts back you said:
"Our inability to accurately measure certain quantum phenomena in certain
specific respects does not make what that phenomena is "depending on the
observer". It is what is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't
effect it. It has nothing whatever to do with an "objective view of the
world". In fact that limitation is something we know...objectively."
That quote gives a good Kantian response to your silly
objection. The noumena is objective in that it is what it
is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't effect
it. Kant would also agree that the limitation is something
we know objectively. Similarly since parts of the phenomenal
world are due to the purely objective noumenal world, and
the objective rules by which a rational mind understands
them, these too will be objective. Although thinking things
can know things, knowledge which does not depend on subjective
features of the knower remain objective.
I am beginning to get the sense that your hatred of Kant
is on par with the hatred of homosexuals held by latent
homosexuals. It was only a couple of weeks ago that you
gave Kant's second formulation of the Categorical Imperative
as the mark of a civilized society. And now you are adopting
Kantian notions to get around problems in quantum mechanics.
I hope you will do some penance for having all of these
Kantian thoughts.
> So what you are saying is a total non-sequitur.
>
> >... The objective parts being the
> > parts that are true for any rational agent, ...
>
> Not "the parts" that are true of reality? Of course not because according to
> Kant we can't know what that is.
>
Not the parts that are true of reality, because even the
subjective parts are true of reality. This may surprise
you, but you and I are parts of reality, so if we have
certain subjective experiences they are part of reality
too. When you get the sense of pride that you have won
an argument, that sense of pride is actually part of
reality, although the winning of an argument by you
rarely is.
> > > In fact, to be objective on the proper standard means to clearly
> identify the
> > > role of consciousness in the process of knowing.
>
> This is to say the least deliberately ambiguous and in this context
> dishonest because you are clearly trying to gloss over the essence of Kant's
> epistemology which is that we cannot know reality as it "really is". The
> "role of consciousness" then becomes how to seem to be rational and
> objective in the face of its impossibility.
This is, I hope, a non-deliberate case of your inability
to count to two. Otherwise it is quite mean of you to
bad mouth someone who rose to your defense as did the author
of that passage which you are attributing to me.
Lon
> Fred Weiss
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
>"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:q1utivk08ldko5k47...@4ax.com...
>> On Mon, 4 Aug 2003 05:17:21 +0000 (UTC), Fred Weiss
>> <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>> >Of course we have to process the data provided by our senses. What would
>be
>> >unprocessed data? But the data we are processing is *of reality*. It
>doesn't
>> >matter in the slightest how we process it. It is not how we process it.
>It
>> >is what we are processing.
>>
>> Circular. And if true, you might as well throw away your copy of ITOE.
>
>Moronic. And, like you have the slightest grasp of ITOE.
Open you mind ever so slightly to the facts of reality, Frederick, and
you'll see that I do know, and furthermore, that your emphasis on the
"what" over the "how" begs the question of what you are processing to
form objective concepts and not merely subjective perceptions.
>>...we should not *assume* we have grasped the whole picture.
>That is not the issue. The issue is whether we are capable of grasping "the
>whole picture" or even whatever it is we grasp that it is of the picture "as
>it is".
That is your issue which you bring up because you think objectivism
has solved it and the answers are cut-and-dried to be picked up and
utilized by the various sergeants and buck privates of the objectivist
movement.
There is just nothing in the objectivist movement that speaks to the
issue of how our changing perspective of QM phenomena brings forth
different states of particles but never all states at once. The fact
that we are incapable of grasping the whole picture at one time is an
objective fact.
>>...There is always another perspective on things, and to
>> assume one has the complete picture, and has thus intellectually
>> encompassed every perspective, would be a pretense at omniscience.
>That is not the issue. One doesn't have to know everything to know that you
>know something. The real pretense of omniscience here is your assumption
>that omniscience is required to know anything, i.e. that if you don't know
>everything, you can't know anything, i.e. if you don't have "the whole
>picture" then you can't have any part of it.
I never claimed that. In fact, I have disputed that theory on another
forum. I don't see us as being in disagreement here.
>> >> > No, it depends on the facts - ...
>
>> How do you know where to look?
>
>Err...reality.
Simplistic. Obviously if you want to determine if the cause of a
disease is physical or mental, you're going to look at reality.
Sheesh.
>> What guides you?
>
>Err...reason and logic.
You're groping a little closer to the answer at this point, Frederick,
but still overly simplistic.
>>...you have to know which
>> direction to look in first, and this knowledge is a priori to the
>> investigation.
>
>This knowledge is disconnected from what it is you are investigating? Or are
>you merely deliberately using "a priori" in an ambiguous manner to try and
>convey that you are saying something seemingly rational and innocouous when
>in fact your purpose is the exact opposite.
How would you know my purpose? Why don't you try some real observation
rather than judging a priori from what your objectivist masters have
brainwashed into you, for a change? I agree, there is a certain
ambiguity underlying the term "a priori," and your posts exemplify its
pre-critical use as "based on assumptions," in your case, prejudiced
assumptions based on no observation whatsoever.
This brings us down to the deepest level of this particular topic. If
you start with random a priori assumptions based, in your case, on the
pathological desire to be part of the objectivist movement, then you
can prove anything about your observations. You can pick apart almost
any and find mainly bad "purposes," if those posters disagree with
your assumptions. The underlying assumption is that if a post doesn't
"sound" like something from Rand or Peikoff, then it is not only bad,
it is evil. Or just the opposite, someone could start with the
underlying presumption of innocence and find nothing but good
intentions in the exact same post. But which is the truth? That is
something you cannot know without claiming omniscience, but it is best
to start with the presumption of innocence if your view of man and the
universe is one of benevolence. That you tend to view other men
(non-objectivists particularly) as evil indicates that you have a
malevolent sense-of-life which malevolence you use objectivism to
protect yourself from. So if you wrap yourself up in the flag of
reason and benevolence, you believe these evil forces cannot touch
you. That is the purpose behind intellectualizing reality through
a-priori assumptions, but it is based on a wrong-headed view of the
a-priori, and of reason.
But still, it is funny when you come so close to validating my own
point, "innocuous" or not, when you implied earlier that reason is
a-priori to the investigation. We start with the laws of reason and
logic. Of course these two need to be grounded in something besides
the empirical (psychological or external), or else you are circularly
starting with reality and not primarily with reason and logic. These
laws of reason are that which free us from the often deceptive nature
of existence, such as the appearance that the earth is the center of
the universe. If it was not possible for man, imaginatively and
creatively, out of his own mental resources, to think beyond that
appearance, we would not have bothered to blast ourselves into space
and observe the true nature of the solar system first-hand, or develop
instruments to peer out into the universe and find that it is
seemingly neverending with no evidence that there is any center at
all. That power to think first before acting, to theorize beyond the
mere observations (a very Platonic thing) and overcome centuries of
prejudice and habit (which is Aristotle's means to virtue) in our way
of looking at the universe around us, is what I mean by the a priori.
Was that explanation too ambiguous for you?
>> ...Scientific instruments are supposed to be more objective than our own
>> senses...
>
>They are? What's not objective about our senses? And if our senses aren't
>objective, how do they read the instruments to know that the instruments are
>more objective?
You may fall back on the idea that if we see a straight line as
curved, then that perception is at least an objective fact about the
way we observe things. But how do we know to begin with that it is in
fact a straight line? Not by reference to the senses, but through a
different source: our a priori reasoning, which gives us a different
standard than the senses through which to determine the objective
facts of reality. Geometry originated partially from observation, that
is a simple enough fact even for objectivists. However, its purpose is
not merely to measure what we already observe, but to bring
objectivity to our observations by going beyond them through an
a-priori deductive generation of facts. Thus geometry is born of our
own mental powers, and moreover, from a subjective need to attain
objectivity where our senses and observations often fail us. And that
they often do fail us is an objective fact that should not have
escaped even your notice.
DMF
> QM is stating that objectivity is not possible in this measuring.
> You will reply that the fact that it is impossible is itself an objective
> fact. However, the measurement itself is still not objective.
Objectivity as defined by Kant is not possible because consciousness
has identity and works through specific means.
>The participation of the QM observer introduces a subjective
> element which corrupts the objectivity of the measurement, making
> it impossible to determine.
If it is "impossible to determine" then how do you know that it is
"corrupt"? That QM is confounding existence and consciousness
should come as no surprise given the sorry state of philosophy in
general and the philosophy of science in particular. Using QM as
the proof of Kantian concepts is circular because QM rests on
Kantian epistemology.
Regards,
David
Fred Weiss
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:tfOXa.48363$cF.18234@rwcrnsc53...
Since we can't know reality the way it really it is, it was just a "mental
construct". Later we concocted another "mental construct". Who knows which
is right?
That's about your view, right? So what's the problem?
(You will now proceed to hedge your view like you do on the validity of the
senses. Tomorrow you will say something completely different. But, hey, it's
all a mental construct, so what difference does it make? Why can't we have
different constructs for different days of the week? Makes life
interesting.).
Fred Weiss
HPO Jury = Malenoid
>Malenoid wrote...
>> QM is stating that objectivity is not possible in this measuring.
>> You will reply that the fact that it is impossible is itself an objective
>> fact. However, the measurement itself is still not objective.
>
>Objectivity as defined by Kant is not possible because consciousness
>has identity and works through specific means.
That's not what I've read in my two first-hand readings of the first
Critique and many 3rd-party non-Objectivist analyses. Henry Allison's
"Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense" is a
good, unbiased analysis of the Critique. But best of all is to read
the Critique yourself, focusing particularly on the introductions
which are easier to read than the main body of the Critique and give
great clues as to how to proceed from there. It is best, by far, to
trust the author of any such work, because there is then no need for
any interpretation.
In my experience, I can never trust the interpretations of either
objectivists or physicists (or particularly of a certain objectivist
physicist who posts on usenet) on the issue of Kant's first Critique.
I trust my own mind the most, in that I take a particular
interpretation and compare it to my years of study on the Critique
itself, and do not weigh it against other interpretations (such as,
heaven forbid, objectivism's grotesquely biased, non-objective opinion
on the subject).
>>The participation of the QM observer introduces a subjective
>> element which corrupts the objectivity of the measurement, making
>> it impossible to determine.
>
>If it is "impossible to determine" then how do you know that it is
>"corrupt"?
Because when physicists determine one quantum state (position) they
lose touch with the other quantum state (momentum). It is impossible
to achieve both determinations at the same time.
>That QM is confounding existence and consciousness
>should come as no surprise given the sorry state of philosophy in
>general and the philosophy of science in particular. Using QM as
>the proof of Kantian concepts is circular because QM rests on
>Kantian epistemology.
QM has not been defended by Kantians, but by Humeans who know the
tremendous fundamental distinction between those two philosophers, a
distinction which objectivists often, if not always, try to obscure.
By the way, a decade ago my opinion on Kant was the same as yours and
objectivism in general. It was through my first-hand analysis of the
subject that my opinion began to change, and grow into knowledge. I
always did try to take Rand's advice and be as first-handed in my
opinions as I could. It is perhaps the only advice she had that was
worth listening to.
Lon
59$It4....@rwcrnsc51.ops.asp.att.net>...
>
>
> Didn't Kant regard Space and Time as artifacts of consciousness. That is
> to say Space and Time are not Out There but In Here (the consciousness
> of the observer.
beings comprehend things, as opposed to how things are in
themselves. However I don't think he would want to say
that space and time are in the consciousness of the
observer. Within the world as we understand it there will
still be an inner/outer distinction in which physical objects
are outer, and our perceptions of them are inner. Space and
Time remain objective on his view since they are the result
of objective faculties of rationality. He was, famously,
wrong about what limitations there are on the possible
structure of space.
>
> This is not necessarily a fatal criticism. To observe a process or
> entity one requires an observing mechanism be it an eye, a telescope, a
> cloud chamber etc. and a consciousness to integrate the perceptions that
> make up the observations. The observation is the result of an
> interaction between the thing observed and the observing mechanism or
> process. So it becomes a fair question to ask how much of space and time
> is a property of the basic observing mechanism, namely the brain and how
> much is it a property of what is being observed.
>
> This leads to the general question of to what extent is consciousness
> intermixed with what is observed. Experiments in human perception
> indicate that consciousness is not a passive participant in the act of
> observation. The history of the observer's consciousness in some
> circumstances clearly influences the -observeration-, i.e. the resulting
> of the observer (complete with consciousness) and the thing observed.
This is certainly the general idea that Kant had. That is,
what we see is how things are when seen by us, and this is not
the same as how they are in themselves. There are limits
to how much we can know about how things are in themselves
since all of our experience is of how things are as we see
them. Obviously there are questions about the details.
Lon
>
> Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
>
> Because when physicists determine one quantum state (position) they
> lose touch with the other quantum state (momentum). It is impossible
> to achieve both determinations at the same time.
That is a little bit off. Let v_1 and v_2 be complementary variables
(such as position and momentum). Let DEL be the variation of measurement
of a variable. Then DEL v_1 * DEL v_2 >= h-bar where h-bar is the Planck
constant divided by 2*pi.
Bob Kolker
Gordon Sollars
bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu says...
> Fred Weiss <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message news:<bgnsmn$n3e$1@slb
> 1.atl.mindspring.net>...
> > themselves". So where is the objectivity?
> >
> You seem to have trouble following simple arguments when
> given by people other than yourself, so I will try to
> explain this using an argument by someone who is more on
> your level.
A reply as good as this one comes along perhaps once every ten years.
--
Gordon Sollars
gsol...@pobox.com
HPO Jury = Malenoid
Bob, I have only read popular science, I am not a dedicated physics
student. What I was explaining can best be described as high school
physics. Can you tell me, in plainer english, how my description was
off? Was it off conceptually, or did I just miss the finer elements
involved of the process? If the latter, then what I wrote was
sufficient TO THE TASK AT HAND.
Fred Weiss
"Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
news:c24964d1.03080...@posting.google.com...
> Fred Weiss <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
news:<bgnsmn$n3e$1@slb
> 1.atl.mindspring.net>...
> > "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
> > news:c24964d1.0308...@posting.google.com...
> That quote gives a good Kantian response to your silly
> objection. The noumena is objective in that it is what it
> is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't effect
> it.
But according to Kant we can't know it, so it is not objective. It is in
fact *unknowable*. In actual fact it is intrinsic, not objective.
Objectivity is a condition of human awareness based on the facts of reality.
If we cannot know the facts of reality, the concept of objectivity is
meaningless.
>.. Similarly since parts of the phenomenal
> world are due to the purely objective noumenal world, ...
You mean: some parts of what we perceive are due to things in reality of
which we have no knowledge. So, since we have no knowledge of it how do we
know if it is "due to" it?
>... and the objective rules by which a rational mind understands
> them,....
What "objective rules" and on what does Kant base their objectivity, since
objectivity is based on knowledge of the facts of reality the possibility of
which he denies?
> ... This may surprise
> you, but you and I are parts of reality, so if we have
> certain subjective experiences they are part of reality
> too.
It doesn't surprise me but it is apparently too difficult for you to grasp
that to the extent that they are supposed to be *of reality* then their
truth, and objectivity, must be based *on reality* which Kant denies that we
can know.
Fred Weiss
Fred Weiss
"Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
news:c24964d1.03080...@posting.google.com...
>... There are limits
> to how much we can know about how things are in themselves
> since all of our experience is of how things are as we see
> them.
We are blind because we have eyes.
> Obviously there are questions about the details.
Is this your rather lame attempt at humour. No, I somehow doubt it. I think
you are really serious.
Fred Weiss
Don Matt
> > our thoughts or our desires could ever change what is the truth. I was
> > refering to experiments that showed our intrinsic inability to really
> > know the ultimatte objective truth.
> QM shows no such thing. First of all our inability to measure certain
> quantum phenomenon precisely doesn't effect our ability in any other area.
Maybe you´ve misunderstood my quote about QM. I was refering to the
fact that if you look to the particle aspect of light you can not
have, at the same time, the wave component of light. Just for
emphasis: particle and wave (energy) are contraditory terms so the
light should be or particle or wave. It is both. On my view this
finding, undoubtedly, contradicts what I was discussing with Malenor
to be an axiom of science, and that we call step one - observation -
that supposes an absolute separation of what is observed from the
observer.
Now let me tell you that an axiom is a maxim widely accepted on its
intrinsic merit. If something is one thing and another depending on
the observer´s experiment the observer and what is observed are
conected. Thus, the step one axiom, an absolute open mind objectivity,
has became not anymore widely accepted. *Pure* observation can not be
an *axiom* of science.
This changes the concept of objectivity. On my view it exists, as
I´ve said, in a sense that when you do an experiment you must follow a
method, it must be reproductible to be valid. But choosing an
experiment depends on an idea that comes first, the observer is
somehow connected with what is observed. Recognizing this as a more
complete philosophycal axiom brings a better approach to objective
knowledge - science. It becomes more complete and with more powerful
results once the philosophical premisse is more correct.
> It is one particular, exceptional kind of phenomenon, our study of
which is
> still relatively recent. It not only says nothing about our ability to know
> truth, it is an example of our ability. QM is an extremely advanced branch
> of science and is a reflection of our scientific abilities, not the
> opposite.
QM is an example of a wrong philosophical axiom.
> > We will always "see" the world
> > through our mind,...
>
> We see so we are blind? Is that it?
>
> Of course we have to process the data provided by our senses. What would be
> unprocessed data? But the data we are processing is *of reality*. It doesn't
> matter in the slightest how we process it. It is not how we process it. It
> is what we are processing.
The problem on my view is why have you chosen to process an specific
data?
> >.... reality is, light is, but when we try to describe it we can not see
> the whole
> > reality.
>
> This is pure Kantian nonsense. What about reality can't we grasp? And how do
> you know that you aren't grasping it "whole", i.e. that you are missing
> something? What are we missing?
It is a funny thing to write "Kantinian nonsense" without knowing
Kant more than a very superficial level. Probably some of his concepts
are familiar to me because of my extensive reading of Jung, a
psychologyst that bases his concepts on Kant´s philosophy.
I intend to start "critique of pure reason" on the following next
weeks, when work gives me a break. Maybe then I´ll understand why I am
with evil ideas ;)
> >.... However, the internet is full of
> > articles that explain what I´ve said. This one, for example:
> > http://www.newciv.org/ISSS_Primer/asem20jh.html
> It's total self-contradictory nonsense. Again, an example of the viciously
> pernicious and pervasive influence of Kant on modern thought.
I would not know it was Kantinian if you did not tell me.
> > > No, it depends on the facts - which in a given state of knowledge the
> > > evidence might not yet be conclusive to establish the cause of a
> disease.
> > Right, but you may not see some facts if you don´t look for them.
> So, look for them!
Should I look for genes that locate the collective instincts of the
human emotional mind?
> >.... I only tend to think we
> > must consider, as a philosophical premisse, that our objectivity has
> > some limits.
> How do you know that, unless you know what it is that is limiting you? If
> you know there may be aspects of a situation you are overlooking, then you
> know those aspects. If you don't know what they are, how do you know they
> are there?
> > Then, how to explain the QM light experiments?
> That's a problem of physics, not philosophy.
QM contradicts the initial axiom of "pure observation". It is a
matter to philosophy.
(snipped)
> >... This world view does not change the results of our experiments but I
> > think they change the experiments we choose to do.
> > Therefore, on my view, a correct philosophy of science should correct
> > this bias of our mind.
> A correct approach to science should definitely try and avoid personal
> biases. I think that is a basic principle of science.
So it is only a matter of you accepting the reality.
Don.
Fred Weiss
"Gordon Sollars" <gsol...@pobox.com> wrote in message
news:MPG.199a0c0b5...@news.optonline.net...
Oh, don't denigrate yourself, Gordon. You're at least as good a
philosophical con artist as Lon. Keep in mind that in this particular
instance he's merely expounding on the historical master at it, Immanuel
Kant. Popper is lame in comparison, since his errors are considerably more
obvious, so you work at a disadvantage.
Fred Weiss
Robert J. Kolker
Fred Weiss wrote:
> We are blind because we have eyes.
Produce a quote from -Critique of Pure Reason- where Kant either says
that or even implies that. Page reference to any standard translation is
just fine.
Bob Kolker
Lon
84lf54nmknsb...@4ax.com>...
>
> QM has not been defended by Kantians, but by Humeans who know the
> tremendous fundamental distinction between those two philosophers, a
> distinction which objectivists often, if not always, try to obscure.
great majority of people with knowledge of science. I
am not sure what Kantians are not in this group. It
would surprise me if there are many Kant scholars who
don't either support QM or acknowledge they don't
know enough physics to comment either way. The same
is true of adherents to most serious philosophies. I
don't mean to suggest that QM is particularly Kantian.
Some defenders were radical empiricists in the Humean
mold. Others were decidedly not. But QM is our
current best science, so philosophers of various
epistemic stripes accept it.
Of course Kant scholars do not tend to be Kantians
in the way that students of objectivism are objectivists.
So perhaps you have a smaller group of people in mind
when you talk about Kantians. I would have thought
a more accurate description would be that despite
Kant's historical importance, there are few true
Kantians around anymore, and those people who admire
Kant also admire science and endorse its best theories.
Lon
HPO Jury = Malenoid
wrote:
>HPO Jury = Malenoid <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message news:<bu10jvgpi
>84lf54nmknsb...@4ax.com>...
>>
>> QM has not been defended by Kantians, but by Humeans who know the
>> tremendous fundamental distinction between those two philosophers, a
>> distinction which objectivists often, if not always, try to obscure.
> This is a curious claim. QM is defended by the
>great majority of people with knowledge of science.
In my experience, the great majority of people with knowledge of
science (i.e., scientists) lean toward Hume and away from Kant.
This might be because QM theory takes such a radical departure away
from the law of causality that Hume's skepticism seems to be validated
by it, or vice versa.
>I am not sure what Kantians are not in this group. It
>would surprise me if there are many Kant scholars who
>don't either support QM or acknowledge they don't
>know enough physics to comment either way. The same
>is true of adherents to most serious philosophies. I
>don't mean to suggest that QM is particularly Kantian.
>Some defenders were radical empiricists in the Humean
>mold. Others were decidedly not. But QM is our
>current best science, so philosophers of various
>epistemic stripes accept it.
> Of course Kant scholars do not tend to be Kantians
>in the way that students of objectivism are objectivists.
>So perhaps you have a smaller group of people in mind
>when you talk about Kantians. I would have thought
>a more accurate description would be that despite
>Kant's historical importance, there are few true
>Kantians around anymore, and those people who admire
>Kant also admire science and endorse its best theories.
Between Kant and Hume, the Hume scientists seem to be in much greater
number. These same scientists just adore attacking Kant. As for your
last comment, I have never met a science-hating Kantian. I don't know
what they think of QM, but I imagine they would simply give it a
Critical analysis in the Kantian fashion. But that goes beyond my
point, which is that physicists I have been in contact with prefer
Hume over Kant by far.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> Between Kant and Hume, the Hume scientists seem to be in much greater
> number. These same scientists just adore attacking Kant. As for your
> last comment, I have never met a science-hating Kantian. I don't know
> what they think of QM, but I imagine they would simply give it a
> Critical analysis in the Kantian fashion. But that goes beyond my
> point, which is that physicists I have been in contact with prefer
> Hume over Kant by far.
One reason is that Hume's philosophy denies synthetic a priori
propositions. True things are true because of logical
tautology/definition or because experience indicates they are true.
Empiricism ueber alles.
Bob Kolker
"When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc
must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.
Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry
and illusion."
Peter Kinane
"It seems to me that a philosophy system which is not formidably
coherent and true to life amounts to "I know nothing".
If philosophy involves developing coherence of all of the concepts one
features then, in the absence of such coherence there is, what I'll
categorise, a moral choice: When, say, only 80% of one's concepts fit
together very well, one must either take the position to start all
over again, that one's philosophy system is at a kind of "I know
nothing" stage, or of bashing the remaining pieces around in an
attempt to make them fit the space one has available, a kind of "the
20% is evil" position- -philosophy".
Peter Kinane
http://www.effectuationism.com/
Fred Weiss
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:Pw%Xa.50927$Oz4.14316@rwcrnsc54...
Let me understand you. You need a page reference that Kant denies that what
we perceive is the world as it really is? I'll be happy to provide it
but...err....Bob, that is a basic tenet of Kantianism. That's the whole
point of the monstrous edifice of "The Critique of Pure Reason" which is
supposed to somehow address that problem via the most elaborate -and
unfortunately, influential - con in philosophical history.
Influential, I might add, obviously on you in ways you apparently don't even
realize (Kantianism is that pervasive and embedded as an unquestioned given
in modern thought).
Fred Weiss
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
<snippety>
>Influential, I might add, obviously on you in ways you apparently don't even
>realize (Kantianism is that pervasive and embedded as an unquestioned given
>in modern thought).
Your words are true to the Objectivist literature on the Peikoffian
interpretation of Kant, but not from Walsh's side. Can you take into
consideration the late George Walsh's interpretation without prejudice
or ad hominem? Are you even capable of that? I wouldn't want to
stretch your capacities too far, though.
http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/objectivity/walsh1/
"He [Kant] held that insofar as metaphysics deals with concepts 'to
which the corresponding objects commensurate with them can be given in
experience' (Bxviii-Bxix), such metaphysics can be set upon 'the
secure path of a science.' "
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>One reason is that Hume's philosophy denies synthetic a priori
>propositions. True things are true because of logical
>tautology/definition or because experience indicates they are true.
>Empiricism ueber alles.
>Bob Kolker
>"When we run over libraries, persuaded of these principles, what havoc
>must we make? If we take in our hand any volume of divinity or school
>metaphysics, for instance, let us ask, Does it contain any abstract
>reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any
>experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No.
>Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but sophistry
>and illusion."
Reasoning concerning quantity or number takes place in the synthetic
apriori. If it was not connected to experience, it would not be
synthetic, and if it was not necessarily true, it would not be
apriori. The key is to connect concepts with the empirical and create
propositions which are necessarily true, thus synthetic apriori.
Transcendental Idealism ueber alles.
Robert J. Kolker
Fred Weiss wrote:
>>
>>Produce a quote from -Critique of Pure Reason- where Kant either says
>>that or even implies that. Page reference to any standard translation is
>>just fine.
>
>
> Let me understand you. You need a page reference that Kant denies that what
> we perceive is the world as it really is? I'll be happy to provide it
> but...err....Bob, that is a basic tenet of Kantianism.
Produce the citation please. Page and line numbers.
Bob Kolker
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>
> Reasoning concerning quantity or number takes place in the synthetic
> apriori.
No, it is analytic. Theorems in number theory follow logically from the
Peano axioms. All of mathematics is analytic. The applications may
require experience, but the theorems follow purely because of logic,
form and definitions.
Bob Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid
The applications require the synthetic a priori, even if all you are
doing is counting on your fingers and toes as in Kant's famous example
7 + 5 = 12. But you can play with pure, analytic concepts all day if
you like, that's your concern. But if they are then to be applied to
reality you will require a synthesis consisting of a theory that
combines the concept with the reality, understanding with intuition.
Fred Weiss
"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:cpivivc05um0h4e41...@4ax.com...
> But is observation the origin of Aristotle's idea that virtuous action
> is formed by the inculcation of habits that go against human nature?
You have this rather stunning inability to read Aristotle accurately. Where
does he say that habits "go against human nature"? All he is saying is that
if virtue was inborn or innate we couldn't act against it, i.e. we wouldn't
have any choice about it. He is not saying that by acting virtuously we are
acting somehow against our nature. Aristotle believed that we were born
"tabula rasa", i.e. without any specific innate ideas - and that would
include moral ideas. In this regard I think his observation is most
certainly correct - and in this regard he was clearly correct over 2,000
years ago vs. some on hpo (like Bert and Acorn) and many modern thinkers who
think (incorrectly, and I might add, obviously so) otherwise. On this - and
many other matters - they would do well to read Aristotle.
Fred Weiss
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> The applications require the synthetic a priori,
Uh, uh. Synthetic propositions can only be derived from experience.
Bob Kolker
Helen
6.atl.mindspring.net>...
> > Fred Weiss wrote:
> > > We are blind because we have eyes.
> >
> > Produce a quote from -Critique of Pure Reason- where Kant either says
> > that or even implies that. Page reference to any standard translation is
> > just fine.
>
> Let me understand you. You need a page reference that Kant denies that what
> we perceive is the world as it really is?
One would think that Bob's request was simple enough, without being
dressed in overly complex language. Obviously, you still seem to have
problems understanding simple English. So, nice person that I am, let
me help you out: He wants a page reference to where Kant either says
or even implies that "we are blind because we have eyes".
Before you go looking notice that seeing things in a distorted way, or
not being able to see everything, is not the same as being blind. Be
sure to let us know when you found that quote.
Happy hunting -- Helen.
Lon
6.atl.mindspring.net>...
> "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
> news:c24964d1.03080...@posting.google.com...
>
> >... There are limits
> > to how much we can know about how things are in themselves
> > since all of our experience is of how things are as we see
> > them.
>
> We are blind because we have eyes.
eyes make us blind. No, I think the point that I
made above is better. A better way to put it
would be to say that everything we experience through
the eyes is visual because that's how eyes work.
"We are blind because we have eyes" what an imagination
you have.
Lon
> Fred Weiss
Lon
5.atl.mindspring.net>...
> "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
> news:c24964d1.03080...@posting.google.com...
> > Fred Weiss <pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote in message
> news:<bgnsmn$n3e$1@slb
> > 1.atl.mindspring.net>...
> > > "Lon" <bec...@bgnet.bgsu.edu> wrote in message
> > > news:c24964d1.0308...@posting.google.com...
>
> > That quote gives a good Kantian response to your silly
> > objection. The noumena is objective in that it is what it
> > is independent of us. Our lack of knowledge doesn't effect
> > it.
>
> But according to Kant we can't know it, so it is not objective. It is in
> fact *unknowable*. In actual fact it is intrinsic, not objective.
> Objectivity is a condition of human awareness based on the facts of reality.
> If we cannot know the facts of reality, the concept of objectivity is
> meaningless.
>
Fred Weiss whom I quoted in a different response to
you. The fact that we can't know what the state of
a part of reality is, doesn't make that state not
objective. Otherwise the limits that quantum mechanics
places on our knowledge of the states of particles would
make those states not objective. Are you abandoning
the view that things are what they are? If what
you are saying here is true then science tells us
that the concept of objectivity is meaningless. This
seems to be an odd view for an objectivist to hold.
> >.. Similarly since parts of the phenomenal
> > world are due to the purely objective noumenal world, ...
>
> You mean: some parts of what we perceive are due to things in reality of
> which we have no knowledge. So, since we have no knowledge of it how do we
> know if it is "due to" it?
>
Kant believed there were limits to the knowledge of
how things are in themselves, it does not follow
that we have no knowledge of them. The argument
that you seem to be pursuing here is similar to
that of Machian positivism. The response to this
is that our consciousness is not primary. Our
experiencing things does not make things what they
are. Although the way we experience things will
affect how those things are experienced by us.
So the answer to your question is that to deny
that there are objects whose properties are independent
of our ways of perceiving them is to make the mistake
of taking consciousness to be metaphysically primary.
> >... and the objective rules by which a rational mind understands
> > them,....
>
> What "objective rules" and on what does Kant base their objectivity, since
> objectivity is based on knowledge of the facts of reality the possibility of
> which he denies?
>
Kant calls these objective rules "the Categories."
What makes them objective on his view is that he believed
that they applied to all rational beings by virtue of
their being rational. So they are objective in the
way that reason is objective. (My point here is to
get his view right, I am not endorsing his claims here).
>
> > ... This may surprise
> > you, but you and I are parts of reality, so if we have
> > certain subjective experiences they are part of reality
> > too.
>
> It doesn't surprise me but it is apparently too difficult for you to grasp
> that to the extent that they are supposed to be *of reality* then their
> truth, and objectivity, must be based *on reality* which Kant denies that we
> can know.
>
I'm not sure how you mean to parse this. If what you
are saying is that Kant claims that we cannot know that
their objectivity must be based on reality, then that
is false. He does know that the truth and objectivity
of elements of reality must be based on reality.
If what you are saying is something like, Kant says
that we cannot know everything about the objective
reality that produces our experience, then what you
are saying is right. But I would advise you to go
back and read that message by the smarter Fred Weiss,
who in talking about quantum mechanics correctly points
out that this is irrelevant to the objectivity of
the knowledge that we can have. Why should our limited
knowledge of why at the quantum level computer screens
appear the way they do to us get in the way of our
having objective knowledge that there is a computer
screen in front of me when I write this and in front
of you when you read it. Similarly why should limits
of what objects are like in themselves get in the way
of our having objective knowledge of what they are
like as visual objects?
Lon
> Fred Weiss
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<pape...@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
>
>
>"HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com> wrote in message
>news:cpivivc05um0h4e41...@4ax.com...
>
>> But is observation the origin of Aristotle's idea that virtuous action
>> is formed by the inculcation of habits that go against human nature?
>
>You have this rather stunning inability to read Aristotle accurately.
Better to have stunned and lost, than not to have stunned at all.
>Where
>does he say that habits "go against human nature"? All he is saying is that
>if virtue was inborn or innate we couldn't act against it, i.e. we wouldn't
>have any choice about it. He is not saying that by acting virtuously we are
>acting somehow against our nature. Aristotle believed that we were born
>"tabula rasa", i.e. without any specific innate ideas - and that would
>include moral ideas. In this regard I think his observation is most
>certainly correct - and in this regard he was clearly correct over 2,000
>years ago vs. some on hpo (like Bert and Acorn) and many modern thinkers who
>think (incorrectly, and I might add, obviously so) otherwise. On this - and
>many other matters - they would do well to read Aristotle.
You may be correct if you argue this way. Man has no nature, the mind
is nothing, non-existence, until the first thought springs into being.
The mind is thus nothing but thought and is nothing without thought.
Mind and thought are synonymous.
Such theory may be easily attributed to Aristotle as he wrote in De
Anima. That however is different from tabula rasa, because in that
case at least the slate is blank, but prepared to receive writings
(thoughts or knowledge), while according to Aristotle, the slate and
the writings come into being together.
So morality is not natural or innate to man, and the origin of our
values is left up in the air, except that they must be trained into
men as virtues.
But by what observation did Aristotle come to the conclusion that man
has no innate nature, either moral or intellectual, until the first
thought is formed?
HPO Jury = Malenoid
You are confusing the synthetic with the a posteriori.
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> On Wed, 6 Aug 2003 18:38:11 +0000 (UTC), "Robert J. Kolker"
> <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>
>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>
>>>The applications require the synthetic a priori,
>
>
>>Uh, uh. Synthetic propositions can only be derived from experience.
>
>
> You are confusing the synthetic with the a posteriori.
No sir, I am not. The only way one can assert a predicate about an
entity that is not true by definition is to look at the entity.
Synthetic implies a posteriori. There is no such thing as a synthetic a
priori. That is one of Kant's howlers.
Bob Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid
<bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>
>
>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>> On Wed, 6 Aug 2003 18:38:11 +0000 (UTC), "Robert J. Kolker"
>> <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote:
>>>HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
>>>>The applications require the synthetic a priori,
>>>Uh, uh. Synthetic propositions can only be derived from experience.
>> You are confusing the synthetic with the a posteriori.
>No sir, I am not. The only way one can assert a predicate about an
>entity that is not true by definition is to look at the entity.
>Synthetic implies a posteriori. There is no such thing as a synthetic a
>priori. That is one of Kant's howlers.
No, that is one of your, and empiricism's, howlers. For without the
synthetic a priori, your happy little mathematical propositions are
entirely without substance, even though true in themselves merely by
deduction from arbitrary axioms.
So here you go, plenty of argument for you to troll, troll your
materialist boat against. But then, if you didn't have an alleged
enemy to dispute, your concepts would no longer serve any function.
Because human life has meaning, and even the arbitrary must serve
some function, even if only psychological as in your case.
First of all, you have expressed a dichotomy, according to
Objectivism's analysis which is good enough for this argument. You
imply that some attributes predicated of an object are in some way
ontologically distinct from others. But according to Objectivism, a
concept is more than its definition, it includes all the attributes of
an object, known or unknown, whether or not they are included in the
definition. A definition is merely the selective conscious focusing on
some of an entity's characteristics as more defining than others in
terms of their commensurability, a process that is based on human
epistemological needs and has no ontological implications per se.
How is it true in reality that 7 + 5 = 12, and not merely true "by
definition"? What gives this proposition substance, and preserves it
from the graveyard of other propositions that proved to be mere
flights of arbitrary fancy? While Objectivism can easily demolish your
dichotomy, it cannot answer for these questions without appealing to
dogma.
Modern (post-Kantian) mathematicians have successfully divorced
mathematical propositions from reality. Like you, they have rejected
the Kantian solution and prefer merely to play logic games with
arbitrary axioms. Some good may actually come of that, new sciences
and technologies have been born because of it. But what made this
process formally possible was Kant's analysis. Before him, it was
already occurring in a more intuitive, informal way. Kant, as the
Objectivists rightly point out, formalized the old "analytic-synthetic
dichotomy," only not to destroy knowledge, but to right an ancient
wrong. But pointing it out and formalizing it seems to have only given
new strength to the skeptics such as yourself who wish to divorce
concepts from reality, which was never Kant's intention, and then howl
at the moon with exuberant joy at their final intellectual release
from the burden of having to live in reality. Your release is gained,
not from understanding Kant, but through pointing out the great
difficulty in understanding his answer, and if the answer is that
difficult, then we should all just give up hope.
But the answer is not that difficult, it is only easy to obscure by
the modern obscurantists who are good at twisting words and utilizing
bizarre logics. The proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is indeed synthetic because
we can easily verify it in reality by counting to twelve on our
fingers and toes. However, that in itself does not make the
proposition NECESSARILY true. It could be, to borrow from Objectivist
rhetoric, that 7 + 5 = 12 is true today, but not tomorrow. Tomorrow it
may be equal to pi. Who knows? And the Objectivists are correct to
make that criticism, except not in the manner they anticipated,
because the fault for that conceptual dilemma is not Kant's, it is
yours.
It is yours because while you previously stated that mathematics is
proven in itself according to analytical arguments, you implied this
time that there is a synthetic truth that must also be applied to
concepts, and that would include concepts of mathematics. For example,
the definition of twelve is not "7 + 5." "Twelve," by definition, is
simply the twelfth unit over on a number line, using an ordinary
numbering system, from an arbitrary starting-point called 'zero.' Note
that there are no 7s or 5s in that definition. Therefore, in order to
determine the truth of the proposition, you have to go outside the
definition itself, as you did when you claimed that any truths not
contained in the definition are determined by appeal to the senses.
And that is just what Kant proceeds to do as he counts on his digits.
And since mathematical propositions are not only analytical
(particularly the axioms), but synthetic, showing your own
inconsistency is proof enough at this point in the game. There is no
point in going further until you are able to grasp at least this much.
Acar
----- Original Message -----
From: "HPO Jury = Malenoid" <Male...@hotmail.com>
Newsgroups: humanities.philosophy.objectivism
Sent: Tuesday, August 05, 2003 3:54 PM
Subject: Re: The relationship of Philosophy to Science
> On Tue, 5 Aug 2003 16:38:16 +0000 (UTC), DMF <m...@sans.spam.com> wrote:
>
> >Malenoid wrote...
> ... I always did try to take Rand's advice and be as first-handed in my
> opinions as I could. It is perhaps the only advice she had that was
> worth listening to.
Rand was full of good advice.
.
.
.
Eudaimonus
> But by what observation did Aristotle come to the conclusion that man
> has no innate nature, either moral or intellectual, until the first
> thought is formed?
This is just about silliest thing you've ever said (but I repeat myself).
Prehaps you are confused about the terms he is using, or how he holds that
mind is pure potentiality, but that this doesn't mean it doesn't exist.
Aristotle clearly held that man has a moral and intellectual nature, even
before the first thought is formed. He would merely make the distinction
that the nature would be one of potentiality, not actuality.
Or else you would have to hold that he doesn't hold that, before we have our
first thought, we have the potentiality for having thoughts. But that is an
absurd position. Or prehaps you think that he wouldn't have held that
having the potentiality for having thoughts doesn't constitute having a
nature? But a things nature is it's capacities for affecting and being
affected, and "mind" is defined by it's capacity for the "pure" reception of
form. So clearly, he would hold that the having of the potentiality for
thought is the having of a specific nature.
DMF
DMF wrote:
> >If it is "impossible to determine" then how do you know that it is
> >"corrupt"?
>
> Because when physicists determine one quantum state (position) they
> lose touch with the other quantum state (momentum). It is impossible
> to achieve both determinations at the same time.
I think that this is the crux of the issue right here. On what grounds
and by what standard do you imply that it SHOULD be possible to
determine both at the same time? Isn't claiming or implying that it
should be possible an expression of the primacy of consciousness?
Isn't holding up an impossible goal as the standard of awareness the
denial of identity? I agree with AR, I think that it does. The fact
that we can't measure position and momentum at the same time can
only be called "corrupt" on the basis of the primacy of consciousness.
The desire to perceive (i.e., measure) quantum states apart from our
means (which limit us to one element of a quantum pair at a time) is
a denial of the identity of consciousness.
> >That QM is confounding existence and consciousness
> >should come as no surprise given the sorry state of philosophy in
> >general and the philosophy of science in particular. Using QM as
> >the proof of Kantian concepts is circular because QM rests on
> >Kantian epistemology.
>
> QM has not been defended by Kantians, but by Humeans who know
> the tremendous fundamental distinction between those two philosophers,
> a distinction which objectivists often, if not always, try to obscure.
Nevertheless, it is primarily Kant and his dominant influence that is the
source of the idea that objectivity is to acquire knowledge without means,
i.e., without an observer. (Kantian subjectivism logically follows once you
accept that premise).
Go back to what Don Matt wrote... "When the experiments revealed
that the light was either particle [or] energy, depending on the observer,
it was clear that a pure objective view of the world was impossible."
Ignoring the issue of whether or not this is Kantian -- do you agree with
the implied concept of objectivity of Don's statement? This view dominates
modern thinking and I think that it is wrong.
> By the way, a decade ago my opinion on Kant was the same as yours
> and objectivism in general. It was through my first-hand analysis of the
> subject that my opinion began to change, and grow into knowledge. I
> always did try to take Rand's advice and be as first-handed in my
> opinions as I could. It is perhaps the only advice she had that was
> worth listening to.
Don't forget; "check your premises."
Regards,
David
Robert J. Kolker
HPO Jury = Malenoid wrote:
> How is it true in reality that 7 + 5 = 12, and not merely true "by
> definition"? What gives this proposition substance, and preserves it
> from the graveyard of other propositions that proved to be mere
> flights of arbitrary fancy? While Objectivism can easily demolish your
> dichotomy, it cannot answer for these questions without appealing to
> dogma.
Actually it is both. If you -define- 2 to be the succesor of 1, 3 to be
the succesor of 2 , etc.. You can show in a formal manner that that
7+5=12 follows logically from the Peano Axioms. On the other hand if you
are a pragmatist (like I am) you hold up 7 fingers on your left hand
(have you seen -Bruce Almighty-?) and 5 fingers on your left hand and
count. The act of counting and coming up with an answer is a posterior.
So if you insist that 7+5=12 is a synthetic propostion then it is also
a posteriori.
Kant was flat out wrong on the matter of the synthetic a priori. He was
right on other matters.
>
> Modern (post-Kantian) mathematicians have successfully divorced
> mathematical propositions from reality. Like you, they have rejected
> the Kantian solution and prefer merely to play logic games with
> arbitrary axioms.
They only seem arbitrary. One finds out how arbitrary they really were
-after the fact-. That is what a posteriori means by the way. All that
abribtrary math has given us not only superlative science, but a lot a
neat gadgets. The Ultimate Good of science is -proven- by the gadgets it
produces. That is a fact.
Math rulz physics, physics rulz science and facts rulz both.
Bob Kolker
Fred Weiss
"Robert J. Kolker" <bobk...@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:Ei9Ya.80359$uu5.8626@sccrnsc04...
> > Let me understand you. You need a page reference that Kant denies that
what
> > we perceive is the world as it really is? I'll be happy to provide it
> > but...err....Bob, that is a basic tenet of Kantianism.
>
> Produce the citation please. Page and line numbers.
You've never heard of his distinction between the "noumena and the
phenomena" and you need proof that he actually held such a view?
This is a profoundly dishonest request. I'm telling you that outright. It's
like asking me to provide citations for Plato's Forms or Hume's denial of
our knowledge of causality or Descartes' "I think therefore I am" or Marx's
dialetical materialism - or any other basic and accepted tenet of the major
philosophers.
I have better things to do with my time than teach history of philosophy 101
on hpo and go digging around for citations to please you because you are
engaged in some kind of continual and chronic denial of the obvious - a
pervasive feature of your comments on this forum.
That said:
"The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the other hand,
is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing
in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves
as their intrinsic property, that objects in themselves are
quite unknown to us, and that what we call outer objects are
nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form
of which is space. The true correlate of sensibility, the thing
in itself, is not known, and cannot be known, through these
representations; and in experience no question is ever asked
in regard to it."
Critique of Pure Reason, TRANSCENDENTAL DOCTRINE OF ELEMENTS
FIRST PART TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC, Section 1: Space (last paragraph)
I vaguely recall your once saying that you were an admirer of Mortimer
Adler. This is a comment on Kant from a website which appears to be strongly
influenced by Adler's thinking:
"Notice that the sole point of connection of man's knowledge with reality
outside the mind is the vague influence of phenomena on the sensing-power.
From that point on, the whole process of knowing, and its products, are
man's own. Here is idealism, here is subjectivism with a vengeance. And Kant
plainly asserts that the noumena or essences of things cannot be known by
man. The phenomenon is not strictly knowable, but it moves the sense to act;
the noumenon is not knowable at all. The noumenon (Das Ding an sich) lies
outside the reach of mortal man.
So Kant is as subjectivistic as Hume ever dared be."
http://radicalacademy.com/adiphilwrgkant.htm
I'm not endorsing their analysis in totality, nor have I examined their
whole site and I imagine there would be much I disagree with, but I
certainly agree with their conclusion about Kant:
"Kant's philosophy is fundamentally wrong and is one of the major
contributors to the intellectual insanity which we see today."
Fred Weiss
Robert J. Kolker
Fred Weiss wrote:
> You've never heard of his distinction between the "noumena and the
> phenomena" and you need proof that he actually held such a view?
Produce the citation please. Page and line number in any published
translation of -Critique of Pure Reason-.
You are the one making the claim. -NOW BACK IT UP-.
Bob Kolker
>
Robert J. Kolker
Fred Weiss wrote:
> This is a profoundly dishonest request. I'm telling you that outright. It's
> like asking me to provide citations for Plato's Forms or Hume's denial of
> our knowledge of causality or Descartes' "I think therefore I am" or Marx's
> dialetical materialism - or any other basic and accepted tenet of the major
> philosophers.
I can provide references to Plato's Forms and Humes denial of causality.
It is just a matter of bring up the items from the web and doing a text
search.
Now I have told you how to do it. Show a quote from Kant that implies or
says outright we are blind because we can see.
I was challenged by that half-wit Hertle to bring up certain bogus
things that Aristotle wrote. Which I did. His answer to me was that
Aristotle really did not write them. It was someone else with the same
name.
Now if I can do it, so can you, if you have the will.
Back up your claims or hush yo' mouf.
Bob Kolker
>
Ralph Hertle
[ text omitted ]
> I was challenged by that half-wit Hertle to bring up certain bogus
> things that Aristotle wrote. Which I did. His answer to me was that
> Aristotle really did not write them. It was someone else with the same
> name.
[ text omitted ]
Robert:
That is and outright and unchecked lie.
If you were to re-read my posts on that matter you would find that I
said that the collected works of Aristotle that we have are from several
different secondary sources. For example, there are some of Aristotle's
original books, his lecture notes, the notes of students, and there were
some commentaries and changes of interpretations that were added by
various editors. Most of the works we have of Aristotle, except for the
re-arrangements, clarifications, additions or changes from the editors
of his works, originated in some way with Aristotle. There have been
changes to the meanings and interpretations due to the editors.
No where did I say what you said, "that Aristotle really did not write
them." That is your lie.
No where did I say what you said that, "It was someone else with the
same name." Nor was that said in any answer of mine to you. That is your
lie.
Shall we say that Robert J. Kolker is a liar?
Ralph Hertle